European Parliament

# Foreign policy

## SUMMARY

European Union (EU) action beyond its borders often requires a combination of approaches. The EU Treaties differentiate between common foreign and security policy (CFSP), common security and defence policy (CSDP), external action, and the external dimension of internal policies, but in the field, issues are so intertwined that more often than not a single tool is not sufficient. For example, population displacement triggered by a conflict over natural resources has to be addressed by humanitarian aid, itself secured by a CSDP mission, and its effects mitigated by adequate migration and development policies, while peace talks are conducted. Coordination between all stakeholders is challenging but vital, not only as a response but also for prevention.

To address new challenges such as climate change, rising insecurity or new migration patterns, the EU has put forward concrete solutions to shape synergy between the actors, in order to use shared expertise more effectively, and to find new sources of funding. The new foreign policy framework (EU global strategy) is intended to map the tools and resources best designed to help society as a whole, in the EU and partner countries, to withstand natural and manmade shocks more effectively. This means making connections between actors and between traditionally separate policy areas. Budgetary constraints and the will to depart from a donor/recipient relationship have also resulted in innovative financing tools, using EU funds to leverage private investments.

While, since its launch, the global strategy has proved to be a coherent vision, sturdy, comprehensive external action nevertheless requires coordination at all levels. In the years to come, global instability is expected to rise; the challenge for the EU will be to ensure security while upholding the core values of the Treaties – human rights, democracy and the fight against poverty – as its primary objectives on the global stage.

*This is an update of an earlier briefing issued in advance of the 2019 European elections.*

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## State of play

The rise of instability in the world has had direct consequences for the EU.[1] Violence in the EU's neighbourhoods, as well as conflicts and natural crises further afield, have triggered massive displacements of people, some making perilous journeys in their attempts to reach the EU. As difficulties coping with temporary spikes of migrant arrivals have shown, it is important that EU and Member States act as one in the face of global challenges. The EU's new ambition is to focus on areas where it can make a difference and on partners with shared interests. **The redefinition** of the EU as a stronger global actor has been a principal political, organisational and financial objective since 2014. On the political side, the EU Member States and institutions have been involved in a strategic debate. When it comes to the organisational structure, efforts have been made to improve the coordination of policies and stakeholders and to 'break down the silos' in traditional policy areas. On the financial side, setting new priority areas means streamlining financial instruments, something that is currently under debate for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework.

EU foreign policy strategy is designed primarily to **monitor and mitigate the root causes of insecurity through an integrated approach**, bringing all the EU stakeholders concerned together, both at headquarters and in the field. To address the impacts of global insecurity on its soil, the EU has undertaken to step up its defence policy and counter terrorism instruments. At the same time, the EU is a fierce advocate of a multilateral approach to the global environmental, economic, and political challenges that are the root causes of instability. This new approach has also inspired changes in development cooperation and humanitarian aid policies, also taking on board **international frameworks** devised with an active EU contribution, such as the United Nations' sustainable development goals. This briefing presents what has been achieved so far in some areas of EU foreign policy, and highlights the European Parliament's contribution.

## Public expectations for EU involvement[2]

Comparative Eurobarometer surveys on citizens' 'perceptions and expectations', conducted for the European Parliament in 2016 and 2018, show that in 2018, 57 % of EU citizens wanted to see increased EU involvement in foreign policy, an increase of seven percentage points compared with 2016. Despite this, there were still nine Member States where only a minority of the population wanted greater EU involvement in foreign policy. The lowest level of support was registered in Denmark (35 %) and the UK (40 %), while the highest was registered in Cyprus (84 %) and Spain (77 %). An increased desire for more EU action in foreign policy was shared by most Member States. In some countries levels even increased by double figures – in Germany (by 18 percentage points), Malta (16), Romania (14), the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Hungary (12, 11, 11 and 10 percentage points respectively). The most significant decrease in the share of citizens hoping for more EU involvement was registered in Italy (from 63 % to 56 %) and Bulgaria (from 55 % to 50 %).

Figure 1 – Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage point difference between 2016 and 2018



Data source: Eurobarometer 85.1 - 2016; 89.2 -2018.

Figure 2 – Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than it does at present



Data source: Eurobarometer 85.1 - 2016; 89.2 -2018.

Foreign policy is a broad area and, when asked about particular aspects of it, citizens often express differing opinions. As concerns the diplomatic aspects of foreign policy, detailed answers in Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 show that more than seven out of ten citizens want the EU to speak with one voice in front of other great world powers such as the United States of America (US), Russia or China, or when addressing Middle-Eastern instability. However, other aspects, such as development cooperation or humanitarian aid, are not specifically addressed in the questionnaire. Furthermore, policy areas with a strong 'external' dimension, such as the fight against terrorism, democracy promotion, migration management, border protection, security and defence are dealt with as separate entries in the Eurobarometer.

Foreign policy is one of the areas where more citizens find EU action adequate (41 %) than insufficient (36 %); only 6 % find it excessive. This analysis must be nuanced, however. Citizens find it hard to assess EU foreign policy and the proportion of citizens who 'don't know' if they would like the EU to intervene less or more in this domain is the second largest (12 % in 2018) after industrial policy. The overall improvement in the evaluation of EU involvement in foreign policy is four percentage points. This positive trend is shared by all Member States but three – Luxembourg (a seven percentage point decrease), the UK (five percentage point decrease) and Germany (two percentage point decrease). The highest improvement in the evaluation of EU involvement in the

Figure 3: Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage point difference between 2016 and 2018



Source: EPRS, based on Eurobarometer 85.1 - 2016; 89-2 -2018.

foreign policy was registered in Romania (an 18 percentage point increase) and Bulgaria (16 percentage point increase). The gap between expectations and evaluations of EU involvement in foreign policy remains small despite a slight increase. The increase is caused by a rise in citizens' expectations, surpassing the improvement in citizens' evaluations of EU involvement.

# EU framework

## Legal framework

There are multiple dimensions to what is referred for the sake of ease as 'EU foreign policy'. These are reflected in the Treaties:

> The Treaty on European Union (TEU) includes provisions on 'common foreign and security policy' (CFSP) and 'common security and defence policy' (CSDP): these policies have been designed mainly by the Member States, through the Council (using the intergovernmental method).

> The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also includes external policies on which the European Parliament and Council share the power to legislate (ordinary legislative procedure). This is the case for development, humanitarian aid and trade agreements. For other international agreements, participation in international fora or sanctions, Parliament is informed or consulted and can influence EU policy making.

> A third level of action relates to the 'external dimension of internal policies' such as migration policy and the fight against terrorism.

> The close relationship between CFSP, EU external action, and the 'external dimension' has been embodied by the Lisbon Treaty (2009) in the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP).

A large toolbox and a variety of actors are engaged in EU foreign policy. For instance, **development cooperation** is a major aspect of EU external policy. Its main objective – 'the reduction ... of poverty' – should be a guiding principle for all other EU foreign policies in developing countries (Article 208 TFEU). The EU institutions and Member States share this responsibility and together fund more than half of global development aid. **Humanitarian aid** is also a domain where competences are shared between EU institutions and Member States (Article 4 TFEU). Together the world's top donor (€7 billion in 2017), they are committed to respecting the principles of international humanitarian law: 'impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination' (Article 214 TFEU). **European Neighbourhood Policy** (ENP) was developed in 2004, to prevent fault lines from growing too great between the enlarged EU and its closest neighbours. Expressly enforced by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU), it consists of tailor-made agreements between the EU and each of 16 countries sharing its external borders, financed by a specific budgetary programme, the European Neighbourhood Instrument. In the framework of its international responsibilities, the EU can also conclude agreements with **third countries** and **international organisations** (Article 5 TEU, Articles 2, 3 and 4 TFEU). The European Parliament has enhanced its role in EU external action since its consent is required for most types of **international agreement** and it also has broad supervisory powers.

## Financial framework

### EU Budget and foreign policy

Currently, funds for foreign policy are split between the EU budget and the European Development Fund.

Figure 4 – European Development Fund 2014-2020 and Heading 4 of the MFF 2014-2020 - commitment appropriations (in € million)



Data source: European Parliament, from various regulations and websites, 2017.

Most EU foreign policy financing instruments – except the European Development Fund (see below) –appear under **Heading 4, 'Global Europe'**[3] of the EU general budget. Heading 4 was allocated €66 262 million for the 2014-2020 period, which represents 6.1 % of the multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020). Heading 4 comprises more than a dozen financial instruments, but the following four account for 80 % of commitment appropriations:

> the **Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)** which focuses on combating poverty in developing countries (€19 661.64 million);

> the **European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)** which finances better political cooperation and better economic integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries (€15 432.63 million);

> the **Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II)** providing financial support for candidate countries for EU accession and potential candidate countries (€11 698.67 million);

> the **Humanitarian Aid Instrument** (€7 100 million) which is the EU budget's share of funds for emergency relief for victims of disasters.

## Financial instruments outside the EU budget

The **European Development Fund** (EDF) is the most significant programme outside the EU budget. It is financed through EU Member States' contributions and has specific provisions for its implementation.[4] It is the main instrument for providing development aid in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The 11th EDF (2014-2020) has been allocated €30 506 million. All Member States contribute to the EDF, and its incorporation within the EU budget, long discussed, is envisaged (but not yet decided) for the next multiannual financial framework. Other financial instruments, provided by EU budget, EDF and voluntary contributions from some Members States have also been put in place in recent years (see below 'Budgetary initiatives').

# Deliveries of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term[5]

The eighth parliamentary term (2014-2019) was marked by the adoption of two major policy frameworks: the **EU global strategy** and the **revised European consensus on development**. The setting up of these new frameworks has triggered a domino effect on most aspects of EU foreign policy: for sectoral as well as regional strategies.

## Global strategy

The EU global strategy represents a complete overhaul of the EU response to global challenges. Re-establishing the EU as a stronger global actor was one of the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) was given a mandate by the Council to engage upon a strategic reflection in collaboration with the Member States.

The resulting EU global strategy was endorsed by the European Council in June 2016. The approach was also supported by the European Parliament, which has often highlighted the need for proactive action to prevent crises. Parliament stressed that 'development is not possible without security, and security is not possible without development' and insisted that preventive policies be put in place, such as de-radicalisation programmes. Within a year of its launch, many of the global strategy's principles had been translated into actionable programmes, such as the strategic approach to resilience in EU external action, the implementation plan on security and defence, or the new partnership framework on migration. Sectoral (development, humanitarian aid) and geographical (neighbourhood and beyond) policies were also reviewed in line with the global strategy.

### Better coordination to build resilience

The document that resulted from the strategic reflection 'Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe' has become the new blueprint for EU external action. Acknowledging that global disorders are threatening the Union's own security, the global strategy calls for better coordination and the strengthening of all EU external policies and policies with an external dimension, with the clear aim of protecting the EU's interests. First, the global strategy calls upon the EU institutions and Member states to step up their cooperation on defence and counterterrorism. Ensuring EU security also means helping third countries, especially in the neighbourhood, to address and adapt to shocks such as food insecurity, violent conflicts or political instability; in other words: building 'resilience'. To this end, the EU needs to build on its institutions' and Member States' expertise and combine a series of tools, such as: security and defence missions, development aid, humanitarian assistance and trust funds. This includes support for border control and the fight against migrant smugglers, as the aim is also to address the root causes of migration and develop a more effective migration policy. As regards the global order, the document advocates for support for regional organisations and action to strengthen global governance.

## A new consensus on development

➤ On the global stage, the UN adopted its 2030 agenda in September 2015, setting 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs), each with several measurable targets. This comprehensive policy framework addresses all aspects of human development – economic, social, political, and environmental – and commits all countries and stakeholders, stepping away from the donor/recipient relationship. It is the result of a long process, in which the EU played an active role.

➤ The EU also committed to mainstream the SDGs into its policies. This commitment led to the revision of the **consensus on development**, a memorandum of understanding between the EU institutions and the Member States. The new consensus primarily targets fragile and conflict-affected countries, with a view to using development cooperation as an instrument to prevent violent conflicts or mitigate their consequences. It builds on the concept of 'resilience' outlined in the global strategy, and

developed in the EU resilience policy framework, which promotes increased cooperation between the EU, the Member States, other donors and stakeholders.

> The European Parliament called in particular for the fight against poverty to remain central to EU development policy; it insisted that migration-related development aid be focused on promoting inclusive and well-administered, democratic policies. Parliament also requested a binding regulation to improve coordination between the EU and Member States in the development field, but the Commission has yet to follow up on the proposal.

## International trade

International trade is an exclusive competence of the EU. EU institutions are entrusted by Member States to conclude trade agreements with third countries and to legislate on trade and investment (under Article 207 TFEU). The 'Trade for All' strategy commits the EU to conduct an effective and transparent trade policy, based on values such as promoting sustainable rights and workers' rights. More than 70 trade agreements with third countries or groups of countries are currently in place or under negotiation.

When it comes to development-related trade issues,[6] the EU grants unilateral tariff reductions to developing countries (under the generalised scheme of preferences, GSP) with incentives for vulnerable countries that commit to international conventions on human and social rights, environmental protection and good governance (GSP+), and up to duty-free, quota-free trade on 'everything but arms' (EBA) for the least developed countries. Specific trade agreements with African, Caribbean or Pacific groups of countries are also geared towards the development of the countries concerned and their integration into world markets. During the 2014-2019 term, Parliament pushed for initiatives to prevent EU-based companies operating in third countries from importing or producing goods if their supply chains generate negative impacts on the environment, human rights or working conditions.

> This led to a regulation imposing due diligence on importers of minerals from conflict-affected countries.
> Parliament also called on the Commission to propose a binding legislation on due diligence for supply chains in the clothing sector, a call that has not yet won the approval of the Commission and Council.
> Parliament also called for the monitoring of and a ban on imports of goods produced through slavery, forced labour or child labour.

## Humanitarian aid: improving effectiveness

During the 2014-2019 mandate, the EU responded to several serious humanitarian crises. Humanitarian effectiveness was high on the agenda, with the EU advocating for a better exchange of information on risks, needs, capacities and available funding.

> This is all the more necessary since, while the EU and Member States together are the world's main humanitarian donor, funding remains far below needs.
> At EU and Member State level, effectiveness is based on the coordination of all stakeholders. The European Parliament called for the principles laid down in the EU consensus on humanitarian aid – coordination of EU Member States and institutions and respect for humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence) – to be effectively implemented in the field and followed-up.
> Humanitarian crises have had a direct impact on the EU, in the form of subsequent surges of people seeking asylum on its soil. The European Parliament often calls for efforts to 'avoid any contradiction between development aims and security, humanitarian and migration policies'.

Conflicts often aggravate the effects of natural catastrophes. The challenge is to ensure a better transition from emergency assistance to sustainable development aid, while maintaining their distinct characteristics: humanitarian response is based only on the assessment of needs; development and security policies are sensitive to the political context of recipients, as well as the EU's own interests. In the context of the migration 'crisis', the European Parliament also warned that the proposed Union resettlement framework should be based on humanitarian principles and not be used as a migration management tool.

# New impetus in neighbourhood and enlargement policies

The Arab Spring uprisings triggered the evolution of the Union's relations with neighbouring countries towards a 'more for more' approach, aimed at strengthening relations with those countries engaging democratic reforms. However, spillovers of the Syrian civil war, the collapse of the Libyan state, the Ukraine crisis, the impact of the eastern frozen conflicts and other crises in the EU's neighbouring countries and their own neighbourhoods are challenging the EU's own security.

➤ A radical review of the **European neighbourhood policy** (ENP), focused on the stabilisation of neighbour countries, became necessary. In November 2015, the revised ENP was published, taking into account Parliament's call for a 'more strategic, focused, flexible and coherent, and politically driven' strategy. The revised policy now better differentiates southward and eastward approaches, including Russia's geostrategic interests in the latter. Its granularity allows a country by country approach, taking into account the actual aspirations of partner countries. The European Parliament approved the main aspects of the reform, but insisted on keeping **democracy support and human rights** at the centre of the new policy; it also called for increased funding for the ENP, in order to leverage the EU's influence in the regions concerned.

➤ In the Western Balkans, the EU has helped to stabilise economies, but acknowledges that respect for the rule of law has not been achieved. In 2018, to reinforce its leverage in the region, the EU launched a new **Western Balkan strategy**, to give a 'credible enlargement perspective' to the candidate and potential candidate countries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo*),[7] provided they strengthen the rule of law, improve the competitiveness of their economies, and solve disputes with neighbours. In return for real social and political willingness to belong to the Union, the new strategy sets out clear benchmarks for accession.

> Neighbourhood policy is not just about migration and security, as evidenced by the ambitious 2018-2028 'PRIMA' research partnership focused on sustainable management of water resources and food production in the Mediterranean basin.

## Revised regional strategies

A major innovation in EU foreign policy, clearly highlighted in the global strategy, is the will to break down EU 'policy silos', be they geographical or topical. This also enables better account to be taken of each partner's needs (differentiation).

➤ Clear examples are provided by the revised regional strategies, such as those for the Sahel and for the Horn of Africa. These strategies bring together most stakeholders (EU, Member States, regional partners) and tools (CSDP missions, humanitarian aid, trade and development programmes) with **integrated programming and common goals**: climate action, better migration policy, and the fight against terrorism. While both regional strategies promote similar objectives – such as preventing and countering radicalisation, fighting against human trafficking, creating better opportunities for youth – they provide for flexibility and differentiation between partner countries.

Specific actions for each country are detailed in the 2015-2020 regional action plans for the Sahel and for the Horn of Africa.

> **Differentiation** has also led to the 2015 EU regional strategy for Syria, Iraq and the ISIL/Da'esh threat being complemented with two specific strategies, taking into account the new circumstances of each country. The 2017 Syria strategy pledges immediate humanitarian aid and for support for a political transition in the country. The 2017 Iraq strategy is aimed at addressing the post-ISIL/Da'esh challenges in the country: assistance to over 3 million displaced Iraqis; reconstruction of the areas freed from the terrorist group; and support for the establishment of an inclusive society. For both strategies the European Parliament has called for respect for minority rights and has raised concerns about the risks of territorial fragmentation.

## Reviving international partnerships

> The EU also shares strategies with other partners on topics of common interest. One example is the **Northern Dimension** (ND) in the Baltic Sea and Barents region, a joint policy of the EU, Norway, Iceland and Russia. The ND Parliamentary Forum, which last met in November 2017, helps to maintain an EU dialogue with Russia, despite tense relations.

> Similarly, the Joint African EU Strategy (JAES) has proven to be a key platform for the EU-African Union dialogue, even on contentious issues such as migration management.

> Migration is also likely to be at the core of negotiations concerning the renewal of the **EU partnership with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP)**. But there is much more to it: the renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement offers the opportunity to streamline relations between the ACP countries and the Union, taking into account the UN sustainable development goals, new EU strategies and new ambitions of the partner countries concerned. The European Parliament has advocated reinforcing the role given to civil society and parliaments.

> As concerns the various **global arenas** in which it is involved, the EU has continued to lend its strong support to multilateral organisations against attacks, in particular from the new US government. The EU was an active broker of the Iran Nuclear deal and is still fully committed to it, despite US withdrawal from the agreement.

# Budgetary initiatives

The new comprehensive foreign policy and limited availability of budgetary resources translate into the redistribution of current budget lines and the implementation of innovative financing tools as a leverage for extra-budgetary resources.

> **More flexibility in budget use**: the mid-term revision of the 2014-2020 MFF brought more flexibility in the use of the budget's global margin for special instruments. This made it possible to mobilise funds for a quick humanitarian response or for civil crisis management (Emergency Aid Reserve) and to cover unexpected expenses arising from developments in the global context (the Flexibility Instrument).

> **Funding the security dimension of development**: insecurity often hampers development.[8] The EU's global strategy considers that proper development policy involves responding to instability. Until 2017, however, the EU rules for funding security actors excluded direct financing of a third country's military. A 2016 revision of the OECD criterion for official development assistance allowed the EU to review its policy in the area: it is now possible (Regulation 2017/2306) to use funds from the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) to channel assistance to all security sector actors, including the military.

> **New financial instruments**: the ambitious targets set by the sustainable development goals would cost 'from billions to trillions' of dollars. Traditional official development assistance (ODA) would not suffice: other resources have to be mobilised. During the

last parliamentary mandate, the EU contributed to the new agenda on financing for development, and launched innovative financing tools. New **EU Trust Funds** were designed as a way to circumvent the lack of resources and flexibility of the EU budget: they blend commitments from the EU budget with voluntary contributions from Member States. Three of them are aimed mainly at addressing the root causes of irregular migration.

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**Leveraging investments in the Southern Neighbourhood and Africa**

As well as providing direct funding for programmes and projects in third countries, the EU can help raise private and public investment by providing guarantees and technical assistance. To this end, the EU designed a **European External Investment Plan** (EIP). The objectives are mainly to address the root causes of migration in the Southern Neighbourhood and Africa, by endeavouring to boost growth and jobs. Focused on priority areas such as agriculture and agroindustry, energy and connectivity, and SMEs, the EIP is an umbrella for several initiatives, based on three pillars: mobilising financing, providing technical assistance, and developing a favourable investment climate and business environment.

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# Potential for the future

## Budgetary outlook



Figure 5 –Simplified foreign policy budget for the 2021-2027 MFF (commitments, 2018 prices, € million)

Data source: European Commission and European Parliament, 2018.

The proposed MFF for the 2021-2027 period plans to merge eight existing EU budget sources[9] into a Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), worth €79.2 billion (in constant prices).[10] NDICI would also include most part of the European Development Fund (EDF), which is currently financed outside the EU budget. This new structure is meant **to allow for greater flexibility in the use of funds**. Other budgetary instruments would complement the NDICI: the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (€12.8 billion); the

Humanitarian Aid Instrument (€9.7 billion); the European Instrument for Nuclear Safety; funds for overseas countries and territories (€0.44 billion, also including part of the EDF); and a common foreign and security budget (€2.6 billion). According to Parliament's Committee on Budgets this corresponds to a 13 % increase of the budget for this policy area.[11] In addition, the High Representative is proposing to create a European Peace Facility, worth €9.2 billion, to be financed by Member States' contributions outside the EU budget (it would include the African Peace Facility, currently part of the EDF).

## Policy strategies and debates

External action projects and policies implemented in the 2014-2019 term are already fruitful, but there are still many challenges ahead. Experts predict that global insecurity will continue to grow and the global level of governments' security and defence spending confirms this hypothesis.[12] Containing the spread of violence in the Middle East, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will still call for considerable efforts from the EU and other powers. Migration management will remain a core challenge, as humanitarian crises, conflicts and dire economic conditions will keep pushing men, women, and children to leave their homes to search for better living conditions. Efforts to bridge staff and resources operating in the areas of humanitarian aid, development, migration management, security and counterterrorism continue with a view to harnessing and reinforcing the efficiency of the global strategy.

The President of the European Commission evoked new ways forward in his 2018 State of the Union address. He proposed a **new Africa-Europe alliance** for sustainable investment and jobs. This proposal builds on the existing EU external investment plan (see above). Several projects have already begun under this banner.

On the institutional side, President Juncker has proposed that more foreign and security policy decisions be made by **qualified majority** as opposed to unanimity. This would make it easier to reach compromises on sensitive issues. However, the Council has so far not shared this vision (such a change in the voting rules itself depends on a unanimous Council decision).

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Lazarou, E. et al., Peace and Security in 2019: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future, EPRS, European Parliament, June 2019.

## ENDNOTES

[1]  This is analysed in details in Eleni Lazarou et al., Peace and Security in 2019: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future, EPRS, European Parliament, June 2019.

[2]  This section has been drafted by Alina Dobreva, with graphics by Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova.

[3]  For more details, see Roland Blomeyer, Sebastian Paulo and Elsa Perreau, The budgetary tools for financing the EU external policy, study for the BUDG committee, European Parliament, January 2017.

[4]  In particular, 'In the EDF, the use of funds within a single action may extend over several years [contrary to the rule for the EU general budget]. Therefore, unspent commitments are not lost and the EDF can accumulate reserves'. (The budgetary tools for financing the EU external policy, European Parliament, 2017).

[5]  The EU has carried out multiple actions in various external policy areas: for details, see the In Focus papers about trade, human rights, democracy promotion, migration, the fight against terrorism, protection of external borders, and security and defence, on What-Europe-does-for-me.eu.

[6]  For detailed information on International trade and globalisation, see the In Focus paper on What-Europe-does-for-me.eu.

[7]  Kosovo*: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

[8]  Although the links between a country's security and its development are complex, as explored by Marta Latek in Interdépendance entre sécurité et développement: l'approche de l'UE, European Parliament, EPRS, May 2016.

[9]  Namely: the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries (PI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the External Lending Mandate (ELM), and the Guarantee Fund for External Action.

[10]  The figures used in this section are those of the Secretariat of the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament: see methodological note on page 1 and comparative table in Annex 3(a) of the analysis of the Commission's proposal by EPRS, July 2018.

[11]  See Annex 3(a) in the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and new own resources: Analysis of the Commission's proposal, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2018.

[12]  This is analysed in detail in Eleni Lazarou et al., June 2019.

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