Towards a new European security strategy? Assessing the impact of changes in the global security environment

AFET SEDE

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ABSTRACT

As work on a new European Security Strategy begins, this briefing examines the impact of changes in the security environment of Europe. It argues in favour of an ambitious new security strategy which, twelve years after the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy, is most needed in a degraded security environment. It looks back at the process and content of that document and identifies its successes and shortfalls. The briefing describes the massive changes in Europe’s security environment since 2003. Mapping those changes, the report points at new threats and challenges and the changing nature of conflict. It also focuses on the transformation of Europe’s neighbourhood both in the East and in the Middle East and North Africa, which have challenged the assessment that Europe is not facing threats on its borders. The briefing presents an assessment of the changes in the institutional and political architecture of the EU in the post-Lisbon context, which is significantly different from the 2003 institutional environment. It emphasises the multiple tools the EU is using to develop its security policy. Finally, the briefing provides some recommendations for the process and the substance of the starting strategic review and future strategy.
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The rationale for a new European security strategy

Discussing the need for a new European Security Strategy (ESS) or another strategy document requires study of the origins and nature of the 2003 ESS and its 2008 review and to take stock of the successes and limits of these two documents. Given the massive changes in the European security environment since 2003, the briefing argues in favour of an ambitious new document.

Mapping threats & challenges

Is the world today more dangerous than it has ever been? Looking at the new threats and challenges we face from large-scale violent conflict and climate change, the answer is perhaps: not more dangerous but certainly not any safer.

But there is good news: we have learned a great deal about how to manage and resolve conflicts, and how to prevent war when it comes to other societies – we now need to apply what we have learned to ourselves; and we know that climate change is upon us, we know about its potential effects, and we know some of the things we have to do to mitigate the damage.

Ascertaining risk is fraught with uncertainties and most of our methods tend to lead to underestimation of low-probability events and not predicting ‘black swan events’ (which could be simply described as major unpredictable events leading to systemic changes such the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States) at all. The briefing puts forward an impact matrix to assist in framing our thinking about where best to put our efforts and resources.

The briefing explores the predictions about the changing nature of conflict from cyber-attacks to drones and space war, and the use of WMD and terrorism and the impact of climate change. It also addresses regional challenges including the ‘new’ Russia, the European Partnership Agreements (EPA) and the southern and eastern strategic dimensions.

Summary of post-Lisbon architecture and environment

The innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are now being severely tested. The main objective of the changes was to increase the effectiveness and the impact of EU actions. In the field of security, the new framework was intended to make it easier for the senior EU management to develop and apply the available instruments to identified common problems in a coherent manner. This would include actions that link the resources from different EU institutions and actions taken in cooperation with the national efforts of member states.

The strategic environment today is less benign than was expected at the time the Lisbon Treaty was being negotiated, and the power of some of the instruments that the EU expected to be able to call on may also be lower than was expected, partly because of the impact of the financial crisis. In these conditions, the level of ambition and the main priorities for EU security policy are being re-evaluated in a process of strategic reflection.

The point of the departure for the strategic reflection is not a blank sheet, however, because there are a large number of existing geographical and functional strategies and guidance documents that need to be taken into account. Any new strategic review also has to take into account its relationship with

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reflection processes and decisions in security institutions where EU member states are prominent among the membership—first and foremost NATO.

First indications suggest that the outcome of the strategic reflection will be to establish a set of priorities to guide EU actions, with a strong focus on responding to developments in the immediate neighbourhood. In that endeavour, acquiring and incorporating guidance from member states will be a critical test for the post-Lisbon arrangements.

The need to respond to challenges that cannot easily be defined by geography will be a critical test of the ability of the post-Lisbon arrangements to combine the efforts of different institutions, including internal and external dimensions of EU security, into a coherent framework for sustained action.

Policy options for a new European security strategy

Methodology and time frame are vital for a successful process. Arguing in favour of an ambitious approach, the recommendations combine process-oriented points and key strategic priorities. With regard to process, the briefing argues for the need for a reasonably long time frame in order to build consensus. It favours an open and inclusive process involving all stakeholders and engaging key partners. It suggests covering all EU tools, as external policy is increasingly comprehensive in scope. On substance, it proposes addressing current security challenges, with a considered prioritisation of threats. More specifically, the neighbourhood including the consequences of Russia’s assertiveness in Eastern Europe should be addressed, as well as the consequences of long term disorder in the South. Finally, transversal challenges such as proliferation, terrorism, cyber vulnerabilities, and climate change should be covered in a future action-oriented strategy.

This study was conducted by three leading international security institutes in Europe (Chatham House in London, the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). It involved a comprehensive survey of existing policy documents as well as of the relevant academic and think-tank literature on European security and the international environment. The research team set out to capture the state of play (as of spring 2015) of the current debate. The team drew on their extensive expertise acquired in previous, joint or separate, projects and seminars, and their direct involvement in on-going EU debate on a future strategic document. The authors are responsible for the views and policy recommendations in the briefing.
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1 The rationale for a new European security strategy

1.1 Looking at the existing European security strategy

1.1.1 The 2003 European security strategy

The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the European Council in December 2003 was a first attempt by the European Union to frame a global strategic document which could compare to the US National Security Strategy or other national White Papers or Strategic Reviews. With the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Strategic Concept, it is the only example of a regional or international institution drafting such an ambitious document formulating an overarching strategic framework combining an assessment of the security environment and a shared vision of its international role. As such, it was going beyond pre-existing regional or thematic EU policies.

The drafting of the 2003 ESS, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, took place in a very specific context:

- It was drafted at a time of deep divisions amongst member states in the aftermath of the launch of the 2003 Gulf War which saw European countries divided between those that joined the US-led coalition in Iraq and those that firmly opposed the US decision to attack Iraq. It was therefore an opportunity to bring them back together around a shared security document after months of deep divisions.

- It was drafted in a pre-Lisbon Treaty environment, when the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was very much a under construction. The defence pillar (then labelled European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) was in its infancy as the first autonomous EU operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were launched in 2003.

- The ESS was drafted before the EU enlargements, there were only 15 member states at the time of its adoption, and future members were only associated marginally.

The process leading to the adoption of the ESS at the December 2003 European Council was also unprecedented and original as it gave a central role to the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, who worked with a small team to produce a first draft only six weeks after it was commissioned at the Rhodes ministerial meeting (May 2-3, 2003). Solana later worked through a six-month long iterative process, involving research seminars under the auspices of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, in order to produce the final text. Member states also provided comments and inputs, but were only one stakeholder and major contributor amongst a larger group of experts consulted. This can be described as a process as it combined both a method and an outcome.

Ultimately, the 2003 ESS is a short 15-page document detailing the security environment in fairly general terms, covering global challenges and five specific transversal threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime), and three strategic objectives for the EU (addressing the threats, neighbourhood security-building and

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promotion of effective multilateralism). It also lists partners (the United States, Russia, and emerging powers in Asia, Africa and Latin America).

Even though the 2003 ESS was saluted as EU’s first and successful attempt to develop a ‘security strategy’, many experts and analysts criticised the ESS for its broad scope and relatively vague character. Lack of clear prioritisation and limited input regarding implementation of the set objectives were viewed from the outset as its main shortfalls.

1.1.2 The European security strategy ‘review’ (2008)

The 2008 Review of the ESS started as an ambitious attempt to draft a new version and ended up with an Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy, and fell short of meeting its initial ambition. It did not assess the successes and effectiveness of EU Foreign and Security Policy.

In spite of some meaningful additions to the 2003 document, for example on cyber security, pandemics or climate change, it did not fundamentally alter the overall balance of the document (see table in annex 1 for a detailed comparison between the two documents).

The inclusion of the ‘new’ member states seems to have further complicated the delicate balance between national positions and thus reinforced the impression of a document describing the environment and listing general principles, rather than a strategic document with a clear prioritisation and a set of precise implementation measures.

Table 1 - 2003 ESS and 2008 Implementation Report: A Quick Comparison

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European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.*

We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.’

1.2 Major developments since 2003-2008

1.2.1 A new EU

a) A transformed EU

As described below, the European Union has been significantly transformed since the adoption of the ESS in 2003.

The Lisbon Treaty transformed EU institutions in depth, and allowed the creation and development of the European External Action Service (EEAS), significantly improving the EU’s ability to establish and conduct foreign policy, and bringing the multiple international tools available to the EU closer under the leadership of the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP). Under the direction of the first HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, EEAS established itself as a significant international player and the EU demonstrated leadership on several important crises (the Iranian nuclear negotiations, Serbia/Kosovo).

It is true however, that EU foreign policy has not – to this date – fully taken into account some of the most significant institutional developments achieved in the Lisbon Treaty. The ‘permanent structured cooperation’ contained in article 46 has not been used to deepen cooperation amongst member states. Another example is article 42 (7) of the Treaty on the European Union, which contains a clause interpreted as a form of mutual-defence clause in spite of the many caveats in the text itself (*3). The solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster also has deep implications.

b) An enlarged EU

Another major development was enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, which changed the EU with the inclusion of not only 13 additional member states, but by including most of the European countries west of the borders of the former Soviet Union. Leaving aside Turkey and former Soviet states (with the exception of the three Baltic States), the EU now encapsulates most of the European continent with only a handful of countries having decided to stay out of the Union (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland) or seeking membership (in the Western Balkans). The fact that the EU now covers most of the continent (as member states or as states applying its standards) is – in its own right – a significant transformation for the EU. The enlargement has also transformed the nature of the

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* If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum of its implementation’
relationship with the EU’s neighbourhood. The EU is the dominant actor in the European space and is perceived as such by neighbouring countries and international partners. This was not the case in 2003 when enlargement to the East was only about to begin.

Enlargement had important consequences in regard to the European Security Strategy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). First, achieving consensus and defining priorities among 28 stakeholders has proven more difficult. This difficulty played a role in the 2008 process which led to the Implementation Report and fell short of a genuine review, as different approaches amongst member states made it hard to achieve consensus on a number of core issues. Amongst these core issues, it has been increasingly difficult to develop a shared EU approach to major partners such as Russia in the aftermath of the Georgia conflict of 2008 in a context in which consensus decision-making remain the rule. The relationship with Turkey and the management of the potential enlargement has also proved divisive with conflicting views regarding association of Turkey to specific policies such as CSDP in a Lisbon Treaty environment in which the Western European Union mechanisms are no longer relevant.

Secondly, many ‘new members’ have expressed growing concerns since 2008 with regard to the Eastern neighbourhood. Growing Russian assertiveness and non-cooperative behaviour have generated palpable anxiety amongst neighbouring countries in the North and East of the EU, contrasting with a more ‘relaxed’ approach of many ‘old’ members, at least until 2014 and the latest developments in Ukraine. This divide, which is not purely geographical but also encompasses different political approaches to Russia amongst European governments, played a negative role in past efforts to review the strategy as many actors feared a process exposing a divided EU, not only over Russia but also about the definition of the right set of geographic and strategic priorities. Developments in Russia since the Georgian conflict, and of course since the Ukrainian crisis, are not properly addressed in existing security documents, starting with the ESS.

c) Impact of the financial crisis

In this context, the deep financial crisis, which has severely affected many EU countries even if some are now recovering, has also had a negative impact for several reasons.

1. Since 2008, the EU has focused on solving the debt and fiscal crises affecting the Eurozone and threatening the economies and societies of several EU countries. This approach has been logical given the depth of the crisis but the inward focus has de facto limited the ability of the EU to engage collectively in an ambitious CFSP or CSDP, as member states and institutions focus on the immediate economic challenges. The fact that no European Council was devoted to defence issues from 2008 to 2013 shows this disinterest at the highest political level.

2. In practical terms, the mobilisation of resources for external action has also suffered from this environment as budgetary constraints have affected EU institutions’ capacity to build support for significant increases of the budget allocated to external action. Only a handful of new CSDP operations of limited ambitions were launched after 2008.

3. In the security and defence realm, the crisis has led to deep reductions in European defence spending and capabilities, significantly limiting the level of ambition of CSDP as many member states have faced such deep reductions that their ability and willingness to take a share of international crisis management has reduced. This negative trend in defence spending (with the average reduction since 2008 being 10 percent, according to SIPRI data) sharply contrasts with significant increases in the rest of the World, including in Russia (+48 percent since 2008). In 2001, the EU spent four times as much as China and Russia combined; it now spends roughly as much as these two powers combined. As the European Defence notes with concern ‘the total defence
expenditure has been declining since 2006, dropping by over € 32 billion or about 15% from 2006 to 2013. Both as a share of GDP and as a share of the total government spending, defence expenditure has decreased for the seventh year in a row to its lowest value since 2006, 1.45% and 2.97%, respectively (*).

1.2.2 A degraded immediate environment: emerging security challenges on EU’s borders

As detailed in section 2, the transformation of the strategic environment since 2003 is significant. Although some positive developments were registered globally or locally, important challenging security developments took place in the immediate environment of Europe.

Russia appears no longer interested in preserving a cooperative relationship with the EU and the West in general, and perceives NATO and the EU as threats to its project of restoring Russian leadership and influence in the former soviet space. The Ukrainian crisis saw the return of war on Europe’s border, combined with a challenge to some of the pillars of European security, now contested by Russia.

Moreover, the current crisis and conflict in Ukraine suggests that the normative or soft power of the EU not only remains, but is perceived as a political challenge by other powers, such as Russia, that intend to develop an alternative model. In spite the absence of a discussion on power in the EU, its normative power promoting the rule of law, democracy and transparency (inter alia through partnership agreements) can be contested.

The Arab spring deeply transformed North Africa and the Middle East. Both seem to have entered a phase of long-term turmoil, combining the rise of new forms of religious radicalism with a growing terrorist threat affecting not only the region but also EU countries, as shown by the recent attacks in Belgium, France and Denmark. Despite the fact that most of the publics and political leaderships in Europe seem increasingly reluctant to engage in military operations in the MENA region after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, developments in the region have prompted Western military responses in Libya (2011) and in the Levant (2014). Further South, terrorist threats and weak states in the Sahel region create additional challenges for Europe.

These developments massively alter Europe’s security environment. Possibly valid in 2003 or 2008, the basic assumption that the EU was spreading peace beyond its immediate borders and that Europe faced no threats on its borders is no longer valid. In a rapidly evolving environment, the EU faces multiple security challenges in its immediate neighbourhood.

1.2.3 The evolving partnership with the United States

The nature of the relationship with the United States has also deeply evolved since 2003. After demanding military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is engaged in a partial withdrawal from security affairs, and appears increasingly reluctant to engage in new military operations or to take the lead in the management of all security crises and conflicts.

This has direct consequences for Europe. Firstly, Washington expects its European allies to take a larger share of the burden of international security. Secondly, in a constrained fiscal environment, the US has been moving away from Europe and is rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. With crises and conflicts in the immediate European neighbourhood (Ukraine, Levant, Maghreb), the EU appears to

be increasingly on the frontline and cannot expect the US to automatically take the lead there. European countries and the EU still need to fully acknowledge the consequences of these changes, which are likely to be much deeper and not only motivated by the specifics of the Barack Obama administration. It remains to be seen, however, whether this partial security vacuum will be filled or not, and what role the EU can play in this.

1.3 European values and EU added value

The 2003 ESS and 2008 review successfully identified global trends and threats (e.g. terrorism, WMD proliferation, cyber threats, climate change, and failed states) and many have been confirmed by events. They also offered a narrative that framed core principles for the external action of the EU, fully coherent with its values. The most recent developments in Europe’s neighbourhood, however, point to a transformed environment that is more unstable and complex than expected in 2003.

The ESS coined the phrase ‘effective multilateralism’ to describe the EU strategy on the world stage. Although this continues to encapsulate the EU approach to international affairs, effective multilateralism has become far more difficult to achieve in practice. The US under President Obama adheres to a similar legalistic and multilateral approach but other actors, such as Russia, have moved away from it. In such a context, the EU post-Westphalian (\(^5\)) narrative built around economic strength, soft power and multilateral institutions is colliding with an international environment marked by the return of geopolitics and hard power.

The EU has emerged as a major international actor, and at times a successful security provider - as in the Balkans or in the fight against piracy, but its values are increasingly challenged by other players on the international scene, whether they are major revisionist powers or non-state actors. The EU therefore needs to define its values and interests better on the international stage in order to make the best use of its added value (i.e. its ability to combine multiple forms of power and influence) through the range of tools available for its international action. Beyond the necessary and sobering reassessment of its security environment, this should be the principle objective of the strategic review.

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\(^5\) The term ‘Post-Westphalian’ has been coined to describe the evolution of international politics from power politics amongst states as enshrined in the 1648 Westphalia Treaty to a more integrated and multifaceted international environment: the EU is often seen as epitomising this evolution.
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2 Mapping the strategic changes in the global environment

2.1 Threats, challenges and the changing strategic environment

Looking back at the strategic concerns throughout the last decade, the 2003 ESS was prescient in many respects in prioritising: terrorism; WMD proliferation; regional conflicts; state failures; and organised crime. The 2008 ESS review updated the priorities by adding in: cyber security; energy security; and climate change. In the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, however, there are some significant new threats and challenges that have come to the fore. Despite clearly laying out strategic objectives that set out to address the identified threats and building security through engagement, capacity-building and effective multilateralism, a new ESS is needed for the EU to adapt fully to the volatile strategic environment and identifiable future threats.

A new ESS should prioritise the set of threats Europe faces in terms of the severity of the impacts and decide how to respond through the lens of societal resilience. Such an approach can be made to work for a wide range of threats and can, therefore, be highly cost-effective. Resilient societies that have built in ways and means to absorb or spread shock will manage their responses far more effectively than ill-prepared and more fragile communities.

This section addresses the new threats and challenges that have either arisen or worsened over the period 2003-2015 and will attempt to predict key aspects that will need attention for the foreseeable future. It looks at the security challenges that Europe is facing in terms of serious and widespread conflict (including horizontal, asymmetric and hybrid warfare), terrorism, climate change, infrastructure threats - particularly energy security, food security and cyber security – including cyber threats to energy, communications and space security. The inextricable links between the internal and external security of the EU will be emphasised along with the significance of the emerging strategic partnerships with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; the security implications of political transition in the western Balkans; a strategic umbrella for MENA and Africa; and the evolution of strategic partnerships with, for example, the BRICS countries and other regional powers in Asia and Latin America.

‘Prosperous, secure, free’ or ‘more dangerous than ever’

Today’s security environment seems a far cry from the opening sentence of the 2003 EU Security Strategy:

‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.’

However, the 2008 economic crash, instability and conflict in the Middle East, shifting power relations and the shock of Russian military action including conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine have all served to destabilise the European security environment. In 2013 General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed this up when he stated that the world is now ‘more dangerous than it has ever been’ (6). This statement struck a chord with many people. Our societies and our futures can feel increasingly insecure with daily headlines of economic crises, violent conflict, terrorism, racism, crime, disease, turbulent weather, earthquakes, volcanoes and fear.

It is certainly true that in the period 2003-2015, the European security environment has become increasingly vulnerable. Of course, compared with much of the 20th century and certainly the centuries

preceding, the world is in fact a far safer and more hospitable place than it has ever been for the vast majority of the world’s people. However, our priorities and expectations have changed over time. The people of Europe expect to be kept safe from future harm. They expect their governments and the EU to have thought ahead and put in place measures to prevent war, reduce crime, and mitigate against climate change. They naturally want a future that is prosperous, free from fear and hunger and opportunity-rich. This is the future promised to them and their descendants by the idea of European unity and the EU needs to present an updated strategy to deliver on its commitments.

In developing a new ESS, it is vital that the EU identifies – in so far as it is possible – current and future key traits and security challenges facing Europe and – more importantly – develop an approach of European resilience in order to be able to withstand the full range of strategic changes in its environment over the long term.

In addition to the economic crash, the Syrian civil war, and the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts, Europe and other parts of the world have encountered a significant number of catastrophic shocks in recent years including tsunamis, earthquakes, reactor meltdowns, severe weather events, epidemic disease and terrorist attacks. These are events that could not not have been specifically foreseen but they were expected to occur at some point and so could have been better planned for. European resilience for the most part has been able to withstand these shocks, adapt and mitigate the damage. However, the fact that so many were not foreseen, publicly discussed and prepared for should be of great concern. In our fast-changing, complex, turbulent world, we should prepare for more shocks and at an increased pace. How Europe provides for its citizens will depend on how well Europe can identify the range of threats, plan ahead, increase its resilience, and engage with the rest of the world to ensure that the threats are reduced and manageable.

The world has become more interrelated in terms of communications, trade and economic interdependence and there is a corresponding increase in complexity. The old idea of a single problem with a single solution, if ever true, no longer holds. Given the diversity and significance of the range of threats to the European Union, an approach that incorporates the key challenges, their connectivity and complexity, and the full array of vulnerabilities that they expose is required. Most significantly we need to frame the issues so that their interconnectedness and the vulnerabilities are woven throughout. What we are faced with is a set of problems for which there are no straightforward solutions or even sets of solutions.

The largest difficulties facing the EU arise from highly complex situations in an unpredictable fashion, for which the EU is not prepared. A new ESS gives the EU the opportunity to grapple with the challenges ahead – in particular to recognise that we cannot predict all of the possible threats and challenges and we need to approach our future by ‘hoping for the best, prepared for the worst, and unsurprised by anything in between’ (7).

### 2.2 Conflict, violence and war

Over the last ten years, the number of active conflicts worldwide has remained fairly constant (between 31-37) (8). These conflicts are for the most part within states, not between states, and include a number of ‘frozen’ conflicts, which haven’t been resolved although the violence has been reduced and the peace has held. Unresolved conflicts are highly vulnerable to being reignited and so it is possible that we find ourselves in a highly unstable period in which the reduction in the number of violent conflicts leads us into a false sense of security.

7 Angelou, M., I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, London: Virago, 1984
Figure 1 - Countries with one or more violent conflicts in 2014
Uppsala Conflict Data Program UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Figure 2 - Number of armed conflicts by type, 1946-2013

Although the number of violent interstate conflicts decreased dramatically from the end of the Cold War to 2003 and full-scale wars halved in number in that period, the numbers have started to reverse in the last four years as a result of the Syrian civil war, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria with ISIL/ISIS/Daesh(1), the upturn of violence in Libya and Nigeria, the civil war in Yemen and the Ukraine-Russia conflict. There is war throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa in various forms and the potential for widespread conflagration is clear and very real. These conflicts are proving to be longer lasting than predicted, hard to resolve and contagious. They have the potential to escalate and spill over into other regions and countries and they are at the edge of the European borders.

As a result of the severity of these conflicts, the statistics on levels of violence and conflict death rates have climbed again after a long period of decline. It is not possible to say at this stage if the rise in the

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(1) There is a great deal of disagreement on what to call the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL). Some refer to it as IS (Islamic State), some as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and, increasingly, scholars prefer to use the Arabic term ‘Daesh’ (ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-‘Irāq waš-Šum), the Arabic equivalent of ISIL. We have decided to use ISIS/ISIL/Daesh in order to increase certainty as to which group we are discussing and to assist in word searching and citation.
number of conflicts will constitute a long-term trend. Nor can we rule out the likelihood that these conflicts will spread into other regions, including into Europe. Now is certainly not a time for complacency with respect to the prospects for violent conflict within Europe’s borders once again.

Figure 3 - Battle related deaths, 1989-2012

2.3 The changing nature of conflict

Many factors have supported the reduction in armed conflicts including the withering of proxy wars, UN sponsored peace processes and economic development. Perhaps most significantly, research by the Human Security Report (10) demonstrates that peace negotiations and cease-fire agreements reduce violent conflict even when they fail. This is an important understanding; it explains why ceasefire and peace negotiations are worthwhile even when the likelihood of success is low. It also demonstrates that the 2003 ESS took an effective approach.

It would be folly to imagine that large-scale wars are unlikely to happen again, including in Europe. However, there are a number of features pertinent to current conflicts that demand analysis for strategic planning.

Since the end of the First World War, the development of international humanitarian law (IHL), the adoption of the UN Charter and human rights law, has meant that war has lost its place in human affairs as ‘just another way of doing business’ or ‘diplomacy through violent means’.

Jus in bello (law in war) limits human suffering by protecting and assisting victims in conflict. It does this through the body of international humanitarian law (IHL) that protects victims irrespective of on whose side they fall and that regulates the behaviour of fighting parties in terms of the humanitarian impact of their actions, regardless of fault or justifications.

Jus ad bellum (law on the use of force) or jus contra bellum (law on the prevention of war) address the legitimate and illegitimate causes and the prevention of conflict. Since the adoption of the UN Charter, States have agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state (Art. 2, para. 4). The only exceptions allowed are in the case of self-defence or as a result of a decision by the UN Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

However, as humanity develops its warfighting technologies there are increasingly sophisticated ways to disguise the instigators and perpetrators of conflict so as to sow seeds of confusion and develop doubt in the minds of the public and in those charged with conflict prevention and resolution. This is particularly true in cyberspace where – although it is clear that IHL applies\(^{11}\) – attribution is fraught with difficulties even to the point where the victims cannot even be sure a deliberate attack has taken place. It has also been a major problem in wars within and across boundaries in which loose alliances of non-state armed groups fight under poor command and control structures. Information warfare designed to deceive and shock, and the use of inhumane weapons, including WMD, have all been conducted without clear attribution. Holding to account and any legal retaliation is then fraught with problems and the risks of making a bad situation worse quickly escalate.

### 2.3.1 Hybrid conflicts; levelling the battlefields

Hybrid warfare is nothing new. Defined\(^{12}\) as a military strategy in which combatants employ a multi-layered mix of military and non-military tactics, modern day hybrid warfare is the integrated combination of capabilities including: conventional warfare; non-conventional weaponry use; non-attributable forces; terror tactics (including improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers; cyber warfare; deception; and information/propaganda strategies (which are targeted by the perpetrator at both domestic and foreign audiences).

The strategies and tactics of hybrid warfare have received considerable attention of late because of the use of non-attributable forces in the conflict in Ukraine, the employment of propaganda warfare in almost all conflicts today, the potential for cyber warfare to play a major insidious role and the use of chemical weapons, IEDs, barrel bombs and non-attributable forces in the Syrian civil war.

There are proposals that a joint approach by NATO and the EU could tackle hybrid warfare more effectively than just NATO alone\(^{13}\) on the grounds that a military alliance such as NATO is not equipped to address the full range of threats posed by hybrid warfare. NATO’s rapid response policy may deter and contain overt military threats but it cannot deal effectively with the nebulous unconventional challenges of hybrid warfare. The EU’s more flexible and nuanced instruments of crisis management, security sector engagement, conflict prevention, in-depth institutional diplomacy and so on are far more suited for addressing the complexity of hybrid warfare.

Combining the institutional expertise of the EU and NATO would not be without its challenges – not least of which is the issue of a partial overlap in membership, the long-held aversion of important EU non-NATO member states to nuclear weapons and the restricted inter-operational and functioning experience of those outside the intersection of membership in either the EU or in NATO. However, the December 2013 European Council Conclusions, the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales (NATO, 2014) and the 2015 informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in Riga (EU Council, 2015) has furthered encouraged the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU to counter such hybrid, complex threats. Certainly, the conflicts and increasing challenges on the borders of Europe ought to focus the minds of all European states to form smart partnerships in order to stave off common enemies.

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2.3.2 Unresolved territorial disputes and frozen conflicts

Since 2003, there has been little change in the numbers of unresolved territorial disputes throughout the world, many of which could cause significant problems for the future. They have different characteristics, history and dynamics. Some are disputes over territory between states while others are between states and linguistic/ethnic groups. There are also disputes over waterways, shipping routes and common spaces. Called frozen conflicts: in which a violent conflict has ended without any formal settlement of peace agreement. As a result, the conflict cannot be said to be over; merely ‘frozen in time’ – and it could easily be renewed. This type of situation detracts from long-term confidence and security-building.

Currently among the most significant frozen conflicts are: Crimea (Russia-Ukraine dispute) and eastern Ukraine (Russian-backed separatists-Ukraine dispute); The South Ossetia and Abkhazia disputes (Russia-Georgia); the frozen conflicts in the Western Balkans; Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia-Azerbaijan); Kashmir (India-Pakistan); South Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island (Russia-Japan); the conflict on the Korean Peninsula; the Spratly Islands (Taiwan Republic-China-Vietnam); Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Japan-China); Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas (UK-Argentina); The Palestinian Territories (Israel-PA); and Western Sahara (Morocco-Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic); to name a few.

Long-standing territorial disputes are, for the most part, frozen conflicts. They thaw and heat up when other triggers push the unresolved dispute back into the limelight. Such triggers include political or ideological differences, resource scarcity, new economic developments, demographic change and so on. As the climate changes and world population grows and demand for land and for scarce resources – mineral, energy, water and food – increases, it is likely that territorial disputes will once more lead to serious military conflict in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

In the mid-term future, disputes and possible conflicts are likely to increase over the unresolved territories of the Antarctic and the Arctic particularly as climate change reveals new sources of minerals and carbon energy deposits.

2.4 Ideological and religious conflicts

Ideological conflicts are less common today than in the past. Since the end of the Cold War, the wide gulf between communism and democratic capitalism has diminished, ending many of the drivers for control of countries and regions. The fall in opposing ideologies is in large part behind the long-term decrease in the numbers of violent conflicts and wars.

However, the new rise of fundamentalist ideologies, particularly in some Islamic communities, coupled with frustrations within countries that have stressed economies, high youth unemployment and oppressive leaderships – particularly in the Middle East – has led to a wave of terrorist attacks in many countries in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, Europe and North America. The 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 against the United States and the subsequent conflict in Afghanistan, coupled with further destabilisation of the Middle East in 2003 by the US-led conflict in Iraq, have fed into an arc of instability from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border to the Maghreb. This combination of ideology and old tensions in the Middle East has also resulted in calls for the establishment of a caliphate.

The 2010-11 Arab Spring secular uprisings (see below for further discussion) further exacerbated tensions within the region and have resulted in civil insurgency wars and a religious insurgency war that involves a protracted war in Syria, conflict and instability in Libya and the rise of a well-armed and disciplined ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), or the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) and referred to as ‘Daesh’ in Arabic. In the medium term the situation is being addressed through the containment of ISIL/ISIS/Daesh in part through aerial bombardment led by the US with the support of key allies, and in part by the intervention of regional forces from Iraq and Iran. However, the tensions are
long-standing and will continue unless the issues are dealt with at the religious and cultural level within the region. In addition, the current civil war in Yemen and the mobilisation of a Unified Force from the League of Arab States that includes military forces from Saudi Arabia and Egypt complicates the complex links between different traditions and tribal affiliations in the region. Perhaps the one ray of light is Tunisia which – while certainly not free from the scourge of terrorist attacks – is making progress in terms of political reform, stability and economic growth. The EU’s investment and partnership with Tunisia seems to have reaped rewards, and lessons from the Tunisian experience could be of serious benefit for its neighbours, the EU and for charting the way forward.

Ideological and religious wars are likely to continue to be a major feature of future conflict for the short- to mid-term in many regions. Jihadist groups around the world, particularly in African countries, such as Boko Haram, are pledging allegiance and/or support to ISIL/ISIS/Daesh (TRAC 2014).

The power of ideology holds a powerful appeal for many young people, keen to find meaning and purpose in life. Add in the grievances of the 2003 Iraq war, the failures to stabilise both Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade, the continuing failure to find a sustainable solution for Palestine, and the collapse of Arab autocracies have all served to create political vacuums into which extremists forces have moved and flourished.

2.5 Terrorism – a persistent threat

Terrorism will persist as a threat for the foreseeable future. Trends point towards the localised (50% of all terrorist attacks in the world have occurred in ten countries), the domestic (93.1% of attacks were carried out without the involvement of foreign individuals), low fatalities (55.87% of terrorist attacks have caused zero fatalities and 94.66% have caused ten or fewer fatalities), and low tech (explosives were used in 46% of attacks and weapons in 28% of them) terrorist activities, which are likely to continue (GLOBAL 2013).

Terrorism and counter-terrorism remain a top priority for the European Union. The EU is a major counter-terrorism actor within Europe and an increasingly important one beyond its borders. According to Europol, following an increase in 2012, there was a decrease in the total number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2013. 152 terrorist attacks were carried out in seven EU member states in 2013, a decrease on the corresponding figure of 219 for 2012 and fewer than in 2011 (174) (TE-SAT 2014). However, in 2015, a number of violent extremist attacks took place in Europe for example in France, Belgium and Denmark, which have changed the perception of the threat throughout Europe.

The threat within EU countries has evolved from structured groups and networks to smaller EU-based groups and solo terrorists or lone actors, and overall activity relating to terrorism and violent extremism still represents a significant threat to EU member states. EU citizens have also come under attack outside EU territory, most notably in the Middle East and in North and West Africa. Attacks in Libya, a number of attacks and hostage-taking in Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Syria and Iraq – including the filming and posting of beheadings on social media sites for all the world to see – underscore the threat to EU citizens outside EU boundaries. On the other side of the equation, EU citizens have been going to fight for and against ISIL/ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq, raising concerns that – as with similar situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen – such individuals will return to Europe and may engage in terrorist activities in subsequent years. Indeed, the US National Counter-terrorism Center notes that the
number of foreign fighters who could potentially return to their home countries to participate in or support terrorist attacks exceeded 20,000, in 2015. (14)

In addition, one of the unintended consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ has been limited consideration of the potential of smaller, more informal radical networks that tend to be imbued with more personal motivations, including extreme religious expression. Either referred to as ‘lone wolves’, ‘stray dogs’, ‘lone’ or ‘solo’ ‘terrorists’ or ‘actors’, these self-recruited independent individuals are often detached from wider society. For the most part, they are inspired by extremist ideas – sometimes of a religious nature, sometimes of a xenophobic character – spread through modern communications, but are not operationally or financially supported by larger organisations, and their tactics mostly consist of low-tech attacks on soft targets. Although this is not a new phenomenon (for example, Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City in 1995 and David Copeland, the ‘London Nail Bomber’, in 1999), the July 2011 attacks in Norway, and the spate of recent attacks in Boston, London, Paris, Copenhagen, Garissa and Brussels demonstrate that despite widespread law enforcement and intelligence measures, attacks carried out by a small group or one individual can and will happen (15), (16). No country is immune.

In fragile regions and conflict areas, terrorist tactics (e.g. suicide bombings, the use of IEDs, kidnappings and hostage takings) will continue to be used as a way of levelling the technological gaps. The advances in mobile technologies will continue to have an impact on the way terrorist groups and individuals plan and carry out their operations and on the way officials monitor and disrupt terrorist activities. Public opposition to targeting killing strategies – for example the use of drones against civilian targets – are likely to grow. Given the negative impact for forces on the ground, moral unease, and reputational and diplomatic repercussions, political tensions between the US and Europe may be exacerbated (17).

The ESS in 2003 helped put in place a number of important instruments to tackle the terrorist threat but this challenge has mutated and a new ESS should approach the situation of terrorist activity at home and abroad in a more streamlined, seamless fashion. The calls for ‘moderation’ will have little impact on those who are passionate about their beliefs and the way they see the world. The link between beheadings abroad and bombings at home has to be understood better within our societies. The use of social media and other communication tools in a manner that engages effectively – particularly with the young both in Europe and outside – is a vital component of any future strategic approach to stemming terrorism in Europe.

2.6 New military technologies and strategies

2.6.1 Explosive weaponry in highly populated areas

Over the last few decades, the trend for most government-controlled militaries has been in the direction of highly accurate, low explosive, low collateral-damage weaponry. Landmines and wide area cluster munitions have been banned through international treaties (the 1997 Mine Ban Convention and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions) as a result of the field research demonstrating the long-term in-situ failure rates resulting in humanitarian disasters that inordinately affect women and children. The public ethical demands for humanitarian considerations to be applied in war – the ‘dictates of the

public conscience – have led to a strengthening of the application of the laws of armed conflict and a
pride in the low numbers of non-combatant deaths in western-led military interventions.

However, since 2003, conflicts have been bucking this trend – most notably the Syrian civil war, the war
in Yemen in 2015, the 2014 Israel-Gaza and the 2014-15 Ukraine conflict. Large-scale use of cluster
munitions, air-delivered explosives, low-tech IEDs and – in the case of Syria – low-tech barrel bombs
have reduced urban areas to rubble, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. Coupled with
increasing urbanisation and the consequent rises in population density in cities in almost all parts of the
world, and given the availability of cheap explosive materials and the ease of handling, the use of
explosives in highly populated areas is likely to be a worrying trend in asymmetric conflicts and civil
wars.

IEDs in particular pose a major threat to civilians. They are easy and cheap to make at home or in small
factories employing a wide variety of materials and parts found in industry, agriculture and discarded
military equipment. Over recent decades there has been a significant increase in their use in populated
areas. They are routinely used against bystander civilians as well as against active combatants, with the
main purpose of terrorising local populations. IEDs have become ‘the single most deadly threat in
Afghanistan’ (18) and their use has been widespread in many other conflicts such as in Iraq and Pakistan.
IEDs are also used in terrorist attacks in cities throughout the world and are essentially the technology
used in suicide bombings. They can be detonated in various ways, including remotely and
automatically, and so they constitute a grave threat to civilian populations both inside and outside
Europe.

2.6.2 Guided missiles, UAVs and armed drones

In the last ten years, guided missiles and unmanned armed aerial vehicles, commonly referred to as
armed drones, have been a significant addition to the family of technologies available to militaries and
increasingly to non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

Unarmed drones are useful and, in addition to being used in military conflicts, are available to
international organisations such as the UN, non-governmental organisations and private individuals,
and are primarily used in surveillance and delivery of humanitarian assistance such as food and weather
protection in hard-to-reach areas. In cities however, unarmed drones, while presenting a potential
commercial boon (e.g. for parcel delivery and agricultural surveillance), also represent a threat to
privacy and to safety, particularly in regard to airplanes – for example, in July 2014, a drone came within
six metres of a plane landing at Heathrow airport in London.

In conflicts, the growing general uptake of drones brings both unprecedented challenges and
opportunities. Armed and unarmed drones serve both as weapons and as vital tools of military
intelligence. Their uses range from real-time battlefield surveillance, targeting and weapons delivery,
and delivery of supplies. There are over twenty (and that number is growing) countries that use drones
in their militaries for surveillance and/or as weapons.

However, such sophisticated technologies are no longer the purview of western militaries and drones
are being used to counter the asymmetries on the battlefield, to the advantage of smaller less well-
equipped forces. Civilian uses of technologies such as robots and drones are increasingly introducing
the likelihood that they are being modified for violent use. In general, non-state actors have increasing
access to lethal and disruptive technologies, such as precision-strike capabilities employing highly

accurate data for real-time targeting, and manufacturing methods, such as 3D printing, will make it easier to produce sophisticated lethal weapons. Controlling drones through access to satellite technologies will change the intelligence and information equation for non-state armed groups and reduce the asymmetries in warfare even further.

Indeed, in 2014-15, unidentified drones breached restricted airspace over nuclear power plants in Europe – primarily in France (19). The drones were able to penetrate restricted airspace with ease. The flights have exposed serious vulnerabilities in attribution, detection and interception. The drones are believed to have been sophisticated civilian devices and the intrusions were seemingly coordinated and generally occurred at night.

In the future, unless successfully addressed under negotiations within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), autonomous weaponry – particularly autonomous drones – may also become a major feature in the weapons arsenals of many countries. Such weapons will not require any human decision-making at the point of use – they will depend entirely on pre-programmed data gathering and decision-making instructions. There are enormous implications for the adoption of such weapons – such as how to discriminate between children and adults, humanitarian workers and combatants, hospitals and munitions stores. If such discrimination is difficult enough for human brains today, will robotic fighters be adequate to the task (some futurists argue that robots will make better decisions and be thus more ‘humane’)? In addition, if mistakes are made and decisions are challenged, who will be held responsible and accountable: the military owners, the computer programmers or the weapons manufacturers?

2.6.3 The use of weapons of mass destruction

Since the 2003 ESS, the EU has been a visible leader in international efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. A great deal has been achieved through these efforts but a great deal remains to be done and recent events suggest that the taboo against WMD use is not as strong nor as widespread as it needs to be.

In particular, Syria’s chemical weapons attacks in 2013 demonstrated that a government which does not feel bound by international humanitarian law may be prepared to use chemical weapons in a mass-destruction mode.

Non-conventional weapons are more difficult to obtain and master than conventional weapons such as guns, light weaponry and bombs, and so the likelihood of terrorist groups of carrying out massive CBRN attacks has hitherto generally been judged to be small. However, one major development since the 2003 ESS has been the acquisition and use of small-scale improvised chemical devices (ICDs) by non-state actors throughout Iraq and Syria over the past few years. ICDs are comprised of readily available industrial and chemical agents – for example chlorine or organophosphates – and although potentially fatal, the number of fatalities is low in most cases – the exception being if the chemicals are released in closed and highly populated buildings. Certainly, a significant game-changer would include the acquisition of large stocks of chemical weapons by ISIL/ISIS/Daesh, for example from the sale of CBRN capabilities from a state such as North Korea, which could then be used in a terrorist attack in Europe.

There has been a steady decline in chemical weapons and chemical weapons possessors as the numbers of parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) increases to near-universality and the large possessors (notably the US and Russia) eliminate their stockpiles. However, the technology for

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biological and chemical disrupters is changing rapidly as synthetic biology and chemical micro-reactors look set to develop into manufacturing tools. The spread of such techniques will not be controllable through traditional arms-control processes and new innovative approaches are needed.

All states in the Middle East are full members of the CWC with the exception of Egypt, which has yet to sign and Israel, which is a signatory but has not yet ratified. Both Egypt and Israel are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol (Israel attached a reservation on accession). In the case of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), all states in the Middle East are full members of the BWC with the exception of Israel and Syria, which have yet to sign and Egypt, a signatory that has not yet ratified. Efforts by the EU to bring in Egypt and Israel into full membership and compliance of the CWC and BWC would be well worth undertaking, in terms of enhancing security in the Middle East and in Europe.

Iran, the nuclear deal and the EU

One of the most positive impacts of the 2003 ESS and 2003 Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction has been the EU3+3 approach to the Iranian nuclear conundrum. The approach – which was begun in 2003 and joined by China, Russia, and the US in 2006 – has proved a game changer in bringing Iran to the negotiating table, freezing Iran’s nuclear research and development programme, and ensuring that the international community is working coherently in the same direction. The 2013 Joint Plan of Action has proved effective and the IAEA remains satisfied as to Iran’s compliance. The agreement reached in April 2015 is primed to establish a workable framework for the building of trust and the lessening of sanctions. The EU played a pivotal sustained role throughout the years’ negotiations, demonstrating the way in which ‘effective multilateralism’ can contain meaning and produce real effect.

The dangers of the nuclear legacy

Unlike chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are not yet banned through a global prohibition treaty. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits most countries from acquiring nuclear weapons but five nuclear weapon states (NWS) – China, France, Russia, UK and US – that are party to the treaty are allowed to have them temporarily but with no timeframe for their elimination, and three states have never joined the NPT – India, Israel and Pakistan – two of which have tested nuclear weapons and one (Israel) is assumed to have a significant capability but has yet to yield to requests for transparency.

Much remains to be achieved in the nuclear weapons realm. North Korea is a constant worry in North East Asia and the nuclear weapons legacy in the European theatre remains of significant concern for the EU. Approximately 16,350 nuclear weapons (SIPRI 2014) remain in a handful of countries. Although nuclear weapons stockpiles in four of the possessor states (France, Russia, UK and US) are decreasing (20), in China, India, North Korea and Pakistan stockpile numbers are increasing and all possessors seem committed to retention and modernisation, despite global expectations to the contrary. Little is known about numbers and modernisation in Israel. It is important to note also that the US and Russia each has about 900 nuclear warheads on full alert, meaning deployed and on delivery vehicles, and can be launched in minutes or hours (21).

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20 The US and Russia have decreased their stockpiles significantly and, of those that remain, most have been taken into storage. By 2014, the US had some 7,300 nuclear warheads in total, Russia about 8,000, France 300, China 240, UK 225, India approx. 90-110, Pakistan approx. 100-120 and Israel perhaps 80 (all estimates, SIPRI 2014).

Nuclear weapons have the potential to directly threaten the European Union and its wider interests both inside and outside the EU, including expatriate communities, stationed and deployed troops, and economic interests. The detonation of nuclear weapons in future conflict is quite possible and would constitute a major game-changer in world affairs. Nuclear use would be particularly probable in a major conflict between large nuclear weapons states such as the US and Russia, or in a regional conflict such as between India and Pakistan, North Korea and Japan, or in the Middle East. There have been a number of close calls and near inadvertent use of nuclear weapons over the last seventy years (22) and the possibility of non-state armed and terrorist groups seizing nuclear weapons during the chaos of a crisis should not be ruled out.

This analysis is as true today as it was in 2003 and European-wide efforts to address not only the proliferation of WMD but also the global elimination of WMD are vital. The EU has demonstrated its sustained and significant capabilities in brokering and participating agreements on WMD. The EU has shown itself to be a significant and effective force for good and its confidence in being able to address WMD proliferation and elimination has thus been quite rightly boosted. Further efforts in this regard – such as through the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) initiative and within the NPT – would continue to pay significant security dividends for Europe.

2.7 The growth in digital technologies

2.7.1 Cyber dependencies and the Internet

Although identified as a major strategic concern in the 2003 ESS, cyber insecurities have intensified and spread far greater than had been understood over a decade ago.

The Internet is increasingly important in almost every aspect of our daily lives. Dependence on fast-developing digital technologies is growing and a safe, secure, accessible and trusted Internet is set to be for the long-term future – one of Europe’s most important strategic assets. Global internet data flows have increased five-fold in the last five years and are predicted to triple in the next five years. The general trend is toward ever-more connected and intelligent systems, creating increasing dependency on the global cyber-based infrastructure. Annual global IP traffic is predicted to pass the zettabyte (1000 exabytes) threshold by the end of 2016, and reach 1.6 zettabytes per year by 2018 (CISCO, 2014). Traffic is growing most rapidly in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and in the Asia Pacific the compound annual growth rates is over 21% (23).

The Internet is one of the most important features of Europe’s economy and of growing importance for developing countries and world trade. The need to establish global and local security, privacy and access to the Internet is one of the most exciting debates being held in 2015-16. The structure and management of the internet are being subjected to some profound changes (24), some of which will facilitate growth and development; other changes could lead to a fragmented, broken internet in which significant regions of the world operate within a closed system with limited access to the rest of the world and vice versa. Part of the problem has been a reduction in trust in the security and privacy of the Internet, (GCIG, 2015). Governments that try to control and block access to the Internet for reasons of

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culture and fear of openness risk blocking access to markets and economic opportunities for their citizens. Such fragmentation of the Internet would have profound social and economic implications.

The EU has been a champion of an open Internet that is available to all, secure and safe. European institutions and countries need to develop a set of norms and ‘rules of the road’ to ensure responsible behaviour on the internet that would: increase cyber security; ensure access for all; protect privacy and personal data protection as a fundamental human right; and ensure that surveillance is proportional and authorised by law only when necessary and not used as a tool of repression. A new ESS is an opportunity to establish a strategic approach to the way the Internet works for the foreseeable future. An age where the ‘Internet of Things’ (25) means that our homes, vehicles, shops, offices, roads and so on are all connected digitally, will be a world with enormous benefits but also with significant risks.

2.7.2 Cyber technologies for warfare, targeting and attack

Since 2003, the role of cyber technologies in the armed forces and in conflicts has expanded to a point where there is already an ‘Internet of Military Things’. The digitisation of weaponry and command and control capabilities equipment within and across militaries, along with all of the cyber technologies for gathering information and in real-time, faster-than-human decision-making capabilities in military aircraft and weapons systems, have improved military capabilities significantly since the first ESS. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) that saw the combination of cyber technologies with conventional explosive weaponry to great effect in regards to accuracy and responsiveness has become everyday reality integrated into all military forces – whether state or non-state.

In the field, communications between commanders and fighters have benefitted from the adoption of mobile and satellite hand-held devices. However, their use by non-state armed groups has resulted in vulnerabilities that enable state forces to track and target them more readily. Classic deception techniques are thus being employed in order to throw trackers ‘off the scent’ and evade detection. A pattern of measures and countermeasures is emerging in the Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts with ingenuity and creativity creating temporary advantage. As yet unseen is the ability to reverse the vulnerability by non-state armed forces gaining the ability to track and target state militaries in the same fashion but that day may well arrive soon.

In addition to the enhancement of conventional forces, cyber tools are being used for attacks on a wide range of assets from sensitive databases to interference with satellite communications and, perhaps most worryingly, on the cyber controls of command and control systems. The technical capabilities not only extend to non-state armed groups but also to individuals; thus the control over cyber technologies will remain severely limited in free and democratic societies. Consequently, even strong defences and retaliation will not be sufficient to deter and deal with cyber-attacks and a risks-and-resilience approach is required for the foreseeable future. Understanding the risks (the combination of probability and consequence) and creating an in-built resilience will not only serve to protect against cyber-attacks but will also decrease the desirability of key targets and therefore also serve to deter.

Soft power projection via cyber technologies

In addition to enhancing hard force projection, cyber technologies are being used for soft power projection through new and extensive ways to propagate information, deceive and recruit. These technologies are relatively inexpensive and widely available and have created a more level playing field between large established military powers and rising powers, including non-state arms groups. So

much so that the information projection and control gap between small non-state armed groups and state militaries has been reduced or even reversed (26).

At the propaganda and recruitment level, non-state groups across the spectrum of neo-Nazis to Islamist terrorists have been able to reach out globally to disaffected youth through the judicious use of social media networking – often employing deliberately deceptive language to entice, groom and snare young people to the point where they have been unwittingly sucked into a conflict. The Russian government is said to have thousands of people employed to interact on the internet and reach out through social media networks, to ensure that the Russian government’s perspective is propagated. These techniques have been employed in the conflicts with Ukraine and Georgia and have gone some way to reducing any negative views of Russia action in Russian-speaking regions (see below).

2.7.3 Cyber vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure

The exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure is becoming an increasingly pervasive security threat. Security breaches in government and commercial systems occur on a regular basis, and many are only discovered long after the damage has been done. While some of these are relatively low-impact, the theft of intellectual property, along with the hacking of secure systems, is severe and of increasing concern. The scale of the problem illustrates the potential for large-scale disruption and high impact, and is complicated by conflicting public and private sector perspectives on how to mitigate threats.

The problem is rapidly involving more countries as dependence on cyberspace is increasing globally, and has the potential to create new and unexpected vulnerabilities. Interconnected infrastructures span the globe, and developed economies are heavily dependent on an ‘outsourced inside’ – critical infrastructure or key assets that are owned, operated or manufactured internationally – to provide the daily necessities upon which our societies depend. Understanding and managing the risk that arises from these dependencies is rarely straightforward or transparent. If the financial crisis that began in 2008 has demonstrated anything, it is that these types of risks may ultimately affect everyone. This is particularly true of critical infrastructure, upon which whole economies and societies depend. Recent work (Clemente, 2014) has shown that traditional categories of critical infrastructure do not adequately capture the complexity and speed of modern systems; countries increasingly depend on infrastructure and assets over which they have little or no control.

The energy infrastructure – the nuclear cyber vulnerability

The energy infrastructure is of critical importance to European security and prosperity. As a result, a great deal of thought and effort has gone into ensuring its resilience. Resilience is particularly important at the international level because digital interconnections create efficiency but increase dependency. Redundancies have been built into the energy production and the supply network. European energy relies on a wide range of sources from fossil fuels to wind, solar, hydro and nuclear. Many countries are particularly vulnerable to a single source natural gas supplier (i.e. Russia) and this has had recent negative consequences (see below in section 2.5.1 The energy grid is structured so that a failure in one part of it can be compensated by another section elsewhere and so that action can be facilitated speedily, minimising disruption and economic and human security impact.

However, there is no sharper point of the intersection of cyber security and energy security than the vulnerability of nuclear plants. Nuclear energy facilities, which rely on computer networks for most

internal processes, are connected to external networks (even those that believe themselves to be ‘air-
gapped’), and there is a wide array of ways in which a malicious actor could potentially exploit those
dependencies to create a critical safety or security incident\textsuperscript{27}. Since 2003, there have been a number of
features within nuclear power plants that may have increased the risks considerably\textsuperscript{28}.

It is important that a new ESS addresses this problem because we are becoming increasingly aware of a)
the vulnerabilities of the nuclear infrastructure and b) the attractiveness of nuclear facilities and
organisations – be they civilian or military – to cyber-attack by terrorist groups or enemy states. If a
nuclear plant were to be attacked in some way, it would not be solely the disruption to the electrical
grid that would be occupying the minds of governments and populations of Europe. Since the stark
illustration of the impact of a natural disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 2011, there is
renewed concern that attacks on civil nuclear installations – including cyber-attacks – may prove
attractive to terrorist organisations and to states (\textsuperscript{29}). The recent spate of drones (see above) invading
the controlled airspace of nuclear installations should serve as a warning that nuclear facilities are
particularly attractive targets for attack and a strategy of coping with such an event, whether by cyber
or more conventional means, should feature in European security strategic planning.

Communications and command and control systems
Satellites for information gathering and targeting have until very recently been under the control of a
few governments – primarily Russia, the US and France. However that picture has changed dramatically
in the last 15 years. Since the 2003 ESS, countries such as India and China have surged ahead in
deploying considerable space-based assets for a wide range of earth observation and intelligence-
gathering functions.

New space technologies also mean that non-governmental small-scale entities (for example NGOs) or
international organisations (such as the UN) can add in mini-sats or nano-sats for highly cost-effective
launching when larger governmental or commercial payloads are being delivered into orbit. These new
developments along with high resolution imagery available to non-state actors have enabled new
efforts in earth observation for environmental and humanitarian purposes, but have also opened the
door for non-state armed groups to develop space-based observation and communications facilities.

\textsuperscript{27} A report from the US Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) revealed that in 2012 the
team responded to several cyber incidents that targeted organisations in the nuclear sector. Networks were compromised
and in some cases, data was compromised. However, of the six incidents reported by the nuclear sector, the ICS-CERT report
states that the team is not aware of any compromises into control networks, ICS-CERT Monitor
Simulations have also demonstrated start vulnerabilities: in 2013 The Economist reported on a simulation of
such an attack: ‘…. under the admiring eyes of industry specialists, spooks and other officials, four teams of hackers were
trying to breach (dummy) missile-control software in the hope of reaching the final of Britain’s Cyber security Challenge. Last
year the task, also successfully accomplished, was to blow up a nuclear power station.’ The Economist, ‘How America and
Europe are trying to bolster their cyber-defences,’ 14 February 2013,
\url{http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571868-how-america-and-europe-are-trying-bolster-their-cyber-
defences-barricades}.

\textsuperscript{28} Concerns about nuclear vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks were highlighted in the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, March
2012(NSS 2012) and at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in 2014 (NSS 2014). States at the 2014 Hague meeting
addressed the growing threat of cyber-attacks, including on critical information infrastructure and control systems, and their
potential impact on nuclear security, (NSS 2014)\textsuperscript{29}.

\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, there have been reports of cyber-attacks on nuclear installations, including on those in Fukushima and in 2012, the
website of the Japanese government-appointed panel probing the Fukushima disaster was hit by a cyber-attack. In
addition, alleged US and Israeli involvement in the Stuxnet attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure may lead to reprisal
attacks and an escalation of hostilities (Goldman 2013). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the target of a
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recent cyber-attack by a group calling itself Parastoo
The cyber-vulnerability of space-based assets is of particular concern. Civilisation depends heavily on space systems for communication, data flows, environmental monitoring and command and control systems. Space platforms are essentially digital information conduits, which makes them increasingly attractive targets for cyber-attack. Both cyber security and space security are mutually interdependent. For example, the use of cyber technologies in satellites and other space assets sourced from a broad international supply base, and the ability to remotely configure upgrades makes space assets vulnerable to cyber-attack. Moreover, satellites are used to provide internet services while Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) technologies – including the U.S. version, Global Positioning System (GPS) - are increasingly embedded in critical infrastructure.

Many satellites have woefully inadequate cyber protection (30). While U.S. military satellites are better protected against cyber-attack (depending on their age, orbit and access), commercial platforms are increasingly used for military purposes. In the last few years, satellite technology has been also shifting to small satellites in constellations available to several users, thus increasing the complexity of systems, users and vulnerabilities. There is an urgent need to study and address these cyber challenges in western military systems. Likewise, we also need to ascertain the cyber threat to space-based command and control systems in other countries, particularly Russia, China and India (31).

Military vulnerabilities

Over the last twelve years, the military reliance on satellite technologies for intelligence gathering, navigation and communications has increased, and taking remote control of a satellite or other space asset, which can be used to destroy or deactivate the space asset, is of severe and growing concern (32).

Nuclear and conventional missile systems depend heavily on space assets for navigation and targeting, command and control, operational monitoring and other functions. Just as with physical attacks on space-based assets, cyber-attacks have the potential to wreak havoc on strategic weapons systems, destabilise deterrence, and create confusion and uncertainty as to the origin of attack. Cyber technology and innovation is accessible to most state and non-state actors, levelling the field and creating opportunities for states such as North Korea to instigate high-impact attacks on the U.S. If left unaddressed, cyber vulnerabilities in the command and control layer of the strategic infrastructure will result in severe consequences for international security. Cyber vulnerability strikes at the heart of the key technologies in Western strategic doctrines. In the event of crisis escalation – such as over events in Ukraine, the Middle East or in Asia, the assumption is that weapons systems will perform as planned. But this is not a safe assumption. Cyber vulnerabilities could undermine the performance of

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31 The European Space Agency has commissioned a study on risks in space mission communications objectives and the US Department of defence has identified nine cyber vulnerabilities in strategic missile command and control systems

32 Modern satellites are vulnerable to cyber-attack, including attacks directed at the ground, station, as most satellites are now equipped with on-board computers that allow for remote configurations and upgrades. Or given the global supply chain, a backdoor could be present in a satellite component, allowing hackers to gain access. Thus, a hacker could send a command from the ground that causes a satellite to manoeuvre, ‘decaying’ or lowering its orbit so that it re-enters the earth’s atmosphere and burns up. A sophisticated hacker could also manoeuvre a satellite to bring about a collision with another satellite or space object. Alternatively, a hacker could engage in grilling, causing a satellite to burn up. ‘Grilling’ involves activating all of the satellite’s solar panels and exposing them to the sun, overcharging the energy system so that it causes irreparable harm. Older satellites are particularly prone to jamming or spoofing attacks, since they have less security embedded than newer satellites. ‘Jamming’ consists of an attacker flooding or overpowering a signal and spoofing goes a step beyond jamming to replace the flooded signal with a false signal. Such attacks can be used to control and alter information or take down communications networks, power grids and other critical infrastructure
strategic systems, increase uncertainty in information and analysis and, therefore, the credibility of
deterrence and strategic stability. Loss of trust in technology also has implications for attribution and
strategic calculus in crisis decision-making and may increase the risk of misperception. There is strong
evidence that states are actively developing these capabilities (33) and this poses a new threat that has
developed since the 2003 ESS.

2.8 Strategic threats due to climate change

The 2003 ESS did not identify climate change as a strategic threat. In 2008 however, the ESS review
brought the issue to the fore. Since then, scientific understanding has meant that we now know that
climate change is one of the most significant strategic threats to Europe in the mid- to long-term. Its
effects will have considerable impact on peoples within Europe and those in the near-neighbourhood,
as well as throughout other parts of the world. It will impact on Europe’s strategic partnerships,
international trade and global stress such as severe weather events, food production security, fresh
water scarcity and migration.

The IPCC Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report of 2014 outlines a range of predictions and by any measure,
climate will be a major global threat, impacting everyone, and the poorest populations for the most part
will suffer the worst. The effects of climate change on water availability, food production, and economic
development are likely to increase instability of populations, displacement and migration and amplify
drivers of violent conflict (34).

Climate change is likely to have major new security implications for Europe. It is important to be
aware that there is a wide variation in expert views on the relationship between climate change and
global and regional insecurities, violent conflict and war.

The IPCC, for example, has put forward the proposition that ‘violent conflict increases vulnerability to
climate change’ on the grounds that large-scale violent conflict reduces the capability to adapt to
climate change through the damage to infrastructure, institutions, natural resources, social capital, and
livelihood opportunities.

The US Department of Defence, however, in its 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, predicts
that climate change ‘may cause instability in other countries by impairing access to food and water,
damaging infrastructure, spreading disease, uprooting and displacing large numbers of people,
compelling mass migration, interrupting commercial activity, or restricting electricity availability.
These developments could undermine already fragile governments that are unable to respond
effectively, or challenge currently stable governments, as well as increasing competition and tension
between countries vying for limited resources.’ In addition the US Military Advisory Board explored
how conflicts in the Sahel, including Darfur, South Sudan, Niger, and Nigeria have been affected by
drought and desertification and adding resource competition into political and ethnic conflicts (35).

33 For example, Chinese hackers are believed to have accessed two US Government earth observation satellites used for
reconnaissance in 2007 and 2008. While they merely penetrated the system and stopped short of issuing commands, they
are thought to have acquired ‘all steps necessary’ to do so. Russia recently accused Ukraine of attempting to decay the orbit
of a Russian television satellite in March 2015

34 The IPPCC concludes that: ‘Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems.
Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels
of development.’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report,’ 2014,

35 Although stressing that climate change did not cause the recent crisis in Mali, one of the factors was that of desertification
and food insecurity exacerbated by climate change which added environmental stressors to the once-coexistent
relationship between the Arab Tuareg and non-Arab Muslim ethnic groups in central and southern Mali. Similarly, climate
However, these causations are disputed. Recent research (36) that examined eleven cases of areas where droughts or floods pose threats to human security in Niger, Sudan, the Jordan and Nile basins to Cyprus, Italy and the Sinai desert did not show that hydro-climatic variation is an important source of violence and insecurity – this was true for both transboundary and domestic levels. Instead, the research found the converse: that violent conflict increases the hazards of hydro-climatic stress to vulnerable populations and that ‘strong and well-functioning social security systems appear to be an important instrument for human security in the face of climatic risks.’ (37):

Certainly, from the range of results, whether climate change can be thought of as one of the causes of conflict or whether conflict is seen to exacerbate the negative impacts of climate change, it is clear that climate change is already major factor in human security, and it is vital that it effects are factored into future strategic planning.

Migration – already a significant issue for Europe – is set to increase as a result of climate stress and food production is changing apace. Prudence, planning and caution are the watchwords of adapting to climate change. While wealthier countries with well-established infrastructure and effective long-term planning and resilient political and economic structures may well be able to adapt adequately to climate change, other countries, particularly those already stressed by violence and poverty will not be able to rise to the challenges (38).

It is clear that focused targets, resilience, strategic planning and good governance are significant aspects of reducing human insecurity in climate change, and such strategic approaches need to be included as a significant part of a new ESS both within the EU and outside.

2.9 Maritime security

Maritime transport is a major conduit for legal and illegal shipping of a vast array of commodities. Maritime security is primarily focused on two main issues: 1) the security of vessels at sea and 2) the smuggling of illicit goods including: conventional weapons, ammunition, missiles and components, complete and precursors of CBRN weapons and other similar life threatening, destabilising technologies. Indeed, the majority of seizures of illicit arms and dual-use tech coming from or going to states under United Nations sanctions on maritime vessels (39).

Maritime trafficking in people, particularly across the Mediterranean and the Indian and Pacific oceans, is proving to be destabilising and a threat to human security and human dignity. Maritime transport is used by the clandestine trade and smuggling networks because of the reach of the high change is believed to have been a catalyst in the 2011 Arab uprisings thanks to drought conditions in Russia and China that led to global wheat shortages, these then contributed to higher food prices in Northern Africa which was one of the triggers in the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. The report points out that the civil war in Syria was preceded by five years of devastating droughts, coupled with unresponsive state institutions, and overgrazing that decimated livestock, devastated 75 percent of crops in some regions, and forced millions to migrate to urban areas. In both rural areas affected by water and land insecurity, and urban areas burdened by inadequate support systems, antigovernment forces were emboldened (MAB, 2014).

38 The EU is engaged in major efforts in climate change impact reduction, including through its strategic partnerships However, as a recent report warns: EU bilateral strategic partnerships have had ‘only a modest impact on multilateral cooperation over climate change issues’
39 See for example The SIPRI Vessel and Maritime Incident Database (VMID) http://www.sipri.org/research/security/transport/vmid
seas, the ease of shipment, low regulation and enforcement, flags of convenience and the ability to evade detection.

An important shift since 2003 has been the increase in piracy on the high seas that takes place throughout the world’s shipping routes. Thanks to the vast areas of open water and the consequent difficulties in patrolling and monitoring, piracy is a persistent economic and security threat. In recent years the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea and the wider Western Indian Ocean have suffered inordinately from the practice.

However, the response of the international community including the EU – and in large part due to the identification of the issue in the 2008 ESS review process – to increase naval, air, satellite and land cooperation from several countries has improved the situation. For example, countries have combined forces in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to escort humanitarian aid vessels.


2.10 The EU’s Eastern neighbourhood

Ukraine

The [EU-Ukraine 2014 Association Agreement](#) (AA) and [DCFTA](#) promote gradual rapprochement based on common values and close and privileged links, and seek to increase Ukraine's association with the EU. The AA provides a framework for: enhancing political dialogue; promoting preserving and strengthening peace and stability; establishing conditions for enhanced economic and trade and integration in the EU internal market; enhancing cooperation in justice, freedom and security; and increasing close cooperation in other areas of mutual interest.

However, given the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine following on from the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine decided to delay the lowering of tariffs for European goods into Ukraine until the end of 2015 so as to help reduce the tension with Russia. The issue of Ukraine’s membership of the EU is also in abeyance. With the difficulties that Ukraine faces economically and in terms of security and the integrity of its borders, the reality is that Ukraine’s economy is dependent on Russia for imports – particularly of energy in the form of gas – and for its role as an export market. If Russia continues to strenuously oppose Ukraine’s increasing involvement with the EU, the stresses on Ukraine’s economy and security will continue to increase. On the other hand that situation is changing at pace. In April 2015, Ukraine began the process of separating out the state gas industry into different components, and is also harnessing ‘reverse flow’ gas arrangements with EU neighbours and so reducing its dependence on Russian gas. It is also possible that Ukraine could be in a position to implement the DCFTA by early 2016 (40). In meeting EU standards, Ukraine would have a wider range of options for its exports. At this point, the decision on the way forward between Ukraine and NATO would be largely a political one that would be contingent on Ukraine’s security calculus.

All of the above considerations would be even more severe if Ukraine were to push forward to join NATO. At the moment, there is little desire within NATO for Ukrainian membership but President Poroshenko recently suggested that Ukrainian membership of NATO would be decided by a nationwide referendum. If that were to happen, it would be hard for NATO countries to completely ignore a positive outcome. Much depends on how the structure and integrity of Ukraine and its territory evolves and how NATO countries and Russia respond.

Georgia

Georgia’s security situation has suffered serious onslaught and transformation since the 2003 ESS. In August 2008, a large-scale land, air and sea conflict between Georgia and Russia took place throughout South Ossetia and at the Kodori Gorge, with a blockade along the Georgian coast. A ceasefire agreement was negotiated by France and Russia withdrew its troops, but the conflict remains in a frozen state. Russia went on to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia in response. Georgia however is all too aware of the importance of the Russian trade and economy – particularly in the form of remittances from Russia. However recently, due to the slow-down in the Russian economy, the gain from remittances has fallen along with falling oil prices.

The EU supports peace and stability in Georgia through the EU Special Representative for South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and the EU Monitoring Mission established in 2008 as a consequence of the conflict with Russia. Georgia participates in common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations through a framework agreement that took effect from March 2014.

Georgia has participated in the Eastern Partnership since its inception in 2009 and in 2014 the EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement that includes a DCFTA. The cooperation objectives include: justice reform – including harmonising Georgian law with EU legislation; agriculture and rural development – including developing free trade area; and public sector reform, particularly through support for civil society organisations.

Georgia has shown willingness to participate in a number of practical peace-keeping and peace-building actions. It is involved in EUFOR in the Central African Republic and in EUTM Mali and has also participated in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in the post-2014 follow-on mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. Georgia is also involved in NATO’s counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean.

Georgia is also actively seeking membership of NATO, and at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, a package of measures was launched to strengthen Georgia defence capabilities and assist its preparations for NATO membership. Dialogue taking place within the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for close political dialogue and cooperation in support of the country’s reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

The US and Georgia agreed a Strategic Partnership in 2009 that includes priority areas: democracy; defence and security; economic, trade and energy issues; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Annual senior level meetings review commitments, update activities, and establish future objectives.

Russian actions in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have had enormous reverberations in Georgia in the wake of the 2008 conflict. The security perceptions in the region have changed and there is a great deal more concern about longer-term Russian intentions. In formulating new European strategic plans, Georgia’s security and economic concerns, including the careful managing of its relationship with Russia, will need to be factored in.
Moldova

In many respects Moldova has transformed itself since 2003; it has adopted highly pro-Europe, pro-West policies and has reformed the judiciary, law enforcement, the security system, border management and infrastructure. It is often referred to as the ‘poster child’ for the EaP.

The EU-Moldova Association Agreement, including a DCFTA was signed in 2014 with the aim of deepening political and economic cooperation, developing common values and instigating agreed reforms. In particular, the EU and Moldova are working together to: prevent corruption; reform the judiciary; to strengthen the financial sector; to ensure media transparency; and to improve the business and investment climate – including improving transport and communication connections. Cooperation in education, culture, and research and innovation is being fostered through the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme.

However, geography still defines Moldova and Russia’s economic, cultural and political influence remains strong and is growing. Russia’s new foreign policy overtures are proving attractive and the conflict in Transnistria, is destabilising Moldova. Finding a sustainable political and economic solution to the Transnistria conflict and simultaneously respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova is of great importance. The EU has stressed that the Moldova DCFTA was on offer to the business based in Transnistria – an economy that is under significant stress.

Support for the EU seems to be waning however: in 2009, 55% of Moldovans wanted EU integration and 30% preferred closer connection with Russia. In 2014 however 35% prefer EU integration whereas 38% want increasing involvement with Russia (41). In discussions on the way forward for EU strategic security, the ways in which the EU can re-engage the Moldovan population has to be considered.

The EU is currently evaluating policies towards the whole of the neighbourhood — to the east and to the south. Finding a new way forward on European neighbourhood policy was one of the priorities identified by the Commission President for his first year in office — which is strongly supported by member states. The publication of a ‘green paper’ at the beginning of March 2015 is a first indication of the approach to be taken (42). The starting point for the new approach is an analysis of the current situation in the neighbourhood and how it has changed.

The EU has reconfirmed its commitment to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a framework for dialogue and engagement with countries to the East. The security environment that the countries participating in the Eastern Partnership currently confront is different, but some important common themes are also to be found. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are all currently locations where control over national territory is contested, and where there is either ongoing armed conflict, or a serious risk of conflict. These countries, first and foremost, seek help in ending the current conflicts or managing their impact, and collective consideration of how to implement effective measures for conflict resolution will inevitably be a high priority in discussions.

In current circumstances, containing the conflict in Ukraine and reducing the risk that new fighting will erupt on the territories where unresolved conflicts are very high priorities for the EU. The Eastern Partnership is based on the premise that security will eventually be based on the values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Strengthening the resilience of partner countries emphasises promoting the rule of law, an independent judiciary and effective measures to combat corruption. In addition, civilian security sector reform, civil protection and disaster management are also emphasised as that can help prepare societies and countries to resist sudden shocks of different kinds (43). After the experience in Ukraine, where the EU was criticised for lacking conflict sensitivity in its policies and actions, (44) the European Union will continue to actively promote the values on which the EaP was founded, but has to pay closer attention to conflict risk factors.

The current analysis challenges the underlying basis of past policy — that all countries in the neighbourhood share common objectives. The situation of countries is now differentiated along different pathways, with some countries making it clear that they want to come closer to the EU in most, if not all, policy dimensions. For example, in 2014 Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine all signed Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs) with the EU. In his first set of political guidelines for the new Commission, President Juncker stated that there would be no new EU members in the next 5 years. However, through implementation of the agreements, these countries will align legislation and standards to those of the EU — which could be a precondition for eventual membership, should such a decision be taken in the future.

Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to place a priority on good relations with the EU, but without demonstrating the same interest in deep engagement. These countries seek pragmatic, transactional relationships around specific issues — such as the arrangements for trade and commerce in sectors where they have a strong economic interest or assistance in attracting investment. For Armenia, engagement with the EU is balanced against other international commitments, and participation in other forms of integration (for example, in association with Russia). For Azerbaijan, there may be a reluctance to undertake the domestic reforms that would be necessary to implement the terms of deeper association with the EU.

Belarus has essentially turned away from the EU, and explored other forms of integration, first and foremost with Russia. How the EU should develop its relations with Russia is a key concern, and the recent assertion by President Vladimir Putin that the Eastern Partnership is an ‘attempt to tear states which had been parts of the former USSR off Russia and to prompt them to make an artificial choice between Russia and Europe’ suggests that a constructive dialogue on the future of the EaP is unlikely (45). However, the degree to which EaP actions will take account of potential Russian reactions is not clear.

While stressing differentiation, the EU has the stated goal of ensuring that the EaP is equally relevant to all partners, ‘regardless of the level of ambition they pursue in their relations with the European Union (46). Given the divergence in relations with the EU among EaP countries, three of the four multilateral platforms that were designed as joint endeavours are likely to be difficult to sustain in their current form, however. The substantive content of the platforms on democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration; and energy security would be difficult to design in a

way that meets the need of all partners. This could increase the value and the importance of the fourth platform, however, on people-to-people contact.

The use of flagship initiatives is one possible approach that might help maintain a degree of inclusion and cohesion without preventing differentiated policies that respond to the specific context in partner countries. Flagship initiatives that are designed around what are essentially technical issues could be designed and implemented without including a significant political element.

The use of cross-cutting working groups to address functional issues is already envisaged in the future work plan of the EaP. For example, under a 2014 Joint Cooperation Agreement, the Commission and the Council of Europe will initiate and jointly implement projects focused on good governance (47).

In February 2015, Edgars Rinkēvičs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, who will host the next Eastern Partnership Summit, described the meeting as ‘the survival summit’ (48). The EU is very unlikely to reach the consensus that would be needed to offer a membership perspective to any of the partner countries, and in these conditions Rinkēvičs put particular emphasis on delivering measurable benefits through the individual bilateral framework. However, in practice the content and scale of EU engagement with EaP partners is diverging rapidly.

The huge reform agenda that the Ukrainian government has promised, and the strong EU commitment to support that reform effort, means that a significant amount of time and a large volume of resources will have to be set aside for Ukraine (49). Among those measures that have already been elaborated, elements such as promoting the mobility of people and integrating transport systems will lean on the EaP framework. However, the Commission also created a dedicated support group with significant staff resources to oversee implementation of the agreed measures (50).

The framework being created to support Ukraine could be expanded to include Georgia and Moldova. However, for that to happen, a new decision would have to be taken. EU documents lack specific information on what kinds of differentiated and tailored approaches could be applied towards Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Bilateral initiatives that the EaP facilitates have been a testing ground for new instruments, notably deep and comprehensive free trade areas and mobility partnerships. Mobility partnerships, which include visa liberalisation or the less far-reaching step of visa facilitation between the EU and its partners, have been considered an important incentive for countries to engage with the EU. The ability to enter the EU for education, skills training or employment, and then to return home to apply the benefits is a potentially powerful attraction for citizens of partner countries. Progress in elaborating mobility partnerships might be one tangible element in further developing EaP.

**Fast-tracking peace and stability**

A new ESS needs to take on board the very real threats that Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (amongst others) face and move ahead in a more coherent strategic fashion. The strengthening of peace and stability components of each association agreement should be fast-tracked with facilitation, if
appropriate, through the EU Special Representatives and EU Monitoring Mission approach as in Georgia. Such mechanisms embed the EU more fully in the populations and enable the EU to be far better in tune with the politics and culture of the countries and thus understand what is really required for development, security and stability. The pulls within these countries towards what Russia is offering are very strong culturally, linguistically and economically. Unless the European standards for good governance and democracy can actually be made to work and improve peoples’ lives, it will be hard to resist the alternatives.

2.11 The Middle East and North Africa

Almost any analysis that attempts to characterise the turbulence that is currently the political and conflict situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) soon appears to have been understated. Since the early days of the so-called Arab Spring (51), political vacuums have been filled with unrest, violence and civil war. The Middle East is now primarily a region in which violent extremists have created political and conflict dynamics that are reshaping the region, regional alliances and international coalitions. Although the region has been one of unrest for over a century, with unresolved and active conflicts, and although there had been predictions for years that the authoritarian regimes that held power in the region would at some point fall, the potential for the severity of events that were initiated in 2010-2011 was not factored into the 2003 ESS or the 2008 review.

The southern states of the EU are at the frontline of the catastrophic consequences of the conflicts and terrorist activities in the MENA region and in sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty, resource shortages, including freshwater shortages — a situation that will likely be worsened with future climate change — are also placing great stresses on people in many parts of the African continent and in the Middle East. Europe is witnessing the knock-on effects of the dire situations in which people – many of whom are refugees – are prepared to risk enormous sums of cash and life and limb to cross the Mediterranean into Europe or as off the coast of the Horn Africa and in West Africa – also prepared to enter into criminal activities such as piracy or illicit goods smuggling including drugs, weapons, ancient artefacts and endangered species.

The EU approach to the MENA regions has been developed through its Southern Dimension, which addresses: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine Syria and Tunisia. The EU has been and remains vitally important for stability and economic prosperity in the region and preserving EU influence is a central focus. EU’s MENA policy is primarily based on encouraging political and economic reform in each individual country and through regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the European Union. The EU makes a significant contribution to the region through developmental aid packages.

Over recent decades, EU has actively supported efforts to resolve the regional conflicts including the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the resolution of which is a necessary – but not sufficient – factor in addressing all conflicts in the region. The EU’s objective is a ‘two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours’ (52). The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian state-building efforts. The EU has structured its relationships in the region bilaterally and multilaterally. For example, relations with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE include a strong connection through EU-Gulf Cooperation

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Council. Relationships with Arab States more generally are enhanced through a strong EU-League of Arab States (LAS) interaction.

The Southern Dimension operates through Association Agreements. A great deal of headway has been made in negotiating and implementing Association Agreements in the region. Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco was agreed in 1996 and has been implemented since 2000. Negotiations for a DCFTA have been taking place since early 2013 and include the extant bilateral negotiations on trade in services. The longer-term objective is to widen the scope of the Association Agreement to include trade in services, government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights, investment protection and the gradual integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU single market. Tunisia signed an Association Agreement in 1995, which has been implemented since 1998. The EU is working with Tunisia to prepare for DCFTA negotiations that will likewise include the bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services and establishment. An Association Agreement between Egypt and the EU entered into force in mid-2004 and an agreement on further liberalisation of trade in agricultural products entered into force in June 2010, and a dialogue on a DCFTA was launched in June 2013. Israel and the EU have been implementing an Association Agreement since June 2000 and an EU-Palestine Association Agreement has been established since 1997. The EU and Jordan Association Agreement has been implemented since May 2002 and there is an active DCFTA preparatory process ongoing and the Algeria-EU Association Agreement entered into force in September 2005. The EU-Lebanon Association Agreement entered into force in April 2006.

In the case of Syria however, negotiations for an Association Agreement concluded in 2004 and the text was initialled in December 2008 and adopted by the Council in October 2009. However, the signature has been put on hold by the EU ever since ‘for political reasons’ (European Commission, 2015).

In 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean was established to work with sixteen countries in the Southern Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East to enhance governance, civil society participation and develop practical, regional and national projects. This approach was based on the premise that the demographic make-up of the region with over 30% of the population between the ages of 15 and 29 (53), was leading to untenable stresses for that generation and economic development was the path to stability and prosperity. Although that analysis was undoubtedly correct, the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 were triggered in part because the pace of change in the region was too slow, and what was on offer from the EU is not attractive to extremists in the region that have charged along a track of shocking violence and creating instability within and across the countries of the region.

In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the EU attempted to bring key states into the EU fold. For example: the EU invested €50 million in Yemen to assist with a peaceful transition; Algeria was offered an EU neighbourhood action plan; the EU is investing €130 million in Libya, in addition to €80.5 million for humanitarian assistance in 2011; and discussions on a free trade agreement began with Egypt. Unlike the case of Tunisia where the EU has had significant effect, the impacts of these initiatives in Algeria, Libya and Egypt have not yielded the results that had been hoped. It is clear that for all the EU efforts, in the post-Arab spring the EU could exert little leverage with most of the states and non-state groups.

The interconnected and enormous problems that have to be faced include: the Israel-Palestinian conflict; the role of Hamas and Hezbollah in that conflict; the severe tensions and risk of conflict

53 Although it should be noted that the region’s demographics are far from uniform in this respect: the Magreb and Iraq-Iran-Syria region for example has a far greater youth bulge than the Gulf region where the youth population can be as low as 15%, see Roudi, F., ‘Youth Population and Unemployment in the Middle East & North Africa’, Population Reference Bureau, 2011, http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/roudi.pdf
between Israel and its neighbours – particularly Iran; the continuing civil war in Syria; the conquests of ISIL/ISIS/Daesh in Iraq, in the Kurdish Autonomous Region and Syria and the fears for a wider regional war that would put Arab countries and Iran into direct confrontations and could involve both Turkey and Israel; the civil conflict in Yemen and the role of the Arab states versus the role of Iran; the wider role of terrorist groups in the region and in the North African countries and through to West Africa; stability in the Gulf and the growing tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Not only do these crises in governance in the terms of the rule of law, terrorism, conflict, corruption, lack of basic services, food and water shortages and so on destabilise the countries of the Middle East and Africa but they also have created crisis situations in Europe, particularly in Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain. The return of jihadi fighters and supporters to European countries is of great concern with regards to further radicalisation of people in Europe (54). A new ESS needs to continue to stress the fundamental importance of assisting those countries and populations most at risk through strategic partnering, association agreements, upstream diplomacy, policing and border assistance and direct aid. At the same time, a new ESS could establish a new approach to security issues in the region – not one of interference but of facilitation. Any regional security dialogue is still completely absent from the Middle East and North Africa, and forming new institutions for creating opportunities for strategic discussion would be a game-changer.

However, in considering how to develop a new ESS that could meaningfully address the EU’s role in the MENA region, the EU needs to consider what it can actually achieve and how much influence it can realistically wield and – given that understanding – what the EU might hope to achieve.

2.12 Western Balkan security issues

Preventing the re-emergence of violent conflict from frozen conflicts remains one of the most important and successful long-term strategies of the EU over two decades. However, the extensive, long-term and severe conflicts in the Western Balkans that began in the early 1990s still pose major problems for the sub-region. Ethnic divisions remain as do refugees, economic repercussion and disputed border issues. Organised crime and corruption as described above is a significant problem and is endemic in the region, exacerbated by weak institutions, poor and corrupt law enforcement and struggling economies. Addressing the issue of migration from the region, recently particularly from Kosovo, is of particular importance. The recent surge in migration from Kosovo is being enabled by a network of human traffickers who prey on vulnerable would-be migrants (55). EU accession aspirations are recognised as being vital for governance reform in the region and look to the success of the 2013 Serbia-Kosovo agreement. A continuing and sustained focus on conflict prevention in the Western Balkans has to remain a vital component of the future ESS.

The Western Balkans are crucial for Europe’s long-term energy security. Through the Western Balkans, Europe could achieve energy supply diversity and so peace and security in the region are essential in order to guarantee the security of oil and gas supplies for the EU. In particular, Croatia has deep-water facilities for liquid natural gas (LNG) tankers and a significant pipeline which could provide Central

55 Wave of Kosovan migration sparks unease in European capitals, 25 February 2015 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/108a8d7a-b90e-11e4-b8e6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3aRCY48KP
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Europe with alternative gas supplies; Western Balkan states could provide a route for an extension of Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)\(^{56}\).

The region’s main insecurities reside in; serious organised crime and corruption in the security sector, primarily the trafficking in drugs and humans, the abuse of human rights, money laundering and criminal involvement in politics. There is a widespread availability, proliferation and misuse of small arms in the region. The demand for weapons remains high despite attempts to control in large part due to a sense of insecurity that the region’s governments fail to mitigate. Regional military and intelligence cooperation are a vitally important factor for political stability, security and economic prosperity and would be instrumental in addressing the key challenges of political extremism, borders and discrimination against national minorities, organised crime, corruption, border management and illegal migration. The serious situations with regards to human rights issues in the Western Balkans, particularly over freedom of speech, the media, justice in prosecuting war criminals and harassment and intimidation against people such as Roma and LGBT people\(^{57}\).

Added into the mix is the fact that people in the Western Balkans have been seriously affected by the Eurozone crisis. There are extreme social needs thanks to high levels of unemployment, corruption, organised crime and dysfunctional institutions – these issues in turn contribute to fuelling ethnic tensions. Other stressors included environmental insecurity due to earthquakes and frequent flooding leading to unsustainable economic activity that in turn leads to activities such as illegal logging, illegal building, and increased pollution, which in turn leads to soil erosion and exacerbates soil integrity and flooding. The Western Balkans are in need of protective environmental measures and cross-border cooperative mechanisms to manage shared resources such as water.

Two other major players matter significantly in the Western Balkans: Turkey – which has emphasised that its engagement in the region is complementary to EU accession; and Russia – which has important historical and cultural ties to the region and is of strategic importance due to transit of oil and gas, but also as an export market. It is important to note that Russia is very economically active within the region. Russian state-backed businesses have become part of the fabric of a number of Balkan economies and the Russian government has thus come to exert considerable influence in the region. However, Russian investment increases the Western Balkans’ energy dependence on Russia, and encourages the non-transparent business models that undermine progress towards European integration. Russia has tended to highlight the national-ethno-cultural ties of ‘Slavic brotherhood’ and Christian orthodoxy primarily in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) provides a comprehensive road map towards accession tailored for each state, however, there is a resistance growing both within European Union countries and within the Western Balkans. EU members in the region would like to see the Western Balkans states integrated in order to increase stability and security in the region. However, EU enlargement is often characterised as one of the drivers of labour migration from poorer, newly acceded EU countries into wealthier long-established EU states. Populist movements within Europe are harnessing anti-immigration sentiment and fomenting fear of enlargement at a time when Europe has suffered severe economic shock. In addition, euroscepticism is widespread in the Western Balkans as Europe has been portrayed as the instigator of social and economic reforms that have not received full support.

\(^{56}\) TAP is a pipeline project to transport natural gas from the Caspian Sea. It begins in Greece goes through Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy and then on to the rest of Western Europe

Any further integration of the region is likely to be very slow and – as the EU has seen in regards to Turkey – such lengthy processes can cause social protest and decreased governmental and civil society support for further integration. Additionally, keeping these countries in a suspended state will create a political vacuum, which could be exploited by other regional powers such as Russia.

Instead, the most certain way for the EU to continue to maintain regional security is for a new ESS to provide alternative strategic visions in which the countries of the Western Balkans will see the prospect of increasing stability and economic prosperity, and one in which their unique cultural and linguistic heritages will be valued and supported.

2.13 The 'new' Russia

The relationship between Russia and the EU is undergoing a radical overhaul. In 2003, the relationship was one of long-term partnership, cooperation and mutual economic development. However, in recent years, severe problems have arisen between the EU and Russia. Military activity in Georgia over the status of South Ossetia, and most recently the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and destabilisation of Ukraine, has led the EU to impose a set of targeted sanctions on Russia and to suspend talks on the new EU-Russia agreement and most EU-Russia cooperation programmes. In 2015, the relationship is undergoing the most difficult period since the end of the cold war and is in a state of crisis.

Russia and Europe have always been – and will always be – very important to each other. Russia is the EU’s third largest trading partner after the US and China with a total value of €326,000 million in 2013 (58). The current basis for cooperation remains the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). EU-Russia Agreement negotiations were launched at the 2008 Khanty-Mansiysk summit with the aim of: providing a more comprehensive framework for EU-Russia relations, reflecting increased cooperation since the early 1990s; and including substantive, legally binding commitments in all areas of the partnership, including political dialogue, freedom, security & justice, economic cooperation, research, education & culture, trade, investment and energy.

The 2010 Rostov Summit established the Partnership for Modernisation on economic, technical standards and regulations, the rule of law, and the judiciary. Initiatives include: rule of law projects - a judicial appeal system; anti-corruption measures; fostering civil society; economic and technical modernisation.

Although there have been growing concerns about Russia’s new assertive approach in EU countries for at least a decade, the annexation of Crimea and the clandestine military activities in Ukraine that have led to continuing conflict requires that the EU reconsiders its relationship with Russia. The fighting in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk, Luhansk and Mariupol has thus far led to some million refugees and 6,000 deaths (59). The Minsk (II) ceasefire agreement of February has led to reduction in violence but is being regularly violated and trust in its long-term implementation is low. The European Union and the US are working together to address the situation but the long-term prospects appear bleak.

The EU needs to thinks through very carefully about how to manage the growing security problems with Russia and – most importantly – how to prevent any escalation into further conflict and war.


59 Sten, R., ‘The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power International Affairs’, International Affairs, 91 (3), 2015, referencing United Nations Office in Geneva, ‘Death toll in eastern Ukraine crosses 6,000, High Commissioner Zeid says’
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rebalancing of the relationship between Russia and the EU is long overdue and has to form a major plank within a new ESS.

Russia’s shifting foreign and defence policies

In order to address the relationship with Russia, it is important to understand the approach and direction that Russia is taking. There has been a tectonic shift in Russian foreign policy strategy since the 2003 ESS and a new ESS needs to recognise that reality. As a deliberate and detailed strategy, Russia is clearly demonstrating its leadership at the international level and cementing its hegemony at the regional level. Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of February 2013 portrays a more assertive international approach that envisages a Russia that ‘will work to anticipate and lead events’. Russia is also keen to embed its influence and gain territory in regions such as the Arctic and Ukraine and further afield it maintains its interest in Central Asia, the Middle East and Antarctica. In addition to the traditional use of military power to protect its interests, Russia is using military power and ‘soft power’ in new ways to re-establish itself as a global force that can longer be ignored. It is important for the EU to be fully aware that Russia is not shying away from the use of force and conflict with EU or NATO countries – particularly in the Baltics – should be considered as possible, even probable.

At the end of December 2014, Russia updated its Military Doctrine in which NATO’s capabilities, global reach, nearby deployments on land and at sea, and enlargement are characterised as Russia’s major risks along with concerns over ‘destabilisation of countries and regions’ and U.S. strategic ballistic-missile defence, the so-called Global Strike and strategic conventional systems. The Military Doctrine is integrated with Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept and with the National Security Strategy, which take into account the significant changes since the financial crash of 2008 and the Arab uprisings of 2011. The doctrine refers to ‘intensification of global competition’ and the ‘rivalry of values’, ‘information warfare’ and ‘outside interference’ in domestic politics. The military doctrine maintains Russia’s extant nuclear weapons posture – the right to first use in the case of an imminent and massive conventional attack and retaliatory with respect to nuclear and other WMD.

The new military doctrine views the West as a rival and competitor but also the source of significant threat. Russia has been keen to develop tools of ‘soft power’ in order to increase its influence and support. Such approaches have included the use of a set of communication tools including social media platforms, and media and business organisations – including creating enhanced relationships through new embassies and consulates – with an emphasis on reaching out to civil society in Russia, neighbouring countries and further afield to foster a wider understanding of – and thus support for – Russian culture, policies and decision-making.

Russia’s new network of allies

Russia is putting increasing emphasis on building a network of allies. Belarus is seen as the most reliable, integrated and long-term ally. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan comprise the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) Treaty in which member states agree that: ‘In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the member states all the others member states will provide it with necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN

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60 Monaghan, A., ‘Putin’s Russia: shaping a grand strategy?’, International Affairs, September 2013 http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/194090

Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

Member states agree to consult jointly and immediately in response to threats to international peace and security, territorial integrity and with the aim of coordinating their positions and implementing measures to counter the threats. The aim of the CSTO is to become an ‘integral part of common and comprehensive system of collective security for Europe and Asia’. The CSTO member states have rapid-reaction forces to counter a range of contingencies. Threats in Central Asia are of particular concern. In December 2014, CSTO members were invited to join the newly established National Defence Control Centre in Moscow.

In 2014, following decades of development, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia have established the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which came into effect on 1 January 2015. The EEU provides for the free movement of goods, capital, services and people and common transport, agriculture and energy policies, and plans to create a single currency in the future. It has created a single integrated market of some 176 million people and a GDP of approximately €3.5 trillion. The functional structure of the EEU includes the Eurasian Commission, the Eurasian Commission’s Council, the Court of the EEU and the Eurasian Development Bank. The EEU is seen as one of the central planks of Russian foreign policy, establishing Russia at the heart of Eurasia rather than as an appendage to Western Europe. Along with the CSTO, Russia is clearly ‘mirroring’ the EU and NATO and thereby seeking international legitimacy for its positioning at the centre of a new Eurasian project for the 21st Century. A new ESS will need to address this new structure and find ways to interact with it and strategically build trust and security between the European and Eurasian institutions for the long-term.

Russia is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) an intergovernmental international organisation established in 2001 with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as full members. Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan are observer states of the SCO and Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka are dialogue partners.

The main goals of the SCO are ‘strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order’.

Russia has recently agreed two ‘Treaties on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ - one with Abkhazia on 24 November 2014 and one with South Ossetia on 18 March 2015 (62). Following the 2008 violent conflict in South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia, Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as independent countries.

The Russia-Abkhazia Treaty has a term of 10 years, extendable to 15, and includes ‘coordinated’ foreign policy; creation of a common defence and security space; a common social and economic space; and social-economic development. The collective defence approach includes combined forces for joint protection of the Abkhaz borders with units from the Abkhaz and the Russian armed forces. (63).

62 These treaties have been in the making since the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, in which NATO gave assurances that Georgia would eventually be allowed to join the alliance. General Yuri Baluyevsk, head of the Russian armed forces responded by saying that if Georgia joins NATO, ‘Russia will take steps aimed at ensuring its interests along its borders and these will not only be military steps, but also steps of a different nature’. President Putin then vowed support and protection to Abkhazia and South Ossetia

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The Russia-South Ossetia Treaty has a term of 25 years and deepens the integration of South Ossetia with Russia, with ‘separate units of the armed forces and security agencies’ of South Ossetia becoming part of Russia’s armed forces and security agencies, and the integration of the cross-border customs services.

Russia and the Ukraine crisis

Long before the start of the Ukraine crisis in late 2013/early 2014, Russia has been prodding and testing NATO resolve. Since various gas crises between Russia and Ukraine from 2005 to 2009 (leading to the 2010 natural gas agreement) and the Russia-Georgian crisis in 2008, Russia seems to be testing western determination within its sphere of influence. This is akin to the pinging (64) of submarines or the testing of air defences in which adversaries regular test each other’s ability and willingness to detect and respond to incursions. And indeed, incursions into national airspace and waters have been a characteristic feature in recent Russian manoeuvres. Air and coastal defences have detected these incursions but there has been no escalation thus far. It is possible that Russia doubts and is testing the determination of NATO to defend its territory and in particular the extent to which NATO is committed to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all of NATO – particularly in regards to new NATO states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The situation in Ukraine is very different to the types of conflict seen throughout the cold war. The Ukraine crisis has included a form of deceptive deployment in which Russian military personnel have removed their identifying insignia and joined the separatist fighters in the east of Ukraine with impunity. Dubbed ‘the little green men’ or ‘polite men’ (65) they have not fooled the local fighters but this tactic does make it difficult to ascertain what sort of force NATO may be pitted against in the future.

NATO’s response has been to announce the strengthening of the NATO Response Force and Special Forces ability to respond quickly to any threat against any member of the Alliance, including where there is little warning. NATO has established a readiness action plan (NATO 2014) to respond to the challenges posed by Russia, their strategic implications, and to the risks and threats from the Middle East and North Africa. The plan has significantly enhanced the responsiveness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and has established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that is able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. The force consists of a land component with appropriate air, maritime and special operations forces, command and control and in-place force enablers and contributions from NATO allies on a rotational basis.

The February 2015 Minsk II led to an agreement to: a ceasefire; the subsequent bilateral withdrawal of heavy weaponry; withdrawal of foreign armed groups/weapons/mercenaries; OSCE monitoring; a dialogue on local elections in break-away regions; amnesty for fighters; release of hostages and prisoners on both sides; supervised aid delivery; and restore economic services. The agreement mandates constitutional reform by the end of 2015 including decentralisation and a permanent special

64 Pinging in submarine detection describes the process of sending out a pulse of sound underwater and listening for the reflections that comeback from the submarine that is being sought. The submarine that is pinged may wish to a) demonstrate that the submariners have detected the ping and move away in case they may otherwise be attacked (tactical manoeuvre) or b) they may choose to ignore the ping in order to pretend that they submarine is not as technologically advanced as it truly is (strategic deception)

65 ‘Little green men’ refers to the green Russian army uniform that these soldiers wear and that they seem to have come from another planet. ‘Polite men’ has been used as a term of art by the Russian and separatists forces due to the ‘polite demeanor’ of the unidentified soldiers when annexing Crimea
status for the separatists regions. The agreement enabled a financial package of €35 billion over a period of 4 years from the IMF.

**How to respond to the new Russia?**

Russia’s more assertive foreign policy is posing serious problems for the European Union and other western countries. Keen to lead rather than follow, this is a new Russia for a new era and one that will ensure its influence in a highly strategic, determined fashion. Russia is often leading in the UN Security Council and it is promoting its interests – often constructively and to great effect – in key international forums such as the BRICS group, the EU3+3 negotiations on Iran and in the NPT.

Russia is also however combining its soft power with a harnessing of social media and control of the Internet (see above on Internet governance) and is taking a more aggressive tone and action in its hegemonic stance to its neighbours and former allies. Moving away from the UN Charter approach, it is prepared to use military power to pursue its interests and has resorted to less-than-veiled threats over its nuclear weapons capability and willingness to use them in certain circumstances.

Russia’s new approach to alliance-building is aimed mostly at former USSR allies, particularly those with large Russian-speaking populations. Its recent successful actions in dividing off South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea are an uncomfortable reminder for Europeans of the dangers of stirring up sentiments based on ethno-linguistic nationalism. This is an additional danger that Europe faces. Not just the Russian approach to Russian-speakers but the emotions that could be stirred within other ethno-linguistic groups throughout Europe. A new ESS needs to understand the strategic vision that Russia is presenting in the region and counter with an alternative, progressive strategic vision on which only Europe can deliver.

### 2.14 Sub-Saharan Africa

Over the previous decade, several countries within the continent of Africa have been undergoing new and severe stress, while others have managed to develop resources and governance that have increased resilience and enabled social and economic growth.

The conflicts that have been in place for years have grown increasingly complex. There is a growing interconnectedness between non-state armed groups and governments in and bordering the conflicts. For example, the civil war in Congo has been exacerbated by the cross-border interferences from fighters in Rwanda and Uganda and vice versa – for example, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda are based in eastern Congo. The frozen conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has spilled over into Somalia, where Ethiopia has backed the Mogadishu government and Eritrea has been supporting al Shabaab’s activities that have also included horrific large-scale terrorist attacks in Kenya. The Ugandan-based Lord’s Resistance Army has moved into the conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. Sudan and South Sudan remain in a state of intermittent conflict and support proxy non-state armed groups and insurgencies – such as the White Army – in each other’s territories and the Janjaweed militias in Darfur have been involved in fighting in CAR and eastern Chad. In West Africa, Boko Haram is causing havoc through attacks and kidnappings in Nigeria, and has spread into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (66). In 2015, the long-standing civil conflict in Burundi erupted again – hundreds of thousands of people have died in the conflict since 1962 and all attempts to resolve the conflict have thus far failed.

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The EU has focused its work in Africa primarily through the African Union, the AU. In the 2007 Lisbon Summit, the Africa-EU Joint Strategy was established as the long-term framework for a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation between the two continents (‘Two Unions, One Vision’). The strategy identifies common priorities, strengthens economic cooperation, sustainable development, security, democracy, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity. The Joint Strategy is implemented through agreed Action Plans and sustained political dialogue at all levels and the JAES Support Mechanism was set up to address implementation difficulties and provide administrative and secretarial support for the Joint Strategy. The JAES Support Mechanism facilitates meetings and assists the EU and the AU to identify and formulate future initiatives through a series of targeted feasibility studies and through engaging civil society, youth groups, social and economic partners from Africa and the EU.

The African Peace Facility (APF) was established in 2004 to provide predictable financing through the European Development Fund with thus far an amount of over €1.9 billion, the 2014-2016 Financing Agreement has a budget of some €750 million. The APF strategy deliberately combines short-term funding to address crises as they occur (for example for peacekeeping) with longer-term support for institutional capacity building. The APF funding covers allowances for troops, salaries for civilians, logistical, transportation, medical, communication costs but does not fund military equipment, arms, ammunition or military training.

The specific objectives of the funding instrument include: 1) enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security; 2) operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); and 3) assistance for Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The main financial commitment for the APF is to PSOs; 90% of the funds go to support African-led peace operations and 10% to support the operationalisation of the APSA and ERM conflict prevention and crisis management activities. Priority areas include: long-term capacity building to enable African institutions to ensure peace and security on their own without external assistance; an early response mechanism (ERM) for rapid action to prevent, manage or resolve crises. The 2014-16 Action Programme has an initial allocation of €15 million for the ERM; and African-led Peace Support Operations. As a result of a 2013 evaluation (67), the 2014-2016 Action Programme introduced four new elements: developing exit strategies and financial burden sharing for long-running peace operations to allow for stronger African ownership and better sustainability; realignment of APF support to APSA and capacity building to more targeted support and decreasing general support for staff costs; increased coherence and complementary between activities co-funded by APF and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) and stronger coordination with the EU regional delegations; a simplification of the Commission decision procedure to increase speed and reactivity.

The EU strategic approach towards Africa is in part due to the historical, commercial and domestic interests of key EU member states, particularly in regards to trade and migration and in part due to the evolution in the EU’s international reach and influence (68). In particular, the strategic approach of the EU that treats peacekeeping as a development issue and enables the EU and the AU to address security issues through a developmental lens.

The EU and South Africa have developed a bilateral strategic partnership – for which the participation of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) in pivotal – in which South Africa is a development collaborative assistance partner rather than a development assistance recipient.


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Africa’s long-standing commitment to African economic development, conflict prevention, human rights and peace has led to the establishment of a trilateral development cooperation (TDC) partnership for South-South Cooperation. South Africa has in-depth expertise in humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. In addition to its own extraordinary experience in conflict prevention, South African peacekeeping troops have experience in Burundi, the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, the Comoros, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.

South Africa itself is a developmental aid donor supporting projects and programmes in other African countries to build capacity in good governance, conflict prevention and resolution and economic development. For example, South Africa has contributed significant funds (approximately €50 million pa currently) to the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) (Masters, 2014).

As the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership develops and lessons are learned through joint evaluations and shared experiences, other trilateral development cooperation (TDC) partnerships for South-South cooperation could be developed within Africa. Countries that might be most suited for such partnerships would include Nigeria, Botswana, Gabon and Kenya because of their economic and democratic capacities and ability to implement the partnerships. Considering what strategic partnerships would mean and how both the EU, the AU, each partner and each potential beneficiary country would benefit – what each could bring to the table, the level of equal participation, and how economic development, peace and security could be enhanced through such strategic partnerships, needs to be thought through in terms of value added and long-term viability.

The EU and its African partners are grappling with an increasingly wide range of policy challenges. The interconnectedness between security and development; regional and global terrorism; trans-national crime; maritime insecurity; climate change; infectious diseases and migration form a fabric of interconnected challenges. For example, in West Africa the Ebola virus outbreak of 2014 led to over 26,000 people being infected and caused over 11,000 deaths and was classed as a major health security risk for the region and globally – President Obama called the epidemic a ‘national security priority’ (69).

The EU’s approach to sub-Saharan Africa is long-term norm building and genuinely strategic and comprehensive, although whether that will produce the results that both the EU and the AU want is hard to predict. Africa’s future depends on whether the strategic approach combining security and development can provide the framework needed to move beyond the post-colonial environment and into an era of independence and prosperity (70).

2.15 Evolution of strategic partnerships: the evolution of US strategic interest; BRICS, regional powers in Asia and Latin America

Strategic Partnerships are tools for the EU’s long-term engagement with a fast-changing, multipolar world in order to promote and defend European values and interests. Each strategic partnership has a different history, a different agenda, and differing levels of activities and cooperation.

The strategic partnership idea began at the end of the 1990s when Russia became a ‘strategic partner to the Union’. Strategic partnerships evolved and the EU now has ten state strategic partners – Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the United States – and five organisational strategic partners.

The legal basis for strategic partnerships focuses on principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights. As a result, the strategic partnerships are all very different in terms of emphasis. The criteria for strategic partnerships – and why some countries enter into them – are rather hazy but constructive ambiguity can be useful in terms of flexibility and political action. Some strategic partnerships – such as with the US and Canada are based on seeing the partner as possessing convergent interests and the possibilities of working together coherently and strategically on common objectives. The strategic partnerships with Brazil, China, India, South Korea and South Africa all include long-term strategic discussions on development issues. Others are more long-term economic equal partnerships and others are more political in nature in the hope of engaging in a regional power structure.

Strategic partnerships can serve to promote the EU’s interests at the bilateral and multilateral level but for this they must be long-term strategic rather than a string of joined-up tactical projects. Any long-term plans need to have built-in resilience in case of major political shifts. The Security Dimension of strategic partnering is inconsistent across the range of partnerships. If the EU were to focus more overtly on the security aspects of strategic partnerships – in which trade and development would naturally play a vital role – it might be easier to sustain a more coherent and consistent approach in which the common purpose of collective human security and the EU’s interests in providing security for European citizens were clear for all to see.

Although current trends suggest that the EU’s relative weight in the international system will decrease over the next two decades, the EU will still harness considerable economic, natural, technological and military resources to match those of the US and China. However, rather than stake a claim to ‘super power’ status, the EU may be better placed playing to its strengths and further develop its strategic partnerships (71) that focus on international cooperation for a rules-based global order, and long-term capacity-building for good governance and conflict prevention. In particular, if conflict prevention were elevated as a priority to be above all other demands and cemented at the heart of the range of strategic partnerships, the EU could lever its partnerships to deepen security dialogues and establish plurilateral security and conflict prevention negotiating forums.

2.15.1 The EU strategic partnership with the United States

The strategic relationship between the European Union and the United States is of primary importance to transatlantic prosperity and stability, with the EU and the USA accounting for over 30% of the world trade and over 50% of global GDP(72).

The 2003 ESS described the transatlantic relationship as ‘irreplaceable’ – that remains true today, perhaps even more so. The European Union and the United States have indeed shown that when acting together on security issues such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, landmine clearance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, they are ‘a formidable force for good in the world’. Since 2008, the US in rebalancing its foreign policy has also worked increasingly in multilateral partnerships and through the UN. ‘Effective multilateralism’ has resulted in considerable and tangible progress. In the uncertain strategic environment, the strong cooperation between the US and the EU could be strengthened to great effect, particularly in working together to prevent large-scale conflict in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.


The US is going through some major changes, however. In particular, the production of shale gas, growth in the use of renewables, and increased energy efficiencies mean that the US is predicted to eliminate net energy imports by 2030 and start exporting energy from around 2017 (73). This new energy abundance will radically alter the relationship that the US has with oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia. The US is also undergoing steady demographic changes. Unlike much of Europe, the US has a growing population, thanks primarily to immigration. 25% of the population is under 20 years old and 48% of the population growth is due to an increase in Hispanic and Latino Americans with new immigrants and their descendants expected to provide most of the U.S. population gains in the future (74).

The European Parliament and the American Congress established the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) in 1999. The TLD aims to strengthen and enhance the level of political discourse between European and American legislators and is based on the understanding that policies and legislation made either in the US or in Europe has an effect across the Atlantic. The TLD agenda includes issues pertaining to: foreign policy and trade; economic and financial policies; energy and climate change; and civil liberties (75). The TLD holds bi-annual meetings of the European Parliament and the US Congress delegations and holds teleconferences on specific topics of mutual concern. The European Parliament has also established a Steering Committee to co-ordinate TLD activities and to ensure that the parliamentary committees are included.

The EU-US strategic partnership is more informal than the other EU partnerships. It is based on the 1995 ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ and developed through the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the 2007 Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007. The framework for action for the strategic partnership is contained within the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda:

1. Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development including working for: a stable and prosperous Europe; democracy and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine and other newly independent states; a secure peace in the Middle East; human rights; non-proliferation; and development and humanitarian assistance.

2. Responding to global challenges including tackling: international crime; drug-trafficking; terrorism; the needs of refugees and displaced persons; environmental protection; and combatting disease.

3. Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations in order to: strengthen the multilateral trading system; and promote closer economic transatlantic ties

4. Building bridges across the Atlantic, working with: the private sector; the scientific community; educators to improve communication and to invest in future generations.

The EU and the US hold an annual summit and large number of technical working meetings on the full range of key issues. In recent years, the joint crisis management and conflict prevention efforts have deepened and a work plan has been developed on crisis management and conflict prevention, including operational measures on, for example, early warning and stabilisation. The EU and US are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), aimed at cutting

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tariffs and regulatory barriers to trade between the US and EU countries and increasing the access each other’s markets.

In 2003, the relationship between the EU and the US was not as coherent as it is today. In the post 9-11 environment the US, along with the UK, Australia and Poland, took military action against Iraq and toppled the Ba’ath government led by Saddam Hussein. The invasion of Iraq was opposed by a number of EU member states on grounds of illegality and fear for the long-term consequences. The US government led by George W. Bush also radically altered US long-standing foreign policy on a number of security and defence issues such as arms control and disarmament treaties – and took a number of unilateral actions in these regards. Such actions did not sit well with the ‘effective multilateralism’ framing of the 2003 ESS. It took a rebalancing of US foreign policy in 2008 when President Obama reset security and defence policies such as US-Russia bilateral nuclear weapons reductions and articulated the vision for a world free of nuclear weapons in his [Prague speech](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament) in April 2009.

The United States however has in recent years turned its gaze increasing towards Asia and, in particular, to the rise of China. In Canberra, November 2011, President Obama announced the US ‘pivot’ (now called ‘rebalancing’) to Asia (76). The rebalancing to Asia has been primarily focused on peace and security, the international order; upholding international law and norms and freedom of trade and navigation.

As part of the US defence review, the US committed to modernising America’s new flexible defence capabilities in the Asia Pacific region as a top priority. However, events in Ukraine and the military actions of Russia have served to temper the Asia Pivot and re-engage the US in Europe. Likewise, the conflict in Syria and the military actions of ISIL/ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq have served to refocus US attention on the Middle East. European and US views differ however on, for example, whether to arm the Ukrainian military and the extent to which military action in the Middle East might be efficacious.

### 2.15.2 EU partnership with regional powers in Asia and Latin America

The EU has developed strong bilateral strategic partnerships with regional powers in Asia and Latin America. China and India are fast growing economic and military powers and the ESS needs to take their strategic importance and the possible long-term partnerships into account. China is a major donor and investor worldwide and will increasingly play a role in international and regional politics. India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Brazil are flourishing democracies, each with strong civil society participation and important long-term political and strategic partners for the EU. Each is or soon will be a developmental aid donor supporting projects and programmes in other regional countries to build capacity in good governance, conflict prevention and resolution and economic development.

#### China

In the 12 years since the 2003 ESS, China’s wealth and ambition has grown significantly. This was not unexpected and indeed, the actual growth has been less than predicted in 2003 thanks to the knock-on effects of the 2008 US-European financial crisis. The EU however is China’s biggest trading partner, and China is the EU’s second biggest trading partner. China’s partnership with the EU is based on the 1985 trade and cooperation agreement. It has developed to include business opportunities creation, international security issues, environmental protection and academic exchanges. The EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which was published in 2013, lays out a shared set of objectives to

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promote cooperation in the areas of peace and security, prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchange. The EU and China have also worked strategically and constructively on Climate Change and international development dialogue.

China’s progress since 2003 has been impressive. For example in 2003, China launched its first crewed space mission, in 2011 began to establish a Chinese space laboratory and in 2013 China’s Chang’e 3 space craft became the first object to soft-land on the Moon since 1976. China has invested heavily in renewable energy technologies and nuclear power in order to maintain growth and reduce carbon dioxide emissions and has closed down a considerable number of coal-fired power stations.

China is similarly modernising its military capabilities. Chinese land, sea and air forces in terms of military personnel constitute the largest military in the world, with 2.3 million active personnel and a further 500,000 estimated in reserves (77). China’s military modernisation has been enabled by China’s economic growth. Each year in the last decade has seen an increase in military spending. In 2014 China announced a 12% increase in military spending to €115 billion.

China recently launched its first battle group aircraft carrier, ‘The Liaoning’, with its associated J-15 fighter aircraft that has long-range due to a mid-air refuelling capability, a new strike aircraft (the J-16), and the first photos of a new class of medium-lift helicopter (the Z-20). All of these new technologies however are based on Russian or US designs and contain foreign components (78).

China has also developed a significant high-tech IT industry and has developed capabilities in programming and super computing. As part of this new expertise, China has been identified as one of the most active regions for malicious hacking and cyber security attacks. In addition, China has been attempting to restrict access to the Internet for its citizens and monitor people online.

Human rights remain a major problem between the EU and China. The EU-China Human Rights dialogue was established in 1995 and enables two discussions on human rights issues per annum. The dialogue has contributed to some progress such as the UN Commissioner for Human Rights visiting China; the signing of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the signing and ratification of the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights; and the release of named prisoners.

China’s new assertiveness in the region is being demonstrated in the South China Sea – a region of over 250 islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars and many of which are either under water at high tide or permanently submerged - collectively they have a total land surface area of less than 15 km2 at low tide. The main interests are the islands’ natural minerals, gas, and oil deposits; the fishing rights; and the right of free passage at sea. The islands include: the Spratly Islands, that are disputed between China, the Republic of China/Taiwan, and Vietnam, (Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines claim parts of the archipelago); the Paracel Islands, disputed between China, the Republic of China/Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Pratas Islands, disputed between China and the Republic of China/Taiwan; the Macclesfield Bank, disputed between China, the Republic of China/Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam; the Scarborough Shoal, disputed between China, the Philippines, and the Republic of China/Taiwan. Until now, China has refused to submit to the arbitration process established under the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (79); however, China has recently released a ‘position paper’ aimed at putting forward its case and so progress may be made towards settlement in the near future.

(79) Muller, W., ‘China’s Missed Opportunity in South China Sea Arbitration’, Chatham House, 19 March 2015
China’s interests and activities in African countries have had an impact on EU strategic plans within the continent. In 2008, the European Commission proposed establishing a new tripartite approach to reinforce cooperation and dialogue between the European Union (EU), Africa and China in order to promote the stable and sustainable development of Africa. There are major problems in such a trilateral enterprise. Not least of which are the very different views on how to achieve peace and stability. The European approach that emphasises good governance, democracy and respect for human rights is very different to the Chinese approach, which stresses peaceful coexistence, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. China imposes no human rights or good governance conditions on its investments. Concerns over corruption, human rights abuses or destabilising neighbouring governments do not affect Chinese assistance and investments decisions in the way that such matters impact on EU or US decision-making.

**Japan**

Japan is the EU’s second biggest trading partner in Asia and remains a major trade partner and investor for the EU and Europe is a very important market for Japan. The EU strategic partnership with Japan prioritises cooperation in the political and economic spheres. In November 2012 the EU started negotiations for a FTA with Japan. There is a close and intensive political dialogue between the EU and Japan on a range of foreign and security policy issues such as: terrorism, non-proliferation, UN reform, human rights, energy security and climate change. Historically, Japan has played an active role in resolving the Western Balkans’ conflicts. The EU has a major political and economic stake in Asia’s peaceful development and has actively supported international efforts to promote stability on the Korean peninsula.

**South Korea**

The Republic of Korea is the EU’s ninth largest trading partner and the EU is Korea’s second largest export market. The EU-South Korea Strategic Partnership addresses a wide range of international concerns, including: non-proliferation, human rights, cooperation on counter-terrorism, climate change, energy security and development assistance. FTA from 2010 aims at integrating the two economies and removing barriers to trade. Following the establishment of the FTA, in Oct 2010 the two countries agreed to formally upgrade status to ‘strategic partnership’.

**Brazil**

Brazil is the most important trading partner for the EU in Latin America. The EU-Brazil strategic partnership began in 2007. It includes a set of discussions on regional issues in Latin America and on more international peace and security questions such as Iran, Syria, the Middle East Peace Process and African security. There are also discussions on global challenges such as international cyber policy and internet governance, climate change and energy policies and sustainable development.

EU-Brazil cooperation is also governed by the EC-Brazil framework cooperation agreement (1992) and the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation (2004). Under the Development Cooperation Instrument (2007-2013) Brazil has benefitted from €61 million, mainly for the development of bilateral relations including support to sectorial dialogues, scholarship programs and European Studies Institute and support to the improving the environment.

[http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/17237](http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/17237)
Mexico

In 1997, Mexico was the first Latin American country to sign an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and in 2008, Mexico became one of the EU’s strategic partners. As a higher middle-income country Mexico does not receive any bilateral EU development aid, and bilateral relations are moving towards a more equal partnership cooperation to promote shared values and interests.

The strategic partnership has an associated Joint Executive Plan, covering issues such as: UN reform, GFC, non-proliferation, arms control, peace and security, transnational organised crime, corruption, migration, development, aid, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

India

Like China, over the last decade, India has been experiencing enormous economic growth and demographic changes and may be on track to exceed China’s growth with annual expansion of more than 8 per cent in the next year (80). The Indian military is the world’s second largest in terms of personnel.

India is the EU’s tenth largest trading partner. The EU’s strategic partnership with India includes: international cooperation through multilateralism, including promoting peace, combating terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights; enhanced commercial and economic interaction; cooperation on sustainable development, protecting the environment, mitigating climate change and combating poverty; continuous improvement of mutual understanding and contact between the EU’s and India’s civil society. The strategic partnership also focuses on issues to do with innovation, particularly in the energy sector and in fundamental and applied scientific research. Also of note is that Bilateral India-Africa trade is growing substantially. India is keen to build capacity and develop trade projects in African countries. Indian imports crude oil from Nigeria and has increasing energy needs.

India is currently the world’s largest weapon’s importer but in 2015-2016, India is increasing its defence spending by 11% to approximately € 35 billion and aims to reduce its dependency on foreign military technologies (81). India is in a difficult strategic environment, with China and Pakistan on the borders, each armed with nuclear weapons, as is India. Since 2003, India has suffered significant terrorist attacks including in November 2008, when Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamic militant organisation based in Pakistan, carried out coordinated shooting and bombing attacks over a four day period in Mumbai.

India is a mix of a modern society with high economic aspirations and one that is still rooted in the politics of its non-aligned past and so India’s international role is ambivalent. India tends to be very active within South-South frameworks and there is a general sense that the strategic partnership with India has not performed as had been hoped. For example, the negotiations on an EU-India FTA despite their importance have been in progress for several years.

India wants to be a leader in the region and on the global but is beset with internal political strings that prevent it from fulfilling that role. India tends to hold back from assuming global responsibilities particularly those that are strategic rather than tactical. In a new ESS, the EU could find ways to assist India step up to its rightful place in South Asia through a mix of soft power and support.

The EU, for example, could begin a regular exchange between parliamentarians as with the US Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue so as to increase the chance of a ‘bottom-up’ dialogue and understanding. In addition the EU could encourage students – through scholarships and relaxed visa requirements – from all the emerging economies such as India, China and Brazil to study in Europe rather that the US (82).

3 Changes in the institutional and political architecture and environment of the EU

3.1 The post-Lisbon environment of the EU

Since its creation, the European Union has incorporated far-reaching objectives into basic documents — and the changes codified in the Lisbon Treaty did not reduce the extremely ambitious goals in the area of security policy (83). The Treaty takes a values-based approach, and emphasises the promotion of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The collective view of the EU is that peace is best guaranteed in ‘a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail.’

The approach is guided by an enlightened self-interest—if the conditions noted above can be reproduced and multiplied, the EU would expect to be a major beneficiary. Moreover, the Treaty does not back away from ambitious commitments—such as, for example, the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to common defence.

The Lisbon Treaty can be seen as an enabling document, but not a prescriptive one. Its provisions allow for many different kinds of action, but the Treaty does not provide specific guidance on the geographical or functional objectives of the EU, or give any timetable for achieving those broad objectives it does contain. The Treaty points instead for the need to promote convergence over time.

The Treaty is clear that it is for member states to identify strategic EU interests, determine the objectives of the common foreign and security policy and define general guidelines for collective action (84). To that end, the Treaty replaced pre-Lisbon instruments that were recognised to be ineffective (such as Common Strategies (85)) with other methods. However, post-Lisbon, the deficit in strategic guidance has not been filled successfully, which has become very obvious in present circumstances where comprehensive guidance on how the EU should respond to the deteriorating European security environment is lacking. In this respect, the measures in the Treaty have been at best partly successful.

The lack of top-level guidance, a theme that emerges in discussions with officials inside the EU institutions at all levels, does not reflect a lack of documents. There are many documents—perhaps too many—with titles that include the words ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic’, but officials at all levels nevertheless question what the overall EU objective is in respect to a given country, region or functional issue, and how their work relates to achieving that objective.

Is Russia to be confronted, contained or accommodated? Does the EU seek to promote stability or encourage change in the countries on its periphery? A clear collective view on these issues from the highest level in member states would be of great value to the EU in shaping its activities at all levels. However, is unlikely that clear answers could be provided in a public document, and the difficulty of maintaining confidentiality might be an obstacle to creating a restricted, internal document.

In 2014, the Council adopted a strategic guidance document for the next five years that included developing the EU as a strong global actor as one of its main objectives (86). The Council highlighted a number of priorities within that objective, but these are general. Some of them could be said to point in different directions when considered in a particular context: ensuring overall consistency between the foreign policy goals of member states and the EU as a whole; promoting stability, prosperity and democracy in the countries closest to the EU; engaging global partners on a wide range of functional issues (trade, cyber security, human rights and crisis management); and strengthening the EU’s common security and defence policy.

The Lisbon Treaty requires prior notification and consultation if a state takes a national action with significant impact on the EU as a whole. However, current events are testing the limits of solidarity—and the test would become more severe if the security situation of the EU became more critical. States that see key national interests at stake may decide to break ranks.

3.2 The post-Lisbon institutions for foreign, security and defence policies, neighbourhood and enlargement policies

The changes introduced through the Lisbon Treaty are part of a continuum — building on the ‘lessons learned’ from earlier treaty reforms — and are unlikely to be the final word on how the EU will implement its foreign and security policy in the future. In particular, two weaknesses identified by the former HR/VP, Javier Solana, do not seem to have been addressed successfully under the new arrangements.

First, Solana pointed to the lack of a meaningful process for measuring progress and success (or lack thereof). Second, he observed that strategy documents were not effective enough inside the EU institutions — helping EU staff to understand their specific role within a larger whole, and helping them use their programmes and budgets to support agreed objectives in a way that progress could be measured.

For the time being, however, the process of setting up new structures is considered complete, and the priority for the new leadership is to test how they can be used. Implementing agreed actions will need to connect the internal resources that the EU has at its disposal, and also make use of many and varied frameworks for cooperation with external partners.

3.2.1 Changes in senior management structures

The President of the European Council is empowered to ensure the external representation of the EU on issues concerning common foreign and security policy. The new President, Donald Tusk, has signalled his strong personal interest in shaping EU long-term thinking on key issues in external relations — in particular concerning Russia and relations with countries to the east of the EU — both through direct engagement with member states at the level of heads of state and government, and in discussions with the President of the United States of America (87),(88). Working together, the Council President and the HR/VP (the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission) could make the necessary link back to the policies of member states.

The Lisbon Treaty created the post of HR/VP, merging the functions previously held by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Commissioner for External Relations (89). The Treaty gives the HR/VP opportunities (either alone or supported by the Commission) to put forward proposals and initiatives. Another important change introduced by the Treaty — the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) — was intended to make this process more effective (90).

The new President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has underlined his expectation that under his leadership will work more collectively by creating the Group of External Relations Commissioners. With the support of its President, the HR/VP might be able to promote the necessary cooperation on security issues across the Commission.

The Group of External Relations Commissioners, which meets very regularly, is to provide policy orientation on important issues to staff before documents such as Green Papers and Communications are drafted. In this way, the Group should help to define strategic priorities and plan activities, including in relation to security policy.

The work of the newly created Group of External Relations Commissioners should be helpful in addressing the coherence of the EU approach, and indications are that it is beginning to function effectively. The group is to remain engaged continuously with issues on its agenda in order to promote coherence and consistency within given policy areas and between inter-related areas. This means regular consideration of the relationship between cross-cutting functional issues and policies focused on given countries and regions. The meetings are properly prepared, with inputs from the level of Director-General, there is joint reporting on any decisions taken, managed by the Secretary General of the Commission, and each meeting has a procedure to follow up on recorded decisions.

The group is also expected to promote effective implementation by the Commission of the agreed work programme by following initiatives throughout the inter-institutional decision-making process. This will require coordination of the positions taken by the members of the group in different institutional settings and configurations.

The new senior management team has made a strong start in promoting initiatives that can have an impact on coherence and promote collective action. What might the consequences for security policy be?

### 3.3 Priorities for the new senior management

Apart from the purely administrative and human-resource tasks associated with creating a new entity, the main priorities for the External Action Service in its first five years, as explained by HR/VP Ashton, were: to ensure that the service has the necessary capacities (human and financial) to support the policy priorities of the EU; to establish the procedures to bring the almost 140 EU delegations into the work of the EEAS; and to develop the necessary partnerships with national diplomatic services of EU member states (91).

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At a time when the EU is still preoccupied with a financial and economic crisis, the main emphasis is being placed on finding proactive ways to use assets in a more coordinated way to make more effective joint interventions. Better coordination of EU instruments is not a new aspiration, but the new senior management team in the EU has given some indications of how it plans to approach the task, including a more collective approach that engages not only the HR/VP, but also the Presidents of the Council and Commission.

Looking forward, the priorities identified for the next period of development for the EEAS emphasised the need to strengthen the ‘VP’ element of the HR/VP position, through closer engagement in Commission decision-making on external programmes. This closer engagement would require the HR/VP to persuade colleagues in the Commission that it is in their interests to take security factors into account in their various areas of responsibility, and that by doing so they would not be to the detriment of their functional portfolios — be it trade, energy, migration or other issues.

The new arrangements are being tested in a very challenging environment. At the time the Lisbon Treaty was discussed, there was a widespread assumption that the EU was facing a relatively benign security environment. However, the developments described in the previous chapter have changed the background conditions substantially. Many of the states where the EU has an active engagement face challenges that they may not be able to overcome alone. Their governments cannot exercise control over the territory of the state, they cannot deliver the services that citizens expect, and (arising from the previous failures) they find their legitimacy increasingly questioned and are even facing violent conflict at or within their borders.

As very important issues inside the EU (not least the financial crisis) continue to demand greater attention, the willingness and the capacity of the EU to be of practical assistance to the countries facing such fundamental challenges has also been called into question. Moreover, the power of attraction of the EU has been reduced, even if it is still considerable, as growing economies in other parts of the world offer alternative markets, finance and sources of investment. The same developments might reduce the effectiveness of using positive or negative incentives (i.e. conditionality) to achieve results.

The importance of thinking about how to close what may be a widening gap between expectation and delivery has included discussion of rebalancing some approaches used by the EU in light of changing circumstances — for example, a greater emphasis on capacity-building and the use of coercive approaches, such as sanctions and restrictive measures. However, different pathways have also been proposed.

Some analysts have suggested that the EU should scale back its ambitions — monitoring what is happening closely, and analysing it, then adapting to the changes taking place in the world, but giving up any ambition to make fundamental changes in the situation on the ground in other countries and regions. Others have taken a different view — that the level of ambition should remain, but, in the words of Javier Solana, ‘the objective must be to boost European security integration (in its broadest sense), lifting Europe to the forefront of global security’ (92).

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Which of these pathways is to be followed may be further clarified in the outcome of the Strategic Review called for by Federica Mogherini, the current HR/VP, but early indications suggest an approach somewhere between the extremes (\(^93\)).

President Juncker provided the Group of External Relations Commissioners with specific near-term guidance (\(^94\)). In his list of ten priorities, making the EU a stronger global actor was given ninth place (\(^95\)). Moreover, Juncker did not refer to security issues at all when talking about this priority, emphasising instead two sub-priorities for external action: stocktaking and finding a new way forward on European neighbourhood policy, and playing a full part in the elaboration of the post-2015 framework for the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

References to security are found two other priority areas. First, moving towards a new policy on migration, and second, creating an area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust inside the EU.

One sub-theme in the focus on migration included updating the existing EU internal security strategy, and elaborating operational measures to fight terrorism and measures to counter forms of radicalisation that promote extremist violence. A sub-theme related to the area of justice and fundamental rights includes a comprehensive revisiting of the rules governing data protection through dialogue with the United States. In pursuing each of these priorities, the internal and external dimensions will inevitably become interwoven.

To summarise, the public documents produced by the new senior management indicate where the priorities are likely to lie in the coming period.

- Relatively little emphasis is placed on the military dimensions of security.
- The need for a more coordinated approach to external and internal security is emphasised.
- The need to address ongoing crises in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood is emphasised.

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\(^93\) Mogherini, F., ‘Answers to the European Parliament Questionnaire to the Commissioner Designate’, 6 October 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_ep_hearings/mogherini-reply_en.pdf. The HR/VP recently noted that ‘the EU has to be aware of its potential. Sometimes we tend to believe that a Western or European intervention holds the key to solving any crisis. Well, I am afraid that is an illusion. We could also end up thinking that we are powerless, and we should try to lock ourselves into our Fortress Europe. Let me tell you: that would be a very naïve illusion. … Europe needs to be pragmatic and ambitious at once.’ Keynote Speech at Chatham House by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini, 24 February 2015.


\(^95\) The ten priorities in the Political Guidelines were:
   1. A new boost for jobs, growth and investment;
   2. A connected, digital single market;
   3. A resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy;
   4. A deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base;
   5. A deeper and fairer Economic and Monetary Union;
   6. A reasonable and balanced free trade agreement with the United States;
   7. An area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust;
   8. Towards a new policy on migration;
   9. A stronger global actor;
   10. A Union of democratic change.
3.4 Common security and defence policy (CSDP): An assessment of the tools, structures and procedures developed since 2003 and their capacity to respond to the evolving challenges

Since 2003 the EU has mounted more than 30 civilian missions and military operations in the framework of CSDP, of which 16 are ongoing. All of these activities have been in locations that are conflict-affected and, with an average of roughly three missions being launched per year, it can reasonably be said that the EU has become a factor in conflict areas or in states that were recently in conflict but where conditions remain extremely fragile.

At the same time, there is also an often-expressed view that the evolution of CSDP has not matched the expectations created by the Lisbon Treaty. As noted above, the Lisbon Treaty is a framework that enables common action in response to member-state guidance and instruction. The Treaty created both methods of working and defence-related institutions that member states could use at their discretion.

Groups of member states that are willing, and have the necessary capacity, are authorised to implement an agreed task on behalf of the EU (96). Moreover, the establishment of permanent structured cooperation within the EU was created to link the countries with the most highly developed military capabilities (and that would be able to manage and sustain more complicated missions) more tightly. The Treaty also laid out the procedures for developing and using permanent structured cooperation (97).

The Treaty elaborated tasks for the European Defence Agency (EDA) that could have given it a more central role in defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments. The EDA was tasked to identify operational requirements, promote measures to satisfy those requirements, help identify and possibly then implement measures to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, and participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy (98). The Lisbon Treaty also envisaged specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access the common budget in order to finance preparatory actions at short notice (99). The kinds of actions for which a fund drawing on the common budget could finance include civilian and military disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, as well as the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (100).

The Treaty was perhaps expected to underline the view that EU military instruments could also play a positive role in managing conflicts and security challenges. In reality, however, member states have made relatively little use of the new options for cooperation that the Lisbon Treaty enables. Moreover, while the CSDP encompasses civilian and military activities, as noted above, so far there have been 11 military operations and 21 civilian missions.

The scale of the operations and missions the member states have been willing to endorse has been modest. Missions and operations have generally been carried out at a scale and level of complexity that would be within the scope of an individual member state. With one or perhaps two lead nations

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engaged in a mission or operation, the EU framework is useful first and foremost for the political impact that support from 28 states and the EU itself provides.

3.4.1 Achieving the maximum impact from CSDP

In changing conditions, however, more clarity is needed on how CSDP supports actions that have an impact on the security of the EU for three main reasons.

– First, **a growing share of EU spending for external actions is likely to be concentrated in conflict-affected and fragile countries**. The better use of the capacities developed through CSDP to contribute to the effective use of common resources would be a specific added value that could not be provided from anywhere else. Of the roughly €51.5 billion available for external action in the 2014–2020 framework, by far the largest amount will be spent through development assistance and through instruments focused on countries in close proximity to the EU. This spending should include a security analysis at all stages, from programming, to implementation to after-action assessment. A security analysis would increase the probability that EU programmes will succeed in terms of development and in terms of promoting EU security interests. Furthermore, there is a need to consider whether and how to engage the military and civilian resource base that supports CSDP on a wider basis than only the countries where active missions and operations are underway. Finally, while the military and civilian dimensions of CSDP should be brought together with EU activities in every fragile and conflict-affected location, there is also a need to continue paying close attention on the ground to ensure that CSDP military and civilian operations are not isolated from wider EU actions in the countries and regions where they take place. Even if the CSDP actions succeed in their own (very limited) terms, in isolation they will never make a meaningful impact on the security challenges they are intended to address.

– Second, the EU has placed a high emphasis on **implementing decisions taken at the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence**. The two-word statement that ‘defence matters’ from EU leaders has created an expectation that their engagement will lead to clear results that can be measured. The discussion among EU leaders was initiated specifically to promote a tangible EU contribution to international crisis management — including ensuring that the military capabilities and personnel are in place to play a part across the whole spectrum of crisis management action. Since the process of evaluating the EU role in security and defence matters was set in motion (in December 2012) there has been a rapid and dramatic alteration in the external security environment of the EU. In contrast to previous deliberations, at the end of 2013 the EU leaders not only elaborated specific tasks, they also established a process to ensure their continued engagement in evaluating the outcomes. For EU leaders to ignore the changes in the security environment when making their evaluation of security and defence matters would certainly undermine the seriousness of the overall effort.

– Third, the capacity of CSDP to respond to evolving challenges needs to **take account of how EU efforts relate to other military frameworks and initiatives in Europe**. First and foremost, this would mean evaluating how efforts by the EU in the field of security and defence relate to the activities of NATO. Speaking before the European Parliament, the NATO Secretary-General (101) spoke of three areas of cooperation: building resilience together (where

101 Stoltenberg, J., NATO Secretary General, European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Sub-committee on Security and Defence [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118576.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118576.htm)
he made specific reference to cooperation related to the risks of hybrid warfare; building resilience together with neighbours to the east and the south; and defence investment. In the question-and-answer period, the Secretary-General referred to the quality of his personal relations with senior EU leaders (both national and in the institutions) as well as the working level cooperation between staff. However, in current circumstances the need for something more fundamental is needed — namely, to recognise that previous policies have failed to provide adequate security, and that the transatlantic community needs a new basis for cooperation.

3.4.2 Engaging CSDP in fragile and conflict-affected locations

As noted above, the EU has a relatively small number of CSDP missions and operations, but it is active in all of the roughly 60 countries considered fragile or conflict-affected using the OECD definition. In light of the contribution the EU makes as a development assistance provider, the need to incorporate development programmes and initiatives into the strategically coherent use of EU instruments is uncontested. However, it can be argued that much remains to be done to connect the work of the parts of the EU working predominantly on development with those working on security.

Recent CSDP efforts have been largely concentrated in Africa, and it is important to make sure that operations are carried out effectively, not only so that they succeed according to their own terms of reference, but also to gain multiplier effects. For example, the naval operation underway to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, and the training of Somali security forces in EUTM Somalia, in Uganda, all contribute to what has progressively evolved into a more comprehensive approach towards Somalia.

Furthermore, the missions and operations should not be seen in isolation, but as part of coordinated action with the African Union, and as part of the EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen (102). From this perspective, the tendency to orientate CSDP towards a model based on capacity-building and working in partnership with international and regional organisations is the right approach. However, there is still work to do to maximise the results. To take one example, the African Peace Facility has supported regional African Union peace operations, including AMISOM in Somalia. A recent detailed evaluation of the EUTM Somalia highlighted the significant reduction in effectiveness resulting from lack of force protection for the mission activities (103). Another general problem that is illustrated by EUTM Somalia is the difficulty of following up on actions to judge their impact. More than 4,000 personnel have graduated from EUTM training, but there is no way to know what happened to them later. Anecdotal evidence suggests a significant number have later deployed with AMISOM, but in general there is no picture of the tasks being undertaken by EUTM graduates. Force protection to EUTM Somalia could be provided by AMISOM, but it has not been, and AMISOM could also provide information on the background of its soldiers, but does not. The partnership approach means that AMISOM is tasked by the African Union — and that there is no direct line of command from the EU to AMISOM, even if the mission is financed by the EU.

The potential to promote and support joint disarmament operations, as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty, is currently under-exploited (104). More broadly, the role of arms control and confidence and

security-building within security policy is itself neglected. The relative lack of interest in cooperative 
security initiatives in NATO leaves a space in this functional area that is currently not being filled.

Under the new senior management, the degree of engagement with CSDP issues is said to be greater 
than was previously the case. Bringing CSDP and development people closer together is a need 
expressed from both sides, and there should be a strong top-down signal that closer cooperation is 
something that senior management insists on — and something that will be monitored and 
measured.

In the 2003 European Security Strategy the relationship between security and development is treated 
in a cursory way — limited to the observation that ‘security is the first condition for development’ 
(105). At senior levels in the EU institutions there has undoubtedly been a major evolution from a 
situation where staff did not really believe in the existence of a security-development nexus, to a 
situation where staff are interested in how the nexus can be addressed. However, making this way of 
thinking normal procedure at all levels and across all institutions is a task that is not complete.

Although the Europeans and the Canadians initiated the analysis of the security-development nexus 
in the 1990s, with support of financial institutions — first and foremost, the World Bank — in 2012, a 
detailed analysis found that there were still fundamental differences around key issues, including the 
underlying political values, understanding of key words (sovereignty, peace, justice, freedom) and 
allocation of resources (106). The development and security communities tend to propose radically 
different solutions, meaning that different actors from the European Union (each sincerely trying to 
improve conditions on the ground) could even be implementing offensive military actions and 
programmes to enhance education and public health systems side-by-side, but walled off from one 
another.

As part of an overall effort to develop effective peace-building policies, programmes and actions, 
there has been a major effort to improve situational awareness in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, for the most part by developing analytical tools and methodologies that make the most 
effective use of information in the public domain.

The recent Action Plan intended to take forward the comprehensive approach to external conflict and 
crisis underlined that the comprehensive approach is first and foremost ‘a general working method, 
and a way of doing things more effectively together that should influence and permeate all EU 
external action’ (107). Implementing the Action Plan should also help to overcome remaining 
institutional boundaries and differences in professional culture that can reduce the effectiveness of 
activities in the field.

It is not clear that the resources like the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the 
EU Military Staff are currently engaged more broadly into the development of situational awareness, 
planning and programming, or ongoing activities in places where there are current security 
challenges. In cases where there is an identified, imminent need for a crisis response, the engagement 
of the CMPD and military staff would be an immediate reaction. However, the perspectives should 
also be incorporated into the work of the conflict prevention group as a matter of routine.

106 Spear, J. and Williams, P., Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison, (Georgetown University Press: 
Washington D. C. 2012) 
107 Council of the European Union, ‘Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises: Action 
http://www.parlament.qv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/06/21/EU_62111/imfname_10543107.pdf
In the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (the Gothenburg Programme) that was endorsed in 2001, the EU promised to improve its early warning, action and policy coherence (108). Subsequent initiatives have progressively developed the capacities needed for monitoring (including the development of key indicators), methodologies for conflict analysis and mechanisms for early warning. An initial focal point for early warning was the integrated assessment (updated every six months) put together by the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) drawing on information from a variety of military and non-military sources from across the EU.

After the creation of the European External Action Service, and in response to the 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, the EEAS focused on developing the EU Conflict Early Warning System (EWS) as a means to promote an EU-wide understanding of conflict risk, and to help the senior management develop their thinking on how identified risks could be addressed (109). To support the process, an Early Warning and Conflict Analysis Team has been established within the Conflict prevention, Peace building and Mediation Instruments Division of the EEAS (110).

The Commission has developed its own system for collecting information to provide early warning. The Crisis Room is one focal point for inputs from EU delegations, Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers (RCRPOs) and open source information. The incoming information is part of the raw material used to compile a list of countries at greatest risk using a checklist of root causes of conflict and early warning indicators. However, fragility will in future be a factor taken into account in the programming process for all programme countries, and DG DEVCO is leading a process to promote dialogue and engagement with other development assistance providers — including national authorities in donor countries and multilateral donors, and field offices.

The development of better tools and enhanced knowledge is therefore taking place within two constituencies: those responsible for providing development assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states, and those responsible for crafting political responses to conflict and crisis. In each case the effort is part of the attempt to move away from a reactive approach focused on the most immediate crises and towards an approach based more on prevention.

In addition to sharing knowledge and creating a platform to discuss methodologies for e.g. conflict analysis and long-range forecasting, the need for a common approach to capacity building for EU staff is a key issue. A single staff training strategy for staff in delegations and at headquarters could not only help develop human resources for analysis and planning, it could also expand the pool of deployable staff available for missions and to staff delegations.

One recognised difficulty is making military advice available to EU delegations, including developing a habit of routine engagement to contribute to country assessments as well as providing specific advice and information to a delegation at the moment it is needed. The development of an integrated staff training strategy could also help overcome this problem.

The need to establish closer links was noted in the preparatory documents for the December 2013 European Council on defence matters, which referred to the need for CSDP to ‘part of a strategically

coherent use of EU instruments’ (111). When CSDP operations are put in the wider context described by the joint communication of December 2013 on the Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises, and the subsequent Council Conclusions of 2014, the need is further underlined (112).

The place of the military dimension within the Comprehensive Approach was not elaborated in any detail in the December 2013 Communication, but the recent Action Plan underlines how important it will be to bring CSDP and development people together. The near-term emphasis in the Action Plan is on three things that will require cooperation.

- Capacity-building through programmes that not only train, but also equip partners.
- A procedure for transition based on earlier and more coordinated planning between EEAS and Commission services (as well as with member states) to enable the smooth transition from one form of EU engagement to another.
- Rapid reaction, meaning the ability to create and deploy joint field missions, including participation by staff from EEAS, Commission, member states and EU delegations at short notice.

3.4.3 Implementing the decisions of the European Council

The thematic debate at the European Council in December 2013, the first since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, underlined the need for the EU to update its approach to defence matters, taking account of technology developments, the changing strategic environment of the EU and developments in the military state of the art. The results included new strategy documents on cyber defence, maritime security and long-term defence cooperation among member states. In parallel, the Commission has given increased consideration to the industrial dimension of European defence policy. The December 2013 meeting was not seen as a one-off debate, but promised to return to the issue in 2015 to review progress and possibly consider next steps.

In a number of respects the language of the December 2013 Council Conclusions can be seen as more pragmatic and less ambitious than that used in, for example, the 2008 Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities — which talked of a joint, sustained and shared effort to raise a sustainable force of 60,000 troops in 60 days able to undertake the wide spectrum of operations described in Headline Goal documents. The same level of ambition was included in the December 2010 statements on civilian and military capability development.

The December 2013 language is more restrained and does not discuss numerical targets. There seems to be no appetite to revisit the Headline Goals or to discuss the resource base that would be needed to achieve them — though they have not been cancelled. Instead of a single overarching goal, framework documents and planning documents are linked through a focus on a small number of specific short- and medium-term goals, and include a follow-up process based on high-level peer review of implementation.

The preparatory documents for the European Council referred to the need for capability to act ‘in partnership where possible but autonomously where necessary...including through direct intervention’. However, the Council Conclusions underlined that CSDP actions should take place in

full complementarity with NATO and ‘in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO’.

In spite of the extensive preparations by the EEAS, EDA and Commission, the outcome of the Council discussion was limited in scope, and focused on a relatively small number of specific deliverables intended to close agreed capability gaps that need to be filled. The focus is on four specific but limited projects — a medium altitude, long endurance remotely piloted vehicle, an air-to-air refuelling capacity, preparations for a next generation military communication satellite, and improving the cyber security of EU missions and operations.

3.4.4 Harmonising EU efforts with other frameworks and initiatives in Europe

The EU cannot be indifferent to the wider strategic environment in Europe, and in Council Conclusions and ministerial statements, the need for coherence and closer cooperation with NATO are regularly given a prominent place.

Thinking on defence matters in many member states is currently being shaped by the priority that NATO is placing on strengthening territorial defence and revitalising deterrence. Looking at recent tendencies in military spending, the countries that feel the greatest need for reassurance are the ones increasing their investment in defence in the short term. The data on military expenditure published by SIPRI indicates a clear correlation between proximity to Russia and decisions to increase military expenditure, and most Central European and Nordic countries have announced plans to increase spending (113). The investments made by these countries in the present conditions might emphasise the kinds of forces that are difficult to use in crisis management operations. Military formations based on ‘legacy’ systems — armoured vehicles and heavy artillery — and configured for territorial defence would be less easy to use in expeditionary or crisis management operations outside Europe.

The demand for crisis management and peace operations is not diminishing, however. The data presented by SIPRI indicates that the number of peace operations has increased each year since 2011, and in 2014 seven new peace operations were initiated: four in Africa (including the European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic (CAR) (EUFOR RCA)) and three in Ukraine (including the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)).

The complementarity of different strategic actions inside Europe is an important issue in a number of key areas. The HR/VP report prepared in advance of the December 2013 European Council on Defence and Security included proposals to make the EU an autonomous actor in its neighbourhood, and to be able to project power and back effective multilateralism with military capabilities (114).

A minimum requirement for strategic autonomy would be the capability to take responsibility for security in the Balkans — where significant residual unresolved security problems remain. The Council has emphasised the role of CSDP as part of the consistent application of a combined set of policies and tools ‘ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice’ within the framework of the EU comprehensive approach, in locations where the EU has decided to apply its crisis management efforts. Albania, Croatia and Slovenia are members of NATO, and so a presence in the Balkans is guaranteed in perpetuity. However, whether the time has arrived to draw down the approximately 4,500 Allied troops operating as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR)


and the residual presence that the Alliance maintains in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is an important question for both it and NATO.

Six EU member states have put themselves forward to lead, in rotation, the newly created NATO ‘spearhead force’, a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deployable in days to where it might be needed around the NATO perimeter. Spain has volunteered to be the first task force lead nation, and France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK will play similar role in the future. These countries are responsible for ensuring the forces, but also the necessary command and control and logistical assets are in place to allow rapid deployment. At their Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders also endorsed the Framework Nations Concept, in which clusters of countries promote the development of capabilities, with one country leading each cluster (115). The task force leaders are, in all cases, also framework nation cluster leaders. In this way, over time, habits of cooperation will probably form and crystallise within groups of states in different parts of Europe.

The EU has developed its own concepts of rapidly deployable forces of different kinds that could contribute directly to more complex crisis management operations of different kinds. Examples include Civilian Response Teams, Integrated/Formed Police Units and Battlegroups. However, using these types of capacity requires sustained investment in the necessary forces and the capability to move them rapidly to wherever they are needed — inside or outside Europe. No European Union member state will maintain parallel or redundant capacities for collective defence and crisis management operations, and the need to be able to respond to collective defence operations might increase the reluctance to commit high readiness joint task forces elsewhere.

In the December 2013 Council Conclusions, however, the emphasis is not placed on what strategic autonomy might mean for the EU, but rather on the more pragmatic question of how to make existing operations more effective, and how to support ‘partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves’ (116).

3.4.5 The role of the EU in strengthening CSDP capabilities

Recent speeches have drawn attention to the reduction in military spending by many European states, including member states of the EU, in recent years (117). The December 2013 Council Conclusions note that defence spending will in many countries remain constrained in the near future (118). The question of whether necessary capabilities are available now, and will be available in the future, remains highly relevant. This is not a new question. The original Helsinki Headline Goals of December 1999 are now no longer used as a point of reference, though they have never been formally cancelled. The 2010 Headline Goal document in effect superseded the 1999 document, and was considerably less ambitious. The objective of a force catalogue of 60,000 personnel, 100 ships and 400 aircraft deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year was replaced with the ambition of a combined arms battalion sized force package (1,500–2,200 personnel) with combat

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support and combat service support that could be deployed rapidly and sustained for 30 days. The later Battlegroup Concept was made operational in 2007, but has never been deployed.

The sustainability of EU defence efforts depends on the availability of modern and competitive equipment. To address some specific current shortfalls, the Council pledged ‘concrete projects by member states’ supported by the EDA and the Commission when appropriate in — Remotely Piloted Air Systems, air-to-air refuelling, preparations for a new generation of satellite communication, and ‘a roadmap and concrete projects focused on training and exercises’ in the framework of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy (119). The European Council will assess concrete progress on these issues in June 2015.

In addition to ensuring that the EU is equipped with the capabilities to close the identified shortfalls, there is also a need to make sure that the EU will have access to the key equipment that will be needed in future. EDA data suggest that, apart from the decline in defence spending, there has been a particular contraction in spending on defence research, development and the underpinning technologies (120). To that end, the Council Conclusions noted the need for ‘a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive’ European Union defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to develop and sustain defence capabilities.

In the 1990s, it was widely expected that the EU industrial base for defence and defence-related production would both consolidate and internationalise, in each case with a significant tendency towards European integration. However, the production base remains fragmented, first and foremost along national lines — reflecting the fact that defence markets are national. The competition between European manufacturers in external markets is a further inhibition to consolidation.

At present there is a very limited understanding of the overall state of play within the EDTIB. Neither the Commission nor the EDA collects data on the EDTIB (which lacks an agreed definition) on a systematic basis. The gaps in knowledge may be partly closed by the initiative by Elzbieta Bienkowska, Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, to create a high level group to advise on how the EU can support research related to the CSDP (121). The appointment of Michel Barnier as a Special Adviser on European Defence and Security Policy to President Juncker is another indication that issues related to the EDTIB will be a prominent element in the contribution of the Commission to the European Council’s work on defence policy (122).

The 2013 Commission communication Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector made practical recommendations to address some shortcomings of the current EDTIB within the scope of its competence (123). The focus was on measures such as improving the functioning of the EU internal market for defence-related products, such as key components and sub-systems, as well as the facilitation of participation by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in major defence projects, harmonisation of regulations and rules under the ‘Defence Package’ and technical

123 ‘A New Deal for European Defence: Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2013) 542 final, Brussels, July 2013
standardisation in certain engineering products. The communication also drew attention to the use of common research budgets to promote projects in the security sector.

For Commission initiatives to have a significant impact, however, there would be a need for the European Council to create the right conditions.

The security-related research projects sponsored by the Commission using common funds are, on inspection, overwhelmingly in the area of internal security. While certainly security-related, few have military applications, and while it may be the case that some underlying enabling technologies are dual-use, at the point of product development most items that will be used by the armed forces become military-specific. A decision that community financing could be applied to develop next-generation military-specific products would certainly break new ground, and empower the Commission to play a more active role.

The use of approaches that the Commission is very experienced in developing, such as improving the functioning of markets, can make a certain impact, but at the high level conference on the defence industry in March 2014, exchanges among participants revealed that there is still a long way to go before the instruments that have already been created could be used to their full extent (124).

In the final analysis, strengthening the EDTIB principally depends on the willingness of member states to embark on new major equipment programmes. Otherwise, it will be increasingly difficult for the senior management of what are often diversified civil/military companies to justify investments in their military units.

To summarise, in reality, there is a great deal that is lacking before the EDTIB could reasonably be described as integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive. As noted above, an adequate understanding of the current status of the EDTIB is a first step, and the European Defence Agency has been tasked with producing an authoritative, updated analysis.

A better understanding of current developments at European level is a precondition for addressing potential shortfalls in human resources — for example, if a shortfall in critical skills is detected, if international cooperation creates dependencies on non-European suppliers, or if there is a problem with renewing the skills base as key workers approach retirement.

Another important issue is enhancing the common understanding of the scope of the future EDTIB. The Council Conclusions focus attention on the need to retain expertise in ‘critical defence technologies’. However, identifying the critical technologies of the future requires consideration of the potential application of technologies that are not developed for military purposes. The encouragement for the Commission evaluation of how community-funded research could benefit defence and security industrial capabilities is a step towards ensuring the long-term viability of the EDTIB. The invitation to the Commission, EDA and member states to develop proposals to stimulate further research, and the reference to a Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research, provide another potential avenue.

Taken together, new momentum has been added to policies and programmes in the area of security and defence policy in the past two years. Given the complexity of the current security environment in and around Europe, the process is certain to continue at the strategic level in Brussels (including

124 For example, at the Conference, Michel Barnier stated that with the Defence Package in place, the Commission would be able to eliminate practices such as defence-related offsets that distort competition. However, other participants (such as Philip Dunne, the UK Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, underlined that offsets are currently necessary, and that a zealous approach to using the Defence Package would risk a legal challenge. ‘Setting the Agenda for the European Defence Industry’, High level conference on the European defence sector, Brussels, 4 March 2014
through the strategic review), in the countries where there are ongoing operations and missions, and in fragile or conflict-affected countries where the EU already has significant engagement and commitments.

3.5 Transversal strategic challenges and issues

Given its emphasis on international connectivity of different kinds, problems that cannot be defined by geography or classified as clearly military or non-military threats generally have a powerful impact on the EU. The 2003 strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of the first functional strategies of the EU, and non-proliferation is an example of an issue that is not easy to contain in a discrete category (125).

The exploitation of processes of internationalisation by malicious actors has increased the risks posed by transversal challenges. Moreover, the growing importance of digital products and services, and the rapid expansion in digital communications and digital broadcasting has increased the level of certain risks. Blocking pathways along which goods, people, finance, communications and ideas move might reduce some risks, but would not be beneficial to the EU — which has promoted an approach based on openness, international engagement and a strong preference for multilateral cooperation.

A world that is increasingly fragmented, less open to cooperation, with less respect for agreed rules would inevitably damage the development of the European Union. At the same time, the ways and means to prevent the malicious use of processes of internationalisation are not yet fully understood or developed. There is an important role for the EU in helping to think through, analyse and recommend workable solutions to many such security problems.

The European Union played a leading role in developing the concept of integrated border management, initially for application in the Western Balkans but later for more widespread use in external cooperation (126). The effective management of borders has become an enormously complex task that is no longer limited to activities at the border, but includes a multitude of activities inside the EU, and also far away from its external boundary. This is increasingly reflected in a growing number of separate and dedicated strategies focused on functional issues.

3.5.1 Recent strategies to address cross-cutting functional threats

The EU has increasingly been confronted by threats that fall outside the traditional politico-military definitions of security, based on protecting borders from external attack using military means. The perpetrators of non-military attacks might be national governments or non-state actors (the latter having either political or criminal motives). The attacks might target the national security apparatus of the EU and its member states, but it is perhaps more likely that they will exploit real or perceived civilian vulnerabilities, which might be in either the public or the private sector. Since they are transnational and multifaceted by nature, challenges of this kind by definition erode the boundaries between internal and external security, and between military and non-military response.

The EU adopted a counter-terrorism strategy in 2005 (127). The activities that the EU undertakes to implement the strategy are developed and carried out under a wide spectrum of other functional strategies, discussed further below. While there is an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) under

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125 ‘EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Council document 15708/03, 10 December 2003
126 ‘Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Cooperation’, EuropeAid and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, November 2009
the Council, his tasks do not fully integrate the overall EU effort. The EU CTC coordinates the work of the Council, while maintaining an overview of other EU instruments and reporting to the Council on how they are being used. In his 2014 review of the implementation of the strategy, and its associated Action Plan, the EU CTC underlined the need to enhance the effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy by ensuring that all relevant actors work closely together, integrating the internal and external aspects of the fight against terrorism (128).

The need to make better use of the European Police Office, Europol, is a consistent element in reports on the implementation of the counter-terrorism strategy. The recommendation to establish a European Counter-terrorism Centre at Europol to act as a focal point for the collection and distribution of relevant information provided by member states, and to develop analytical capacities at EU level, is the latest example of an effort to overcome what is seen as an under-utilisation of Europol (129).

Given the characteristics noted above, functional security threats are very challenging problems to combat. The need to combine internal and external strategies is one of the clearest requirements of effective response, but also one that continues to present problems for inter-institutional cooperation. The EU has an overarching internal security strategy, Towards a European Security Model, which was adopted in 2010, and reviewed in 2014, with a view to updating the document in the course of 2015 (130).

The internal security strategy identified five areas where the EU could add value to efforts at the national level: fighting and preventing serious and organised crime; terrorism; cybercrime; strengthening the management of the external borders; and building resilience to natural and man-made disasters. However, in preparing the updated and revised version of the internal security strategy (under the responsibility of DG Migration and Home Affairs within the Commission) there has been little coordination or consultation with parts of the EU institutions responsible for external dimensions of the relevant functional issues (131).

The EU has recently adopted dedicated strategies, or updated existing documents, related to many cross-cutting functional threats, including critical infrastructure protection, cyber security, action to combat extremist violence, and action to strengthen maritime security. The process of elaborating an approach to strategic communications has been initiated.

As part of the response to the mass impact terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the EU began to assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to a variety of different kinds of attack, including attacks with cyber weapons, which led to the development of a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (132). The implementation of plans to strengthen critical infrastructure included both legislation, in the form of a 2008 Directive, and guidance

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128 ‘Report on the implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, Council document 15799/1, Brussels, 24 November 2014
129 ‘EU CTC input for the preparation of the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 January 2015’, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Council document DS 1035/15, Brussels, 17 January 2015
131 Authors interviews, April 2015
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documents, including non-binding guidelines developed by the Joint Research Centre within the Commission for the implementation of the 2008 Directive (133).

In 2012, a Commission report on the implementation of the critical infrastructure protection programme included an Action Plan, a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN), European expert groups, and a process for sharing information. The report also included an external dimension (134). Cooperation with third countries was considered a necessary step, both in order to exchange good practices, and to identify critical infrastructures in third countries that could, if damaged or destroyed, potentially affect the EU (and vice versa). In this regard, the EU documents recommend closer collaboration with Norway, Switzerland and other members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) as a priority. To that end, the Commission recommended using the provisions of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is an external cooperation instrument, to promote discussion of critical infrastructure protection in energy operations and distribution infrastructure, and electronic information and communication networks (cyber security). Among the deliverables from such discussion, the Commission points to the option of engaging the United States and Canada, as well as the EFTA partners, in the development of a global infrastructure security toolkit containing best practices, methodologies, analysis, lessons learned, and other useful materials (135).

The EU approach to cyber security has tried to maintain a differentiation between civilian and military dimensions of an issue that is extremely inter-connected. The risk arising from this effort has been the creation of what has been called a ‘cyber hodgepodge’ of measures with overlaps and contradictions of one or another kind (136). While the EU has a cyber security strategy, the document consciously avoids any focus on cyber weapons, and instead concentrates on the question of how to ensure that the internet remains open and free for legitimate peaceful use, while therefore increasing the effectiveness of protection for citizens and industry against malicious activities and misuse (137). Examples of malicious activities and misuse include cybercrime, but also the risk that non-EU governments would make illegitimate use the internet or information and communications technologies for purposes of surveillance and control. As one element of the approach on which the cybersecurity strategy is based, EU legislation (in the form of a Directive) has set minimum agreed rules on how to define criminal offences and the associated sanctions (138).

The Council has elaborated the cyber defence aspects of cyber security in a separate document from the cyber security strategy. The EU cyber defence policy framework is intended to develop cyber defence capabilities, ‘made available by member states for the purposes of the CSDP as well as the protection of the European External Action Service (EEAS) communication and information networks


137 ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, JOIN (2013) 1 final, Brussels, 7 February 2013

Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

relevant to CSDP’ (139). This is one area where the EU underlines the need for practical cooperation with NATO in particular. As part of the framework, the EEAS and EDA, together with the member states, will develop further cyber defence cooperation between the EU and NATO, ‘with due respect to the institutional framework and the EU’s decision-making autonomy’ (140).

The EU adopted a strategy and an action plan to prevent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, and an action plan in 2005, and updated those documents in 2008. The main aims were to disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals that recruit people into terrorism, to ensure that radical narratives are countered with more mainstream alternatives, and to promote a balanced approach to the internal security of the EU (141). However, events have demonstrated the urgent need to pay continued attention to the issue. While the Commission has emphasised that core actions aimed at preventing and countering radicalisation and terrorist recruitment are, and should remain, at national and local levels, President Juncker has given high priority to strengthening operational measures to fight terrorism. Measures to counter forms of radicalisation that promote extremist violence are expected to be important elements of an updated EU internal security strategy.

In January 2014 a Communication from the Commission laid out ten areas where an EU response could be strengthened. (142) While nine of these were internal, the tenth was to work more closely with partner countries to prevent and counter radicalisation inside and outside the EU. The proposals under this issue area included building on existing capacity-building programmes with partner countries. However, the suggested actions also included working more closely with non-state actors on the ground, including educators, the media and grass roots organisations. The Communication emphasised the need to work with EU delegations and the representatives of member states in partner countries and regions.

Within the Council, the coordination of counter-terrorism is dealt with predominantly by contributing to the creation of a safe and secure area inside the EU. However, counter-terrorism is an issue where the external aspects of internal EU policies have a growing foreign and security policy dimension. The EU documents recognise the external dimension, including the risk that poorly governed areas can be a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment.

In the discussion of counter-terrorism at the December 2014 Justice and Home Affairs Council, the need to align internal and external counter-radicalisation work was noted. Thus, the moment may have arrived when counter-terrorism efforts of member states have to be more closely aligned with the work of EU delegations, in particular in post-conflict or fragile states, and also used to contribute in a more integrated way to the planning and programming in Brussels for work related to, for example, projects to reduce radicalisation and the risk of extremist violence.

The recent Joint Communication on elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/ISIS/Daesh threat is an example of how linking cross-cutting issue strategies with

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141 ‘The European Union Strategy for combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism’, Council document 14781/01/05 REV 1, 24 November 2005
142 ‘Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response’, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2013) 941 final, Brussels, 15 January 2014
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internally and externally, and to protect EU citizens (\textsuperscript{150}). However, it is too soon to say what the elements of this strategic communication plan will be, or how they will be made operational.

### 3.5.2 Mechanisms to implement cross-cutting functional programmes

In advance of the financial perspective 2007–2013, new financial instruments were introduced to replace two that were defined by geography — in particular, they could only be used to finance projects in Central Europe and the post-Soviet space — with instruments that could support projects anywhere in the world. The Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Phare) and the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme were discontinued, and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and what has become the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) were created.

In addition, as noted above, much more systematic thought was given to the question of how the large amount of money available for external action could enhance the security of the EU in different ways — including addressing the root causes of security threats, influencing the thinking of decision-makers in third countries through a combination of incentives and conditionality, and applying resources to specific projects to address particular problems.

Of the roughly €1.5 billion available for external action in the 2014–2020 framework, the (still relatively new) thematic instruments — such as the IcSP and the INSC — will account for a small share. The lion’s share of spending will be channelled through development assistance and projects focused on the neighbours of the EU. In the current multi-annual financial framework €2.3 billion is set aside to finance projects under the IcSP, and €225 million is set aside for projects financed under the INSC. By contrast, € 19.7 billion is set aside for the Development Cooperation Instrument, €11.7 billion is set aside for the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance, and €15.4 billion is earmarked for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (\textsuperscript{151}).

As part of the follow-up to the 2011 Communication on the Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries, the Commission has described how key challenges such as the promotion of human rights and democratic values, the fight against corruption and fraud, and state building in fragile states will now be included more systematically in country programming (\textsuperscript{152}). The future approach is also intended to promote risk analysis and risk management — meaning that budget support can be more flexible and responsive to deteriorations in a partner country’s situation. The Commission is expected to take into account the overall political and security situation, including dynamics of change, on the basis of a joint analysis by the EU and Member States wherever possible. Moreover, this assessment should serve as the basis for coordination with the main development partners. However, the challenge of tailoring existing financial instruments to help address the growing number of cross-cutting functional issues remains.

The governance of budget support has been reinforced by creating a Budget Support Steering Committee (BSSC) composed of senior management from the Commission (both DEVCO and Economic and Financial Affairs) as well as the EEAS. The BSSC is intended to provide continuous

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\textsuperscript{150} Latvian Presidency of the EU Council, ‘EU Defence Ministers in Riga call for unity in addressing European security threats’, 25 February 2015


political inputs at the level of senior management and Commissioner, and to pay close attention to policy coherence across countries and regions.

The process of steering budget support will have to ensure that thematic priorities are reflected in budgets that remain targeted on countries and regions, and whether the existing methods of ensuring coherence across countries and regions is sufficient remains to be seen. Moreover, this will have to be done in conditions where it is no longer self-evident that partners share the EU perspective on current needs and priorities. One area that needs more analysis and assessment is how the EU can make more effective interventions in multilateral processes and make better use of its weight in international organisations.

Aside from planning and programming budget support, as noted above, in future a growing share of projects will be implemented in countries that are fragile or conflict-affected. Those implementing projects will need to be equipped to function effectively in places where security is hard to ensure (for the staff, the projects and the beneficiaries).

There is recent experience, from e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq and in Africa, where development efforts have to be delivered in a location where the military forces of member states (either through CSDP or acting in another framework) are engaged in a peace operation or combat mission. Such cases may be repeated, but it might also be the case that development efforts are implemented under the protection of local or regional security forces. To the extent possible, helping to develop the capacity of partners (including regional and international organisations as well as states) to provide protection should incorporate and build on common rules and procedures.

As noted above, the December 2013 Council Conclusions on CSDP emphasised that providing training, advice, equipment and resources to partners could help them to prevent or manage crises by themselves. A more coherent approach to this task would have to involve joint effort with EU member states — where the people that would have to deliver the training and advice are to be found.

To better enable the training and equipping of partners to become a core capability in conflict prevention and sustainable development, however, joint programming that includes a EU contribution would be logical — and proposals for that are now in preparation.

The focus of the proposals in preparation should strengthen close cooperation with the United Nations and regional bodies — given the increasing emphasis on enabling local partners by building their capacities. Bringing together the different parts of the EU that need to contribute will be a practical test of the Comprehensive Approach, and is likely to be piloted in Mali and Somalia.

The process will have to engage the military staff and crisis management specialists to help guide thinking about operational aspects, the various actors in the Commission and EEAS needed for long-term programming, and the legal services that will have to rule on whether what is proposed is consistent with current interpretations of relevant EU legislation. The discussion will have to take into account perspectives from the partners outside the EU — first and foremost in Africa — using diplomatic engagement and EU delegations.

Challenges that will need to be overcome include whether and how to use common funding to purchase equipment for partners, and how to make activities sustainable — given the difficulties partners may face if asked to pay for necessary missions that European Union countries do not want to undertake using their own armed forces. At present, there are restrictive rules that block the
flexible use of EU financial instruments in CSDP operations, but the outer limits of what can currently be done are being explored (\textsuperscript{153}). The relationship between financing of EU-sponsored missions and the military budgets of both EU member states and partner countries will need to be examined to see where pockets of finance that could be applied might be found. Ideas that are under consideration include the establishment of EU Trust Funds outside the normal financial regulations, the option of combining resources with member states in joint financing, the use of project cells within missions and operations to facilitate participation by member states, and the synergies with other financial instruments being applied in the same location. Apart from the need to apply existing legal and financial regulations, if the point is reached where the activity requires the transfer of military equipment, this will have to be consistent with the existing rules on export control and technology transfer.

3.5.3 Non-proliferation as a case study of the EU contribution in a cross-cutting security issue

As noted above, the EU adopted its strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in December 2003, and in this area there is now a significant body of information that can help understand how the EU approaches a functional problem area.

In January and February of 2004, the public disclosure of the AQ Khan network and the speech by President George W. Bush on the dangers posed by international trafficking of proliferation-sensitive items came only months after the EU produced its first strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted its Resolution 1540, aimed at blocking proliferation pathways and preventing non-state actors from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear capabilities of any kind that could be used in acts of mass impact terrorism.

The challenge posed by the Khan network was not a ‘normal’ proliferation crisis. It was linked to the behaviour of a state (Pakistan) that denied any prior knowledge or direct involvement in the activities but at the same time it was transnational and trans-regional, combining a mix of public and private actors who had both criminal and political motivations.

The EU made important contributions to promoting the wider acceptance of Resolution 1540 — which was controversial at the time of its adoption — and to assist in its implementation has become a very important element of the overall WMD non-proliferation. While it is a product of the UN, the resolution is certainly not a traditional multilateral instrument, and it appeared at a time when the EU was trying to make the idea of ‘effective multilateralism’ more specific and operational. Implementing Resolution 1540 provided a framework for programmes and projects that the EU was well equipped to participate in directly using capacity building and technical assistance instruments.

Within a relatively short period, the EU became actively engaged in applying its own resources (in partnership with member states) to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity rules, and to promote and strengthen nuclear security. The EU has been particularly active in providing states with technical assistance to strengthen national export control systems for dual-use items. The EU has actively helped to develop ‘smart sanctions’ that target programmes of proliferation concern, and also examined how to reduce the risk that banks and financial institutions will unwittingly support proliferation-related commercial transactions.

A framework was created, in the form of regional, networked ‘CBRN Centres of Excellence’, supported financially by (at that time) the newly created Instrument for Stability. The Centres have helped a large number of states make thorough national needs assessments in CBRN risk reduction, and helped them develop national strategies to address identified risks. In time, the regional Centres will begin to deliver additional results in the form of technical assistance in specific areas.

The EU has also been directly engaged in other proliferation crises. It has become the convenor and facilitator for the international effort to address problematic aspects of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle. However, the EU has also contributed directly elsewhere — for example, the Commission has financed the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to verify Syrian chemical weapons elimination.

In this field, the European Union has emerged as a strong supporter and facilitator of a number of processes alongside key partners (first and foremost the United States). The EU can legitimately claim a track record of innovation in this functional area by helping to promote and ensure the secure flow of goods and technologies that are needed for legitimate commercial reasons while reducing proliferation risk. The approach is now being actively examined in other functional areas.
4 Policy options for a new European strategy document

The process towards a new strategy document has now been officially launched with the tasking of the HR/VP to work on a first report by the June 2015 European Council. The HR/VP will submit a ‘strategic review’ by the end of June 2015 and expects a mandate to draft a new strategy document by the end of the year; the timeframe remains open however and could extend into 2016.

The HR/VP has made clear that her ambition is to present a broad ‘external strategy’ or ‘foreign policy’ document, with a larger scope than the original 2003 ‘European Security Strategy’, moving away from the pattern of the 2003 document. The detailed approach however still needs to be approved by a European Council mandate, currently being negotiated.

There is a debate on the benefits of both approaches. From the HR/VP perspective, this is an opportunity to develop a more comprehensive and coherent external strategy, not limited to CSDP or CFSP, which would cover all the instruments of EU external action as a coherent whole. Others, including a number of member states and experts, have argued in the past in favour of a narrow approach that would focus on the security pillar of EU’s external role. Assuming that the European Council approves the general approach put forward by the HR/VP, the broader approach is likely to prevail. The EU will thus embark on a new and more ambitious process leading to an entirely new document both in scope and substance.

This concluding section intends to review options both on substance and methodology and to offer some policy recommendations.

4.1 Building consensus on a new document: Methodology and process

4.1.1 Time frame

The first point to make is that envisaged time frame seems tight for a successful process. Although urgent in many respects, rushing the process towards a new ESS or other strategy document may be cost-ineffective and may not result in the hoped-for broad engagement with the EU member states and citizens. By comparison, NATO’s review of the Strategic Concept in 2009-10 extended over 17 months (July 2009-November 2010), which allowed combining different phases.

- The work of a 12 wise person group (the ‘Group of experts’ chaired by Madeleine Albright) from summer 2009 till spring 2010 delivering an independent assessment and report to the Secretary General of NATO.
- A simultaneous open process allowing to build consensus and gather views through a series of engagements (in Luxemburg, Ljubljana, Oslo, Moscow, Brussels and Washington) which offered opportunities to engage all allies and non-governmental experts (think tanks, private sector, NGO), but also different partners of NATO such as the EU and Russia.
- The drafting of a first version of the Strategic Concept by the Secretary General of NATO during the summer of 2010.
- A more formal inter-governmental process that led to the adoption of the Strategic concept at the Lisbon summit in November 2010.

Other strategic review processes such as the French Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale also extended over a duration of more than six months up to a year. The latest Livre blanc process was launched in July 2012 for a release in April 2013.
Time plays an important part in the consensus-building process, allowing stakeholders to be consulted and to later more easily endorse the final outcome document. It is all the more important in a process involving 28 member states and multiple institutions, as in the EU (or NATO) case. Time also offers more opportunities to engage partners outside decision-making circles such as civil society or external partners. This time factor played a positive role in the process leading to the 2003 ESS. It proved too constrained for a successful 2008 review that simply could not meet its initial level of ambition over the short period of time allocated.

It should also be noted that a number of member states, including some of the largest, have launched or will launch strategic review processes that will be take place or be completed during 2015-16. For example, Germany’s Weissbuch and the United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence and Security Review are likely to be concurrent with the EU process and each has the potential to influence the others. This is a complicating factor as – at the very least – some echo should be expected from these various documents. The publication of other strategic documents in the same timeframe as an EU production would invite comparison.

4.1.2 Methodology: Internal versus open process

There are multiple ways to prepare and deliver a strategic review or a strategy document. Some processes are purely internally driven from within institutions, such as the US National Security Strategy (NSS) or Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR). The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) follows the same pattern.

Other processes, such as for the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the 2003 ESS or the French White Paper, have given an important role to a ‘wise person group’ or allowed significant interaction with the academic, civil society and think tank community. The US Global Trends report issued by the National Intelligence Council follows this pattern. In most cases however, the ultimate drafting responsibility comes back to a more formal process giving a major role to the official institutions.

The benefit of a more open process bringing in outside expertise is to facilitate ‘out of the box’ thinking and allowing the emergence of non-conventional approaches that do not have to start from ‘agreed language’ or ‘sacred texts’. This open approach can also serve as bridging tool if states are too far apart by offering them a common ground provided by a wise person or experts group not bound by national positions. The Albright group for instance found the right policy mix combining ‘reassurance’ and ‘reengagement’ with regard to Russia even though NATO was already divided after the 2008 Georgia crisis; it allowed all NATO allies to feel reasonably comfortable with the new policy framework.

In the EU case, the objective is to find the proper balance between a dynamic process and inclusiveness vis-à-vis all 28 member states and all EU institutions. The challenge is to benefit from a small-group approach bringing together the HR/VP insiders (from the institutions) and outsiders (from the expert community). Such a process would allow fresh ideas to emerge while getting the right level of endorsement by institutions and members states. From this perspective a phased approach could offer the right balance.

One open issue is the role of parliamentarians in the process. A few precedents are interesting. The US strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defence Review, are mandated by Congress but its members play no role in the drafting per se, only reviewing the document ex post. The French White Paper Commission included members of parliament (the chairpersons of the defence committees of both houses). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly prepared some contributions during the Strategic Concept process but this only had a limited impact. The role of the European Parliament in any forthcoming strategic review is yet to be defined, with a
range of options from encompassing formal hearings during the process to direct contributions or participation in future working groups.

4.2 The way forward: Key recommendations for a successful process and a substantive document

Looking back at attempts have been made to identify the best way forward. Some member states have supported or sponsored attempts to offer a review or an alternative approach. France played a central role in the launch of the 2008 review process, but failed to convince the institutions and other member states to endorse the most ambitious approach initially envisaged during the French presidency. Sweden played a central role in supporting a group of European think tanks that drafted a ‘European Global Strategy’. Others such as Finland or Poland have supported the need for a review even before international events made such a review unavoidable.

Bearing in mind all these initiatives and taking stock of other processes leading to review or establish strategic documents, some basic principles and recommendations can be put forward for the EU.

4.2.1 Key recommendations on process

1. Develop an inclusive process. Enough time should be allocated to the process to insure both quality and inclusiveness. Multilateral processes can be cumbersome and innovative ways need to be found to work at 28 and build consensus, which will develop ownership amongst member states (national governments and parliaments, public opinions). The process needs to be as transparent as possible in order to meet the democratic criteria; without suggesting a series of town hall meetings, associating more closely all EU institutions, including the European Parliament, and holding multiple open or semi-open events is important.

2. Facilitate ambitious and ‘out of the box’ thinking. Wise person or expert groups can serve a useful purpose to foster the process and help new ideas to emerge. Security strategies need to start from a high level of ambition. Given that the drafting process tends to water down assessments and recommendations, the more ambitious and straightforward the starting point (tasking and first draft), the more exists the chance to achieve a meaningful document.

3. Cover all EU tools. The process should not be too constrained by institutional responsibilities and should try to cover the multiple dimensions of EU international role and tools. There is a natural leadership role of the HR/VP and EEAS, but the strategic review should also cover other tools of EU external action. The Lisbon Treaty enables a very wide spectrum of actions within the framework of foreign and security policy, but only limited use has been made of the opportunities created.

4. Engage external partners. This should be an integral part of the process. The EU has developed in-depth cooperation with international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the African Union (AU). Engaging such institutional partners as well as countries with which the EU has developed a political dialogue (such as the US, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, India and China) will be fundamental in the long-term. One open issue to be decided is the desired level of engagement with Russia.

5. Introduce a five-year review clause. Strategy documents have a shorter ‘life expectancy’ than in the past; most documents are now reviewed or redrafted entirely after five to ten years in order to take into account the rapid transformation of the world stage.
4.2.2 Key recommendations on substance

General substantive points

1. **Do not shy away from addressing current security challenges.** In developing a new ESS, it is vital that the EU identifies – insofar as it is possible – current and future key threats and security challenges facing Europe, and – more importantly – develop an approach of European resilience in order to be able to withstand the full range of strategic changes in its environment over the long term.

2. **Prioritise threats based on impact assessment and resilience.** The ESS should prioritise the set of threats Europe faces in terms of the severity of the impacts and decide how to respond through the lens of societal resilience. Such an approach can be made to work for a wide range of threats and so can be highly cost-effective. Resilient societies that have built-in ways and means to absorb or spread shock will manage their responses far more effectively than ill-prepared, more fragile communities.

3. **Reassess neighbourhood policies.** The ring of conflict that has gradually moved closer to the borders of the EU makes a new assessment of the neighbourhood policy unavoidable. A differentiated approach that takes account of the different perceptions of the European Union in neighbouring countries, and that shapes their decisions on the balance of advantage in cooperating with the EU, is needed. The existing European security system has failed, and a thorough and far-reaching assessment of what to do next is required.

4. **Balance immediate priorities and concerns with long term trends.** The future strategic document could not ignore immediate security concerns in the East or in the South without running the risk of falling into irrelevance. It should nevertheless factor in longer-term transversal challenges such as climate change and cyber vulnerabilities.

5. **Underline that the EU will not withdraw from global affairs.** The EU approach of being open to international engagement and working through constructive engagement remains the right one. At the same time, it is important to set priorities, identify where the EU has genuine comparative advantages, and concentrate on delivering high performance in those priority issue areas.

6. **Propose an EU contribution to the security/development nexus.** The EU has a unique contribution to make as the prime international contributor to development and as a security provider. In the past decade, much of the thinking about the relationship between security and development has been done in Europe. This thinking now needs to be applied in a systematic and coherent way through EU external action.

7. **Develop an action-oriented strategy.** The main criticism the 2003 ESS faced was its general nature. A future document should be an opportunity to endorse concrete decisions and priorities.

Partnerships

1. **Emphasise the role of strategic partnerships.** Rather than stake a claim to ‘superpower’ status, the EU would be better placed playing to its strengths and focus on international cooperation for a rules-based global order. In particular, if conflict prevention were elevated as a priority above all other demands and cemented at the heart of the range of strategic partnerships, the EU could lever its partnerships to deepen security dialogues and establish plurilateral security and conflict prevention negotiating forums. A new ESS needs to stress the fundamental importance of assisting those countries and populations most at risk through strategic partnering, association agreements, upstream diplomacy, policing and border assistance and direct aid.
2. **Take into account the evolving nature of the transatlantic relations.** These are entirely different from 2003, when the EU published its first common document outlining a security strategy. A fundamental reassessment of the way in which the EU and the United States work together needs to be a central plank in considering next steps in European security. The 2003 ESS described the transatlantic relationship as ‘irreplaceable’ – that remains true today, perhaps even more so. The European Union and the United States have indeed shown that when acting together on security issues such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, landmine clearance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, they combine to be ‘a formidable force for good in the world’ as stated in the 2003 ESS. Since 2008, the US in rebalancing its foreign policy has also worked increasingly in multilateral partnerships and through the UN. ‘Effective multilateralism’ has resulted in considerable and tangible progress. In the uncertain strategic environment, the strong cooperation between the US and the EU could be strengthened to great effect, particularly in working together to prevent large-scale conflict in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

3. **Address the NATO/EU relationship.** Both organisations share a largely common membership (23 out of 28 EU members states are NATO allies), and are already actively working together. A more proactive policy on the part of the EU in engaging NATO would be needed. Both organisations not only share the same set of western democratic values and broadly converging policy orientations. EU efforts to develop defence capabilities through the European Defence Agenda converge with NATO’s ambition to foster defence spending and the best use of available resources. Both organisations are also often engaged on the same theatres of operations (for example in Afghanistan). All these factors combined suggest the need to deepen cooperation at both the political and working level. A number of serious political and practical roadblocks still exist given the different nature of the organisations and the objective of some member states in both EU and NATO. It is however important to move forward.

**Regional security challenges**

1. **Recognise the increased risks associated with conflicts.** As a result of the severity of recent conflicts and after a long period of decline, the statistics on levels of violence and conflict death rates have climbed in the last years and especially in 2014. It is not possible to say at this stage if these new conflicts may constitute a long-term trend. Nor can we rule out the likelihood that these conflicts will spread into other regions including into Europe but now is certainly not a time for complacency with respect to the prospects for violent conflict near Europe or in Europe.

2. **Assess the consequences of Russian assertiveness in Eastern Europe.** Russia can no longer be treated primarily as a partner, although it might remain a long-term objective for the EU to develop such a partnership, conditional upon the respect by Russia of the basic principles of European security that the EU stands for. Russia’s aggressive posture in Ukraine and beyond is a strategic challenge for the EU as it goes against the cooperation and the policy of inclusiveness put forward by the EU since the end of the Cold War. While the EU should not give way to a ‘new Cold War’ narrative, it cannot ignore the systemic changes associated with Russian policy which challenge the pillars of the European security architecture (Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Budapest Memorandum). As Russia is moving away from the post-Cold War cooperation/partnership narrative, it becomes increasingly difficult for the EU to not renew its own approach. Russia’s discourse and actions in the former soviet space are an uncomfortable reminder for Europeans of the dangers of stirring up sentiments based on ethno-linguistic nationalism. The ESS needs to understand the strategic vision that Russia is presenting in the region and counter with an alternative, progressive strategic vision that only Europe can deliver.
3. **Address the challenge of long-term disorder in the Middle East, Maghreb and Africa.** Ideological and religious wars are likely to continue to be a major feature of future conflict for the short- to mid-term in the Middle East and Africa. Jihadist groups around the world are pledging allegiance and/or support to ISIL/ISIS/Daesh. Perhaps the one ray of light is Tunisia, which, while certainly not free from the scourge of terrorist attacks, is making progress in terms of political reform, stability and economic growth.

4. **Develop an EU specific position on the security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region.** Asia was almost ignored in the 2003 ESS. As instabilities exist and could develop in the Asia-Pacific region (in the China Sea in particular), the EU recognises it has important partners in the region and cannot ignore those challenges for a series of reasons: e.g. trade with Asia is crucial for the EU’s prosperity; security challenges in Asia are critical for the US and other key partners.

**Transversal challenges**

1. **Build upon EU’s leadership in the field of WMD non-proliferation.** The EU has demonstrated its sustained and significant capabilities in brokering and participating agreements on WMD – e.g. in the Iran E3+3 negotiations and in the Syrian chemical weapons eliminations efforts. The EU should actively pursue its efforts to promote the universality of international treaties.

2. **Stemming terrorism.** Terrorism and counter-terrorism remain a top priority for the European Union. It is a major counter-terrorism actor within Europe and an increasingly important one beyond its borders. The ESS in 2003 helped put in place a number of important instruments to tackle the terrorism threat but that challenge has mutated and any new ESS has to approach the situation of terrorist activity at home and abroad in a more streamlined, seamless fashion. The calls for ‘moderation’ will have little impact on those who are passionate about their beliefs and the way they see the world. The link between beheadings abroad and bombings at home has to be understood better within our societies. The use of social media and other communication tools in a manner that will engage effectively – particularly with the young – both in Europe and outside is a vital component of any future strategic approach to stemming terrorism in Europe.

3. **Tackle cyber vulnerabilities.** European institutions and countries need to develop a set of norms and ‘rules of the road’ to ensure responsible behaviour on the internet that would: increase cyber security; ensure access for all; protect privacy and personal data protection as a fundamental human right. Cyber tools are being used by both state and non-state actors for attacks on a wide range of assets from websites to sensitive databases or to interference with satellite communications and, perhaps most worryingly, on the cyber controls of critical infrastructure and on command and control systems. Recent events have demonstrated the crucial importance to tackle cyber vulnerabilities as our societies and critical infrastructures are becoming everyday more cyber dependent.

4. **Addressing the security consequences of Climate Change.** Migration – already a significant issue for Europe – is set to increase in part as a result of climate stress. Prudence and planning are the watchwords of adapting to climate change. It is clear that focused targets, resilience, strategic planning and good governance are significant aspects of reducing human insecurity in climate change and such strategic approaches need to be included as a significant part of the new ESS both within the EU and outside.
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## List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSSC</td>
<td>Budget Support Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIWIN</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLIICO</td>
<td>Climate Change, Hydro-conflicts and Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLIWASEC</td>
<td>Climate induced changes on water and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Coordinator</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DCFTAs</td>
<td>Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements</td>
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<td>DG NEAR</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Union defence technological and industrial base</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>European Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>ESPAS</td>
<td>European Strategy and Policy Analysis System</td>
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<td>European Police Office</td>
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<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>FPC</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Concept</td>
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<td>FRS</td>
<td>Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>FRIDE</td>
<td>Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue, Spain</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>HINW</td>
<td>Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative/Vice-President</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>improvised chemical devices</td>
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<td>ICS-CERT</td>
<td>Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Africa-EU Joint Strategy</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied natural gas</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSAGs</td>
<td>Non-state armed groups</td>
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<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>Nuclear weapon states</td>
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<td>Quadrennial Defence Review</td>
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<td>RECs/RMs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>Regional Indicative Programmes</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>The revolution in military affairs</td>
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<td>SADPA</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SCP</td>
<td>The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small- and medium-sized enterprises</td>
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<td>Trans Adriatic Pipeline</td>
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<td>TDC</td>
<td>Trilateral development cooperation</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VJTF</td>
<td>Very High Readiness Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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POLICY DEPARTMENT

Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

Policy Areas
Foreign Affairs
  Human Rights
  Security and Defence
Development
International Trade

Documents