Briefing
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Resilience in the EU's foreign and security policy

SUMMARY

The migratory pressure with which the European Union is struggling is yet more evidence that distance or the natural borders inherent in seas, mountains and deserts are of little significance when people are confronted with challenges like conflict, fragility or failure of governance. The scale of conflicts, natural hazards, water shortages and state collapse suggests that things will only get worse – unless a new policy paradigm is effectively implemented.

Resilience – understood as the capacity of different layers of society to withstand, to adapt to, and to recover quickly from stresses and shocks – has gradually emerged as an answer to the growing complexity of the international security environment. In the EU context, the concept of resilience combines different policy areas: humanitarian aid, development assistance, disaster-risk reduction, climate-change adaptation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As a relatively new addition to EU jargon, the aim of building societal resilience still needs to be translated into tangible, practicable measures.

This briefing complements an earlier briefing, Risk and resilience in foreign policy, published in September 2015.

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Societal resilience: old wine in new bottles?

It is not an invasion by a foreign army or a conflict between big powers but migration of civilians escaping war, injustice or simply looking for better opportunities that has brought to the fore two basic truths about the European Union's security position: on one hand, its limited preparedness to deal with external crises, and on the other hand the need for the EU to continue to engage externally in order to ensure security within its borders. There is no longer any doubt that the nexus between internal and external security is not just an academic construct: developments in the EU's close and extended neighbourhood are challenging European social, economic and political systems in unprecedented ways. For instance, faced with refugee influxes, the governments of Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden have imposed limitations on the application of the Schengen Borders Code by introducing temporary border controls. It is also increasingly clear that the EU's domestic policies have their limits and in some cases are even outdated. The effort needed to make the European Common Asylum System a well-functioning mechanism is just one example.

While the effectiveness of European Union policies is being called increasingly into debate, it is also evident that to safeguard the open and values-based system on which it was founded, the EU cannot withdraw from its role as a regional security provider. However, new challenges in its southern and eastern neighbourhoods may require the EU to adopt new, more people-centred optics through which to view events in other parts of the world. What the EU refers to as 'root causes' in most policy documents are, as a matter of fact, the daily lives of millions of people to Europe's south and east. Now more than ever it is clear that sharing Europe's wealth – by investing in stable, democratic and resilient societies in the EU's own neighbourhood – might be the best way to ensure the security and prosperity of EU citizens. At the same time, the EU cannot look outwards to outsource its own security. Therefore, strengthening the EU's own resilience is, in the long term, the only way to raise the threshold of its vulnerability.

What is resilience and why does it matter?

The concept of resilience has emerged as a potential remedy for the fragmentation that has rendered peacebuilding, and humanitarian and development work inefficient and unsustainable. Resilience within the scope of EU policy is generally defined as the capacity of different layers of society – individuals, households, communities, countries or regions – to withstand, adapt to and recover quickly from stresses and shocks such as natural hazards, violence or conflict. Its particular value lies in bringing under the same umbrella different communities, with their respective short and long-term approaches to risk management.

As references to resilience become more common, it is essential to ensure that it is not just another buzzword devoid of substance, but rather a set of practical approaches and instruments to tackle risks. Addressing risks comprehensively is necessary in order to avoid an artificial division of labour that might ultimately compromise a common objective. For instance, food security crises in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel highlighted the need to focus on similar objectives in different policy areas such as agriculture or water resource management. Building resilience also requires different sectors to work together in order to ensure complementarity and to avoid conflicting approaches. For instance, investment in the use of new technologies for development programmes (i.e. education, healthcare and agriculture) will not bring the desired results if there is no energy infrastructure that can recharge a mobile phone or power a computer. Finally,

risks are distributed differently among layers of society and are dealt with in different ways, which calls for the involvement of stakeholders at global, national, sub-national, community and household levels. Consequently, a comprehensive risk and vulnerability analysis is one of the main elements in ensuring that resilience building reaches each layer of society. Broad engagement of this kind helps to ensure that the interconnected nature of risks is taken on board and reflected in existing or future programmes.

External determinants of the EU's vulnerability

Societal, economic, technological and geopolitical trends point to the growing vulnerability of the world's population to shocks and stresses, including: interstate conflicts, natural disasters, extreme weather events, water crises, state collapse and cyber-attacks. In such a rapidly changing environment, complex and interconnected risks do not fit within neat categories delineated by geographical borders or legal boundaries, and challenge traditional approaches to foreign and security policy. The migratory pressure the EU is currently facing is an illustration that distance or natural borders outlined by seas, mountains and deserts are irrelevant when people are confronted with conflict, poverty or persecution.

Conflict and insecurity

The 2011 World Bank report on Conflict, Security and Development explored the theoretical link between conflict, security and development issues. The report noted that at least 1.5 billion people globally were (at that moment) affected by ongoing violence or its legacies. It found that organised violence was often spurred by a range of domestic and international stresses, such as youth unemployment, income shocks, tension among ethnic, religious or social groups and trafficking networks. Risks of violence were greater when high stresses combined with weak capacity or a lack of legitimacy of key national institutions. According to recent data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, even though the number of **armed conflicts** has decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War, the yearly death toll has been its highest since the end of the Cold War. Of the 40 active conflicts reported, all but one (between India and Pakistan) were intrastate conflicts: in 13 of them, one or more other states – including EU Member States – were contributing troops to one or both sides; five out of six Eastern Neighbourhood partners were involved in frozen or ongoing conflicts in which Russia played a role.

A security vacuum created by many of these conflicts has also generated conditions favourable to the spread of **terrorism**. The available data show that in 2014, deaths caused by terrorist attacks in Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan amounted to 73% of total fatalities; while the Middle East and North Africa registered the highest number of attacks, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen one of the highest increases in terrorist activities. As a consequence of war and conflict, worldwide **displacement** in 2015 was at the highest level ever recorded, with almost 60 million people forcibly displaced (compared with 37.5 million a decade ago), with the average period spent in displacement estimated at 25 years for refugees and more than 10 years for 90% of internally displaced persons (IDPs). At the same time, **hybrid threats** challenge the pre-established legal, institutional and conceptual basis of such fundamental notions as sovereignty, legality and accountability, increasing the risk of misperception and escalation that could result in an interstate conflict.

Figure 1 – The EU's neighbours and their coping capacity



Data source: INFORM 2016.

Security of resources

Limited access to food, fresh water or energy can be both a result and one of the main drivers of instability. The situation is aggravated by extreme climate conditions. For instance, the conflict in Syria has its roots in structural and economic problems that were already widespread in Syria in the early 2000s. Prior to the violent uprising of 2011, the countries of the greater Fertile Crescent had experienced one of the most severe droughts in history. According to the United Nations Response Plan, by 2009, some 1.3 million inhabitants of eastern Syria had been affected by this disaster, with 803 000 persons having lost almost their entire livelihoods and facing extreme hardship. Between 2006 and 2009 the income of over 75 641 affected households decreased by 90%, and their assets and sources of livelihood were severely compromised, resulting in large-scale migration out of the affected areas to urban areas (figures range from 40 000 to 60 000 families). A report by the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America suggests that mass migration of farming families to urban centres and growing inequalities eventually contributed to the political unrest. As a consequence of overcrowding in refugee camps and poor living conditions, governments in neighbouring countries – in particular Jordan and Lebanon which host the highest numbers of Syrian refugees per capita – are currently under pressure to deliver basic services to their citizens (including education, healthcare and employment), in order to curb growing dissatisfaction with government handling of the migration crisis and prevent instability that could spill over across the whole region.

According to FAO forecasts, 34 countries globally – 27 of which are in Africa – are in need of external assistance for **food** as a result of civil conflicts and adverse weather conditions, such as El Niño-associated drought. Access to fresh **water** and water resources will also increasingly become a cause of instability. In 2014, 49 countries were faced with water scarcity (compared with 22 countries in 1962 when such measurements were first conducted) while a further 27 countries were confronted with water stress.[1] The situation is only going to deteriorate as the world's population grows, and demand for resources and dependence on water increase. As the recent OECD report on the future of the ocean economy stresses, the global value added of the ocean economy (ocean-based industries,

including the shipping sector, fisheries, offshore oil and gas drilling, and tourism) could reach over US$3 trillion by 2030 (in constant US dollars) and contribute to creating approximately 40 million full-time equivalent jobs. This potential, however, might never materialise given the impact of climate change. The situation around the Mediterranean basin is only going to deteriorate. According to a NASA study the droughts that have hit the eastern Mediterranean since 1998 are the worst in 900 years. Another study on the impact of climate change in the Middle East and North Africa has found that by 2050 summer temperatures across the region will reach around 46 degrees Celsius, and that hot days will occur five times more often than was the case at the beginning of the 2000s. Such extreme temperatures, in combination with increasing air pollution by windblown desert dust, will render living conditions in parts of the region intolerable, and may lead to a 'climate exodus', migration (most likely to Europe) and result in social unrest.

Figure 2 – The European Union's exposure to humanitarian crises and disasters



Data source: INFORM 2016.

Shocks to global networks and interconnectedness

The depth of the European Union's integration in **global markets** – not only financial markets but also trade, energy, tourism, transport and communication markets – is a potential source of vulnerability. For this reason, the EU has a strong interest in improving its situational-awareness with regard to policy developments in its main partner countries (in particular those to which the EU is exposed), strengthening policy coordination, especially in those areas where physical borders are no longer guarantors of security (trade, finance, cybersecurity), and shaping the international regulatory environment. Europe's dependence on **energy resources**, **minerals** and **rare earths** might increasingly expose its vulnerability, as many of the EU's suppliers either challenge its economic and political role globally (e.g. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia), are dependent on Europe's challengers (e.g. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan), or are located in relatively volatile regions (e.g. Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Iraq). Consequently, resource scarcity could result in the securitisation of resource management and trade, and lead to tensions. This has been the case for the supply of Russia's gas to Ukraine and other European countries, and the export of rare earths from China to Japan. **Natural hazards and man-made disasters**, too, can have an unintended negative impact on bilateral relations. A volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010 disrupted international air travel – in Europe in particular – with the total loss to the airline industry estimated at €1.3 billion. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan in March 2011, caused by an earthquake and subsequent tsunami, resulted in radioactive contamination of 30 000 km^2 of the Japanese mainland – a surface area comparable to the territory of Belgium or triple the size of Cyprus – with

long-lasting implications. The reliance of our societies on internet-based platforms for the delivery of services and communications increases vulnerability to **digital security** risks. According to recent studies, internet-related technologies such as mobile internet, the Internet of Things and cloud computing will generate, by 2025, potential economic benefits of between US$8.1 trillion and US$23.2 trillion annually. At the same time, the contribution of the internet economy to the global economy is between US$2 trillion and US$3 trillion – up to 20% of this amount (US$400 billion) is lost due to cybercrime. Furthermore, trends in online demographics suggest that the leading role that the EU and USA have traditionally played in shaping global standards and policies in the digital world will increasingly be challenged. The number of internet users is expected to reach 4.7 billion by 2025. But most of this growth will come from developing countries and emerging economies, whose citizens will represent 75% of the world's online population, and not from the transatlantic area.

Weak governance and distrust in governments

The extent to which many of the identified trends and phenomena evolve to become threats and a source of insecurity – both for third countries and for the EU – depends partly on the level of societal resilience. This, on the other hand, will result from the quality of government policies and the capacity (or lack of it) to implement them. According to the 2016 Index for Risk Management (INFORM), almost 28% of countries worldwide have a high or very high lack of **institutional and infrastructure-linked coping capacity**, with the situation being worst in Sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia and south-east Asia.

Figure 3 – The European Union's exposure to major risks globally in 2016



Data source: World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2016.

Government policies can also have adverse effects on societal resilience. For instance, the 2016 report by the Yale University Environmental Performance Index assessing countries' performance on high-priority environmental issues linked to protection of human health and of ecosystems found that many African, Asian, and Arab countries – hence those expected to suffer most due to climate change – are also among the poorest performers. In addition to the question of the content and objectives of the policies, there are also certain risks associated with the policy-making process. Misguided overconfidence that governments can cope with the problems alone – without engaging

all stakeholders – can push governments to focus excessively on strengthening the instruments of state power (i.e. law enforcement, defence) at the expense of other policy areas (i.e. health, education, urban planning), and disregard the support that civil society and the private sector can provide. Over-reliance on security instruments and their potentially negative impact on civil liberties and freedoms may, in turn, further undermine the legitimacy of governments, resulting in instability and social unrest.

The EU's approach to resilience

The concept of resilience emerged in the EU's foreign policy gradually, as the need to address development, conflict, and security in a holistic manner became clear. Formally adopted in the Council conclusions on an EU Approach to Resilience (2013), the elements of resilience had already been mentioned in the Council conclusions on Security and Development (2007), which acknowledged that 'there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security' as there will be no sustainable peace without development and poverty eradication. The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, adopted in 2011, established a guiding framework for the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources when dealing with complex security challenges.

The 2013 Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries for 2013-2020 further recognised the need to address the root causes of crises, and bring together a number of key elements, including risk assessment; risk reduction, prevention, mitigation and preparedness; and swift response to and recovery from crises. The main components of the Action Plan are development and strengthening of national and local resilience capacities; innovation, learning and advocacy; and methodologies and tools to support resilience, including EU procedures and mechanisms. The 2014 EU Resilience Compendium provides concrete illustrations – including flagship projects such as Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience (SHARE) and the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR) – of how the resilience approach is being translated into reality by governments, donors, civil society organisations and vulnerable communities themselves.

The review of the European Security Strategy – triggered by the changing global environment – has provided an opportunity for a more focused reflection on societal resilience, both in the EU and in third countries. To that end, in April 2015 the European Commission presented a communication on capacity-building in support of security and development. The European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have also taken steps to improve their operational capacities by issuing guidance notes on the use of conflict analysis in support of EU external action, and on addressing conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security under EU cooperation instruments. Given the global nature of long-term forced displacement – and its political, economic and societal implications – in September 2015 the Commission issued a communication on the role of EU external action in the refugee crisis, which stresses the importance of addressing the root causes of migration and displacement. In 2016, the Commission presented two policy papers that reflect the dilemmas associated with responding to increasingly complex security challenges and highlighting the importance of resilience: a communication on forced displacement and development and the EU Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.

By bringing under the same policy umbrella several instruments and mechanisms, the EU's approach to building resilience in third countries aims to bring together different

policy communities and create complementarities at all stages of the crisis cycle: preparedness, prevention, response and recovery. The main challenge in this regard will be to reconcile the different organisational cultures and missions of the various organisations participating in the crisis cycle.

Preparedness and prevention

Increasing awareness of risks and promoting early preventive action is a complex task that requires solid mechanisms for risk assessment. But a robust risk assessment mechanism constitutes the basis for designing efficient preventive action and response plans. The **EU's Conflict Early Warning System** (EWS), managed by the conflict prevention, peacebuilding and mediation instruments division of the European External Action Service (EEAS), provides an assessment of conflict risks. Early identification of potential hotspots and potential root causes is essential for effective policy response in the field of development assistance, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.

Development assistance

Managed primarily by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), this is a set of instruments focused on a number of specific policy objectives, including reduction of poverty, sustainable economic, social and environmental development and promotion of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights. Many of these objectives are pursued, for instance, through capacity-building initiatives that aim to equip partner countries with skills, legal frameworks or institutions that contribute to their development. Development aid is also increasingly used to support security-related objectives. In February 2016, the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed to update the existing approach to reporting expenditures for peace and security and treat them as official development assistance (ODA).

Disaster-risk reduction (DRR)

DRR is the concept and practice focused on systematic efforts to reduce the damage caused by natural hazards (i.e. earthquakes, floods) and to strengthen the resilience of communities, helping them to anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks. Over 48% of all projects funded by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate-General (DG ECHO) include DRR activities. Examples of DRR practices include wise management of land and the environment, lessening the vulnerability of people and property, and improving preparedness and early warning for adverse events.

Climate-change adaptation

This approach aims to anticipate the adverse effects of climate change and take actions that prevent or minimise potential damage or take advantage of opportunities that may arise. Concrete examples of measures include using scarce water resources more efficiently, adapting building codes to future climate conditions, and developing drought-tolerant crops. The minimum cost of not adapting to climate change in the EU is estimated at €100 billion a year in 2020 and €250 billion in 2050.

Response and recovery

Humanitarian aid coordinated by DG ECHO deals with the negative impact of crises and conflicts on the lives and conditions of the populations affected, including measures to improve their health, education, food and access to water or shelter. The EU architecture for dealing with **complex crises and disasters** has been significantly strengthened with the adoption of the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements and the

transformation of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) into the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) in 2013. For instance, thanks to direct links with the civil protection and humanitarian aid authorities in all Member States, the ERCC enables the smooth and real-time exchange of information regarding the assistance offered to (and the needs of) the disaster-stricken country. **Crisis management** in the context of foreign and security policy implies overall planning, organisation and coordination of crisis-related activities, including preparedness, monitoring and response. It encompasses a broad array of processes that contribute to conflict prevention and peaceful solutions to disputes, stabilisation, longer-term recovery and reconciliation.

Financing resilience-building

With an increasing focus on building societal resilience, EU funding has also undergone some adaptation. For instance, the EU's Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) systematically address resilience, while Resilience Marker helps to assess to what extent humanitarian actions funded by ECHO integrate resilience considerations. In addition to humanitarian aid and development assistance, the EU contributes to building resilience through several thematic and regional instruments managed by the European Commission: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); crisis response and prevention measures under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP); promotion of the Union's strategic interests under the Partnership Instrument (PI); cooperation with industrialised countries (ICI); implementing electoral observation missions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); reduction of poverty through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). In order to ensure greater flexibility for the EU's international engagement, the EU has adjusted the ways in which it uses its financial mechanisms, for instance through a new regulation governing the IcSP and increasing use of trust funds for external action. In June 2016, the European Commission presented a proposal for a New Migration Partnership Framework based on 'tailor-made' and 'results-oriented' cooperation with third countries, and promising increased and more flexible funding for tackling the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Even though the main focus of IcSP remains unchanged (i.e. crisis response, crisis preparedness and conflict prevention), the conflict prevention component has received a substantial boost. The added value of IcSP lies in addressing a set of issues that cannot be addressed effectively under other EU cooperation instruments and in including within its scope new security challenges that do not always meet ODA eligibility requirements (new forms of illicit trafficking, cybersecurity). As a mechanism to complement the EU's geographical instruments, the IcSP is designed to deliver short-term assistance or long-term support worldwide. The focus of the short-term component is on conflict prevention, support for post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery after a natural disaster (e.g. support for international criminal courts, promotion of independent media). The long-term component, on the other hand, aims to strengthen preparedness, mitigation and response capacities to address global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats to law and order, critical infrastructure, computer networks and border management. Specific objectives and priorities – with total funding amounting to €2.3 billion – are laid down in the Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020.

Trust funds and facilities

The main added value of EU trust funds lies in their more coordinated and flexible method for delivering aid in emergencies and post-emergency situations. As part of the External Investment Plan, the Commission intends to present a new fund to mobilise investments in developing third countries, which will focus, in part, on targeted assistance to improve the business environment in the countries concerned. The priority countries as announced by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans include Jordan, Lebanon, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Libya. The existing trust funds and facilities at EU level include:

- **The Facility for Refugees in Turkey**: established on the basis of the EU-Turkey joint action plan and endorsed by the European Council on 15 October 2015. The facility aims to coordinate and streamline the financing of programmes for Syrians under temporary protection and for host communities in Turkey. In February 2016, the EU Member States reached a decision on €3 billion funding for 2016-2017: €1 billion will be financed from the EU budget and the remaining €2 billion by contributions from the Member States according to their share of EU gross national income (GNI). To date, nearly €200 million has been committed to projects, and the EU expects to contract €1 billion in EU funding by the end of July 2016. Implementation will depend on Turkey respecting a governance and conditionality framework laid down in the Joint Action Plan. The European Commission presented the first progress report in April 2016.
- **The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa**: officially launched by the EU, Norway, Switzerland and African counterparts at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015. In line with the Strategic Orientation Document the trust fund aims to respond to the challenges of irregular migration and displacement by addressing their root causes and by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development. Building resilience is one of the trust fund's priority areas, with projects focused on basic services for local populations (e.g. food security, health, education and social protection) and environmental sustainability. The Commission-managed instruments amount to €1.8 billion and are supplemented by additional funds from EU Member States and other donors, which to date amount to almost €82 million.
- **The Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis** (Madad Fund): established in December 2014 with the aim of providing a 'coherent and reinforced aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale', in particular to the needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, the hosting communities and their national and local authorities as regards resilience and early recovery. Two main priorities of the Madad Fund are: to promote educational, protection and engagement opportunities for children and young people in line with the 'No Lost Generation' initiative; and to reduce the pressure on host countries by investing in livelihoods and social cohesion, and support them in providing employment and educational opportunities. As of 20 May 2016, pledges and contributions to the Madad Fund amounted to a total volume of €733 million (out of a target volume of €1 billion), including over €69 million from 21 EU Member States, €24 million in co-financing for reoriented IPA funds for Turkey, and almost €640 million from various EU instruments (ENI, IPA, DCI).

Figure 4 – Selected EU funding for societal resilience in third countries



Data source: European Commission, DG NEAR and DG DEVCO, May and June 2016.

Building resilience through parliamentary action

Building societal resilience cannot be detached from ensuring respect for the rule of law and democracy. In that sense, the European Parliament has actively shaped the EU agenda with regard to funding priorities for EU humanitarian action or for climate change. It has also often acted as a 'collective conscience' for the European Commission and Member States in the Council, for instance when they failed to meet their commitments under the refugee relocation scheme or when they have entered into political agreements with governments with doubtful human rights records.

Foreign affairs and security

The Parliament's May 2015 resolution on implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) stresses 'as a matter of the utmost urgency' the need for the EU and its Member States to 'adapt to the new security challenges, in particular by making effective use of existing CSDP tools, including by linking these better to the EU's foreign affairs tools, humanitarian assistance, and development policy'. Furthermore, a parallel resolution on financing the CSDP calls on the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini and the Member States 'to unleash the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty … with regard to a faster and more flexible use of the CSDP missions and operations'. The Parliament has also stressed the need for the EU to strengthen its partners' resilience and capabilities to provide for their own security. In April 2016 – in the context of the review of the EU's Global Strategy – the EP adopted a resolution on the EU in a changing global environment, which emphasises the importance of building the EU's 'internal and its external resilience, its capacity to anticipate, pre-empt and resolve predictable challenges and threats and to be prepared to take swift action on unpredictable crises'.

Development and humanitarian assistance

With regard to the post-2015 global development agenda, a resolution on financing for development calls on the EU to ensure that financing for development and climate change contributes to building resilience and preparedness while achieving the global goal of leaving no one behind. The focus on resilience is also very dominant in the Parliament's reflection on challenges and opportunities for humanitarian assistance. In a resolution adopted ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit, Members of Parliament underlined that resilience should systematically be incorporated into the response plans

to be provided by local, regional and national administrations, industry and civil society, and accompanied by adequate funding. Consequently, the Parliament called on the Commission to present an initiative that would increase effectiveness and flexibility of the EU response to crisis by linking humanitarian aid, development cooperation and resilience in a more systematic way.

Democracy support

Parliaments as venues for formal political process and dialogue provide an important contribution to conflict prevention, reduction and recovery. The European Parliament's Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group (DEG) plays a primary role in providing political guidance and supervision on a broad range of activities, including monitoring and continued follow-up of elections, support for parliamentary democracy, and management of activities in connection with the Sakharov Network and human rights-related actions. The Parliament may also appoint special envoys for mediation and conflict prevention. By strengthening the role of parliaments in regional and multilateral peace processes, monitoring mediation and peace processes, and developing parliamentary capacities for conflict prevention, it also contributes to the capacity-building of parliamentary bodies in other parts of the world.

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Endnotes

[1] Water scarcity = less than 1 000 m^3/person/year; water stress = 1 000 to 1 700 m^3/person/year; water vulnerability = 1 700 to 2 500 m^3/person/year.

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