Climate Diplomacy

Workshop Proceedings
Abstract

This report summarises the presentations and the discussion that took place at the workshop on Climate Diplomacy held on 20 February 2018 at the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels. It was organised by the Policy Department of the Directorate General for External Policies (DG EXPO) and Policy Department A in the Directorate General for Internal Policies (DG IPOL) at the request of the EP’s Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

The workshop provided members of the AFET and ENVI Committees and all participants with insights from experts on the state of play with climate diplomacy and provided an opportunity to reflect on the role of the EU in this field. MEPs Jo Leinen and Arne Lietz, co-rapporteurs of the EP’s own-initiative report on climate diplomacy, hosted the workshop.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Policy Department in DG EXPO and Policy Department A in DG IPOL held a workshop on Climate Diplomacy on Tuesday, 20 February 2018, at the request of the AFET and ENVI Committees. MEPs Jo Leinen and Arne Lietz, co-rapporteurs of the EP’s own-initiative report on climate diplomacy, chaired the workshop. The workshop was based on presentations by three experts: Nick Mabey, from Third Generation Environmentalism; Alexander Carius, from Adelphi and Laurence Tubiana, from European Climate Foundation.

Mr Mabey’s presentation dealt with ‘Challenges and opportunities for EU climate diplomacy’. He underlined the need to raise the level of ambition of the Paris Agreement in order to prevent a continued rise in global temperatures. Technology would be key to achieve this objective, but politics were important as well in the form of traditional inter-state diplomacy in order to avoid negative social effects of the decarbonizing transition measures, especially in sensitive sectors such as industry and agriculture. Stronger climate ambition relied on the creation of positive feedback between the real economy, political interests and diplomacy. The author called for alignment between the EU and the Member States in order to achieve climate leadership by the EU, which would lead to deep structural changes.

Mr Carius addressed the issue of ‘EU responses to climate security risks’. Failure to tackle climate change was a major security risk, he said. He identified the main water conflicts worldwide and analysed the relationship between climate and state fragility. When global pressure increased, due among other factors to climate change, compound risks arose, driven mainly by local resource competition. The desiccation of Lake Chad was an example, which had resulted in 7.1 million people suffering food insecurity in 2017 and 2.6 million displaced people in the region. Mr Carius’s recommendations for EU policies related to the incorporation of climate security into EU foreign policy and the inclusion of crisis prevention and conflict sensitivity into climate-related spending.

Ms Tubiana presented ‘Policy recommendations for climate diplomacy, including the role of non-state actors’. It was important, she said, for the EU to align its climate diplomacy with other actors to adopt the Paris Rulebook and to raise ambitions. The National Determined Contributions (NDCs) were not enough; countries had to step up by 2020 and revise them upwards. Other tasks for EU diplomacy were: to share its successes and challenges on the clean economy transition and to develop a foreign affairs strategy that supported the development of industrial policies to deliver net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Climate diplomacy must be aligned with the financial system, Ms Tubiana said, and she advocated using the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to drive transformation in the agriculture and industrial sectors.

The workshop concluded with a Question and Answer session between the authors, the co-chairs and the audience.
WORKSHOP AGENDA

Workshop
on Climate Diplomacy

Tuesday 20 February 2018 from 13.00 to 14.30
European Parliament, Room P3C050, Brussels

Chairing: Mr Jo LEINEN, MEP and Mr Arne LIETZ, MEP

The workshop aims to inform the Members of the AFET and ENVI Committees and all participants about the state of play on climate diplomacy. The workshop will provide insights from experts and give the opportunity to reflect on the role the EU wants to play on climate diplomacy. The workshop is hosted by MEPs Jo LEINEN and Arne LIETZ, co-rapporteurs of the EP own initiative report on climate diplomacy.

Agenda

13:00-13:10 Opening and welcome by the co-rapporteurs, MEPs Jo Leinen and Arne Lietz

13:10-13:25 Building Climate Ambition: Challenges and opportunities for EU climate diplomacy
Nick MABEY, Co-founding Director and Chief Executive of E3G

13:25-13:40 EU responses to climate security risks
Alexander CARIUS, Managing Director of Adelphi

13:40-13:55 Policy recommendations for climate diplomacy, including the role of non-state actors
Laurence TUBIANA, CEO of the European Climate Foundation

13:55-14:20 Questions & Answers

14:20-14:30 Closing remarks by the co-rapporteurs
WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

Opening remarks by Jo LEINEN and Arne LIETZ, co-Chairs

In his opening statement, Mr Leinen stressed the contribution of the workshop to the European Parliament’s own-initiative report on climate diplomacy that was being prepared. Climate protection was a global challenge and the Paris Agreement, concluded at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was a milestone. The Paris Agreement was reached partly thanks to the successful role played by French diplomacy during this Conference. He pointed to the importance of climate diplomacy ahead of the COP24 and of raising the level of ambition of all the parties to the Paris Agreement in their commitments in order to meet the global temperature goals.

Mr Lietz pointed out that the workshop was the first opportunity for the AFET Committee to debate the issue of climate diplomacy. He welcomed the mutual benefits of the cooperation between the ENVI and AFET committees on the topic and the valuable contribution of the workshop to the own-initiative report being prepared in the European Parliament. He concluded by presenting the workshop’s agenda and introducing the speakers.

Presentation by Nick MABEY: Building Climate Ambition: Challenges and opportunities for EU Climate Diplomacy

Mr Mabey praised the results of COP21, but reminded the audience that the level of ambition of the Paris Agreement must be raised if a global temperature rise was to be avoided. Failure to address this issue would cause divisions in the EU since the southern countries would be far more severely affected by climate change than the northern ones. Technology was important for achieving this goal but politics were important too because populist forces might use the harmful effects of decarbonizing policies to toxify national climate politics. These policies must be initiated now because they would affect sensitive sectors such as industry and agriculture up to 2040. The author also praised state-to-state diplomacy as a tool for reducing frictions in security, trade and investment.

Mr Mabey went on to present the positive factors (technology, public opinion) and negative factors (populism, transition costs) that would affect the EU’s action and then mapped the global players. He focused on mapping the major power dynamics and the political strategies needed ahead of 2020 in order to secure results. Stronger climate ambition relied, he said, on the creation of positive feedback between progress in the real economy, political interests and diplomacy. The EU and its Member States needed to align around the most impactful areas and incorporate national agendas into the EU’s global action in areas such as climate policies, and climate and energy diplomacy, 2020 ambition coalition and support for deep structural change. In order to sustain this, he showed statistics that demonstrated the support of the EU public for climate-change mitigation policies. The author concluded by calling for more EU cooperation and greater ambition ahead of 2030 in order to achieve a climate leadership role and increased diplomacy, especially ahead of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
Presentation by Alexander CARIUS: EU Responses to Climate Security Risks

Mr Carius began by identifying the failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation as the fourth risk with the greatest impact in the next 10 years. The connection between climate, natural resources and security could be observed in the main water conflicts worldwide. Climate change might, he said, be one of the factors causing the fragility of a state when it lacked basic governance functions. When global pressures increased, because of factors including climate change, compound risks arose: local resource competition; livelihood insecurity; extreme weather; volatile food prices; trans-border water management; rise in sea level; and unintended effects of climate policies. The desiccation of Lake Chad was an example. Since it began in the 1960s, this had resulted in altering access to resources and had thus led to conflicts. As many as 7.1 million people suffered food insecurity in 2017 and there were now 2.6 million displaced people in the region.

In order to upgrade public policies so that they matched global risks, Mr Carius presented his recommendations for EU policies. He advocated incorporating climate security concerns into the entire foreign policy portfolio; enhancing the monitoring of climate conflict risks; including crisis prevention and conflict sensitivity into climate-related spending; and engaging with the wider community through the Planetary Security Initiative and through conferences with non-state actors.

Presentation by Laurence TUBIANA: Policy Recommendations for Climate Diplomacy, including the Role of Non-State Actors

Ms Tubiana started her presentation by emphasizing the importance in EU climate diplomacy of aligning goals, ideas and pathways with many actors. Although the EU knew how to build progressive alliances, it needed to deploy diplomacy more actively than in the past by reaching out to all countries, institutions and stakeholders. The containment of the disruptive influence of the US following its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement was a major task for the global community throughout 2018, although so far there had been no perverse effects leading others to leave.

Ms Tubiana mentioned the following main tasks for EU diplomacy this year:

- Build political will at upcoming political events, such as the California Summit, the Global Covenant of Mayors, the run-up to COP24 and events to be hosted by the EU, such as the Ministerial on Climate Action and the Petersberg Climate Dialogue. The EU had engaged constructively in climate negotiations and was very responsive to the concerns of the most vulnerable countries. Much progress on the Paris Rules and the Talanoa Dialogue had been achieved. However, outstanding issues remained and the EU needed to step in to support accelerated engagement for the adoption of the Paris Rulebook.

- Consider options for raising the level of ambition by 2020. The Paris Agreement defined 2018 as the first moment to assess collectively whether domestic climate actions were on track to achieve the Paris goals. The National Determined Contributions (NDCs) were not enough, countries had to step up by 2020 and revise them upwards. They also needed to present their long-term strategies, which should be more in line with the global temperature goals. Climate diplomacy was based on what the EU Member States did at home, so it had to show that they could deliver more. Although it was difficult internally, it was an important step in making Paris real.

- Share its successes and challenges on the clean economy transition through diplomacy. The Paris Agreement called for deep transformation, while 2050 plans had to cover the whole economy. Developing a foreign affairs strategy that supported the development of industrial policies to deliver net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and the large-scale deployment of existing zero
carbon technologies would help prevent the worst impacts of climate change, including in Europe. The following areas had potential to deliver economic benefits, security and prosperity in the EU: maintaining international leadership on industrial decarbonisation policies and promoting zero-carbon growth models abroad through strategic partnerships (EU-China, EU-India: greater potential lay in partnerships and investments with the neighbouring regions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans).

- Form a common front between climate diplomacy and the financial system. Climate finance was an important area and common goals were needed between diplomacy and the financial system. The MFF was an important tool and as all policies needed to be consistent with the Paris Agreement. Agriculture and industrial policy still needed deeper transformation pathways in order to develop a 2050 policy for net zero carbon emission.

**Question and answer session**

A range of questions were put to the speakers on issues including: the relationship between climate change and potential conflicts, migration and geopolitics; the opportunities and pathways for agriculture in changing climatic conditions; the capacities of the EU diplomacy team to streamline and synthesise by also identifying its shortcomings; the positive interactions between China, Latin America, Europe, Africa and the US, but also the risks of entering into a trade war and the gaps in high-level partnerships (e.g. with Africa, Asia and Latin America) in multilateral mitigation efforts.

In their replies, the speakers emphasized the following points:

- Climate diplomacy had so far been all about pushing mitigation commitments and getting a deal. We should now speak not only about targets but also about the clean economy transition. The value of transition should rally the actors to see the benefits in sustainable development, lifestyles, air quality, agriculture, etc.

- The need to put climate in a geopolitical context was crucial. The links between migration, security and poverty needed to be explored further in order to form a more comprehensive understanding. Climate change in a geopolitical context was a COP24 goal.

- The rise in sea level in the South Pacific, the changes to sea boundaries and climate impacts not only in Lake Chad, but also in the Sahel region, were geopolitical security risks; they would all lead to people movements. There was a lack of means at the UN level to analyse the influence of climate change in security crises.

- Trade was changing rapidly, for example, Saudi Arabia was investing in cheap solar equipment. Electric vehicles and solar panels were of concern for future trade wars, but diplomacy could mitigate tensions.

- The EU was not yet well enough organised to deal with issues that were now more difficult. More capacity was needed in the EEAS and the Member States. Initiatives did not add up to an entire strategy on working better together.
Conclusions

The following conclusions may be drawn from the workshop:

- Climate change poses a new and complex threat. It is increasingly shaping Europe’s foreign policy, trade, neighbourhood policy, security and conflict prevention. Migration across Europe’s shores is already sending shockwaves; the southern neighbourhood is regarded as one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world.

- The EU can be at the centre of the clean economy transition. The containment of the disruptive influence of the US following its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement is a major task for the global community. Developing countries, and especially the most vulnerable ones, expect the EU to counter attempts by President Trump to develop an alliance of countries that believe in the future of ‘clean coal’ and jeopardise the successes of the Paris Agreement.

- This year provides several opportunities for the EU to step up its diplomatic efforts and showcase examples of shared leadership. A series of important events will be hosted in the EU: the Ministerial on Climate Action in June, the Clean Energy Ministerial in the summer, the California Summit, and the COP24 in Poland in December.

- Expectations are high that the EU will signal an action plan detailing how countries intend to contribute to the success of the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue and build the alliances needed to adopt the Paris Rulebook.

- The rallying cry for urgent action from Europe’s foreign ministers sets the stage for the April 2018 European Council, where leaders will be under growing pressure to articulate the forward path for domestic action. As the rationale for climate action has strengthened, Europe needs climate action to remain competitive, strengthen its geopolitical relationships and maintain its internal and external security.
ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 POSTER

WORKSHOP

POLICY DEPARTMENT of DG EXPO

POLICY DEPARTMENT A of DG IPOL

Climate Diplomacy

DATE
20 February 2018

TIME
13:00 - 14:30

ROOM
P3C050

Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET)

Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)

Chairs: MEPs Jo LEINEN and Arne LIETZ, co-rapporteurs of the EP own initiative report on climate diplomacy
ANNEX 2   SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF EXPERTS

Mr Nick MABEY

Nick Mabey is Chief Executive and a founder director of E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) a non-profit European organisation dedicated to accelerating the transition to sustainable development. In addition to his management role, Nick works on European climate and energy policy, climate diplomacy and foreign policy, and the security implications of climate change and resource scarcity.

Nick was previously a senior advisor in the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit leading work on energy, climate change, countries at risk of instability, organised crime and fisheries. Nick also worked in the UK Foreign Office’s Environment Policy Department where he helped establish the UK’s world leading environmental diplomacy network.

Before he joined the UK government, Nick was Head of Economics and Development at WWF-UK. He came to WWF from academic research at London Business School on the economics of climate change; published as the book “Argument in the Greenhouse”. This followed a period in the UK electricity industry working for PowerGen and GEC-Alstom. Nick trained as a mechanical engineer at Bristol University and holds a Masters degree in Technology and Policy from MIT.

Nick has held a range of external appointments and is currently serving on the London Sustainable Development Commission and as a trustee of the Ashden Awards. Nick has previously served on the advisory board of Infrastructure UK, the independent UK Green Investment Bank Commission and as the vice-chair of the European Alliance to Save Energy.

Mr Alexander CARIUS

Alexander Carius is founder and Managing Director of adelphi, the Berlin-based think tank. One of the leading consultants on environmental and development policy in Germany, he is in demand around the world as a speaker, facilitator, and advisor. He is a ground-breaking thinker, innovative designer, nimble strategist, and global influencer. He translates scientific insights into practical options for governments, non-governmental organizations, industry associations, and companies. He works with a diverse range of actors to develop, design, and implement international negotiations, agenda-setting processes, and consultations.

Alexander’s research seeks to answer a fundamental question: what is the future of democracy and governance in an increasingly amorphous and globalized world? For more than two decades, he has investigated how global trends—including global governance, resources scarcity, climate change, crisis and conflict prevention, migration and refugees, and urbanization will shape our shared future.

Together with his 200-person team at adelphi, Alexander works to ensure that global transformations are both environmentally sustainable and socially just. Founded in 2001, the think-and-do tank adelphi operates at the interface of environment, development policy, and foreign policy. Adelphi’s approach is based on the belief that the boundaries between different disciplines cloud our perspective, and that successfully navigating the global transformation will require cross-disciplinary creativity and impact. Over the last 25 years, adelphi has produced several hundred projects for international customers, institutions and networks. Alexander helped to set-up think tanks, social start-ups and partnerships around the globe.
In fall 2015, Alexander co-founded the Open Society Initiative, which organized over 1,000 debates and campaigns calling for a pluralistic, democratic majority in the year leading up to the 2016 German Bundestag elections.

Alexander is the author of numerous essays and monographs on politics and social policy, including Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Freunde (“The open society and its friends”), co-authored with Harald Welzer and André Wilkens (S. Fischer, 2016); and The Rise of Green Economies, with Dennis Tänzler and Elsa Semmling (oekom, 2017).

After a degree in Political Science, Law and Journalism in Berlin, Alexander worked as a Fellow at the Research Center for Environmental Policy at the Free University of Berlin from 1991 to 1992. In 1993 he founded the Ecologic Institute for International and European Environmental Policy, which he led until 2001, and worked as Program Advisor to the German Foundation for International Development (1993-1994). Between 1997 and 1999, he advised the governments of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary during their preparations for accession to the European Union.

Ms Laurence TUBIANA

Laurence Tubiana is CEO of the European Climate Foundation (ECF). She is also the Chair of the Board of Governors at the French Development Agency (AFD) and a Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. Before joining the ECF, Laurence was France’s Climate Change Ambassador and Special Representative for COP21, and as such a key architect of the landmark Paris Agreement. Following COP21, she was appointed High Level Champion for climate action.

Laurence brings decades of expertise and experience in climate change, energy, agriculture and sustainable development, working across government, think tanks, NGOs and academia. She started her career as a Research Director for the French National Institute for Agricultural Research. In the 80’s and early 90’s she founded and then led Solagral, an NGO working on food security and the global environment. From 1997 to 2002, she served as Senior Adviser on the Environment to the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. In 2002, she founded and then directed until 2014 the Paris-based Institute of Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI). From 2009 to 2010, she created and then led the newly established Directorate for Global Public Goods at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013, she chaired the French National Debate on the Energy Transition.

Laurence has held several academic positions, including as a Professor and Scientific Director for the International Development and Environmental Studies Master degrees at Sciences Po, Paris, and Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, New York. She has been member of numerous boards and scientific committees, including the Chinese Committee on the Environment and International Development.
ANNEX 3 PRESENTATIONS

Presentation by Nick MABEY

Building Climate Ambition

Challenges and Opportunities for EU Climate Diplomacy

Nick Mabey, E3G, February 2018

Takeaways

- **Paris made Europeans safer but not safe**: The main task of international climate diplomacy has shifted from developing legal frameworks to driving greater climate ambition at “Paris Moments” in 2020 and 2025.

- **Technology cannot solve political problems**: cheaper clean technology is a key driver of greater climate ambition but its impact will limited by resistance from domestic incumbents & turbulent geopolitics

- **Europe has a critical role**: Paris was a European success and its citizens expect govs to make it deliver. Europe’s climate allies & potential partners expect it to lead in defining the politics of “shared leadership”.

- **Success requires investment in broader “Team EU” diplomacy**: domestic climate action is a necessary but insufficient foundation for EU global influence. Delivering more impact requires better alignment of MS and EU action and investment in diplomatic capacity, especially post-Brexit.
Paris made Europeans safer but not safe. Emissions must be 40GT> by 2030

**Global greenhouse gas emissions**

- **Current policy projections**
- **Fledges and INDCs**
- **1.5°C consistent median and range**
- **2°C consistent median and range**

**Source:** climateactiontracker.org | 1 October 2015

**Probability of > 4C reduced by 80%; 2.7C-3.5C likely outcome**

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Direct climate vulnerability varies hugely inside the EU; failure will drive divisions.

**Aggregate potential impact of climate change**

- **High negative impact (0.6 - 1.0)**
- **Medium negative impact (0.3 < 0.5)**
- **Low negative impact (0.1 > 0.3)**
- **No impact (-0.1 < 0.3)**
- **Low positive impact (< 0.1)**
- **No data**

**Note:** The map data was provided by the European Environment Agency (EEA) 2013.
## Mixed Context for the 2020 & 2025 Politics of Climate Ambition

- **Technology Leads**: global markets have reduced clean energy costs 15 years earlier than anticipated. Countries will deploy clean technology faster for national economic reasons.

- **But politics still matters**: lower costs alone will not retire fossil infrastructure fast enough, or remove the barriers to clean solutions from incumbent interests. Poor social management of transitions will present opportunities for populists to toxify national climate politics.

- **Climate geopolitics become harder**: global politics will continue to fragment into regional blocks with rising security, trade & investment frictions. Stronger state-to-state diplomacy is needed to manage these tensions; keeping climate cooperation strong & markets open.

- **“Success” in 2020 masks risks for 2025**: Cheaper technology, strong energy efficiency & inflated baselines – likely to deliver *aggregate* NDC over-achievement 2020. With leadership from key countries & non-state actors this could keep Paris on track politically in 2020.

- **Need to prepare politics of deep decarbonisation now**: in 2023 countries must consider deep cuts in sectors with no easy fixes such as industry & agriculture. Weak US action and “rogue” states will make global alignment on deep decarbonisation much harder in 2025.

## Ambition Politics will be increasingly driven by Perceptions of Trends and Events

### Tailwinds
- Falling technology costs and multiple national/local benefits
- Climate risks integrated into the financial system
- Climate impacts shifting public opinion and growth of attribution science
- Non-state actor commitments and momentum around local coal/ICE phase-outs

### Headwinds
- Rising nationalism & instability in fragile regions undermines cooperation and leadership
- Growing authoritarianism suppresses non-state actor influence
- Incumbent asset owners & inertia in regulatory frameworks
- Poorly managed social & industrial transitions & costs/distraction of climate impacts
Mapping of Major Power Dynamics

- Countries’ political system positions are based on analysis of balance of government, business and public stakeholders.
- Countries’ national conditions are based on analysis of alignment of economic, energy, technology, public goods and finance interest with moving to a low carbon and climate resilient economy.

Source: Summaries based on E3G PLEM mapping

Business as usual results in little pressure on G20 to increase ambition in 2020. This can be changed.

- Blocked Greens: high level political engagement can encourage more leadership from countries who’s national interests are aligned with climate ambition but have mixed or negative internal politics; Japan, South Korea, Mexico are key G20 targets.

- Weak Champions: partnership for low carbon reform and maximising national co-benefits can help shift countries with strong or mixed politics but contested national interests; China, India, Brazil, Canada, Argentina. Outliers South Africa & Indonesia are dependent on high carbon industries and will need strong support to provide credible low carbon alternatives.

- Political Blockers: engagement on broader geopolitical issues – and private sector restrictions on high carbon financing – could help shift countries with negative political views but mixed real economy incentives to a more neutral position; Turkey, Australia, USA (if a 4 year Trump)

- Fossil Rogues: Russia & Saudi are not powerful enough to block progress towards 2C>> on their own. An active US and/or a Trump re-election could change this resulting in a coalition of fossil dependent states significantly disrupting progress; India, Turkey & Japan are at risk.

Bigger is not always better. Non-G20 countries are deploying major fossil investments and have key role in demonstrating transformational climate transitions.
Stronger climate ambition in 2020 relies on creation of positive feedbacks between real economy progress, political interests and diplomacy.

**How to build national politics for greater action?**

- Climate Ambition Politics
- "Shared Leadership"
- Climate & Energy Diplomacy
- Showing Progress in the Real Economy
- Structural Reform
- Real Economy Change
- Over-Achievement

**Where can decarbonisation trends be accelerated?**

**How can collective action make countries do more?**

**What changes are needed now to support deep decarbonisation?**

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Wide range of interventions. EU & MS need to align around the most impactful areas.

**Climate Politics**
- Aligning climate with geopolitical interests e.g. security, trade, investment, SDGs etc
- Aligning national climate goals with broader development debates and objectives
- Managing transition politics
- Aligning regional interests with climate change, including energy security

**2020 Ambition Coalitions**
- NDC Delivery Support
- Coal Phase Out/Moratorium
- Public climate funding/GCF etc
- Development Bank Reforms
- Climate Disclosure/Divestment
- National Green Finance Reform cooperation
- City and Company 2C>> Pledges
- High ambition implementation
- Implementation of avoided deforestation

**Climate and Energy Diplomacy**
- Building stronger diplomacy around climate risk
- UNFCCC Rulebook and Ambition Process
- High Ambition Coalition 2.0
- Technical assistance and financial support
- Building sub-national ambition diplomacy
- Common approach for dealing with low ambition states
- Regime for geo-engineering & negative emissions

**Support for Deep Structural Change**
- Long term strategy e.g. 2650 Roadmaps
- Oil & Gas orderly decline strategies
- ICE phase-out
- Mission Innovation/CEM focused on energy intensives
- Food, diet and land use reforms
- Regulatory cooperation
- Learning and capacity building
- Deep resilience cooperation
- Clean energy integrated into trade and investment agreements
Success in 2020 is not enough. Strategies must also build foundations of deep decarbonisation in 2025.

1. **Beyond NDCs**: building confidence in developed & emerging economies to both exceed their NDCs & undertake reforms to gain the benefits from clean, smart and efficient technology. This requires deeper “real economy diplomacy” & smarter technical assistance to co-develop systemic energy, infrastructure & financing reforms.

2. **Building Shared Leadership**: State-to-state diplomacy between major powers to put global climate action, along with open markets, at the core of international cooperation.

3. **Blocking the Coal Pipeline**: the biggest threat to reaching the 2°C pathway is failing to phase out OECD coal power & the coal power project pipeline outside the OECD. Momentum against coal is accelerating but requires greater cooperation to resist push back & inertia.

4. **Step-Change in Clean Finance**: tackling countries’ infrastructure financing gap by reforming public & private finance systems to make clean infrastructure more attractive & deliverable at scale; while internalising fossil investment risks.

5. **Empowering Decentralised Decision Makers**: incumbents are powerful in blocking climate action in central governments. Reforms of infrastructure, market & financing systems can outflank this by releasing the power of sub-national actors to accelerate clean investment.

6. **Tackling Hard to Change Sectors**: many sectors vital for delivering deep decarbonisation to 2040 need significant additional investment to generate credible & scalable solutions.

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**European citizens support climate leadership & action to make Paris work**

91% of citizens see climate change as a serious problem.

Climate impact experiences increase citizen concern.

+90% Support ↑ national low carbon action by 2030.

+80% Agree tackling climate change boosts economic growth.

93% Think fighting climate change will only be effective if all countries act together.

*Eurobarometer, 2015 and Pew, 2016*
Interviews with 30 stakeholders from across the world gave these elements of European leadership

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The EU’s state and non-state allies want the EU to lead but are unclear if it will

- “the EU should not follow [Trumps] agenda, set your own. It really is about Europe realising that it needs to step into that space.” NGO expert
- “the EU...stands at a juncture where its strength or weakness would have positive or negative implications...it’s only the EU that is potentially capable to send a good diplomatic signal” Vulnerables negotiator
- “The EU is no longer seen as a leader in implementation, which diminishes its credibility” NGO expert
- “The more volatile the international political landscape the more important non state activities, economic lobbyists, civil society become to drive the agenda” EU MS official
- “EU needs to be committed to extending the regime; committed to the goal of raising ambition; committed to having rules” former US negotiator
Components for EU climate leadership

- Citizen demand
- EU priorities
- EU internal climate alignment
- Intl expectations & ambition
- Climate-economic diplomacy
- Institutional integration
- Climate rules evolution
- Climate politics
- Increased EU 2030 ambition

Possible priorities for EU climate diplomacy

**Climate-Economic Diplomacy**
1. Sub-national EU-emerging economies economic cooperation
2. Econ & tech dialogue on transition and resilience solutions/reforms
3. Support vulnerabilities to leverage private sector investment
4. Agree team EU approach for low carbon economic relations
5. Showcase EU sustainable finance reforms

**Institutional Integration**
1. Learning platforms for countries to increase understanding of benefits e.g. MDBs, OECD. And communicate benefits of transition
2. Advocate for multilateral climate integration
3. Support ACP integration in regional institutions
4. Annual climate risk assessment w/ vulnerabilities
5. Joint campaigns on major aligned benefits e.g. air pollution, health

**Climate Rules**
1. Uphold commitment to transparency and propose & build consensus for robust Paris rules
2. Capture & assess non-state action
3. Provide climate finance, strengthen regime
4. Frame emergent issues e.g. geoengineering
5. Capture overachievement in regime
6. Renew approach to adaptation & L&D

**Climate Politics**
1. EU-China 2030 ambition package
2. Set the climate agenda in international fora
3. Hold the line & prevent backsliding
4. Annually communicate progress in real economy
5. Maintain HAC but allow plural high ambition alliances
Delivery requires better “Team EU” cooperation & more diplomatic capacity

Brexit means EU “loses” 147 FTE UK Climate & Energy diplomats. EEAS has 1.

Thank You & Further Information

https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G_Understanding_Climate_Diplomacy.pdf

https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G_-_EU_foreign_policy_in_a_changing_climate_-_June_16.pdf

https://www.e3g.org/showcase/degre esa-of-risk.pdf
EU responses to climate security risks

Climate Diplomacy Workshop at the European Parliament
20 February 2018
Alexander Carius, Director, adelphi

The Global Risks Landscape 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global Risks Report</th>
<th>The 5 risks that will have the biggest impact in the next 10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rank</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme weather events</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure of climate change mitigation &amp; adaptation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water crises</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Risks Perception Survey 2017-2018, World Economic Forum
Where will the world's water conflicts erupt?

Situations of fragility

In a situation of fragility, the state lacks basic governance functions and the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society.

Fragility can emerge on different levels and in different forms:

- **Transitional Stages**
  - post-conflict
  - regime change

- **Crisis**
  - large-scale violence
  - state collapse

- **Pockets of Fragility**
  - localized conflict
  - violence

*Sources: OECD (2018), UN (2016) 
*Adelphi*
Compound climate-fragility risks

1. Global pressures are increasing
   - Urbanization
   - Environmental degradation
   - Unfettered economic development & inequality
   - Population growth
   - Climate change
   - Increasing resource demand

2. Creating 7 compound risks that threaten states & societies
   - Sea-level rise & coastal degradation
   - Transboundary water management
   - Unfettered effects of climate policies
   - Volatile food prices & provision
   - Extreme weather events & disasters
   - Livelihood insecurity & migration
   - Local resource competition

7 compound climate-fragility risks

- Sea-level rise & coastal degradation
- Transboundary water management
- Unfettered effects of climate policies
- Volatile food prices & provision
- Extreme weather events & disasters
- Livelihood insecurity & migration
- Local resource competition

Local resource competition
Unfettered effects of climate policies
The Lake Chad crisis – one of the world's forgotten crises

7.1 million people severely food insecure during the 2017 lean season

80-90% of the population depend on agriculture, fisheries and livestock for their livelihoods

2.6 million displaced people

USD 70.2 million urgently needed for the implementation of FAO's response

Source: FAO

The shrinking of Lake Chad: 1963 - 2007

This collection of maps has been sourced from a series of satellite images provided by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.

Pathway to Resilience - EU Policy Recommendations

- **EU Global Strategy** (2016):
  - Strategic importance of climate change as a root cause of conflict and a “threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement”. It calls for pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy, and for enhancing energy and environmental resilience.

- **Put this vision into practice & strengthen preventive diplomacy:**
  - Integrate climate security concerns into the entire foreign policy portfolio. Carry out discussions and briefings with diplomats; and offer an annual multi-day climate security training to EU diplomats, defence and development communities -> strengthen capacities/awareness.
  - Enhance monitoring of (climate) conflict risks through early warning system; make this available proactively to Member States (->GDN). Survey diplomats on their experiences/use of climate-related indicators to improve monitoring.
  - Systematic screening (1) mainstream crisis prevention and conflict sensitivity into climate-related spending (EU budget, e.g. DEVCO, but also funding for Green Climate Fund etc. and (2) ensure climate compatibility of the remaining 80% beyond dedicated climate-related spending.
  - Engage with the wider community e.g. through the Planetary Security Initiative, own conferences with participation of non-state actors, etc.
Pathway to Resilience - EU Policy Recommendations

- The 2016 Climate and Energy Diplomacy Council Conclusions commit to increasing efforts to address the nexus of climate change, natural resources, including water, prosperity, stability and migration.

- But there is a **financing gap for climate security responses**, especially for crisis prevention.

- Therefore, earmark a budget for climate security responses in the next multi-annual financial framework (MFF). In particular, make provisions
  - in the **Partnership Instrument** (PI) aimed at improving coherence and the
  - **Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability** (lcSP); e.g., scale up the ongoing UNEP pilot project on climate change and security and provide finance and support to the Lake Chad Risk Assessment agreed by the G7 and its working group and partners on climate-fragility risks.

- Only 25m EUR of the 2014-2017 budget of €379m are allocated to the **crisis preparedness component**
This report summarises the presentations and the discussion that took place at the workshop on Climate Diplomacy held on 20 February 2018 at the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels. It was organised by the Policy Department of the Directorate General for External Policies (DG EXPO) and Policy Department A in the Directorate General for Internal Policies (DG IPOL) at the request of the EP’s Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

The workshop provided members of the AFET and ENVI Committees and all participants with insights from experts on the state of play with climate diplomacy and provided an opportunity to reflect on the role of the EU in this field. MEPs Jo Leinen and Arne Lietz, co-rapporteurs of the EP’s own-initiative report on climate diplomacy, hosted the workshop.