Aviation strategy — European Union Aviation Safety Agency


Background

This note seeks to provide an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s Impact Assessment on the Review of Regulation (EC) 216/2008. This is one of two impact assessments accompanying the proposal on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and repealing Regulation 216/2008. The second impact assessment, which is on the safe development of drone operations, will be dealt with in a separate briefing.

The proposal was adopted on 7 December 2015 and was referred to Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism. It is part of a wider strategy for aviation adopted by the Commission on the same date. This broader strategy, which spans the period 2015 to 2018, includes planned revisions of certain regulations and implementing acts, guidance documents, fitness checks and studies and evaluations, covering various areas such as aviation safety, global competitiveness of European airlines and airports, air traffic management, passenger rights and aviation agreements with third countries. The Communication on Aviation Strategy is accompanied by a Report on the European Aviation Safety Programme, and explains ‘how aviation safety is managed from a European Perspective’ (Annex 1, p. 4).

The aviation sector directly employs 1.4 to 2 million people in the European Union, and supports a total of 4.8 to 5.5 million jobs. Its contribution to EU GDP is EUR 110 million and its overall economic impact is EUR 510 billion through the multiplier effect. One of the main challenges facing European aviation is to maintain the current high level of safety against the background of an increasing number of flights. As explained in the EPRS Implementation Appraisal, ‘international civil aviation is a dynamic industry and airline manufacturers expect the total number of commercial aircraft to double between today and 2030 and global air transport to grow by around 5% annually in the same timeframe.’

Problem definition

The IA identifies the following four groups of problems in need of action at the EU level:

1) The current EU regulatory system for aviation safety may not be sufficiently able to identify and mitigate safety risks in the medium to long term (IA, p. 10);
2) The current EU regulatory system for aviation safety is not proportionate and creates excessive burdens, especially for smaller operators (IA, p. 11);

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1 Communication on Aviation Strategy, p. 16.
2 For more details on aviation strategy, see EPRS briefing of January 2016 on New Civil Aviation Safety Rules.
3 Communication on Aviation Strategy, p. 2.
3) The current EU regulatory system for aviation safety is not sufficiently responsive to market developments (IA, p. 13);
4) Differences exist in the organisational capabilities of the Member States (MS) (IA, p. 16).

Problem 1: Regarding safety risks, the IA claims that it is looking at aviation safety ‘from a systemic perspective’. In this respect two main issues are identified: shortages and inefficient use of resources by aviation authorities, and the reactive nature of aviation safety regulation and oversight. Even though the new proposal is not intended to deal with operational issues, ground handling and security aspects of aircraft and aviation systems’ design are also examined for EU action (IA, p. 10). The IA estimates that the risk reduction required due to the expected increase in air traffic volume should amount to around 25% in the short term (10 years) and 60% in the long term (30 years) (IA, p. 11).

Problem 2: Regarding excessive burdens for smaller operators, the IA claims that disproportionate costs due to over-regulation are inflicted especially on SMEs and general (i.e. non-commercial) aviation. This claim is supported by stakeholders. For example, 77% of National Aviation Authorities stated that safety regulation is ‘too detailed or difficult to comprehend’ and 88% of them said that ‘existing safety levels could be maintained with lower costs’ (IA, p. 11). SMEs themselves have also expressed dissatisfaction with excessive requirements and with the fact that insufficient attention is paid to more proportionate regulation of commercial activities of SMEs, while ongoing improvements are mostly focused on non-commercial aviation (IA, p. 12). Quantified examples include high maintenance costs for small aircraft and gliders (increased by 50% since 2003), disproportionate costs for advanced pilot training (the share of private pilot licences with instrument rating is 5.2% in the EU and 26.8% in the US), and a comparison between the development of technical rules and industry standards, where it takes around three times longer to develop the former than the latter (it is suggested that there is increasing reliance on industry standards) (IA, p. 12).

Problem 3: Regarding market developments, the IA considers that the regulatory system has difficulties in quickly accommodating safety- and efficiency-enhancing technologies, and in responding to new operational practices in the industry (IA, p. 13). It claims that the majority of stakeholders agree that prescriptive rules, such as those in the current regulation, hamper innovation and put EU industry at a competitive disadvantage (respectively 88% and 77% of National Aviation Authorities and 72% and 83% of organisations5). The same view is shared in a support study on performance. The IA notes that more comprehensive environmental regulation is necessary, as the current Regulation 216/2008 ‘is limited to environmental compatibility of aeronautical products only’ (IA, p. 14). The problem is illustrated through the expenses incurred by manufacturers due to slow certification procedures. For example, 2% of the cost of an aircraft accounts for the penalty for 6 months’ delay in delivery, and airline development costs can increase by 10% in case of design issues discovered at a late stage of the development process, with the total price of an aircraft exceeding EUR 10 billion (IA, p. 14). It is not quite clear from the IA what is meant by ‘operational practices of the air industry’. The IA refers to new employment practices and business models, mainly concerning the current necessity of holding Air Operator Certificates (AOC) from multiple MS. The IA asserts that ‘in 2014 at least three EU airline consortia expressed interest in merging their AOC into a joint approval’ (IA, p. 15). Costs of multiple AOCs are not illustrated. Regarding new employment practices, the IA only mentions a few of these in a footnote. No reference is made to stakeholders, such as pilots, having expressed any opinion on this issue. Concern is expressed in the IA about the safety of the new business models, mentioning problems with the medical certification of pilots. In its 2015 report, the EASA working group concluded that ‘regulators’ own procedures and methodologies are not adapted to the developments in business models’ (IA, p. 16). The inclusion of a list of the specific market developments or operational practices which are seen as constituting problems for aviation safety would certainly have enhanced the clarity of the IA in this respect.

Problem 4: The IA describes the problems caused by ‘significant differences in organisational capabilities of Member States’, but the way in which they are presented is somewhat confusing, with the emphasis very much on to where these differences stem from: namely, varying approaches of national authorities to oversight, availability of resources and qualification of staff, as well as differences in financing oversight (IA, pp 16-17). The problems to which the differences lead include safety risks, ‘as some Member States are not sufficiently capable of effective oversight of EU legislation’, mistrust among Member States in not accepting certificates issued by some other authorities, and various interpretations of aviation requirements among Member States, negatively affecting the level playing field of the market (IA, p. 16). Later, the IA explains that inadequate oversight by National Aviation Authorities is caused by shortages of staff

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5 28% of public consultation contributions came from organisations which included large enterprises (20), SMEs (15) and microenterprises (21). IA, Annex II, p. 82.
and inadequate qualifications. This would seem to suggest that one of the problems in need of EU action might arguably be this deficient national oversight, rather than the generally mentioned ‘differences in organisational capabilities’ caused for the reasons mentioned above.

Some of the problem drivers described in Chapter 2.2 seem to be rather similar to the descriptions of problems themselves. In particular, the problem of prescriptive regulations presented under the problem description is simply repeated under problem drivers (see IA, p. 18).

Objectives of the legislative proposal

The general objective of the initiative is ‘to .. maintain the position of the EU as the safest region in the world’ (IA, p. 35). The Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal defines the objective as being to ‘continue to ensure safe, secure and environmentally friendly air transport for passengers and the general public’ (Expl. Mem., p. 2), and to repeal the current Regulation 216/2008. In addition to aviation safety, the new proposal aims to contribute to fostering growth and jobs, developing the internal market, strengthening Europe’s role in the global aviation, increasing competitiveness of European aviation industry and aeronautical manufacturing, and creating regulatory framework for the integration of new business models and safe integration of unmanned aircraft (Expl. Mem., p. 2).

The IA defines the following specific objectives:

1) Eliminate unnecessary requirements and ensure that regulation is proportionate to the risks associated with different types of aviation activities;
2) Ensure that new technologies and market developments are efficiently integrated and effectively overseen;
3) Establish a cooperative safety management process between the Union and its Member States to jointly identify and mitigate risks to civil aviation;
4) Close the gaps in the regulatory system and ensure its consistency;
5) Create an effectively working system of pooling and sharing of resources between the Member States and the Agency (IA, p. 35).

The IA mentions that some participants in the public consultation did raise the need for introducing specific safety targets, but that the idea was abandoned due to the findings of the safety performance study which states that ‘the EU is not yet technically ready’ for that. However, the IA fails to explain what these technical hurdles are, or what the ‘unintended consequences’ might be in case such safety targets were to be set. Nor is it clear if these are described in the external ECORYS study, which does not appear to be publicly available.

Range of options considered

The IA presents the policy options by grouping them under the following five independent policy domains (IA, Table 7, pp. 36–37):

Quality and management of resources:
Option 1.1 – baseline scenario; Option 1.2 – Enhanced cooperation within the current system; Option 1.3a) - joint oversight system with voluntary transfer of responsibilities; Option 1.3b) - Emergency oversight support mechanism, Option 1.4 - A single aviation safety authority.

These options are targeted at making better use of the current resources of EASA and national aviation authorities, for example in the area of certification and oversight work. Under a single aviation safety authority option ‘there is only one safety programme for the whole of the EU instead of 28 national programmes’ (IA, p. 41).

Proportionality and safety performance:
Option 2.1 – baseline scenario; Option 2.2 – Enablers for a proportional and performance based safety system; Option 2.3 – Two-layered regulatory system; Option 2.4 – Transition to a full performance based regulatory system.

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6 One of the two studies done by external contractor ECORYS supporting the IA, the other is study on the resources.
7 For example, compared to the US with a similar size of aviation market, ‘the EU should be able to manage with the current resources a much bigger aviation market’ (IA, p. 38).
'The options considered under this section aim at better identifying and mitigating safety risks, at supporting the development of more proportionate regulations, and at using resources more efficiently by targeting them according to risk priorities.' (IA, p. 42)

**Gaps and inconsistencies – ground handling:**
Option 3.1a) – Ground handling baseline scenario; Option 3.1.b) – Ground-handling industry standards/no certification; Option 3.1c) – Ground handling Implementing rules/certification

Ground handling in the EU is regulated only indirectly, and these options seek to allow for the imposition of safety requirements directly on providers of ground handling services (who are in favour of EU action).

**Gaps and inconsistencies - aviation security:**
Option 3.2a) – Aviation security baseline scenario; Option 3.2.b) – Legal framework for security aspects of design; Option 3.2c) – Coordinated approach to safety and security related matters

These options seek to address ‘the most pressing problems related to identified safety gaps (security matters related to the design of aircraft and aviation systems, including cyber-security), and better coordination of interfaces between safety and security measures’ (IA, p. 46).

**Gaps and inconsistencies – environment:**
Option 3.3a) – Environment baseline scenario; Option 3.3b) – EU essential requirements for environmental protection with respect to aeronautical products.

The IA presents the package of preferred options by choosing one option from each of the five problem domains as follows:

**Option 1.3.b): Emergency oversight support mechanism**
This mechanism would permit the Commission to transfer the oversight of a particular organisation or group to the EASA in the case of Member States which fail to provide rapid resolution of a developing problem. The preferred option contains the same basic measures as those in Option 1.3a) with regard to the creation of a system of ‘pooling and sharing’ of resources between EASA and national aviation authorities. Member States and industry both support Options 1.2 and 1.3a), whereas option 1.3b) is supported mainly by industry.

**Option 2.2): Enablers for a proportional and performance based safety system**
This option would facilitate the achievement of such a system for example by reviewing aircraft related definitions such as ‘commercial operation’ and ‘complex motor-powered aircraft’ (IA, p. 43). A collaborative safety management process would require Member States to establish their own state safety programmes. ‘Decision on the type of rule to be introduced is best taken on a case by case basis’, each time by a new Implementing Rule. (IA, p. 44) This option is expected to be supported by both MS and the aviation sector.  

**Option 3.1.b): Ground handling industry standards/no certification**
High level essential requirements regarding safety of ground handling would be established based on industry standards, with EASA issuing Acceptable Means of Compliance/Guidance Material. No certification requirements are envisaged. This option is expected to be supported by ground handling service providers, aerodrome operators and Member States.

**Option 3.2c): Coordinated approach to safety and security related matters**
Closer cooperation between EASA and the Commission on aviation safety matters would be established. The role of EASA ‘would not cover measures which require a security threat and risk assessments, which would remain under responsibility of the Member States and the Commission’ (IA, p. 47).

**Option 3.3b): EU essential requirements for environmental protection with respect to aeronautical products**
‘Under this option the EU adopts its own essential requirements for environmental protection for aeronautical products, parts and appliances, which is the present scope of the EU competence.’(IA, p. 47) The EU would be able to depart from minimum International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requirements in justified cases. All Member States would be obliged to file a difference under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.

Discarded options include ‘no EU action’, using international standards only, and ‘soft law’ measures, such as industry standards for aviation safety. The reasons given for precluding these options seem plausible.

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8 As opposed to the two-layered regulatory system, where all implementing rules are drafted both in a prescriptive and in a performance based manner, which could draw opposition from Member States due to additional administrative burden.

9 This Article stipulates the procedure under which signatory States can alter the rules of the Convention.
Scope of the Impact Assessment

- The IA presents impacts under each of the five policy domains in the form of a very detailed table (IA, pp. 49-65). The impacts analysed under the baseline scenario\(^\text{10}\) cover economic impacts, including impacts on SMEs and implementation costs for public authorities, social impacts and environmental impacts (even though environment domain is the only one where environmental impacts apply).
- **Economic impacts** evaluated include the functioning of the internal market, operating and compliance costs for businesses, administrative burden, innovation, SMEs, international relations, competitiveness, and implementation costs for public authorities.
- **Social impacts** evaluated include the number and quality of jobs and aviation safety.

Regarding **environmental impacts**, Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention becomes directly applicable in EU law through the current Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (regarding minimum standards of airport noise and engine emissions) (IA, p. 22). No detailed analysis of these aspects is offered.

Table 1 (see below) provides an overview of the main positive and negative impacts under each of the five policy domains (neutral impacts have been omitted for space reasons). For impacts on public finance, SMEs and international relations please see the respective paragraphs below.

**Subsidiarity / proportionality**

The proposal is based on Article 4(2)(g) TFEU, which stipulates that transport is a shared competence between EU and Member States. Article 100(2) lays down the possibility for the EU to act in the area of air transport. According to the IA, a common European air safety system ‘can most effectively be achieved only at EU level’ (IA, p. 34). Regarding cyber-security and security aspects of aircraft and system design, while the IA acknowledges that the EU lacks a clear mandate to act (IA, p. 20), it also insists that cyber-security threats affect multiple Member States, and therefore require a coordinated action at the EU level (IA, p. 35).

No Reasoned Opinions on the legislative proposal have been received from national parliaments at the time of writing; the deadline for contributions is 2 March, 2016.

**Simplification and other regulatory implications**

The proposal seeks to replace the existing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Certain problematic aspects of aviation safety, such as the lack of common framework for drones, is dealt with in the second IA accompanying the proposal. It has to be noted that options regarding safety gaps and inconsistencies by their very nature inevitably have regulatory implications, such as industry standards or a better co-ordinated approach from the Member States, EASA and the Commission.

### Table 1: Scope of the Impact Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy domains:</th>
<th>To evaluate the options considered, positive impacts are estimated for:</th>
<th>To evaluate the options considered, negative impacts are estimated for:</th>
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</table>
| Quality and management of resources | Internal market, innovation, competitiveness, administrative burden  
Aviation safety                                                                 | Operating and compliance costs to industry  
(initial AOC issuance: EUR 90 000; annual fee: EUR 464 000), competitiveness under single European authority option |
| Proportionality and safety performance | Internal market, operational and compliance costs for businesses, innovation, competitiveness (improved collaborative safety management process)  
Number and quality of jobs, aviation safety (safety level improvement of 19% (10 years) and 44% (30 years))  
Environment                                                                 | Administrative burdens for businesses (additional reporting requirements)                                                      |
| Gaps and inconsistencies: ground handling | Internal market, harmonised EU standards for ground handling operators, airlines (reduced costs of ground handling related damage and associated delays)  
Number and quality of jobs, aviation safety                                                                 | Operating and compliance costs, and administrative burdens for businesses, ground handling service providers (additional costs to ensure compliance with the new essential requirements) |

\(^{10}\) Described in Chapter 2.3 of the IA, pp. 29 to 33.
Budgetary or public finance implications

The IA gives detailed quantified estimations of public finance impacts under all five policy domains for both the Member State and the EU level. Such costs are expressed in net present value for the timeframe 2016-2030 (IA, pp. 52-53, 56-57, 60, 62, 64). The total amount of resources needed for EASA under the preferred policy package is EUR 28.65 million (IA, p. 72). Most options falling under the quality and management of resources domain are considered to have positive budgetary implications. The same is true of Option 2.2 (preferred) under the proportionality and safety performance domain (the other two options under this heading have negative public costs implications). For the policy areas concerning gaps and inconsistencies in ground handling, aviation security and environment, budgetary implications are generally negative due to new implementation costs or additional costs for acquiring the necessary expertise. Finally, the IA claims that nearly EUR 3.5 million would be saved for the EU budget under the package of preferred options as the EU could reduce 23 full-time equivalents for EASA (IA Annex X, p. 123).

SME test

The IA refers to SMEs’ input from the public consultation throughout the descriptions of the policy options. According to the IA, 15 SMEs and 21 micro-enterprises responded to the public consultation. Impacts on SMEs are also explicitly evaluated under each of the five policy domains. Impacts under options concerning quality and management of resources, as well as proportionality and safety performance, are considered to be largely positive. Impacts under options for ground handling, aviation security and environment are considered to be mainly neutral, with the exception of Option 3.1(c) on implementing rules and certification for ground handling, under which administrative costs ‘would have a more significant impact on SMEs than on larger companies’ (IA, p. 59). No negative impacts on SMEs are identified under the preferred option.

Relations with third countries

Under options concerning quality and management of resources, the impacts on international relations are described as generally positive - for example, the opening of cooperation between virtual training academies and third countries. The same is true for options concerning aviation safety and the environment. ‘Positive impacts are expected through better coordination of EU positions at the international level, more optimal use of resources for technical work at ICAO and other international fora’ (IA, p 51). Impacts of options regarding proportionality and safety performance and ground handling are generally neutral. The IA considers that EU compliance with international ICAO standards should improve as the requirement for States to adopt and implement a State Safety Programme already exists at international level (ICAO Annex 19) and will be transposed into EU legislation under the options for safety performance. Under the aviation safety policy options, the compliance of EU Member States with the ICAO Annex 17 recommendations concerning measures related to cyber-threats (Recommendations 4.9.1 and 4.9.2.) would improve (IA, p. 56). Under the preferred policy option for gaps and inconsistencies regarding the environment, the IA states that the negotiating position of the EU in the ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) would improve (IA, p. 63).

Quality of data, research and analysis

The IA explains that ‘the policy options within the respective domains were developed taking into account the suggestions made in the two external support studies (on resources and on performance, completed by ECORYS), results
of the public consultations, EASA Opinion, Article 62 evaluation, and the Report of the Management Board sub-group’ (IA, p. 36). The document base is solid and varied, but a lot of valuable informative details are left only in the Annexes.

The IA refers to many aviation safety related documents; however, at times the source of those documents, and their link to the issues discussed in the IA, is unclear and not explained. It is not always possible to read the IA without searching for additional information in order to follow the structure of the content (for example, with regard to the background and problems, or Article 62 evaluation\textsuperscript{11}). In some parts, the IA refers to Annexes other than those contained in the IA itself without indicating the source.

Relevant supporting documents, such as the Communication on an Aviation Strategy for Europe, and the European Aviation Safety Programme, together with their respective Annexes, are very informative and helpful for understanding the political context/background and the problems involved; yet the IA does not seem to make optimal use of the information they contain.

Existing problems are described in rather technical language, and rather broadly, making it difficult to gain immediately a precise and informative insight.

Even though the Commission is at pains to point out that the five policy domains are independent from one another, many of the policy options presented seem to be complementary in nature, rather than representing distinct, individual courses of action. Also, the preferred options have been given a more detailed description and analysis than the others. The choice of options considered is rather unbalanced from one domain to another. For example, only one alternative to the baseline scenario is proposed regarding gaps and inconsistencies in the area of the environment, whereas management and quality of resources is covered by four alternatives.

Apart from the very clear cost breakdown for EASA and national aviation authorities (see above item on budgetary and public finance implications), much of the analysis is qualitative. The IA explains that even this cost breakdown ‘should only be used as an indication. The reason for that note of caution is that no precise data are available for all Member States’ (IA, p. 32).

In spite of the fact that ‘travelling public and consumers’ (see below) are mentioned in the IA among the stakeholders affected, specific impacts on such groups have not been evaluated.

**Stakeholder consultation**

The IA clearly states that the stakeholders concerned by the proposal are: national aviation authorities, industry players (manufacturers, airlines, maintenance and training organisations, and their staff), private airspace users, employees in the aviation sector, aircrews, the travelling public and consumers (IA, Annex III, p. 104). Two public consultations were run from 15 May 2014 to 15 September 2014: a general one by DG MOVE and another, more technical, by EASA (Advance Notice of Proposed Amendment). The IA mentions that 15 SMEs and 21 micro-enterprises responded to the public consultation, together with 20 large enterprises. It is not clear how well represented SMEs actually were in the public consultation, and if they were consulted in a more targeted way, for example, when meeting Member States and industry representatives. It should be added that 70% of the contributions to the public consultation came from five countries: Germany, Switzerland, UK, Belgium and France (IA, Annex II, p. 83). A very positive aspect is that the IA consistently refers throughout to the stakeholder consultations and the views expressed therein (for example, p. 20 on problem drivers). As provided for under the Commission’s new Better Regulation Guidelines, an additional stakeholder consultation round was launched following the adoption of the proposal, with a deadline for contributions of 1 March 2016.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

The IA includes a chapter on monitoring and evaluation (IA, p. 73), in which it is explained that ‘Ample mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation already exist and can be used, due to the fact that in the field of aviation safety the monitoring of performance is an integral element of the regulatory framework’. The IA lists monitoring and evaluation indicators according to the specific objectives identified (see Objectives section above). Responsibility for the implementation of EU aviation safety rules is shared between the Commission, EASA and the EU Member States. The IA

\textsuperscript{11} Article 62 of the Basic Regulation requires the Management Board (established in Article 33) of the Agency to commission periodically an independent external evaluation of the implementation of the Regulation. (EASA Article 62 Panel Evaluation Final report, p. 3)
states that the main implementation risks are linked to the measures concerning the transfer of responsibilities for the implementation of EU aviation safety legislation - for example, horizontal transfers (between Member States), vertical transfers (between Member States and EASA) and the emergency oversight mechanism (IA, pp. 75-76).

**Commission Impact Assessment Board (IAB)**

The Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) delivered a positive opinion on a draft version of the IA on 19 June 2015. In its opinion, the IAB highlighted several shortcomings requiring improvement. These included the need for clarifications on the problem definition, strengthening of the baseline scenario, and better explanations of the options - for example, how some options, such as those dealing with ground handling and environment, will contribute to the improvement of aviation safety - and, finally, how the Member States with limited means will cope with the new changes.

It would appear from the paragraph on the Board’s comments (IA, unmarked Annex, p. 78) that DG MOVE has endeavoured to take into account in the final version of the IA many of the Board’s recommendations. However, the problem definitions and definitions of options could still have benefited from more clarity and more specific descriptions, if only in the interest of better readability by a non-expert audience. In addition, the IAB calls for clear explanations of technical language and terminology, which still remains a problem. For example, the Annex I list of abbreviations and Annex XXIII on technical terms explain some very general and widely understood terms such as ‘SME’ and ‘GDP’, or ICAO, but omit some more technical ones such as ANSPs (air navigation service providers), RPO (risk-based oversight), PBO (performance based oversight, etc.).

**Coherence between the Commission’s legislative proposal and IA**

The relevant parts of the Commission’s legislative proposal appear to follow the recommendations of the preferred policy package expressed in this IA, the remaining parts, notably those concerning drones, being covered by a separate impact assessment which is the object of a separate initial appraisal.

**Conclusions**

The main strengths of the IA are its apparently solid information base, including the two supporting studies, as well as good presentation of stakeholder views and the results of the public consultation throughout. It is, however, unfortunate that the external supporting studies do not appear to be publicly available.

The IA would have benefitted from a clearer and more complete presentation of the background information and problem definition, as well as more direct reference to the evidence identified. There appears to be a certain bias towards the preferred options, as far as the way in which options are presented is concerned; the question remains as to whether additional options could have been considered in order to provide a broader choice of genuine alternatives. There are also some technical presentation issues, such as rather inconsistent numbering of the items in some sections. It is striking that no reference whatsoever appears to be made to the existence of a second, separate IA (on drones) which accompanies the same proposal and thus is presumably intended to complete the overall analysis.

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This note, prepared by the Ex-Ante Impact Assessment Unit for the European Parliament's Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) of the European Parliament, analyses whether the principal criteria laid down in the Commission’s own Impact Assessment Guidelines, as well as additional factors identified by the Parliament in its Impact Assessment Handbook, appear to be met by the IA. It does not attempt to deal with the substance of the proposal. It is drafted for informational and background purposes to assist the relevant parliamentary committee(s) and Members more widely in their work.

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