

Common Foreign and Security Policy

In a nutshell

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is designed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security and ensure the visibility and effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Spending under the CFSP covers only some EU foreign policy measures, namely civilian missions, EU Special Representatives and measures supporting non-proliferation and disarmament.

EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) heading and policy area

Heading 4: Global Europe

Common Foreign and Security Policy

2014-2020 financial envelope (in current prices and as % of total MFF)

Commitments: €2 338.72 million (0.22%)

2015 budget (in current prices and as % of total EU budget)

Commitments: €320.77 million (0.22%)

Payments: €267.91 million (0.19%)

2016 budget (in current prices and as % of total EU budget)

Commitments: €327.3 million (0.21%)

Payments: €298.6 million (0.21%)

Methods of implementation

Indirect management (CFSP missions, EU Special Representatives and international organisations) and *direct management* (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments).



In this briefing:

- EU role in the policy area: legal basis
- Objectives of the expenditure
- Funded measures
- Assessment of expenditure
- Other EU programmes and action in the same field

EU role in the policy area: legal basis

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established as a specific EU policy area by the 1992 Treaty on European Union ('Maastricht Treaty') (TEU) as the second 'pillar' of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty did not change the intergovernmental character of the policy.¹ The EU Treaties currently in force do not offer a precise **definition of the CFSP**.² According to [Article 24\(1\) TEU](#), the [CFSP](#) covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the EU's security, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Considered the operational capacity and the military component of the CFSP, the CSDP covers crisis-management tasks (military and civilian) performed outside EU territory for 'peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter' ([Article 42\(1\) TEU](#)), as well as Member States' commitment to improve and coordinate their defence capabilities. The Treaties also contain a commitment to 'the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy' which 'will lead to a common defence', when decided unanimously by the European Council and following ratification by the Member States.³

The CFSP is unique in that it comes under Title V of the TEU, and not Part V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which covers the **EU's other external policies**: development cooperation, humanitarian aid, common commercial policy and other aspects. Within Title V TEU, which comprises general provisions on the EU's external action, Chapter 2 (Articles 21 to 46 TEU) contains specific provisions on the CFSP, including specific provisions on the CSDP.⁴

The question of the Union's **competence** (i.e. exclusive, shared or supporting [competence](#)) in this policy field is still debated in light of the specific rules governing the CFSP. Articles 24 TEU and 2(4) TFEU stipulate that the CFSP is a Union competence, giving it the power 'to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy'. However, the CFSP is not included in the list of shared competences in the Treaty. Therefore, some analysts have considered the Union's competence in the CFSP as either a shared competence *sui generis*, or a supporting and coordination competence (whereby the EU has only a complementary or coordinating role to action taken by the Member States).⁵ The general view seems to be that the CFSP is rather a *sui generis*, special competence, comparable to the coordination of economic and employment policies.⁶

The Lisbon Treaty introduced major institutional innovations in foreign policy, for clearer international representation of the EU and better coordinated external action, in particular by creating the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and by establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is a 'fully autonomous body of the EU', separate from the Council and Commission. It supports the HR/VP in fulfilling all their functions, and assists the presidents of the European Council and of the Commission in their external-relations tasks; the EEAS also supports other EU institutions, including the EP. The EEAS contributes to the development of a strategic framework for EU external relations. It is also co-responsible for preparing the Commission's decisions on the strategic multiannual steps in the programming cycle of the EU's external cooperation programmes, except those for pre-accession assistance and humanitarian aid (the latter types of proposals are made following Commission procedures and must be adopted by the Commission). The EEAS **budget** is part of the EU general budget, over which the European Parliament (EP) has full budgetary control.

The European Parliament's role

Article 36 TEU defines the EP's role in CFSP/CSDP matters: the EP is to be **consulted** by the High Representative (HR/VP) on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, and **informed** about the evolution of policies; the EP may ask questions or make recommendations to the Council and the HR/VP. The exclusion of legislative acts from the remit of the CFSP also means the EP has no formal power to adopt CFSP decisions. For international agreements concluded by the EU with a bearing on the CFSP, the EP has the right to be informed at all stages of the negotiation of these agreements, but it has no right of consultation or consent (Art. 218 TFEU). However, through its **budgetary powers**, including the right to amend the draft CFSP budget, the EP has acquired influence over the conduct of the CFSP.

The 'Declaration on Political Accountability' (DPA, 2010), agreed by the HR/VP during negotiations on the creation of the EEAS, contains [additional commitments](#) by the HR/VP to the EP. In particular, the HR/VP undertakes to respect Article 36 TEU; to keep the EP fully and immediately informed at all stages of negotiating international agreements relevant to the CFSP, and to extend the practice of Joint Consultation Meetings on CFSP missions financed from the EU budget, which take place at least five times a year between selected members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the Council, the EEAS and the Commission. Importantly, the Joint Consultation Meetings were included in Point 25 of the [Interinstitutional Agreement \(IIA\) of 2 December 2013](#) between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, cooperation in budgetary matters and sound financial management.⁷

In addition, the HR/VP pledges to comply with the provisions of the 2002 IIA on access by the EP to sensitive information related to the CSDP, and to provide access to other documents in the CFSP field on a need-to-know basis to MEPs; to allow exchanges of views between MEPs and diplomats nominated for high-level EEAS positions, Heads of Delegations and EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), before they take up their posts; and to establish a system to ensure that she is represented when unable to appear before Parliament in person.

CFSP financing from the EU budget

Administrative and operational expenditure in the CFSP as a policy area is financed by the EU budget, with the exception of operational expenditure with military or defence implications (as this cannot be funded by the EU budget) or cases when the Council decides otherwise ([Article 41 TEU](#)). It is administered by the Commission's [Service for Foreign Policy Instruments](#) under the responsibility of the HR/VP. Under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, CFSP expenditure, as a specific item in the budget, comes under [Heading 4: Global Europe](#), which covers all expenditure on external action, except the European Development Fund.

Appropriations under the CFSP expenditure are committed through [Council Decisions](#) which rest upon different **legal bases** in the Treaty, depending on the measure being funded (for example, launching a CSDP mission, or financing disarmament projects in third countries).⁸ As the concept of operational expenditure is not defined by the Treaty, reference has been made to **Article 28 TEU** (the former pre-Lisbon Joint Actions), which sets out the procedure for decisions taken by the Council 'where the international situation requires operational action by the Union'. In practice, financial commitments under the CFSP are committed in accordance with decisions based on either Article 28 or **Article 26(2) TEU** (which states that the Council will take the necessary decisions to define and implement the CFSP on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic direction provided by the European Council).⁹ In particular, the CFSP budget ([Chapter 19 03](#) of the EU budget) finances:

- Common costs of **civilian missions** and **other civilian crisis management activities**. Taking into account their operational nature, appropriations are committed under

Article 28 TEU in accordance with Articles 42(4) and 43(2) TEU, which refer to the procedure for adopting decisions relating to the CSDP, and in particular to the implementation of the EU's crisis management tasks;

- EU Special Representatives ([EUSRs](#)) have a mandate to represent the EU in a region or foreign policy field. Commitments for EUSRs are based on Article 28 TEU in accordance with Article 33 TEU, which sets out the procedure for their appointment;
- Measures in support of **non-proliferation and disarmament** (see description of each funded measure below). For these, financial commitments are based on Article 26(2) TEU in accordance with Article 31(1) TEU, which provides for unanimous decision-making. Article 26(2) may have been used because measures financed to advance non-proliferation and disarmament are meant to implement the '[Strategies](#)' defined by the European Council¹⁰ – the [EU Security Strategy](#) (2003), the [EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction](#) (2003) and the [EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition](#) (2005).¹¹

The CFSP budget is managed by the [Service for Foreign Policy Instruments](#), part of the Commission and under the authority of the High Representative.

Objectives of the expenditure

The Lisbon Treaty establishes the CFSP as part of the EU's external action, governed by a set of common principles and general objectives ([Article 21 TEU](#) in accordance with [Article 3\(5\)](#) TEU), designed to ensure the consistency and coordination of all the EU's external policies. Among these, the objective most directly related to the CFSP is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with international law and international principles. Furthermore, it is up to the European Council to 'identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union' on the basis of the general principles and objectives of the EU's external action (Article 22 TEU). The European Council should identify the EU's 'strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define the general guidelines for the CFSP' (Article 26 TEU). Accordingly, a panoply of interests and objectives for the CFSP has emerged, such as the pursuit of effective multilateralism, cooperation with international and regional organisations, and a focus on countries in the EU's neighbourhood.¹² A general [objective](#) of the CFSP is to increase the visibility and weight of the EU in international diplomacy.

Funded actions

EU civilian crisis management missions and other civilian crisis management activities

The aim of the overall system of crisis management is not to anticipate violence, but to identify risks and take preventive measures in order to avoid devastation and preserve lives.¹³ The crisis management approach of the CFSP includes involvement in all phases of the crisis cycle; from preventive strategies, to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as comprehensive and coordinated use of all foreign policy instruments. Civilian missions are a key element of [this approach](#). In addition to the funds provided by the EU budget, these missions can be supported by funds from the Member States, as well as from participating countries outside the EU and other international players (the latter being subject to the Commission's approval).

CSDP civilian missions specified in the budget

There are three EU missions with specific budgetary allocations explicitly listed in the EU budget for 2015 (the remaining civilian missions are covered in the next section). They

are the **European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia** (€23 million for 2015 and €19 million for 2016 in commitments), the **European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)** (€85 million for 2015 and €70 million for 2016 in commitments) and the **European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)** (€65 million for 2015).

[EUMM Georgia](#) was established by a [2008 Council Decision](#) as an unarmed and impartial civilian mission to monitor the ceasefire under the [Six Point Agreement](#) that followed the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. The mandate of the mission has been extended since then, most recently through to 14 December 2016 under Council Decision [2014/915/CFSP](#). EUMM's objectives are to prevent a return to hostilities; facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life for local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and build confidence between the parties to the conflict.¹⁴ EUMM's presence and work has helped improve the security situation, but it faces challenges in executing its mandate as its staff does not have full access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

[EULEX Kosovo](#) is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP. Commitments intended to cover spending on EULEX for the period from its establishment in 2008 ([Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP](#)) through to 14 October 2014 amounted to €757.8 million ([Council Decision 2014/349/CFSP](#)). EULEX complies with [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244](#), and the most recent extension of its mandate was to June 2016 ([Political and Security Committee Decision \(CFSP\) 2015/969](#)). [EULEX](#) is part of the overall EU effort to promote peace and stability in the Western Balkans. EULEX's aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities, especially police, judiciary and customs, in reforms they have carried out to strengthen the multi-ethnic character and independence of these institutions, in accordance with internationally recognised standards and European best practice. In line with the local ownership principle, the EULEX mission provides monitoring, mentoring and advice, and retains some executive responsibilities only in specific areas, such as war crimes, organised crime and high-level corruption, as well as property and privatisation cases.


[EUPOL Afghanistan](#) is a civilian CSDP mission, established in 2007 ([Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP](#)) with its mandate extended by the Council to 31 December 2016 ([Council Decision 2014/922/CFSP](#)). EUPOL supports the Afghan government's efforts to build a civilian police service operating under an improved rule of law framework and in respect of human rights. It provides police and rule of law experts from EU Member States to advise the relevant Afghan institutions (Ministry of Interior, Afghan National Police, Ministry of Justice, and the Attorney General's Office) in Kabul. EUPOL helps to develop local training capacity and institutions, and to improve interaction among Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice authorities.¹⁵ After the end of the EUPOL Afghanistan mandate, support for the professionalisation of the Afghan police and application of the rule of law is expected to continue as part of a broader international effort, including funding from the European Commission and EU Member States, coupled with a possible reinforcement of the EUSR Office in Kabul.

Other crisis management measures and operations, emergency measures, and preparatory and follow-up measures

In addition to long-term commitments, efforts to contribute to stability under the CFSP include a number of activities that require a flexible and swift response to changing circumstances. To this end, the CFSP includes budget allocations for crisis management measures and operations, emergency measures, and preparatory and follow-up

measures (almost €194 million in commitments for 2016). The specific measures included here vary. These budgetary allocations cover eight **other** ongoing [EU civilian missions](#). Their precise individual budget allocation is determined by the necessities of the crisis on the ground. Figure 1 presents the annualised budgetary allocations for each of the civilian missions for 2014. They include the EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of defence, launched in 2005 ([EUSEC RD Congo](#)), the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point launched in 2005 ([EUBAM Rafah Palestinian Territories](#)), the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories which began in 2006 ([EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories](#)), the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa deployed in 2012 ([EUCAP Nestor Djibuti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania](#)), the European Union mission to support capacity building of the Nigerien security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime, deployed in 2012 ([EUCAP Sahel Niger](#)), the European Union support mission for internal security in Mali deployed in 2014 ([EUCAP Sahel Mali](#)), the European Union border assistance mission which began in 2013 ([EUBAM Libya](#)), and the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine deployed in 2014 ([EUAM Ukraine](#)).

In addition, budgetary allocations for crisis management measures and operations, emergency measures, and preparatory and follow-up measures cover CFSP actions and interventions for [conflict prevention, peace building and mediation responding to ad-hoc requests](#). Examples include fact finding missions, preparatory missions (determining the feasibility of conducting or preparing a crisis management operation) and technical assessment missions.¹⁶



European Union Special Representatives

According to the 2014 [Council guidelines](#) on the appointment, mandate and financing of EU Special Representatives, EUSRs should contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action and representation; in particular, they should strive to ensure that all the EU's instruments and Member State action function consistently to attain the EU's policy objectives; and they should contribute to the effectiveness of the EU's response to crises and to implementing its strategic policies. They have a mandate to represent the EU in relation to a region or a thematic area.

The European Union currently has nine [EUSRs](#) who support the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, promote the EU's policies and interests in troubled regions and countries, and play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law. The budget for all EUSRs for 2015 is €20 million, and it has been increased to €25 million for 2016 (commitments). This

funding covers the maintenance of the EUSRs and their offices, as well as the cost of projects implemented under the direct responsibility of the EUSRs.

An active political presence, a 'voice' and 'face' for the EU, they play an important role in strengthening the CFSP and the EU's role as an influential player on the world stage. The nine EUSRs cover the following countries, regions and issues: Central Asia, the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the Horn of Africa, Human Rights, and the Sahel.

Support for non-proliferation and disarmament

The measure 'Support to non-proliferation and disarmament' finances activities contributing to non-proliferation and prevention of trafficking of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and small arms and light weapons. The budget for all non-proliferation and disarmament actions for 2015 was €17 million, and it was increased to €19 million in 2016 (commitments). The most recent non-proliferation and disarmament measures, supported by new Council Decisions adopted in 2015, are presented by way of example in Table 2. The full list of all measures and their legal basis is provided in the [EU Budget](#).

Table 2 - Measures for non-proliferation and disarmament - Council Decisions of 2015

Council Decision	Supported action	EU budget (€, commitments)
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1908 of 22 October 2015	Global reporting mechanism on illicit SALW and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition ('iTrace II')	2 530 684 (implementation period 24 months) (489 316 co-financing by Conflict Armament Research Ltd and the German Federal Foreign Office)
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1837 of 12 October 2015	Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation	3 024 756 (implementation period 24 months)
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/259 of 17 February 2015	Activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	2 528 069 (implementation period 36 months)
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/203 of 9 February 2015	International Code of Conduct for outer-space activities as a contribution to transparency and confidence-building measures	1 274 399 (implementation period 24 months) (201 556 co-financing by UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and UNInstitute for Disarmament Research)

Data source: [EUR-Lex](#).

Although the challenges posed by, and tools used against, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) may differ, and may depend on the political context, the EU takes a consistent approach based on multilateralism and the universality of international treaties; international cooperation and a strengthened international non-proliferation regime; and complementary use of all available diplomatic instruments and financial resources to maximise impact and effectiveness.

The objectives of the [EU strategy on SALW](#) focus on strengthened control over exports, imports and production, as well as measures to address the underlying sources of illegal demand for SALW. SALW initiatives under CFSP expenditure are complemented by additional non-proliferation measures included in military missions; insertion of [SALW clauses](#) in agreements negotiated by the EU with third countries; police, customs and judiciary action within the EU, as well as relevant measures financed under the [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#).

The [WMD strategy](#) addresses both proliferation of WMDs by state and non-state actors. Non-state actors present a new challenge, especially given an increased terrorism threat. The strategy puts emphasis on the need for all relevant EU players to be involved, and for greater coordination of their efforts. International cooperation is also part of the EU strategy regarding WMDs, and this is reflected in the measures it funds.

Assessment of expenditure

In 2014, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) issued a special report on [the establishment of the European External Action Service](#), which also touched upon measures funded under the CFSP. The report concluded that there are still weaknesses in the prioritisation, organisation and allocation of resources that had reduced the EEAS's efficiency, and that EU Special Representatives are not sufficiently integrated. The report also recommended reviewing the appointment process and functioning of EU Special Representatives and EEAS recruitment procedures. Due to their rather broad mandates, much is left to EUSRs' discretion, but this makes it difficult to evaluate their performance. A higher degree of flexibility is recommended regarding the administrative and financial framework for the management of EU civilian missions, in order to reduce the complexity and rigidity resulting from the current budgetary arrangements and to allow for flexible implementation of their mandate and fulfillment of their tasks.

The ECA also scrutinised some individual measures under the CFSP. In a 2012 [assessment of the EULEX mission in Kosovo](#), the ECA outlines the difficulties and circumstances specific to Kosovo that hinder efforts to achieve progress on rule of law issues (police, justice, customs, anti-corruption). Although there has been progress, the ECA concludes that it has been slow, and that there are sometimes doubts about its sustainability. Funds are correctly managed, but some shortcomings in the effectiveness of EU assistance result from insufficiently clear objectives, major coordination challenges for Commission and EULEX operations, and staffing constraints. Based on the experience of EULEX, the ECA made some general recommendations regarding future CSDP missions, such as providing sufficient staffing and ensuring that CSDP missions are given a legal personality.


In 2015, the [ECA assessed the implementation of the EUPOL Afghanistan police mission](#) and found it partly effective in delivering on its mandate. The mission faced a very unstable environment, high illiteracy rates and widespread corruption in the Afghan police and justice systems, as well as the absence of a trained, fully functioning Afghan police force. Nevertheless, it contributed significantly to the reform of the Ministry of the Interior and to the professionalisation of Afghanistan's police and its efforts to gain the trust of the public. Despite this progress, the Afghan police and justice systems continue to suffer from systemic and institutional weaknesses, an ineffective legal framework, limited staff capacity, undue political influence, and corruption. These shortcomings, as well as the volatility of the overall security situation, put at risk the sustainability of the results achieved by EUPOL. In its report, the ECA pointed towards the reporting systems of EUPOL Afghanistan as a weakness, describing them as 'too basic, without sufficient focus on results and added value'. The assessment of EUPOL Afghanistan led to some general recommendations for future CSDP missions: provision of sufficient logistical, technical and human resources; timely deployment of missions; and planning for, and taking steps to ensure, the sustainability of all activities and the smooth phasing out of the missions.

CSDP missions are widely recognised as 'the means through which the EU has become an actor of multilateral crisis management' with comparative advantages over other national or international actors, and a significant contributor to the stabilisation of countries in which they operate.¹⁷ Although the question is no longer whether the EU is a security actor, but rather what kind, there is still criticism and high expectations related to this issue. Much of it is related to the fact that security and crisis management is an ongoing challenge. There is criticism that the presence of different financial mechanisms for operational costs leads to a fragmented and overly flexible general structure for financing CSDP operations.¹⁸ Fragmentation is seen in the fact that Member States are not obliged to participate, the specific funding features of different operations, and the different mechanisms for implementation of operations, depending on their objective and nature.

The EU is felt to have great potential as an important actor in non-proliferation policy, but it is undermined by its extensive bureaucracy and its lack of flexibility in dealing with non-proliferation issues.¹⁹

Other EU programmes and action in the same field

CFSP expenditure covers only part of the EU's overall foreign and security policy. Figure 3 presents the wide range of programmes and actions under Heading 4, 'Global Europe', and their share within this heading. Due to differences in legal basis and scope of EU competences, these programmes and actions also have different types of funding.



External financial instruments

Heading 4, 'Global Europe', of the EU budget (€9 167 million in commitments for 2016) includes CFSP expenditure alongside other EU external financial instruments. The major EU instruments for external action (the [Instrument for Pre-accession assistance](#), the [European Neighbourhood Instrument](#), the [European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights](#), the [Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace](#), the [Partnership Instrument](#) and the [Development Cooperation Instrument](#)) comprise a legislative

package that was revised in the context of the preparation of the 2014-2020 MFF. This revision introduced changes supporting more differentiation of assistance, concentration, flexibility, and simplified rules and procedures for external spending.²⁰ The instruments included in this package share a [common implementing regulation](#), which enables them to function in coordination and complementarity. Heading 4 also includes a number of other programmes, with largest by budgetary allocation being [Humanitarian Aid](#) (€1 108.8 million in commitments for 2016) and the Guarantee Fund for External Action (€257.1 million in commitments for 2016). Another important foreign policy tool is the intergovernmental [European Development Fund](#) (EDF), funded outside the EU budget, but also managed by the European Commission.

Athena mechanism and military missions

The [Athena mechanism](#) was [established in 2004](#) as a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations that have military or defence implications. It is part of the CFSP/CSDP, but is not funded via the EU budget. According to [Article 41\(2\) of the Treaty on European Union](#), Member States contribute to the annual Athena budget based on their gross national income. Apart from Denmark, which opted out of the mechanism, all EU Member States participate in it.²¹ A Special Committee under whose authority the mechanism functions consists of representatives from each Member State contributing to the financing of military operations. It sets the financial rules applicable to each area of eligible expenditure under Athena. The major types of expenditure under the Athena mechanism include lodging; travel; administration; public communication; locally hired staff; force headquarters (FHQ) deployment; medical services; and infrastructure, including IT systems and information gathering. Following a special approval procedure, Athena may also finance additional equipment and services.

Currently, there are [six active EU military operations](#) and all of them benefit from Athena financing. They are EUFOR Althea (Bosnia Herzegovina), EUNavfor Atalanta (Horn of Africa), EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUMAM RCA (Central African Republic) and EUNavfor Med (Mediterranean). EU Member States (and third countries) that decide to contribute to an EU military operation pay for this from their national budgets, with no contribution from the Athena mechanism. Nevertheless, 'nation-borne costs', such as fuel, water and food, are managed under the Athena mechanism.

Train and Equip Initiative

The Train and Equip Initiative is a new initiative conceived as part of the comprehensive approach of the EU towards its external policy, especially the need to simultaneously provide development assistance and tackle issues related to the increased threat of terrorism and organised crime around the world. Depending on the local conditions, it is either implemented as a way of complementing CSDP operations, or as a separate measure. The need for this initiative is seen in the fact that a certain level of security is a necessary precondition to sustainable development, while development fosters sustainable peace.²² The pilot cases of Mali and Somalia, in which the EU provides support for the training and equipping of local partners, aim to build capacity in the security sector, to enable them to prevent and manage security crises, and ultimately to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The Mali pilot case is financed through Member State contributions and the Athena mechanism. The Somalia pilot case is financed under various instruments, including the operation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (run by the African Union, but with the EU as its main financial contributor) and the three CSDP missions in Somalia and the wider region, focusing on

military training, counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building (financed and staffed by contributing Member States, complemented by the Athena mechanism for common costs).

Official development assistance

EU external assistance places clear emphasis on non-military spending: under the 2014-2020 MFF, at least 90% of overall EU external assistance needs to be official development assistance (ODA), which generally excludes military expenses. There is no intention to provide lethal weapons even outside ODA spending.²³ However, due to the link between security and the provisions for sustainable development, some activities funded by the African Peace Facility (14% for the AU operation in Mali (AFISMA) and 5% for the AU operation in Somalia (AMISOM)) are considered ODA-eligible.²⁴

Building on the experience of these pilot cases, the [Joint Communication on 'Capacity-building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises'](#) of April 2015 outlines the way forward as a new commitment to deliver on peace and stability and to improve capacity building in the security sector. Initially, this should be done using the existing EU foreign assistance instruments, and through matching and coordinated efforts by the Member States. Further development of this initiative, its financing and implementation are still under discussion.

EU Delegations

In addition to the EUSRs and CSDP EU Missions, currently the EU also has [139 delegations and offices](#), which are run by the EEAS (funded under the administrative expenditure budget) and funded under the CFSP with special mandates in response to specific circumstances in countries or regions around the world. These delegations provide political representation for the EU and its citizens globally. They are mostly responsible for single states, but sometimes delegations represent the Union in a region/group of countries, or maintain relations with international organisations (e.g. the United Nations). They play a key role in implementing the EU's foreign policy, including through negotiations according to their given mandates, as well as by providing analyses and reports of developments in their host countries. The delegations act in full complementarity with the CSDP, support the implementation of various EU programmes – especially some actions under the EIDHR – facilitate coordination with EU member states, and liaise with international partners. Other programmes supported by the EU delegations and funded by various EU expenditures contribute to their overall funding. They maintain political and cultural dialogue, and oversee EU trade issues with the respective countries.²⁵ The EU delegations are tasked with strengthening the visibility and role of the EU in its external relations.²⁶

Endnotes

¹ The Member States ensured that they remained in control of the CFSP, with little formal involvement from 'supranational institutions'. Unanimous decision-making remains the norm, with the European Council and the Council of the EU as the main institutional actors, while the High Representative/Vice President and Member States are responsible for implementing the CFSP. The adoption of legislative acts (i.e. acts adopted through the legislative procedure) is specifically excluded under the CFSP; therefore the European Commission and Parliament have a limited formal role with regard to the CFSP and the CSDP, and the Court of Justice of the EU has no jurisdiction (with two exceptions: monitoring respect for the powers of EU institutions ([Article 40 TEU](#)) and reviewing the legality of CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons ([Article 275\(2\) TFEU](#))). Moreover, Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the Treaty maintain that the CFSP and CSDP provisions do not affect 'the existing legal basis, responsibilities and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy'. Importantly, the CFSP lacks an enforcement mechanism to ensure Member States' compliance with decisions, although they are bound by an obligation of loyal cooperation and mutual solidarity.

² See Commentario breve ai Trattati dell'Unione Europea, Pocar F., Baruffi M. C., CEDAM, second edition 2014.

- ³ Denmark has an opt-out from decisions or actions having military/defence implications. See Article 5 of Protocol 22 annexed to the Treaties.
- ⁴ See European Union Treaties: Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/ Geiger, R., Khan, D., Kotzur, M. (Eds.), München, 2015, 1247 p.
- ⁵ See Commentario breve ai Trattati dell'Unione Europea, op. cit., 2014.
- ⁶ See The Treaty on European Union (TEU): a commentary, Blanke H-J., Mangiameli S., Springer, Heidelberg, 2013.
- ⁷ See [Official Journal C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1](#).
- ⁸ See Commentario breve ai Trattati dell'Unione Europea, op.cit., 2014.
- ⁹ See The Treaty on European Union (TEU): a commentary, op.cit., 2013.
- ¹⁰ In addition, experts point out that the acts providing for **financing** to third countries or international organisations (many EU non-proliferation measures consist of financing projects in third countries and supporting the activities of international bodies in this field), which before the Treaty of Lisbon were called Joint Actions, now refer more often to Article 26(2) TEU than to Article 28 TEU. See Pocar F., Baruffi M. C., op. cit., [2014](#).
- ¹¹ See Commentario breve ai Trattati dell'Unione Europea, op.cit., 2014.
- ¹² See Blanke and Mangiameli, op.cit.
- ¹³ See [Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations](#), edited by Rehl J. and Glume G., 2015.
- ¹⁴ See [European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia. Towards Security. Building Confidence](#), EEAS, 2015.
- ¹⁵ See [EU Police Mission in Afghanistan. Factsheet](#), EEAS, 2015.
- ¹⁶ See [Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations](#), EEAS, 2013.
- ¹⁷ See [CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?](#), Tardy T., 2015.
- ¹⁸ See [Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations: explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure](#), Terpan F., 2014.
- ¹⁹ See [Unrecognized and Unwelcome? The Role of the EU in Preventing the Proliferation of CBRN Weapons, Materials and Knowledge](#), Zwolski K., 2011.
- ²⁰ See [EU financial instruments for external action. Briefing](#), Cirlig, C.-C., EPRS, 2013.
- ²¹ See [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications \(Athena\) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP](#), European Council, 2015.
- ²² See [Enabling partners to manage crises – From ‘train and equip’ to capacity-building. Brief No 18](#), Tardy T., 2015.
- ²³ See [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises](#), European Commission, 2015.
- ²⁴ See [Enabling partners to manage crises – From ‘train and equip’ to capacity-building. Brief No 18](#), Tardy T., 2015.
- ²⁵ See [Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP - 2014 - Draft Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament](#), Council of the EU, 2015.
- ²⁶ See Joint [Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises](#), European Commission, 2013.

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