
Briefing January 2016




The nuclear agreement with Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency referred the issue of Iran's nuclear programme to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. The UN gradually adopted restrictive measures against Iran, including an embargo on states exporting materials that could be used for Iran's nuclear programme and placing financial and travel restrictions on certain individuals. Following several years of rather chilly relations between Iran and the E3/EU+3 (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU High Representative, China, Russia, and the United States) the discussions about Iran's nuclear programme gained new impetus with the election of Hassan Rouhani as president in June 2013. Building on a series of contacts between Iran and the E3/EU+3, the Joint Plan of Action was adopted on 24 November 2013. In April 2015, negotiators announced agreement on a set of parameters which provided the framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and annexes agreed on 14 July 2015.







A political understanding by the parties concerned, the JCPOA aims to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, in exchange for the termination of sanctions against Iran. The signatories of the agreement envisage that its implementation will allow Iran to move forward with 'an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme' and for the rest of the international community to progressively 'gain confidence' in the peaceful nature of Iran's programme.

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA





NO **ENRICHMENT** of uranium above 3.67%

addition, Iran agreed that it will not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.



FXPORT of spent nuclear fuel and heavy water

During the 15-year period, Iran will only enrich uranium to up to 3.67% (substantially below the 90%

threshold required for the production of a nuclear bomb) and it will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched

uranium from 10 000 kg today to a maximum 300 kg for 15 years. Iran's research and development and

testing capacities for enrichment will also be limited. Enrichment will be further restricted to a single

site, where only Iran's oldest, least efficient centrifuges will be operating for a duration of 10 years. In



CENTRIFUGES by number & type



FULL IAEA ACCESS to Iran's declared and suspected nuclear sites



JOINT COMMISSION monitors procurement & settles disputes


RELIEF AND SNAPBACK phased termination and snapback in case of non-compliance

The agreement foresees extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the 'Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues' agreed with the IAEA. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — or her designated representative will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission established to monitor the implementation of the agreement and resolve related disputes.

The deal includes provisions for the reintroduction of sanctions in case Iran is found to be in non-compliance.

SANCTIONS






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
OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA

The IAEA's verification process focuses on a number of key issues, including removing centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordow facilities, redesigning the heavy water research reactor in Arak and shipping out excess uranium stockpiles. The IAEA is also expected to implement several transparency measures, such as installing active electronic seals for online enrichment monitoring purposes and improving monitoring at uranium mills.



DISPUTE SETTLEMENT


The Joint Commission comprises representatives of Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The HR/VP or her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and she will serve as coordinator of a Working Group on procurement and a Working Group on the implementation of sanctions. The objectives of these working groups are, respectively, to review and decide proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear-related transfers to, or activities with, Iran, and to review and consult on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting.



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On 18 October 2015, the European Union and the United States adopted the legal acts to prepare for the lifting of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions (Adoption Day). On 16 January 2016, the Director-General of the IAEA presented a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which confirms that Iran has completed the necessary steps to start the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Implementation Day). The same day, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 entered into force, confirming the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions.

LENGTH OF IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS & RESTRICTIONS



The UNSC sanctions on ballistic missiles will be lifted in 2023 (Transition Day) at the latest, and Iran must seek ratification of the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards. In 2025, on Termination Day, the UNSC resolution endorsing JCPOA and all heightened scrutiny ('consideration') of the Iranian nuclear programme terminate. The EU is obliged to terminate all remaining sanctions on the same day. The remaining constraints on Iran will be gradually phased out by 2040. Parliamentary elections in Iran scheduled for February 2016, and US presidential elections in November 2016 may influence the achievement of further milestones on this timeline.

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