

EU efforts on counter-terrorism – Capacity-building in third countries

SUMMARY

In the European Union (EU), responsibility for counter-terrorism lies primarily with Member States. However, the role of the EU itself in counter-terrorism has grown significantly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks that have hit Europe in the post-'9/11' era. The cross-border aspects of the terrorist threat call for a coordinated EU approach. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as internal and external security, has come to shape the EU's actions beyond its own borders. In the context of terrorism, the EU has an extensive toolkit of human and financial resources that support third countries in managing or mitigating terrorist threats.

A key element of EU action is capacity-building in partner countries, to ensure local ownership, a sustainable assistance model and the full use of local expertise for challenges that are geographically distinct. The EU's external capacity-building efforts in counter-terrorism include security sector reform (SSR)-associated measures, such as strengthening the rule of law, improving the governance of security providers, improving border management, reforming the armed forces, and training law enforcement actors. As part of the EU's multifaceted assistance, efforts to curb terrorist funding and improve strategic communications to counter radicalisation and violent extremism complement SSR-related activities. Soft-power projects funded through the Commission's different funding instruments, coupled with both military and civilian common security and defence policy missions provide the framework through which the EU tries to address both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism and radicalisation.



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Glossary

AML/CTF:	Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing.
CSDP:	Common security and defence policy.
IcSP:	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.
IPA:	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance.
ISIL/Da'esh:	The 'Islamic State' in Iraq and the Levant, a jihadist terrorist group.
SSR:	Security sector reform.

Terrorism 'hot-spots' – state of play

Terrorist groups in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel – ISIL/Da'esh and al-Qaeda and their local franchises, and Boko Haram – have been put on the back foot; some have lost most of the territory in which they operate, while others have seen their enclaves and influence diminish. Afghanistan stands out as an exception, but the territorial retreat of terrorist groups in the Levant, the Maghreb and the Sahel can be seen as a positive sign in the fight against terrorism. The control of territory facilitates recruitment, financing, logistics and propaganda production. At the same time, the severity of a group's threat is not always a function of the territory it controls. Terrorist groups have shown themselves able to adapt and morph their structures in order to wage low-resource types of insurgencies. The loss of territory also means that foreign terrorist fighters will return to their home countries, increasing the threat of terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Moreover, as long as the key underlying factors of dissent have not been addressed, groups will still maintain active networks of support, even without the control of significant territory.

Western Balkans

The countries of the Western Balkans have well established travel routes to and from conflict zones in the Middle East. It is [estimated](#) that nearly 1 000 fighters have travelled from the Western Balkans to fight in Syria and Iraq since 2012. The battle experience of returning foreign fighters, together with the availability of small and light weapons and explosive devices, compound the threat of religiously motivated, ethno-nationalist and separatist [terrorism](#) in the Western Balkans. High youth unemployment, widespread corruption and weak institutions are shaping the economic environment of the region. Economic challenges are thus added to inherently tense inter-communal relations, creating an environment ripe for radicalisation.

Middle East and North Africa

As a result of the very successful military campaign against 'Islamic State' in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), the group has lost two thirds of the territory and all of the major cities it once [controlled](#) in Syria and Iraq. The group is expected to lose most of its territory in Iraq and Syria by mid-2018, and transform into an underground armed insurgency. There are concerns that ISIL/Da'esh will engage in more '[traditional](#)' terrorist activities and carry out attacks in the Middle Eastern and European countries from which its fighters originally came. Moreover, the discontent among [Sunni](#) communities in Iraq and Syria that contributed to the rapid rise of ISIL/Da'esh in the region has not been addressed and could lead to the rise of '[ISIS 3.0](#)'.

The political crisis of the post-Arab spring era has also encouraged insurgencies in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, a region that has long suffered state neglect, heavy-handed [securitisation](#) measures and lack of economic opportunities. The jihadi insurgency overlaps with Bedouin grievances that have been prevalent since the 1980s, indicating that violence has deeper

[socio-economic roots](#) that morph over time. In Libya, despite ISIL/Da'esh's near complete defeat, the presence of [three governments](#), a multitude of militias, the availability of small arms from the extensive arsenal of the former Gadhafi regime, and income from oil and [illicit activities](#), make the country an ideal safe haven for regional terrorist groups.

The Sahel

Rapid population growth coupled with diminishing stocks of water and arable land are raising tensions between pastoralists and farmers in the Sahel region. At the same time, the young population is left with few viable paths for socio-economic advancement. A [common feature](#) of governance in the Sahel is a weak centralised state, marginalised peripheries, weak institutions and endemic corruption. Criminal gangs, ethnic militias, smugglers and traffickers [operate in the area](#) and are all resisting state control. Violent extremist actors use the networks of these groups, operating alongside them or controlling their activities. Nevertheless, terrorist groups in the [Sahel](#) have failed to translate the weak control of the central government and socio-economic disenfranchisement into an opportunity to seize and administer territory for significant periods of time. In Mali, while progress has been made, despite a 13 000 strong UN-peacekeeping force (MINUSMA) and support from the French-led operation Berkhane, [terrorist attacks persist](#), jeopardising a fragile peace agreement.

Boko Haram is indicative of how an organisation can tap into economic and political disenfranchisement, enrich itself through illicit activities in ungoverned spaces and successfully combat a demoralised, poorly trained and ill-equipped [security apparatus](#). The military action undertaken following the formation of a regional multi-national joint task force – by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria – has severely weakened Boko Haram and recaptured the territory it was occupying. However, the organisation maintains the ability to launch deadly and disruptive low-resource [attacks](#).

Afghanistan

Despite a nominally 183 000 strong Afghan national army, and a 151 000 strong police force, Afghanistan's government and security apparatus have failed to push back insurgent groups within the country. A series of high profile attacks have taken place across the country in 2017, which has been one of the [deadliest years](#) since 2001. Due to political infighting, the national unity government's reform agenda has [stalled](#), and arbitrary detentions, torture and attacks against journalists [persist](#).

Conceptual framework of EU involvement

Capacity-building

Since the mid-1990s, all major multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and non-governmental development organisations have adopted capacity-building as a core element of their policies (for further information, see EPRS briefing on '[Understanding capacity building](#)', April 2017). The approach crystallised as a mainstream development approach in the 2006 [paper](#) from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD's DAC defines capacity-building/development as 'a process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time'. Capacity-building efforts also aim to increase the ability of a state to change in order to deliver its functions more effectively.

Following the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued [resolution 1373](#), outlining the measures to be taken by states to prevent future attacks. These included criminalising terrorism and support of terrorism, tackling

the financing of terrorist activities, effectively controlling territory and borders, reforming justice systems, sharing information and boosting crime fighting.

A multifaceted counter-terrorism strategy can often be [supported](#) most effectively by offering cooperation and assistance in the form of capacity-building. Such an approach allows the donor to contribute to national security objectives by offering expertise and assistance, without potentially costly and ineffective direct intervention abroad. At the same time, capacity-building increases the recipient's pre-existing capabilities and local understanding of the issue at hand; allows for local ownership and a sustainable effort that mitigates the donor's fluctuations in commitment or agenda changes.

Security sector reform (SSR)

SSR aims to change the way in which a state's monopoly of the use of force is monitored, decided and executed. SSR first emerged as a concept in the late 1990s, with calls for reforming the security sector into something citizens 'run to, and not run from'. SSR looks beyond a state's ability to successfully and effectively monopolise the use of force, to its ability to do so in a way that respects and strengthens [human security](#). The emphasis in SSR on respect for human rights, and democratic and civilian oversight as well as the rule of law seeks to ensure 'the security of individuals, their protection and empowerment'.

According to the EU's [Strategic Framework for SSR](#), reforming the security sector is achieved by 'transforming a country's security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance'. In the medium to long term, such reforms strengthen state security, as it is ultimately rendered more efficient and effective, increasing the state's ability to pursue, protect and respond to various threats. In the context of terrorism, the focus on human security allows policy-makers to address some of the root causes of radicalisation, with the aim of preventing terrorism in its nascent stage.

The areas that fall within the [scope](#) of security sector reform include democratic oversight and accountability mechanisms and institutions, armed forces, security and intelligence services, border control management, law enforcement services, the justice sector and paramilitary units. The policy prescriptions that come under the SSR 'umbrella' were not new when the concept emerged. The novelty was that they were subsumed under a common framework providing for cooperation between development and security actors. In the post-9/11 era, in which terrorism emerged as one of the top issues on the global agenda, SSR's relevance is evident given its comprehensive approach to issues pertaining to security; both at the state level and at the individual, 'human security' level.

Resilience

Preventing all possible crises, whether man-made or natural, is not possible. This implies that societies must learn to deal with crises and how to mitigate their impact. [Resilience](#) is defined as the capacity of different layers of society – individuals, households, communities, regions and the country – to withstand, adapt and recover quickly from stresses and shocks. Such shocks may be natural hazards (earthquakes, drought or floods), violence or conflict. The effects of such shocks can be further accentuated by global trends that include mass migration, climate change, urbanisation and population ageing. Resilience to these threats is built through humanitarian aid, development assistance, disaster-risk reduction measures, climate-change adaptation measures, conflict prevention and effective crisis management.

Terrorism funding

In an increasingly inter-connected world, state sovereignty is not only upheld by preventing the illicit smuggling of people, arms and goods, but also cash flows. Jihadi groups must be cut off effectively from [revenue sources](#). Combating terrorist financing has been an essential part of the strategy to defeat ISIL/Da'esh. This requires close international cooperation between financial institutions, law enforcement agencies and judicial bodies. Some of the key aspects of such cooperation (i.e. implementing appropriate preventive measures or actively involving the private sector) are mentioned in the [Manama declaration on combating the financing of terrorism](#) (2014) and more recently in UN resolutions [2199\(2015\)](#) and [2253\(2015\)](#). The EU adopted an [action plan](#) to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing in 2016.

Strategic communication

Terrorist organisations make extensive use of [propaganda and disinformation](#), often through social media. For that reason, [strategic communication](#) has been added to the mix of policy prescriptions in the context of countering terrorism and radicalisation. Strategic communication may involve public diplomacy; communication activities on EU-funded programmes and activities; capacity-building for journalists and media actors and engaging with civil society. Coupled with addressing the underlying factors that render 'toxic messages' and disinformation appealing to citizens in third countries, strategic communication aims to disrupt jihadi and extremist narratives that are disseminated through various channels within and beyond the EU.

Funding sources

European Union funds

There are currently six different EU financial instruments that can be used to support various capacity-building efforts in third countries. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace ([IcSP](#)) can be used to fund [initiatives](#) in the areas of crisis response, conflict prevention and peace-building, as well as measures to address global and trans-regional threats. Following a recently adopted amendment, the IcSP can now also be used to finance measures in support of capacity-building for security and development (CBSD) of military actors in partner countries. The [European Neighbourhood Instrument](#) ([ENI](#)) was created with a view to advancing democracy, the rule of law and respect for human right in the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhoods. The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance ([IPA](#)) supports reforms by providing financial and technical help to EU [enlargement countries](#). The IPA supports the adoption and implementation of political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required to align a country to the Union's rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to future membership. The European Union emergency Trust Fund for Africa ([EUTF](#)) was created in 2015 as one of the immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures to address the refugee crisis, with a focus on the Sahel and Lake Chad area, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. It promotes resilience, economic opportunities, security and development, in an effort to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights ([EIDHR](#)) funds activities to support democracy and respect for human rights in third countries. The Peace Facility for Africa provides funds to support the efforts of the African Union and the [African regional economic communities](#) in the area of peace and security. Funding goes to capacity-building projects, early response mechanisms and African-led peace support operations.

CSDP missions

Civilian missions under the common security and defence policy (CSDP) are financed by the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) budget. The [Foreign Policy Instruments](#) service of the European Commission administers the CFSP budget, which is under the direct responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini. Under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, the amount allocated to the CFSP budget is €2 076 million, with annual commitments of around €296 million.

CSDP *military* operations cannot be funded by the EU budget. EU Member States (and third countries) that decide to contribute to an EU military operation cover their individual participation costs. However, since the establishment of the [Athena financing](#) mechanism in 2004, some common costs of EU CSDP military missions are funded jointly by EU Member States (except Denmark) according to their gross national income. (Further information on the financing of CSDP missions is available in an [EPRS note](#).)

Capacity-building in third countries

International terrorist threats that affect the EU often originate in parts of the world that lie beyond its borders. The EU's [counter-terrorism strategy](#) acknowledges the connection between the internal and external aspects of security in an increasingly open and inter-dependent world. For that reason, assistance to priority third countries is an integral part of the strategy, including in the area of conflict resolution and the promotion of good governance and democracy. Enhancing the [capacities](#) of third-country institutions, justice systems and broader security sectors to address the terrorism threat is also part of that approach. It comprises the promotion of regional dialogue, technical cooperation, training and the provision of essential equipment, material and funding. The ultimate aim of capacity-building is to put a state in a position to address both terrorism and its root causes, using effective soft-power and hard-power tools and policies.

The capacity-building elements of CSDP missions can sometimes evolve or change as geopolitical events unfold. For example, the mandate of the EU capacity-building mission ([EUCAP Sahel Niger](#)) (see below) – originally to fight terrorism and organised crime – was expanded in 2016 to include efforts against irregular migration, at a time when the EU was trying to manage large numbers of refugees and migrants coming to Europe. Other missions do not have counter-terrorism as an explicit mandate, yet they have direct impact on counter-terrorism efforts in the country or the broader region. To ensure the coherence, coordination and effective delivery of all EU-funded counter-terrorism projects in the world, and to strengthen the EU's role in global counter-terrorism efforts, the EU funds the counter-terrorism, monitoring, reporting and support mechanism ([CT MORSE](#)). This is designed to ensure that all efforts are executed as part of a common and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, and that overlap and duplication is minimised, recommendations are followed, and expert analysis is carried out. It also seeks to ensure the visibility of the EU and its role.

The EU's capacity-building activities target different actors and institutions, and are divided into the following thematic areas: rule of law and good governance, land and sea border management, armed forces, law enforcement, building resilience, terrorism funding, and strategic communication. The following section provides an overview of EU funds and operations in these areas.

Rule of law and good governance

According to the EU's 2016 [framework on SSR](#), a national security sector has to operate within a clear and appropriate legal framework, be guided by sound security and justice policies and consist of properly functioning institutions. A security sector's [effectiveness](#) is judged by the extent to which it delivers stability, the rule of law and human security for citizens. Poor governance, weak institutions and the absence of the rule of law can fuel disenfranchisement, injustice, and social as well as political marginalisation. In turn, this creates fertile ground for radical ideologies that portray violence as an alternative route towards social, economic and political advancement. Weak institutions and the absence of the rule of law can also severely hamper the economic prospects of a country, exacerbating instability by preventing economic growth and job creation.

Projects run by the European Commission

As part of its counter-terrorism strategy, the EU has put in place a series of projects, aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of justice systems and reinforcing the rule of law. [Witness protection programmes](#) in the Western Balkan countries aim to protect witnesses that have valuable testimony pertaining to cases of terrorism, organised crime and corruption. Building effective criminal justice systems to combat terrorism is the aim of a project being implemented in [Arab League](#) member states and countries in the Horn of Africa. Strengthening the legal framework and capacity of justice officials to address the problem of [foreign terrorist fighters](#) is the aim of a project being implemented across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the Balkans. In Kosovo, the EU provides help to institutions in their fight against organised crime, corruption, money-laundering and violent extremism. In Jordan, the EU invests in initiatives to try and understand the drivers, methods and trends of radicalisation while strengthening the rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalised persons and returnee fighters. Similar [projects](#) to strengthen the ability of legal regimes to deal with foreign terrorist fighters are being implemented in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, and Tunisia.

CSDP operations

The EU coordinating office for Palestinian police support ([EUPOL COPPS](#)) is a civilian CSDP police and rule of law mission for the Palestinian Territories, which has been active since 2006. One of the aims of the mission is to strengthen the institutions that are part of the Palestinian Authority's criminal justice system.

Law enforcement and internal security

Law enforcement actors are tasked with protecting citizens and their property, preventing crime and maintaining public order across national territory and ensuring territorial integrity. The size and responsibilities of law enforcement agencies vary from country to country, as the type of threat may range from minor civil disorder to armed insurgency. Internal security actors, such as the police, gendarmerie, border guards or intelligence agencies, also play a key role in addressing such threats, as they are tasked with domestic security and border management and are often present in daily civilian life.

European Union funds

Through the IPA, the EU funds two projects in the Western Balkans. In [Albania](#), the PAMECA V project aims to assist key law enforcement agencies, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the state police and the prosecutor's office, align with EU standards; in [Bosnia](#), to increase the level of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and improve their coordination in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and corruption.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is used to provide technical assistance to law enforcement and judicial officials in an area stretching from Africa, via the Arabian Peninsula, to Pakistan. Projects include training aviation administrations and law enforcement authorities in [aviation security](#); [training](#) counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and investigation and prosecution officials; and advising on the optimal inclusion of a human-rights approach in counter-terrorism strategies. In the Horn of Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen, IcSP-funded projects seek to enhance the capabilities of intelligence officials, law enforcement agents and prosecutors to disrupt terrorist activities and prosecute terrorism suspects. In [Pakistan](#), the IcSP funds training to judicial officials responsible for investigating, prosecuting, convicting and detaining terrorists.

A project funded by the EUTF for Africa aims to assist several [West African](#) countries – Benin, Ghana, Mali and Niger – to modernise and strengthen police information systems. Activities focus on improving the way data is collected, stored and shared, to improve the effective use of data by law enforcement actors. In [Mali](#), the EUTF also finances efforts to re-establish the rule of law in the north of the country, through an increase in the presence of security forces operating as part of civilian missions, including the police, gendarmerie, national guard, Malian armed forces, customs and civil protection forces.

In [Nigeria](#) and [Burkina Faso](#), the IcSP is used to support law enforcement agencies in managing the threat of Boko Haram. In Nigeria, efforts focus on improving the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases, and reducing extremism through a rehabilitation project for imprisoned extremist offenders. In Burkina Faso, an IcSP-funded project provides assistance to the government in modernising and developing its law enforcement agencies.

CSDP operations

[EUCAP Somalia](#) focuses on improving Somalia's ability to ensure maritime security in its territorial waters, through better application of maritime law. The mission works with the Somali coast guard, the maritime police, prosecutors and judges, providing strategic advice, specialised training and technical support, including on the drafting of laws. The mission aims to improve the legislative and institutional framework governing maritime security, to enhance the country's law enforcement actors' ability to combat piracy.

[EUCAP Sahel Niger](#) is a civilian CSDP mission that supports the Nigerien security sector in its fight against terrorism and organised crime. The mission provides advice and training to support the Nigerien authorities' efforts to strengthen their security capabilities. The mission involves around 120 international experts, mostly from European security forces and justice departments, who are based in Niamey. The mission's mandate was expanded in 2014 to include assistance to Niger in controlling and fighting irregular migration.

[EUCAP Sahel Mali](#) lends support to the Malian government as the latter implements a nationally driven security sector reform. The mission also provides training and advice to the country's law enforcement actors. In an effort to assist the government to re-establish territorial control over the country, EUCAP Mali works with the national gendarmerie and national guard to improve their operational effectiveness, to re-establish their respective chains of command, reinforce civilian oversight and facilitate their redeployment in the north of the country. As in EUCAP Niger, emphasis is placed on building the capacity of future officers by improving their recruitment and human resources (HR) processes and restructuring training methods.

Land and sea border management

Organised crime networks and terrorist groups benefit from permeable borders, which allow their members to escape prosecution, to procure and transfer resources including weapons and fighters, and to establish trafficking and smuggling routes. This provides them with the financial resources necessary to continue and upgrade their operational capabilities. The long [list](#) of security and non-security actors involved in successful border management poses a significant challenge for donors as coordination and sequencing becomes more complicated. Given the major structural, organisational and legal reforms necessary for integrated border management, successful reform has important implications for other SSR efforts within a country.

European Union funding

Funding from the IcSP is used to strengthen cross-border capacity for the control and detection of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear ([CBRN](#)) substances in North African countries. Moreover, in [Tunisia](#), an IcSP-funded project seeks to increase the participation of border communities in securing and managing borders. The aim is to enhance levels of trust between local stakeholders and border security agents, in order to facilitate trade, prevent smuggling and address some of the factors that contribute to crime and extremism. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) funds two projects in [Lebanon](#) and [Tunisia](#) that provide the Lebanese and Tunisian authorities with equipment and technical support to modernise border crossings. With the broader aim of [stabilising the region](#), a project funded through the [EU Trust Fund for Africa](#) aims to maximise the effectiveness of security actors with respect to controlling borders and territory in the Sahel region, by enhancing transnational and regional cooperation.

CSDP operations

The EU Mediterranean naval operation, [EUNAVFOR Sophia](#), was initially a military mission aimed at identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels and assets used by human traffickers in the southern central Mediterranean. The aim of the mission is to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the area. In June 2016, the mandate of the mission was enlarged to include training and capacity-building of the Libyan coast guard and navy, with a view to transferring responsibility for EUNAVFOR-type activities to the national authorities. The mandate of EUNAVFOR Sophia does not explicitly include the fight against terrorism. However, by providing training to Libyan forces tasked with managing the maritime border, the mission contributes indirectly to stabilisation and counter-terrorism efforts.

The EU border assistance mission in Libya ([EUBAM Libya](#)) operates out of Tunis, alongside the EU Delegation to Libya. Its mandate is to plan for a future civilian CSDP mission in support of the Libyan Government of National Accord. A future mission of this kind, once created, could provide advice and capacity-building in areas such as police and criminal justice, border management, irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking.

In 2005, the EU launched the border assistance mission at the Rafah crossing point ([EUBAM Rafah](#)), to monitor the operation of the crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The crossing is managed by the Palestinian Authority, with Israeli oversight. The mission was set up following the agreement on movement and access signed between the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in November 2005. The mission aims to build up the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to manage all aspects of the border crossing, in order to increase confidence between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. The mission is part of wider EU efforts to Palestinian state-building and has been extended until [30 June 2018](#).

Armed forces

However useful support to properly trained, armed, led and monitored armed forces would be for the effective defence of a country's territory, fighting in accordance with international humanitarian standards and acting as the guarantor of democracy, Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) largely prevents the EU budget from funding military and defence-related activities, hence limiting the ability to support activities that target defence actors abroad.

European Union funds

Funds from the ENI are used to provide [technical assistance](#) to the Lebanese armed forces and the Directorate of General Security, to support security sector reforms undertaken by the Lebanese authorities. This pioneering inter-agency project aims to strengthen civilian oversight of the two security institutions, through improvements in internal organisation, communication capabilities and accountability mechanisms.

CSDP operations

The EU's military training mission in Somalia ([EUTM Somalia](#)), with a mandate running until 31 December 2018, is one of three CSDP missions in the country, alongside [EUCAP Somalia](#) and the EUNAVFOR [Atalanta](#) naval operation. The mission provides training and capacity-building to the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. EUTM Somalia has trained nearly 5 000 troops. It has also mentored Somali trainers, to allow the country to take national ownership of efforts to improve the effectiveness of the Somali national army. The mentoring and advice that the EU has given to the Ministry of Defence have played an important role in establishing civilian oversight of the Somali national army, and have helped the government reassert control over Somali territory.

The EU military training mission in Mali ([EUTM Mali](#)) provides military training and advice to the Malian armed forces (MaAF), in an effort to curb the activities of terrorist groups operating in large parts of the country. The mandate of EUTM Mali is to enhance Malian military capacity, allowing the armed forces to conduct operations to reduce the threat of terrorist groups and restore the territorial integrity of the Malian State. EU military advisors provide expertise in human resources management, logistics, intelligence, operational conduct, finances, planning and information systems. More than 8 000 troops have been trained, with the aim being to train the future 'trainers' of the MaAF. The mission also aims to develop Mali's military education system, so that training systematically includes courses in human rights, international humanitarian law, treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) and preventing gender-based violence (GBV).

Building resilience

Building resilience in third countries is an important [objective](#) of the EU Global Strategy, aimed at enhancing the Union's security. The IcSP funds several projects – with no geographical limitations – that focus on building resilience. These include [community-level projects](#) on countering violent extremism, which involve working with local partners to develop and implement [approaches](#) to counter radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism (such as, for example, the [Extremely together](#) approach and toolkit).

IcSP support also goes towards reducing tensions between internally displaced persons and host communities in [Iraq](#), through supplementing basic services. In [Jordan](#), [Somalia](#), [Burkina Faso](#), [Mali and Senegal](#), aid goes towards grassroots-level interventions aiming to prevent radicalisation by engaging with vulnerable youth and communities. The IcSP is also providing aid to stabilise post-conflict areas in [Mali](#) through support to the local economy and the improvement of basic services. With projects in [Cameroon](#), [Kenya](#) and

[Uganda](#), the EUTF aims to increase social cohesion by providing economic opportunities to refugees and host communities, building confidence between marginalised communities and local authorities, as well as providing technical and vocational education and training.

In South Asia, the IcSP supports job creation in three key cities in Afghanistan, to improve state-society relations, provide urban stabilisation and counter violent extremism. In [Pakistan](#), IcSP funds are used to increase women's and youth involvement in security, peace and post-conflict planning and policies, and to nurture a [process](#) of dialogue and reconciliation between Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities.

In the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region of [Tajikistan](#), IcSP funds are used to encourage young leaders to engage in policy dialogue and support social and economic development initiatives. Similarly, three projects in Kyrgyzstan aim to foster [open dialogue](#), involve [youth actors](#) in preventing and countering violent extremism initiatives, and promote [open and free public discourse](#) on religion.

Terrorism funding

Countering the illicit channels through which groups fund their activities is a core [component](#) of the EU's [strategy](#) against terrorism. Proceeds acquired through taxing illicit activities, or even licit economic activities, are channelled through a variety of formal and informal money transfer systems.

Through the IPA, a project to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the country's anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing system (AML/CFT) was recently completed in [Turkey](#). Another IPA-financed project is being implemented in [Bosnia](#) to increase the capabilities of official bodies to fight money laundering, financing of terrorism and financial crime, in line with EU practice. Through funding from the IcSP, the EU aims to strengthen the capacity of the financial sector and the criminal justice system to apply effective AML/CFT measures in the [Horn of Africa](#).

Strategic communication

ISIL/Da'esh has been a pioneer with regard to its [strategic communication](#) and outreach efforts. The content, as well as the means through which it communicates, are unlike the methods previously used by terrorist and insurgent groups: magazines, videos, and a constant presence through social media. There is an urgent need to counter such narratives through effective strategic communication tools, to make it more difficult for terrorist groups to reach potential recruits online.

The IcSP funds a [project](#) through the Club de Madrid to produce a set of comprehensive, multilateral recommendations that will strengthen counter-violent narratives and produce positive messaging using online tools and journalism. A similar project airing through BBC Arabic and other channels involves [radio series](#) on the Syrian conflict, in order to counter violent jihadi narratives of radicalisation. At a broader level, the ENI provides funding to 106 research bodies in the Euro-Mediterranean region in an effort to improve the output and importance of research institutes and think-tanks and [promote inclusive policy-making](#).

European Parliament and counter-terrorism capacity-building

The European Parliament has expressed support for a series of measures aimed at boosting the EU's external counter-terrorism efforts, such as tougher rules on [money laundering](#), an obligation for internet industry and service providers to delete [online content](#) used for radicalisation, ensuring greater transparency, checks and penalties in

[arms exports](#), improving the general framework of [CSDP](#) missions, and increasing EU [funding](#) for counter-terrorism capacity-building related activities abroad. Parliament also expressed support for capacity-building in [a 2015 resolution](#) on financing for development, though not specifically mentioning counter-terrorism at the time.

Parliament also welcomed the Commission's proposal to [revise](#) the IcSP, as this will strengthen the link between development and security. The revision takes the form of an amendment to Regulation (EU) No [230/2014](#) that created the instrument in 2014. Adopted on 12 December 2017, the revised IcSP will put the EU in a position to support all security sector actors, including the military. This could significantly improve the EU's ability to respond comprehensively to deteriorating security environments, even though there will be no change to the EU position that assistance may not be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunition, or training that is solely designed to contribute to the fighting capacity of the armed forces.

The [resolution](#) of 14 February 2017 on the revision of the European consensus on development reiterated the direct link between security and development. At the same time, the resolution stressed the need to strictly follow the recent official development assistance (ODA) reform on the use of development instruments for security policy.

On 6 July 2017, MEPs voted to set up a [special committee](#) to address the practical and legislative gaps in the fight against terrorism across the EU and with international partners and actors. The Committee on Terrorism ([TERR](#)) has 30 members, who will, inter alia, examine the relationship of the EU with third countries and international agencies in the fight against terrorism, including existing international cooperation and instruments in the fight against terrorism, including exchange of best practice, and the effectiveness of the current level of information.

Main references

[Counter-Terrorism Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood](#), Policy Department for External Relations, European Parliament, February 2017.

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