

## Policy Coherence for Development: still some way to go

### SUMMARY

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) has become an EU legal obligation, after years of slow progress. PCD aims to incorporate development concerns in non-aid policies in order to minimise contradictions, and if possible, create synergies between policies. However, despite a reiterated political commitment and reinforcement of the institutional framework to follow up on PCD, scepticism prevails outside the Commission on the feasibility of achieving PCD. Difficult-to-reconcile objectives, and the differing values and institutional cultures underpinning development policy and other policies, make PCD a challenge. Particular questioning surrounds EU trade policy, where PCD-related measures in favour of developing countries look marginal in an overall EU strategy prioritising its economic and security interests. In food-security related agricultural and fisheries policies, criticism is less strong, taking into account the gradual elimination of export subsidies that have long been the focus of criticism by some NGOs, and the recent reform of fisheries agreements. In the migration and climate change policy areas, ambiguities in EU policies remain, in spite of development-friendly rhetoric. As for the security and development nexus, inter-institutional tensions add to the overall difficulties in coordinating these legally heterogeneous fields, making the achievement of PCD a minor issue compared to overall problems of coherence and coordination. The question some raise is whether this quest for PCD will not, in the end, result mostly in the instrumentalisation of development policy, which would be used to compensate for EU hard economic and security goals rather than to alter them. The European Parliament's pragmatic approach aims to strengthen PCD implementation tools, in particular by proposing an EU arbitration mechanism and a complaints system, in order to remedy possible inconsistencies between policies.



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**Abbreviations**

<b>ACP:</b>	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
<b>CAP:</b>	Common Agricultural Policy
<b>EEAS:</b>	European External Action Service
<b>EPA:</b>	Economic Partnership Agreements
<b>GAMM:</b>	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
<b>LDC:</b>	Least developed countries
<b>MDGs:</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>ODA:</b>	Official development assistance
<b>PCD:</b>	Policy Coherence for Development

**Issue**

Defined as absence of contradiction between policies, coherence is an important challenge, especially for complex legal-institutional structures such as the EU.<sup>1</sup> In the case of EU external activities, inconsistencies can arise vertically, from lack of coordination between actions of Member States and of the EU, or horizontally, between EU institutions or policies. Objectives and means can often be difficult to reconcile. In the case of development aid, potential tensions can arise between various aid and non-aid policies, as well as from 'complex inter-regionalism', that is the effect of different forms (bilateral, multilateral and intraregional) of the relationship between the EU and developing countries.<sup>2</sup> The Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) initiative aims at reducing the negative impact of non-aid policies on developing countries, with the objective of increasing the contribution of these policies to the achievement of development goals.

**EU legal and political frameworks****Legal basis**

The legal obligation for all actors implicated to strive for coherence in EU foreign policy was introduced during the revision of the EEC treaty in 1986 (Single European Act). The Treaty of Maastricht gave prominence to horizontal coherence between EU external activities in the context of external relations, security, economic and development policies. Currently, the EU Treaties clearly state the obligation to take account of the objectives of development cooperation in those policies likely to affect developing countries ([Article 208](#) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) and include development, with its main target of poverty reduction, among the overall objectives of the Union's external action ([Article 21](#) of the Treaty on the EU).

**Political framework**

Part of the European consensus on development (2005), the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) initiative tackles the issue of horizontal coherence. It aims at enhancing the compatibility of EU policies with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The European Commission has identified 11 priority areas, where the challenge of attaining synergies with development policy objectives is considered particularly relevant.

The commitments made in 2005 are grouped, since the [2009 Council Conclusions](#), under **five main PCD challenges**:

- **Trade and finance**, with special focus on development orientation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) and other trade agreements, better access for developing countries to the EU market, promotion of labour standards and corporate social responsibility, and improving transparency of cross-border financial flows to combat tax evasion.
- **Climate change**, with particular focus on seeking synergies between climate change, energy and development policies, facilitating the access of developing countries to low-carbon technologies and their participation in the carbon market.
- **Global food security**, with particular focus on Common Agricultural Policy and the impact of biofuels production on developing countries.
- **Migration**, emphasising the reinforcement of positive synergies between migration and development, through reduction of transfer costs for remittances, enhanced dialogue with diasporas and preventing 'brain-drain'.
- **Security**, with focus on conflict prevention, addressing the situation of fragile states, support for security-sector reform and an approach integrating the social, economic and environmental dimensions of international peace operations.

The Council has also asked the Commission and Member States to prepare operational tools for PCD implementation. The [PCD 2010-13 work programme](#) prepared in response includes a set of objectives, targets and indicators to measure progress in selected priority areas. In December 2013 [conclusions](#), the Council stressed the **need for an evidence-based approach** and underlined that further work is needed to move towards a more focused, operational and results-oriented approach to PCD. The role of **EU Delegations** in this regard is seen as important, and they are advised to create PCD focal points, enhancing dialogue with local civil society and report further on PCD processes and initiatives at country level. It calls too on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to develop long-term planning for EU action in PCD, integrating the new issues emerging from the post-2015 agenda. In parallel, the [Council conclusions on the post-2015 agenda](#) (June 2013) emphasised the need to enhance policy coherence at all levels, in particular through PCD, as well as to improve measurability in order to achieve a new set of development goals, merging the sustainability and poverty reduction aims.

## Institutional framework

### EU PCD implementation tools

The Commission **reports every two years** on the progress made by the EU and Member states in advancing PCD. The last [report](#) was published in November 2013.

According to the [2009 Commission guidelines on Impact Assessment](#) (IA), in every IA the potential impact of proposed policy options on developing countries should be assessed, as well as its coherence with the EU's development policy goals.

A [CONCORD](#) study reveals that only a small number (in 2009-13, 17 of 177) of the Commission's IAs of measures with potential impact on developing countries were actually analysed from the PCD angle. The European Parliament's Ex-ante Impact Assessment Unit therefore has a potentially significant role to play in this field.

It is stressed by CONCORD that non-development sector policy-makers are not really committed to PCD monitoring.

### Lisbon Treaty innovations

To avoid incoherence, various policies need to be coordinated. The Lisbon Treaty (in force since 1 December 2009) introduced **some key institutional innovations** aimed at ensuring a more coordinated approach, and thus more coherence in the EU's external action, regarding:

- the President of the European Council;
- the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

In particular, the potential for the EEAS **to play the role of coordinator of EU external policies and between different levels of governance** has been seen as promising for both vertical and horizontal coherence. However, the reorganisation of powers between the Commission and EEAS has proven difficult as disputes arose over the new division of responsibilities.<sup>3</sup>

### European Parliament scrutiny

Concerning PCD implementation and monitoring, the European Parliament (EP) has **gradually reinforced its scrutiny**. Following the recommendation of its May 2010 resolution on PCD, the function of **Standing Rapporteur for PCD**, appointed by the Development (DEVE) Committee, has been established, as well as biannual reporting on PCD.<sup>4</sup> In its successive reports and [resolutions](#) on the topic, the EP, a strong supporter of PCD, has brought forward several concrete proposals to improve its implementation at EU level. In its 2012 resolution the EP suggested that a 'structured annual meeting' be held with national parliaments on PCD issues. An Inter-parliamentary committee [meeting](#) with national parliaments on the topic took place on 23 April 2013 in Brussels.

The EP's [2014 PCD report](#) identifies tools and methods to enforce PCD. The EP calls on the Commission to **establish an arbitration system**, under direct supervision of the President of the Commission, who would have to take political responsibility in case of divergence between different EU policies. The Commission is also asked to conduct a regular ex-post IA on development aspects of its policies, especially in the areas of trade, energy, including biofuels, and agriculture. The resolution calls in addition for the creation by the EU of an **independent system of complaints**, open to people from developing countries affected by EU policy. In order to increase the awareness of PCD issues among the staff of non-development services of the Commission and the EEAS, training activities should be organised.

In the majority of Member States there is an expressed political commitment in favour of PCD; however, its translation into coordination and monitoring mechanisms remains uneven. Reports on PCD are produced in some states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden), and others have included it as a point in their general development reports, but the majority still have no mechanism for assessing the impact of their policies. Coordination mechanisms in the form of inter-ministerial committees, working groups or similar is more widespread. Only a few Member states have none of these (Bulgaria and France).<sup>5</sup>

### State of play in five main PCD areas

#### Trade and finance

The 2012 [Trade, Growth and Development strategy](#)'s aim is to put trade, perceived as key engine of export-led growth, at the service of development, especially of the Least developed countries (LDC). This aim is being pursued by three types of EU measures.

*Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)*

The EU policy towards developing countries has undergone dramatic change, from offering non-reciprocal market access towards seeking mutual liberalisation.

Under the Lomé Convention (1975-2000), EU trade with most developing countries (the 77 ACP countries) was based on **preferential non-reciprocal market access** for goods. Partly due to a WTO injunction, the decision was taken in 2000 to negotiate EPAs with the ACP (split into seven regional groupings) aimed at the **gradual creation of free trade zones** compatible with the WTO's non-discrimination and reciprocity rules. Due to the difficulties encountered, after 12 years of negotiations only two comprehensive regional EPAs have been concluded.<sup>6</sup> Indeed the new approach, strongly supported by the Commission, has been severely criticised by civil society NGOs from both north and south for its potential negative impact on the budgets, food security, regional integration and infant industries of developing countries.

*Aid for Trade*

The [EU and Member States strategy on AfT](#) (2007) aims to help developing countries integrate into the rules-based world trading system and to use trade more effectively in promoting the objective of eradicating poverty. The EU Aid for Trade (AfT) scheme covers financing for various areas related to improving a country's capacity to trade. Despite a 2010-11 slowdown, AfT has considerably increased in recent years, making the EU the largest provider of AfT in the world, accounting collectively for 32% of total AfT. The majority of support is provided in the form of official development assistance (ODA) grants (67% in 2011) and is characterised by a high disbursement ratio (97% in 2011).<sup>7</sup>

*Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)*

The 2014 reform of the [Generalised System of Preferences \(GSP\)](#) aims to adapt the system, introduced in 1971, to the neediest partners. In order to reduce the competitive pressure from more advanced preferential partners, and preference erosion due to overall trade liberalisation, the new GSP reduces drastically the number of its beneficiaries from 176 to 90 and covers a greater number of [products](#).

Beside the **standard GSP regime** (70% of all GSP in 2012) which provides for non-reciprocal duty reduction on about 66% of tariff lines, two specific schemes provide for enhanced preferences.

The **Everything but Arms** scheme, representing 21.3% of all GSP in 2012, applies to 49 LDCs which have full duty-free and quota-free access for all products, except arms and ammunition.

Under **GSP+** (in 2012, 8.5% of GSP overall) more enhanced preferences are offered to 'vulnerable'<sup>8</sup> countries after their ratification and implementation of 27 international conventions on labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. Following the 2014 reform, the EU's monitoring of local implementation will be reinforced.

Several important related initiatives have been promoted by the Commission in the last few years, particularly in the field of combating illicit financial outflows from poor countries (2013 amendments to Accounting and Transparency Directives) or in the promotion of development friendly natural resources policy ([2011 communication 'Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials'](#); and [EU Timber Regulation](#) (in force since 2013)).

The Commission's policies, including GSP reform, have been strongly criticised by some academics and stakeholders. Young and Peterson stress that increased **political emphasis on LDCs is just a formal justification of policy change** from preferential treatment of developing partners to pursuit of bilateral, reciprocal liberalisation. This is further backed, in their opinion, by the limited impact of development considerations on the EU's positions in multilateral trade negotiations. In this perspective, the rise of development issues in the Doha Round is to be attributed to the sole assertiveness of developing countries dissatisfied with the multilateral trading system.<sup>9</sup> Carbone notes that, although progress has been made in areas where **trade measures are used as development instruments**, thanks to their **marginal importance to the European economy**, in overall trade policy, the interests of export-oriented firms seeking enhanced market access prevail over development considerations.<sup>10</sup>

### Global food security

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has long been one of the most criticised EU policies, due to the impact of highly subsidised EU production on developing countries' markets.

According to the Commission, successive reforms – including the [2014 revision](#) – marked by the shift away from price support to direct payment, with gradual elimination of regular export subsidies, have **reduced the overall impact** on the developing world.<sup>11</sup>

This impact, however, differs according to a country's trade profile. This to some extent explains why development interest, not easy to define in this context, has not had as great a profile in the debate on the latest reform as it did in previous rounds of CAP reform.<sup>12</sup>

NGOs and think-tanks put forward different institutional options to **enhance the monitoring of CAP effects on developing countries**; indeed lack of data make evidence-based decision-making difficult.<sup>13</sup> Olivier De Schutter, the [UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food](#), had also called upon MEPs to back the [proposal](#) from the DEVE Committee to establish such a mechanism. The [final version](#) of the Regulation, however, limits monitoring to internal performance-related aspects of CAP without even mentioning PCD.

The 2010-13 EU work programme on PCD identifies other policy areas for the EU to address in order to improve global food security – trade policy, research and development and innovation policy; biodiversity, land access and use, and impact of bioenergy production, as well as the Common Fisheries Policy.

The **2014 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy** will – according to the Commission – **reinforce the sustainability** and increase the added value for partner countries under a new generation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs). Developing countries will receive financial compensation for EU countries' access to their waters, and support for implementing a sustainable fisheries policy. Commentators point out that better coordination inside the Commission (particularly between DGs MARE and DEVCO) in areas such as negotiating FPAs and providing financial support to the fisheries sector in developing countries would promote the implementation of PCD in this field.<sup>14</sup>

### Climate change

Since mid-2005 there has been increasing [political commitment](#) for the EU to address climate change both in the internal and international context.



The Council of the EU, in its [conclusions](#) of 17 November 2009, called on EU Member States and the Commission to further integrate adaptation, risk reduction and mitigation efforts into development cooperation policies, strategies and activities. In [June 2013](#) the Council identified managing climate change as a central challenge for sustainable development.

According to the 2013 PCD report, EU policies have contributed positively to overall global responses to climate change. It is stressed that the EU is the first provider of climate finance, and surpassed its commitments on [Fast Start Finance](#) provided for climate mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries. It is also pointed out that the EU has reached its commitments on emissions reduction, made under the first Kyoto period.

However, the **EU's renewable energy policy** which induced high demand for biofuels was [criticised](#) by some civil society organisations both in the South and [North](#). They denounced the land grabs resulting from the rush towards biofuels production, reinforced by the EU policy on renewable energies that affects people in developing countries, where thousands of hectares of the best arable land is removed from traditional food production to be transformed by large multinationals into non-food crop plantations.

In 2012, the Commission ordered the [study on the impacts of biofuels production in developing countries](#). Its conclusions have confirmed that biofuel growth is exacerbating the problems due to agricultural intensification, in particular its impact on land tenure, gender and access to water. According to its recommendations, the EU institutions should identify and address existing gaps and inconsistencies between the [EU Food Security Policy Framework](#) (2010) and the [EU Renewable Energy Directive](#) (2009). The on-going [revision](#) process, although welcomed by environmental and social [NGOs](#) for recognising the negative impact of biofuels production on food security, was still criticised for not going far enough to address the problem. The study stresses the need to enhance cooperation between different DGs of the Commission to integrate PCD considerations in different EU policies, and the key role of EU Delegations to gather information through their dialogue with local actors on the impact of non-aid EU policies.

### Security

The growing awareness of the obvious negative **correlation between insecurity and poverty** in developing countries has led the EU – since 1990 – to try to improve the synergies between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and development policy.<sup>15</sup> This was confirmed in both the 2003 [European Security Strategy](#) and the 2011 [Agenda for Change](#). The Commission has published a series of communications on the links between security and development. Since the [2001 communication on conflict prevention](#), existing development cooperation instruments have increasingly taken into account 'the root causes of conflict' and directly addressed security challenges through security-sector reforms, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), civil protection and mediation. Two instruments – the African Peace Facility ([APF](#)), created in 2004 and the Instrument for Stability ([IfS](#)) launched in 2007 – specifically address the security-development nexus focusing primarily on conflict prevention, response and post-crisis recovery. On the CFSP/CSDP side, the crisis management framework developed by the EU is a good example of efforts made to foster synergy between EU foreign and defence policy, but it

does not include a development dimension. However, some of the long-term activities it contains (such as security-sector reform, border assistance) come close to the borderline with development policy.

In its 2013 PCD report, the Commission noted progress in the way the EU is addressing the **complex issue of fragile States**, as well as the gradual development of **regional strategies** and of the **global conflict early warning system**. Efforts of the EU to regulate the **arms trade** at global level and to manage the **natural resources** at the heart of some conflicts are also mentioned.

Merket notes that in spite of a **myriad of instruments and policies** merging, to differing extents, development and security aspects, and the general rhetoric in favour of this, there is a **lack of a clear political framework** defining how the nexus should be articulated in practice.<sup>16</sup> The [2007 Council Conclusions on Security and Development](#) identified initial pragmatic actions in several fields (strategic planning, security-sector reform, partnerships with regional and sub-regional organisations, and humanitarian aid and security) in order to improve coherence and synergy between development and security policies. The Council called upon the Commission to prepare an action plan on this issue. However, after years of preparatory work and in spite of various [voices](#) stressing its importance, the long-awaited action plan on security, fragility and development was never finalised.<sup>17 18</sup>

The recent step – a communication '[The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises](#)' (2013) – has not yet fulfilled the expectations raised.

The transition between short-term and long-term actions deployed in protracted or recurrent crises are also the focus of the **Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)** approach, reaffirmed in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2007). The latest communication on resilience (2012) stresses also the need for a kind of development assistance in protracted crises. For [Mosel and Levine](#), the renewed political focus on resilience is the best opportunity ever to progress on LRRD, building complementarity between EU humanitarian and development aid.

The **comprehensive approach** refers to the consistent and complementary use of a wide range of external relations policies and instruments (political, diplomatic, security, defence, financial, development and humanitarian) and shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States. The casual interconnection between security and development underpins this approach which aims to cover **all stages of the cycle of conflict** from prevention to long-term development. Concrete steps are proposed to foster the new approach. One of them consists of elaborating a **common methodology of crisis analysis**, including development, humanitarian, political, security and defence perspectives and leading to the development of a single, **common strategy** (between EU institutions and Member States) for conflict or crisis. Recent examples include the Horn of Africa Strategic Framework and the EU Strategy for security and development in the Sahel. The **focus on conflict prevention** and the coordination of the transition between short-term and long-term engagements are other elements linking security and development perspectives.

In its April 2014 [resolution on EU comprehensive approach and coherence](#) of EU external action, the EP regrets that, despite the huge potential of Lisbon Treaty innovations, the consistency of EU external action in areas such as security, humanitarian matters, development trade, energy, environment and migration has not



progressed. The EP points in this context at the **Commission's defensive approach**, minimising the EEAS's coordinating function in order to protect its own competences.

The EP welcomed the new communication, and in particular, the emphasis it places on the link between security and development. However, the potential for tension between PCD on the one hand and the comprehensive approach to crisis management on the other hand is acknowledged. It is therefore essential, according to MEPs, that anti-poverty objectives are not marginalised in EU foreign policy, and that the comprehensive approach does not erode the civilian character of development cooperation.

This echoes concerns expressed by some development NGOs about the **securisation of EU development policy**, which would subordinate aid for fighting *poverty* to the security concerns of the developed world. This trend would result partly from the post 9/11 focus on the fight against terrorism, but also from the new strategic interest in African oil-producing countries and concerns raised by migration from Africa and other developing regions. The security-development nexus has shaped part of ODA flows, as many donors allocate the majority of their ODA to countries perceived as a threat to their security interests.<sup>19</sup>

Some [commentators](#) go even further than the EP in their criticisms of progress accomplished. Merket points at 'improvisation, duplication, fragmentation and inter-institutional tension' that arise from a lack of organisational coherence while reinforcing the link between development and security. It may be recalled that the overlapping competences of EU institutions (EEAS/Commission) and the Member States even led in 2005 to the Commission and Council going to the Court of Justice over a dispute on whether disarmament support to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a development or a CFSP measure.

### Migration

The revised 2011 [Global Approach to Migration and Mobility](#) (GAMM) is, according to the 2013 PCD report, putting greater emphasis on ensuring coherence between the internal and external aspects of these policy areas. The GAMM is designed to better organise legal migration, prevent and combat illegal migration, including human trafficking, and promote international protection and asylum right, all of them in full respect of human rights. A key instrument of GAMM is the Mobility Partnerships (MPs) paving the way for visa facilitation and readmission agreements. So far, MPs have been concluded with eight countries: Moldova (2008), Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009), Armenia (2011), Morocco (2013), Azerbaijan (2013), Tunisia (2014) and [Jordan](#) (2014). The political dialogue on migration is undertaken in the framework of the implementation of different types of EU international agreements such as Association Agreements (AA) or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), and also in seven regional dialogue platforms.<sup>20</sup>

The GAMM includes as well provisions for operational support and capacity-building, that led in the 2012-13 period to more than 90 migration-related projects, with a value of more than €200 million.<sup>21</sup>

In its communication '[Maximising the Development Impact of Migration](#)' of 21 May 2013, the Commission, acknowledging migration as a powerful engine for development, tried to broaden the link between migration and development in EU policies, and formulate the EU position for the [UN High Level Dialogue on International development](#)

[and migration](#) (October 2013). The development-migration nexus that focuses traditionally on remittances, diaspora, brain drain and circular migration to OECD countries should, according to the Commission, consider a broader perspective. South-south flows, including intra-regional migration, forced migration, and flows induced by climate change should also be addressed at global, regional and country levels. An effective integration of migration into national development and poverty-reduction plans and the inclusion of refugees and other displaced persons in long-term development planning is also advised.

Several commentators point at the gap between the official EU discourse on migration as a tool for development and the mostly securitarian approach of the external dimension of EU migration policy, which focuses on limiting the access of low-skilled third-country nationals to the Schengen area. They note also the imbalance between actions taken to facilitate legal labour migration and those addressing illegal migration, especially border controls. The effect is that in the majority of EU countries the channels for legal migration are increasingly narrow.

The EU is also questioned for its move towards minimum standards on internationally codified human rights, especially regarding family reunification. In this context, the [ETUC](#) (European Trade Union Confederation) has asked the Council and the Commission to change their position, and invites the Member States to ratify the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, as a cornerstone of a rights-based approach to migration.

Other critical voices question the usefulness of MPs in view of the restrictive labour migration policies of Member States. Maroukis and Triandafyllidou stress that MPs are conditionality-driven, concluded only with countries that meet certain conditions such as cooperation on illegal immigration and readmission. This tendency is increasingly linking development aid to migrant return and readmission agreements, and committees to curb illegal immigration pathways.<sup>22</sup> This, together with the failure of the EU and ACP to reach an agreement on migration in the [revised Cotonou agreement](#) in June 2010, could suggest that it is more about making development work for migration than the declared opposite goal of 'making migration work for development'.<sup>23</sup>

## Outlook

CONCORD, a main NGO grouping active in the development field, backs the opinion that, although progress has been made in PCD implementation, there is a clear need for a **redress mechanism**, which enables decision-makers to revise the incoherent aspects of policies from the PCD perspective. An issue to be addressed is also how to **involve developing countries** in debating and monitoring PCD, on both bilateral and multilateral levels.

According to CONCORD, the ambitious post-2015 agenda makes the PCD even more vital. In its [2013 Spotlight on PCD](#), CONCORD calls on the EU to seize the unique opportunity, which is still open in the final year of post-2015 agenda definition, to establish **PCD as the universal standard** in order to make all policies of all countries converge towards the eradication of poverty. But to strive for PCD at global level, a **paradigm shift** in thinking about development is advocated. Indeed a number of civil society organisations active in the [post-2015 debate](#) call for a transformative shift consisting of abandoning the current consumption-driven and growth-centred

economic model as a driver of development, and focusing on the structural roots of poverty and income inequalities in the perspective of long-term sustainability.

However such a shift is quite unlikely, taking into account the strong and diffuse implication of corporate business in the post-2015 process.<sup>24</sup> On the contrary, some observers have even noted, since the [Busan conference](#) in 2012, a growing focus on economic growth that goes with enhanced productivity through strategic investment, a stronger role for the private sector, as well as greater integration between foreign aid and other policy areas, such as trade, investment and migration.<sup>25</sup>

Taking into account this tendency as well as the EU's internal institutional and political divides, the achievement of PCD seems very difficult to some. Carbone wonders even if it is not 'mission impossible'<sup>26</sup>, while Negre asks whether official adoption of PCD, especially in the trade area, is 'an exercise of hypocrisy or false agreement'.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> [The Programming of EU 's External Assistance and the Development Aid and the Fragile Balance of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO](#) / Tonnous, I., European Foreign Affairs Review 18, no 3, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> European Parliament [resolution](#) of 18 May 2010 on EU Policy Coherence for Development and the 'Official Development Assistance plus' concept.

<sup>5</sup> [Overview of PCD systems in some EU member states](#) / CONCORD, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> [Overview of EPA negotiations](#) / European Commission, Updated July 2014.

<sup>7</sup> [Aid for Trade Report 2013, Review of progress by the EU and its Member States](#) / European Commission 2013.

<sup>8</sup> A 'vulnerable country is one i) which is not competitive on the EU market (import-share ratio) and ii) does not have a diversified export base (diversification ratio). [List of countries](#) having passed vulnerability criteria.

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- <sup>22</sup> [Mobility Partnerships: a convincing tool for the EU's global Approach to Migration?](#) / Maroukis T., Triandafyllidou A., TGAE Policy Paper 76, 26 February 2013.
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- <sup>24</sup> [Corporate influence in the post-2015 process](#) / Pingeot, L., Global Policy Forum, January 2014.
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