



DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT **C**
CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

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**Candidate selection
procedures for the
European elections**

Study for the AFCO Committee





DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
DIRECTORATE C - CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

**Candidate selection procedures
for the European elections**

STUDY

Abstract

This study was prepared by the Centre d'étude de la vie politique (Cevipol), part of the Institute for European Studies (IEE) and the Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques (FSP) of the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). It provides a systematic and thorough account of candidate selection procedures for the European elections. It covers four aspects: (1) a general overview of candidate selection procedures in the major parties of all EU Member States; (2) a detailed account of the candidate selection procedures for a sample of countries/parties, based on an analysis of the formal and informal practices; (3) an investigation into the relations between national political parties, political groups in the EP, and the European political parties; and (4) the provision of recommendations as to how to improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections.

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs.

AUTHORS

PILET Jean-Benoit
VAN HAUTE Emilie
KELBEL Camille

RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR

Petr NOVAK
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
European Parliament
B-1047 Brussels
E-mail: petr.novak@europarl.europa.eu

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS

Original: EN
Translation: FR

ABOUT THE EDITOR

To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to:
poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu

Manuscript completed in May 2015.
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This document is available on the Internet at:
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EEA European Electoral Authority

EL Electoral Law

ERC European Research Council

ESCE Electoral System Changes in Europe since 1945

FRS-FNRS Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique - Belgium

MEP Member of European Parliament

MP Member of Parliament

PL Party Law

EPPGs European Parliamentary Party Groups

PPELs Political Parties at European Level

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Aim

This study aims at providing a systematic and thorough account of candidate selection procedures for the European elections.

Key Findings

1. Three dimensions of differences

- Candidate selection procedures differ on three main dimensions;
- The first dimension of candidate selection corresponds to the level of inclusiveness of the selectorate, that is, the body in charge of selecting candidates; it varies from the most inclusive (the entire electorate decides) to the most exclusive (only the party leader decides);
- The second dimension is the territorial level at which it is organized; it varies from the most centralized system (entirely controlled by the national party organs) to the most decentralized system (where the procedures are independently run by decentralized branches);
- The third dimension is the inclusion of specific rules determining who is eligible to be selected as candidate, or the selectability; it takes the form of facilitation or limitation criteria, i.e. criteria that facilitate the selection of certain types of candidates or limits the selection of others.

2. Selectability and selectorate

- As regard the selectability criteria at the individual level, four types of rules are applied by national political parties: (1) the requirement of some form of endorsement of the applicant candidate (by representatives or by members); (2) the requirement of party membership; (3) age limits; and (4) incompatibility rules between offices. Other requirements are also sometimes applied, such as having an interest in European issues, speaking multiple languages of the EU Member States, showing no record of judicial problems or no involvement in the pre-1989 regime in CEE countries. These criteria are very similar to the rules applied for national elections;
- Selectability criteria are also applied at the party level. The most common is related to gender-balanced lists of candidates, via minimum representation imposed by a legal framework or by the parties themselves, or gender balance in the selectorate. Additional quotas are not very common in party statutes. Again, these criteria are very similar to the rules applied for national elections;
- In terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate, (1) at the initiative stage, there is a wide range of bodies mentioned in party statutes, the most frequent being the party executive and party officials; (2) at the input stage, there is less variety in terms of intervening actors, and the process appears a bit less inclusive; (3) at the formal approval stage, the level of inclusiveness is again lower. Overall, the process is not very inclusive and this differs from the national level in about half of the parties;
- As regard the territorial organization of the process, the national organization is the dominant actor in the three phases of the process in a majority of the parties, because in most countries the European elections are organized in one nationwide district. For the vast majority of the parties, this differs from the national level;
- In none of the parties do the European parties or the party groups in the European Parliament have any formal role in the selection of candidates for European elections by national parties.

3. Informal practices

- Interviews with MEPs tend to confirm and reinforce the results of the analysis of the formal rules in terms of selectorate and centralization: the candidate selection process for European elections is highly centralized and rather exclusive;
- The party on the ground is rarely considered as a powerful player in the process, although there are informal indirect channels of influence;
- When the party on the ground is involved in the process, the system via which it is organized vary greatly across parties;
- As regard selectability, it appears that parties are looking for additional, interrelated individual criteria that can differ from the party statutes: financial contribution, socio-demographic characteristic, competences, experience, incumbency, investment in the party, and ideology;
- Parties also favour different types of collective criteria than the ones mentioned in party statutes: territorial balance and intra-party factions.

4. Role of the European Parties

- Not a single party mentions Europarties or European parliamentary party groups in their statutes when referring to candidate selection;
- Informally, EPPGs and PPEs play a role in the reselection of incumbent MEPs;
- That informal role is centralized in the hands of a few key actors at the EU level;
- The main determinants are the international recognition of the candidate and the connection between key figures at the EU level and their national party.

5. Recommendations

- Based on a comparative dataset on candidate selection procedures in Europe, as well as on a detailed inventory of formal and informal procedures in a sample of parties, this study provides a series of recommendations as to how to regulate and improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections;
- Four recommendations can be suggested;
- First, due to electoral rules, candidate selection procedures for European elections generally imply more centralized procedures; this trend should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness and openness of the process;
- A second recommendation relates to the informal role that Europarties could play in the process of candidate selection (e.g. participation in informal meetings, coordination of events; elaboration of a common minimal electoral platform, or even the selection of the candidate for the Presidency of the new European Commission), as well as their formal input (e.g. reporting on the activity of outgoing MEPs, or providing an overview of the issues that will be high on the agenda of the upcoming EP);
- Third, in the case of an election of a share of MEPs via a EU-wide constituency, Europarties would have to organize the selection of those candidates via some degree of centralization to coordinate this process, but again it should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness of the process;
- A fourth recommendation is to propose common minimum standards of selectability to national political parties, either in the form of recommendations, or as formal requirement to be included in party statutes or electoral law.

6. Main Results

- The comparative analysis of the candidate selection procedures for European elections allows for the suggestion of possible innovations on four major aspects;
- Candidate selection procedures for European elections imply more centralized procedures, but this should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness and openness of the process;
- Europarties could play an role in the process of candidate selection, either informally via meetings and coordination, or more formally via input or final approval on the candidate for the Presidency of the new European Commission;
- In the case of an election of a share of MEPs via an EU-wide constituency, Europarties could organize the selection of those candidates, but again it should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness of the process;
- Common minimum standards of selectability in national parties could be recommended or formally required.

INTRODUCTION / GENERAL INFORMATION

KEY FINDINGS

- Candidate selection procedures tend to differ across national political parties;
- This variation leads to a great diversity in the way parties select their candidates for various elections, including the European elections;
- Candidate selection procedures matter as they have consequences on levels of participation, representativeness, competition and responsiveness.

Building on the results of the study on 'The Selection of Candidates for the European Parliament by National Parties'¹ and the study on 'Criteria, Conditions, and Procedures for Establishing a Political Party in the Member States'², the proposed study aims at providing a detailed account of candidate selection procedures for the European elections, and practical guidelines to improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections.

Representation is a continuous process that does not start with the election campaign and ends once the votes are counted and the seats allocated to parties and candidates (Norris 1997; Farrell 2001). Nonetheless 'election time' constitutes a crucial period for the representative process: citizens delegate authority to elected representatives who are at the same time held accountable. It is during the campaign that all candidates 'synchronously' put in most effort to prove that they are -- prospectively or retrospectively -- 'good representatives', and this in a highly competitive context, competing not only with candidates of other parties, but also with candidates of their own party.

Yet, a first crucial moment of the delegation and accountability chain occurs before the elections and even before the kick-off of the campaign, i.e. at the moment of candidate selection. Party selectorates pick the candidates that they believe can best represent the party's core beliefs and issue positions, while also guaranteeing territorial and functional representation of their party members and voters. In addition, they may look for less conventional candidates that can reach beyond their traditional voters' basis and connect to citizens that are not motivated by the party's programmatic choices and electoral promises, but by other motivations, whatever those may be.

As stated in the study on 'How to create a transnational European party system?'³, parties are the products of national political settings. Parties emerged and developed in these national settings. It makes party structures and party organizations vary a lot from one setting to another. In particular, the content of party statutes allows for a great diversity in models of internal functioning and democracy. One specific aspect on which parties differ across Europe is their candidate selection procedures, although in this respect the process is 'often far from being transparent'⁴; it is a 'secret garden of politics' (Gallagher, 1988; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Candidate selection is often a key arena for intra-party disputes and internal power struggles, as it determines who controls the party, what it stands for and does (Schattschneider, 1942:64; Ranney, 1981:103; Gallagher, 1988:3). Such selection conflicts may jeopardize the image of the party as a strong unitary actor, capable to compete as a cohesive team against other parties for votes, offices and policies. Hence, party elites have a strong interest to

¹ Doc. PE 410.683.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=28216>

² Doc. PE 431.512.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=79493>

³ Doc. PE 425.623.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=32371>

⁴ Doc. PE 425.623, p.40.

monitor the nomination process. Candidate selection may also offer an important opportunity for participation. For the rank-and-file members, activists, local and constituency party officials, the nomination process may constitute an essential substantive incentive for their party work in general, and more specifically as campaign volunteers. Finally, candidate selection may also affect in-between election representation. As selectors have the power to (re)select, but also deselect, one can presume that incumbents will behave in a responsive way towards the expectations of their electorate, also in-between elections.

The study 'How to create a transnational European party system' investigated the territorial dimension of candidate selection (at which level does candidate selection occur within the party), and the phasing of the process (right of proposal vs. final decision). The study 'Criteria and Conditions for Establishing a Political Party in the Member States' discussed the degree of inclusiveness of the electorate.

This study intends to build on these results in order to provide a systematic and thorough account of candidate selection procedures for the European elections, thereby covering the central goals indicated in the tender application guidelines. In order to do so, the study covers four sections:

1. Section 1 consists of a general overview of candidate selection procedures in the major parties of all EU Member States.
2. Section 2 consists of a detailed account of the candidate selection procedures for a sample of countries/parties, based on a comparative analysis of the formal rules and informal practices.
3. Section 3 looks more specifically at the relations between new political parties, political groups in the EP, and the European Political Parties.
4. Section 4 provides recommendations as to how to improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections, with a specific focus on how to facilitate the transnational character of the electoral competition.

The methodology envisioned for the proposed study relies on the comparative analysis of various data, including party statutes coded by national experts, and qualitative interviews.

This study has been coordinated by Prof. Jean-Benoit Pilet and was prepared by a team of scholars at the *Centre d'étude de la vie politique* (Cevipol), which is part of the Institute for European Studies and the *Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques* of the *Université libre de Bruxelles* (ULB), Belgium. The Cevipol has a long tradition of research on Parties and Elections, with a specific focus on European Union and EU Member States, and therefore has a considerable amount of data and expertise in the areas of political parties, elections, representation, and democracy⁵.

⁵ <http://dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/en/recherche.html>

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES

KEY FINDINGS

- Candidate selection procedures differ on three main dimensions;
- The first dimension of candidate selection is the level of inclusiveness of the selectorate, that is, the body in charge of selecting candidates; it varies from the most inclusive (the entire electorate decides) to the most exclusive (only the party leader decides);
- The second dimension is the territorial level at which it is organized; it varies from the most centralized system (entirely controlled by the national party organs) to the most decentralized system (where the procedures are independently run by decentralized branches);
- The third dimension is the inclusion of specific rules determining who is eligible to be selected as candidate, or the selectability; it takes the form of facilitation or limitation criteria, i.e. criteria that facilitate the selection of certain types of candidates or limits the selection of others.

The three basic dimensions of candidate selection that are investigated in this report have been selected because they have been shown by political scientists to be the most crucial in understanding the dynamics of candidate selection within political parties.

The first, and most often studied, dimension of candidate selection is the nature of the selectorate, of the party body in charge of selecting candidates, of drafting and approving the list of candidates that will stand for the party in the next elections. The most recent and extensive study on this dimension was published by Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010). They distinguish the different selectorates on basis of one main criterion: its inclusiveness. On that criterion, they range selectorates from the most inclusive, when all voters are eligible to take part to the selection of candidates (e.g. US primaries) to the most exclusive when one single person – generally the party leader – selects candidates. Between these two extremes, selectorates may be composed of party members, party delegates, and a combination of party members and of party elites.

Hazan and Rahat have collected many examples of candidate selection methods in various parties across Europe, Israel, and North and Latin America that they range along this continuum at the end of the 2000s (see table 1).

These examples emphasize the diversity of candidate selection methods. On one extreme of the continuum (the most inclusive), one finds for example the USA and their system of primaries in which voters can participate to the selection of candidates for elections. Still on the inclusive side of the continuum, but further away from the most inclusive method, one can find a method that lets all party members select candidates for elections. Some parties in a couple of Member States of the European Union at the time of the study used this rather inclusive method: Belgium (Ecolo), the Netherlands (D66), the United Kingdom (Conservatives in some districts), Finland, and Ireland (Fine Gael). Moving further away from the inclusive side, one finds the selection of candidates by party delegates in a party convention. This method was used at the time of the study in Ireland (Fianna Fail and Labour), or in Germany (most parties at the district-level).

Table 1. Selectorates used for candidate selection

Voters	Members	Delegates	Members + Elite	Elite	Leader
<i>USA</i> Democratic Party Republican Party	<i>Israel</i> Labour Party Likud Kadima	<i>Ireland</i> Fianna Fail Labour Party	<i>Belgium</i> CDH CD&V PS SP.a Open VLD MR	<i>Japan</i> LDP (until 1990)	<i>Italy</i> Forza Italia
<i>Mexico</i> PRD (2003)	<i>Finland</i> All parties since 1975	<i>Germany (single- member districts)</i> SPD CDU FDP Die Grünen	<i>The Netherlands</i> CDA VVD PvdA	<i>France</i> RPR (until 1980s)	<i>Israel</i> Kadima
<i>Spain</i> Catalan Socialist Party (PSC)	<i>Belgium</i> Ecolo Socialist party (until 1970s) Christian-democratic party (until 1970s)		<i>Denmark</i> People Party	<i>Italy</i> PCI (until 1986)	<i>France</i> Front national
	<i>United Kingdom</i> Conservative Party		<i>Sweden</i> Communist/Left Party		
	<i>Ireland</i> Fianna Fail (until 2007)		<i>New Zealand</i> Labour Party		
	<i>The Netherlands</i> D66		<i>Greece</i> PASOK (2006)		
	<i>Ireland</i> Fine Gael				

Source: Rahat and Hazan 2010

The most widespread method is a mixed method, where candidates are selected by party members or party delegates – in the latter case, on basis of a proposal made by a party agency composed of representatives of the party elite. This was the method used by parties in most Western European countries at the time of the study. This mixed method varies depending on who has the final say - the party elite or party members or party delegates. Finally, on the opposite side of the continuum (most exclusive), some parties restrict the selection of candidates to a closed body of party elites or to a single leader. It was the case of the French Front national. It was also the case in Italy, where candidates of Forza Italia were selected by Berlusconi in collaboration with the party's regional coordinators.

Hazan and Rahat go beyond the mere classification of candidate selection rules; they try to evaluate what could be the consequences of the chosen selectorate on who gets selected. Their underlying question is whether more inclusive methods to select the party leader or candidates lead to more intra-party democracy. This question has been heavily debated in the literature. In order to try to answer this question, one has to keep in mind that mass participation is one of multiple dimensions of democracy, together with representation, competition and responsiveness (Morlino 2011). As Rahat and Hazan (2010) point out, the relationship between

the four dimensions is not linear and positive. Therefore, more participation does not always mean more representation, more competition, or more responsiveness (Katz, 2001).

First, authors have shown that the expansion of the selectorate does not ensure a high level of participation of that selectorate, not even for the first contest. Other researchers have stressed the undesirable effects of more inclusive selectorates, such as high turnover in membership figures (members join to support a specific candidate for the leadership race or candidacy, and then leave the party), or instrumentalization of rank-and-file by the contestants. Therefore, more inclusion does not automatically mean more participation.

Second, Rahat and Hazan show that more inclusive selectorates goes often to the detriment of more social representation: parties tend to better select representative candidates because they want to ensure the representation of certain groups in society. Third, Rahat and Hazan also stress that more participation is often to the detriment of real competition. More inclusive selectorates tend to select incumbent candidates because of the personalization of politics. A tool to compensate that tendency and enhance competition can be to grant a party agency the capacity to approve/disapprove incumbents' candidacies. Finally, the selection of leaders and candidates by a more inclusive selectorate may jeopardize responsiveness of these candidates towards the party and diminish intra-party cohesion. However, this last argument has been contradicted by some recent studies showing that more inclusive methods may, on the contrary, help to select candidates who are more in line with the party ideology as well as with party voters (Mikulska and Scarrow, 2010).

Overall, one should avoid concluding that more inclusive selectorates equals more internal democracy. It depends on the conception of democracy adopted, and on the importance granted to each of the above-mentioned dimensions. If one adopts a participatory conception of democracy, then the most important dimension would be the size of the selectorate. In that case, an expansion of the selectorate would mean more intra-party democracy. If one adopts a representative conception of democracy, then the most important dimension would be social or substantive representativeness. In that case, a large selectorate might put at risk reaching representativeness.

Similarly, the answer to the question will vary depending on how one conceives the articulation between democracy at the state level and intra-party democracy: 'If we see the relationship between democracy within states and democracy within parties as complementary then parties, instead of investing further in participation – which is the imperative of the democratic state -- may enhance other democratic dimensions. The creation of a relatively balanced list, the creation of higher levels of competition in order to offset incumbency, or balancing responsiveness, may thus require placing limits on the extent and impact of intra-party participatory democracy' (Rahat and Hazan 2006, p. 10).

The second dimension of candidate selection most often mentioned in the political science literature is the territorial level at which it is organized. On this dimension, the two extreme are, on the one hand, a system entirely controlled by the national party organs and, on the other hand, a system where the procedures are independently run by decentralized branches. Between the two extremes, one can find various situations where rules involve multiple levels of power, with one having the final word. According to Bille (2001), in most Western parties, the traditional pattern has been that candidate selection was dominated by decentralized bodies, the national party organs only having a consultative role. Yet, in the most recent period, several authors have identified a trend towards increasing influence of the central party organs. In particular, it appears that larger parties, but also political parties in Southern Europe, are more likely to centralize candidate selection procedures (Lundell, 2004; Rahat, 2007).

This aspect of the territorial organization of candidate selection is especially relevant for this report. It raises the question of how national parties in EU Member States connect or not with European parties when it comes to selecting candidates for the elections of the European Parliament.

In this regard, one of the most widespread assumptions found in the literature is that national parties control the process for European elections, while political parties at European level remain largely excluded (Hix, 2002;

Faas, 2003; Thiem, 2009). At the same time, these processes often lack transparency. They can be regarded as the 'secret garden of politics' (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988), as were considered the processes within national parties a quarter of a century ago (Bardi et al., 2010). Indeed, empirical researches on candidate selection methods for European elections have so far been very limited, with the exception of some case studies (Buskjær Christensen, 2009; Linek and Outly, 2006), and notwithstanding a more encompassing attempt of general overview (Lehmann, 2009). Although never systematically collected, the existing data points toward a certain convergence of practices between the different Member States and within each EP group (Bardi et al., 2010). Despite an absence of influence in almost half of the national parties, a limited and often informal role of Europarties was detected, exercised via the power of incumbents (outgoing MEPs), but also based on instrumental and legitimacy reasons.

As for national elections, authors dealing with the candidate selection procedures at the EU level have largely tried to explain the dynamics in terms of selectorate and decentralization, although the two appear as largely intertwined. Regarding the former, scholars have linked the legislative behavior of MEPs and the grip of national parties thereupon precisely by their power in the candidate selection processes (Hix, 2002; Lord, 2002; Mühlböck, 2012). The absence of Europarties from the electoral arena, coupled with the second-order nature of EP elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) means that MEPs do not need to follow the preferences of their electorate because their actions, the policies they defend or oppose in the EP, the discipline to their European parliamentary group are largely unrelated to their reelection. Conversely, they have all the reasons to be more responsive to the preferences of their main selectorate, the national party, which decides on their placement on the lists and can accordingly reward or punish them (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2002; Lord, 2002). Regarding this last point, isolated studies have shown that where centralized methods are used in national parties to select MEPs, they tend to defect from their EP party group lines more frequently (Faas, 2002; 2003). In contrast, more decentralized candidate selection methods for EP elections allow for MEPs to act more independently from their national party, and more in accordance with their EP party group lines. Such decentralized methods, Hix argues, would also permit that MEPs follow the preferences of the voters and not simply of party leaders (Hix, 2004).

The variations in candidate recruitment and selection processes in terms of selectorate and centralization bear important consequences for parties, legislatures, and representative government (Norris, 1995; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). This is all the more true for the EU level. Mainly a preserve of national parties, candidate selection for EP elections constitutes one of the main obstacles to the development toward fully-fledged Europarties, which is believed to be pivotal to European representative democracy (Beetham and Lord, 1998).

Next to the selectorate and the level of centralization, a third element should be discussed when it comes to how political parties choose their candidates: it is the inclusion of specific rules determining who is eligible to be selected as candidate. Theoretically, a very inclusive model of candidate selection would allow any citizen to apply for a position of candidate, and all applicants would be treated equally with no privilege or mechanisms of positive discrimination giving any advantage to some applicants over others. But the reality of candidate selection by political parties does not perfectly match this theoretical model, often for good reasons.

These specific rules on candidacy can first be differentiated between those limiting access to the selection process and those facilitating the selection of certain categories of individuals. The first type of rules imposes some requirements on citizens if they want to apply for nomination. The most frequent is that the potential nominee should be member of the party since a minimum period of time. It is the most frequent requirement among political parties in the European Union (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). At the same time, parties may sometimes decide to select 'independent' candidates who are not party members for a few positions on the list, or sometimes even open candidacy to any citizen as long as they adhere to the ideology and electoral manifesto of the party. That was for example the case of the Swedish Liberals for the 2004 European elections (Aylott, 2005). Another frequent limitation imposed by parties is the use of age limits. These could either be minimum age requirements, or age ceilings (not allowing older citizens to stand as candidates). Most Belgian parties, for example, imposed that candidates should not be over 65 years old, or if they are, they need a special authorization from the party organs (van Haute and Pilet, 2007).

In parallel to these candidacy requirements, many political parties have also adopted rules of positive discrimination that are adopted to guarantee a minimum representation of certain groups. The most frequent rules in that respect are those imposing quotas of minimum representation for women. Such measures are not new; they were already used in the 1930s in India. What is remarkable is their recent diffusion to the majority of democracies since the 1980s (Caul, 2001).

Yet, here again, behind the general label of 'gender quotas', one may observe different realities. A first element of distinction is the level at which the quotas are in place. In that respect, Krook proposes a distinction between three types of quotas: reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas (Krook, 2006). The first type refers to a predefined number of seats that are reserved for women and that in most cases are allocated through a separate election contest reserved to female candidates. These reserved seats are, one must say, alien to European political systems. They are more frequently found in emerging democratic countries such as Morocco, Rwanda, or Kenya. Second, party quotas refer to rules adopted by political parties themselves. They can foresee that each sex should be guaranteed a minimum proportion of seats. These rules were often the first type of quotas adopted in European countries. They were introduced for instance by some parties in the Netherlands as early as in the 1970s, as well as in Austria, Belgium, Denmark or Germany in the 1980s. Since then, several countries have incorporated these rules into the electoral law, going beyond the voluntary self-imposition by political parties. In Europe, it has been the case in the 1990s in Belgium, France, Italy or Romania.

The second element of diversity in the use of gender quotas relates to the required threshold of guaranteed positions of candidates for each sex. At one extreme, we find systems of strict gender parity, imposing 50pc of male and 50pc of female candidates. This system is legally imposed in some countries like Belgium since 2000, or voluntarily adopted by parties like Die Grünen in Austria and Germany, the Democratic Party in Italy, Dei Lenk in Luxembourg, or the Swedish Social Democrats, Greens and Left party. At the other end, quotas may also be set at lower values, further away from a strict parity. For instance, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), the Slovak SDL, or the Maltese Labour Party have adopted quotas of 20pc of female candidates.

Following the same logic, parties may also adopt rules setting quotas for a minimum share of candidates from minority groups, be it linguistic, ethno-national, regional or social minorities. For example, some Israeli parties reserved places on their list of candidates to new immigrants, to the Arab and Druze minorities, as well as to citizens living in kibbutz or in settlement colonies (Hazan, 1999). In Belgium, for local elections, some parties guarantee reserved positions on their lists to linguistic minorities in bilingual districts.

Finally, many parties also have specific rules regarding how incumbents are included in the candidate selection process. Often, the goal is to facilitate the reselection of incumbents. In the 1980s, for example, the Irish Fianna Fail organized a first vote reselecting automatically all incumbents as candidates for the upcoming elections, before deciding who the other candidates would be. Other parties rather impose additional hurdles to incumbents to avoid that they stay for too many terms in office. These are frequently used by Green parties (although more frequently in their early years) in order to refrain the natural trend towards the professionalization of political parties.

This section aimed at presenting the most frequent dimensions along which political scientists have studied the process of candidate selection. These dimensions have all been included in the data collection for this study. In the next section, we present how candidate selection procedures are organized by national political parties in the 28 Member States in the premises of the coming 2014 European elections.

2. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURE IN ALL MEMBER STATES

KEY FINDINGS

- As regard the selectability criteria at the individual level, four types of rules are applied by national political parties: (1) the requirement of some form of endorsement of the applicant candidate (by representatives or by members); (2) the requirement of party membership; (3) age limits; and (4) incompatibility rules between offices. Other requirements are also sometimes applied, such as having an interest in European issues, speaking multiple languages of the EU Member States, showing no record of judicial problems or no involvement in the pre-1989 regime in CEE countries. These criteria are very similar to the rules applied for national elections;
- Selectability criteria are also applied at the party level. The most common is related to gender-balanced lists of candidates, via minimum representation imposed by a legal framework or by the parties themselves, or gender balance in the selectorate. Additional quotas are not very common in party statutes. Again, these criteria are very similar to the rules applied for national elections;
- In terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate, (1) at the initiative stage, there is a wide range of bodies mentioned in party statutes, the most frequent being the party executive and party officials; (2) at the input stage, there is less variety in terms of intervening actors, and the process appears a bit less inclusive; (3) at the formal approval stage, the level of inclusiveness is again lower. Overall, the process is not very inclusive and this differs from the national level in about half of the parties;
- As regard the territorial organization of the process, the national organization is the dominant actor in the three phases of the process in a majority of the parties, because in most countries the European elections are organized in one nationwide district. For the vast majority of the parties, this differs from the national level;
- In none of the parties do the European parties or the party groups in the European parliament have any formal role in the selection of candidates for European elections by national parties.

2.1. Presentation of the data

This study presents a general overview of candidate selection procedures in the major parties of all EU Member States. So far, there is no systematic and comprehensive dataset on candidate selection procedures. The most recent developments in the literature, and more specifically the most comprehensive study published by Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010), provide many examples of candidate selection methods in various parties across Europe, Israel, and North and Latin America. However, this comparative work cannot be regarded as an exhaustive dataset on candidate selection procedures. Yet, in order to provide a general overview of candidate selection procedures in the major parties of all EU Member States, a systematic and comprehensive dataset had to be built.

Given the large scope of the data collection (all major parties, all EU Member States) and the relatively short time frame of this study, we have proceeded via the mobilization of experts for the data collection in the 28 Member States. The experts have been selected on the basis of their expertise on electoral systems and party organizations (see list of experts in Appendix).

Each country expert received an Internet-based questionnaire to be filled for the major parties of the country based the most recent version of party statutes. The exact list of parties was initially built on basis of the results of the 2009 European elections. All parties having won a seat in 2009 have been included. Then, that list was updated on basis of the reactions of the national experts, adding some new parties that have entered national

parliaments since 2009 and deleting some parties that have ceased to exist. The final list of parties comprises 145 parties in 27 Member States (no data was unfortunately available for Slovakia, as well as for a few parties in other Member States) and is presented in Appendix.

The questionnaire itself contained a list of questions on the rules organizing the selection of candidates at the national and European level. The goal was to gather information on the three main dimensions of candidate selection procedures:

1. The inclusiveness of the selectorate (ranging from all voters to a single leader);
2. The territorial level of the party at which nomination occurs (i.e. (de)centralization ranging from the constituency level to the national level);
3. The existence of specific rules for incumbent candidates; for minority candidates; and regarding gender.

The data gathered is therefore a brand new and unique dataset on candidate selection procedures in Europe. It constitutes the most robust and comprehensive dataset on candidate selection ever constituted on candidate selection in Europe. It allows emphasizing similarities and differences between parties and across EU Member States.

The next sections present a general overview of candidate selection procedures in all Member States, organized in four dimensions:

1. Specific rules for candidacy at the individual level (including rules regarding incumbency);
2. Specific rules regarding candidacy at the party level (including rules regarding gender and minorities);
3. Identification of the selectorate in the candidate selection procedure;
4. Identification of the territorial level in the candidate selection procedure.

2.2. Specific rules for candidacy – individual candidates

A first dimension to look at when it comes to rules organizing the selection of candidates for the European elections is the specific rules that apply to determine who can be candidate, and under what conditions (see table 2 for an overview, and table 12 in Appendix for the details party by party). In that respect, we can distinguish between four types of rules that are frequently applied by national political parties:

- Requirement of some form of endorsement of the applicant candidate;
- Requirement of party membership;
- Age limit;
- Incompatibility rule.

Table 2 provides a comparative overview of the use of these specific rules. The exact list of parties applying these specific rules in each Member State is provided in Appendix.

Table 2. Specific rules of eligibility for individual candidates in party statutes

	No	Yes	Total (N)
Endorsement by a minimum number or percentage of the party's elected officials (legislators, regional leaders, etc.)	86.8	13.2	100.0 (145)
Endorsement of a minimum number or percentage of members	91.7	8.3	100.0 (145)

	No	Yes	Total (N)
Endorsement by an official faction	93.1	6.9	100.0 (145)
Being a member of the party	55.2	44.8	100.0 (145)
Payment of a monetary fee or monetary deposit to the party	89.7	10.3	100.0 (145)
Minimum age	74.5	25.5	100.0 (145)
Minimum length of membership	86.2	13.8	100.0 (145)
Pre-requisite of previous mandates (incumbency)	97.9	2.1	100.0 (145)
Incompatibility with other mandates or professions	77.9	22.1	100.0 (145)
Other	70.3	29.7	100.0 (145)

Note: Exact wording of the question: "In order to be considered a candidate (approved nomination) for the final stage of the party's candidate selection process, which of the following criteria must the would-be candidate fulfill?"

Endorsement mechanisms

First of all, some political parties impose to applicant candidates to be endorsed in order for their application to be taken into consideration. Such rules may be understood as filters placed by parties to avoid ending with too many applicants candidates, and in particular to avoid having applicant candidates who are not supported by anyone within or outside the party. The type of endorsement required varies across parties.

Some parties require that the applicants have been endorsed by a minimum number of party officials. This rule may be found in the party statutes of 13.2pc of the political parties covered in this study⁶. It is a very common rule in some counties. For instance, in Poland, Lithuania and Romania, most parties do impose endorsement. Such endorsement mechanisms are more frequent in the Member States that have joined the EU in 2004 or later.

A second mechanism is to require applicant candidates to be endorsed by a minimum number of party members. 8.3pc of the parties have such a rule in their statutes⁷. It is for example imposed by the British Conservative Party, by the Irish Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, The French socialists and greens as well as by the Romanian UMR, the Estonian Reform Party, and the Latvian Farmer Union. A third mechanism is used in parties that are organized in factions or wings. These parties may require that the applicant be endorsed by one of the factions in order to organize a fair and proportional representation of each of the factions in the total number of candidates eventually selected. It is the case in 6.9pc of the parties, and, for example, in three Polish parties: PIS, PSL, and SLDP, as well as in several Finnish parties (KOK, SDP, Kesk)⁸.

⁶ For the list of parties requiring such an endorsement mechanism, see table 12 in Appendix.

⁷ For the list of parties requiring such an endorsement mechanism, see table 12 in Appendix.

⁸ For the list of parties requiring such an endorsement mechanism, see table 12 in Appendix.

Finally, a few parties apply a mechanism of 'financial endorsement' by asking candidates to provide a financial deposit for their candidacy. This financial deposit can be provided by the applicant himself or by a group that supports him. The goal, like for other endorsement requirements, is to serve as a first filter in the application process. It may also be a way for political parties to organize the financing of the coming electoral campaign. Financial deposit are required 10.3 pc of the parties covered in this report⁹. The amount of the required deposit varies a lot across parties. It is generally a few hundred euros, but it can go far beyond. An interesting example in that respect is the Romanian PP-DD. The PPDD's candidates in the 2012 national parliamentary elections were required to sign a 'contract' before entering in the electoral race, pledging to pay 2 million euros to the party if they migrated to another party while in office. It is interesting to note that these financial deposits have sometimes been heavily debated and criticized in some Member States.

Party membership requirements

Next to these endorsement requirements, another frequent criterion is to be a member of the party. It is actually the most frequent requirement; it is found in almost half of the parties covered in this report (44.8pc, see table 2)¹⁰. In some of the Member States, the rule is applied in all parties, like in Denmark Sweden, Romania or Lithuanian, or in almost all parties like in Belgium, Ireland, Croatia, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Austria. In a few extreme cases, parties reject any applicant that has previously been a member of another party. Such rule is frequent in Croatia or Lithuania, for example.

Finally, some parties also impose a minimum length of party membership. It is the case in 13.8pc of the parties, that is, about one third of the parties requiring applicant candidates to be a party member (see table 2)¹¹. This additional requirement is for example in place in most Danish and Cypriot parties, but also in the UK Conservative and Labour parties, in the Czech ODS, in the Social Democratic Party in Lithuania, and in the Belgian CD&V and CDH. The minimum length of membership may vary significantly but it usually ranges from six months to one year.

However, it should be noted that the requirements related to party membership may not apply to all candidates. Many political parties leave open the opportunity to have a few positions open to non-party members, such as external sympathizers of the party, in order to broaden the electoral appeal of the party beyond its core supporters.

Age limitations

A third and rather frequent type of candidacy requirement are rules related to age limitations. Parties may require in their statutes that candidates should have a minimum or a maximum age. The former is not very common in party statutes; the latter is more frequent, with several parties imposing an age limit that corresponds to the legal age of retirement, or slightly above. Overall, age limits are found in the party statutes of 25.5pc of the parties covered in this study (see table 2)¹². The rule is however not evenly spread across Member States. In most Member States, parties do not impose age limitations; but in a few Member States, age limitations are imposed by almost all parties, like in Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Spain, The Netherlands and Sweden.

Incompatibilities between offices

A fourth frequent set of candidacy requirements are dispositions setting an incompatibility between holding some political office and being candidate for the party for the European elections. Such rules of incompatibility are found in 22.1pc of the parties covered in this study (see table 2)¹³. They are rather frequent in Belgium, the

⁹ For the list of parties requiring such an endorsement mechanism, see table 12 in Appendix.

¹⁰ For the list of parties applying this rule in their statutes, see table 12 in Appendix.

¹¹ For the list of parties applying this rule in their statutes, see table 12 in Appendix.

¹² For the list of parties applying this rule in their statutes, see table 12 in Appendix.

¹³ For the list of parties applying this rule in their statutes, see table 12 in Appendix.

Netherlands, Croatia or Lithuania but are also imposed by one or two parties in other member states such as Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, France, Spain and Romania. In most cases, the specified incompatibilities are between multiple elected or public positions, such as candidate for the European elections (and therefore a potential MEP), and the holding of another local mandate or an intra-party position. The rationale behind these requirements is that being an MEP should be a full-time job and could not be exercised jointly with another important political office.

Other requirements

The above-mentioned requirements are the most frequently found in the party statutes under study. Yet, there are a few other specific rules that are not very widespread but that may be shared by a few parties, and that are therefore worth mentioning in this report.

First, a few parties require their candidates to have the abilities to participate actively to the European debate. In line with this goal, they want to recruit candidates who have an interest in European issues (e.g. Maltese Democratic Alternative) or who speak multiple languages of the EU Member States. This last requirement is for example specified by the Czech ODS and CSSD that impose the knowledge of at least one foreign language to run as candidate for the EP elections. The Czech KSCM also imposes the knowledge of at least one of the working languages of the EU (English, French, or German).

Another frequent requirement is to show no record of judicial problems. Parties want to avoid that one of their candidate, or one of their becoming MEP, would be facing judicial problems during the campaign or once in office. Therefore, some parties require their candidates not to have a judicial record, or even to demonstrate their 'probity'. For example, the Maltese Democratic Alternative declares that having a criminal record or showing bad 'moral conduct' is incompatible with candidacy. The Romanian ARD even explicitly includes 12 'integrity criteria' in its statutes¹⁴.

Finally, we also observe that several parties in the new Member States forbid their candidates to have been politically involved in the activities of the pre-1989 regime. In Czech Republic, three parties (KDU-CSL, ODS, and CSSD) impose their candidates to have a 'negative lustration', meaning that they cannot have been associated to the activities of the former communist regime, and especially of the secret police forces. The same kind of requirement is imposed for example by the PDL-ARD in its 12 'integrity' criteria in the selection process.

Comparison with rules for national elections

A last element to be mentioned is the very strong similarity between the rules imposed by parties for European elections and for national elections. As it appears from table 3, only a minority of parties (16.7pc) mentions in their statutes different requirements for EU elections and national elections. In other words, it seems that EU elections are regulated by parties as any other type of election. They are not treated as a distinct electoral contest for which significantly different requirements should be imposed to citizens who are willing to become candidates for the European Parliament.

¹⁴ The 12 criteria are: not being convicted of a crime (or taken into custody, or prosecuted) in Romania or another country; no evidences or solid 'suspicion' of criminal actions of corruption, fraud, cooperation with the organized crime; not being declared incompatible by a final court decision on the complaint of the National Agency of Integrity; lack of serious reasons to believe the conclusion of illegal, preferential or obscure business contracts with public institutions; no findings of the National Integrity Agency sent to the courts concerning significant differences between the public declared wealth and income and the revenues of the candidate; not a former employee or collaborator of Securitate (as established by the Romanian courts)- furthermore, the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives' decisions were potential reasons for rejecting a candidacy; was not a holder of a remunerated leadership position in the Romanian Communist Party -at the central or local level; the candidate did not take part in racist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic actions; he or she did not violate the rules of public morality in the exercise of public functions; no indecent public behavior, physical violence or threats to physical integrity of another person; the candidate did not switch parties within the Alliance (ARD) and did not migrate from one political party to another during the last five years.

Table 3. Specific rules of eligibility for individual candidates in party statutes: Divergences between European and national elections

	Divergence EU – National level
No	83.3
Yes	16.7
Total (N)	100.0 (145)

When there are differences, these are often not major additional barriers. First, as mentioned above, a few parties impose that candidates for the European elections should be fluent in another language than the national language(s) of their home country. In addition, a few parties have somewhat less strict candidacy requirements for the EU elections. For example, the Belgian PS imposes an age limit at 65 years for national elections but not for EU elections; the Greek ND imposes candidates to be supported by at least 50 citizens in the constituency for national elections, but it does not have a similar rule for EU elections. Yet, overall, the differences between candidacy rules at the EU and national levels are minor.

2.3. Specific rules for candidacy – Party level

Political parties sometimes also impose criteria at the party level to make sure that, overall, the list of candidates guarantees a minimum representation for some groups in society. Our dataset provides information on these provisions at the party level in party statutes, presented in table 4 (see also table 13 in Appendix for the details party by party).

The most frequent set of rules in that respect is related to the fair representation of the two genders on the list of candidates. As explained in section 2, since the 1980s-1990s in most countries gender quotas have been adopted. In some cases, it was done via laws that impose a minimum representation of each gender in every single party. It is for example the case in Belgium and France where the law imposes gender parity on the lists to all parties. In other countries, no legal framework has been adopted and it is left to parties themselves to adopt such gender quotas if they want to.

Table 4 shows that more than one third of the 145 parties covered in this study impose some form of gender quota (37.9pc)¹⁵. However, the exact nature of these gender quotas varies. In some parties, low/minimal quotas are imposed. It is the case for example of the Cypriot party DIKO that sets a minimum of 20pc of female or male candidates on its lists. Some go further and impose a minimum of 30pc or 40 pc of candidate of each gender. It is for example the case of GERB and BSP in Bulgaria, of the Croatian Labour Party, of the Italian Democratic Party, or of the Cypriot DIS and EDEK. Another group of parties apply full gender parity (e.g. the Austrian Greens, or Die Linke and Die Grünen in Germany). Finally, some parties go even further by imposing rules to guarantee that gender parity on the list translates into gender equality in the MEPs eventually elected. The list system used in many countries facilitates the election of the top candidates on the list. Therefore, to avoid that the best positions would all be reserved to candidates of the same sex, a few parties impose gender quotas for the top positions on the lists. That is for example the case in Belgium for the two green parties (Ecolo and Groen). They both impose a systematic alternation between men and women on their entire list for the European elections. Another example is the Czech KSCM that imposes at least one of the top three candidates on the list to be of a different gender.

It should be noted that some parties that do not impose gender quotas or balance on their list of candidates sometimes apply gender balance in their selectorate. The rationale behind this is that a more diversified selectorate should select more diversified candidates. It is for example the case of LSAP in Luxemburg, or DA in

¹⁵ See table 13 in Appendix for the full list of parties applying gender quotas.

Malta. These parties require a gender balance in the Electoral Commission in charge of supervising the candidate selection process.

Table 4. Specific rules of eligibility at the party level in party statutes

	No	Yes	Total (N)
Gender quota or balance.	62.1	37.9	100.0 (145)
Ethnic quota or balance.	93.8	6.2	100.0 (145)
Geographical quota or balance.	90.3	9.7	100.0 (145)
Linguistic quota or balance.	98.6	1.4	100.0 (145)
Quota for satellite organizations or civil society candidates.	96.5	3.5	100.0 (145)

Note: exact wording of the question: “Could you indicate, for each of the parliamentary parties, whether party statutes mention the following specific rules regarding the composition of the list for the national level?”

In section 1, we mentioned that other types of quotas may sometimes be applied to guarantee a fair representation of specific ethnic, linguistic, social, or geographical minorities. However, our overview of candidate selection rules for the EP elections shows that such additional quotas are not very common in party statutes.

In particular, few parties adopt formal rules of minimum representation for ethnic, geographical, or linguistic minorities, or for satellite organizations. When mentioned in party statutes, these requirements usually only take the form of general, vague and informal aspirations rather than specific and formal quotas, and were therefore coded as ‘no quota/balance’. Formal linguistic representation is only found in 1.4pc of the party statutes (that is, two parties only, the Latvian Green Party and the Basque Party EAJ-PNV in Spain), whereas guaranteed geographical representation is mentioned in 9.7pc of the party statutes.

The absence of formal quotas does not, however, mean that considerations regarding a minimum presence of these minorities among the candidates are not at all relevant for the parties studied in this report. Actually, in various parties like can one read that the party should pay attention to guarantee a fair representation of ethnic, linguistic or geographical minorities in the candidate selection process. But there is no strict threshold of minimum representation that is set. It would therefore be especially interesting to explore in the next stage of this research how, informally, these general considerations about a minimum and fair representation of minorities do intervene in the actual composition of list of candidates for the 2014 European elections.

Finally, if we look at the discrepancies between the rules for European and national elections, we observe little differences. The vast majority of parties (87.6pc) apply the same rules guaranteeing a minimum level of representation of some social groups for elections at both levels. The few exceptions are found in countries that have very different electoral systems for the EU and national elections like, for example, the United Kingdom. A different electoral system leads the party to adapt its rules on, for example, gender quotas in order to be efficient under different electoral laws.

Table 5. Specific rules of eligibility at the party level in party statutes: Divergences between European and national elections

	Divergence EU – National level
No	87.6
Yes	12.4
Total (N)	100.0 (145)

2.4. Selectorate involved in the candidate selection procedure

The preceding two sections have described how political parties regulate the access to the process of candidate selection by imposing some individual eligibility requirements or by applying some rules that define the general equilibrium that the final list of candidates should achieve in terms of diversity and representation. In the next two sections we turn to other dimensions of candidate selection by looking at who is entitled to intervene in the actual selection of candidates, and at which bodies are formally authorized to have a say in the drafting of the party lists for the European elections. As explained in section 1, we do it by looking at two aspects: the territorial levels involved in the process, and the inclusiveness of the selectorate.

For both, we make a distinction between three phases of the candidate selection process: the initiative, the formal input and the formal approval. The initiative stage corresponds to the right to propose a first list of candidates to be selected for the European elections. The formal input stage corresponds to the right to propose amendments to the first list of candidates proposed at the initiative stage. The formal approval stage corresponds to the final ratification of the list of candidates that will run for the party at the next European elections.

In this section, we look at the selectorate in charge for each of the three stages. As explained in section 1, the seven selectorates are differentiated by their degree of inclusiveness, ranging from fully inclusive selectorates where all voters may potential have a say (e.g. party primaries) to very exclusive selectorates where one single person - generally the party leader - selects the candidates. The underlying question is the degree of openness of the candidate selection process.

Regarding the initiative stage when a first selection of candidates is proposed, there are actually a wide variety of actors that are mentioned in the party statutes across Europe (table 6). Actually, in many parties, more than one selectorate is mentioned, which explains that the percentages in the corresponding column sum up to more than 100pc. The most frequently mentioned actor is the party national executive or another national body composed of a limited number of party officials (40.7pc). Then, the most frequent actor taking the initiative is the party leader himself (36.6pc). In other words, often, central party officials are taking the lead and are making a proposal about candidates that may be eligible for being on the list for European elections. Alternatively, we also observe other parties in which the initiative is more decentralised and is coming from party members (35.8pc if we add up initiative by members within a party meeting or individually) or from party delegates (22.1pc). Finally and very interestingly, the parliamentary party, meaning the group of incumbent MEPs of each party, rarely have a formal role in initiating the process of candidate selection. It is only the case in 9.7pc of the parties.

At the second stage of the selection process, the variety of actors intervening is slightly less important. More importantly, the process appears a bit less inclusive. Those who have the possibility to propose amendments to the initial list are most frequently the national executive committee (48.3pc), the party leader (29.7pc) and the conference of party delegates (22.8pc). At this stage of the process, party members only have a direct and formal role to play in few parties (17.3pc). Finally, the right to approve the final list of candidates is often attributed to either the national party executive or another ad hoc body of party officials (52.4pc), to the party

leader (24.8pc) or to a conference of party delegates (26.9pc). Party members are also often associated to the process through a direct member vote (11.7pc) or via a meeting of party members (16.6pc).

Table 6. Selectorate: inclusiveness as in party statutes (N=145)

	Initiative	Formal input	Formal approval
Party leader	36.6	29.7	24.8
National executive committee	40.7	48.3	52.4
Parliamentary party	9.7	5.5	6.9
Party conference delegates	22.1	22.8	26.9
All party members attending party conference / event	12.4	9.7	16.6
All party members	23.4	7.6	11.7
Non-member party supporters	2.8	0.0	1.4

Note: Exact wording of the question: "If there are formal rules specified in party statutes, please indicate the statutory role ("official story") that each of the following plays in the candidate selection process; note deviations from written rules if applicable"

Overall, it appears that when it comes to the formal role of selecting candidates for European elections, the process is not very inclusive. Party members may be associated but are rarely the only actor in charge at any of the three stages of the process, and they even less frequently have the final say alone. Moreover, the most influential actors in the process appear to be the party leader himself and the national executive committee that is generally made of the party elite.

These observations are interesting when compared to the process and the selectorate for national elections. As shown in table 7, in almost half of the parties (44.8pc) we observe that there are divergences between the selectorates in European and national elections.

Table 7. Selectorate: inclusiveness as in party statutes: Divergences between European and national elections

	Divergence EU – National level
No	55.2
Yes	44.8
Total (N)	100.0 (145)

A closer look at the party statutes party by party indicates that these divergences are in the direction of a lower involvement of the more inclusive party bodies. First, party members - and to a lesser extent delegates at the party conference - are more often the main selectorate for national elections. Second, the national party executive - and even more the party leader itself - has a greater formal say for European elections. We observe this pattern in many Member States, like in several parties in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden.

These less inclusive procedures seem to be due to a combination of factors. In particular, as we will see in the next section, the territorial organization of the process is different for European elections. It is often organized at the national level rather than at the regional- or constituency-level. As a consequence, the decentralized party bodies that could organize a more inclusive candidate selection process cannot play their role for EU

elections. The national organs sometimes face practical difficulties to replace them, be it only because of the much larger number of party members that would be involved in the process at the national level. Nevertheless, the greater functional centralization of the process in the hands of a more limited number of party officials is a striking characteristic of candidate selection for European elections in many Member States.

2.5. Territorial level involved in the candidate selection procedure

The last dimension taken into consideration is the territorial organization of the process. Previous research (see section 1) has shown that two levels in particular appear to intervene in the candidate selection procedure: the constituency level and the national level. One of the crucial questions in that respect is how much leeway/autonomy is left to the constituency organs in selecting their candidates for the coming elections.

For European elections, this question is not really relevant in many Member States. For the majority of them, the constituency level is the national level because the European elections are organized in one nationwide district. Only in France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Belgium is the national territory divided into several electoral districts¹⁶. In all other Member States, there is one single constituency and, therefore, there is no actual difference between the constituency and the national party organs.

The direct consequence is that, as shown in table 8, the national organization is the dominant actor in the three phases of the candidate selection process. The role of the national organization is especially strong in the last phases, the formal input/right to amend and the final formal approval. Nevertheless, because the decentralized party organs at the constituency or regional levels are often powerful actors in the internal life of political parties in most Member States, they are often formally entitled to intervene in the selection of candidates for European elections. It is the case, obviously, in those countries where the EP elections are organized in subnational constituencies. But even in some other cases, the constituency and regional organizations have a formal say in the initiative phase or even in the later phases when, for example, a conference of (among others) regional delegates is the selectorate (see previous subsection).

Table 8. Selectorate: level of centralization as in party statutes (N=145)

	Initiative	Formal input	Formal approval
Constituency organization	11.7	6.9	7.6
Regional organization	11.0	10.3	9.0
National organization	71.0	88.6	86.2
Non-member supporters	3.4	0.0	0.7
Affiliated organizations or other political actors	3.4	0.7	0.0
European party	0.0	0.0	0.0

Note: Exact wording of the question: "If there are formal rules specified in party statutes, please indicate the statutory role ("official story") that each of the following plays in the candidate selection process; note deviations from written rules if applicable"

The singularity of European elections when it comes to the territorial organization of candidate selection is also confirmed in table 9. It appears that for the vast majority of the parties covered in this study, there are divergences in the level of centralization of candidate selection process between European and national elections. Most of these changes imply that the national organization is empowered at the expenses of the constituency and/or regional organizations. But the differences, once again, is for most part explain by the

¹⁶ The Belgian case is a bit peculiar. There are two main districts (a Dutch-speaking one and a French-speaking one), plus one single-member German-speaking district. It means that for the most part, political parties only present candidates in one district. Therefore, in Belgium too, the national level and the constituency level do overlap.

electoral system and by the fact that in the vast majority of the member states, the constituencies in which the European elections are organized are wider than for national elections, and often these are nationwide constituencies.

Table 9. Selectorate: level of centralization in party statutes: Divergences between European and national elections

	Divergence EU – National level
No	10.9
Yes	89.1
Total (N)	100.0 (145)

Finally, in none of the 145 parties covered in this study do we read in the party statutes that the European parties or the party groups in the European parliament have any formal role to play in the selection of candidates for European elections by national parties (see table 8). It would therefore be very interesting to explore their possible informal role in this process in the next stage of this research (see section 4).

3. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES USING INTERVIEWS WITH MEPS

KEY FINDINGS

- Interviews with MEPs tend to confirm and reinforce the results of the analysis of the formal rules in terms of selectorate and centralization: the candidate selection process for European elections is highly centralized and rather exclusive;
- The party on the ground is rarely considered as a powerful player in the process, although there are informal indirect channels of influence;
- When the party on the ground is involved in the process, the system via which it is organized vary greatly across parties;
- As regard selectability, it appears that parties are looking for additional, interrelated individual criteria that can differ from the party statutes: financial contribution, socio-demographic characteristic, competences, experience, incumbency, investment in the party, and ideology;
- Parties also favour different types of collective criteria than the ones mentioned in party statutes: territorial balance and intra-party factions.

3.1. Presentation of the data

In this section, the goal is to complement the data presented on the formal rules organizing the selection of candidates for the European elections with information collected through interviews with MEPs. The interviews aim at investigating the informal practices in terms of candidate selection, and at assessing how informal practices differ from formal rules described in section 2. Informal practices are assessed via in-depth interviews of MEPs in order to gather information from candidates who went through the process themselves.

The rationale behind the sample selection is (1) to include countries with 50 MEPs or more (i.e. Germany, France, Italy, UK, Spain, Poland), and (2) to include other countries selected on the basis of a geographical balance (North-South, East-West) and variation in terms of party system characteristics. These additional countries included are Romania, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Croatia. For each party in these countries, we have contacted 5 MEPs minimum (unless for parties that have less than 5 MEPs) and 15 MEPs max. Our case selection also includes MEPs who have successfully run for reselection for the 2014 European election, MEPs unsuccessful in that regard, and MEPs who did not seek reselection. This is crucial since personal circumstances can influence the perceptions of the candidate selection process within the party.

In total, we have contacted 364 MEPs for interview. Eventually, we have received positive answers and held interviews with 43 MEPs from 37 different national political parties between January and April 2014 (the list of parties for which at least one MEP has been interviewed is available in Appendix – table 14). These interviews are helping us to detect when there are divergences between the formal rules as stated in party statutes and the informal practices coming into play for the selection of candidates for the European elections.

These interviews allow us to tackle the following questions:

- Which procedures are used to select candidates, according to the rules and in practice?
- Do these deviations generally contribute to oligarchization of the party, or rather to member empowerment?
- When members are involved in the selection process, what is the degree of participation in nomination decisions?

- What kind of candidate are the selectors looking for: policy representatives, candidates mirroring their target electorate's descriptive identity, or vote catchers?
- Do candidates and incumbents pay particular attention to the representation of their selectorates, in various forms (policy, pork barrel, constituency service)?
- What is the freedom of manoeuvre of selectors freedom in picking (new) candidates, and deselecting/downgrading others?
- Do different selection methods affect incumbency, turnover of MPs, and/or party discipline?
- Do selectors feel that the choice between interested candidates is abundant, or is there in general a shortage of "quality candidates"? How large is the pool of self-recruited vs. reluctant candidates that have to be begged to run?

3.2. Formal rules and informal practices: convergences and divergences

First and foremost, the interviews allowed for a better understanding of the rules and their practices. In a vast amount of cases, the rules can sometimes appear as vague. Thus, although not systematically underlining fundamental differences in terms of selectorate and level of (de)centralization, informal practices help understanding the power structure beyond the list of party actors at the different stages of the process. The interviews emphasize who the veto players are, and who retains more power and where.

Main differences in terms of selectorate and centralization

National executive committees and their emanations (selection committees, or party boards – i.e; the party in central office) are by and large the most often-cited veto players; this is notably the case in all Dutch parties. Yet, the party leader is informally perceived by MEPs as the most powerful in some parties, such as the Belgian VB, the French MoDem and UDI, the Spanish PP, or the Hungarian MSzP, which is remarkable given the variety of ideological profiles of these parties. This reinforces the pattern of high level of centralization of the selection process emphasized in the analysis of formal rules. Furthermore, head(s) of the list sometimes play a fundamental role in establishing the rest of the list. Our interviews reveal that it is the case in the French UMP, or the Belgian Open VLD. This results in a dual candidate selection process. However, these actors are rarely considered as veto players in the process.

The interviews with MEPs also emphasize that assemblies of delegates or party members (i.e. the party on the ground) are rarely considered as powerful in the process. If they are mentioned in a number of party statutes, our interviews reveal that it is often at the less crucial stages of the process, and not as veto players. For instance, in the French UMP, delegates at the National Council only have a right of approval, i.e. the right to symbolically confirm the choices of the party in central office. It is also the case in the Polish PO and SLD.

There are however notable exceptions to this pattern, such as the Bündnis90/die Grünen in Germany, in which delegates are seen as central actors, and the members of the Swedish Pirate Party and the UK and Wales Green Party. The experience of MEPs (SP in the Netherlands, or German parties) also shows that delegates and members can manage to increase their power in the selection process by getting the support or approval of other relevant bodies or individuals in their party, such as local chapters, Länder, thematic working groups. By getting the support of these bodies, members and delegates can indirectly benefit from their rights (formal input or amendments). Party executive at various sub-levels of the party can also help coordinating the voting power of their delegates.

However, in a number of parties (e.g. the French MoDem), neither members nor delegates are involved in the selection process. Instead, members might be consulted very indirectly via a consultation of the various local circles, such as in the Polish PO and SLD, or by informally contacting the leader, such as in the case of the Spanish PP.

It is interesting to note that when delegates or members are involved in the selection process, the system via which they are involved seems to vary quite a lot across parties. A majority of parties apply a secret ballot system at a conference or assembly. It is for example the case in the Hungarian MSzP, and it is possible under request in the case of the Spanish PNV Basque party. Other parties use alternative systems, such as acclamation, show of hands/hand voting¹⁷, electronic voting¹⁸ postal ballots¹⁹, online primaries²⁰, or a mix of different possibilities²¹.

Voting on pre-established lists constitutes the dominant pattern, such as in the Belgian OpenVLD or the Hungarian MSzP. Some parties allow members and/or delegates to completely alter the list (e.g. CDA in the Netherlands) or more moderately to add new candidacies for specific positions (e.g. Die Linke in Germany and SP in the Netherlands). This occasionally leads to a “very complicated” system and counting of the votes, as emphasized by the MEPs.

However, a number of parties allow for members or delegates to vote on restricted parts of the list or on individual candidates. For instance, in the French UMP, the vote is held on and limited to the pre-established top-two candidates. A few exceptions allow members or delegates to vote on candidates presented in a random order, with no pre-ranked list. In those cases, the vote is organized via with preferential voting (e.g. the UK and Wales Green Parties).

Overall, the patterns emphasized in the formal rules seem to be reinforced informally, the selection process for European elections appears as very centralized and in the hands of the party in central office. The party on the ground appears to have a weak role, if not only symbolic in most parties.

Main differences in terms of selectability

In terms of candidacy, the interviews unveil some interesting informal practices both at the individual and the party levels.

First, despite the fact that almost no party statutes mention fees to be paid prior to selection, some MEPs have mentioned important financial contributions to be made to their parties during their mandate. This is an element that some MEPs see as taken into account at the time of reselection. Some parties would tend to reward financially loyal MEPs.

Besides this financial criterion, MEPs emphasize that parties are looking for additional individual criteria that can differ from the party statutes. Most often, parties are looking for a combination of (1) socio-demographic characteristic, (2) competences, (3) experience, (4) incumbency, (5) investment in the party, and (6) ideology.

In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, gender and age are the most often cited characteristics. In terms of age, parties try to find a balance between selecting junior candidates and candidates with sufficient “political capital” (i.e. solid political networks both locally and nationally, a well known name among voters, a previous experience as high level elected official, etc.), which are more often senior politicians (see interview with Polish PO).

Competence is interpreted differently depending on the party. Some parties value competence in some policy domains, as it is deemed to offer a large appeal to the public²². However, these domains vary substantially.

¹⁷ Both acclamation and show of hands are for example possible in the assembly of delegates of the Spanish PNV, although the latter is more commonly used.

¹⁸ Used for instance in the National Council of the French UMP.

¹⁹ Used in the UK and Wales Green parties.

²⁰ As in the case of the Swedish Pirate Party.

²¹ For instance, the French EELV allows for members to vote either at the assembly or by post; the Belgian OpenVLD sends postal invitation with a login code for electronic ballot while reserving the possibility for local chapters to organize meetings with electronic voting facilities.

²² For example, the Belgian OpenVLD seeks candidates with professional backgrounds in academia, entrepreneurship, or the cultural sphere.

Other parties tend to favour candidates that master foreign languages²³. Additionally, some parties value a pre-existing knowledge in terms of EU decision-making processes, a prior expertise in European affairs, or an international experience, either explicitly (e.g. CDA in the Netherlands) or more vaguely (e.g. "having an interest for Europe and proving it" as mentioned by a French UMP MEP), or not at all (SLD in Poland). The ability to express oneself in public is also cited as a valued competence in some parties, and the credibility and ability to formulate arguments and present your case is valued for example in the UK and Wales Green parties.

(Political) experience and recognition is sometimes summarised as "to be famous, to have a famous name among voters" and acknowledged to be crucial if not the single most important criteria in some parties²⁴. Recognition of the work done during local, regional, or national mandates is valued. MEPS mentioned that it is a pre-requisite in the French UMP, and taken into account in the PNV in Spain.

Independent from what party statutes mention, incumbency is often seen by MEPs as a double-edge sword, i.e. as a "facilitation" or 'limitation" (see interviews with MEPs from the French UMP and PS as well as from the UK and Wales Green parties). If the quality of the work done in EP is considered as important for incumbents to get re-selected²⁵, this work also constitutes an easy target on which challengers can attack MEPs, as negative points in track records are easily pointed out. This is all the more true since most MEPs acknowledge the limited capacity of selectorates in assessing the work previously achieved in the EP, and since it is often technically difficult for them to answer all the solicitations and attend all the meetings back in their constituencies.

Investment and activism within the national party is almost always mentioned as a must (see Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in Germany, or SP in the Netherlands). However, what is seen as involvement in the party can differ. Some MEPs see involvement as presence at the national level (e.g. in party organs)²⁶, and it more specifically concern relations with the selection committee (as mentioned in the PvdA in the Netherlands) or the support of other important party figures (e.g. MSzP in Hungary). Regional or local involvement might be a plus, not least because the support of these levels should be secured in most processes (see Polish PO). To that extent, constituency work and campaigning covers different realities for the MEPs, who either favour contacts with citizens or contacts within the party at constituency level²⁷. Constituency work can be viewed as an informal criterion within parties, i.e. the building of an audience.

Finally, ideological congruence functions as a more diffuse criterion. Some MEPs have mentioned the necessity to agree with party principles (e.g. Swedish Pirate Party, Belgian OpenVLD), or the necessity to have strong convictions (French EELV). However, this criterion is not equally considered in all parties: MEPs from the Polish SLD do not recall being asked if they share left-wing values or if they agree with the party's manifesto, while the Belgian OpenVLD MEP expressly stressed the importance of adherence to liberal values, subscription to party platform, and defending viewpoints in line with general direction of the party.

Overall, the interviews reveal the difficulties to untangle various criteria that are not independent from each other (e.g. a seniority criteria often goes hand in hand with political experience; incumbency almost inevitably entails a form of involvement in the party at one level or the other; activism is difficult to imagine without a certain level of ideological commitment; etc.). In any case, it is their complementarity which above all plays a

²³ E.g. in the Polish PO, the president of the party - Donald Tusk - clearly stated that he wants all his party's MEPs to be fluent in English. Justifying a good level in English is therefore a prerequisite to stand as candidate on certain parties' list, and the knowledge of one or several other foreign languages is an asset. Conversely, language proficiency is subject to a less controlled appreciation in other parties, such as the Spanish PP, or the Polish SLD.

²⁴ For the Polish SLD, besides well-known politicians such as former MP or Ministers, this entails inviting "celebrities" to join the lists - e.g. contestants in reality TV shows, or famous sportsmen/women.

²⁵ This is notably highlighted in the French UMP and PS, as well as the UK and Welsh Greens, but also the OpenVLD, where emphasis is put on the actual work and not simply on the mandate, according to MEPs from these parties.

²⁶ This can be summarised as having a record and as "existing" within the party, as mentioned in the French UMP, or as "demonstrating commitment to the party", as mentioned in the UK and Wales Greens.

²⁷ E.g. to be present at forums and public meetings, to answer various solicitations during the mandate, or more personal linkages with citizens are important respectively in the eyes of the MEPs of the French UMP and the Spanish PNV, while the UK and Welsh Green Party MEPs insist on the importance of local visibility.

role in the selection process. This 'intersectionality' deserves attention: parties do not only have to take into account one single criteria, but often must combine gender quotas, territorial representation, factions, etc. Given the variety of criteria taken into account and their interconnections, some MEPs underline the unpredictability of the process.

To the same extent, parties favour different types of collective criteria. The interviews have underlined, probably to a greater extent than the formal rules suggest, that territorial balance is crucial. It is important to note that this criterion (territorial balance) can have important repercussions on the voting behaviour of delegates. A pre-existing regional link is most obviously crucial in countries with which encompass several regional constituencies. The French UMP is said to be particularly attentive to that aspect, although the interpretation of this link can be more or less strict. The German parties have all elaborated complex systems of attribution of places on the lists, based on the population, the number of party members, and/or results of the party in the given territory at previous elections. This territorial criteria can delineate different realities: the PNV is essentially concerned with the balance between historical regions of the Basque Country, while the territorial balance among French parties is generally meant to represent the different administrative regions (or departments) within each multi-regional constituency. However, the territorial criterion is also determinant in parties presenting lists in national constituencies, such as in the Netherlands (VVD, CDA).

Next to territorial balance, some parties also take into account factions. It seems to be especially the case among the French parties, that have to take into account ideological currents or motions (PS), different leaders (UMP), different affiliated organisations (EELV, alliance of the Green party with other environmentalists, social activists and regionalists), or even different parties within a coalition (the MoDem and UDI, but also the PNV with other Spanish nationalist parties like the CiU).

4. RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES, POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE EP, AND THE EUROPARTIES

KEY FINDINGS

- Not a single party mentions Europarties or European parliamentary party groups in their statutes when referring to candidate selection;
- Informally, EPPGs and PPEs play a role in the reselection of incumbent MEPs;
- That informal role is centralized in the hands of a few key actors at the EU level;
- The main determinants are the international recognition of the candidate and the connection between key figures at the EU level and their national party.

As stated in the introduction, parties are the products of national political settings, and candidate selection procedures are still largely under the control of national parties, even for European elections.

However, when entering the European political arena and the European Parliament, national parties are confronted with supra-national political organizations and groups (Blomgren 2003). It is therefore interesting to see how newcomers handle the relations between European Political Parties (EPPs) and political groups in the European Parliament (EPPGs) when competing in EP elections for the first time. More specifically, the study intends to look at how candidate selection procedures might be affected by this new context.

A first way to look at it is to consider how many parties mention a formal role of Europarties in their party statutes or in their specific rules for the selection of candidates for European elections. Indeed, one could expect that Europarties or European Parliamentary Party Groups provide some input to the process, either by being consulted by the national parties or by informing the national parties about the activities of incumbent MEPs. In a way, one could expect them to provide advices and recommendations, like functional branches or party factions do in some national parties. However, such role is never observed in the formal regulation of candidate selection by political parties within the Member States. The results from the data analysis are clear and straightforward; we find no case of provisions attributing a formal role to Europarties or EPPGs in the selection of candidates (see table 8). Since candidate selection for EP elections is organized at the national level, it is no surprise that Europarties do not take the initiative of drafting the lists of candidates, nor that they have a say on the final approval of the list of candidates.

The weak role of PPEs or EPPGs is often linked to the issue of integration of the two European faces of the Europarties: there are some discrepancies between EPPGs membership and PPEs membership, notwithstanding the (expectedly growing number of) non-aligned MEPs.

Yet, perhaps that the observations on the formal rules can be nuanced. It may be that Europarties or EPPGs have more informal influence on the selection of candidates by political parties within Member States. In order to verify it, we can mobilise the interviews that we have held with MEPs.

When being asked on the involvement of PPEs or EPPGs, most of the MEPs first inclination is an affirmation that there is none. This however comes with differences, and calling in for more specific direct or indirect intervention possibilities draws a more nuanced picture. In a number of parties, MEPs recognize that there is an informal role for PPEs and EPPGs in handling the reselection of incumbent MEPs. The opinion of the EPPG is sometimes asked on the work done by incumbent MEPs. This is particularly interesting with regard to the literature which tends to assume that re-election (and hence re-selection) is not about the work done in the EP or the policies supported by the MEPs.

The fact that candidate selection processes still tilt the balance toward more exclusive processes is in a sense reflected at European level, whereby individuals with a European affiliation (EPPGs chairs or personalities, PPELs presidents or general secretaries) are seemingly the key actors of the EU-level involvement in candidate selection, when there is any involvement at all. However, the Chairman of the EPPG and PPEL play a role essentially in their own national party. This is the case for instance for Joseph Daul, which opinion has been taken into account as EPP Chairman in the corresponding French UMP selection process, or Guy Verhofstadt in the process within the Belgian OpenVLD.

From the interviews, there is a number of indications that the prospect of having so-called top-candidates (candidates to the European Commission Presidency) plays a role in the parties to which these candidates belong: the Green candidate José Bové did not secure the most votes in his constituency but was nevertheless placed as head of the list, the German SPD has selected Martin Schulz as its Spitzenkandidat. Yet, the German Greens did not select Franziska Keller as their head of list.

In fact, it seems to be the international recognition of the candidates, more than their actual nomination as Europarties candidates, which can account for their (re)selection: in the case of Martin Schulz, the interview suggests that he is the first European politician to be known in Germany and his reselection as list leader owes to that recognition, independently from his role in the PES.

Future prospects for Europarties

The importance given in the literature to the role of party members as inclusive selectorates in the candidate selection processes pushes us to consider the role of individual members in Europarties. Recent studies underline that their number is limited, their power weak within party structures, and their affiliation requirements very heterogeneous (Gagatek 2014; Hertner 2013). The predominance of double-affiliation schemes (the necessity to be a member of one of the affiliated national party) points at the possibility for them to retain a certain influence on European questions within their national parties. Some MEPs confirm their link with individual Europarties members.

Besides, the MEPs that were interviewed are overall favourable to a greater involvement of Europarties, notably through the often-mentioned transnational lists. However, many of them take a rather realist stand on the feasibility of the proposal as well as on the stand of their national party on the matter. Indeed, the vision of national parties on the role of Europarties in general and in the candidate selection process in particular, varies quite a lot, but tends toward a sceptic view.

In the same way, MEPs tend to positively value their position within their own party. Yet, they acknowledge that the way their own party value the position of MEP may be different. In some parties, the position is well valued whereas in other parties, MEPs tend to be ignored or marginalized. Parties that tend to value representation at the EP the most are parties that gained representation in this institution prior to gaining national representation (e.g. the UK and Welsh green Parties or the Swedish Pirat Party).

5. INFORMAL PRACTICES IN CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCESSES

To highlight the main findings, this addendum proceeds as follows. It first underlines the opportunity and appeal of looking into informal procedures of selection as compared to formal ones. By doing so, it further expatiates on why a certain gap can be expected between the rule and the practice. It then presents the results obtained through the interviews relating to that shift.

5.1. Explaining informality

5.1.1. Selectorate and decentralisation

A lot of attention has traditionally been devoted to formal rules and institutions in politics. The study of candidate selection has been no exception to that trend; party rules (as encompassed in statutes and other party documents) have almost invariably served as references when investigating these processes. Yet, informal aspects of politics have been given increased consideration, not least at the EU level where informal governance has long been recognized as one of the most significant features of the decision-making process (Christiansen & Neuhold 2013). In other words, informality in the EU has increasingly been recognized as a central feature of its functioning. Informality occurs when "*participation in the decision-making is not yet or cannot be codified and publicly enforced*" (Christiansen *et al.* 2003: 6), and hence designates processes that are "*uncodified, non-institutional and where social relationships and webs of influence play crucial roles*" (Harsh 2012). In this addendum, the focus will thus be on identifying unwritten processes which guide or structure the making of the lists for European elections. Indeed, in the end, the informal processes prevail in candidate selection: if one wants to understand why a specific person was (s)elected, he/she needs to look at how, in practice, the aspirant became a candidate .

How and why informal practices of candidate selection are developed? This addendum completes the preceding report by identifying the link between formal rules and informal practices. It relies on a typology which differentiates between practices that either complete, accommodate, substitute or compete with formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 729). Different mechanisms might be at play in doing so: (role) learning; norms incorporation as the right thing to do; through coercion; through elites' imposition (*Ibid.*). In sum, light is further shed on the interaction and coexistence of rules and practices.

5.2. How and why national parties' practices of selection for European Elections deviated from their rules

5.2.1. Data and methods

The pivotal role of informal practices has been largely underlined in the literature on candidate selection (see *inter alia*: Hazan and Rahat 2010). Yet, because of the complex and opaque nature of these processes, this has remained a largely unanswered call. Methodological and empirical warnings have been expressed by Gallagher and Marsh who have taken over the denomination of selection processes as '*secret gardens*' (1988). Hazan and Rahat (2010) have later depicted the "*objective difficulties and obstacles one encounters in any attempt to conduct research on candidate selection – namely, the lack of, and inaccessibility to, empirical data*". These hurdles are all the more true for European selection processes given the discrepancy between the level of (s)election (national) and the level where politics and policy-making are at play (European).

The analyses presented hereunder ensue from interviews that were conducted with MEPs. It should be noted that MEPs are very specific aspirants and candidates: they have been successful in the selection process which resulted in them being attributed eligible places, and they were most likely successful in the election (a few exceptions concern those MEPs replacing elected MEPs who stepped down after the election). Because of this specificity of MEPs among the pool of aspirants, one could hence expect a (positive) bias held toward a

selection system which has, in a way or another, favoured them. At the same time, MEPs are the only 'still available' candidates. In the context of the personalization of politics and of the alleged crisis of representative democracy, studying MEPs also allows underlining the normative difference between being a 'good' candidate' and being a 'good' representative.

As a reminder, the first report, after collecting, analysing and comparing the party rules in 145 parties in 27 Member States, had tackled a number of issues through semi-structured interviews of MEPs from 37 national parties from 11 different member states. This addendum has continued on this path by adding new interviews and further exploiting data from the first wave of interviews. The interviews reveal a number of informal practices which have prevailed in the selection of candidates ahead of the 2014 European elections, and provide keys to understand how and why parties have opted for these specific practices. Although we do not seek to construct a representative sample, MEPs have been selected so as to cover the largest range of member states (small to large; with a geographical spread) and political orientations²⁸. Despite the focus being slightly different (the passage from formal rules to informal practices), findings are presented in a manner consistent with that of the first report: practices regarding selectorate and decentralisation are put forward, before individual and collective candidacy (selectability) criteria are highlighted.

5.3. From formal rules to informal practices in the selection of candidates for European elections

5.3.1. Selectorate and decentralisation

The processes of selection

As foreseen by existing analytical frameworks, the processes of selection are often multi-stages and mixed (see in particular: Hazan and Rahat 2010). Yet, party rules often provided for the role of only a few different party actors or bodies in the selection - to the extent that experts recoding these rules often could not distinguish more than two different steps. Practices however suggest that different selectorates in fact select different or the same candidates at one or at several points in time. In addition, similar rules were sometimes meant to apply to selection processes for different elections (in 55.2% of the 145 cases explored in the first report, selectorates intervening were found to be similar for candidate selection for national and European elections). It is hence little surprising that, if not the rules, then the practices will diverge, not least due to the peculiarities of the electoral system for European elections.

Some parties indeed had some very vague to no rules on the running of the process (the Romanian PMP - *Partidul Mișcarea Populară* -'s only rule concerned the participation of members, while the Swedish Greens - *Miljöpartiet de Gröna* - only mentioned the parity rule with the 'zipping system' which does not deal with the process itself). Some other parties presented a formal procedure that was then applied only to select some of the candidates (resulting in a so-called 'assorted' process, whereby different candidates are selected by different selectorates hence taking part in different processes of selection). Often, a distinct informal process was developed for heads of lists which was not foreseen in the rules (this is the case in the Romanian PMP and PDL, but also in the French *Front de Gauche*). These practices are almost invariably more exclusive and centralised than the process predicted by the rules. This is important in particular because eligible places are often limited to the heads of lists, which are hence often themselves determined by rather closed processes. As a result, the formal process (or part of it) only applies to the selection of the rest of the list, which entails mostly ineligible places. This can thus be interpreted as a substitute to the formal rules: processes are partially compatible with what the rules predicted (a different process is put in place) but these rules could not have worked as such. The impossibility to make the formal rules work is attributed to several different factors. In

coalitions, the first key to make the list is the distribution among the different parties taking part (Front de Gauche in France), a key prevailing over different intra-party processes which are sometimes difficult to make compatible. To the same extent, the importance of factions and movements in the functioning of some parties was sometimes improperly considered in the rules, so processes had to be readapted to take into account the equilibrium between the different factions (as in the French PS or UMP). There is also a personalization dimension: specific personalities among which outgoing MEPs are sometimes seen as natural heads of lists (PDL, PMP in Romania). This corresponds in any case mostly to an 'elites' imposition', as the higher instances of the party are the one choosing the selection process in fine (in the *Front de Gauche*, an *ad hoc* body with representatives of the different parties of the coalition had been created to decide on the repartition of the heads of lists between the two main parties and other smaller parties or movements; in the PMP, the direction of the party had decided that the first places would go to outgoing MEPs and that the actual process would apply only for the next places). In some cases, higher party bodies even added candidates (up to the very last minute) after the process of nomination had been enforced, thus complementing the rules with a practice. All in all, the general pattern hence seems to delineate formal processes that are relatively open and decentralised (they include member votes and/or local or regional organisations) but which are only partially applied and informal practices which are more exclusive and centralised and apply to the top of the list.

A similar trend is found in the selection processes put in place in newly created parties, especially those created ahead of the European elections. Their overarching imperative had been to secure registration, delineating rather vaguely their selection processes, which then need to be reinterpreted. In these particular cases, practices may be complementary to under-developed formal rules. Parties might not have clearly defined their selection procedures simply because they were not sure that they would be able to run for elections at all (the priority hence being the registration itself). In those new parties, selection processes were entirely new too and created from the top; it is hence little surprising that they give power to rather exclusive bodies: it might have been difficult to give power to decentralised entities which are not totally in place or operational and it might have been difficult to give powers to an enlarged selectorate (there might be no elected delegates yet and/or only a few members). In the case of the Romanian PMP for instance, the selection process took place before the first Party Congress.

The practices put in place in the parties for selecting candidates for European elections seem overall more exclusive and centralised than the rules had suggested. Among the justification of these practices, it seems that time-management issues come to the forefront. Some MEPs hence mention the difficulty to cope with the emergency of nominations (*Front de Gauche*, PMP) and the need to make selection processes less time-consuming and more effective so as to keep time for the campaign.

The role of members and their delegates in the selection of candidates for European elections

It has been highlighted that many actors often intervene in selection processes. Yet, the respective role and influence of these different actors may vary. One of the highest authorities of the party (often the national leader/chair itself, the national party executive or national-level electoral committee) is often expressly mentioned as the main veto-player – that is, the single most influential actor or body to which MEPs attribute their selection.

To that extent, a first major difference between rules and practices of selection might be found in the role of party members and/or of their delegates²⁹: while rules often provide for their participation, their role is often constrained, reduced, or even bypassed in practice. The rules revealed that the participation of members or delegates may entail either a first endorsement (among the 145 parties considered in the first part of the report, either members or delegates intervene in 57.9% of all initiatives) or a vote (intervening in 41.1% of amendments and 55.2% of all approvals made of the various lists). Endorsement often entails that the rules provide for any

²⁹ Processes involving members are however considered more inclusive than those involving delegates. This is why for each case study precisions are given so as to who is entitled to participate. It should be noted, however, that often – especially in smaller parties or smaller member states – all active members participate in the Party Congress, blurring the difference between members and delegates.

member or a specific number of members to propose candidates. In the former case, it means that actors with different influence and rank all enjoy the same prerogative; in other words, it is likely that specific categories of members (e.g. those who are part of the party higher bodies) will have more influence. In the latter case, endorsement is unlikely to be crucial in practice as other party organs will compile, amend or redraft the list later in the process. As for the vote, such rule may entail different possible modalities which are examined below.

First, regarding on what members or delegates can actually cast a vote, there are several possibilities offered to the parties in practice. The list can be submitted to the members by alphabetical or random order (Green Party of England and Wales), they can be submitted according to local or regional entities which are themselves allowed a specific pre-established rank on the list (such is the case in the German CDU³⁰ and SPD respectively, but also in the Romanian PDL³¹), or they may be submitted with an order pre-established by another - usually higher - authority of the party (such is the case in the French PS, the Belgian OpenVLD, or the UMP³²). In this last case of pre-established lists, there might be a possibility to alter the ranking of the list (Romanian PMP, Dutch VVD³³), to change only specific candidates (die Linke in Germany, the SP in the Netherlands³⁴) or not at all (in the Belgian OpenVLD this is even reduced to a yes/no vote of members on the pre-established list; the same goes for the Hungarian MSzP; in the Dutch CDA, the Party Congress could confirm the list but not amend it). And even when the list is open to changes, there are some practices which might bring a bias in favour of specific candidates. In the Swedish Green party, only the top-five candidates were presented in the party's magazine, which was seen to give them a considerable advantage through an increased visibility.

Second, still pertaining to the practical modalities of the vote is the issue of how members or delegates vote. It seems that Internet-based voting is starting to be quite widespread (in addition to the already mentioned examples of the Swedish Pirate Party and the Open VLD in Belgium, the Swedish Green Party also used an online voting system), although most parties still use ballot boxes or postal ballots (as is the case for instance for the Green Party of England and Wales), in addition to the less usual practice of acclamation (as used by Uni6 delegates in the party's National Council).

Beyond voting modalities, there is also the issue of the importance and influence of such vote in the overall selection process. Despite an affirmation in the rules that members should always vote on candidates, this vote is often in practice more of a consultation, subject to approval by more exclusive and centralised party organs who might alter the order or interpose other candidates (EELV in France; PMP in Romania). Only in very few parties is this vote considered as pivotal and members or delegates as veto players (although this is considered to be the case in most German parties, namely for Die Linke, Alliance 90/The Greens and the CDU).

Explanations put forward by the MEPs for the implementation of such practices emanate from the specific nature of the selection for European elections: large constituencies make it difficult to coordinate voting results; participation rates are in any case rather low (few members do vote when they are offered this possibility; some parties do not in any case have a lot of members); processes can be time-constrained (especially for new parties); coalitions or alliances created for the purpose of these elections entail parties with different rules, traditions and number of members who have to be put together in a single process. All in all, these various practices suggest that the practices constitute a complementation of the formal rules: members do participate but problems associated with this participation are overcome by adding informal elements.

³⁰ Within the CDU/CSU party (and precisely because of this double composition), all lists are drafted at the regional level, and compete as independent lists in the elections. The pre-established ranking hence concerns local entities within regional lists.

³¹ Regional entities were entitled to vote for candidates at specific places on the list, these places being attributed based on previous electoral results of the party in the various regions.

³² Vote of delegates on a pre-established heading duo for each French constituency.

³³ The threshold for amending the proposed list is, however, considerable. For any candidate to be placed higher on the list, this candidate needs the outspoken support of at least half of the voting members.

³⁴ Delegates at the party congress can support the proposed list entirely, or replace candidates individually. The list order can, however, not be changed.

Despite the fact that the first report acknowledged the absence of real influence of Europarties and EP party groups on selection processes which remain centred at the national level, the second wave of interviews again depicts some practices that suggest possible nuances. First, beyond the parties, associated organisations or 'wings' of the political parties at European level have sometimes successfully supported candidates. In the previous election, the MEP and head of the PES woman section had largely gained visibility through this association. In 2014, the interviews revealed that the Federation of Young European Greens (FYEG) had successfully supported several candidates, including a candidate of the Swedish Green Party. This European back-up continued during the campaign whereby a network of its different candidates across countries was developed. Some MEPs also came directly and were recruited explicitly because of their previous experience in working in a party at European level (PMP). Second, the most recent interviews also confronted us again with the splitting of roles between the European and national parties, when the head of a party at European level or EP party group is also concomitantly head of a national party, and hence likely to intervene in selection for European elections. In 2014, this was the case for several national parties, such as the French UMP, the Front de Gauche, and the Belgian Open VLD.

4.3.2. Candidacy criteria

Who can be selected? Various specific criteria may be used to restrict candidacies. They allow distinguishing candidates from the pool of aspirants. These specific selection criteria often receive more public and media attention than the (above described) processes of selection: such and such MEP is often said to have been selected for a specific attribute, often centred on his notoriety or previous political experience. The previous report provided some insights insofar as specific individual and collective criteria were identified as being at play in the selection of candidates for European elections. Concerning the individual criteria, being a member of the party was the most widespread formal requirement found - with almost 45 per cent of party rules imposing it, sometimes accompanied by additional specific length requirements. Other main formal provisions include incompatibilities with other mandate or professions (found in 22.1% of the party rules) and minimum age (25.5%). Yet another type of individual criteria that was examined concerned endorsements which constituted formally only a rather rare requirement (13.2% of rules provided for an endorsement by party's elected official, 8.3% by members, 6.9% by an official faction). As for collective criteria in party rules, where they did exist, they were found to be in an overwhelming majority of cases limited to gender quotas (in 37.9% of party rules) with a few parties also using explicitly geographical (9.7%) or ethnic quota (6.2%) - although this was the case mostly for regionalist parties or parties representing ethnic minorities. It should be noted that these criteria often reflect or prolong national legal provisions (in particular, the electoral law) of the country under scrutiny: parties' gender quotas were evidenced in member states where a parity law already exists; incompatibility with other mandates were often already regulated by law but some parties went further with rules prohibiting multiple offices. Because they are blatantly so country-specific, differences in terms of these formal criteria are particularly difficult to interpret. At the same time, the analyses of the rules had revealed here again (and even more strikingly than for the selectorates) that in an overwhelming majority of cases party rules regarding individual and collective criteria for European selection do not differ from those imposed for selection ahead of national elections (with levels of similarity reaching respectively 83.3% and 87.6% for individual and collective criteria). This similarity of requirements at different levels is particularly suspicious because it tends to suggest that parties would favour the same kind of candidates and of representation whatever the level involved and electoral system applying. To remedy these issues, looking at who got (s)electd is a possible indication of what has really mattered in terms of 'selectability' practices. In other words, interviewing MEPs gives an indication on what successful candidatures are about. In the possible range of criteria, there are those being allegedly used by the parties, those which have especially favoured a specific MEP, but also those that MEPs consider should play a greater role in selection. Parties may of course enforce, reinterpret or skirt the requirements contained in their rules. The first report gave indications on what these ensuing practices might be about, but without linking them explicitly with corresponding rules.

Individual criteria

Most of the criteria that were identified in the previous report still hold following the additional interviews. This perhaps most notably applies to the specific advantage attributed to incumbents. It had also been highlighted that these criteria should be considered in an additive manner: it is often not one but several qualities that play in favour of a particular aspirant (a phenomenon captured by the notion of 'intersectionality').

Among the informal individual criteria, as foreseen in the first report, incumbency indeed appears as an overarching 'facilitator', probably to a greater extent than the first wave of interviews had revealed. This is especially interesting because while in the rules previous mandates or professions are by no means formal ways to select candidates (except for very isolated cases), it seems that EP incumbency and other political experience crucially matter in practice. Outgoing MEPs' candidacies are often analysed independently from the other aspirants. In some parties, there are informally reserved places on the list for incumbents if they wish to run again – and the places are invariably among the top positions (as in the Romanian PDL and MPM parties). All things being equal, being an incumbent is thus an advantage. The incumbency advantage seems to have become a well anchored practice to the extent that some parties have anticipated this 'bonus' for outgoing MEPs: some deputies have quit in the year preceding the election so as to place their successor. This allegedly allowed the 'new' MEP to be presented as incumbent, to have gained some visibility in the party and toward the electorate and some experience (such has been the case for instance in the Danish People's Movement against the EU - *Folkebevægelsen mod EU*). A further research on outgoing MEPs shows that 21 deputies left their position in the year preceding the European elections (although this can be for different motives, including taking on other responsibilities at the national level), a figure amounting to 30 if we consider the period running from January 2013 to May 2014. As such, incumbency which is almost absent from the rules constitutes a competing formal institution; it has become a pivotal consideration, not foreseen in the rules.

MEPs however see two main obstacles to their reselection. First, if the work accomplished during the previous mandate is often highlighted by incumbents as crucial, this, however, appears in contradiction with the alleged absence of interest in their work in the EP and valorisation of their position from their national parties that most of them denounce. Building on the consideration that national political parties in EU member states have strong hold on candidate selection in general and on selection for European elections in particular, the value that these parties attribute to the position should be taken into account. In sum, while the growing powers of the EP and its current role in EU decision-making have raised considerable public interest, most MEPs still think that their parties do not grant much attention to their representatives in the EP (except maybe for isolated cases, such as the Swedish Greens). MEPs often come to that conclusion by comparing the interest and contacts of national parties for the work of their MPs *versus* MEPs. The position of MEPs is, by contrast, generally valued by the MEPs themselves who often consider the EU level as the locus of power. Hence, the qualities that are valued by MEPs (and that they see as important to be a MEP) seem to differ from those needed to be a suitable candidate in the eyes of the parties. Second, outgoing MEPs often find their position unsuited to contacts with their constituency (a problem that they largely attribute to the size of the constituencies). MEPs consequently often feel that they are unknown or not recognized among the electorate of their (large) constituency.

There is also evidence that contacts with party activists (the party grass-root) matter in selection: in two parties, contacts with the grass-roots of the party (activists) and beyond (civil society organisations activists) have been cited as a crucial back-up to (re)selection (the Swedish Greens and the French Front de Gauche). And the link has been established and maintained in particular through the use of social media. As such, activists' support gives some candidates a specific visibility. A nuance can hence be brought to the assertion that all selectorates have a limited capacity to assess the work of candidates.

Party involvement too is shown to be important both at national level (being part of the instances of the party at the national level is described as a way to show investment and adherence to the party), and at the regional and local level (in addition of the support of local activists, the support of local or regional party elites is often necessary). Although not mentioned in the formal criteria regarding selectability, the necessity of this combined national and subnational endorsement has been pointed out in the case of the Front de Gauche and PMP, while

the first report had rather seen party investment at one (investment at the national level in the French UMP and in the Green Party of England and Wales; endorsement in the MSzP in Hungary) or the other level (regional or local endorsement in the Polish PO). This is complementary both to the membership pre-requisite - which was the single most commonly imposed rule in parties' documents -, and to the, rarer, endorsement rules. As such, an additive criterion which can contribute to explanations of the incumbent advantage is hence that it is mostly outgoing MEPs who are also well-known political figures that would be re-conducted.

Beyond the EP, notoriety acquired both through political experience (the French UMP, Polish SLD and Spanish PNV selection processes, but also for the Romanian PMP have presented well-known politicians like former Ministers or MPs) or outside the political sphere (in addition to the Polish SLD, this was also the case for the Romanian PMP which presented a famous tennis woman among its candidates) is confirmed as particularly important.

Among the other criteria that MEPs often insist on is the importance of "knowledge" which can be related to the accent put on "competences" and "interests" by others already highlighted (for the Belgian Open VLD, Polish PO, Dutch CDA and French UMP). It is however not always entirely clear what kind of knowledge (of politics, of the EU system, of languages, more rarely of a specific policy) is meant. If MEPs logically defend their legitimacy through "knowledge" or "competence", this encompasses different realities and different party approaches to the issue. In some parties, this criterion is materialized through selection interviews, especially when an electoral committee exists (Swedish Greens, French UMP). In the Romanian PMP, some candidates had technical EU-specific competences: the list encompassed former project managers for European projects, an EU-studies professor and a former State Secretary for Regional development (one of the main EU-related domain relevant in the country [NDLR]). When such is the case, being a dedicated European is also often mentioned.

Collective criteria

How are quotas enforced or reconsidered in practice? For women quotas, political parties quotas are relevant only if they are more demanding than the law. In France, one initial goal found in some parties was that there would be as many women as men heading the eight lists. This was met for the UDI-Modem lists, and even exceeded in the case for *Europe Ecologie - The Greens*. The only selection provision found in the Swedish Green Party selection rules concern the so-called 'zipping' system (the strict alternation of men and women on the list). This party gender quota has been reinterpreted to the extent that it can be assimilated to a 'men quota': if the results of the members vote would put two women on the top this would be accepted, but if this would happen lower in the list it would not, hence protecting places for men. This can be seen as a form of complementary informality whereby the practice goes further than the party rules (and besides, copes with unforeseen possible lacunae of the law).

Regional quotas also applied *de facto* more than according to rules: local and regional organisations often have a power of initiative in putting forward names (and this is foreseen in the rules sometimes) so a formal rule that is not expressly a quota leads to a *de facto* quota, a case of convergent informal practice. In the Romanian PMP, each departmental organisation was asked to send candidates although no rules provided for that. In other parties, rule explicitly provide for such representativeness of the selectorate rather than of the candidates (with the assumption however, that one leads to the other). All in all, the previous conclusion that territorial balance is pivotal to the building of the lists more than foreseen by the rules is confirmed. This is hence a complementary mechanism in cases where incomplete provisions on regional representation were in place and a competing mechanism when the importance of regional equilibria was simply not foreseen in the rules.

Furthermore, the inclusion of candidates from outside the party sphere is a norm-driven practice that has found some echo in the selection criteria for European elections (and which contradict the 'membership' criteria). The Front de Gauche has for instance included for the second-time a representative from the civil society which has largely undermined the key of repartition between the parties of the coalition. The French PS and Belgian cdH have included former trade union leaders on their lists at the expense of incumbents. Explicit quotas for satellite organizations or civil society candidates were actually present in only 3.5% of the parties under scrutiny.

Another practice which is at the crossroads between intra- and extra-party spheres: giving a role and including associated organisations (generally the women party organisation or the youth wing of the party) had been identified albeit to a limited extent in the rules regarding the candidacies and the selectorate/decentralisation. Affiliated organizations or other political actors were found to be invested with a power of initiative in the making of the lists in five cases (3.4%) - and the same goes for non-member supporters - and of amendment in just one party. As for informal regional quotas, the inclusion of candidates from outside the strict party sphere can be either complementary to or competing with party rules.

Central to all these criteria is of course the question of whether institutions should better reflect the composition of society (descriptive representation) and any criteria which tends toward professionalization (especially competency criteria) creates a gap with the society's composition. Some MEPs hence think that imposing both formal and informal criteria is above all a way to limit candidacies.

5.4. Conclusion

The development of informal practices of candidate selection is both a normative challenge and opportunity for the future of the European Parliament. A challenge, on the one hand, because it rests on often non-transparent and complex arrangements which are difficult to unfold. Hence, efforts to make the institution more transparent and open in the functioning of the legislature are unequally matched in the main defining aspect of this legislature: who gets in and how. An opportunity, on the other hand, because the development of what are sometimes manifold and elaborated processes suggests a growing interest of national political parties in these processes and their outcomes. As such, although the growing public and political interest in the EP – which has thrived in the wake of the institution's increase in powers and influence in the decision-making – still does not fully translate into a similar interest being put in its selection processes, gradual changes are taking place.

There are, however, not one but two main factors which affect the election to legislative office: control of candidate selection and electoral laws (Mitchell 2000: 340; see also: Faas 2003; Gallagher 1988: 258). If the overall electoral system for EP elections certainly affects selection (large constituencies threaten territorial representation and entail difficulties for MEPs to maintain links with their (s)electorates), it is mostly national electoral laws which create a discrepancy in the rules, and above all in the practices of selection (impacting the presence or absence of gender quotas, the rules on the registering of lists, etc.). MEPs accordingly often came to mention the electoral law as being particularly constraining on the parties in putting into place their selection processes. Although this would deserve a more in-depths consideration, this is neither particularly surprising nor peculiar to the EU: the influence of the legal system on selection processes had been largely anticipated by the literature on candidate selection (Norris 1997).

If the interviews have revealed interesting and often unexpected patterns in the selection of candidates across party and countries and have allowed an in-depth analysis of these processes, they have also underlined the need for a more systematic approach which would allow having a broader view on the difference between the rules and the practices. There is hence certainly a need to continue exploring new research avenues in this area.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

KEY FINDINGS

- Based on a comparative dataset on candidate selection procedures in Europe, as well as on a detailed inventory of formal and informal procedures in a sample of parties, this study provides a series of recommendations as to how to regulate and improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections;
- Four recommendations can be suggested;
- First, due to electoral rules, candidate selection procedures for European elections generally imply more centralized procedures; this trend should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness and openness of the process;
- A second recommendation relates to the informal role that Europarties could play in the process of candidate selection (e.g. participation in informal meetings, coordination of events; elaboration of a common minimal electoral platform, or even the selection of the candidate for the Presidency of the new European Commission), as well as their formal input (e.g. reporting on the activity of outgoing MEPs, or providing an overview of the issues that will be high on the agenda of the upcoming EP);
- Third, in the case of an election of a share of MEPs via a EU-wide constituency, Europarties would have to organize the selection of those candidates via some degree of centralization to coordinate this process, but again it should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness of the process;
- A fourth recommendation is to propose common minimum standards of selectability to national political parties, either in the form of recommendations, or as formal requirement to be included in party statutes or electoral law.

Intra-party mechanisms have important impacts both for parties themselves and the system at large (Bille 2001; Katz 2001; Pennings & Hazan 2001; Rahat & Hazan 2001; Hazan & Rahat 2006a, 2006b). Based on a first, original, systematic and comparative dataset on candidate selection procedures in Europe, as well as on a detailed inventory of formal and informal candidate selection procedures in a selected sample of countries/parties, this study provides a series of recommendations as to how to regulate and improve the democratic quality of candidate selection for the European elections.

Relying on insights from the analysis of the relations between national political parties, Europarties and European Parliamentary Party Groups, this study also offers a specific focus on how to facilitate the transnational character of the electoral competition.

From the study, four recommendations in particular may be drafted. First of all, the study emphasized a caveat between the necessary centralization of candidate selection for the EP elections and the capacity to maintain the openness and the inclusiveness of the selection process. The electoral systems for the election of MEPs in the Member States make parties operate in wider constituencies than for national elections. In most Member States, MEPs are elected in nationwide districts. Even in the few countries with subnational districts, these are often wider than the ones used for national elections (i.e. France, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ireland). Rather logically, it leads to a centralization of the process of candidate selection, and leaves less space in the process for the decentralized party organs, in the districts. This trend towards more centralized procedures is not problematic per se, but it could become an issue if it came at the expenses of the inclusiveness and openness of the process. It has appeared in the report that, in several national parties, the party leader or limited national party organs composed of only a few party officials gain salience in selecting candidates for the European elections compared to national patterns. By the same token, the role of party members or of party delegates tends to be reduced at the European level. A first recommendation would therefore be that the

centralization of candidate selection for EP elections should not imply less inclusiveness in the process. It would be worth reflecting on guidelines that could be elaborated to safeguard the role of party members and/or of party delegates in the selection of candidates for EP elections, even when this selection has to happen at the level of the Member State because of the electoral system.

A second recommendation relates to the role that Europarties play in the process of candidate selection. As the report shows, they currently play very little formal role. Furthermore, the interviews emphasized that there is little willingness from the national political parties to give them a more prominent role to play, even informally. Based on these results, the initiation of a reflection on the role of European political parties could follow two avenues.

A first avenue could imply a reflection on how Europarties could act informally through more meetings and more coordination events in the preparation of the EP elections. The coordination could go beyond the elaboration of a common minimal electoral platform, as it is very much the case now, to touch upon the selection of the candidate for the Presidency of the new European Commission. Europarties could also try to discuss and reflect with representatives of national parties about what is expected of MEPs once elected, about what is helping the European party and the EPPGs to act more efficiently.

The second potential avenue for a role of Europarties in the selection of candidates is to discuss the possibility for them to be attributed a formal input in the process. Once the process of candidate selection is launched, it could be envisaged to give Europarties and/or the EPPGs the possibility to make their voice and opinion heard, for example by submitting a report on the contribution of the incumbent MEPs over the course of the legislative term, or by providing an overview of the issues that will be high on the agenda of the upcoming European Parliament and for which candidates with some expertise on the issues would be useful. How exactly this could be organized is to be left to the discretion of the EPPGs, the Europarties and the national parties in the Member States. Yet, providing (formally or informally) a window of opportunity for EPPGs, Europarties, and national parties to exchange ideas and information during the candidate selection process, could be a point to be discussed.

Third, the above discussion on the role of Europarties refers to the current situation, where all MEPs are elected within Member States. Yet, there have been discussions and even sometimes reports on the possibility to have a share of MEPs elected in a EU-wide constituency³⁵. Would that happen to be the case, Europarties would have to reflect on how they could then organize the selection of those candidates running in the EU-wide constituency. In such circumstances, the debates presented in this report on the democratization of candidate selection are highly relevant. One element in particular that should be at the centre of attention is the selectorate in charge of drafting the list of candidates. Some degree of centralization by Europarties themselves would be necessary for coordinating this process, but again it should not come at the expenses of the inclusiveness of the process. Therefore, a possible scenario is a selection by delegates of national political parties, or a direct vote of (Euro)party members, or even registered voters in the Member States. This study has also shown that national parties in the Member States have found ways to associate the constituency party organizations, the party members or other bodies (trade unions, factions) at the various stages of the process of candidate selection for national elections (initiation, input/amendment, and final approval). Europarties may find inspiration in these models, would they have to coordinate the selection of candidates to run in a EU-wide constituency.

Finally, a fourth recommendation would be to initiate a reflection on common minimum standards of selectability to be proposed to national political parties as guidelines when they select candidates for EP elections. This study has shown that many parties in the Member States specify in their party statutes selectability criteria that they apply when they are drafting their lists of candidates. These may be criteria

³⁵ Doc. PE 508.212v02-00

encouraging the selection of candidates showing some qualities that are judged to be useful once they would be elected (facilitating criteria). One example is the requirement of fluency in at least another of the official language of the EU. In the same line, national parties also often formulate in their statutes recommendations for balanced lists in terms of age, gender, geographical origin or ethnicity (when relevant). This recommendation could be promoted in all Member States, and common selectability criteria could be suggested. It would even be interesting to have an in-depth reflection on whether it could go beyond mere recommendations. In several Member States, gender quotas are applied by party themselves or by the law. A generalization of such provisions in all Member States could definitely be a point we would recommend to discuss.

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ANNEX**Table 10. List of national experts**

Code	Country	Expert name	University
BE	Belgium	Emilie van Haute	Université libre de Bruxelles
BG	Bulgaria	Petia Gueorguieva	New University Sofia
CZ	Czech Republic	Peter Spac	Masaryk University
DK	Denmark	Karina Pedersen	University of Copenhagen
DE	Germany	Thomas Poguntke, Jan Kette	University of Dusseldorf
EE	Estonia	Riho Kangur	University of Tartu
IE	Ireland	Connor Little	University College Dublin
EL	Greece	Vicky Bouranta	Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
ES	Spain	Tania Verge	University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
FR	France	Simon Persico	Sciences Po Paris
IT	Italy	Luciano Bardi	University of Pisa
CY	Cyprus	Christophoros Christophorou	University of Cyprus
LV	Latvia	Toms Rostoks	Latvian Institute for International Affairs
LT	Lithuania	Mindaugas Jurkynas	Vilnius University
LU	Luxembourg	Emilie van Haute	Université libre de Bruxelles
HR	Croatia	Bojana Kocijan	Central European University Budapest
HU	Hungary	Zsolt Enyedi	Central European University
MT	Malta	Marcello Carammia	University of Malta
NL	Netherlands	Gerrit Voerman	University of Groningen
AT	Austria	Wolfgang Mueller	University of Wien
PL	Poland	Anna Paczesniak	University of Wroclaw
PT	Portugal	Razzuoli Isabella	Universidade de Lisboa

Code	Country	Expert name	University
RO	Romania	Alexandra Ionacu	University of Bucharest
SI	Slovenia	Alenka Krasovec	University of Ljubjana
SK*	Slovakia	-	-
FI	Finland	Hanna Wass	University of Helsinki
SE	Sweden	Niklas Bolin	Södertörn University
UK	United Kingdom	Paul Webb	University of Sussex

Note: * No expert available for this report.

Table 11. List of political parties included in the study

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
BE	Belgium	Christian Democrats and Flemish	CD&V
BE	Belgium	Centre, Democratic and Humanist	CDH
BE	Belgium	Ecologists	ECOLO
BE	Belgium	Federalists, Democrats and Francophones	FDF
BE	Belgium	Green	GROEN!
BE	Belgium	Libertarian, Direct, and Democratic	LDD
BE	Belgium	Reform Movement	MR
BE	Belgium	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA
BE	Belgium	Open, Flemish, Liberal and Democratic	OPEN VLD
BE	Belgium	Socialist Party	PS
BE	Belgium	Socialist Party – Other	SP.A
BE	Belgium	Flemish Interest	VB
BG	Bulgaria	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	GERB
BG	Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	DPS

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
BG	Bulgaria	Ataka	Ataka
BG	Bulgaria	Reformist Block/Bulgarian Citizens Movement	Reformist Block/Bulgarian
BG	Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party	BSP
CZ	Czech Republic	Christian Democratic Union	KDU-CSL
CZ	Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party	ODS
CZ	Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM
CZ	Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party	ČSSD
DK	Denmark	Social Liberals	SL
DK	Denmark	Social Democratic Party	A
DK	Denmark	Danish People's party	O
DK	Denmark	Venstre	V
DK	Denmark	Socialist People's Party	SF
DK	Denmark	People's Movement against the EU	
DK	Denmark	Conservative Party	C
DE	Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens	BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
DE	Germany	Christian Democratic Union	CDU (DE-CDU/CSU)
DE	Germany	Christian Social Union	CSU (DE-CDU/CSU)
DE	Germany	The Left	DIE LINKE
DE	Germany	Free Democratic Party	FDP
DE	Germany	Social Democratic Party	SPD
DE	Germany	Pirate Party	PP
EE	Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	RE
EE	Estonia	Estonian Centre Party	KE

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
EE	Estonia	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	IRL
EE	Estonia	Social Democratic Party	SDE
IE	Ireland	Republican Party	FIANNA FÁIL
IE	Ireland	Fine Gael	FINE GAEL
IE	Ireland	Labour	Lab
EL	Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK
EL	Greece	New Democracy	ND
EL	Greece	People's Orthodox Rally	LAOS
EL	Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA
EL	Greece	Communist Party	KKE
EL	Greece	Greens	Greens
ES	Spain	People's Party	PP
ES	Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE
ES	Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	EAJ-PNV
ES	Spain	United Left	IU
ES	Spain	Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya	CDC
FR	France	European Ecology-The Greens	EE-Les Verts
FR	France	Democratic Movement	Modem
FR	France	Left Party	PG
FR	France	Socialist Party	PS
FR	France	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP
FR	France	Union of Democrats and Independents	UDI
FR	France	French Communist Party	PCF

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
IT	Italy	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats	UDC
IT	Italy	People of Freedom	PL
IT	Italy	Italy of Values	IV
IT	Italy	Northern League	LN
IT	Italy	Democratic Party	PD
CY	Cyprus	Democratic Rally	DISY
CY	Cyprus	Movement for Social Democracy	EDEK
CY	Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People	AKEL
CY	Cyprus	Democratic Party	DIKO
CY	Cyprus	Movement of ecologists	Movement of ecologists
CY	Cyprus	European Party	EVROKO
LV	Latvia	Unity	LVP
LV	Latvia	Reform Party	RP
LV	Latvia	For Human Rights in United Latvia	PCTVL
LV	Latvia	Latvian Farmers Union	LZS
LV	Latvia	Latvian Green Party	ZP
LT	Lithuania	Social Democratic party	LSDP
LT	Lithuania	Labour Party	LDDP
LT	Lithuania	Order and Justice	TT
LT	Lithuania	Electoral Action of Poles of Lithuania	LLRA
LU	Luxembourg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	LSAP
LU	Luxembourg	Democratic Party	DP
LU	Luxembourg	The Left	Dei Lenk

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
HR	Croatia	Croatian Democratic Union	HDZ
HR	Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia	SDP
HR	Croatia	Labour Party	HL/Labour Party
HR	Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights	HSP-AS
HU	Hungary	Hungarian Civic Alliance	Fidesz
HU	Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSZP
HU	Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik
MT	Malta	Nationalist Party	PN
MT	Malta	Labour Party	PL
MT	Malta	Democratic Alternative	DA
NL	Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA
NL	Netherlands	Green-Left	GL
NL	Netherlands	Party of the Workers	PvdA
NL	Netherlands	Socialist Party	SP
NL	Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD
NL	Netherlands	Democrats 66	D66
AT	Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ
AT	Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ
AT	Austria	Greens	GRÜNE
AT	Austria	Austrian People's Party	ÖVP
AT	Austria	Social Democratic Party	SPÖ
AT	Austria	Hans-Peter Martin's List	HPM
PL	Poland	Law and Justice	PiS

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
PL	Poland	Civic Platform	PO
PL	Poland	Polish People's Party	PSL
PL	Poland	Democratic Left Alliance	SLDP
PL	Poland	Your Movement	TR
PT	Portugal	Social Democratic Party	BE
PT	Portugal	Democratic and Social Centre – People's Party	CDS/PP
PT	Portugal	Socialist Party	PS
PT	Portugal	Social Democratic Party	PSD
PT	Portugal	Portuguese Communist Party	CDU
RO	Romania	Democratic Liberal Party	PDL-ARD
RO	Romania	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	UDMR
RO	Romania	Social Democratic	PSD-PC
RO	Romania	National Liberal Party	PNL
RO	Romania	People's Party - Dan Diaconescu	PP-DD
RO	Romania	Greater Romania Party	PRM
SI	Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS
SI	Slovenia	New Slovenia	NSi
SI	Slovenia	Social Democrats	SD
SI	Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	LDS
SI	Slovenia	Social Liberals	Zares
FI	Finland	National Coalition Party	KOK
FI	Finland	Social Democrats	SDP
FI	Finland	True Finns Party	PS

Country Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
FI	Finland	Centre Party	Kesk
FI	Finland	Greens	Vihr
FI	Finland	Swedish People's Party	SFP
FI	Finland	Christian Democrats	KD
SE	Sweden	Centre Party	C
SE	Sweden	Christian Democrats	KD
SE	Sweden	Green Party	MP
SE	Sweden	Left Party	V
SE	Sweden	Moderate Party	M
SE	Sweden	People's Party Liberals	FP
SE	Sweden	Social Democratic Workers Party	S
SE	Sweden	Pirate Party	PP
UK	United Kingdom	Conservative Party	Conservatives
UK	United Kingdom	Labour Party	Labour
UK	United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats	LibDem
UK	United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru	PC
UK	United Kingdom	Scottish National Party	SNP

Table 12. Specific rules of candidacy – individual level

Endorsement by elected officials	Endorsement by party members	Endorsement by faction	Being member of the party	Payment fee / deposit	Age requirement	Minimum length of membership	Incumbency	Incompatibility	Other
Croatia (SDP)	Estonia (RE)	Finland (KOK, SDP, True Finns, Kesk, KD)	Austria (FPÖ, Grüne, SPÖ)	Croatia (HDZ, SDP, HL/Labour, HSP-AS, DISY)	Belgium (CD&V, FDF)	Belgium (CD&V, CDH)	Malta (PL)	Belgium (CD&V, Ecolo, FDF, Groen, N-VA, PS, SP.a)	Belgium (CD&V, SP.a)
Poland (PO, PSL, SLDP)	Finland (True Finns, Kesk)	Poland (PIS, PSL, SLDP)	Belgium (CD&V, CDH, Ecolo, FDF, Groen, N-VA, PS)	Cyprus (EVROKO)	Croatia (HDZ, SDP, HSP-AS)	Cyprus (DISY, EDEK, Movement of ecologists, EVROKO)	Romania (PSD-PC, PNL)	Croatia (HDZ, SDP, HL/Labour, HSP-AS)	Bulgaria (GERB, DPS)
Estonia (KE, IRL)	Ireland (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael)	Romania (UMR)	Croatia (HDZ, SDP, HL/Labour Party, HSP-AS)	Finland (Kesk)	Estonia (RE, KE, IRL, SDE)	Czech Republic (ODS)		Finland (KOK)	Croatia (HDZ, HL/Labour)
Italy (UDC)	Latvia (LZS)	Sweden (PP)	Cyprus (Movement of ecologists)	Italy (LN)	Finland (SDP, Vihr)	Denmark (SL, A, O, V, SF)		France (EE-Les Verts, PG)	Cyprus (DISY, AKEL, EVROKO)
Latvia (LZS, ZP)	Netherlands (GL)		Czech Republic (ODS)	Romania (PDL-ARD, UMR, PSD-PC, PNL, PP-DD, PRM)	Lithuania (LSDP, LDDP, TT, LLRA)	France (PG)		Greece (Syriza)	Czech Republic (KDU-CSL, ODS, KSCM, CSSD)
Finland (True Finns)	Romania (UDMR)		Denmark (SL, A, O, V, SF, C)	Sweden (Pirate Party)	Netherlands (CDA, GL, PvdA, SP,	Italy (LN)		Hungary (Jobbik)	Denmark (A, SF, C)

Endorsement by elected officials	Endorsement by party members	Endorsement by faction	Being member of the party	Payment fee / deposit	Age requirement	Minimum length of membership	Incumbency	Incompatibility	Other
					D66)				
Lithuania (LSDP, LDDP, TT, LLRA)	UK (Cons)		Estonia (RE, KE, IRL, SDE)		Romania (PDL-ARD, UMR, PSD-PC, PNL, PP-DD, PRM)	Lithuania (LSDP)		Italy (PD)	Estonia (KE)
France (EE-Les Verts)			Finland (True Finns)		Spain (PP, PSOE, CDC, EAJ-PNV, IU)	Netherlands (CDA, D66)		Latvia (Latvian Green Party)	Finland (Vihr)
Romania (PDL-ARD, PSD-PC, PNL, PP-DD)			France (PG)		Sweden (C, KD, MP, V, M, S)	UK (Cons, Lab, Plaid Cymru)		Lithuania (Social Democratic Party, Labour Party, Order and Justice, Electoral Action Poles of Lithuania)	France (EE-Les Verts, PG)
			Greece (PASOK, Syriza, KKE, Greens)					Luxemburg (Dei Lenk)	Germany (Pirate Party)
			Ireland (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Labour)					Malta (PL)	Greece (ND, LAOS)
			Italy (LN)					Netherlands (CDA, GL, PvdA, VVD, D66)	Italy (Unione Democratici Cristiani, Partito

Endorsement by elected officials	Endorsement by party members	Endorsement by faction	Being member of the party	Payment fee / deposit	Age requirement	Minimum length of membership	Incumbency	Incompatibility	Other
									Democratic)
			Latvia (LZS, Latvian, ZP)					Romania (PDL-ARD)	Latvia (PCTVL)
			Lithuania (LSDP, LDDP, TT, LLRA)					Spain (PSOE, IU)	Lithuania (Social Democratic Party, Labour Party, Order and Justice, Electoral Action Poles of Lithuania)
			Malta (PN, PL)						Luxemburg (LSAP)
			Netherlands (CDA, GL, PvdA, SP, VVD, D66)						Malta (PL)
			Romania (PDL-ARD, UMR, PSD-PC, PNL, PP-DD, PRM)						Poland (PIS)
			Slovenia (SD)						Romania (PDL-ARD,

Endorsement by elected officials	Endorsement by party members	Endorsement by faction	Being member of the party	Payment fee / deposit	Age requirement	Minimum length of membership	Incumbency	Incompatibility	Other
									UMR, PSD-PC, PNL, PP-DD, PRM)
			Sweden (C, M, FP, S)						Spain (CDC)
			UK (Cons, Lab, Plaid Cymru)						UK (Conservative Party, Labour, Plaid Cymru)

Table 13. Specific rules of candidacy – party level

Gender quota	Ethnic quota	Geographical quota	Linguistic quota	Quota for satellite organizations
Finland (KOK, SDP)	Belgium (CD&V, CDH, Ecolo)	Bulgaria (GERB)	Latvia (Latvian Green Party)	Bulgaria (GERB)
France (UDI, PCF, PG, UMP, PS)	Bulgaria (GERB)	Denmark (Social Democratic Party, Venstre)	Spain (EAJ-PNV)	Croatia (SDP)
Austria (Grüne, SPÖ)	Luxemburg (Dei Lenk)	Italy (Lega Nord)		Latvia (Latvian Farmers Party)
Belgium (CD&V, CDH, Ecolo, Groen, PS, SP.a)	Netherlands (GL, PvdA)	Finland (KOK)		Romania (UMR)
Bulgaria (GERB, BSP)	Spain (IU)	Netherlands (PvdA)		Sweden (Centre Party)
Greece (SYRIZA)	Sweden (Centre Party)	Latvia (Latvian Farmers Party)		
Germany (ÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, CDU, CSU, Die Linke, SPD)	UK (Liberal Democrats)	Romania (PDL-ARD, UMR)		
Cyprus (DISY, EDEK, AKEL)		Spain (PP, PSOE, CDC, EAJ-PNV, IU)		
Czech Republic (Social Democratic Party)				
Hungary (MSZP)				
Italy (Partido Democratico)				
Lithuania (Social Democratic Party)				
Luxemburg (Dei Lenk)				
Netherlands (GL, PvdA)				

Gender quota	Ethnic quota	Geographical quota	Linguistic quota	Quota for satellite organizations
Poland (PO, SLDP, Twoj Ruch)				
Portugal (PS)				
Slovenia (SDS, NSi, SD, LDS, Zares)				
Spain (PP, EAJ-PNV, IU)				
Sweden (Centre Party, Green Party, Left Party, Social Democratic Workers Party)				
UK (Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party)				

Table 14. List of political parties for which at least one MEP has been interviewed

Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
BE	Belgium	Christian Democrats and Flemish	CD&V
BE	Belgium	Centre, Democratic and Humanist	CDH
BE	Belgium	Ecologists	ECOLO
BE	Belgium	Green	GROEN!
BE	Belgium	Reform Movement	MR
BE	Belgium	Flemish Interest	VB
BE	Belgium	Open, Flemish, Liberal and Democratic	OPEN VLD
BE	Belgium	Socialist Party	PS
BE	Belgium	Socialist Party – Other	SP.A
DE	Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens	BÜNDNIS 90/DIE ..
DE	Germany	Christian Democratic Union	CDU (PPG=CDU/CSU)
DE	Germany	The Left	DIE LINKE
DE	Germany	Social Democratic Party	SPD
ES	Spain	People's Party	PP
ES	Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE
ES	Spain	Basque Nationalist Party	EAJ-PNV
ES	Spain	Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya	CDC
FR	France	European Ecology-The Greens	EE-Les Verts
FR	France	Democratic Movement	Modem
FR	France	Radical Party	PR
FR	France	Socialist Party	PS
FR	France	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP
IT	Italy	People of Freedom	PL
IT	Italy	New Centre Right	NCD
HU	Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSZP
HU	Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik

Code	Country name	Party name (English)	Party acronym
NL	Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA
NL	Netherlands	Party of the Workers	PvdA
NL	Netherlands	Socialist Party	SP
NL	Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD
PL	Poland	Civic Platform	PO
PL	Poland	Democratic Left Alliance	SLDP
RO	Romania	Democratic Liberal Party/ Popular Movement	PDL-ARD/PMP
RO	Romania	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	UDMR
RO	Romania	National Liberal Party	PNL
SE	Sweden	Pirate Party	PP
UK	United Kingdom	Green Party	GP

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PHOTO CREDIT: iStock International Inc.



ISBN 978-92-823-7011-7
doi: 10.2861/573030