The Joint Africa-EU Strategy
ABSTRACT

Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) has taken place in a rapidly evolving political scenario at the global level and specifically within Europe and Africa. The overarching objectives identified in 2007 still remain valid, but concrete priorities now need to be adapted to the new reality. At the strategic level, a refinement of the Africa-EU partnership has become urgent following the adoption of Agenda 2063 and the EU Global Strategy. At policy level, lessons learned from the implementation of the Roadmap 2014-17 and the way ahead indicated in the Joint Communication of May 2017 should be taken into account. Ten years after its adoption and with a view to the next AU-EU Summit, being held in Abidjan on 29-30 November 2017, it is crucial to re-assess the strategy’s validity on the basis of achievements and shortfalls, also in its parliamentary dimension, with regard to the fulfilment of its objectives in an evolving context.
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<tr>
<td>AAAA</td>
<td>Addis Ababa Action Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>AEEP</td>
<td>Africa-EU Energy Partnership</td>
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<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>AIDA</td>
<td>Accelerating Industrial Development of Africa</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>AREI</td>
<td>Africa Renewable Energy Initiative</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
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<td>AU PSC</td>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AUPG</td>
<td>AU Partners Group</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
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<td>CBSD</td>
<td>capacity-building for security and defence</td>
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<td>CFTA</td>
<td>Continental Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>EABF</td>
<td>EU-Africa Business Forum</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEM</td>
<td>Election Expert Mission</td>
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<td>EFSD</td>
<td>European Fund for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>ENI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>EU PSC</td>
<td>EU Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>EUEI PDF</td>
<td>EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility</td>
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<td>FNSSA</td>
<td>Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture</td>
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<td>GCCA</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Alliance</td>
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<td>GPGC</td>
<td>Global Public Goods and Challenges</td>
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<td>HLPD</td>
<td>High Level Policy Dialogue</td>
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<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative/Vice President</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>The Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JAF</td>
<td>Joint Annual Forum</td>
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<td>JEG</td>
<td>Joint Expert Group</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Adaption planning</td>
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<td>NHRI</td>
<td>National Human Rights Institutions</td>
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<td>OCT</td>
<td>Overseas Countries and Territories</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PAIDA</td>
<td>Integration and Development Agenda</td>
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<td>PanAf</td>
<td>Pan African Programme</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Pan African Statistics</td>
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<td>PIDA</td>
<td>Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>RECP</td>
<td>Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SB4A</td>
<td>Sustainable Business for Africa</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>Science, technology and innovation</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Trust Fund</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive Summary

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 can be considered as the capstone doctrine of Africa-European Union relations. It represents the overarching long-term framework of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU).

The objectives identified in 2007 still remain valid but concrete priorities need to be adapted to the new reality. Moreover, refinement of the Africa-EU partnership’s strategic vision has become urgent following adoption of the Agenda 2063 and the EU Global Strategy, new strategic frameworks for the African continent’s socio-economic transformation over the next 50 years and the EU’s foreign and security policy, respectively.

The first part of this study presents an overall assessment of the key features of the JAES. The political dialogue at continental level between Europe and Africa has been conducted mainly amongst Heads of States and Governments at successive Africa-EU Summits, in Cairo (2000), Lisbon (2007), Tripoli (2010), and Brussels (2014). In November 2015, in the wake of the migration crisis in Europe, European and African Heads of State and Government gathered together in La Valletta for a Summit entirely dedicated to cooperation on migration and asylum. The Summit was perceived by African leaders to have been dominated by the EU agenda, with a strong focus on security aspects. In addition, an ongoing Africa-EU dialogue takes place within various institutional frameworks and at different levels, from periodical ministerial-level meetings, to annual College-to-College meetings between the European Commission (EC) and the Africa Union Commission (AUC).

The EU’s significant financial support to the AU, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as well as African countries is a central feature of Europe-Africa relations, representing true added value for Africa. However, EU funding schemes remain fragmented and African partners are still dependent by the funding coming from external actors and unable to mobilize own resources.

One important component of the JAES is to promote a ‘people-centred partnership’ co-owned by both the AU and the EU’s civil society. However, despite formal calls in various policy documents, the partnership has not been able to involve effectively civil society organizations.

The second part of this study is devoted to the evaluation of the 2014-2017 Roadmap, the main outcome of the 2014 Brussels Summit. The first priority area for cooperation between the EU and Africa remains peace and security. As with the previous Action Plan, Roadmap 2014-2017 stresses the need for an enhanced political dialogue on security and other issues, but it has been jeopardised by insufficient communication and coordination at all levels.

The operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), specifically by supporting the African Stand-by Force (ASF), has always been one of the priority actions for the Africa-EU peace and security partnership. However, the ASF still lacks operational capacities for rapid and efficient deployment. The main tool for implementing the Africa-EU peace and security partnership is the African Peace Facility, with more than EUR 2.1 billion allocated to the AU since its creation.

In addition, both the EU and the AU have committed to enhancing dialogue with the UN, especially on supporting sustainable and adequate funding for peace and security in Africa, as well as attracting contributions from other international partners, countries and organisations. The EU also participates in the AU Partners Group (AUPG) in Addis Ababa, which includes all the main AU donors. The AUPG plays a central role, but, it is not as effective as it could be, as it does not have authority over its members and some partners do not always want to be coordinated.
The second priority area of Roadmap is focussing on democracy, good governance and human rights. This priority includes support to civil society's participation, election monitoring by the AU, EU’s electoral observation missions, and full operationalisation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Whereas general EU support to the AGA has been more formal than practical, individual Member States have been more directly supportive. In the democracy and good governance domain, the role of Parliaments is still limited.

In the Roadmap, human rights are presented as a priority implemented through different forums and collaborations. However, as a cross-cutting issue and conditionality for other programmes, the EU has toned down its approach since 2014. Regarding culture, the Roadmap 2014-2017 presents specific potential collaborations on fighting against illicit trafficking of cultural goods, but no specific programmes appear as yet to have been implemented in this area.

Priority area 3 of the Roadmap 2014-2017 is in the human development domain. Science, technology and innovation (STI) spans a range of different subjects, from climate change to food security and is one the JAES most active areas, supported by regular meetings, complex projects and publications. In the last three years cooperation on higher education has continued under the auspices of other initiatives such as Erasmus + and Marie Skłodowska-Curie with limited, but significant results.

Migration is the area that has received most political attention from the EU in the JAES framework lately. The Valletta Summit and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa represent a high-level political dialogue and a robust fund, respectively. Such initiatives are very much in line with the main priorities of Roadmap 2014-2017, but shortfalls appear evident on human rights, political dialogue and long-term vision.

Priority area 4 of the Roadmap 2014-2017 covers a broad set of economic sectors, including the specific domain of agriculture and food security. The EU and the AU expect to strengthen continental integration and trade, particularly thanks to private sector involvement. The Roadmap encourages closer cooperation in the area of industrial development, paying particular attention to the sustainable management and good governance of raw materials as well as natural resources. Generally speaking, energy products and crude materials still represent more than half of the EU-28 imports from Africa. In this specific domain, although the PanAf Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 lists ‘Raw Materials’ as one of the key Components of Priority, no concrete action has been yet undertaken by the EU.

European support for initiatives in the domains of agriculture, food security and safety under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is a key area of cooperation identified by the Roadmap. Within the framework of the EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue in Science Technology and Innovation, the EU and AU launched a Research and Innovation Partnership that led to the creation of a Roadmap concerning a jointly funded EU-Africa Research & Innovation Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture (FNSSA). The fight against climate change has been at the centre of the EU-Africa political agenda and significant steps have been undertaken in the mitigation domain, thanks to initiatives promoting and expanding the penetration of renewable energies across the continent.

The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) was one of the main priorities of the JAES. During the UN General Assembly in 2010, the EU had therefore launched the Millennium Development Goal initiative to help African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations. However, the initiative was not able to attract additional economic resources and the funds were channelled from the EDF.

The third part of the study is focused on the analysis of the Joint Communication released in May 2017 aimed at giving renewed impetus to the Africa-EU Partnership ahead of the AU-EU Summit in November. Whilst the Communication contains an introductory chapter on the changing landscape in Africa, there is no reference to the state of play and important challenges ahead for the EU.
The first part is dedicated to reinforcement of the political relationship with Africa, touching upon one of the most sensitive and neglected areas of political cooperation so far: deepening coalitions on global governance issues. There is space for a reinforced region-to-region diplomacy between Europe and Africa in the context of the UN on matters of common concern, including peace and security, climate change, epidemics, natural resources, migration and mobility as well as humanitarian crises.

The second priority for a reinforced political relationship included in the Joint Communication is to increasing cooperation on common interests and based on frequent political interaction, in particular at ministerial level, not just on foreign policy issues, but also on sectorial policy initiatives and partnerships. While college-to-college meetings between the AU and European Commissions have been functioning regularly and in an effective manner, ministerial meetings have been organised on an ad hoc basis and only sporadically on specific thematic issues.

The Joint Communication also points out ways of converting priorities into actions, and particularly: (1) Building more resilient states and societies; and (2) Creating more and better jobs, especially for youth.

The operationalisation of APSA is included as a milestone for the AU’s ambitions to secure peace and reconciliation. In terms of EU action, a number of steps and flagship initiatives are proposed. A first proposal is to further intensify coordination and dialogue by setting up a collaborative platform. In reality, such a platform is already in place as the AU Partners Group (AUPG) in Addis Ababa. The most challenging step forward would be to transform it into an effective coordination mechanism. The Communication also foresees an EU’s initial contribution to a reinvigorated Peace Fund. The Kaberuka’s report, which envisions the implementation of a 0.2% levy on eligible imports on the continent in order to fund the AU’s activities, represents a relevant basis, but there is uncertainty about its effective implementation.

The Joint Communication refers to the role of resilient societies, but this challenge stretches well beyond the governance system mentioned in the document, including accountable, democratic, effective and transparent institutions, protection of human rights and inclusive participation of citizens in public decision making. The human rights dimension almost disappears, being mentioned only with a reference to ‘encouraging the ratification and implementation of international and AU’s own human rights instruments at national level’. Civil society’s engagement in AU-EU processes is not mentioned explicitly, while support to local authorities appears as a valid field of work.

Migration and mobility are presented as a two-fold issue that can strengthen societies but also destabilise them if not managed properly. However, the Joint Communication does not consider the ineffective programming of these steps which are mainly intended to serve the EU’s internal objective of curbing migration flows. In addition, migration patterns, rather than a country’s needs, determine the allocation of aid, diverting from long-term development goals.

The Joint Communication also emphasises the necessity to encourage investment into the African economic and industrial system and it raises expectations on the positive contribution of EPAs (and Free Trade Agreements) to strengthen EU-Africa trade relations. In reality, EU attempts to conclude EPAs with its African counterparts are far from being successful and a serious reflection on the suitability of these tools to promote trade with Africa should, therefore, be launched at EU level.

The Joint Communication rightly puts sustainable low carbon energy at the centre of the EU-Africa cooperation agenda. The Joint Communication also recognises agro-food as a fundamental sector for the economic and social development of Africa and the main source of income for a large majority of the continent’s rural population. However, emphasis placed by the Communication on the opportunities offered by EPAs to enable Africa’s seizing of market opportunities for its food production appears too optimistic.

The Joint Communication presents education, knowledge creation and human capital as key factors for the empowerment of active, responsible and skilled African citizens and the sustainable development of
the continent. The African Youth facility can contribute to promote more coherently and effectively educational activities in the continent, and a closer link to the labour market could increase the effectiveness of the initiatives.

Overall, the Joint Communication has the merit to spell out clearly which are the main EU’s objectives for a long-standing partnership with Africa, in the attempt to reinvigorate it but also to partially redirect the priorities for action in the next few years. However, the future reassessment of the cooperation scheme and the connected instruments cannot be the result of a EU-alone reflection on the future of the relationship, but it has to be grounded on a shared rethinking and dialogue, in the spirit of the partnership.

Based on the assessment conducted in this study, we suggest further action in the following sectors:

- Enhance the political dialogue and commitment of national governments.
- Ensure a real engagement of civil society actors, one step beyond general and formal statements.
- Streamline EU funding schemes and mechanisms.
- Make a decisive leap forward in the improvement of African capacities in peace and security.
- Promote a tangible reciprocity in the partnership.
- Enlarge the vision on democratic governance and civic participation within the partnership.
- Advance gender equality and women empowerment through the establishment of networks of European and African women.
- Discuss post-Cotonou scenarios at the AU-EU Summit.
- Adopt an integrated approach to natural resources and a specific focus on boosting local manufacturing and processing capacity.
- Prioritise respect for the human rights of migrants.
- Restore the link between the allocation of development funds and long-term development goals.
- Increase the number of regular migrants.
- Encourage investment through bottom-up measures.
- Strengthen the link between energy policies and climate action.
- Emphasise the 2030 Development Agenda and decline the SDGs at the local level (both African and European).
- Promote technological transfer, capacity building activities and automatization processes in the agro-food sector.
- Promote stronger interconnections between the education and labour sectors.
1 Evaluating the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 can be considered as the capstone doctrine of Africa-European Union relations, consolidated in about fifty years of trade and development cooperation and substantially revisited over the last decade. It represents the overarching long-term framework of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), associated with an institutional architecture and specific funding for the implementation of its key actions.

The EU is still Africa’s principal partner, not only for trading but also for development and humanitarian assistance. Over the last decade, key sectors of cooperation have become increasingly important, ranging from governance to regional integration, from energy to climate change and from migration to science and technology. The JAES took stock of this evolution and developed a continent-to-continent partnership based on shared principles, underpinned by strengthened institutional ties and substantiated with operational priorities.

The JAES was designed to address issues of common concern and ‘jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism’, mentioning in particular ‘the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions’. Finally, it sought to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership, acknowledging that ‘the Joint Strategy should be co-owned by European and African non-institutional actors’ willing to make it a ‘permanent platform for information, participation and mobilisation of a broad spectrum of civil society actors’.

Beyond the undeniably political and symbolic significance of the JAES, added value should be measured through its implementation, which was ensured firstly through the Action Plans 2008-2010 and 2011-2013 and more recently through the Roadmap 2014-2017, adopted at the 4th Africa-EU Summit held in Brussels during April 2014.

Implementation of the JAES has taken place in a rapidly evolving political context at the global level and specifically within Europe and Africa. The overarching objectives identified in 2007 still remain valid but concrete priorities need to be adapted to the new reality. Moreover, refinement of the Africa-EU partnership’s strategic vision has become urgent following adoption of the Agenda 2063 and the EU

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2 The EU was Africa’s top trading partner in 2016, with a total volume of EUR 227.2 billion, equivalent to 35.2% of Africa’s world trade. The EU is followed by China, with a total volume of EUR 96.8 million, 15.0% of Africa’s world trade, India, with a total volume of EUR 45.1 billion, 7.0% of Africa’s world trade and the US with a total volume of EUR 43.2 million, 6.7% of Africa’s world trade. Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, 2016.
3 In 2015, EU and its Member States allocated EUR 21 billion of collective ODA to Africa (50% of total ODA to Africa). The EU and its Member States are the biggest donor to the African continent with approximately EUR 20 billion per year of Official Development Aid (ODA), through programmes implemented at continental, regional and national level. Around 20% of this amount is managed by the European Commission. The Africa-EU Partnership, ‘Financing the partnership’.
4 Including ‘peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa’, as detailed on page 3 of the JAES.
5 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, op. cit., p. 3.
6 Ibid., p. 22.
Global Strategy\textsuperscript{11}, new strategic frameworks for the African continent’s socio-economic transformation over the next 50 years and the EU’s foreign and security policy, respectively.

Ten years after its adoption and with a view to the next AU-EU Summit\textsuperscript{12} being held in Abidjan on 28-29 November 2017, it is crucial to re-assess the strategy’s validity on the basis of achievements and shortfalls not only in the fulfilment of its objectives but also with regard to the evolution of both the African and European contexts, as well as the partnership itself.

The objectives of the JAES focus on four main pillars:

1. To reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern, in particular by strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges.

2. To strengthen and promote shared values, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

3. To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns.

4. To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership.

The assessment of the achievements and shortfalls of the partnership on key policy priorities, namely strengthening shared values, meeting all the MDGs and promoting the reform of global governance should be evaluated on the basis of concrete actions implemented through the JAES and particularly in the framework of the Roadmap 2014-2017, which will be addressed in the next paragraph. Nevertheless, it is important to start highlighting the milestones set by the JAES to frame up and sustain Africa-EU relations and flagging some preliminary success and deficiencies that will inform the following analysis.

1.1 Political dialogue

The political dialogue at continental level between Europe and Africa has been conducted mainly amongst Heads of States and Governments at successive Africa-EU Summits, in Cairo (2000), Lisbon (2007), Tripoli (2010) and Brussels (2014). The Lisbon Summit produced the JAES and the First Action Plan (2008-2010), while the following Summits represented high-level opportunities to raise political attention on the partnership and agree on concrete priorities for implementation (Second Action Plan 2011-2013 and the Roadmap 2014-2017). Sensitive political issues and diverging interests also emerged during these gatherings\textsuperscript{13}. In November 2015, in the wake of the migration crisis in Europe, European and African Heads of State and Government gathered together in La Valletta for a Summit entirely dedicated to cooperation on migration and asylum\textsuperscript{14}. The Valletta Summit was perceived by African leaders to have been dominated


\textsuperscript{12} For the first time, following Morocco’s readmission to the African Union in January 2017, the Africa-EU Summit has carried the title AU-EU Summit. Morocco had left the African Union in 1984 after a row over the status of Western Sahara.

\textsuperscript{13} In 2010, Robert Mugabe took part in the Tripoli Summit despite being subject to travel bans and asset freezes in the EU and the United States who accused his regime of denials of basic freedoms in Zimbabwe. In 2014, South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma boycotted the EU-Africa Summit in Brussels to protest against the invitation of Morocco, which was not a member of the AU at that time.

\textsuperscript{14} The Valletta Summit produced a Political Declaration and an Action Plan, including the establishment of an Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, made up of EUR 1.8 billion from the EU budget and European Development Fund, combined with contributions from EU Member States and other donors. See: European Council, Valletta Summit on migration 11-12 November 2015, 2015.
by the EU agenda, with a strong focus on security aspects, return and readmission issues, while African partners tried to maintain focus on development and better governance of migration and mobility.

In addition, an ongoing Africa-EU dialogue takes place within various institutional frameworks and at different levels:

- **periodical ministerial-level meetings.** The last formal ministerial meeting took place at the margins of the Africa-EU Summit in April 2014 on climate change. In the past, these meetings have been organised on an ad hoc basis and usually at the level of Foreign Ministers. Recently, thematic ministerial meetings have been convened on migration and agriculture;

- **annual joint meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) have been organised every year (alternatively in Brussels and Addis Ababa) since October 2008. The meetings focus on peace and security issues of common concern, especially EU support to AU peace support operations (PSOs). These are more consultative exchanges of views than formal meetings for fully-fledged coordination and cooperation tasks;**

- **annual college-to-college meetings between the European Commission (EC) and the Africa Union Commission (AUC). These regular meetings have proved to be very useful in addressing specific issues and contribute to political dialogue within the partnership’s framework;**

- **contacts and meetings between delegations from the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament. Regular visits take place in Brussels and Midrand, and Parliamentary Summits are organised in the run up to the Summits every three years;**

- **an AU representation to the EU in Brussels and an EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, which are designed to ensure ongoing dialogue. The role of the EU Delegation to the AU has evolved in connection with the institutional developments within the EU, gaining increasing political weight, expanding its competences in the field of security and enhancing its autonomy in managing and disbursing funds;**

- **High Level dialogues and meetings of experts ensure implementation of the Roadmap 2014-2017; these include the reference group on Infrastructure, or the EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD) expert group on science, technology and innovation. Such dialogues and meetings have replaced the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs), involving AU and EU representatives which were initially created to implement the priority areas of JAES;**

- **the Joint Annual Forum covering all areas of cooperation within the framework of the Joint Strategy should be gathering together sectoral experts from Member States, institutions, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders once a year to assess progress made with regard to implementation of the JAES. However, the Forum is not yet operational due mainly to divergent views between the AU and EU concerning its composition.**

One of the shortcomings identified during implementation of the Joint Strategy was the lack of high level political dialogue between Summits. The official visits of the High Representative Federica Mogherini to the African Union to meet the Chairmanship of the AU Commission in 2015, 2016 and 2017 seem to have gone in the right direction for the reinforcement of this aspect.

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15 Interview with EEAS officer, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
16 Interview with DG DEVCO officer, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
18 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
1.2 Financial aspects

The EU’s significant financial support to the AU, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as well as African countries generally has always been a central feature of Europe-Africa relations, representing true added value. Implementation of the JAES has benefitted from a number of different financial instruments developed by the EU to support its external partners. Among them, the European Development Fund (EDF)\textsuperscript{19} – including its African Peace Facility (APF)\textsuperscript{20} component – is the EU’s main instrument for supplying development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as well as other Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). In addition, Trust Funds (TFs) totally or partly funded through the EDF have been created\textsuperscript{21}. Two have been implemented in the framework of the 11th EDF: the Bekou Trust Fund in the Central African Republic\textsuperscript{22} and the EU Emergency Trust Fund to provide stability and address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa\textsuperscript{23}. Thematic instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)\textsuperscript{24} and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)\textsuperscript{25} have supported specific activities in the fields of peace, security and good governance. The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), dealing with cooperation between the European Union and South Africa\textsuperscript{26}, is also the legal basis for two recently established thematic programmes: The Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC)\textsuperscript{27} and the Pan African Programme (PanAf), which serves the whole of Africa. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) provides funding for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which covers cooperation with South Mediterranean countries (including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa)\textsuperscript{28}. The proliferation of financial schemes regrettably did not facilitate continent-to-continent cooperation within the JAES framework but rather favoured the perpetuation of ‘silo’ thinking and turf wars among institutions in Brussels\textsuperscript{29}. Moreover, the attempt to create more flexible instruments to respond to emergencies and

\textsuperscript{19} The total financial resources of the 11th EDF amount to EUR 30.5 billion for the period 2014-2020.
\textsuperscript{20} Through the APF alone, the EU has channelled funding amounting to over EUR 2 billion since 2004. Under the current 11th EDF, the APF has allocated EUR 961.2 million to Peace Support Operations, EUR 55 million to the operationalisation of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and EUR 15 million for Early Response actions. See European Commission, Toward the 5th Africa-EU Summit, Peace and security, EC Communication 4 May 2017 – Factsheet N. 1.
\textsuperscript{21} TFs are development tools that pool together resources from different donors in order to enable a quick, flexible, and collective EU response to the different dimensions of an emergency situation. Two types of TFs have been established in the 11th EDF Financial Regulation (Article 42): Emergency and Post-Emergency TFs and Thematic TFs. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund covering the period 2014-2015, SWD(2017) 123 final, COM(2017) 159 final, Brussels, 5 April 2017.
\textsuperscript{22} The Bekou Trust Fund was created on July 2014 with a mandate to support resilience and to link relief recovery as well as development in the Central African Republic (CAR) in the aftermath of an unprecedented crisis in 2013/2014. The fund is endowed today with EUR 136 million. The EDF contributed to the Bekou Trust Fund’s endowment with EUR 44 million. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund covering the period 2014-2015, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{23} Following the Action Plan adopted at the EU-Africa Valletta Summit in November 2015, the EUR 1.8 billion EU Trust Fund was created to support some of the most fragile and vulnerable countries across Africa (in 3 regions Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa, North of Africa and neighbouring countries). See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund covering the period 2014-2015, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{24} Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EUR 124 million has been allocated to conflict prevention, peace-building and security activities in Africa for the period 2014-2020. See EC Communication 4 May 2017 – Factsheet N. 1, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{25} The budget for the current EIDHR amounts to EUR 1.33 billion for the period 2014-2020.
\textsuperscript{26} The Multiannual Indicative Programme for South Africa (2014-2020) details the areas of cooperation for EUR 241 million of funding allocated under the DCI.
\textsuperscript{27} It supports actions in areas such as: environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development, including decent work, social justice and culture, food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture, migration and asylum.
\textsuperscript{28} ENI is worth over EUR 15 billion from 2014-2020.
\textsuperscript{29} James Mackie, Matthias Deneckere and Greta Galeazzi, Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2017, ECDPM, Issue No. 8, January 2017, p. 2.
crises through the Trust Funds has raised concerns about the diversion of aid for wider foreign policy objectives and the lack of transparency in their governance structure.

Conversely, African partners’ dependency on the funding coming from external actors, including the EU, has been considered one of the key factors jeopardising African aspirations to provide ‘African solutions to African problems’ and impeding the full realisation of ownership principles and equal partnership enshrined in the JAES. Implementation of the JAES by the AU is linked to socio-economic difficulties in African countries, many of which are among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, but also to political constraints, due to the lack of commitment to invest resources in supranational institutions by their political elites. In addition, AU’s Institutions have shown a limited absorption capacity for external funding, which is also connected with the proliferation of funding sources and reporting rules. On average, the AU collects 67% of assessed contribution annually from its Member States. However, each year on average around 30 Member States default either partially or completely. As recognised by the AU, this creates a significant gap between planned budget and actual funding, which hinders effective delivery of its agenda.

Since adoption of the JAES, two major developments could potentially improve the JAES’ financial functioning if effectively implemented:

- on the EU side, a Pan African Programme was created in 2014 as a dedicated instrument to support the JAES and is the first ever EU programme in development and cooperation that covers Africa as a whole. As such, it represents a response by the EU to the complaints raised from both European and African sides about the lack of a specific instrument for the JAES. However, it does not replace but rather complements the other EU instruments and programmes mentioned earlier, by supporting projects with a trans-regional, continental or global approach in areas of shared interest. It is funded under the DCI with a budget of EUR 845 million for the period 2014-2020. Aligned with the Roadmap 2014-2017, the PanAf focuses on five key areas of cooperation between Africa and the EU, namely: (a) peace and security; (b) democracy, good governance and human rights; (c) human development; (d) sustainable and inclusive development together with growth and continental integration; (e) global and cross-cutting issues. As of August 2016, the total allocated funding of this instrument amounts to over EUR 300 million, implemented through 25 projects. However, its added value remains to be proven: it is still financially modest and disconnected from the other policy instruments;

- on the AU side, Heads of State and Government adopted the decision ‘Financing of the Union’ during the 27th African Union Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda during July 2016. This Decision directs all AU Member States to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the AU with the objectives of: (a) providing reliable and predictable funding for continental peace and security though the Peace Fund; (b) providing an equitable and predictable source of financing for the Union; (c) reducing dependency on partner funds for implementation of continental development and integration programmes; and (d) relieving the pressure on national treasuries with respect to meeting national obligations for payment of assessed contributions of the Union. The decision came into force in

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33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 A mid-term review will be conducted shortly. Interview with EEAS officials, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
January 2017. However, as yet only a few countries – including Kenya, Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia and the Republic of Congo – have initiated implementing action.

1.3 A people-centred partnership?

One important component of the JAES is to promote a ‘people-centred partnership’. Both organisations have acknowledged that ‘the Joint Strategy should be co-owned by European and African non-institutional actors’ and they are willing to make it a ‘permanent platform for information, participation and mobilization of a broad spectrum of civil society actors’. This open door to non-state actors prompted creation of the Africa-EU Intercontinental Civil Society Forum in 2010, a transregional platform comprising a cross-section of African and European civil society organisations (CSOs), led by recognised JAES Civil Society Steering Groups from both continents. However, despite formal calls in various policy documents, the partnership has not been able to involve civil society groups. Civil society is broadly involved in the partnership mainly through a monitoring and consultation role, but its specific inclusion in strategic decision-making and the implementation of financial instruments is still insufficient. Indeed, from the outset there were signs that the impact of African and European civil society organisations would be limited in regard to the JAES’ design and implementation.

This situation persisted and consequently the second Africa-EU Civil Society Forum in 2013 stated that ‘after reviewing the JAES and the implementation of its two Action Plans […] the CSOs in both the EU and Africa concluded that the JAES framework, both in design and application, had not enabled them to play effective and predictable roles’. The roles envisaged were advocacy, watchdog, monitoring and evaluation together with participation in political dialogues and the thematic partnerships. Most alarming was the continuing lack of standard operating procedures for CSO participation in the JAES process, as well as difficult access to information and decision-makers. The Forum therefore called for structural reform of the framework, to make sure that decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms include civil society.

Unfortunately, the representatives of African and European CSOs who gathered at the third Africa-EU Civil Society Forum held in Tunis in 2017 ‘observed that the space for CSOs has shrunk and that their visibility remains weak within the strategic framework’, regretting in particular that ‘the Joint Annual Forum (JAF) was never convened […] and as such the main mechanism for civil society participation disappeared’. Hence, European and African CSOs feel increasingly marginalised in the formal JAES process and the objective of implementing a ‘people-centred partnership’ remains mostly unattained.

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37 African Union, AU website, op. cit.
39 1st Africa-EU Intercontinental Civil Society Forum, Declaration, Cairo, 10 November 2010.
41 1st Africa-EU Intercontinental Civil Society Forum, Declaration, op. cit.
43 Ibid.
2 Evaluating the implementation of the Roadmap 2014-2017

The Roadmap 2014-2017 is the main outcome of the 2014 Brussels Summit. Its introduction stresses a focus on priority areas where: (a) cooperation between the two continents is essential and has high potential in the framework of the Joint Strategy and (b) where substantial added value can be expected. These statements reveal an intention to invest political and financial resources on actions that fall within the scope of the Joint Strategy as a specific instrument for inter-regional, continental and global partnership, distinct from other frameworks of cooperation. The creation of the Pan African Programme to finance the Roadmap is coherent with these objectives.

Moreover, the Roadmap calls for ‘a results-oriented approach’, thus promising to evaluate implementation of proposed actions on the basis of results achieved. This assessment task has been assigned by the Roadmap to the new Joint Annual Forum, which was designed to replace the previous Joint Task Force in arranging gatherings of all partnership actors. These forums should also ensure achievement of the other objective stated in the introduction of the Roadmap, namely ‘to promote contributions from the private sector and civil society’. However, as mentioned earlier, this new structure was never established.

Another important aspect in the text of the Roadmap is the recognition of the importance and validity of high-level political dialogue conducted between AU and EU institutions under the Strategy including Summits, ministerial meetings, college-to-college meetings between the two Commissions, AU PSC-EU PSC meetings and contacts among African and European leaders. At the same time, it recognises the shortfalls in technical expert structures as well as the need to identify alternative working mechanisms and structures.

Compared with the previous Action Plans, for Joint Strategy implementation the Roadmap reduces the number of priority areas from eight to five: (a) peace and security; (b) democracy, good governance and human rights; (c) human development; (d) sustainable and inclusive development together with growth and continental integration; (e) global and emerging issues. The Roadmap emphasises that these actions come in addition to cooperation at country and regional level.

The main flagship programme of the Roadmap is Africa Union Support Programme III, started in June 2016 with two main objectives: (1) enhanced European-African Union policy dialogue and efficiency of the AU Commission and (2) effective implementation of the Roadmap by the AU Commission, in particular priority areas 2, 3, 4 and 5. It will run until June 2019 and is worth EUR 51 million (85% European Union and 15% AU Commission).

2.1 Peace and security

The first priority area for cooperation between the EU and Africa remains peace and security, as in the previous Action Plans, with the strategic objective ‘to ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth’. In accordance with this objective, key areas for cooperation and specific actions have been identified:

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46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
2.1.1 Enhanced political dialogue

As with the previous Action Plan, 2014-2017 Roadmap stresses the need for an enhanced political dialogue to discuss, reach common positions and implement common approaches in meeting challenges to peace and security in Africa. Indeed, ensuring unity of intent between the partners in regard to these challenges remains one of the major shortcomings in the JAES. Lately, the tendency for securitisation of the migration agenda has reinforced the African perception of a one-way dialogue, ultimately aimed at imposing EU conditionality on its counterpart.

More generally, efforts towards an enhanced policy dialogue on security and other issues has been jeopardised by insufficient communication and coordination at all levels – technical, senior official and political. One of the forums indicated by the Roadmap to reinforce political dialogue is enhanced coordination between AU PSC and EU PSC. Such joint meetings have existed since 2008, in the aftermath of the JAES’ adoption, but their impact is still very limited. They have functioned well as consultative forums mainly to discuss the ongoing conflict and crisis situations in Africa, as well as the EU’s support to the AU on peace and security matters. Over the last two years, a substantial amount of informal dialogue on issues of mutual importance, in particular counter-terrorism, radicalisation, violent extremism and migration, has been established through joint retreats organised on the eve of annual joint meetings.

The Roadmap stresses in particular the thorny question of international criminal justice, including the issue of universal jurisdiction. This is a field where the distance between EU and African partners has reached its peak in recent years, particularly when Burundi, Gambia and South Africa announced their intention to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in October 2016. Although the current backlash can be traced back to the ICC’s investigation in Sudan, Libya and Kenya, critiques levied by African states are not new and stem from the fact that the Court’s investigations have primarily, if not exclusively, focused on Sub-Saharan Africa (nine of its ten current investigations are in African countries). The EU, from its side, has always shown strong support for the ICC generally, but particularly its investigation and prosecution work. Nevertheless, so far as the Africa-EU partnership’s political agenda is concerned, discussions concerning the ICC, including its reform and the tackling of impunity remain unresolved.

2.1.2 Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), specifically by supporting the African Stand-by Force (ASF), has always been one of the priority actions for the Africa-EU peace and security partnership. The APSA was established by the AU as the structural and long-term response to African peace and security challenges. The ASF as a key component of the APSA comprises a central headquarters located at the AU Commission and sub-regional structures, including stand-by multidisciplinary contingents with civilian, police and military components, all ready for rapid deployment.

51 There are a number of technical difficulties, such as the issue of changing interlocutors: the membership of the AU PSC is rotating, whereas all EU Member States are always part of EU PSC, as well as the different approaches of the respective Presidencies. Some also pointed out that the agendas of these meetings are too long and very ambitious, and, as a consequence, meetings are rushed, as they only last one day. Consequently, there can be no in-depth discussion or common analysis. Moreover, this is exacerbated due to political sensitivities on certain issues.
52 African Union, Co-Chairs Conclusions of the Joint African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC)/ European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) retreat, 26 October 2016.
54 The EU has called for a reform of the international justice system, proposing an alternative model based on complementarity between its own courts, namely the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Humans and People’s Rights, and the ICC as the Court of last resort. See James Mackie, et. al., Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2017, op. cit., p. 8.
55 For an overview of APSA’s components and structures, see Annex.
This Force enables the AU to carry out PSOs decided on by the PSC together with interventions authorised by the Assembly. The initial goal to make the AU fully operational by June 2010, developing its capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, validated by a command post exercise, has regrettably been subject to constant postponement. The ASF still lacks operational capacities for rapid and efficient deployment. Between 2011 and 2016, the training and exercise cycle AMANI AFRICA II was conducted by the AU in cooperation with the EU in order to assess the progress made in operationalisation of the ASF. The final report concluded that the programme did not reach its objective and recommended cessation of its support through the APF. However, since operationalisation of the ASF is a key component of the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap, this objective has been integrated into the APSA Support Programme III.

The main tool for implementing the Africa-EU peace and security partnership is the African Peace Facility, created in 2003 to support the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms. Since its creation, more than EUR 2.1 billion have been allocated to the APF: by the end of 2016, EUR 1.9 billion had already been contracted, of which almost EUR 1.8 billion had been paid through this instrument. Under the 11th EDF, the first Action Programme 2014-2016 was adopted with an initial contribution of EUR 750 million, but due to increasing needs an additional EUR 150 million was allocated in December 2015, followed by a further EUR 150 million in December 2016.

The 3 components of the APF are: (1) African Peace Support Operations, (2) operationalisation of the APSA, and (3) initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism. The bulk of the APF funding was allocated to PSOs (EUR 1.76 billion or 89.5% of total contracts between 2004 and 2016), EUR 164 million (8.31%) was used for capacity-building and EUR 30 million (1.52%) for the ERM. It seems that lessons learned from the previous APF cycles have not been fully integrated into the latest financial envelope. The total costs of current AU PSOs is estimated at USD 1.2 billion per year. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) alone (with an approved strength of 22 126 uniformed personnel and 114 civilians) costs USD 900 million per year. The EU's financial support to AMISOM accounts for more than 80% of the PSOs contracted under the 2014-2016 APF and amounted to EUR 178 million in 2016. A specific APSA support programme covers priorities identified in the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap with a commitment of EUR 28.8 million. However, the APF’s capacity-building element is still weak.

In order to address concerns on transparency, accountability and reporting, the European Commission increased its control over the APF’s implementation and financial management activities by the AU and RECs/RMs. The complexity of funding procedures has also been partially addressed through simplification.
of the payment modalities for countries contributing troops to African-led PSOs. This should also help in addressing the issue of limited absorption capacity for external funding by the AU.

The mobilisation of African and international resources remains a priority for the partnership’s sustainability. The contribution from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund, one of the five pillars of APSA, equates to only 7%, due mainly to the high level of arrears and late payments of Member States’ assessed contributions. A major milestone decision taken by the AU Assembly in 2015 is to take financial responsibility for 25% of peace activities by 2020. The Kaberuka report of August 2016 envisages that a 0.2% import levy should contribute USD 325 million to the Peace Fund in 2017, rising to USD 400 million in 2020, while the remainder will fund the AU’s general budget. The launch of the Peace Fund, which according to Kaberuka’s original timeline was foreseen during the January 2017 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, did not take place. However, technical preparations have reportedly been progressing steadily.

2.1.3 Strengthened coordination with Regional Economic Communities and the United Nations

From interactions between the AU and the REC/RMs in the partnership’s framework, the continental level is expected to take a leadership role in channelling funds and providing orientation on policy directions. Although many RECs predate the constitution of the AU in 2002, such a hierarchical division is now generally accepted, albeit sometimes reluctantly. The question is when to act, who goes first and who takes what role.

A number of reports maintain that the most significant gaps lie in communication, coordination and harmonisation between RECs/RMs and the AU organs, a situation which has only partially been improved by the appointment of liaison officers. In the same vein, mainly due to the regional integration process’ slow pace and the well-known overlapping memberships of African regional organisations, RECs/RMs themselves face a number of challenges, which negatively impact not only on coordination with the AU, but also create internal problems in terms of mandates, visions and policy priorities. This is particularly relevant for the composition and functioning of some APSA components: for instance, in regard to the African Stand-by Force, the division of labour between RECs and the RMs remains unclear. In addition, it should be kept in mind that the AU officially recognises only eight REC/RMs with peace and security mandates; other regional groupings still remain outside of this framework.

Reinforcement of the partnership’s regional dimension was accomplished through the so-called Akosombo process, named after the inaugural meeting’s location in Ghana, which since November 2010 has brought together the AU and EU REC/RMs on peace and security issues at the level of senior officials and chief executives. The Akosombo process has partially improved working relations among the partners,

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70 A Memorandum of Understanding governing the relationship between AU and REC/RMs was concluded in January 2008.
73 These are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), as well as the East African Stand-by Force (EASF) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).
especially in terms of programme support coherence. The generic EU financing instrument for cooperation with RECs is the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) that are managed by the EU Delegations. The issue of consistency between support at regional and continental levels is one of the areas into which the EU needs to put more effort in order to coordinate its several strategies and instruments, such as the APF, the PanAf and the RIPs.

In addition, both the EU and the AU have committed to enhancing dialogue with the UN, especially on supporting sustainable and adequate funding for peace and security in Africa, as well as attracting contributions from other international partners, countries and organisations. The EU also participates in the AU Partners Group (AUPG) in Addis Ababa, which includes all the main AU donors. The AUPG plays a central role, as it makes information available, holds specific meetings, for instance on peace support operations, and allows for the alignment of work plans and budgets. However, it is not as effective as it could be, as it does not have authority over its members and some partners do not always want to be coordinated, especially when it comes to funding issues. Furthermore, the Member States’ representatives present are not really working with the AU but with few exceptions are accredited to the host country Ethiopia and extract rather than share information.

The Roadmap also includes a wide range of cross-cutting issues to be addressed through the JAES, such as terrorism, organised crime, trafficking and maritime security, together with a need to strengthen the human rights dimension, as well as the full and effective participation of women in peace and security processes.

2.2 Democracy, good governance and human rights

The second priority area of the Roadmap 2014-2017 is focusing on democracy, good governance and human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. The strategic objective is ‘to ensure a transparent, democratic and accountable environment in the respect of human rights and the rule of law, contributing to reducing fragility, fostering political stability and effective governance, and enabling sustainable and inclusive development and growth’.

2.2.1 Democracy and good governance

The promotion of democratic governance is one of the partnership’s core objectives and positive results have been achieved in this regard through specific programmes. In 2015 the EU launched a EUR 20 million call for CSO proposals to help promote more effective implementation and monitoring of continental legal instruments and to enhance their participation in continental decision-making processes. Similarly, a EUR 11 million ‘Pan-African Financial Governance Programme’ was adopted in 2014 to support harmonised approaches for improving standards of public finance systems through Pan-African organisations active in the four budget cycle areas: Tax policy and administration (ATAF), Budget reforms (CABRI), External audit (AFROSAI) and Legislative oversight (AFROPAC).

A second key area of cooperation is support for election monitoring by the African Union and the EU’s electoral observation missions. The AU has received EU support in developing and establishing observation methodology by providing capacity building, training, study visits and dedicated funds for...
deployed long-term observation missions\textsuperscript{79}. At the same time the EU has also continued to deploy its own monitoring missions\textsuperscript{80}. For instance, in 2016 Election Observation Missions (EOMs) were deployed by the EU in Gabon, Zambia, Ghana and Uganda, while an Election Experts Mission (EEM) was sent to Somalia\textsuperscript{81}.

Encouraging full and active participation of civil society is among the Roadmap’s objectives\textsuperscript{82}. This objective has only partially been met by involving CSOs in some instances, but with a significant gap in high-level meetings. This is mainly due to the fact that the involvement of different stakeholders and the process to select them (e.g. by national governments) remain controversial issues among European and African partners\textsuperscript{83}.

According to the Roadmap, the EU should also support the full operationalisation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA)\textsuperscript{84}. The AGA is a platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders who are mandated to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa, in addition to translating the objectives of the legal and policy pronouncements in the AU Shared Values\textsuperscript{85}. However, in a nutshell, whereas general EU support to the AGA was formal, but not practical\textsuperscript{86}, individual Member States (e.g. Germany) were more directly supportive\textsuperscript{87}. In the democracy and good governance domain, the role of Parliaments seems also limited. The European parliamentary members could take a more active role in electoral observation missions. Both African and European members could also play a stronger role scrutinizing the implementation of the JAES or fostering the presence of the President of the European Parliament to the AU’s institutions and African countries and vice versa. A real legislative role of the Pan-African Parliament, for instance through the implementation of the so-called Malabo Protocol, could reinforce the cooperation on the African side\textsuperscript{88}.

\subsection*{2.2.2 Human rights and culture}

In the Roadmap, human rights are presented as a priority implemented through different forums and collaborations. However, as a cross-cutting issue and conditionality for other programmes, the EU has toned down its approach since 2014\textsuperscript{89}. This has still allowed support for some specific initiatives such as ‘Strengthening the African Human Rights System’\textsuperscript{90} adopted in 2015 under the Pan African Programme. With a budget of EUR 10 million, amongst its main objectives this initiative supported capacity building to reinforce the secretariats of human rights organs, implementation of strategic plans for the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR or Court), the Pan-African Parliament and the Child Committee\textsuperscript{91}. In accordance with the Roadmap, special attention was dedicated to the African Union Human Rights Year 2016 and implementation of its action plan.

Similarly, in 2014 a targeted programme of EUR 5 million was launched under the EIDHR to support the capacity and coordination of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI). Additionally, a EUR 10 million programme contributing to a transparent, democratic and accountable environment was initiated with

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with European Parliament officer, Brussels, 12 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{80} Since 2007, 49 EU electoral missions were deployed in Africa.
\textsuperscript{81} EEAS, List of EU EOM and EEM missions 1993 – 2016.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with European Parliament officer, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{84} African Governance Architecture (AGA), website: http://aga-platform.org/.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview with European Parliament officer, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{86} GIZ, Support to the African Governance Architecture (AGA).
\textsuperscript{87} Peter Fabricius, \textit{Will the Pan African Parliament ever be worthy of its name?}, 5 May 2016, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-pan-african-parliament-ever-be-worth-of-its-name
\textsuperscript{88} Interview with European Parliament officer, Brussels, 11 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, p. 11-12.
support from the African Governance Architecture. More specifically, a EUR 11 million contribution to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme to combat Female Genital Mutilation was adopted in 2015\textsuperscript{91}.

The partnership on human rights also continues in the college-to-college format. The last AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue took place on 10 January 2017 in Brussels\textsuperscript{92}. As on previous occasions, the meeting was preceded by an AU-EU Civil Society seminar.

Regarding culture, the Roadmap 2014-2017 presents specific potential collaborations on fighting against illicit trafficking of cultural goods, the enhancement of tangible and intangible cultural heritage and diversity, digital inventories and promotion of ‘an inclusive approach to culture as enabler and facilitator for development’\textsuperscript{93}. However, no specific programmes appear as yet to have been implemented in these areas.

2.3 **Human development**

Priority area 3 of the Roadmap 2014-2017 has the strategic objective to ‘promote human capital development and knowledge and skills based societies and economies, amongst others by strengthening the links between education, training, science and innovation, and better manage mobility of people’\textsuperscript{94}.

2.3.1 **Science, technology and innovation**

This key area of cooperation spans a range of different subjects, from climate change to food security\textsuperscript{95}. Science, technology and innovation (STI) is one the JAES’ most active areas, supported by regular meetings, complex projects and publications.

The EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue on STI has met regularly and achieved joint results with a long-term vision\textsuperscript{96}. Among the results, for instance, the ‘Roadmap toward a jointly funded EU-Africa Research & Innovation Partnership with a focus on food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture’\textsuperscript{97} was adopted at the 3rd EU Africa HLPD Senior Officials’ meeting, held in Addis Ababa during April 2016. Under the Pan African Programme’s umbrella, the African Union received EU support for the second phase of African Union Research Grants\textsuperscript{98} and extension of the Africa Connect\textsuperscript{99} initiative aimed at creating and developing regional education and research communication networks as well as high-capacity Internet connectivity with a gateway to global research collaboration.

2.3.2 **Higher education**

In the last three years cooperation on higher education has continued under the auspices of other initiatives such as Erasmus+ and Marie Skłodowska-Curie, actions which involve hundreds of students and scholars. Similarly, the Mwalimu Nyerere African Union Scholarship Scheme (MNAUSS)\textsuperscript{100}, launched in

\textsuperscript{91} The Africa-EU Partnership website, Democracy, good governance and human rights.
\textsuperscript{92} The Africa-EU Partnership website, 12th AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Some of these subjects are analysed in section 2.5 on Global Challenges.
\textsuperscript{96} See website of HLPD on STI.
\textsuperscript{97} AU-EU, Roadmap towards a jointly funded EU-Africa Research & Innovation Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture, 2016.
\textsuperscript{98} European Commission, ANNEX 3 of the Commission implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2014 of the DCI Pan-African Programme.
\textsuperscript{100} The Africa-EU Partnership website, A boost for African university students – the Nyerere programme.
2007, financed scholarships for students to undertake postgraduate studies and facilitated the mobility of academic as well as administrative staff within Africa.

The EU also supports the initiative on the African Union Higher Education Harmonisation and Quality Assurance\textsuperscript{101}. The programme has facilitated networking, exchanges, dialogue and training, but the main impact will be visible at the end of 2018 when the last two phases will be concluded (for instance in regard to ‘sustainability and further development of the Pan African QA and Accreditation System’). Similarly, the pilot programme ‘Tuning Africa 2015-2018\textsuperscript{102} is in place as a concrete output from the Roadmap 2014-2017, but a full evaluation of the results achieved by the programme is not expected until the second part of 2018.

2.3.3 Mobility, migration and employment

Migration is the area that has received most political attention from the EU in the JAES framework. The Valletta Summit (11-12 November 2015)\textsuperscript{103} and the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa\textsuperscript{104} represent a high-level political dialogue and a robust fund, respectively. Such initiatives are very much in line with the main priorities of the Roadmap 2014-2017 (intra and inter-regional labour mobility, address trafficking in human beings, cooperation on irregular migration, promoting respect of the human rights of migrants), but two shortfalls appear evident. Firstly, ‘respect of the human rights of migrants’\textsuperscript{105} presented by the Roadmap has not been operationally prioritised in all programmes and activities. Then, the EU has acted with an approach based on emergency, rather than regular political dialogue and long-term vision and the Trust Fund risks to be disconnected from other development programmes. Whilst the Migration and Mobility Dialogue\textsuperscript{106}, also mentioned by the Roadmap, has continued, it seems disconnected and lacking in influence when compared with the other programmes\textsuperscript{107}. Consequently, some dynamics, such as African internal migration, risk being neglected

The Roadmap also supports stronger ‘synergies between migration and development, including by reducing the costs of remittances, enhancing the role and engagement of the diaspora and consolidating the African Institute for Remittances\textsuperscript{108}. The migration-development nexus is present in several EU documents and policies, but its deep and complex implications remain unexplored, as well as the role of diaspora. Regarding remittances, the EU remains the main contributor of the African Institute for Remittances and has contributed to reduce the costs of transfers, while the recipient banks and other agents maintain high rates, representing the next challenge.

2.4 Sustainable and inclusive development together with growth and continental integration

Priority area 4 of the Roadmap 2014-2017 covers a broad set of economic sectors, including the specific domain of agriculture and food security. The key strategic objectives identified by the document include: economic growth promotion and poverty reduction; job creation and sustainable entrepreneurship empowerment, particularly among youth and women; development of private sector and SMEs;

\textsuperscript{101} HAQAA website.
\textsuperscript{102} Tuning Africa website.
\textsuperscript{103} The Africa-EU Partnership website, 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration, 18 November 2015.
\textsuperscript{104} European Commission, A European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 12 November 2015.
\textsuperscript{107} From a budgetary point of view, the Migration and Mobility Dialogue receives EUR 18.5 million compared to over EUR 730 million already approved by the EC (the initial allocation of EUR 1.88 billion).
\textsuperscript{108} African Institute for Remittances website. The Institute was founded in 2012 under the AU umbrella.
The Joint Africa-EU strategy

The Joint Africa-EU strategy is focused on continental integration, notably in the sectors of infrastructure development, energy, industrialisation. In order to achieve these objectives, the Roadmap defines two main key areas for cooperation.

2.4.1 Private investment, infrastructure and continental integration

In this area, the EU and the AU expect to strengthen continental integration and trade, particularly thanks to private sector involvement (specifically public-private partnerships). The EU External Investment Plan (EIP) – especially through the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) – for the first time intends to provide an integrated approach to boosting investments by mobilising additional private and public resources for sustainable and economically viable projects in Africa. Additionally, under the EU-Africa Business Forum (EABF), the parties launched a structured dialogue platform called Sustainable Business for Africa (SB4A).

According to the Roadmap, the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa by 2017 (along with the implementation of the Boosting Intra-Africa Trade initiative) is certainly a major objective in this domain. However, to date progress in this domain remains limited: between 2012 and 2015 intra-Africa trade grew only by 4% (from 11% to 15%, compared for instance with 60% in the EU) and implementation of the CFTA is far from being a reality. Progress on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) also continues to lag behind: to date, only the EPA with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) has come into force, while Interim agreements with individual countries have been ratified by Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Mauritius, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and the Seychelles. In this context, although the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 of the PanAf 2014-2020 identifies ‘Trade and continental integration’ as one of the four Components of Priority Area 4, the single Annual Action Programmes (2014, 2015 and 2016) do not present any specific action (and funding allocations) on the subject.

As for cooperation on a joint capacity to elaborate ‘Statistics and Economic Analysis’, the redaction of the statistical compendium ‘The European Union and the African Union – A statistical portrait’ was jointly produced for the first time in 2016 by Eurostat and the Statistics Division of the African Union Commission in the framework of the promotion of economic governance as foreseen by the JAES. This represents a positive step forward in developing mutual understanding and planning common initiatives. Actions in this sector are also promoted through Pan African Statistics (PAS) funds allocated by the PanAf Annual Action Programme 2014.

Furthermore, the Roadmap encourages closer cooperation in the area of industrial development, paying particular attention to the sustainable management and good governance of raw materials as well as natural resources. Generally speaking, energy products and crude materials still represent more than half of the EU-28 imports from Africa, although they decreased from 67% of the total to 52%. In this specific domain, although the PanAf Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 lists ‘Raw Materials’ as one of the key Components of Priority, no concrete action has been yet undertaken by the EU. However, the ‘EU-AU Joint Session on Infrastructure for the Mineral Sector’, jointly organised in March 2015 as part of the development arm of the JAES and the ‘EU Raw Material Strategy’, represents an initial effort made by the parties towards implementation of the Roadmap. The meeting discussed existing support programmes for infrastructure and industrial development in Africa such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development.

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110 EU-Africa Business Forum website.
111 European Commission, Overview of Economic Partnership Agreements, June 2017.
in Africa (PIDA) as well as on-going regional programmes and development corridors across Africa. Also on the agenda was Accelerating Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA), which is another key priority area identified by the Roadmap.115

Closely related to this issue, various AU-EU cooperation initiatives in the infrastructure domain have been launched within the PanAf framework. Indeed, over the last three-years the EU has founded specific actions in the following fields: ‘EU-Africa Infrastructure Support Mechanism’; ‘Support to Africa Transport Policy Programme Development Plan 3 (SSATP DP 3)’; ‘Pan-African Support to the EuroGeoSurveys and Organisation of the African Geological Surveys’; ‘European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service in Africa Support Programme’; ‘Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Africa Support Programme’. These final two initiatives, in particular, contribute to fostering AU-EU cooperation in the space domain. This is appropriate also in light of the ‘African Space Policy and Strategy’ adopted by the AU’s Head of State and Government in 2016.116

The development of an EU-Africa dialogue in the field of sustainable energy is another key issue addressed by the Roadmap. As mentioned above, energy resources still represent the bulk of bilateral trade, but great efforts are needed to ensure sustainable access to energy in the African continent.117 The EU action in this domain is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation, witnessed by the number of initiatives aimed at improving electricity access across Africa (European Development Fund, European External Investments Plan, Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, Africa Investment Facility, Electrification Financing Initiative, Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund)118.

In this respect, the Africa-EU Energy Partnership (AEEP) represents an important forum for discussion and collaboration between the parties: launched in 2007 as part of the JAES framework (and supported by the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility, EUEI PDF), over the last three years the AEEP has contributed to the strengthening of political and technical dialogue on energy issues between EU and AU. The 2014 High-Level Meeting in Addis Ababa and the AEEP Status Report’s launch (aimed at monitoring implementation of the 2020 targets), the 2015 Ministerial Meeting and the 2016 Second Stakeholder Meeting both held in Italy have contributed to the AEEP’s international recognition as a key institution for the promotion of sustainable energy in Africa (i.e. during the 2015 G7 Elmau Summit). The Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) operates under the AEEP umbrella and is aimed at supporting the development of markets for renewable energy in Africa by advising governments and project developers, disseminating market information and funding opportunities as well as supporting skills development.119

2.4.2 Agriculture, food security and food safety

European support for initiatives in the domains of agriculture, food security and safety under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is a key area of cooperation identified by the Roadmap. Within the framework of the EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue in Science Technology and Innovation, the EU and AU launched a Research and Innovation Partnership that led to the creation of a Roadmap concerning a jointly funded EU-Africa Research & Innovation Partnership on

116 European Commission, Pan-African Programme website.
117 In Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, 600 million people have no access to power and electrification rates predominantly stay below 30%.
118 Simone Tagliapietra, Electrifying Africa: how to make Europe’s contribution count, Brugel Policy Contribution N. 17, June 2017.
119 Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) official website.
120 The European Commission has allocated EUR 47.5 million to fund the Partnership over a 4-year period (2014-17).
Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture (FNSSA). The FNSSA Roadmap identifies short, medium and long-term actions in the agriculture and food domain. Running in parallel, the PanAf Annual Action Programme 2016 funds the specific action LIVE2AFRICA (Pan-African Support to the AU-IBAR for a Sustainable Development of Livestock for Livelihoods in Africa). This action, supporting the implementation of the Livestock Development Strategy for Africa, encourages the development of a stronger and more sustainable livestock sector in Africa, in order to enable food and nutritional security across the continent.

2.5 Global challenges

The Strategic objectives identified within the Roadmap 2014-2017 Priority area 5 to a large extent appear vague and undefined. Indeed, implementation of the JAES in this area is expected to (generally) contribute to the achievement of ‘common positions in global fora and international negotiations and jointly address global challenges’. Climate change and environment protection is certainly among the most relevant challenges: however, contrary to the JAES Action Plan 2011-13, which assigned Climate change and Environment to a specific Partnership (No 6), quite surprisingly the new Roadmap downgrades the importance of this issue, which is now included in the area of the more general Global Challenges Priority. Under implementation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda (adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs), the list of issues addressed by Priority area 5 is completed with reform of the international governance system and disarmament.

2.5.1 Climate change and environment

In the last few years, the fight against climate change has been at the centre of the Africa-EU political agenda. In the April 2014 Summit’s declaration, the parties reiterated their willingness to work together to fight climate change and reach an effective deal during the 2015 COP21, which then successfully concluded with the signature of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, following the US withdrawal from the agreement in June 2017, the EU and the AU immediately released a Joint Communiqué, reaffirming their strong commitment in continuing to address climate change challenges.

The EU’s development funding towards sustainable energy in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2014-2020 amounts to approximately EUR 2.7 billion. In this context, it is important to highlight that based on a European Parliament proposal, at least 35% of the funding under EFSD is expected to support investment contributing to implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate change. However, rather alarmingly, although the PanAf Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 identifies Climate change and the Environment as comprising one of its key components, no specific action is foreseen on this issue in the three Annual Action Programmes (2014, 2015 and 2016).

As highlighted above, significant steps have been undertaken in the mitigation domain, thanks to initiatives promoting and expanding the penetration of renewable energies across the continent. The EU, for instance, supports the AU-led Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) with a EUR 300 million fund expected to leverage total investments amounting to EUR 4.8 billion and add 1.8 GigaWatt of new renewable capacities.

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125 European Commission, Pan-African Programme website.
renewable energy generation in Africa. However, much has still to be done in the joint fight against climate change, particularly regarding environment adaptation and protection. In this context, evolution of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) into GCCA+ represents an important move. Though not exclusively focused on Africa, the programme aims to strengthen political dialogue as well as technical and financial support to the implementation of national climate changes policies, paying specific attention to the adaptation domain (focus on National Adaptation Planning, NAP) and risk mitigation126.

2.5.2 Post-2015 Development Agenda

The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals was one of the main priorities of the JAES. During the UN General Assembly in 2010, the EU had launched the Millennium Development Goal initiative to help African, Caribbean and Pacific nations to reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. However, the initiative was not able to attract additional economic resources and the funds were channelled from the EDF. The initiative set some priorities based on the EU and UN mid-term evaluations of the MDGs, but had a limited impact due to the lack of fresh resources and the concurrent economic crisis.

As the Post-2015 Development Agenda resulted in adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals, the EU elaborated a renewed approach in this regard through the Communication ‘Next steps for a Sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’127 and the ‘New European Consensus on Development: Our world, our dignity, our future’128, as well as new modalities for cooperation with its partners. Although the Communication attempts to establish an overall bilateral framework Africa-EU, the cooperation between Europe and Africa on this subject is still part of the more general post-Cotonou framework on future relations with the ACP Group of States. In this respect, the EU has not yet foreseen a specific programme replicating the Africa-EU Millennium Development Initiative launched in 2010. At the same time, the EU has not considered to discuss the post-Cotonou framework at the AU-EU Summit, while the event could represent an opportunity to reflect on the future of the agreement.

On the African side, adoption of the AU’s Agenda 2063 and its 10-year implementation have been welcomed by the EU, which agreed with its African counterparts to maintain a regular dialogue on implementation, financing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting129.

2.5.3 Proliferation of small arms and light weapons, weapons of mass destruction and transfers of conventional arms

The EU continues efforts towards implementation of its ‘Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Ammunition’ through international regional actions addressing the African continent. In the last trimester the EU pursued three specific projects – targeting security and stockpile management, illicit accumulation and trade as well as better data collection on weapons and ammunition – in the Sahel, Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa130.

2.5.4 Reform of the international governance system

There are no major AU-EU actions that can be identified in this domain. A commitment to reform the international governance system, including the United Nations, International Financial Institutions and the World Trade Organisation, to make it more effective and representative is enshrined in both Agenda 2063

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126 Global Climate Change Alliance+ official website.
127 European Commission, Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability, November 2016.
128 European Commission, New European Consensus on Development: Our world, our dignity, our future, June 2017.
129 European Commission, Joint Communiqué between the African Union Commission and the European Commission at their 8th College to College Meeting, April 2016.
and EU Global Strategy. However, diverging positions among African and European Member States have so far impeded implementation of joint political initiatives.

### 2.6 Implementation of the Roadmap 2014-2017 at a glance

Overall, the results achieved through the implementation of the Roadmap 2014-2017 are mixed. The biggest shortcoming lies in the inability to trigger political dialogue at the highest level between EU and African partners, especially on crucial matters such as migration, international justice, human rights and the reform of global governance. The failure in establishing the Joint Annual Forum to conduct a result-oriented assessment of the Roadmap also jeopardized the objective of a constant and active engagement by the private sector and civil society.

In the peace and security domain, it is undeniable that the EU remains a crucial partner for Africa in terms of both financial and technical support, but there are problems related to the complexity and fragmentation of EU’s funding schemes and lack of absorption capacity by the AU. Moreover, the goal of empowering African peace and security structures still struggles with the heavy dependency of the AU on external sources of funding.

The cooperation on democracy and good governance is limited and in the future should move far beyond electoral observation missions and formal cooperation. The African Governance Architecture (AGA), for instance, should work on practical issues and receive full support from both sides. Mobility, migration and employment is a field that received significant attention from the EU, but without close attention to local needs and to long-term challenges related to poverty eradication.

In terms of investments promotion and business enhancement, the action of the EU still appears confused and ineffective, certainly not sufficient for the economic growth, poverty reduction and job creation expected by the Roadmap. Significant efforts have also to be done in the domain of low-carbon energy and fight against climate change. Indeed, the lack of a unique and coherent Africa-EU framework to address these issues makes the programmatic objectives particularly difficult to be achieved.

The following table provides a schematic assessment of the main issues presented in the Roadmap:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political dialogue</td>
<td>Securitisation of the migration agenda and divergences over human rights and international criminal justice have reinforced the African perception of a one-way dialogue. Efforts towards enhanced policy dialogue jeopardised by insufficient communication and coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)</td>
<td>Full operationalization still hampered by still insufficient absorption capacity, accountability and mobilization of own resources by African partners. Complexity and fragmentation of EU funding and insufficient focus on capacity-building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination with RECs and UN</td>
<td>Strengthened ties, but still gaps in communication, coordination and harmonization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and good governance</td>
<td>Limited, focused mainly on electoral observation and formal cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The African Governance Architecture (AGA)</td>
<td>Formal, not focused on practical issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility, migration and employment</td>
<td>Prioritized, but as a European short-run interest without close attention to local needs and to long-term challenges related to poverty eradication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>EU support to some specific institutional initiatives. Weak as a cross-cutting issue and conditionality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment, infrastructure and continental integration</td>
<td>Limited contribution to concrete achievements (i.e. in trade and market integration).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, food security and food safety</td>
<td>Focus on technology, but no push for necessary effort in the regulatory domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change and environment</td>
<td>Emphasis on the use of development funding for climate change, but action is so far too focused on mitigation and does not cover sufficiently adaption and environment protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-2015 Development Agenda</td>
<td>No specific initiative to integrate SDGs in Africa-EU cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and weapons of mass destruction and transfers of conventional arms</td>
<td>Limited regional-based initiatives. Lack of an overall architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform of the international governance system</td>
<td>Action blocked by divergences still in place within regional groups and in the Africa-EU relations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Joint Communication for a renewed impetus to the Africa-EU partnership: priorities and challenges

A Joint Communication was released in May 2017 aimed at giving renewed impetus to the Africa-EU Partnership ahead of the AU-EU Summit in November. This document is a welcome initiative by the EU to address key challenges identified in the chapters above and put forward proposals for the future of Africa-EU relations, to be reflected in a new Roadmap for 2018-2020. As such, it can be considered as a position paper produced by the EU to inform and influence the Summit’s deliberations, in an attempt to prioritise and communicate the EU’s strategic interests in the Partnership’s framework more effectively. As stated in the document, the Communication: (1) builds on strategic documents recently released by both the EU and AU, namely EU Global Strategy and Agenda 2063; (2) contributes to ongoing reflection launched through the Joint Communication on ‘A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific’; (3) is guided by international frameworks such as the UN’s Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (although the implementation of the SDGs is never mentioned into the text), its Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) on financing for development and the Paris Agreement on climate change; and (4) it is consistent with other relevant EU policies.

Significantly, whilst the Communication contains an introductory chapter on the changing landscape in Africa, which points to the main opportunities and challenges for the African continent in the economic, political and social sectors, there is no reference to the state of play and important challenges ahead for the EU. This reinforces the Communication’s image as an EU wish list for the next Summit and the following years of partnership with Africa. In line with this approach, it is stressed that the EU clearly has a strategic interest in deepening and adapting its longstanding partnership with Africa, highlighting three broad and interrelated EU’s strategic objectives built on the JAES: (1) stronger mutual engagement and increased cooperation in the international arena, based on common values and shared interests, including bilateral relations; (2) security, on land and sea, and the fight against transnational threats as investment in security on both continents; and (3) sustainable and inclusive economic development in Africa, to create the jobs that the continent needs and seize the opportunities it offers to Europe.

The first part is dedicated to reinforcement of the political relationship with Africa, touching upon one of the most sensitive and neglected areas of political cooperation so far: deepening coalitions on global governance issues. The focus is on reform of multilateral institutions, especially in regard to the UN system, including the Security Council. Unfortunately, this is an extremely sensitive issue for both Europe and Africa. Europe has so far failed to develop a common position concerning reform of the UN Security Council, with two permanent members – France and UK – interested in maintaining the status quo, Germany advocating the creation of new permanent members together with Japan, India and Brazil in the so-called G4, whilst Italy and other middle sized European countries call for an enlargement of the Council’s composition through the inclusion of non-permanent members in the Uniting for Consensus coalition. As a regional entity, the AU is alone in presenting a unitary position on the matter in the so-called ‘Ezulwini Consensus’, formally endorsed in the July 2005 Sirte Declaration. Yet, this proposal is increasingly

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131 European Commission, Joint Communication on A renewed partnership with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, JOIN(2016) 52 final, Strasbourg, 22 November 2016.
133 Ibid., p. 5.
downplayed by major African players aspiring to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, realising that its prescriptions could be counterproductive for their own national strategic objectives.

However, there is space for a reinforced region-to-region diplomacy between Europe and Africa in the context of the UN on matters of common concern, including peace and security, climate change, epidemics, natural resources, migration and mobility as well as humanitarian crises. The rule of law and justice are also common priorities for Europe and Africa. Nevertheless, the positions recently taken by some African countries against the International Criminal Court (see section 2.1.1) are destined to jeopardise the dialogue between the EU and the AU on this subject. On their side, African partners have so far failed to show strong commitment to building a solid justice system at continental level

The second priority for a reinforced political relationship included in the Communication is to increase cooperation on common interests and based on frequent political interaction, in particular at ministerial level, not just on foreign policy issues, but also on sectorial policy initiatives and partnerships. As analysed above, this has been one of the weakest pillars of the Partnership’s political dialogue. While college-to-college meetings between the AU and European Commissions have been functioning regularly and in an effective manner, ministerial meetings have been organised on an ad hoc basis and only sporadically on specific thematic issues. This reflects a still limited buy-in from Member States in the Partnership, which remains mainly anchored to the Brussels-Addis Ababa axis.

Finally, delivering a people-centred partnership is correctly labelled a challenging objective, as demonstrated by the analysis in section 1.3. The main obstacles to implementation of this key JAES objective, namely engagement with local authorities, the private sector and civil society, are linked to the lack of space for non-institutional actors in the formal architecture of the partnership, the difficulty and the diverging approaches in identifying the relevant non-institutional stakeholders by EU and AU structures, the lack of capacity and resources for non-institutional actors to make contributions and influence the political dialogue.

After listing the EU's strategic objectives, the Communication points out ways of converting them into actions, and particularly: (1) Building more resilient states and societies; and (2) Creating more and better jobs, especially for youth. Under these two strands, there is an attempt to connect specific actions identified by the EU to an African vision, in finally proposing a number of flagships to achieve the objectives identified. However, the nature of these flagships and their coherence with the text of the Communication is not always clear.

3.1 Building more resilient states and societies

Compared with previous documents, the EU’s choice of language has switched from ‘peace and security’ to ‘resilient states and societies’, stressing the aspect of ‘fragility’ as a direct threat to the EU, in line with its Global Strategy narrative.

3.1.1 Preventing conflicts, addressing crises and building peace

Within the African vision outlined in the Communication, reference is made to key strategic documents adopted such as Agenda 2063, Paul Kagame’s report ‘The imperative to reinforce our Union’ and Donal Kaberuka’s report on ‘Securing predictable and sustainable financing for peace in Africa’. The adoption of APSA is also included as a milestone for the AU’s ambitions to secure peace and reconciliation. In terms of EU action, a number of steps and flagship initiatives are proposed to boost the partnership.

135 See James Mackie et. al., Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2017, op. cit., p. 8.
136 As emerged from the latest Africa-EU Civil Society Forum, Tunis, 10-12 July 2017.
Conflict prevention is centred on a series of actions, including strengthened support to achieve full APSA operationalisation with the building of African capacities. It is complemented by actions aimed at addressing crises and improving conflict management, including initial steps for post conflict peacebuilding such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, both through the EU’s specific instruments such as the APF and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. As underlined above, the EU already contributes significantly in financial terms to this objective, in particular through the APF. However, financial sustainability options have yet to be implemented which will turn the African ownership principle into reality.

Capacity-building is a sector to be reinforced in the partnership, as correctly pointed out by the Communication, particularly in the fields of:

1. Security sector reform, through CSDP missions – both civilian and military – and complementary support such as capacity-building for security and defence (CBSD);
2. Civilian rule of law and law enforcement capacities, in particular African countries’ abilities to counter terrorism, piracy, violent radicalisation and organised crime effectively;
3. Effective implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, policies and conventions, providing relevant expertise;
4. Maritime and aviation security, e.g. through the Instruments contributing to Stability and Peace.

All of these actions require significant funding to be concentrated on capacity-building, possibly redirecting part of the disproportionate funding currently allocated to African PSOs within the Partnership, as well as a direct involvement of relevant countries and RECs/RMs.

A first proposal is to further intensify coordination and dialogue by setting up a collaborative platform bringing together the UN, European, African and other international partners. In reality, such a platform is already in place as the AU Partners Group (AUPG) in Addis Ababa. The most challenging step forward would be to transform it into an effective coordination mechanism in view of taking concrete actions to address threats and crises in Africa. This has not been the case so far and remains difficult due to the different and sometimes competing agendas of the various partners. The current dialogue between the AU and the UN in the framework of the Africa’s Integration and Development Agenda (PAIDA), which has a ten year (2017-2027) framework and includes a specific peace and security component, and the parallel dialogue conducted by the EU in the reactivated EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management can help triggering a new dynamism for a trilateral AU-EU-UN dialogue, to be extended to other interested partners.

The Communication foresees an EU’s initial contribution to a reinvigorated Peace Fund, possibly under the window ‘mediation and diplomacy’. As underlined above, the Peace Fund is a key pillar of the APSA, but contributions from the AU’s budget amounts only to 7%, while the rest of the funding is provided by external partners. The Kaberuka’s report, which envisions the implementation of a 0.2% levy on eligible imports on the continent in order to fund the AU’s activities, represents a relevant basis for relaunching the financial strategy of the APSA, but there is uncertainty about its effective implementation, as well as the financial management and the governance structure of the fund. The additional initiatives planned by the EU, such as demarches to AU Member States to underline the need to raise African funding for African-led PSOs and the introduction of a ceiling in PSOs contracts for a maximum contribution of 80% of troop allowances, can provide an additional stimulus in this direction.
Specifically concerning the **support to African initiatives in the field of maritime security**, the EU points on the implementation of the African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050)**137** and the Lomé Charter**138** to enhance the fight against piracy, people and drugs smuggling, and illegal fishing. In this sector, it is crucial to seek a greater involvement of actors at regional and state level, as foreseen by the EU through its support to a regional Maritime Situation Awareness and to the capacities of coastal states in the Indian Ocean, in the Gulf of Guinea and in the Mediterranean. The EU’s approach also includes the involvement of partners such as the Union for the Mediterranean and regional and sub-regional organisations in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.

### 3.1.2 Strengthen governance systems

The Communication refers to the role of resilient societies highlighting links between governance, development and security. Compared with the Roadmap 2014-2017, a stronger focus is paid to illicit financial flows and how they are largely surpassing the total amount of annual Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, this challenge stretches well beyond the governance system mentioned in the document, such as accountable, democratic, effective and transparent institutions, protection of human rights and inclusive participation of citizens in public decision making.

Methodologically, the Communication suggests that ‘both EU and Africa can benefit and learn from each other's experiences’**139**, but the actions rarely seem oriented toward real reciprocity.

**Support democracy and promote human rights as well as the rule of law**

This point has a robust focus on electoral observation, an aspect that has achieved significant results in the last three years both in terms of support for the AU and also electoral missions. A second focus is on political dialogues with partner countries based on the existing agreements.

The human rights dimension almost disappears, being mentioned only with a reference to ‘encouraging the ratification and implementation of international and AU's own human rights instruments at national level’**140**. Achieving this objective going beyond conditionality is the biggest challenge for the EU. The EU seems, in fact, more oriented than in the past toward a pragmatic approach to the human rights dimension, including conditionality, ICC or related issues, with a view to give the AU full responsibility for implementation. For the AU, the main challenge lies in exercising adequate political weight and using the right leverages to push for the adoption of its own human rights instruments at national level.

**Promote accountable, transparent and responsive governance**

The Communication raises expectations on the participation of citizens in decision-making processes, in particular youth and women. The forums and tools mentioned span from eGovernance services, civil society engagement in advocacy and policy shaping and support to local authorities. eGovernance is a new field that could warrant attention, but would need adequate telematics infrastructure, an aspect that is not touched on in the document.

Support to CSOs working on advocacy is certainly relevant, but civil society’s engagement in AU-EU processes – which has been a critical issue in recent years and represents one of the main challenges of the partnership – is not mentioned explicitly. Finally, support to local authorities appears as a valid field of

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**138** Adopted at the AU Extraordinary Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa in Lomé, Togo, on 15 October 2016.

**139** European Commission, Joint Communication for a renewed impetus for the Africa-EU partnership, 2017.

**140** Ibid.
work, especially in the concrete declaration of facilitating twinnings. This could be a way of encouraging mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents, as already presented in the JAES, and would certainly be in the full spirit of reciprocity.

**Building resilience to environmental degradation and humanitarian crises**

The Communication presents the EU’s support for African partners on disaster risk reduction, vulnerability to disease and ‘strengthening Africa’s own capacity to manage environmental and societal challenges’\(^{141}\).

In line with the Roadmap’s guidelines on Raw Materials, the document also mentions ‘social and environmental conditions in relation to the exploitation of natural resources, including the process of minerals extraction, processing and recycling’. It therefore focuses on environmental and social aspects related to minerals extraction, without mentioning economic and legal processes and their implications.

### 3.1.3 Manage migration and mobility

The Communication suggests a Joint AU-EU high-level conference on electoral processes, democracy and governance in Africa and Europe. This conference aims at exchanging expertise, best practices and lessons learned in a broad-based dialogue. This choice confirms the priority given by the EU to electoral observation over issues related to good governance, such as human rights. The exchange plans to involve the Pan-African and European Parliament, as well as civil society and academia. In this regard, two preliminary steps are necessary in order to have a relevant dialogue. Firstly, the African partners should strengthen the Pan-African Parliament, currently without the same legitimation of the EP. Secondly, the AU and EU and their Member States should agree on the definition of stakeholders, on the selection of CSOs and on their role.

The Communication points out as a priority the domestic resource mobilisation by 2020, in line with the Addis Tax Initiative under the ‘Collect More-Spend Better’ approach to establish efficient, effective, fair and transparent tax systems. This issue is considered a priority because in African countries domestic revenue mobilization is often below the necessary levels. A step forward of the African states in this direction could bring benefit at the domestic and regional level.

Finally, the sustainable management of natural resources is mentioned as a priority. However, this sector is pivotal for African development, not only as sustainable resource. The EU should support economic financial agreements between its Members States and African States both in term of pricing and for the transformation of raw materials in Africa, also tied to create new opportunities for youth.

Migration and mobility are presented as a two-fold issue that can ‘strengthen societies but also destabilise them if not managed properly’\(^{142}\). In this light, the Communication invokes a ‘shared responsibility, calling also for global solutions, based on the principle of solidarity and responsibility-sharing’\(^{143}\). It recalls the Valletta Summit, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the Partnership Framework, the Rabat Process, and Khartoum Process as pivotal political processes. However, the Communication does not consider the ineffective programming of these steps which are mainly intended to serve the EU’s internal objective of curbing migration flows.

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\(^{141}\) European Commission, Joint Communication for a renewed impetus for the Africa-EU partnership, 2017.

\(^{142}\) European Commission, Joint Communication, op. cit., p. 12.

\(^{143}\) Ibid.
Additionally, EU development funding has been channelled through the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa with non-transparent processes, bypassing most good governance principles and without full alignment with partner countries’ priorities. In addition, migration patterns, rather than a country’s needs, determine the allocation of aid, diverting from long-term development goals. A clear challenge exists, therefore, in trying to link all resources to the goal of eradicating poverty, still considered by the last EU documents as the main objective of development aid\textsuperscript{144}.

**Address regional migration flows and related cross-border challenges**

The policies identified to address regional migration flows seem unclear and oriented to reinforcing the challenges presented above. In particular, the concept of ‘Integrated Border Management’ should be clarified in order to avoid generating confusion with the ‘regulatory frameworks conducive to legal migration and mobility within Africa’\textsuperscript{145}. The Global Compact, planned to be finalised in 2018, should consider all these aspects.

**Maximise the dividends of regular migration and mobility as well as its potential as a development driver**

This section does not present innovative approaches to regular migration and it appears inadequate to meet the current challenges. The possibility of reinforcing the number of regular migrants and the option of using offices and embassies outside the EU to process applications for asylum and refugee status before migrants reach Europe are not considered. However, these policies could reduce irregular migrations and save human lives.

Emphasis is given to remittances and the role of diaspora, but without stating how they could become agents of development. The only policy strengthening regular migration is represented by ‘further increase of students and researchers’ mobility’\textsuperscript{146}. To be effective, this action should not only involve a significant increase in numbers (from hundreds to thousands) but also be mutual with opportunities for students and researches to spend time in African universities.

**Enhance cooperation on irregular migration**

The Communication mentions adequate measures and comprehensive legislative frameworks to fight against trafficking and smuggling networks. It also presents ‘preventing and discouraging the use of irregular channels’ in tandem with ‘promoting regular migration and mobility opportunities’\textsuperscript{147}. However, the previous section displays the inadequacy of these opportunities.

The Communication highlights the support to *African initiatives on regular Intra-African migration* and mobility and the increase Africa-EU cooperation in the fight against smuggling and trafficking networks. These priorities well represent the EU Agenda and they show limited opportunities for the African partners.

In addition, the support to the regular Intra-African migration and mobility risks to be limited by other policies (e.g., on boarder management) and by the EU’s limited understanding of African mobility (an example is the current approaches in the Sahel where the EU approach to boarder control risks to discourage regional migration in the Sahel-Maghreb area).

\textsuperscript{144} European Commission, European Consensus on Development, 2005.
\textsuperscript{146} European Commission, *Joint Communication*, op. cit. p. 13.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
3.2 More and better jobs, especially for youth

Although the section’s title might suggest a specific focus on jobs and labour policies, the text of the Communication broadens significantly the spectrum of action, putting under the same umbrella four key areas where the Africa-EU partnership can be deepened: (1) responsible investments; (2) sustainable energy; (3) agriculture and agro-business; (4) education, knowledge and skills. This is a relevant (and to a certain extent surprising) change compared to the Roadmap 2014-2017, which put education in Priority area 3 on Human development, investments and agriculture in Priority area 4 on Sustainable and inclusive development together with growth and continental integration, while energy reappears after being absent in a specific key area for cooperation in the Roadmap.

3.2.1 Attract responsible and sustainable investments

The Communication, in line with the Roadmap 2014-2017, emphasises the necessity to encourage investment into the African economic and industrial system. Along with macro-economic stability and regional markets integration, a favourable investment climate is one of the key factors identified by the Commission to foster economic development and job creation across the continent. The document raises great expectations on the private sector’s role in injecting the adequate levels of investment in Africa, while highlighting the importance of internalising social and environmental standards into economic and industrial policies, in line with universal sustainable development objectives. The integration of sustainability (i.e. low-carbon performance) and corporate responsibility (i.e. working conditions) parameters to evaluate development represents an important factor addressed by the Communication.

Boost massive responsible and sustainable investment in Africa

Encouraging massive responsible and sustainable investment in Africa is the pre-condition for any continental attempt to develop. Under the EIP umbrella, the EU has developed a set of financial tools to achieve this objective. However, while the creation of EIP represents a significant attempt to (at least partially) consolidate the European funding instruments, the fragmentation of these procedures is still a major obstacle to a conducive continental investment climate. In addition, the specific reference to the role of international financial institutions and development banks – completely missing in the Roadmap – has to be welcomed. Coordination between the AU-EU and these bodies is a key factor in trying to avoid duplications, overlapping and inefficiencies.

As with the Roadmap 2014-2017, the Communication then focuses on the realisation of enabling infrastructure in domains such as energy, water, transports and ICT. While infrastructure is certainly a sector where huge private (either national and international) investment could be channelled, the document pays too limited attention to the parallel development of adequate regulatory frameworks necessary to attract funds effectively and encourage private initiatives.

The attention paid by the Communication to business sustainability and social responsibility represents another significant improvement – possibly encouraged by the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs – compared with the Roadmap 2014-2017. However, it is still unclear how sustainability and responsibility parameters will be fully internalised with concrete actions to promote investment and economic growth.

Foster European and Africa business relations

EABF 2017 has activated a set of relevant mechanisms and initiatives to encourage Africa-EU business relations (covering very diverse domains). In this context, the launch of SB4A – to be created in the framework of EIP – represents a potential enabler for further and closer cooperation. The platform will be

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148 Energy was a Priority area of cooperation both in the First (2008-10) and in the Second (2011-13) Action Plans.
seen as particularly relevant if it can guide and orient the different European and African businesses through the complex procedures and mechanisms regulating Africa-EU relations. The EU Economic Diplomacy Missions for European investors in Africa is certainly a positive initiative, but should be accompanied by parallel efforts to present opportunities for African economic players to the European audience.

The Communication raises expectations on the positive contribution of EPAs (and Free Trade Agreements) to strengthen Africa-EU trade relations. In reality, EU attempts to conclude EPAs with its African counterparts are far from being successful and a serious reflection on the suitability of these tools to promote trade with Africa should, therefore, be launched at EU level.

**Support Africa's ambition to build a true inner-African market**

Continental market integration in Africa is a key objective of the Roadmap 2014-2017 which is reiterated as such by the Communication. However, concrete steps towards realisation of the CFTA (which was to be implemented by 2017) are still only partial today. Intra-African trade, potentially a key enabler of sustainable economic development and integration, still accounts for only a limited percentage of the continent’s total commercial exchanges.

Low manufacturing and processing capacity are among the causes of such a situation, but it does not seem that the Communication takes due account of these factors. At the same time, it is very important to reduce administrative custom burdens, introduce standardisation procedures and invest in better infrastructure to set the fundamental conditions for goods to flow across African countries’ borders, as the document correctly points out.

Two out of the three flagships are quite generic (i.e. generate massive EU investments in Africa via the proposed EIP; support a more predictable and conducive investment climate in Africa), and mainly respond to the key strategic of establishing a more favourable **investment climate** in Africa, in order to generate **massive EU investments** in the continent.

Remarkably, although rather nonspecific, the intention - third flagship - to support **Africa’s digital agenda**, possibly not applied only to the investment domain, but to all the sectors addressed by the Communication.

### 3.2.2 Energise Africa

The Communication – somehow at odds with the Roadmap 2014-2017 – rightly puts sustainable low carbon energy at the centre of the Africa-EU cooperation agenda. Indeed, access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy services are essential for Africa’s economic and social development. Today access-to-energy conditions are unacceptable, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa’s rural areas, where large parts of the population lack basic services and the levels of energy consumption per-capita are completely inadequate for the continent’s development needs. Despite its present energy poverty, Africa has great energy potential, both in terms of conventional and renewable resources. In the latter domain specifically, cooperation with the EU – the global leader in clean energy transition – is fundamental, particularly in the domains of generation, interconnection, market design and energy services development. The lack of a reference and link to broader climate policies, in particular in the sectors of adaption and environment protection, represents a flaw (though partial) in the overall structure of the document.

**Spur public and private investment in renewable energy in Africa**

Africa urgently needs private investment and more effective public-private cooperation in the energy domain together with the creation of a High-Level Platform to enable better coordination. However, along with the creation of such a platform, the EU should make a serious effort to rationalise the plethora of
instruments, mechanisms and facilities that are today used to channel investments into the African energy sector.

This high-level initiative cannot be sufficient by itself however, and should be accompanied by concrete bottom-up approaches. As highlighted by the Communication, through its unique experience in this domain, the EU can help African governments to improve the energy sector’s enabling environment: such efforts should also focus on regulatory mechanisms and technical and operational cooperation, through a well-established plan of capacity building activities.

Finally, the issue of cross-border interconnections should certainly be addressed in order to exploit the African energy potential fully. The realisation of cross-border interconnections requires political leadership and huge amounts of capital and in this context the EU can play an important role in facilitating the setting up of stable frameworks to encourage such initiatives. At the same time the EU approach must not forget the urgent need of (new or renewed) domestic transmission and distribution infrastructure and grids, necessary to exploit the huge renewable potential and connect millions of people that still lack access to basic electricity services.

Deepen strategic alliances and collaboration

The Communication rightly recognises the need to intensify dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the Africa-EU Energy Partnership with key international players and initiatives such as the G7 and G20, SE4All, and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) Power Africa. Attempts to coordinate actions more effectively with other international partners is necessary to streamline strategic objectives and avoid needless duplication and should be in line with internal EU efforts to rationalise its international energy cooperation modus operandi.

As mentioned above, focusing on a bottom-up approach to foster sustainable energy cooperation is fundamental if progress is to be made. In this context, the document’s emphasis on collaboration with local authorities to enable low-carbon transition, possibly exploiting existing frameworks such as the Global Covenant of Mayors (which recently launched the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy) is extremely positive. This is particularly relevant because Africa is undergoing an unprecedented process of urbanisation and the experience accumulated by cities around the world can offer relevant ‘lessons learned’ to African policy-makers and energy operators.

Finally, the enhancement of research cooperation through a EU-Africa Research and Innovation Partnership on climate and sustainable energy established in the EU-Africa High Level Policy Dialogue on science, technology and innovation should be welcomed. The initiative should consider the fact that today Energy R&D is regrettably the least developed/advanced dimension of the Energy Union: however, the financing and market opportunities offered by the African continent may prompt European acceleration in this domain.

The flagships attempt to concretely address key sustainable energy goals in Africa. The contribution to AREI’s initiative – expected reach 5 GW generation capacity from renewable energy by 2020, giving access to 30 million people and reducing the CO2 impact of the current inefficient energy sector – is an important effort to engage and empower African stakeholders. Also, the High Level Platform and the EU-Africa Research and Innovation Partnership on climate and sustainable energy could contribute to this objective, provided that significant steps in streamlining EU funding schemes for energy in Africa are taken.
3.2.3 Transforming African agriculture and agro-business, and its blue economy, including fisheries

The Communication recognises agro-food as a fundamental sector for the economic and social development of Africa and the main source of income for a large majority of the continent’s rural population. As it will continue to employ a large share of the region’s population until at least 2030 – according to projections, about 40% of all Africans entering the labour force over the next decade will primarily be engaged in agriculture – successful Africa-EU cooperation in this domain could add important value to the continent’s development process.

However, despite steady progress towards agricultural transformation – a good part of the continent has enjoyed sustained agricultural productivity growth since 2005 – the sector still fails to provide decent living conditions for most of the workforce. A number of continuing structural weaknesses, including a lack of capital, appropriate technologies, unsustainable management of resources, land property issues and the increasing effects of climate change combine to prevent the full exploitation of Africa’s agriculture potential. Similarly, sub-optimal governance, maritime insecurity, illegal and shadowy practices as well as the lack of technological, financial and human capabilities threaten the activities of fisheries, which represent the largest sector of the current African aquatic and ocean-based economy. As highlighted in the Communication, the role of the EU – Africa’s major partner in the agro-food domain – is fundamental in setting up both policy and regulatory initiatives aimed at maximising the sustainable development of these key sectors.

Spur responsible and sustainable value chain development

The Communication adds an important business dimension to its past approach towards the African agro-food sector. This is an important aspect to be highlighted, as one of the main challenges for sector development is the lack of technological, financial and human capabilities. Efforts to facilitate private sector investments (by reducing administrative complexity and limiting policy and regulatory risks) along agro-food value chains must, therefore, be welcomed, but need to be accompanied – as stressed in the document – by concrete climate-related measures for African agriculture/fisheries.

Growth in productivity cannot be obtained to the detriment of Africa’s environment and its citizens’ well-being: agro-food business initiatives should, therefore, integrate adaptation, biodiversity conservation and risk-management measures; the Africa-EU partnership should also establish clear mechanisms to assess these aspects.

However, emphasis placed by the Communication on the opportunities offered by EPAs to enable Africa’s seizing of market opportunities for its food production appears too optimistic. So far EPAs proved to be barely successful and the AU-EU should therefore identify more suitable frameworks to strengthen Africa’s capacity to comply with safety and quality standards.

Foster skills, innovation and collaborative research

The Communication adds an important capacity (vocational training and education) dimension to ensure a virtuous, reliable and sustainable transformation of the African agro-food sector. Such a bottom up approach, integrated by initiatives in the R&D domain (through the implementation of the Africa-EU Roadmap on FNSSA), has to be accompanied by more general policy and regulatory efforts to make the business initiatives of agro-food entrepreneurs and small-farmers doable. Better access to finance, connectivity and digital services – as proposed in the document – but also better infrastructure and lighter

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administrative burdens can significantly help African agriculture and fishery business to transform as needed.

The issue of EU investment is central also when the Communication addresses the agri-business and blue economy (including research and innovation), although the flagships are particularly vague in defining the actions to be concretely undertaken.

The expansion of the network of Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements between the EU and (so far 15) African countries represents a specific action to promote governance and transparent management of African fisheries.

3.2.4 Advance knowledge and skills

The Communication recognises education, knowledge creation and human capital as key factors for the empowerment of active, responsible and skilled African citizens and the sustainable development of the continent. Despite significant improvements experienced in recent years, the levels of education in Africa remain critical. In a context of demographic booming, Africa will need to unlock and unleash the full potential of young people, primarily through education and capacity building. Initiatives in the domains of science, technology, research and innovation are necessary to accompany this fundamental process of people empowerment.

Support quality education at all levels

Improving Africa’s performances in terms of access to and completion of primary and secondary education (paying particular attention to gender issues) is the key objective and the starting point of a more ambitious agenda; however, the Communication does not offer clear indications on how such objectives could and should be reached in practice.

In line with the Roadmap, the document then focuses on mobility together with regional educational integration and harmonization, focusing in particular on the potential of Erasmus+ in connecting African students and scholars.

Extend support for Vocational Education, Training and Entrepreneurship

VET is a fundamental tool for a continent that needs to create 18 million new jobs each year up to 2035 to absorb new labour market entrants. In this context, the launch of an EU VET Facility proposed by the Communication may represent an important vehicle to connect the education and labour sectors. If accompanied by the development of digital skills and literacy together with the use of digital technologies and services, this can contribute to more rapid and inclusive (also involving youth and women) social and economic development.

When it comes to higher education policies, mobility policies are of key importance, as demonstrated by the emphasis posed by the Communication on Erasmus+ also in this section, and should be accompanied by effort to harmonize education systems across the continent.

Intensify Africa-EU collaboration on research

Research and innovation form a tool for boosting social and economic development in Africa, as well as an instrument for deepening and expanding cooperation between the EU and the continent. Enhancing collaboration between researchers and innovators from Africa and Europe was an important objective identified by the Roadmap, and it is clearly reiterated in the Communication. Marie Skłodowska-Curie and Horizon 2020 programmes represent well-established tools to engage African researchers and scholars in
European R&D activities, and could significantly benefit from harmonisation, standardisation as well as digitalisation dynamics across the continent’s educational systems.

The two flagships proposed, the **African Youth facility** (expected to expand the scope of Erasmus+ programme) and the **EU VET facility** can contribute to promote more coherently and effectively educational activities in the continent. A closer link to the labour market could increase the effectiveness of the initiatives.

### 3.3 Some preliminary conclusions on the Joint Communication

The Joint Communication has the merit to spell out clearly the main EU objectives for a long-standing partnership with Africa, in the attempt to reinvigorate it but also to partially redirect the priorities for action in the next few years. It is the result of a reflection conducted by the EU institutions – primarily the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – mainly on the basis of the new strategic framework established by the EU Global Strategy and in view AU-EU Summit in Abidjan. EU Member States have welcomed the Joint Communication and committed to take it forward in the Summit and beyond.\(^{150}\)

On one side, the greater clarity on the EU’s strategic objectives provided for by the Joint Communication might enhance the buy-in of European national governments, in terms of both political and financial capital devoted to the partnership. On the other side, being a 100% genuine EU product, it might have a potentially disruptive impact on the institutionalisation of the relationship between European and African partners based on the JAES and its implementations plans and roadmap. As such, it might reinforce the perception by the African partners involved – AU, African governments and RECs – of a one-way dialogue and discourage their active engagement.

The gaps identified above in the implementation of the Africa-EU partnership seem to suggest the need for a reassessment of the cooperation scheme and the connected instruments. However, this cannot be the result of a EU-alone reflection on the future of the relationship, but it has to be grounded on a shared restructuring and dialogue, in the spirit of the partnership. The next Summit can lay the ground for a revision of the JAES, ten years after its adoption, and identify a roadmap for an inclusive and effective process to accomplish this objective.

4 Strengthening Africa-EU cooperation: the way ahead

The AU-EU Abidjan Summit to be held in November 2017 is a golden opportunity to relaunch cooperation between the EU and its Member States on one side, and the African continent on the other. The partnership established 10 years ago with the JAES has provided both the EU and the AU with a functioning scheme of interaction, with solid architecture, exchanges at political and technical level, as well as a significant financial basis and priority actions.

Nevertheless, its effective implementation has been hampered by a number of shortcomings, particularly those related to insufficient political dialogue, lack of commitment by national governments, limited engagement of civil society organisations, EU’s fragmented funding system, as well as the limited capacity to manage resources in a transparent and effective manner by African partners.

In the Joint Communication, the priority actions to be included in the next Roadmap 2018-2020 are anchored to an African vision, but mainly linked to the EU’s strategic interests. This approach is aimed at reviving the partnership as an effective and sustainable tool for the EU’s longstanding relation with the African continent, in line with the ‘principled pragmatism’ defined in the EU Global Strategy. This can be the stimulus for a more frank partnership based on clearly identified mutual interests and incentivise the buy-in of Member States, but at the same time it carries the risk of overlooking the issue of African ownership and a fair assessment of local needs.

The current international environment and the changing context in Africa and Europe have triggered the adoption of two new strategic documents on both sides: Agenda 2063 and the EU Global Strategy. A thorough reassessment of the strategic vision of the JAES could facilitate the identification of more effective actions and instruments at political and operational level to address the main gaps assessed above. But it has to be the result of a joint and inclusive process, based on the participation of the main stakeholders at continental, regional, national and local level, beyond institutions, Addis Ababa and Brussels.

Based on the assessment conducted in this study and pending a decision on an overall revision of the JAES, additional efforts are needed in order to make the current framework of cooperation work. We suggest further action in the following sectors:

**Enhance the political dialogue and commitment of national governments in the partnership**, notably through more frequent visits of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to the AU’s institutions and African countries, regular meetings at ministerial level on sectorial issues of common concern, effective coordination on peace and security matters at the AU PSC-EU PSC meetings. There should also be more frequent contact between Members of the European Parliament and Members of the Pan-African Parliament and African national parliaments.

**Ensure a real engagement of civil society actors, one step beyond general and formal statements** by opening channels of effective participation, particularly in the AU-EU Summits and allowing CSOs to exercise their watch-dog tasks by establishing the Joint Annual Forum, increasing efforts to establish transparent and fair procedures for the selection of the non-governmental stakeholders involved in the partnership both on the European and African sides and providing them with adequate financial resources to improve their capacity to contribute to the partnership.

**Streamline EU funding schemes and mechanisms** by reducing the number of initiatives and making them more mutually coherent. Fully exploit the potential of dedicated Pan African financial instruments, such as the PanAf Programme, together with their coordination and subsidiarity with existing geographical and thematic instruments in order to reinforce the JAES and allow the prioritisation of actions on the basis of an overall needs assessment in line with partnership principles.
Make a decisive leap forward in the improvement of African capacities in peace and security, mainly through the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and African Stand-by Force, rebalancing the funding allocated to Africa PSOs in favour of capacity-building for AU, RECs/RMs and African countries’ institutions, multiplying efforts to ensure African contribution to the Peace Fund in line with the Kaberuka report and ensuring predictable funding to African peace and security in the UN framework.

Promote a tangible reciprocity in the partnership. Although the financial dimension remains unbalanced, the EU should support mutuality in all the policies and programmes. ‘Exchange’ and ‘dialogue’ should guide the partnership in areas such as climate change, mobility or cultural cooperation. On education and research, academic scholarships should support both African and European students and scholars offering opportunities university between the continents. Similarly, twinnings and exchanges at local level should be supported.

Enlarge the vision on democratic governance and civic participation within the partnership by promoting initiatives to build accountable and inclusive political systems in Africa beyond electoral processes. The parliamentary dimension of the JAES should be reinforced in this direction. For example, increasing the scrutiny role of the parliaments on the implementation of the JAES or fostering the presence of the President of the European Parliament to the AU’s institutions and African countries and vice versa.

Advance gender equality and women empowerment through the establishment of networks of European and African women to share experiences and promote joint initiatives in fields such as business, education and peacebuilding. Women parliamentarians networks involving members of the Pan African Parliament and the European Parliament can become a catalysing element.

Discuss post-Cotonou scenarios at the AU-EU Summit. Avoiding Post Cotonou from the Summit agenda may side-step contentions issues, but in the long run, it would be a missed opportunity as there will hardly be any further opportunities to build synergies between the EU-ACP and AU-Africa partnerships.

Adopt an integrated approach to natural resources. A social and environmental focus – in line with SDGs – on natural resources is not sufficient and it should be enlarged to the regulatory, legal and educational dimensions. In particular, the definition of clear and effective Pan-African regulatory frameworks for the management of natural resources (i.e. land ownership; land use controls), might guarantee sufficient levels of investments along with more control on the behaviour of the actors involved.

A specific focus on boosting local manufacturing and processing capacity could favour the exploitation/transformation of Africa’s natural resources to the benefit of its own citizens, contributing to the strengthening of internal demand and to boost intra-African trade, as expected by the JAES.

Prioritise respect for the human rights of migrants. The EU and its Member States should pay constant attention to the human rights of migrants including human rights frameworks in all the agreements with other countries. They should also ensure that agreements with partner countries do not include provisions that reduce the EU and Member States’ responsibility for hosting and protecting asylum seekers and refugees. The securitisation trend should be limited, first of all by clarifying the concept of ‘Integrated Border Management’ and articulating it in this human right framework.

Restore the link between the allocation of development funds and long-term development goals. EU internal priorities and migration flow management should not divert development aid from the pivotal objectives of eradicating poverty and should respect the principle of joint planning with local partners.

Increase the number of regular migrants. Enhancing regular migration is a way of offering opportunities to African citizens and decreasing irregular migration. The mobility of students and scholars should be
boosted. In addition, the option of using offices and embassies outside the EU to process applications for asylum and refugee status before migrants reach Europe should be considered.

Along with funding opportunities, investment should be encouraged through bottom-up measures aimed at establishing attractive and trustable regulatory frameworks. In the energy domain, for instance, energy-related initiatives such as Med-Reg and Med-TSO – launched by the Commission in the Mediterranean region – could be replicated in sub-Saharan Africa.

**Strengthen the link between energy policies and climate action**, accompanying the ambitious action in the mitigation domain with reinforced adaptation initiatives. **Promote a comprehensive Africa-EU green finance programme**, to be applied to all the sectors of the African economy (not only on energy projects) with particular emphasis on SMEs.

In addition, **greater emphasis should be paid to the 2030 Development Agenda** and to the transition from MDGs (to address which the EU launched the Africa-EU Millennium Development Initiative) to the SDGs. A joint effort – led at the institutional level but involving businesses, civil society, research and academia – to **decline the SDGs at the local level** (both African and European) and to define major points of contact/cooperation and key actions to be undertaken.

Take advantage of the Africa-EU Roadmap on FNSSA to **promote technological transfer, capacity building** activities and automatization processes in the agro-food sector (possibly identifying further fields of application, such as education), always putting African businesses and citizens at the centre of the initiative. Revise the tools to strengthen Africa-EU agro-food trade, looking for frameworks – possibly a single one – more effective than the current EPAs system.

**Promote stronger interconnections** – possibly through digital platforms – **between the education and labour sectors**. Encourage Africa-EU innovation and research exchanges finalised to ‘return to Africa’ policies, with the specific objective of creating and spreading local knowledge, skills and expertise across the continent.
Annex  African Peace and Security Architecture

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