

2014 IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS

**Democratic People's  
Republic of Korea  
(North Korea):  
Kim Jong-un softens his punch**



**Abstract**

Kim Jong-un became the third leader in North Korea's history, after succeeding his father Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011. The succession took place smoothly and the new leader follows his predecessor's repressive political line and insists on the development of a nuclear and space programme in an effort to reinforce the country's international position and secure external aid.

Pyongyang succeeded in both launching an intercontinental rocket in December 2012 and testing its third nuclear bomb in February 2013. This caused an international outcry and resulted in more UN sanctions against the DPRK regime. The situation was normalised after China imposed severe limitations to bilateral trade and financial transactions. Since last year North Korea has softened its tone, even launching a 'charm offensive' to appease its opponents.

Two decades after the great famine that killed more than one million people, agricultural production hardly covers the population's nutritional needs. North Korea depends mainly on aid granted by China and some other donors for its survival. The country is also one of the most repressive in the world and holds a very poor human rights record.

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## 1 Key issues and developments

- Kim Jong-un has not modified the North Korean apparatus substantially. The major challenges for the new leader are still the country's crippling economy, international isolation and poverty.
- Kim Jong-un is following his predecessor's repressive political line, including the development of a nuclear and space programme. Pyongyang succeeded in both launching an intercontinental rocket in December 2012 and had tested its third nuclear bomb in February 2013. This caused international reactions and ultimately, tighter UN sanctions against the DPRK regime.
- The situation was defused after China imposed severe limitations to bilateral trade and financial transactions. This must have convinced Pyongyang to reconsider its strategy, although restrictions on trade with North Korea seem to be a temporary 'punishment' rather than a strategic change.
- China is the only ally of North Korea. Pyongyang depends on Chinese exports of oil and food. China's enforcement of UN sanctions has been considered very lax so far. However, China is growingly dissatisfied with its ally and does not support its nuclear programme.
- The response by the South Korean Government to the North Korea's provocations has been both firm and flexible. Seoul made it clear that it would not accept any threat to its security from the North.
- President Park of South Korea has not renounced the policy of 'trust' that provides for a distinction between military negotiations and humanitarian and economic cooperation.
- Although the US supports the South Korean strategy towards Pyongyang, it has clarified that it is not re-opening any negotiations or providing humanitarian aid unless North Korea puts an end to its nuclear programme.
- North Korea has since last year significantly softened its tones and launched a sort of 'charm offensive' aiming at gaining support from the international community, nevertheless without renouncing its nuclear and space programme. The last (successful) rocket launch occurred on 30 June 2014.
- The economic situation of North Korea remains unstable. The country's agricultural production is still not sufficient to nourish the population. The risk of starvation is always present, exacerbated by a steady decline of industrial production, repeated power shortages and a series of natural disasters. North Korea survives mainly because of aid granted by China and some other donors of which the number is decreasing due to the country's lack of transparency in its use of the received humanitarian aid.

## 2 European Parliament–North Korea: Milestones

- 2004-2011** In the 6<sup>th</sup> legislative term (2004-2009), the European Parliament (EP) created a Delegation for Relations with the Korean Peninsula which covers relations with North Korea.
- An *ad hoc* AFET delegation met with DPRK representatives in February 2004.
- April-July 2010** On 7 April 2010, the EP Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) held a hearing on the situation in North Korean prison camps, which included the chilling testimony of a former inmate. This led to a resolution on North Korea adopted on 8 July 2010. Resolution 2010/0290, which highlights a range of human rights issues, is addressed to North and South Korea, China and the UN, as well as the customary addressees of EU institutions and Member States.
- 24 May 2012** In a resolution voted on 24 May 2012, the EP called on China to stop deporting North Korean citizens back to North Korea, as returnees and their families are at 'great risk of abuse and even execution'.(2012/2655)
- July 2013** The EP Delegation for relations with Korea visited North Korea in July 2013 (led by the (former) chair Herbert REUL, 7 MEPs).
- 14 March 2013** The EP condemned the nuclear tests and missile activities as well as the DPRK's official announcement that the country reserves its right to carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike. The EP expressed its deepest concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in the DPRK. (2013/2565)
- 17 April 2014** Parliament voted a resolution in which it reiterated its strong condemnation of the decade-long state repression and called on North Korea to fulfil its obligations under the human rights instruments (2014/2696). The EP demanded that those most responsible for the committed crimes against humanity be held accountable, and brought before the International Criminal Court, and subjected to targeted sanctions.
- 9 September 2014** AFET chair Mr Elmar Brok met Mr Kang Sok Ju, Secretary-General of the Workers Party of the DPRK, in Brussels. In his press statement, Mr Brok emphasised that North Korea shows clear commitment in issues related to nuclear disarmament and human rights, the EU could re-engage with it. The possibility of re-launch of the Human Rights Dialogue was suggested.

### 3 Political situation in North Korea

#### 3.1 Overview

DPRK, initially inspired by Communism, turned into a dynastic nationalist state

The fight against the Japanese and the Korean War lie at the core of the North Korean state and ideology<sup>1</sup>. In the aftermath of the Korean War, hostility between the two Koreas intensified, and the antagonism between the two states led to radically diverging social cultures that still characterize the bipolarization of the Korean peninsula.<sup>2</sup>

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established on 9 September 1948, a few weeks after the Republic of Korea was declared in Seoul. Kim Il-sung was named premier, a title he held until 1972, when, under a new constitution, he became president (*Juseok* in Korean). This title was suppressed after the death of the North Korean leader in 1994 and replaced by others (such as Chairman of the National Defence Commission), but this did not prevent the successors of Kim Il-sung from exerting quasi absolute control over North Korea.

Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il gradually reinforced their grasp over the North Korean state and society and secured the succession in what de facto became a dynastic system. But they also transformed from a state initially modelled on the Stalin's Soviet Union, to a dictatorship that gradually lost most of its 'socialist' characters and became what is essentially a nationalist and isolationist country ruled by a dynasty.

The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is explicitly recognised as the party of government. Its institutions shadow and control those of the state at all levels, although in recent years its top organs have been sidelined to some extent.

The DPRK's highest organ is the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) while the executive power is concentrated in the hands of the National Defence Commission (NDC) and the Cabinet (known until 2008 as the State Administrative Council).

The country's founder was Kim Il-sung, a veteran of the anti-Japanese fight in the 1940s who had been trained by the Soviets. By the time the country acquired its distinctive character, it had transformed itself into a fiercely nationalist country inspired by neo-Confucianism, with a thin residual overlay of Marxism-Leninism.

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<sup>1</sup> For a general presentation of Korea's history please refer to. 'Korea, old and new history' (Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990). On the Korean War please refer to Max Hastings 'The Korean War' (1986).

<sup>2</sup> Northeast Asian History Foundation, Korean History for international citizens (2007)

## 3.2 Supreme People's Assembly (SPA)

The Supreme People's Assembly is officially North Korea's highest state organ

The Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) is officially the DPRK's highest State organ, with extensive legislative powers (at least in theory) and the right to assume the work of the executive and judicial branches (Article 87 of the 2009 Constitution). The Assembly has five standing committees: bills, budget, foreign affairs, qualifications screening and reunification policy deliberation.

Elections to the 13<sup>th</sup> Supreme People's Assembly took place on 9 March 2014. Each of the SPA's 687 deputies represents a constituency of about 30 000 electors<sup>3</sup>. The WPK approves a single list of candidates, who are elected without opposition. A symbolic number of seats are normally reserved for minor parties that are members of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland<sup>4</sup>.

In principle the SPA formalises and legitimises decisions taken by the Presidium. Convened only once or twice a year by the chairman of the Presidium, the SPA's deputies usually meet in regular yearly sessions in March or April, and have, since 1985, also met some years in extraordinary sessions in November or December. The 1<sup>st</sup> meeting of the 13<sup>th</sup> Supreme People's Assembly that took place on 9 April 2014 saw the expected confirmation of Kim Jong-un as Chairman of the National Defence Commission (NDC).<sup>5</sup>

When the SPA is not in session, it is replaced by another organ, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, which can exercise full legislative powers. The Presidium is composed of a group of 15 members chosen among high-ranking WPK affiliates. The current chairman of the Presidium and the nominal head of state is Kim Yong-nam<sup>6</sup>. The ambiguous character of his role derives from a decision taken with the 1998 Constitution to permanently abolish the office of the president and to confer on the defunct leader Kim Il-sung the title of 'Eternal President'<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> The New York Times, [North Korea Uses Election To Reshape Parliament](#) (2014)

<sup>4</sup> The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland was created in 1946 with the aim of easing the unification of Korea but it suddenly became a political tool controlled by Kim Il-sung and his successors. It is currently composed of the three political parties officially registered in North Korea, namely the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the Korean Social Democratic Party and the Chondoist Chongu Party. The two smaller parties won 50 and 22 seats respectively in the 2009 elections. The remaining nine seats were attributed to 'independent' candidates (three seats) and to the representatives of the 'General Association of Korean Residents in Japan' (six seats).

<sup>5</sup> Yonhap, North Korea's National Defence Commission Reinstalls Kim Jong-un as First Chairman (10 April 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Kim Yong-nam was born on 4 February 1928. Before being appointed chairman of the Presidium in 1998, he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1998 and had a brilliant career inside the WPK.

<sup>7</sup> Darren C. Zook, Reforming North Korea: law, politics and market economy (Stanford University, Journal of International Law, 2012).

### 3.3 National Defence Commission (NDC)

The National Defence Commission and its chair control armed forces and plays a central role in the North Korean State

Created in 1972, the National Defence Commission (NDC) became the most powerful organ in the DPRK in 1992 when it was detached from the Central People's Committee and given full powers over the military. The Constitution of 1992 gave a central role to the NDC Chairman, who was granted the title of 'Supreme Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'<sup>8</sup>.

The chair of the NDC not only retains control over the armed forces but also has the authority to issue civil orders and decrees. He is only formally accountable to the Supreme People's Assembly. The Constitution of 2009 further extended and clarified the powers of the NDC and its chairman (Article 103). The NDC chairman was granted the 'open-ended power to oversee and guide the overall affairs of state and to issue edicts of any sort on any topics'<sup>9</sup>.

On 13 April 2012, the SPA officially proclaimed the defunct Kim Jong-il 'Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission' and appointed his son, Kim Jong-un, 'First chairman' (a new title replacing the honorary one that had been granted his father, who passed away in December 2011).

### 3.4 Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)

Workers' Party of Korea is after the military the second pillar of Kim Jong-un's regime

Founded in 1945, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was originally inspired by Marxist-Leninist principles. Its structure and programme were heavily influenced by Mao Tse Dong and the Chinese Communist Party. The DPRK has often been depicted as the 'world's last Stalinist country', but, despite its origins being in the late Stalinist period, the WPK gradually developed its own concept of governance influenced by domestic doctrines (the 'Juche' and the 'Songun', see below) as well as by traditional Asian culture (neo-Confucianism).

Article 11 of 2009 Constitution gives the WPK a central role in country's political life: 'The Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducts all activities under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea'. Regardless of recent constitutional amendments, the role of the party in the North Korean society is still prominent. No decision can be made without the party's approval, and only party members are allowed to have a position of responsibility within the state apparatus.

The party's main bodies are the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee. The Central Committee is composed of the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Central Control Committee and the Central Auditing Committee. The Secretariat is the executive body of the WPK. It is chaired by a First Secretary, Kim Jong-un<sup>10</sup>, and divided into 11 secretaries and 23

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<sup>8</sup> Article 100 of the 2009 Constitution.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. D. Zook (footnote 7)

<sup>10</sup> Kim Chong-il was recently appointed 'Eternal General Secretary'.


departments (see charts below). These secretaries and departments are responsible for organising and implementing the policies and decisions of the WPK. The Central Military Committee and the Organisation and Guidance Department are the most powerful entities within the WPK<sup>11</sup>.

### 3.5 The Cabinet

A 1998 amendment to the constitution revived the Cabinet, which had been abolished in 1972, and restored it as the top administrative body and main organisation making economic policy-. The Cabinet has also the right to supervise and control the Local People’s Committee (LPC) with regard to local economies and administration.

The cabinet is currently composed of 33 ministries<sup>12</sup>. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces is not part of the cabinet but is functionally subordinate to the NDC. The current premier is Pak Pong Ju.<sup>13</sup>

DPRK WMD and Space Programs  
Key Organizations



Source: 38 North

<sup>11</sup> Institute for Defence Analysis, [North Korean Policy Elites](#) (2004)

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/print/KN.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Short Biography of [Premier Pak Pong Ju](#).

### 3.6 DPRK's new leader: Kim Jong-un

Kim Jong-un after a relatively promising start of openness, does not seem to be open to reform the country

Kim Jong-il passed away on 19 December 2011 at the age of 69. North Korean state media immediately anointed Kim's third son, Kim Jong-un, as the 'beloved successor'.

Unlike Kim Jong-un's father, who officially came out of mourning and succeeded his father only three years after his death, Kim Jong-un's acquisition of power was immediate. Some analysts have argued that this served to 'demonstrate decisiveness perhaps aimed at dispelling concerns about his ability to rule'<sup>14</sup>.

On 11 April 2012, Kim Jong-un was officially appointed "supreme leader" and awarded with the title of "first secretary" during the 4<sup>th</sup> party conference, the country's first major political gathering since 2010. The following day, Kim Jong-un was also granted the title of 'First chairman' of the NDC, thus enabling the new leader to assume the power of North Korea's party, military and state leadership.<sup>15</sup> Finally, on 17 July 2012, Kim Jong-un was also named Marshal, the highest military rank in North Korea, which had only previously been held by his father and grandfather.<sup>16</sup> The expected elevation of Kim Jong-un to the top defence rank post completes his rise to the summit of the North Korean state.

The new leader has also publicly recognised that some reform to the country's economy is needed. On 15 April 2012, Kim Jong-un pledged to 'let our people who are the best in the world [...] not tighten their belts again and enjoy the wealth and prosperity of socialism as much as they like'. He is said to have ordered officials to 'find reconstruction measures suiting the nation through discussion without taboos'<sup>17</sup>. This concept was reiterated on many occasions but so far it did not result into any serious attempt to address economic failures. Also it seems the regime is not ready to undertake a serious self-criticism. Instead it prefers accusing the United States and the international embargo or laying the blame on the 'lack of responsibility among workers, who are not exerting themselves'.

The 2013 nuclear and missile experiments and the recurring recourse to the traditional aggressive rhetoric against the South and its allies, may suggest that the new leader is not going to modify the line followed by his predecessors and does not intend to abandon the political, economic and military assumptions that are the foundations of the North Korean regime. However recent (2014) openings (see below) may suggest that, after 2013's military tensions, the regime has opted for a more moderate stance with a view of easing some of the current stringent sanctions that still heavily

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<sup>14</sup> Le Figaro, '[Kim Jong-un, dictateur sous surveillance](#)' (21 December 2012)

<sup>15</sup> The New York Times, Times Topics: [Kim Jong-un](#) (4 September 2012)

<sup>16</sup> BBC, [North Korea's Kim Jong-un named marshal](#) (18 July 2012)

<sup>17</sup> *Time*, [Is Kim Jong Un Preparing to Become North Korea's Economic Reformer?](#) (April 2012)

impact on DPRK's elites and economy.

### 3.7 Nuclear programme

North Korea has successfully tested its third nuclear bomb and is now a full-fledged nuclear power

The North Korean nuclear program began in the late 1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union on a nuclear research program near Yongbyon. The DPRK's first research reactor became operational in 1967.

Though North Korea joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 under Soviet pressure, safeguards inspections began only in 1992. The delay has raised questions about the quantity of plutonium North Korea had produced clandestinely: it is likely to have been enough to produce one or two bombs.

In 1994, North Korea pledged, under a framework agreed with the US, to halt and eventually close down its nuclear programs in return for several kinds of assistance. The agreement was broken in 2002 when international experts found that the DPRK had launched a clandestine uranium enrichment program. In response to the suspension of aid — mostly of food and heavy oil — from the US, North Korea restarted its reactor and reprocessing plant and refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to further inspect its enrichment sites.

Members of the Six-Party Talks — the US, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and North Korea — began meeting in August 2003 but were unable to resolve the crisis. Negotiations broke down in 2005, and North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006.

An agreement was reached in February 2007 to securing a verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. This was breached by North Korea two years later when Pyongyang launched a missile in April 2009. While Pyongyang claimed the missile was designed to propel a satellite into space, it was more likely intended to verify whether the missile could bring a nuclear warhead within a range of many thousands of kilometres. On 25 May 2009, Pyongyang announced it had successfully tested its second nuclear device<sup>18</sup>.

Following two-day bilateral talks with the United States in February 2012, North Korea announced that it would suspend the development of its nuclear programme and give international inspectors access to the country's main nuclear plant. In return, the United States pledged to supply up to 240 000 tonnes of food — most of it nutritional supplements, rather than rice or grains<sup>19</sup>. The deal reached 29 February 2012 with the US (food in exchange of a moratorium on Pyongyang's nuclear programme) was discontinued a

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<sup>18</sup> This section is essentially based on the CRS Report entitled [North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues](#) (February 2012)

<sup>19</sup> DG EXPO Policy Department, [North Korea Agrees to suspend its nuclear programme](#) (2012)

couple of months later, when Pyongyang announced its intention to launch a satellite into space<sup>20</sup>.

In December 2012, North Korea successfully launched a rocket that was able to place a satellite in orbit. The alleged 'civil' nature of the new vector claimed by Pyongyang did not convince the international community that reacted by imposing further sanctions against Pyongyang. On 22 January 2013, the UN Security Council concluded that the launch was a ballistic missile test and upon request from the United States and Japan unanimously imposed further sanctions on North Korea.<sup>21</sup>

On 13 February 2013 DPRK successfully carried out its third nuclear experiment which according to analysts was twice as big as the 2009 test.

As a result of the rocket launch and nuclear tests, the UN imposed a new series of sanctions on North Korea. These essentially consisted of a ban on luxury goods (largely circumvented by the North Korean elite) and an arms embargo, as well as a few additional sanctions.<sup>22</sup>

DPRK recently successfully performed new rocket launches and it is further progressing on the preparation of improved nuclear devices some of which may also be likely to be carried over by inter-continental vectors and reach the territory of the US.<sup>23</sup>

Recent satellite intelligence has shown that North Korea finally completed the upgrade of its space centre for larger rockets. That should enable the Asian country to test its new generation of intercontinental vectors currently under development.<sup>24</sup>

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
<sup>20</sup> Oxford Analytica, [North Korea rocket failure overshadows celebrations](#) (April 2012)

<sup>21</sup> Although space launches and missile launches follow slightly different trajectories and the rocket may be optimised for one purpose or the other, the basic technology used is the same. This includes the structure, engines, and fuel. If the Taepodong-2 were successfully launched and it reached its maximum estimated range, its increased power could put Australia and parts of the US, among other countries, within range.

<sup>22</sup> UN Security Council Resolution [2087](#) of 22 January 2013 and UN Security Council Resolution [2094](#) of 7 March 2013

<sup>23</sup> The Telegraph, Satellite images show North Korea has 'completely upgraded' rocket launch site (2 October 2014)

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem.



### 3.8 Human rights in North Korea

Human rights' record of North Korea is one of the worst in the world

North Korea's human rights record is difficult to evaluate: access to the country is restricted for foreigners, and those who enter are closely monitored. As citizens are not allowed to leave the country, the country's human rights record is mainly composed of the contributions of refugees and defectors.

There is no freedom of speech, press or worship in the country, and the right of movement is severely limited.<sup>25</sup> 'Disloyal' citizens are sent with their families, without trial, to political prison camps (called *gwalliso*), where they face work conditions approaching slavery. Kept on the verge of starvation, prisoners are often tortured and executed.

The Government only provides access to food and health care to citizens who are considered 'reliable' (generally members of the party or the armed forces). Repatriated refugees and their family members are exposed to severe punishment. Many of them now live in neighboring China as illegal immigrants and fear repatriation.

The judiciary system is far from being independent and does not provide fair trials. The government makes no known attempt to prosecute officials who commit human rights abuses.

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and the ascension of his son, Kim Jong-Un, have so far had little effect on North Korea's human rights record<sup>26</sup>. As recently as December 2011, DPRK authorities issued a statement indicating their intent to 'annihilate' up to three generations of a family if a member fled the country during the 100-day mourning period for Kim Jong-Il. Border controls were tightened subsequently.

<sup>25</sup> US State Department, [Background Note: North Korea](#) (May 2012)

<sup>26</sup> Human Rights Watch, [Human rights in North Korea](#) (2012).

North Korea's human rights violations have been widely condemned, including by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council which have adopted 16 resolutions so far, the last three by consensus. The latest resolution, adopted in March 2013 by the UN Human Rights Council on the initiative of the EU and Japan, established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 'systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights' in the DPRK and extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK.<sup>27</sup>

Reacting to the EU's engagement in the UN, the DPRK has suspended the EU-DPRK human rights dialogue in 2003, initiated in 2001<sup>28</sup>. The DPRK has recently offered to resume the HR dialogue but no decision has so far been taken by the EU authorities.

There have been small signs of cooperation with some UN entities — the World Food Programme, the Children's Fund, World Health Organisation and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — although this was essentially due to North Korea's need to secure urgent external aid to face its severe food shortages.

The following table provides an overview of human rights in the DPRK:

Category	HR violations in North Korea
Right to life	Criminal Code leaves room for arbitrary decisions regarding death penalty; the death penalty is applied for crimes like smuggling and vandalism.  In prison camps, women are forced to have abortions; newborns are often killed. Many people do not survive the camps' harsh conditions.
Freedom from torture	Arrested individuals often face torture to enforce obedience or to extract bribes and information.
Freedom from slavery	Around 200 000 persons in political prison camps, are forced to work in conditions of slavery.
Right to fair trial	People suspected of disloyalty to the regime are deported to prison camps without trial, together with their parents, spouses and children.
Right to food	In 2013 the UN World Food Programme estimated that 8 out of 10 North Koreans are undernourished. Nearly a third of children under the age of five show signs of stunting.

<sup>27</sup> [HRC resolution on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 18 March 2013](#)

<sup>28</sup> [EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2012](#)

Freedom of expression/ information	Media is strictly controlled by the government. Internet use is limited to the political elite; mobile phone access is limited to an internal network.
Freedom of religion	Severely restricted; North Korea is officially an atheist state.
Freedom of movement	North Korea criminalises leaving the country without state permission.
Disabled rights	While North Korea participated in the Paralympics in 2012, disabled people in the past have been allegedly sent to special camps.
Labour rights	North Korea is one of the world's few countries that has not joined the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Rule of law	Independent judiciary and individual rights do not exist.

## 4 External relations

### 4.1 North-South Relations

South-South relations remain tense after a long series of provocations from Pyongyang

North Korea and South Korea remain officially at war, never having signed a formal peace treaty to end the 1950-1953 Korean War. The war ended with a cease-fire between the DPRK and its ally China, on the one hand, and on the other, the US-led multinational United Nations Command, which participated in the war in support of the ROK. As a result, the border between the North and the South is one of the most heavily fortified frontiers in the world. Most of North Korea's 1.1 million-strong army are positioned along the 250-km long DMZ, within easy striking distance of the South Korean capital, situated only 40 km away. Therefore, even if North Korea were unable to win a war against South Korean and the US army on the peninsula, it could cause serious damage to Seoul in case of conflict.

In the late 1990s, after prolonged poor relations, the then-President of the ROK, Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003), initiated a policy of constructive engagement with the DPRK, making conciliatory gestures, including economic incentives, in the hope of bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. This 'Sunshine Policy' resulted in a historic summit between President Kim and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il in June 2000, as well as family reunions and economic co-operation, including joint ventures in the Mount Kumgang tourist resort and the Kaesong Industrial zone. To many observers, this looked like the beginnings of an opening of North Korea along Chinese and Vietnamese lines.

Given the erratic nature of the DPRK leadership, however, none of these achievements proved as durable. The resort was confiscated by DPRK authorities and the future of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, legally a North Korean corporate body, is uncertain.

Inter-Korean relations deteriorated further in 2010, when the North Koreans sunk the South Korean ship 'Cheonan' in March, killing 46 sailors, and opened fire against the island of Yeonpyeong in November, causing the death of four South Korean nationals. Both attacks occurred in the area south of the 1953 Armistice zone (the so-called 'North Limit Line') that is claimed by Pyongyang.

The Cheonan incident had the effect of chilling bilateral relations. Seoul cut-off all cross-border economic exchanges and in response, Pyongyang severed all ties with Seoul.

The new North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un persisted on the space and nuclear programmes initiated by his predecessors.

On 15 April 2012, the North attempted — and failed — to launch a satellite to mark the centenary of its founding leader, Kim Il-sung. North Korea declared the 12 December 2012 launch of the unit — an Unha-3 launcher carrying a satellite that the North Koreans baptised Kwangmyongsong (or 'Iodestar') in honour of one of the nicknames of Kim Jong-il, father of current leader Kim Jong-un — a success. The North American Aerospace Defence Command confirmed that an object had, in fact, achieved orbit.

On 12 February 2013, North Korean State media announced Pyongyang had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, its third in seven years. Experts estimated the power of the bomb to around 6-7 kilotons.

As a result relations with South Korea dramatically worsened and all contacts between the two countries were severed. Pyongyang threatened Seoul of complete destruction and closed the co-managed Kaesong industrial facility.

The response by the South Korean Government has been both firm and flexible. Seoul made it clear that it was not ready to accept any threat to its security from the North. President Park however did not renounce its policy of 'trust' between Koreas that draws a distinction between military negotiations and humanitarian and economic cooperation. Also thanks to the pressure exerted by China, Pyongyang decided to put an end to its early 2013 provocations and accepted to meet, for the first time in two years, representatives from the South (9 June 2013).

Since mid-2013, DPRK has dramatically changed its attitude and moved towards a less aggressive and more constructive dialogue with ROK and other neighbours. The improvement of bilateral relations resulted in an unprecedented visit to the South (4 October 2014) by some of the DPRK's highest authorities<sup>29</sup> on the day of the Asian Games closing ceremony.<sup>30</sup> While president Park's executives and most of the South Korean public

ROK's President Park has adopted a flexible policy vis-à-vis North Korea which makes a distinction between military and humanitarian issues

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<sup>29</sup> The 3 high-level authorities are known to be Hwang Byung-suh, director of the military's General Political Bureau, Choe Ryong Hae, the Korean Workers' Party [KWP] Secretary, and Kim Yang Gon, KWP Secretary and Director of United Front Department.

<sup>30</sup> Asia Today, Surprise Visit from North Korean Heavyweights... What are the Conditions for reopening North-South Korean Summit (6 October 2014).

opinion remain sceptical about the real intentions of the DPRK's regime, Seoul has recently shown some readiness to resume high-level dialogue and enter a new phase in the inter-Korean relations.

This is not the first time Pyongyang - pressed by international sanctions and by the increasing blame from China - has resorted to its blackmail policy which typically foresees military escalation followed by attempts to get aid. This strategy is well described by the Diplomat: '[the] process begins with North Korea making wild, outlandish threats or otherwise provoking a crisis. Many times South Korea, the United States and Japan have provided aid after some sort of agreement is reached. North Korea then later breaks the agreement, again making wild and threatening statements, and once again receiving aid. This pattern has repeated over and over'.<sup>31</sup>

## 4.2 United States

The US consider North Korea a serious threat to regional stability and does not accept that Pyongyang has a working nuclear technology

The United States has never developed a proper strategy to deal with the DPRK. So strong was the US belief that the country would disintegrate in the near future, that no coherent initiatives were adopted to handle the country. Washington still keeps some 28 000 soldiers in the ROK, but has refrained from military initiatives. The announcement by the DPRK that it had successfully detonated its first atomic bomb may well have contributed to the US's military prudence.

On 18 June 2012, US President Barack Obama renewed sanctions against North Korea and depicted the country as an 'unusual and extraordinary threat' to the US.

The detonation of the DPRK's third atomic bomb and the subsequent military escalation that specifically targeted the US has increased the tension in the area and prompted Washington to provide further military and political support to its Southern ally. President Obama also publicly praised Ms Park's 'Trust policy' but made it clear that the US is not ready to restart food assistance to DPRK and re-open negotiations unless Pyongyang puts end to its provocations and agreed to stop its nuclear programme.

In October 2014 the US explicitly stated that it is prepared to reduce military presence in Asia under the condition that North Korea follows through on its denuclearization commitment.<sup>32</sup> This seems unlikely as North Korea considers the US as their principal enemy and recently accused Washington to be behind the recent UN inquiry on human rights violations in North Korea.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The Diplomat, [The real reason for North Korea crisis: hunger?](#) (2013)

<sup>32</sup> Yonhap News, Kerry: U.S. ready to reduce military presence in Asia if N. Korea gives up nuclear program (22 October 2014)

<sup>33</sup> Agence France-Presse, N. Korea lashes out at US over human rights 'racket' (25 October 2014)

### 4.3 People's Republic of China

China is the oldest and best ally of North Korea and the main trading partner

China is North Korea's oldest and most faithful ally. Without Beijing's economic help, the North Korea regime would face even more severe economic stress, and many of its inhabitants might again risk starvation. China also plays an essential role in moderating the excesses of the Pyongyang's regime, and may even intervene in case of political crisis or military escalation<sup>34</sup>.

In recent years, diplomatic relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have evolved. China is no more the country that Mao Tze Dong left when he died in 1976, and the Chinese attitude towards North Korea is multifaceted. Beijing considers North Korea part of its inner sphere of influence and is unwilling to accept the unification of the two Koreas under US aegis. China therefore also prefers the preservation of the status quo in the region. Just as for South Korea, a sudden collapse of the DPRK could lead to major instability for China along its border.

However, the two countries' interests and objectives have largely diverged over the last few years, and China may have begun to consider North Korea more as a burden than a benefit. It is North Korea's unpredictable and sometimes belligerent military policy that has proven particularly problematic for China, which depends on domestic and regional stability for future economic development. Currently facing an acute economic slowdown with potentially severe effect on social and economic issues, domestic and regional stability has become the principal goal of Chinese foreign policy.<sup>35</sup> Beijing also increasingly realises that its support of Pyongyang has had a negative impact on China's reputation abroad, which does not please the growingly influential Chinese elite.

Diplomatic relations with Beijing worsened over the years and China has increasingly shown irritation against its ally's initiatives

Diplomatic relations between the two neighbours have suffered over the past year. New nuclear tests or the recent successful missile launch clearly displeased China. Kim Jong-un did not pay a visit to China since his anointment in late 2011. He has also disregarded Chinese solicitations to refrain from further progress in the missile and nuclear programmes.

As noted by the Financial Times, 'concerned about the consequences for regional security and also angered by Mr Kim's disregard for China, Beijing has started to use the financial sanctions to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea' and, in an unprecedented move, gave instructions to suspend all major financial dealings with North Korea.<sup>36</sup> This decision is likely to have convinced Pyongyang to revise its strategy but such restrictions on trade with North Korea appear to be a temporary punishment rather than a

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<sup>34</sup> Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, 'China-North Korea relations', *Essays on Strategy, Economics and International relations*, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *China's North Korea Policy. Assessing Interests and Influences*. (July 2011)

<sup>36</sup> The Financial Times, *China banks rein in support for North Korea* (13 May 2013)

strategic change.

Yet for all the tensions, there is no doubt that Beijing will play a central role in the future of North Korea. In the coming years, China may push the new North Korean leadership to promote limited reforms along its own model: greater economic freedom that does not call the role of the ruling party into question. Beijing is not ready to accept a reunification of North and South Korea under US aegis. For political reasons, China still refuses to discuss contingency plans with Seoul and Washington.

## 5 Economy

North Korea economy is on the brink of collapse and heavily dependent on external aid and supplies

Despite attempts to reform, the economic system in the DPRK has remained extremely frail and exposed to potential disruptive breakdowns. Agriculture is unable to satisfy the basic country's needs and shortages of machinery and fertilizers due to industrial mismanagement and poor infrastructure aggravating an already compromised situation.

The regime promised to make North Korea a 'strong and prosperous' nation by the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, which was celebrated in April 2012. But the DPRK is far from its goals. Kim Jong-il's heritage is in reality a devastated country on the brink of starvation, highly depending on external aid to survive.

Traditionally the Korean peninsula was divided between a more industrialised North and a more rural South where agriculture had been the leading sector of the economy. After the Korean War, and also thanks to massive Soviet assistance, DPRK was able to reconstruct and industrialise its economy at an accelerated pace. Inspired by the most orthodox Stalinist model of development, emphasis was placed on heavy industry and in particular, the chemical, metallurgic and machine tool sectors.

Until the early 1970s, North Korea outpaced the South in the degree of industrialization. The North equalled the South's per capita GDP. After 1974, the progressive collapse of the DPRK's production and the impressive concomitant development of the ROK's economy completely modified the picture. By 2010, Seoul's per capita GDP outpaced Pyongyang's by 18 to 1.

Pyongyang's initial economic success faded quickly. Two decades of sustained growth and industrialization were followed by almost 40 years of severe economic slowdown, stagnation and overall decline, affecting all productive sectors and in particular agriculture.

Wrong economic policies and excessive military expenditures have proven to be disastrous for the DPRK

The economic situation in the DPRK further deteriorated after 1990 with the collapse of communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. After 1991, the new Russian leadership found little political incentive to continue supporting the DPRK, and even less economic capability. At the same time, the Chinese leadership became more focused on its own domestic political and economic problems. Seeking to eradicate the vestiges of the Cultural Revolution, Beijing promoted economic growth based on an export - oriented model that required complete insertion in the international

economy and world affairs.

With almost no capability to compete in the international market (except in specific sectors such as armament), the DPRK accumulated an impressive foreign debt, which it was clearly unable to repay on schedule<sup>37</sup>. This prompted its trading partners, including Russia and China, to demand payments (particularly for oil and food) in hard currency and at international market prices. Under these conditions and without a fundamental reform of the productive system, North Korea experienced a severe — and inevitable — economic depression at the beginning of the 1990s.

North Korea faced a ruinous famine in 1995-97, during Kim Jong-il's rule. Being a mountainous country, North Korea has only a very small surface of arable land (14 % of all territory). Attempts to maximise crops have involved environmentally unsustainable techniques and ultimately resulted in dramatic soil depletion. This obliged the North Korean authorities to bring more and more marginal land into production and proceed with extensive deforestation (which had already started during the Japanese rule), further aggravating a difficult environmental situation and exposing large areas of the country to the risk of severe flooding. In addition to these structural problems, North Korean agriculture suffered from serious organisational problems, including an over-centralisation of decision-making, large and inefficient state farms and poor supply of fertilisers and agricultural machines<sup>38</sup>.

Despite extensive food aid from third countries (totalling around USD 1.6 billion in the period 1995-2008), the famine is estimated to have killed more than one million people and devastated an entire generation, leaving many with serious cognitive disabilities.

Compelled by internal contingencies — the decline of industrial output as well as famine — Kim Jong-il had no choice but strengthen North Korea's traditional relations with China and ask the international community to supply the country with food and oil. Pyongyang also accepted the investment of South Korean companies in the North. This led in 2003 to the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) known as Kaesong Industrial Park, just north of the de-militarised zone. Events such as the sinking of the South Korean military ship Cheonan and the recent nuclear tests have jeopardised the business relationship and resulted in temporary suspensions of Kaesong's activities the last of which took place in April 2013 and lasted four months.

Analysts estimate that North Korean GDP fell by about one third between 1990 and 2002. The economy then stabilised and even modestly recovered at

The famine in North Korea is estimated to have killed more than one million people

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<sup>37</sup> Estimated at about USD 20 Billion.

<sup>38</sup> Marcus Noland (and others), [Famine in North Korea: causes and cures](#) (1999)

the beginning of the past decade, marking a 1.1% rate in real annual GDP growth in year 2013,<sup>39</sup> but the economic structure remains rather fragile and exposed to cyclical crisis.

Output and living standards remain far below 1990 levels. While other centrally planned economies in similar situations have opted for domestic economic reform and liberalisation of trade and investment, this did not happen in North Korea. Pyongyang has only authorised some modest wage and price reforms. The regime was also forced to tolerate the emergence of a small private sector given the ongoing deterioration of the state-run distribution system and its inability to satisfy the population's basic needs.

The North Korean currency was redenominated in November 2009 at the rate of 100 old won (KPW) to 1 new won. The Government justified this initiative as a measure to reduce inflation and keep prices of food under control. In reality, the redenomination was an attempt by the state to appropriate the 'black market' money that had accumulated by the flourishing — though officially forbidden — informal economy. The operation was a complete failure and resulted in popular protests and a further weakening of the economy. The Government apparently has learnt its lesson and has since then largely left markets alone<sup>40</sup>.

The North Korean economy is still reliant on industry (48 % of GDP) and agriculture (21 %). The service sector is rather small and poorly developed (31 %). DPRK has appreciable reserves of coal and minerals and its industrial structure could have, at least on paper, allowed Pyongyang to become an important economic actor in the region<sup>41</sup>. However, years of isolation, inefficient economic planning and lack of proper maintenance have rendered most of the industrial plants in the country obsolete. Industry in North Korea also faces recurrent power shortcuts that further reduce productivity.

Shy economic reforms have proven to be rather ineffective

## 5.1 External trade

Korea is one of the most segregated countries in the world and its external trade is minuscule when compared with the one of South Korea

North Korea's external sector is very small by regional standards. Pyongyang essentially trades to China and South Korea (the two destinations absorb about 90 % of all trade). Recently Pyongyang has launched limited exchanges with emerging countries such as India, Brazil and Thailand. It has also re-opened a trade line with Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Algeria). Exchanges with these countries, however, remain limited. Trade with the EU is negligible<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> The Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product Estimates\* for North Korea in 2013 (27 June 2014)

<sup>40</sup> Nick Nanto (International Journal of Korean Studies), The North Korean Economy After the 2009 Currency Reform: Problems and Prospects (2010)

<sup>41</sup> CIA World Factbook: North Korea (2012)

<sup>42</sup> Stephan Haggard, Marcus Noland, Engaging North Korea: the role of economic statecraft (2009)

North Korea essentially exports minerals, metallurgical products, manufactured goods (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products. The country imports petroleum, coking coal, machinery, equipment, textiles and cereals.

Illegal sales of weapons are also an important source of foreign currency for Pyongyang, but they are generally more limited and less lucrative than in the past<sup>43</sup>.

Relations with Beijing are particularly important for North Korea. Bilateral trade has boomed in recent years (though starting from a very low base), increasing Pyongyang's dependency on its powerful neighbour. China is currently North Korea's only significant source of foreign investment. Chinese FDI is concentrated in infrastructures and mining<sup>44</sup>.

The North Korean Government proved sporadic but persistent interest in creating joint-ventures with foreign economic operators. The creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) - essentially based on the Chinese model - intended to bolster economic growth and attract foreign investment and import modern industrial know-how.

The first SEZ established by North Korea in 1991 was Rason in the far northeast of the country. The two Koreas have also established two joint economic zones in the North, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region (whose operations are now suspended).

North Korea's interest in developing SEZs revamped in 2010, when Pyongyang renewed its attempts to modernise Rason, and more recently (2013) announced that new SEZs would be established in each province of the country.<sup>45</sup>

## 5.2 Foreign Aid

DPRK is heavily dependent of foreign assistance and on supplies of food and oil

The DPRK is not self-sufficient and relies on foreign aid to feed millions of its people. About two thirds of foreign assistance received by Pyongyang from third countries consisted of food and heavy oil.

Since in 1995, Pyongyang has requested foreign assistance a number of times. The US and South Korea have made their assistance conditional on Pyongyang's dismantling of its nuclear programme. North Korea's failure to respect its commitments and recent incidents prompted foreign countries to halt their assistance. North Korea still receives help from Beijing and from UN agencies (such as the World Food Programme), although deliveries from the

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<sup>43</sup> Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland (Peterson institute), Working paper, North Korea's External Economic Relations (2007)

<sup>44</sup> The *Economist*, North Korea country report (August 2012)

<sup>45</sup> The National Committee on North Korea, [Special Economic Zones in the DPRK](#) (2014)

latter are below the planned thresholds due to administrative and logistical obstacles<sup>46</sup>.

According to a joint report compiled by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Food Program, the combined overall crop production for 2014 is expected to increase by 5% to 5.98 million tons. The report also estimated that North Korea would need to import about 340,000 tons of cereals to fully satisfy its domestic food consumption.<sup>47</sup>

## 6 Relations between the European Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

### 6.1 Legal Framework

The EU and North Korea have almost no relations and there is no EU embassy in Pyongyang

With the exception of France and Estonia, all Member States of the European Union have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Only seven Member States<sup>48</sup> actually maintain embassies in Pyongyang however. The others work by providing their ambassadors in Seoul, Beijing or Tokyo with double or multiple accreditations. France appointed a Presidential Envoy for the DPRK in October 2009, to explore humanitarian and cultural cooperation.

The European Commission established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in May 2001. However, due to the above-mentioned exceptions among Member States, the EU does not yet have a representation in Pyongyang. Current humanitarian projects are managed from Brussels through European experts based in the DPRK, while regular visits by senior officials of the Commission's Seoul Delegation provide project oversight and opportunity for political meetings. There are currently no political or commercial treaties in force with North Korea.

Unlike humanitarian assistance, fully-fledged development cooperation is subject to political considerations, UN sanctions and other constraints. A Country Strategy Paper for the DPRK was adopted in March 2002, but its implementation was suspended. The paper has since expired, and there are currently no plans to prepare a new one or engage in development cooperation unless the situation in the country evolves positively.

On 18 February 2013, the EU imposed a new set of sanctions on North Korea targeting sectors such as gold, diamonds and bonds.

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<sup>46</sup> The *Guardian*, [North Korea appeals to foreign governments for food aid](#) (10 February 2011)

<sup>47</sup> The *Guardian*, [North Korean farmers under pressure to feed hungry nation](#) (14 July 2014)

<sup>48</sup> Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom.

## 6.2 Humanitarian Assistance

Most of the EU efforts vis-à-vis North Korea consists of humanitarian aid

EU humanitarian aid is provided to North Korea, as it is to all other countries, without regard for political issues. ECHO has been present in the country since the severe flooding of 1995 which prompted the DPRK regime to request foreign aid for the first time. ECHO responded with emergency assistance and support in the health, water and sanitation sectors, as well as food aid. Operations were only wound down in 2007 in accordance with ECHO's mandate, as the post-emergency situation was deemed to have ended. Because people in North Korea and their food supply remain vulnerable to natural disasters, ECHO's regional support office in Bangkok continues to monitor the situation closely. Since 1995, over EUR 366 million in aid has been provided to North Korea in the form of food aid, medical, water and sanitation assistance and agricultural support.

In the spring of 2011, following a lower-than-expected summer crop harvest (the principal one of the year) and a particularly harsh winter, the rations provided through North Korea's public distribution system were substantially reduced. Based on the findings of an ECHO expert mission in June, on 4 July 2011 the European Commission announced its intention to provide up to EUR 10 million for food assistance to the DPRK — the maximum sum it may authorise without turning to the Member States. Channelled through the World Food Programme (WFP), this was intended as a one-off, short-term emergency operation.

Although the focus is usually on food assistance, the European Commission released EUR 132 520 to be used by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) in response to the floods in July and August 2013.<sup>49</sup> As ECHO is currently supporting North Korea in increasing capacities for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) by allocating EUR 72,000 toward the country through the Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO) implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).<sup>50</sup> In addition to emergency and food aid, the EU launched a food security programme in 2000 that included providing fertilisers and agricultural machinery. The total of EU aid since 1995 amounts to over EUR 366 million.

According to the European Commission, 'recent assessments on the food and nutrition situation in North Korea do not call for emergency assistance', but the situation remains fragile and subject to deterioration in case of shocks.<sup>51</sup>


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<sup>49</sup> European Commission, North Korea (DPRK) ECHO Factsheet (September 2014)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> European Commission, [Humanitarian and civil protection](#), DPRK (update July 2014)

Figure 1: North Korea, ECHO project 2012-2015



Source: European Union

## ANNEX I: TABLE

<b>People and geography</b>			
<b>Population</b>	24,850,000	2014 (estimates)	<i>Source: CIA Factbook</i>
<b>Capital city</b>	Pyongyang	2 840 000	<i>Source: CIA Factbook</i>
<b>Total land area</b>		120 538 km <sup>2</sup>	<i>Source: CIA Factbook</i>
<b>Ethnicity</b>	Koreans		<i>Source: CIA Factbook</i>
	Small minorities: Chinese, Ethnic Japanese		
<b>Life expectancy at birth</b>	men	65.96	<i>Source: CIA Factbook</i>
	women	73.86	
<b>Rankings</b>			
<b>Name of index:</b>	<b>Ranking:</b>	<b>Explanation and source:</b>	
<b>Human development index</b>	not ranked	United Nations Development Programme, 2013.	
<b>Press freedom</b>	179 / 180	Reporters Without Borders, The World Press Freedom index, 2014	
<b>Freedom in the World</b>	'Not free': political score: 7/7 civil score: 7/7	Freedom House, <i>Freedom in the world</i> , 2014. (1 represents the most free and 7 the least.)	

## ANNEX II: COMPARISON DPRK-ROK (BASIC INDICATORS)

(Prepared by Jakub Przetacznik)

### Geographical indicators

	North Korea	South Korea	North compared to South in %
Area	120 538 km <sup>2</sup>	99 720 km <sup>2</sup>	120.9 %
Population	24 850 000	49 040 000	50.7 %
Population density	206 inhabitants/km <sup>2</sup>	492 inhabitants/km <sup>2</sup>	41.9 %

### Economical indicators

	North Korea	South Korea	North compared to South in %
GDP (purchasing power parity) <sup>1</sup>	40 billion USD	1 666 billion USD	2.4 %
GDP per capita (PPP)	1 800 USD	33 200 USD	5.4 %
Export	3.9 billion USD	557.3 billion USD	0.7 %
Import	4.8 billion USD	516.6 billion USD	0.9 %
Export per 1,000 inhabitants	157 USD	11 364 USD	1.4 %
Import per 1,000 inhabitants	193 USD	10 534 USD	1.8 %

<sup>1</sup>- North Korea does not publish reliable National Income Accounts data; the data shown here are derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP estimates for North Korea that were made by Angus Maddison in a study conducted for the OECD; his figure for 1999 was extrapolated to 2011 using estimated real growth rates for North Korea's GDP and an inflation factor based on the US GDP deflator; the results were rounded to the nearest \$10 billion.

### Health indicators

	North Korea	South Korea	North compared to South in %
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births	24.5	3.9	623 %
Life expectancy at birth	69.8	79.8	87 %

### Infrastructural indicators

	North Korea	South Korea	North compared to South in %
<b>Electricity</b>			
Production	21.04 billion kWh	485.1 billion kWh	4.3 %
Consumption	17.62 billion kWh	449.5 billion kWh	3.9 %
Production per capita	847 kWh	9 891 kWh	8.6 %
Consumption per capita	709 kWh	9 166 kWh	7.7 %
<b>Telephone lines</b>			
Main lines in use	1 180 000	30 100 000	3.9 %
Main lines in use per 1000 inhabitants	47	614	7.7 %

**Source for all tables:**

CIA Factbook, own calculations based on figures from CIA Factbook.

**ANNEX III: MAP OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**



Map No. 4163 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS  
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section