Clash of Cultures: Transnational Governance in Cold War Europe

EPRS Annual Lecture 2019
Wolfram Kaiser, a non-resident Visiting Fellow with the European Parliamentary Research Service, delivered the EPRS annual lecture in Brussels on 6 November 2019, the text of which is reproduced below.

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Introduction

Is the European Union about to implode? Its enemies are certainly hopeful, if not jubilant. Sympathetic observers are also mindful that the EU could, indeed, come apart. Thus, in a recent article for the left-liberal *Guardian* newspaper, George Soros, the Hungarian-born American philanthropist, warned that European leaders appeared to issue statements and pass regulations doing business as usual. The EU at the start of 2019 reminded him of the Soviet Union when it entered its irreversible process of disintegration after the end of the Cold War. His contribution to the debate as a strong supporter of the EU was intended as a wake-up call to Europeans to stem the tide of nationalism – a tide that seemed to be swelling before the 2019 elections to the European Parliament.

Douglas Murray, a Scottish author, recently published a book about his travels across Europe and conversations with ordinary Europeans. We Europeans, he concluded, are about to commit collective suicide sacrificing some 70 years of peace and prosperity in Western Europe. Paraphrasing the title of the Australian historian Christopher Clark’s book about the First World War, he believes that we are ‘sleepwalking’ into chaos – chaos that in his view could take the shape of anything from economic protectionism to outbursts of extreme nationalism and violence, and the collapse of our political institutions in the EU and its Member States.

Or, for that matter, war in one form or another. In fact, the German conservative national daily newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* recently asked only half-jokingly: ‘Have we had no war for too long already?’ The incredible corrosion of British institutions and politics in the wake of the 2016 referendum has at least led to war rhetoric reaching new heights. Dunkirk now appears to be everywhere.

Despite once-more rising support for the EU in opinion polls since 2016, European democracy remains in a state of crisis. Many Europeans see political, economic and academic elites as a bunch of self-serving technocrats without a vision or ability to act decisively. The EU as the attempted transnational incarnation of democracy in an age of globalisation has come under especially sharp attack both from the radical Left and the radical Right, who are using more and more vitriolic anti-European nationalist rhetoric under the pretext of defending national democracy. Only those who have grown up in the collective amnesia about Mussolini after 1945, for example, can fail to recognise the decidedly fascist style and rhetoric of Matteo Salvini, who has spent a great deal of time aggressively denouncing other European political leaders and countries.

The crisis of European democracy has multiple origins. Contrary to the Faragiste view, the EU is not its main – let alone its only – cause. In my lecture I will argue, however, that the EU has been profoundly shaped by three main notions and practices of transnational governance, which all sought to modify or overcome traditional forms of intergovernmental decision-making by foreign ministries in international organisations; that these governance traditions have deep roots going back to the nineteenth century which created strong pathways over time; that they are associated with very different notions of transnational democracy; that they have clashed and competed with each other to the point of contributing to discrediting each other; and that they have become so intersected and blurred in the present-day EU that they, not the simplified formal decision-making procedures since the Lisbon Treaty, make it difficult for citizens to understand, and identify with, the EU.
These three governance traditions are first, the struggle for executive autonomy, which was deeply embedded in what Johan Schot and I in our book *Writing the Rules for Europe* have called technocratic internationalism – a tradition of practicing governance beyond the nation-state that also strongly influenced the thinking of Jean Monnet about European integration, and that was in turn influenced by him.

Second, practices of neo-corporatist concertation and consensus-seeking that dominated transnational industry cooperation as well as industrial relations in many European countries for a long time – practices that have also shaped the EU.

And third, the vision to Europeanise parliamentary democracy by constitutionalising what is now the EU – or turning it into a parliamentary system more or less like any other as they had developed in Europe since the nineteenth century.

I will discuss these three visions and practices in turn. In conclusion, I aim to show how each one of them has impacted on attempts to create transnational European democracy – and how they might actually have facilitated the far more aggressive contestation of European union – union here written with a small 'u', at a time when sharp attacks on the EU as an organisation increasingly only serve as a smokescreen for opposition to almost any form of structured cooperation in Europe.

**Technocratic internationalism**

By the time of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951-52, technocratic internationalism had created a long-term trajectory for transnational governance practices. This trajectory strongly influenced Jean Monnet, the first Head of the High Authority.

Following his own initiative to set up technocratic Franco-British bodies in London to coordinate the Allied effort in the First World War, Monnet represented France on many of them including the Allied Maritime Transport Council created in 1917, which divided up Allied shipping tonnage to shorten the war.

Monnet's experience in London during the war had major repercussions for his thinking about European cooperation. His objective was never a particular institutional form ('supranational' or otherwise), but to achieve the highest possible degree of autonomy for effective informal – and what he considered to be 'rational' – cooperation. Reflecting on Allied collaboration in a BBC interview televised in 1971, he recollected that while the French trade minister always thought 'in terms of a document ... of a finished product, I didn't think in terms of a finished product because there is no such thing.'

Characteristically, in a memorandum for the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Monnet highlighted the need for a set-up for the future League of Nations which would allow the analysis of an issue 'in its entirety' and not based on the 'immediate interests' of states and governments. Monnet's preference for de-politicising issues to facilitate their 'rational' analysis and solution also informed his subsequent work as deputy secretary general of the League of Nations between 1919 and 1923. Thus, in 1921 he proposed to Eric Drummond, secretary general of the League of Nations, to delegate intricate and highly contested territorial issues like the future of Danzig to technical commissions with sufficient independence to propose and implement solutions. Unlike Monnet, however, Drummond strongly believed that the governments in the Council had to take direct responsibility for these issues and mediate between the countries concerned.

The war effort also induced new forms of domestic state intervention and planning as well as Allied cooperation. Monnet favoured such economic interventionism and he supported the French trade minister’s proposal to the Paris Peace Conference for a new European economic order. This order would have allowed the continuation of at least some of the wartime governance institutions and practices, but it was rejected by the Allied governments in April 1919.

Allied cooperation during the First World War was fraught with difficulties from the start, however – an experience that made Monnet more determined to seek greater autonomy and independence
for executive governance in the future. To begin with, the French and British governments entered more intensified cooperation only under the extreme pressure resulting from a disastrous harvest in 1916 and from the renewed unlimited submarine warfare declared by the German Reich on 31 January 1917.

Even when they agreed intensified cooperation, it was still overshadowed by strong bureaucratic and national rivalries. To begin with, the British could rely on their huge Empire and merchant fleet for the provision of goods. As a result, they were in a much stronger bargaining position than the French. In line with public opinion, the British government was reluctant to concede equality to France in any bilateral cooperation.

Both governments also played diplomatic games over their respective demands for the allocation of food and tonnage, which made it hard for Monnet and his collaborators to operationalise the common interest in winning and shortening the war.

Despite these cumbersome difficulties, cooperating with other nationals in the Shipping Commissariat, as it was jokingly called after the Russian Revolution, was a unique experience for Monnet. It showed him both the opportunities and limits of executive governance as constrained by the formally more intergovernmental institutional set-up and governments aggressively pursuing what they regarded as their 'interests'.

Monnet's cooperation preferences and practices had already characterised much of the work of transnational voluntary and international organisations in the nineteenth century. Experts who worked in and for organisations like the International Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union, for example, largely shared three key assumptions about how best to tackle such transnational issues.

First and foremost, informed by the growth of technology and science and the experience of industrialisation and its social consequences, they advocated scientifically informed policy making by themselves within agreed parameters of evolving knowledge about the issues at stake.

Secondly, these experts also believed that de-politicising issues through rational deliberation in committees would allow consensual agreement on optimal policy solutions. In their view diplomats were trained to treat international negotiations as zero-sum games in which one state gains at the expense of another. In contrast, they were working towards what Monnet called the 'common interest'.

As a result, they – thirdly – sought to create the greatest possible space for policy deliberation and decision-making for themselves and to limit the influence of foreign ministries.

As President of the Schuman Plan Conference, Monnet claimed that 'three essential points' would transform Western Europe. One of them was what he now called the 'supranational' character of the future Community. Even at this point, however, Monnet conceived of 'supranational' integration primarily as the common practice of overcoming national viewpoints.

Actually, Monnet told the members of the tripartite Consultative Committee, which had no decision-making functions at all, that it, too, was a 'supranational' institution. As a result, it should strictly avoid drawing on the support of biased experts from national companies, associations and trade unions for their deliberations. Such consultation already entailed the danger of mixing 'the interests of the Community and those of individual social groups'.

Monnet justified his chaotic working methods at the helm of the High Authority with the need to 'teach my staff to think along European instead of national lines'. In February 1953 he claimed that he would only need four months for this task. Then 'a basic transformation of European life and history will have been effected'. Most staff in the High Authority at least shared Monnet's preference for direct communication and cooperation between the High Authority as an international executive institution and national ministries. In the case of the European Communities, policy-making contacts as a rule were between the High Authority and the Commission and the
responsible national ministries, with the foreign ministers in the General Council retaining more of a supervisory role.

**Neo-corporatist cooperation**

The second governance vision and practice derived from transnational business cooperation, and spilled over into national and European level concertation and consensus-seeking between state institutions and societal groups.

Transnational cartel practices had characterised the European coal and steel industry since the late nineteenth century. Cartels favoured informal over formalised cooperation and sought to maximise industry influence and minimise what companies regarded as interference by governments. As reflected in the initial scepticism of steel companies towards the Schuman Plan, this tradition sat uneasily with Monnet's attempt to build a new kind of formal institution in the form of the High Authority with strong legal powers. However, both were connected through the shared belief in autonomy and rational decision making.

In interwar Europe advocates of cartels increasingly sought to legitimise them as more than just economic policy tools for avoiding what they called 'wasteful competition'. Moreover, cartels could draw upon informal international machineries with small secretariats usually linked to company headquarters, which also, like cooperation in expert committees, avoided intrusion by diplomats.

The claim that transnational cartels could even foster international understanding and peace in fact appeared to be borne out by the International Steel Cartel initiated by the German steel magnate Fritz Thyssen and Emile Mayrisch from ARBED, who also worked towards Franco-German reconciliation in the Franco-German Information and Documentation Committee set up in 1926. In this case, transnational business and European political cooperation appeared to go hand in hand.

At the more practical level of managing coal and steel markets, an entire generation of decision-makers in the industry became socialised into transnational cartels as the appropriate approach to governing the sector. Moreover, in Western Europe this notion survived the Second World War. During the war, traditional business links, friendships and family ties buttressed networks and established patterns of cooperation. By the end of the war, as John Gillingham has observed, 'conflicts of interest, management breakdowns and different national loyalties' had failed to 'undermine the tradition of co-operation' in West European heavy industry.

Monnet viewed cartels critically and facilitated the inclusion of anti-cartel articles in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty. He also managed to avoid the appointment of obvious industry lobbyists as members of the High Authority. Heavy industry influence at national level was more pervasive, however. Moreover, the steel industry secured transnational influence on Coal and Steel Community policy-making in two crucial ways.

First, it largely controlled the hiring of industry experts for key High Authority departments. Secondly, industry concertation was well organised in the Consultative Committee. Relations between the High Authority and steel-producing interests were very close. Contrary to Monnet's preferences, the Consultative Committee quickly began to involve experts from companies, national associations and trade unions. In fact, the High Authority's links with business interests became so close that it effectively delegated some decision-making to the Consultative Committee, for example the allocation of European co-funding for research.

The cooperative cartel tradition, therefore, became embedded in European governance through the High Authority's staff policy, with hiring of industry experts effectively controlled by coalescing national governments and industry associations, as well as through industry influence via the national route and the Consultative Committee. Far from implementing a more forceful competition policy, moreover, the High Authority fostered the re-concentration of the German and European steel industry. The institution's economic growth ideology of achieving productivity gains through
concerted action in practice required close collaboration with the industry which Monnet had initially sought to avoid.

The High Authority also made no effort to stamp out the cartel tradition more thoroughly. From the 1960s onwards ordo-liberal notions of competition slowly gained ground in the European Community, but – as Laurent Warlouzet and others have shown – it took a very long time for them to have impact on policy-making and legal decision-making in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, concertation practices survived the end of the Trente glorieuses, or nearly 30 years of uninterrupted growth until 1973. Nowadays they often take the form of close cooperation across the business-NGO divide to prepare ready-made policy solutions for the Commission which then claims broad societal support for its legislative proposals.

**Constitutionalising European integration**

Not just Charles de Gaulle from his nationalist perspective criticised the apparently evolving European technocracy. In April 1960, for example, Hans Furler, the German President of the European Parliament, warned against 'overbearing bureaucracies' that could develop 'technocratic lives of their own'. For him and many others, European integration had to develop a political system with a European Parliament with full budgetary and legislative powers that would also control a European government of sorts. This view amounted to the third vision and practice in post-war Europe: working towards the Europeanisation of parliamentary democracy by constitutionalising what is now the EU.

This broadly federalist agenda had many so-called ‘fathers’, of course – including, for example, Belgian and Italian socialists like Altiero Spinelli. However, the Christian Democrats, their transnational party organisation and their Group in the European Parliament played a particularly crucial role in what political scientists have called the 'system-building' of institutionally deepening European integration.

In the early post-war period, the continental Western European Christian Democrats strongly supported forms of ‘core Europe’ integration. Once the ECSC became operational, the Christian Democrats took a pragmatic approach to institutional issues at the intergovernmental level. At the same time, the Christian Democrat Group upheld the constitutionalisation paradigm. Not only was Article 38 for a European Political Community inserted in the European Defence Community treaty on the initiative of Alcide De Gasperi; Christian Democrats subsequently also dominated the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Assembly that drafted the European Political Community treaty during 1952 and 1953.

After the failure of both treaties, the Christian Democrat Group was also at the forefront of efforts in the Common Assembly to push for some form of relaunch of European integration, as it was frequently called at the time. As rapporteur in the Political Affairs Committee, the Dutch member Margaretha Klompé reminded her fellow Group members, 'We must never forget we are a political institution, and not an Assembly of technocrats'.

The Group of the European People’s Party – EPP, as it was called after 1976 – continued to play the role of federalist engine. The Group's Italian chairs of the Political Affairs Committee during the period of no formal institutional change until 1970 pushed the reform agenda strongly. The EPP Group advocated European-level parliamentarisation as the key component of what its Belgian member Alfred Bertrand in the mid-1970s termed the strategy for the Community's 'fundamental democratisation'.

The Christian Democrat Group, the Political Affairs Committee, and the European Parliament as a whole, focused first of all on making proposals on how to implement the Treaty provision for the Parliament's eventual direct elections. Once the Parliament was directly elected for the first time in 1979, the EPP Group immediately set out to discuss institutional reform in the Political Affairs Committee's institutional sub-committee. After its publication of several inconsequential reports,
however, Altiero Spinelli claimed in the plenary that ‘the Community is practically paralysed’. He took the initiative and set up the cross-party Crocodile Club to bring about fundamental constitutional change through creating an ad hoc committee to prepare a draft constitution to be ratified by the parliaments of the Member States.

Although the final version of the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union marked a constitutional compromise and was never ratified, the process leading up to the vote on it nevertheless played a crucial role: first, in sustaining the EPP Group’s leadership role on institutional deepening despite its origins in the Spinelli initiative; second, in facilitating cross-party consensus on the need for endowing the Parliament with substantial powers and for overcoming blockages in the Council by stopping the unanimity practice; and third, creating a repertoire of constitutional ideas like ‘subsidiarity’ which the Groups in the Parliament, national parties and governments could later draw upon for institutional reform. Thus, facilitated by the internal divisions among the Socialists, the European Christian Democrats and the EPP Group in particular, played a leading role in creating and consolidating a strong trajectory for the constitutionalisation of the present-day EU.

Three vectors of transnational governance

So far, I have sketched what I would call three vectors of visions and practices of governing Europe, which strongly influenced post-war European integration. Did those who promoted these disparate visions and practices all seek to create transnational democracy? To begin with, that is only true to a very limited extent.

Monnet, for example, was primarily interested in what the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl later described as ‘what comes out at the back’ – or the result of a European level policy- and decision-making process which had to emerge from the pooled knowledge of independent generalists and experts in a European executive – and their definition of what was in the ‘common interest of all’. Did Monnet give much thought to the quality of democracy at the new European governance level? Most certainly not: in fact, his original plan did not even include a provision for a parliamentary assembly.

The same was true for European business groups and trade unions. For them European integration fulfilled a variety of functions such as facilitating growth, enhancing the competitiveness of European business, reducing prices for consumer goods, or containing the communist threat – as they saw it – in countries like France and Italy; this in addition to these groups’ broader interests in peace and stability. These organised societal groups were generally happy with the evolving consensus-oriented practices in the Communities. These largely replicated what they knew from their domestic political systems and practices. In Europe, moreover, consensus-oriented policy-making practices seemed essential so shortly after the Second World War. At the time, pluralist competition where some interests might entirely prevail over others, would have been seen by these societal groups as a danger for reconciliation and institutionalised cooperation.

Even many among those who advocated some form of federal ‘union’ did not give much thought to essential or desirable qualities of transnational democracy. They often habitually transposed their domestic experience with parliamentary democracy to the new European level. Strengthening parliamentary power by itself would remedy any ‘democratic deficit’ as it came to be known from the 1970s onwards – or so it seemed. Or they partly acted out of institutional self-interest. As I have recently shown in my study of the European Parliament’s role in pushing for institutional deepening during the period from 1979 to 1989, the directly elected Members of Parliament simply wanted something useful to do, and to have a proper say in decision-making.

What legacies have the three vectors that I have sketched had, and how have they impacted on European integration and future prospects of transnational democracy?

To begin with, the drive for executive autonomy certainly had a lasting impact on the institutional identity of the European Commission. The Commission collectively has believed – and arguably
continues to believe – in the notion that it, and only it, knows what is in the ‘common interest of all’. Its institutional behaviour has traditionally had a strong anti-pluralistic streak as a result. The overriding objective is, from its perspective, to identify the best policy option, and then to gain the support of the Council and these days, the Parliament, for it.

In contrast, the Commission has always regarded the drive towards what political scientists have called input legitimacy through the wide involvement of societal interests and citizens in policy-making, with great suspicion, although it might have paid lip-service to it. For it, output has always trumped input. This approach fitted perfectly with the post-war modernisation paradigm and the widespread belief in technocratic policy-making.

To be fair, many citizens did not expect much more from democracy than casting their vote at the ballot box every four years or so as long as their welfare grew continuously during the Trente glorieuses. In times when many citizens demand greater involvement in politics, which is much more challenging at transnational European level, and when politics is becoming more ‘political’ once more, the Commission has become an easy target for criticism – criticism that in essence de Gaulle already levelled against it nearly 60 years ago, of its technocratic approach of de-politicising politics following Monnet, and its lack of popular legitimacy.

Organised and informal cooperation among societal actors in European integration, and with the supranational institutions and national governments, has added a second legacy: consensus-driven politics which largely still characterises the policy-making patterns of the EU, especially in the Council. Consensus-seeking was mostly seen as essential and desirable in the early post-war period. However, the necessarily complex formal processes and more importantly, informal practices, of decision-making in the EU are now criticised for lacking transparency. Moreover, the strong consensus orientation hampered the transparent articulation of political alternatives and in this sense minimised the political nature of European union with a small ‘u’ – and of the EU itself.

This lack of reasoned politicisation of EU politics has made it easier for Euro-populists to develop their own exclusionary and nationalistic narrative and politics of ‘us against them’. Paradoxically, their narratives of victimhood, where their nation suffers from oppression by ‘Brussels’ as a hegemonic centre controlled by dark forces – appear to be electorally successful especially in countries like Italy, where the political elites for sixty years told the story that all of the country’s diseases would be cured by European integration – externalising political responsibility for all domestic political problems from corruption to tax evasion and a ludicrously inefficient administration. These are hopes that political elites in South-Eastern Europe also appear to invest into future EU membership, but that could eventually backfire on them, when it turns out that the EU does not provide comprehensive vaccination against domestic political failure.

Even the federalist vision left a lasting problematic legacy. Its constitutionalisation paradigm assumed that a United States of Europe would have a powerful parliament and a government that depended on its support, and that this would create sufficient legitimacy. In the 1970s, advocates of some form of federal ‘union’ in fact dramatically talked up the notion that the Communities were suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’ because of the lack of full parliamentary powers at what they called the ‘supranational’ level. In this way they actually strongly reinforced the ‘democratic deficit’ narrative that stuck in the minds of citizens and which has been abused by Europhobes.

Federalists of course fostered the ‘democratic deficit’ narrative to gain powers for the European Parliament – and with significant long-term success. However, many citizens already believed in the 1980s that the Parliament had powers, and that it was to be blamed alongside other institutions for the ineffectiveness of politics and policy-making. The Parliament thus trapped itself in its own ‘democratic deficit’ narrative, too. Arguably, moreover, the ‘deficit’, in as much as it did exist, also extended to insufficient national-level parliamentary control of executive policy-making in ‘Brussels’.

In the 1970s and 1980s, in other words, federalists had insufficient understanding of the necessary dual legitimation of Community politics at national and European level. Moreover, federalists were
also slow to grasp the desirability of democratic participation beyond parliamentary politics. With the Member States striking back in the course of the financial crisis, and the rise of populism across Europe, the lack of national-level control and legitimacy has become a huge problem for the EU.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I argue that we need to understand visions and practices of governance and democracy in their time-specific context and problematise the legacies they have left for the EU of the twenty-first century. This is not to deny the enormous historical achievements of post-war Western European integration, which are now under threat.

Foremost among these – I would say – is the moderation and transnationalisation of political rhetoric. Many Community Member States experienced quite dramatic domestic political polarisation in the early post-war period. This also impacted to some extent on European integration – such as when the German social democrat opposition leader Kurt Schumacher called Chancellor Konrad Adenauer the ‘chancellor of the Allies’ for his support of the Coal and Steel Community; or when French communist racists denounced foreign minister Robert Schuman as ‘the German’ for his German accent and strong support for the Western integration of the Federal Republic.

Actually, the fact that men in grey suits negotiated European integration after 1945 was a blessing – not that it would not have been desirable to have more women involved, but in this regard European institutions merely reflected national politics; rather, because their transnational political rhetoric marked a wonderful change from the extreme nationalism of charismatic leaders like Hitler and Mussolini. At the transnational level, post-war European integration created a positive and even affectionate narrative of reconciliation that helped cool down tensions and fostered a spirit of cooperation.

Perhaps it is not primarily the governance vectors and the EU’s governance structures and practices on which I have focused in this lecture, but the current weakness of this narrative that allows Euro-populists to advance their heavily nationalistic fata morganas – in which they employ naked lies to attack their domestic opponents and their neighbours and to discredit European cooperation, such as when Marine Le Pen claimed earlier this year that Alsace-Lorraine would soon be occupied by Germany again – just because French President Emmanuel Macron supports German and French language acquisition on either side of the border with Germany.

We are currently facing a major crisis of democracy in which the EU is an easy target. The EU is confronted not just with internal challenges, but also multiple external ones – from Putin’s support for Euro-populists to undermine and break up the EU; to China’s attempts with the Road & Belt initiative to pick the Member States off one by one; and Trump’s identification of the EU as an ‘enemy’ of the United States, at least on trade. These challenges should also be seen as a gift, however, in that they allow Europeans to develop a clearer notion of what kind of EU, and what kind of transnational governance and democracy, we want. Thus, the horrendous Brexit saga for the first time has mobilised hundreds of thousands of young people in the United Kingdom for European union with a small ‘u’, and for EU membership.

It is now also energising prominent British citizens into narrating – in many cases for the first time – in surprisingly emotive and lyrical ways their European experiences, which can be such a great unifying force. To conclude I would like to quote, as an example, JK Rowling, the author of Harry Potter, who recently wrote about her European experiences as a youngster and student: ‘At the time of writing, it’s uncertain whether the next generation will enjoy the freedoms we had. Those of us who know exactly how deep a loss that is, are experiencing a vicarious sense of bereavement, on top of our own dismay at the threatened rupture of old ties.’ Addressing her first German pen-friend from many decades ago, Rowling quotes Voltaire: ‘L’amitié est la patrie’ – where there is friendship, there is our homeland. And stretching out her hand to Hanna, with whom she is no longer in touch, she expresses her deep-seated desire in times of crisis: ‘I really don't want to lose my homeland.’
MAIN REFERENCES


Wolfram Kaiser, a non-resident Visiting Fellow with the European Parliamentary Research Service, delivered the EPRS annual lecture in Brussels on 6 November 2019. In his lecture, he argued that the EU has been profoundly shaped by three main notions and practices of transnational governance: the struggle for executive autonomy, practices of neo-corporatist concertation and consensus-seeking, and the vision to Europeanise parliamentary democracy by 'constitutionalising' what is now the EU. He sought to show how each has impacted on attempts to create transnational European democracy, and how they might actually have facilitated the far more aggressive contestation of European union (with a small 'u').