Peace and Security in 2019

Overview of EU action and outlook for the future
This is the second EU Peace and Security Outlook produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The series is designed to analyse and explain the contribution of the European Union to the promotion of peace and security internationally, through its various external policies.

The study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment. It then focuses on the centrality of the promotion of peace and security in the EU’s external action and proceeds to an analysis of the practical pursuit of these principles in the main areas of EU policy: development, democracy support, and security and defence, as well as in the increasingly relevant area of disinformation and foreign influence. It concludes with an outlook for the future.

A parallel study, published separately, focuses specifically on EU peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. The studies have been drafted with a view to their presentation at the Normandy World Peace Forum, in June 2019.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The promotion of global peace and security is a fundamental goal and central pillar of the external action of the European Union (EU), following the model of its own peace project. Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Yet the deteriorating security environment of the past decade has posed significant challenges. Following the release of its Global Strategy in 2016, and in line with the wording and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been intensifying its work in pursuit of peace and security in a number of key policy areas. In this respect, 2018 was a year of implementation and of transforming vision into action.

According to some academics, the world has become more peaceful in recent centuries. Europe in particular has experienced the longest period of peace in its history, not least thanks to a regional network of international organisations, of which the EU is a major example. Today, peace is defined in a positive way, not only as 'the absence of war', but also in terms of quality of government, free flow of information and low levels of corruption. In this context, of the 39 most peaceful countries in the world, based on the 2017 Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, 22 are EU Member States. Nevertheless, the instability that currently characterises the geopolitical environment has translated into a sharp deterioration of peace in the EU’s neighbourhood and has challenged its internal security. In addition, multilateralism, a core element in the EU’s foreign policy and identity and a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security, is under increasing pressure from alternative value systems and ideologies.

The over-arching objectives of the EU guide it in all facets of its activity in this area, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy. As envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 Global Strategy introduced several elements to refine and improve the EU’s efforts, including the promotion of resilience and capacity-building in the world. This approach is reflected in the EU’s external policies.

As far as development is concerned, a significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. In 2017, the EU committed to a 'new consensus on development' that emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences and aiding recovery from them. The new consensus clearly focuses on fragile and conflict-affected countries, which are the main victims of humanitarian crises. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel.

With progress made by means of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund and other such initiatives, 2018 was marked by the continuation of efforts to build a more autonomous and efficient EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). Of all the policy fields in the area of peace and security, this is the one that has enjoyed the greatest support from EU citizens (75 %) for more EU spending. Through the CSDP, the EU also runs 16 missions and operations, making it
one of the UN's main partners in peacekeeping. These elements of 'hard power', together with the EU's long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security. New elements strengthening the EU's security and defence capabilities, launched under the outgoing EU Commission and European Parliament legislature, including the initiatives in the area of European defence research and development, are boosting the EU's capacity to work for peace and security.

Looking to the future, the global environment is expected to grow in complexity. New threats such as cyber-attacks, disinformation and foreign influence campaigns demand new types of multifaceted responses. As the mandate of the current European Commission and the current European Parliament draw to a close, the legislation adopted is evidence that the EU has made significant progress in furthering its aim to strengthen its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security. The proposals for the post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which focus on streamlining the EU's various programmes and instruments, allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats while also implementing innovative financial instruments. However, the final adoption of the 2021-2027 MFF will take place under the next European Parliament after the European elections of May 2019. Underlying the quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation is the strategic goal of empowering the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, while adapting to the new realities of the international order and the rapid technological, environmental and societal changes of our times.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>coordinated annual review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>common foreign and security policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>common security and defence policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>early warning system</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDAP</td>
<td>European Defence Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European defence technological and industrial base</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>European defence union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFI</td>
<td>External financing instrument</td>
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<td>EFSD</td>
<td>European Fund for Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ELM</td>
<td>external lending mandate</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Instrument</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European security strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>EU Capacity-Building Mission</td>
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<td>EUGS</td>
<td>Global Strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy</td>
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<td>EUNavfor</td>
<td>EU Naval Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU training mission</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GFEA</td>
<td>Guarantee Fund for External Action</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IfG</td>
<td>Instrument for Greenland</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>(East African) Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSC</td>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCPOA</td>
<td>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multiannual financial framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT:</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>ODA:</td>
<td>official development aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCIA:</td>
<td>peace and conflict impact assessment methodology</td>
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<td>PCD:</td>
<td>policy coherence for development</td>
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<td>PESCO:</td>
<td>permanent structured cooperation</td>
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<td>PI:</td>
<td>Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>PKO:</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>RBPA:</td>
<td>recovery and peacebuilding assessment methodology</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs:</td>
<td>UN sustainable development goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHARE:</td>
<td>EU initiative for supporting the Horn of Africa’s resilience</td>
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<td>TEU:</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA:</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMDs:</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. A volatile geopolitical environment

*Europe has no time to lose. It should take over a portion of the tasks facing the world. This would not only contribute to the lessening of present day tensions in a worldwide framework but it would make a decisive contribution to deflecting onto the orderly path of progress the upheavals that otherwise would have tragic consequences for everyone.*

Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, 1968

The world is leaving a period of relative stability to enter a time of profound transformation of the global order. The past decade has been characterised by volatility and disruption, leading to continual adaptation and transformation at local, regional and global levels alike. For some analysts, global instability is ‘the new normal’,¹ where disorder and tension have gradually replaced two decades of relative stability across the world. Since 2012, conflicts have been on the rise, with the number of civil wars and attacks perpetrated by states and armed groups increasing for the first time in a decade. Violent extremism, terrorism and hybrid threats have grown to constitute new sources of major risks to security, peace and stability around the world. An understanding of the current global risks landscape necessitates concepts and knowledge going far beyond the traditional interpretations of war and peace. This is why the EU is taking stock of mega-trends and catalysts in regular exercises such as the ESPAS mechanism,² which covers a large number of international and intra-national variables. In the 2019 ESPAS report, the EU is addressing conventional threats, such as military build-up and international instability, but also climate change, demography, urbanism, energy, migrations and robotics.³ Similarly, in 2019, a survey by the World Economic Forum ranked environmental threats, such as extreme weather events, failure of climate change mitigation and natural disasters among the top three global risks in terms of likelihood and impact, together with weapons of mass destruction, data fraud and cyber-attacks.⁴ The multidimensional nature of the emerging threats necessitates new approaches to peace and security, merging conventional notions of power with new scientific methods, including foresight, to assess the impact of variables such as natural resources, demographics and technology in the formulation of policy. In the words of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), ‘we live in a world of predictable unpredictability’ (see Figure 2).

In this environment, actors – of various sizes – around the globe find themselves in a process of reconsidering and adapting their strategies with regard to security and the preservation of stability. The recognition of new threats to peace and security is reflected in the national security strategies (or equivalent strategic documents) of all the UN Security Council members, the EU and other G20 states, some of which are summarised in Figure 1.

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¹ R. Muggah, *The UN has a plan to restore international peace and security - will it work?*, World Economic Forum, 2016.

² ESPAS (the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System) provides a framework for cooperation and consultation at administrative level, on a voluntary basis, to work together on medium and long-term trends facing or relating to the European Union.


Peace and Security in 2019 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

Figure 1 – Threats to peace and security recognised in strategic documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Global Strategy</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>Hybrid threats</th>
<th>Economic crisis</th>
<th>Climate change</th>
<th>Energy insecurity</th>
<th>Violent conflicts</th>
<th>Cyber security</th>
<th>Disinformation / Information warfare</th>
<th>Fragile state</th>
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| Brazil             | ×         |                |                 | ×              | ×                 | ×                | ×             |                                      |              |                   |      |
| Germany            | ×         | ×              | ×               | ×              | ×                 | ×                | ×             |                                      |              |                   |      |
| Japan              | ×         | ×              |                 | ×              |                   | ×                |               |                                      |              |                   |      |
| Australia          | ×         | ×              | ×               | ×              |                   | ×                | ×             |                                      |              |                   |      |

Data sources: EU Global Strategy; China’s Military Strategy; Livre blanc sur la défense et sécurité nationale (France); Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation; National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: annual report 2016 (UK); National Security Strategy of the United States of America; Livro Branco (Brazil); Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr; National Security Strategy (Japan); Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security.

The EU Global Strategy, devised in 2016, echoes concern about the state of the world, labelling current times as ‘times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’. The violation of the European security order in the east, the rise of terrorism and violence in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as within Europe itself, lagging economic growth in parts of Africa, mounting security tensions in Asia, disruptions caused by climate change and the exertion of foreign influence through the spread of disinformation are just some of the threats documented in the strategy.

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Some issues are also present in several strategies but not per se in the EUGS: migration (Germany, Australia), pandemics (US, Germany, UK), piracy (Brazil), outer space (China).
Figure 2 – Threats to peace and security in the current global environment

**DISPLACED PEOPLE**

Top hosting countries:
- Turkey: 3.5m
- Iran: 979,400
- Afghanistan: 2.6m
- Pakistan: 1.4m
- Lebanon: 1m
- Syria: 6.3m

85% of displaced people worldwide are in developing countries.

- 68.5 million forcibly displaced people
- 44,400 people are forced every day to flee their homes because of conflict and persecution
- 25.4 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18
- 10 million internally displaced people

**FAILED STATES**

- A failed state is a state that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign state: it cannot project authority over its territory and it cannot protect its national boundaries.

**CLIMATE**

- Global average temperature in 2018 was approximately 1.1°C above the average for the pre-industrial era.
- +11°C
- 46% of which are due to floods
- In 2017 there were 18.8 million new displacements due to disasters
- Rising water scarcity affects more than 40% of the global population

**ACTIVE/FROZEN CONFLICTS**

- Over 87,000 fatalities were located in state-based conflicts
- 131,000 fatalities in organised violence (2016, 2017)
- 49 state-based conflicts in 2017
- 82 non-state conflicts in 2017

The International Crisis Group drew attention to the risk of escalation in Ukraine and Libya.

10 million internally displaced people
Peace and Security in 2019 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

TERRORISM

The total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the 3rd consecutive year, falling by 27%

18,814 deaths from terrorism in 2017

Of the approximately 5,000 Europeans that departed for Iraq and Syria between 2011 and 2016, approximately 1,200 are estimated to have already returned.

In some Member States, almost 50% of departures have returned.

4 deadliest terrorist groups:
Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Taliban, ISIL/Da’esh

CYBERSECURITY

Efforts to combat cyber crime are increasing, with security expenditure on international cooperation rising steadily.

The EU holds cyber dialogues with China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States

$124 billion – the amount worldwide cybersecurity spending will reach in 2019

2% of CO₂ emissions come from data centers

$6 trillion – the amount cybercrime will cost the world by 2021

56.1% of the world’s people are connected to the internet

70 million records were stolen or locked from poorly protected cloud devices

INDUSTRIES MOST VULNERABLE TO CYBER-ATTACKS

NFU

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Sustainability of the INF Treaty: threat of a new nuclear arms race in Europe

The US will increase spending to US$500 billion over the next decade to maintain and modernise its nuclear forces.

Iran, China and DPRK’s kinetic and non-kinetic capacity has grown in the last decade

14,935 nuclear weapons worldwide in 2017

93% of all nuclear weapons

In response to the challenging security environment, emerging or re-emerging global actors, such as Russia, China and India, have been boosting their defence spending (Figure 3) and upgrading their military capabilities. A growing number of experts maintain that the world has entered a new era of great power competition. This new arms race in an unstable multipolar world is itself great cause of concern, especially when traditional limitation mechanisms such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) are under attack.⁶

At the same time, and largely owing to the effects of the economic and financial crisis, defence spending in the EU-28 had been falling for almost a decade and only began to rise again – by 2.3 % – in 2014.⁷ The response to the need for a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence matters has been a particularly prominent issue on the Juncker Commission’s agenda in recent years.⁸

**Figure 3 – Change in military spending of major global actors in the past decade**


According to the Global Peace Index, an annual report produced by an Australian think tank, the Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017 was marked by a slight increase in peacefulness, for the first time since 2014.⁹ But the report also noted that, in 2017, violence cost the global economy US$14.3 trillion in purchasing power parity terms – equivalent to 12.6 % of the world’s GDP. War alone cost the global economy US$1.04 trillion. At the same time, peacebuilding expenditure cost an estimated US$10 billion (less than 1 % of the cost of war). In this context, the EU’s holistic approach to the promotion of peace, as outlined in Chapter 2, is particularly relevant, not only to fighting the roots of the disruption of peace, but also to reducing the cost of ‘non-peace’ in favour of investment in development and peace.

### 1.2. Is the world (and Europe) more peaceful?

#### 1.2.1. A less violent world

In the past decade, controversy has emerged about the 'long peace'. Some scholars, such as Steven Pinker, have argued that over recent centuries of human history, and even though the First and Second World Wars were immensely destructive, there has been a global tendency

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towards a decrease in violence.\textsuperscript{10} In ancient societies, violence was widespread (inside and outside the family) and legitimate. As a result, the likelihood of dying from violent causes was much greater in previous centuries than it is today.

As Norbert Elias pointed out 70 years ago, one central aspect of this decrease in violence lies in the fact that across the world, the modern state has monopolised most of the violence (army, police forces) as well as the means to wage war (taxation).\textsuperscript{11} This has resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of homicides worldwide and in Western Europe in recent centuries, as shown by Max Roser (see Figure 4).

1.2.2. A less violent Europe

As Europeans well know, this does not mean that violence disappeared, as bloody inter-state wars have continued, with deadlier weapons, in recent centuries. Millions of Europeans were killed, injured and displaced during the First and Second World wars. However, Europeans have also lived through long periods of relative peace in the second part of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century.

\textbf{Figure 4 – Homicides per 100 000 people per year since 1800}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{homicides.png}
\caption{Homicides per 100 000 people per year since 1800}
\end{figure}


In the 50 years following the end of the Second World War, the continent lived under the threat of nuclear war, and the people of central and eastern Europe under violent authoritarian regimes. Since the Cold War ended, wars, violence and even genocide (Srebrenica, 1995) have taken place on the European continent, which is not exempt from violence even today, with millions of displaced people in Ukraine\textsuperscript{12} and more than 10 000 casualties there since 2014.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} S. Pinker, \textit{The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined}, 2011. The idea has been criticised with regard to the use of data, especially from prehistoric times (D.P. Fry, \textit{War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views}, 2013). Nevertheless, the book gathered more comments on the reasons for the decline in violence (emergence of the state, urbanisation, literacy rates) than on the fact that our world is less violent.


\textsuperscript{12} See \textit{Ukrainian crisis}, UNHCR, 2018.

1.2.3. A European model of cooperation

After the First World War, the first movements seeking European Union, such as ‘Pan-Europa’, founded by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a Hungarian-Japanese intellectual, mobilised European civil society. Meanwhile, the League of Nations, in Switzerland, brought together mostly European countries to secure peace on the continent. Jean Monnet worked actively in that context to settle conflicts between Germany and Poland in Silesia, through international tribunals, and discovered a functionalist model that would later inspire him. However, the League of Nations failed to prevent a new war on the continent because of its very lax cooperation and monitoring mechanisms.

Nevertheless, in comparison with past centuries, it is clear that Europe has been experiencing a ‘long-peace’ since 1945. Under the EU and NATO umbrellas, the perspective of inter-state wars among Member States has disappeared and generations of Europeans have lived their lives without the prospect of fighting on their national borders.

In 1950, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and the other founding fathers of the EU decided to take a functional approach, by pooling the coal and steel resources needed to conduct war. It led to the creation of a very tight web of organisations and legal mechanisms for conflict resolution that enabled peace to be established between the Member States through cooperation in the fields of human rights and culture (Council of Europe), in the military alliance against the Soviet threat (NATO) and the progressive extension of economic cooperation (coal and steel with the ECSC, atomic energy with Euratom), and in a move towards economic integration (the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)). All these forms of cooperation, together with the American assistance provided under the Marshall Plan, enabled Europeans to regain prosperity and further develop their democracies after the war. This lead to what historians call ‘democratic peace’ – as democracies do not generally go to war with each other. By its very existence, European integration has saved the lives of countless Europeans who have lived through the greatest period of peace in the history of the continent, unlike those in previous generations who lived through wars in which millions of people died.
The EEC economic project gradually expanded towards western and northern Europe, then to the new democracies of the south, followed by the east after the end of the Cold War. Never in their history had European states been part of the same political body and, for the first time, it was their choice. This institutional and economic model that the European Union has managed to create is viewed with interest by the states and sub-regional organisations of Africa (African Union), Latin America (Mercosur) and Eurasia (Eurasian Union) for its peace-making virtues.

1.3. How to measure peace?

If the world is more peaceful than it used to be, and if the situation is statistically more secure for each individual, where does the feeling of insecurity come from, and why is there a growing perception of a world at risk? One answer can be found in the ‘Tocqueville paradox’: the better the situation, the more the distance between the reality and the ideal situation is difficult to accept. For example, according to the World Bank, around 1.1 billion people have moved out of extreme poverty since 1990. In 2013, 767 million people lived on less than US$1.90 a day, down from 1.85 billion in 1990. Today, around 10% of the world’s population lives in extreme poverty, down from 52% in 1981. Never before in its history, has humanity enjoyed such a combination of increased life expectancy, high literacy rates, female equality and protection from large scale pandemics. Nevertheless, the perception of inequalities in the world remains very strong and, for many, there is a widespread view that their situation has stopped improving, in a world where social media enable immediate comparison in space and do not favour comparison across generations.

This is why the modern definition of peace refers not only to ‘an absence of war’, but also includes elements of well-being: we demand more from peace. This positive dimension of peace is difficult to measure as it is a continuum, between inter-state war and positive public perceptions. As demonstrated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (see Figure 6), this continuum includes international (i.e. wars, hybrid conflicts) and intra-national violence (i.e. gang or police violence, forced displacements). Therefore, any measure of peace has to take numerous dimensions into account. One attempt has been made in recent years by the Institute for Economics and Peace. Its annual ‘Positive Peace Index’ (PPI) takes into account 24 indicators, including various aspects, such as ongoing domestic and international conflict, acceptance of the rights of others, societal safety and security or militarisation. This index tries to go beyond a negative conception of peace as non-war to show that qualitative peace has to include a broad number of dimensions.

Figure 6 – ‘A Violence-peace spectrum and manifestations of violence and peace’

In line with the EU’s Global Strategy 2016, another way to measure peace is to take into consideration the level of threats to peace, in order to address them and avoid possible deterioration. Without doubt, some states in the world have to face multiple threats that not only affect peace individually, but can also merge to create new challenges. Focusing on the ten main threats defined by the EU’s Global Strategy and the state of democracy, the new Normandy Index, developed by the European Parliament with the help of the Institute for Economics and Peace, captures the level of threat to peace faced by 136 countries in the world and allows for discussion and action on how best to address them (see Figure 7).19

1.4. Europe: Still very peaceful despite rising global threats.

In the 2018 Positive Peace Index,20 all 28 EU Member States rank within the top 45 states on the list, 26 having a ‘very high level’ of positive peace, and Bulgaria and Romania being among the three highest scores in the ‘high level’ of positive peace category.

In addition, the level of threat to peace in the EU remains very low compared to other regions and countries in the world. In the 2019 Normandy Index, the EU-27 ranks as the seventh least threatened area of the world, with Norway, Switzerland, Iceland (three countries that are part of the Schengen area and have access to the single market) being the three least threatened countries in the world. Energy security is the only dimension where Europe is more at risk than the world at large.

In addition, the EU’s neighbourhood continues to be subject to a number of ongoing conflicts. Of the 86 crises in the world monitored by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in March 2019, 21 are either in the EU (Northern Ireland, Cyprus), in countries negotiating their accession to the EU or with a European perspective (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,21 North Macedonia, Turkey) or in countries covered by European Neighbourhood policy – ENP (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Palestine, Ukraine, Syria, Tunisia). According to the Normandy Index, western Balkan countries, as well as Georgia, are less at risk than neighbourhood countries, while many European neighbours such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are at serious risk. This means that the EU needs to continue its support for these countries in a decisive manner, as rising threats for one country usually spread to neighbouring countries.

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21 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
1.5. European action on peace and security: What do Europeans think and expect?

Unlike the fixed EU competences enshrined in the Treaties, the preferences of citizens regarding EU involvement in certain areas change. These preferences vary significantly, depending on the policy area in question. They have inevitably been influenced by the sense of instability and transition arising from the migration crises and terrorist threats and attacks. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2016\(^\text{22}\) and then repeated in 2018,\(^\text{23}\) the majority of European citizens would like to see increased EU involvement in all the policy areas in the realm of peace and security. Despite a small decrease in this preference for some areas, the expectation of more EU-level external action remains very strong.

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Figure 8 – Preference for more EU intervention in different policy areas relevant to peace and security

Data source: EPRS based on Eurobarometer 85.1 - 2016; 89.2 - 2018.

The highest increase in preference for more EU intervention from 2016 to 2018 is in the field of foreign policy (a seven percentage-point increase, up to 57%), followed by the promotion of democracy and peace in the world (a five percentage-point increase, up to 73%), and security and defence policy (two percentage-point increase, up to 68%). Although there has been a decrease in the citizens’ interest in more EU involvement in the fight against terrorism (five percentage-point decrease, down to 77%), this is still the policy area that tops citizens’ preferences for more intensive EU involvement.

In the areas relating to peace and security, the fight against terrorism is the field for which EU citizens demonstrate the highest support for EU intervention. In both the 2016 and 2018 Eurobarometer surveys, EU citizens demonstrated overwhelming support for increased EU intervention in this field. Some 82% of all EU citizens in 2016, and 77% in 2018, wanted to see expanded Union involvement in the future. Differences between countries were also smaller than in other policy areas. This is, therefore, the policy that generates the greatest consensus when it comes to support for EU intervention.
The Eurobarometer survey also shows that there is a clear gap between citizens’ evaluation of EU involvement in these policy areas and their expectations of that involvement. Although in some policy areas the majority of citizens still find the level of EU involvement to be insufficient, in many cases the gap is closing and the number of those considering EU action to be inadequate is falling sharply. In all the listed policy areas, more citizens evaluate EU involvement as sufficient in 2018 than in 2016. The highest and most notable improvement in citizens’ evaluation of EU policy performance has been in the fight against terrorism (nine percentage-point increase from 23 to 32 %) and the protection of external borders (nine percentage-point increase from 26 to 35 %). These same policy areas demonstrate the most significant drop in the number of citizens with a negative evaluation of EU involvement - fight against terrorism (12 percentage-point decrease from 69 to 57 % of citizens evaluating EU involvement as insufficient) and protection of external borders (11 percentage-point decrease from 61 to 50 % of citizens evaluating EU involvement as insufficient). This rather significant increase in satisfaction with EU performance in these specific areas related to peace and

Data source: EPRS based on Eurobarometer 85.1 - 2016; 89.2 - 2018.
security can explain the falling pressure for more EU involvement. Public perception of EU performance has also improved in all other peace and security-related policy areas. The increased attention paid by EU institutions to policies relating to peace and security is acknowledged by citizens. The gap between expectations and evaluation of EU involvement is closing in the areas of the fight against terrorism, the issue of migration, protection of external borders and promotion of democracy and peace in the world. The areas where the gap is growing are foreign policy and security and defence policy, where the improved evaluation of EU performance has not kept pace with increased expectations. There is still more to be done to match the public assessment with their expectations.

Figure 10 – Preference for more EU spending in different policy areas

![Figure 10]()


According to a Eurobarometer survey, of all peace and security-related policies defence and security policy enjoys the strongest support for more EU spending. With a two percentage-point increase since 2015, 7% of citizens supported it as an EU spending priority in 2018. The changed preferences mirror changes in the perceived security situation. Currently, security and defence is in sixth place in citizens’ ranking of the most important spending priorities, which is a significant change compared to the tenth place it occupied in 2011. Nevertheless, there is no clearly declared preference for a significant increase in spending on peace and security policies.

Curiously, only 4% of EU citizens would like to see migration issues as an increased spending priority in 2018, which is one point less than in 2015. This drop is despite the strong preference for more EU involvement in the issue. More research is required to determine to what extent the reason for that is a preference for budget-neutral EU policy involvement in migration issues, and to what extent the reason is the impression of EU citizens that the EU budget is already tilted in that direction. In 2018, when asked to rank the same policy areas according to people’s perception of current EU budget spending, citizens rank defence and security at third place and immigration at fifth (the latter was positioned seventh when answering the same question in 2015). In other words, citizens perceive defence and security as the policy area with the third largest share of the EU budget. When comparing citizens’ perception of EU spending in a particular policy area with their preferences, the areas with a negative balance, i.e. where

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citizens think that the EU spends more than it should, include all peace and security-related areas (assistance to EU neighbours, immigration issues, defence and security, and development and humanitarian aid). Although citizens’ perception of EU spending priorities does not mirror the actual spending priorities in the budget, it can have a strong impact on their opinions.

Development and humanitarian aid are not significant spending priorities for EU citizens. Similarly, the preference for EU spending on assistance for EU neighbours remains the same and is positioned almost at the bottom of the spending priorities.

The lack of a complete overlap between preferences for increased EU involvement in the peace and security area, on the one hand, and support for increased EU spending in that field, on the other, points to the need to explore citizens’ preferences for particular policy actions in greater depth.
2. The EU and the pursuit of peace and security

2.1. Exporting peace? Peace and security in the EU’s external policies

In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.\(^{25}\) The Norwegian Nobel Committee said its decision was based on the ‘stabilising role the EU has played in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace’. Indeed, the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the initial step towards European integration, came after two world wars with devastating consequences for European states, and aimed to secure lasting peace on the continent.\(^{26}\) Six decades later, the achievement of peace in the part of the continent that constitutes the EU is hailed as one of the Union’s major achievements, having been enshrined in its Treaty as one of its main aims (Article 3 TEU).\(^{27}\)

At the same time, the promotion of peace globally, following its own ‘success story’, has become one of the fundamental pillars of the EU’s external action. Article 3(5) TEU includes the contribution to peace first among the objectives of the EU’s relations with the wider world, alongside security, sustainable development, the protection of human rights and others.\(^{28}\) These objectives guide the EU in all facets of its external action including the common foreign and security policy (CFSP);\(^{29}\) development cooperation;\(^{30}\) economic, financial and technical cooperation;\(^{31}\) humanitarian aid;\(^{32}\) common commercial policy;\(^{33}\) and neighbourhood policy.\(^{34}\) It follows that the promotion of peace goes hand in hand with any type of EU engagement with the world. This has led scholars to argue that it is a characteristic of the EU’s identity as a global actor. The Union’s pursuit of the diffusion of its own values and norms, including peace, in its external engagement has led to it being described as a ‘normative power’.\(^{35}\) In that sense, the EU’s foreign policy derives directly from the very nature of the EU itself and its ambition to achieve long-lasting peace through integration. This inherent principle places particular emphasis on multilateral cooperation, the primacy of diplomacy (as opposed to coercion), the use of mediation to resolve conflicts and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{26}\) A peaceful Europe – the beginnings of cooperation, European Union, Brussels, 2012.


\(^{29}\) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European External Action Service.

\(^{30}\) International Cooperation and Development – DG DEVCO, European Commission.


\(^{32}\) EU legislation: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, EUR-Lex.

\(^{33}\) EU legislation: Common commercial policy, EUR-Lex.

\(^{34}\) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), European External Action Service.


The EU model of regional integration

As the earliest and only project of regional cooperation to attain such a high level of supranationalism, the European project that led to the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s has been used as the central empirical object in the study of states’ capacity to move from intergovernmental cooperation to fully fledged integration, guiding the conceptualisation of regionalism across a number of regions. So far, in the study of regional integration, no entity figures as prominently as the EU. In the main literature on the subject, the European integration project is often used as the key example for the building and testing of theories explaining why states choose to integrate, to build supranational institutions, share competencies and pool sovereignty. While common markets, common currencies and customs unions are not unusual, the EU has evolved from that level into a political community with its own institutions, legal system, policies, values and principles. In spite of suffering from the impact of the multiple crises of the past decade (the economic crisis, but also the migration crisis and the rise of populism) this ‘EU model’ of integration, coupled with the levels of prosperity attained, has been at the heart of the EU’s ‘soft power’ of attraction in other regions such as Latin America, Africa and Asia. This model is captured in the words of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini:

…we achieved security through cooperation. We built peace with multilateralism. And this is the real vocation of the European Union. We are a cooperative force for peace and security. We have a long history of violence that has taught us that our national interests are much better served through cooperation with our neighbours. This is the strength of the European Union experience.

Speech by the HR/VP at the Hessian Peace Prize Award Ceremony, Brussels, 20 July 2017.

Since the creation of the CFSP with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, it has become increasingly clear that, in order to pursue the aims of its external relations effectively, the Union needs to be able to speak with one voice and take common – or coordinated – action. The first issue was addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which created the position of the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’. Appointed for a five-year term, the High Representative steers EU foreign policy, represents the EU in diplomatic negotiations and international fora, including the UN, coordinates the EU’s foreign policy tools (development assistance, trade, humanitarian aid and crisis response) and helps build consensus between the 28 EU Member States. The High Representative is assisted by the European External Action Service, the European Union’s diplomatic service, also created by the Treaty of Lisbon. On the substantive level, the first major effort to strengthen the EU’s presence as a global actor, by defining specific principles, aims and tools, was the elaboration in 2003 of the European Security Strategy and more recently the 2016 EU Global Strategy.

The EU has made the promotion of peace a quintessential part of its enlargement policy, offering the EU membership perspective as a vehicle and incentive for applicant countries to consolidate peace and stability. Beyond the limited group of potential members, it promotes regional cooperation, democratisation, rule of law and economic reforms as a prerequisite for peace through its neighbourhood policy (ENP), which covers sixteen countries to the south and to the east of the EU. The conception of the ENP is an example of how the EU aims to export its values, as a route towards achieving the ‘democratic peace’ that the EU itself enjoys. But

38 For example, the Latin Monetary Union was created in 1865 between France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium. It lasted until 1927 and enabled users to pay in any other member state using national currency. K-H. Bae and W. Bailey, The Latin Monetary Union: Some Evidence on Europe’s Failed Common Currency. Korea University and Cornell University, 2003.
39 Common Foreign and Security Policy, EUR-Lex.
40 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016.
beyond its immediate neighbourhood, similar principles are applied, aiming at the promotion of its model through its inter-regional and bilateral trade agreements, but also in development cooperation. Moreover, the EU promotes peace through active participation in mediation and diplomacy, including through the UN.\textsuperscript{44} The Middle East Peace Process (Israel/Palestine),\textsuperscript{45} Ukraine\textsuperscript{46} and Colombia\textsuperscript{47} are some examples of the wide-ranging involvement of the EU in diplomatic talks for peace.

### Enlargement and the EU Neighbourhood

Enlargement has been an objective since the very beginning of European integration. It was the founding fathers’ aim to unite the continent despite the Cold War. In 1950, the Schuman declaration stated that this innovative cooperation was ‘open to the participation of the other countries of Europe’ and would even play a role in the development of Africa. Already three years later, welcoming the European Assembly’s project of political union, Georges Bidault stated that the objective was to unite the ‘Europe of geography’, ‘the Europe of liberty’ and ‘the Europe of will’. The community of six members enlarged rapidly to the west (1973) and south (1981, 1986), and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the east (2004, 2007, 2013). In the case of southern Europe, accession consolidated the rebirth of democracy, and in central Europe, it brought stability, protection of minorities, a market economy and strengthened democracy. In the Western Balkans, as previously in Central Europe, enlargement talks played a role in downplaying tensions between regional actors. They even contributed to resolving the dispute over the name of North Macedonia in 2018,\textsuperscript{48} with North Macedonian and Greek leaders being nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. In 2018, the European Commission revived prospects of accession to the EU for the Western Balkans\textsuperscript{49}. Accession talks with Turkey have stalled, with the EU expressing concerns about the rule of law, and the European Parliament calling for a freeze in negotiations.\textsuperscript{50}

In the north, the EU is linked with Norway and Iceland through the European Economic Area (EEA), which allows the free circulation of people and goods. After 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) which is a privileged relationship between the EU and its closest partners, from Morocco to Belarus. For some of the partners, such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, the ENP has led to visa liberalisation and deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs), and, for Morocco, to an advanced status. The ENP November 2015 review called for a more flexible, tailor-made, political and sectoral approach depending on the interests of the EU and its partners. The new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main financial instrument for implementing the ENP, with a budget of €15.4 billion for the 2014-2020 period.

All these policies, enlargement, the EEA and the ENP, embody the core EU philosophy inspired by Montesquieu, that ‘the natural effect of commerce is to bring peace’, and, in the medium term, comfort common values.

Throughout time, the EU has developed a broad crisis-management agenda, including conflict prevention, mediation, and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict stabilisation. With the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP),\textsuperscript{51} the EU began to engage in crisis-management activities outside its territory, aimed at ‘peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security’ (Article 42(1) TEU),\textsuperscript{52} in line with the UN Charter. Nowadays, it is a major actor in peacekeeping, through its own peacekeeping operations (PKO), but also together with the United Nations, with which it has been

\textsuperscript{44} Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European External Action Service.

\textsuperscript{45} Middle East Peace Process, European External Action Service.

\textsuperscript{46} Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, European External Action Service.

\textsuperscript{47} EU will support Peace Process in Colombia with Special Envoy Eamon Gilmore, European Union External Action, November 2015.

\textsuperscript{48} North Macedonia name change enters force, Deutsche Welle, 12 February 2019.

\textsuperscript{49} Velina Lilyanova, Western Balkans, Enlargement strategy 2018, EPRS, March 2018.

\textsuperscript{50} Philippe Perchoc, Turkey: 2018 country report, EPRS, March 2019.

\textsuperscript{51} The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European External Action Service.

\textsuperscript{52} Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union: Section 2: Provisions on the common security and defence policy - Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU), Official Journal of the European Union.
cooperating systematically at strategic and operational levels, with consultation and coordination mechanisms now well established.\textsuperscript{53} The UN recognises the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping, both for its operational capacity but also due to the broad convergence of norms and values, including the overarching goal of achieving a peaceful world. Moreover, the EU and its Member States contribute around 33\% of the funding for UN peace-keeping.\textsuperscript{54} The EU’s CSDP missions and operations carry out tasks such as military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, rule of law and security sector reform, border assistance, etc. The majority of these missions have been in Africa, with some operating in parallel to UN PKOs or to African Union (AU) missions.

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\textbf{Mediation} & \\
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Mediation is part of the EU’s preventive diplomacy, and is an important tool used within the context of conflict prevention and peace-keeping. The EU has developed its own mediation support capacity based on the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities and its definition of mediation as a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the help of an acceptable third party. 'The general goal of mediation is to enable parties in conflict to reach agreements they find satisfactory and are willing to implement'. The EU carries out its mediation efforts through a variety of actors, including EU Special Representatives, EU Delegations and CSDP missions. Mediation efforts include direct mediation or facilitation by the EU; financing mediation efforts at different levels; leveraging mediation through political support; promoting mediation and good practice in peace processes and supporting mediation efforts of others, for example those of the UN, or regional organisations. In recent years, the EU has engaged in mediation activities in a number of conflict countries, including Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Ukraine. A number of mediation initiatives are undertaken by Members of the European Parliament. & \\
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\textsuperscript{53} C. Cirlig, EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management, EPRS, 2015.
\textsuperscript{54} The European Union at the United Nations, factsheet, European External Action Service.
North Macedonia is placed 16th out of 136 countries measured in the Normandy Index. Its performance is below the average for Europe on most indicators, but it outperforms the global average when it comes to democratic processes, cybersecurity and homicide indicators.

**Traditional sources and indications of conflict**

In 1991, North Macedonia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia and since then has remained relatively peaceful. It scores within the top quartile of countries in the democratic processes indicator. The current government, led by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) since May 2017, has improved relations with the EU and, in particular, with Bulgaria and Greece. With the Prespa Agreement, the country changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia in exchange for Greece ending its veto on the latter’s EU and NATO accession.

North Macedonia performs well in the Normandy Index conflict indicators and the homicide and violent conflict indicators are in line with European averages. The country has experienced less terrorism than the regional average.

**New security and hybrid threats**

Since independence, North Macedonia has made progress in developing a westernised, open-market economy. There have been reforms in areas such as property registration, access to credit and the protection of minority investors. North Macedonia is the only middle-income country to rank among the top 20 countries globally in ease of doing business, as ranked by the World Bank. The country has applied for both EU and NATO membership. Its progress on economic reform is demonstrated by its strong economic crises score. However, North Macedonia scores just below the world average, and the second lowest in Europe, on press freedom.

**EU involvement**

North Macedonia was the first western Balkan country to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU (in 2004); just one year later, it became a candidate country. Because of the accession process, the country developed an on-going relationship with the EU and is gradually taking on the acquis communautaire. Since then, progress towards joining the EU has stalled. However, the June 2018 Prespa Agreement resolved a long-standing dispute with Greece over the country’s name, removing one of the main obstacles to both EU and NATO membership. The EU played a key role in assisting both parties in finding a settlement. Accession negotiations are set to begin in 2019. To prepare the country for membership, the EU has allocated €664 million of funding for the 2014-2020 period, focusing on the areas of institutional building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources and rural development.

The EU also helped to set up the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office, which was created in 1963 to boost cooperation between young French and German citizens. RYCO promotes student exchanges with the EU and in the region, in order to foster reconciliation.
Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 37 in the Normandy Index. Despite its strong score, it is considered more at risk than the European average. It performs significantly less well than the European average in cybersecurity and fragile states, but scores well in terrorism and energy insecurity.

**Traditional sources and indications of conflict**

Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced severe armed conflict between 1992 and 1995, resulting in several international peacekeeping missions.

In 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in a decentralised government system. The country is divided into two semi-independent federal units, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are largely self-governing.

This decentralised governance is partly the reason for Bosnia and Herzegovina having the second lowest Fragile States Index score in Europe. Efficient cooperation among the country’s constitutional entities is impeded by mistrust among ethnic groups and political parties. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina still ranks within the top 100 overall and higher than considerably larger countries. The country is heavily dependent on coal, at 67% of total electricity production, but is investing in renewable energies, with vast hydro and non-hydro renewable energy potential.

**New security and hybrid threats**

Bosnia and Herzegovina has some vulnerabilities to new security threats, owing to resources still being allocated to rebuilding following the conflict and a highly decentralised state structure. One example is cybersecurity, where the country ranks in the bottom 20 for cyber-defence. The constitutional entities in the country lack expertise and resources to build a coherent and solid cybersecurity strategy. While growth in gross domestic product has stagnated somewhat since 2008, some areas of the economy have grown significantly and offer opportunities to build resilience to these threats. For example, tourism has grown over the past decade, increasing by 12.1% in 2018 alone.

**EU involvement**

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a potential candidate for EU membership and therefore has a special relationship with the EU. After the war in the western Balkans in the 1990s, the Dayton Agreement brought peace in the country. Since 2004, the EUFOR Althea mission has been supporting efforts in BiH to secure an irreversible peace. Nevertheless, BiH is facing difficulties in a number of areas. It remains a fragile state because constitutional cooperation between the communities is difficult. The EU is assisting with a number of building and twinning programmes. The EU also supports environmental and climate transition through the Pre-accession Instrument, allocating €9.5 million in 2018.
2.2. The Global Strategy: First years of implementation (2016-2018)

2016 can be seen as a landmark year for the EU’s approach to peace and security. In June 2016, on the basis of the mandate received from the European Council and following a year-long process of strategic reflection and consultations, Federica Mogherini, in her capacity as High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, presented the new European Union Global Strategy.55 The strategy is based on an assessment of the current global environment as:

- a more **connected** world, in which a surge in global connectivity and human mobility challenges traditional approaches to migration, citizenship, development and health, while simultaneously facilitating crime, terrorism and trafficking;
- a more **contested** world, in which fragile states and ungoverned spaces are expanding, due to instability and violence triggered by poverty, lawlessness, corruption and conflict-ridden electoral politics;
- a more **complex** world, where power is shifting towards other regional players in the developing world and is increasingly shared between state and non-state actors.

In this environment, the strategy maintains, ‘an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders’. Furthermore, it recognises the intrinsic link between internal and external security, as well as internal and external peace: ‘our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’.56 Based on this realisation and committed to the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’, the Global Strategy prioritises five broad areas:

1. Security of the Union
2. State and societal resilience in the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood
3. Integrated approach to conflict and crises
4. Cooperative regional orders
5. Global governance

Through the definition of these areas, the Global Strategy emphasises the need for EU action. Firstly, stressing that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security (i.e. in respect of terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility or energy insecurity), the strategy calls for stronger security and defence cooperation in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. This translates into concrete actions in the field of defence policy; counter-terrorism; strategic communications, energy security and cybersecurity. Secondly, recognising that fragility beyond EU borders threatens its interests, the EU will promote resilience in third countries and their societies as a means to ensure their growth and stability. This objective is to be pursued through a ‘credible enlargement policy’ based on strict and fair conditionality, elements of resilience in the European Neighbourhood Policy, and development policy. To address the root causes of migration and associated phenomena, such as trans-border crime, the EU will work towards a more efficient deployment of development instruments, through trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation.

With regard to conflict prevention and resolution, the strategy recognises the importance of an ‘integrated approach’ and of ‘pre-emptive peace’ – monitoring root causes, such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – as a means to prevent conflicts from breaking out. Finally, the strategy recognises the importance of promoting and supporting cooperative regional orders and of a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, as the basis for ensuring peace, security, human rights and sustainable development.57

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As the following chapters of this study illustrate, the focus of the period since the presentation of the Global Strategy has so far been on implementation, or, in the words of the HR/VP, on translating vision into action. According to the two annual implementation reports issued by the EEAS between 2016 and 2018 several of the strategy’s proposals have been translated into concrete initiatives. In 2017, the Commission and the High Representative released a joint communication on resilience and a European Neighbourhood Policy Review, among other things. The integrated approach has been implemented, in conflicts ranging from the Sahel to Colombia. In security and defence, a series of initiatives for closer and more efficient cooperation have been put in place as explained in detail in Chapter 5. The second year of its implementation, 2018, was marked by additional progress in the areas of security and defence, support for cooperative regional order and global governance and multilateralism, strategic communications and public diplomacy.

In the spirit of the strategy, the EU is mobilising all tools at its disposal in a coherent and coordinated way, by investing in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union. This calls for a strengthening of all dimensions of foreign policy by improving the effectiveness and consistency of the EU’s other policies in accordance with its values. In order to achieve the objectives of the strategy, the mobilisation and cooperation of all relevant EU institutions, actors and instruments is a prerequisite for peace and security (Figure 11).

**Figure 11 – Who does what in the EU institutions?**

**Data source:** European Commission, 2015, with updates from relevant EU websites; for Parliament: EP organisation chart, 2018; EUISS, 2017.

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58 See Implementing the EU Global Strategy: Year 1 and Implementing the EU Global Strategy: Year 2, European External Action Service.
61 Colombia and the EU, European External Action Service, May 2016.
2.3. Peace and security in the EU’s budget

The EU budget includes a heading dedicated to external policy and to the role of the EU in the world. It is called ‘Global Europe’ and, in the context of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), it accounts for approximately six per cent of the overall budget. Nevertheless, it has attracted considerable attention inside and outside the EU. The reason for this can be traced to the significant reach, scope and impact of the funded programmes. For example, the EU, together with its Member States, is the biggest donor of development and humanitarian aid in the world; it is also a key contributor to the economic development of the EU neighbourhood.

Figure 12 – EU budget 2019 (in million euros)

The Global Europe heading includes a number of instruments. Each of them has its own specific geographic or thematic focus, as well as a specific connection to the peace and security agenda in relation to the well-established link between conflict, security and development. The instruments allow for joint efforts between Member States and EU institutions, which maximise the impact and visibility of the external action. The instruments under the Global Europe heading give the EU the chance to further reinforce its role on the global stage and to promote its interests and values.

- **External financing instruments**

   Global Europe is mainly composed of the external financing instruments (EFI), which provide support to third countries and people abroad contributing to peace and security, and operate under a single regulation for better harmonisation.\(^{62}\) The EFIs include the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI),\(^ {63}\) the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

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(EIDHR), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC), the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), the Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries (PI), and the Instrument for Greenland (IfG). Although it is not funded through the EU budget, the European Development Fund (EDF), which works for the benefit of 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, is also considered an EFI. It draws resources from EU Member States, but not in the same proportion as their EU budget contributions, and its payments are not subject to annual budgetary payments. The total financial resources of the EDF for the 2014-2020 period amount to €30.5 billion. The EDF provides financial support for the African Union’s peace and security architecture (APSA), mostly through the African Peace Facility (€2.04 billion for the 2014-2020 period).

Figure 13 – ‘Global Europe’ budget heading, 2019 (in million euros)

Although the recent EPRS European implementation assessment demonstrates some shortcomings in the implementation of the EFIs (e.g. limited political steering and lack of sufficient flexibility and capacity), it also concludes that they contribute to peace and security in the world despite the increasing external challenges. There is a need for still greater flexibility in the use of the EFIs in order to be able to respond to unforeseen threats to security and peace.

65 M. Parry, European Neighbourhood Instrument, EPRS, 2016.
To achieve peace and security, the EFIs need to respond with short-term expediency on security threats, but also to provide for long-term needs related to development goals, support for democratisation, promotion of EU fundamental values and capacity-building, in order to guarantee sustainable results. This blending of the short- and long-term goals is also in line with the EU Global Strategy. Even if the EU budget cannot cover the increased spending demand to deal with all threats to peace and security, including the migration crisis, it is still a key instrument of influence and coordination of national efforts into a combined EU effort.

Of the EFIs, the IcSP is the one most directly related to promoting peace and security. Established in 2014, it contributes funding for crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness, and to address global and trans-regional threats. The instrument thus plays a role in both EU foreign and development policy, providing short- and long-term assistance. Short-term assistance normally tackles emerging and existing crises. Long-term assistance addresses global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. Due to the unpredictable character of the issues covered by IcSP-funded actions, the distribution of the funding under different themes provides an opportunity for flexibility and adaptation according to need. This indicative distribution of financial allocations earmarks 70% of the funding for exceptional assistance measures, 21% for global, trans-regional and emerging threats, and 9% for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding. The region with highest spending allocations is Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, and European countries and Central Asia. The IcSP has been evolving to respond to changes in the security environment.72

- **Common foreign and security policy**

Another programme under the Global Europe heading, which is focused directly on peace and security is the common foreign and security policy (CFSP).73 It functions under its own regulation, adapted to its intergovernmental character. It is designed to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security and ensure the visibility and effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Spending under the CFSP covers only some EU foreign policy measures, namely CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Representatives and measures supporting non-proliferation and disarmament. The crisis management approach of the CFSP includes involvement in all phases of the crisis cycle; from preventive strategies, to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction, as well as comprehensive and coordinated use of all foreign policy instruments. So far, expenditure with military or defence implications has been covered by the Athena financing mechanism. Established in 2004, it is not part of the EU budget, but its funds are based on allocations from the Member States based on their gross national income (except Denmark). Third countries and other international organisations are also allowed to participate under specific conditions.

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**The Athena mechanism**

The [Athena mechanism](#) was established in 2004 as a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations that have military or defence implications. It is part of the CFSP/CSDP, but is not funded via the EU budget. According to Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, participating Member States contribute to the annual Athena budget based on their gross national income (only Denmark opted out of the mechanism). A Special Committee, under whose authority the mechanism functions, consists of representatives from each participating Member State. It sets the financial rules applicable to each area of eligible expenditure under Athena. The major types of expenditure under the Athena mechanism include lodging; travel; administration; public communication; locally hired staff; force headquarters (FHQ) deployment; medical services; and infrastructure, including IT systems and information gathering. Following a special approval procedure, Athena may also finance additional equipment and services.

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72 See details about the budgetary changes in the IcSP in Chapter 4.

Currently, there are six active EU military operations and all of them benefit from Athena financing. They are: EUFOR Althea (Bosnia Herzegovina), EUNavfor Atalanta (Horn of Africa), EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUTM RCA (Central African Republic) and EUNavfor Med (Mediterranean). EU Member States (and third countries) that decide to contribute to an EU military operation pay for this from their national budgets, with no contribution from the Athena mechanism. Nevertheless, ‘nation-borne costs’, such as fuel, water and food, are managed under the Athena mechanism.

•  **Humanitarian aid**

The European Union’s expenditure for humanitarian aid provides needs-based, emergency response to natural disasters and man-made crises beyond the Union’s borders, in order to preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering, and maintain the human dignity of those affected.\(^74\) Such assistance provides first response to areas suffering from a lack of peace and security. The EU remains a leading global donor of humanitarian aid, as well as an example for a high standard of humanitarian aid delivery. Despite that, it still faces challenges in responding to the growing demand for humanitarian assistance worldwide. In order to close the funding gap for humanitarian aid, there are attempts to work towards reduction of humanitarian needs through an increase in conflict-resolution capacity in the international community, the bridging of the humanitarian-development divide in order to better tackle the protracted crises and its root causes, as well as a strong commitment to invest in disaster preparedness and risk mitigation.\(^75\)

•  **External Investment Plan**

In response to a sharp increase in the number of people trying to migrate to Europe, and as part of the mid-term review of the MFF, the Commission has proposed an external investment plan to tackle the root causes of migration from countries neighbouring the European Union, to support investment in the EU’s partner countries, and to promote new forms of private-sector participation. It consists of a European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) and quantitative and qualitative changes to the European Investment Bank’s External Lending Mandate (ELM), which includes the Guarantee Fund for External Action (GFEA).\(^76\) The purpose of the EFSD as an integrated financial package is to provide support through the supply of financing capacity, in the form of grants, guarantees and other financial instruments to eligible counterparts, investments and increased access to financing, starting in African and Neighbourhood partner countries. The EU guarantee to the EIB covers the risks related to loans and guarantees granted to third countries, or for projects to be executed in third countries. The GFEA is designed to implement the EU guarantee, whilst protecting the EU budget. The two new objectives (tackling the root causes of migration and contributing to the long-term economic resilience of refugees, migrants, host and transit communities) are to be covered by the EU guarantee.

•  **Financial instruments outside the EU budget**

In addition to the EU budget instruments, there is a broader architecture for financing EU external policies and spending that is directly or indirectly related to peace and security. It includes the European Development Fund (EDF) (mentioned above), and EU external trust funds, blending grants and loans. The creation of funds and instruments outside the EU budget enables the EU to pursue its objectives with more flexibility, swiftness and innovativeness, but it has also led to more complexity and fragmentation. In the context of growing demands, these innovations have also contributed to the mobilisation of more resources, as well as to intensifying collaboration with a wide range of stakeholders.

The budget allocations of EU countries in the field of peace and security can also be seen in the context of NATO agreements. Over the years, European countries that are members of NATO have been under pressure from the US to increase their military spending. In 2014, an

\(^74\) A. Dobreva and A. Heinmaa, Humanitarian Aid, EPRS, 2015.


\(^76\) A. Dobreva and M. Parry, Guarantee Fund for External Action and EIB external lending mandate, EPRS, 2018.
agreement set a target of two per cent of the economic output of each country to be devoted to defence budgets by 2024. Increasing the spending on peace and security in the EU budget can contribute to reaching this target level.

### 2.4. Peace and security in the EU’s multilateral engagement

The post-war world has seen the creation of a range of global and regional institutions, established to manage economic, political and security relations. With the end of the Cold War, several of these institutions extended into the 'more fully global multilateral system of governance' which exists to this day. The most notable and laudable achievement of this system has been the preservation of peace among the great powers and the provision of a degree of stability that has prevented major nuclear security crises.

Multilateralism is key to the EU’s identity and to its engagement with the world. The first ever comprehensive European Security Strategy (ESS) — formulated in 2003 and entitled ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ — made 'strengthening the United Nations (UN), equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively' a European priority. The ESS placed advocacy of 'effective multilateralism' at the centre of the EU’s strategic goals.77

The EU Global Strategy78 reiterates the EU’s dedication to the promotion of ‘a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core’. At the same time, the EUGS emphasises that 'the format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case', citing policy areas ranging from cybersecurity (where states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts are actors to consider) and maritime policy (the UN, UN specialised agencies, NATO, strategic partners, and ASEAN), to humanitarian, development and climate policy (the UN, G20, new donors, civil society and the private sector).

#### Multilateral efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change: The Paris Agreement

The impact of climate change and environmental degradation on international security is becoming an increasingly salient topic and a new challenge for the EU and for the world. Among other things, climate change can exacerbate fragile situations and lead to increased violence through factors such as food insecurity, economic shocks, and natural disaster-related displacements. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier by increasing extreme weather events such as floods, windstorms and droughts. Since 2008, an average of 26.4 million persons around the world have been forcibly displaced by such events. In 2019 the Council of the EU referred to climate change as a 'direct and existential threat'.

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The past two years have been marked by the waning commitment of major countries to multilateralism, an issue which is of major concern to the EU. In the area of security, this, among other things, is jeopardising the survival of important nuclear arms-control treaties, with potentially direct implications for Europe. In May 2018, the US unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark agreement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, over allegations that Iran was violating the spirit of the agreement. In February 2019, both the US and Russia announced the suspension of their obligations under a landmark nuclear-arms-control treaty they signed in 1987. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated and prohibited ground-launched intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. If the two parties do not reconcile, the INF Treaty will end on 2 August 2019. Any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles will put Europe once more in the line of fire of strategic nuclear weapons, for the first time since 1991. If the INF Treaty is abrogated, Europeans will be faced with stark choices all carrying inherent security risks, including engaging in a deployment race with Russia, or refusing re-deployment of US missiles on European soil, potentially leaving European countries exposed to Russian intimidation.

2.4.1. Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations

The EU’s participation in the UN forms the basis of its commitment to multilateralism in the area of peace and security. According to its Charter, the UN was conceived as a place where people would 'unite our strength to maintain international peace and security and ... ensure ... that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'. The EU has developed a strong relationship with the UN, by working closely with the UN secretariat and the various UN agencies, funds and programmes. In 2011, the EU was granted the status of observer at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations.


The EU is committed to addressing the implications for peace and security of climate change by means of multilateral cooperation. The 2015 Paris Agreement is the basic multilateral framework governing global action to deal with climate change. The EU was instrumental in brokering the agreement and, in 2018, in the COP24 in Katowice, in working for an agreement on the rules for the agreement’s implementation by 184 countries. Multilateralism has therefore been at the forefront of the EU’s climate diplomacy. In addition, the EU, with the support of the European Parliament, and the European Investment Bank are together the biggest contributor of public climate finance for developing countries.

![Figure 14 – Internal displacement of persons due to natural disasters, 2017](image)


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81 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945.
the UN. The status of observer allows the EU to present common positions, make interventions, present proposals and participate in the general debate at the UNGA. It seeks to coordinate among its 28 Member States to present a unified position. Two EU Member States, France and the UK, are Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{82}

On 17 July 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the ‘EU priorities at the United Nations and the 72nd United Nations General Assembly’.\textsuperscript{83} The EU reiterated its commitment to ‘reinvigorating multilateralism and supporting a strong United Nations as the bedrock of the rules-based global order’, with a focus on three interlinked and mutually reinforcing priority areas, including stronger global governance, and peace and conflict prevention.

### Non-proliferation and disarmament at the United Nations

Since its creation, the UN has pursued two parallel and mutually reinforcing goals: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear) and the regulation of conventional arms (in particular the illicit trade in small arms).\textsuperscript{84} The EU is committed to pursuing these goals through its status in the UN and through the participation of its Member States in the various UN bodies responsible for disarmament and non-proliferation. These include several bodies that have been created exclusively for that purpose, notably:

- The United Nations Charter grants the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) and ten non-permanent members, which are elected by the UNGA for two-year terms.

- The United Nations General Assembly is the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. Its members include all United Nations Member States (as of 2017, 193 members). The UNGA meets in regular session principally from September to December each year. It has six main committees; the First Committee deals with issues related to disarmament and international security.

- The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a subsidiary organ of the UNGA, mandated to consider and make recommendations on disarmament issues. The Disarmament Commission consists of all UN Member States and holds annual sessions at the UN Headquarters in New York.

- The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral body for negotiating disarmament treaties. It has 65 permanent members, which meet in Geneva in three sessions each year.

- Three Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have been held since the UN’s establishment in 1945, most recently in 1988.

- The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs was established in 1982 to promote the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation.

- The three United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, situated in Lomé (Togo), Kathmandu (Nepal) and Lima (Peru), provide practical assistance to states in substantive and technical areas, including firearms legislation, support in stockpile management and weapons destruction and registers of conventional arms.

- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up to promote global cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology.

- The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established in 1997 to ensure the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

- The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation was established in 1996 to build the global verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has not yet entered into force.

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Within the United Nations and its related bodies, a number of important disarmament treaties have been formulated, including the Chemical Weapons Convention,85 the Biological Weapons Convention,86 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),87 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.88 Moreover, there are voluntary and informal measures on missile arms control, including the Missile Technology Control Regime89 and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.90 In order to regulate the trade in conventional arms, the UNGA approved the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)91 in 2013. As regards the trade in small arms and light weapons, two UN instruments were agreed in 2001. Under the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, countries adopted a Firearms Protocol.92 Governments that ratify the text commit to adopt a series of crime-control measures and implement three sets of provisions on firearms, namely (a) a licensing system relating to manufacture and trade, (b) the establishment of criminal offences on illegal manufacture and trade, and (c) provisions on the marking and tracing of firearms. In the same year, countries agreed on a Programme of Action focusing on preventing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

### Nuclear disarmament

Global nuclear disarmament – in other words, a world free of nuclear weapons – is one of the United Nations' most long-standing objectives. The first ever resolution adopted by the UNGA in January 1946 called for 'control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes' and for 'the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons'.93

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime.94 The NPT is built on three pillars – nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy – and aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote cooperation among states parties on civilian nuclear energy, and ultimately achieve complete nuclear disarmament. It grants the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT – China, France, Russia, the UK and the US, are recognised as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the NPT; India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed the NPT; North Korea left the Treaty in 2003 to develop its nuclear weapons programme.

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85 Website of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
87 Website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
89 Website of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
90 Website of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).
93 Resolution on the Establishment of a Commission to deal with the Problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, United Nations General Assembly, 24 January 1946.
Figure 15 – Nuclear weapons worldwide in 2018

Data source: SIPRI, January 2018, all figures are estimates.

The number of nuclear weapons worldwide has been declining since the mid-1980s, when they had reached an all-time peak of nearly 70,000 nuclear warheads. The decline has been due primarily to cuts made in the Russian and US nuclear forces as a result of three arms limitation treaties since 1991, as well as unilateral force reductions. However, the pace of the reductions in nuclear arsenals is slowing. Moreover, neither Russia nor the US – which together account for nearly 93% of nuclear weapons in the world (see Figure 15) – has signalled any intention to make further reductions in its strategic nuclear forces beyond the modest cuts mandated by the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). At the same time, both Russia and the US have launched extensive and expensive programmes to replace and modernise their nuclear warheads, missile and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear weapons production facilities.

The Nuclear Ban Treaty

Beginning in 2013, a group of United Nations member states and non-governmental organisations launched a 'humanitarian initiative' to reframe the nuclear disarmament debate by emphasising the devastating effects of a nuclear detonation on citizens all over the world. The initiative led to the adoption, on 7 July 2017, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral, legally binding instrument for nuclear disarmament to have been negotiated in 20 years. This new instrument has been hailed as historic by supporters of the humanitarian initiative, of which Austria was one of the key drivers. However, opponents of the Ban Treaty, including many other EU Member States, argue that the conditions for disarmament do not currently exist, and point to the danger of undermining the NPT. Enrenched disagreements between supporters and opponents of the treaty are likely to impact on future negotiations under the NPT and may derail the 2020 NPT review conference, potentially further weakening the existing non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The treaty may also undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. The treaty has also been criticised as having been hastily drafted and as lacking rigorous verification and enforcement provisions. It may also pose a risk to Euro-Atlantic and international security by delegitimising nuclear deterrence relationships. Moreover, there are concerns that the Ban Treaty will be used mainly to put


pressure on France, the UK and the US, to the detriment of European and East Asian security, rather than to address genuine security issues posed by other NWS or states known to have nuclear weapons. Among EU Member States, only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden voted in favour of the Ban Treaty and, so far, only Austria has ratified it, while Ireland has signed it.97

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran (JCPOA)

Iran has been a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT since 1970. In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, amid international suspicion that Iran was seeking to develop a nuclear weapon. The following year, the United Nations Security Council adopted the first of a series of resolutions calling on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related activities, and imposing sanctions. Starting in 2003, Iran, the IAEA and several other countries made a number of attempts to negotiate a settlement concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. After three years of intense negotiations, in 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the European Union, which played a new and significant role in this context), reached agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a 25-year agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear capacity in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 January 2016, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted. The negotiations between the E3+3/P5+1 and Iran that led to a comprehensive deal on Iran’s nuclear programme represent the most significant development in the NPT’s non-proliferation pillar.

While the United States under President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018 and re-imposed US sanctions on Iran, the EU remains committed to ensuring the full and continued implementation of the JCPOA by all remaining parties. To this end, Germany, France and the UK have set up a payment channel with Iran called INSTEX, to help continue trade and circumvent US sanctions. At the same time, the EU has expressed concerns relating to issues outside the scope of the agreement, such as the development of ballistic missiles by Iran.

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA

The agreement envisages extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the ‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’ agreed with the IAEA. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — or her designated representative — will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission established to monitor the implementation of the agreement and resolve related disputes.

Data source: EPRS, The nuclear agreement with Iran, January 2016.

2.4.2. EU sanctions

The EU’s sanctions policy is guided by its overarching foreign policy principle of effective multilateralism, with the United Nations (UN) at its core. Sanctions or restrictive measures (the two terms are used interchangeably) are one of the EU’s tools to promote the objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights and international law.\textsuperscript{98} Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature, which seek to bring about a change in activities or policies, such as violations of international law or human rights, or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. EU sanctions are always part of a wider, comprehensive policy approach involving political dialogue and complementary efforts.

There are three different major categories of EU sanctions, mandatory sanctions, supplementary measures and autonomous sanctions.\textsuperscript{99} The EU implements mandatory UN sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security. The EU can also adopt autonomous sanctions that go beyond UN sanctions. These are referred to as supplementary measures. Finally, the EU can adopt autonomous EU sanctions applied in the absence of UN sanctions. These can be used in situations where the UN Security Council cannot reach a common position, due to the opposition of a Permanent Member. Autonomous EU sanctions are always targeted and form part of a comprehensive approach, including political dialogue, incentives, conditionality and, as a last resort, coercive measures. Autonomous sanctions are often implemented in cooperation with other states or regional organisations in order to enhance their effectiveness.

Figure 16 – Countries targeted by an EU arms embargo (as of April 2019)

Data source: EU Sanctions Map, April 2019.

Restrictive measures imposed by the EU may target governments of third countries, or non-state entities and individuals (such as terrorist groups and terrorists). There are different types of sanctions, including diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties, and suspension of official visits); suspension of cooperation; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic

\textsuperscript{98} Sanctions Policy, European External Action Service.

resources, prohibition of financial transactions, restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; boycotts of sports or cultural events, and restrictions on admission.\textsuperscript{100}

Arms embargoes may be applied to interrupt the flow of arms or military equipment to conflict areas or to regimes that are likely to use them for internal repression or aggression against a foreign country. Arms embargoes generally comprise a prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts.\textsuperscript{101}

EU arms embargoes – in the form of UN mandatory, EU supplementary or EU autonomous sanctions – are currently in place against 20 states or non-governmental forces operating within a specific country. Moreover, arms embargoes are in place against two terrorist organisations – al-Qaeda and ISIL/Da’esh – and associated entities. EU sanctions are reviewed at regular intervals.\textsuperscript{102} The Council of the EU decides whether sanctions should be renewed, amended or lifted. The European Parliament does not have a formal role in the adoption of CFSP sanctions, but it has the right to be informed.

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**EU restrictive measures against North Korea**

The EU first introduced restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in December 2006. Those measures implemented the United Nations’ sanctions regime, which was adopted following the DPRK’s claim that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test. The EU also reinforced the UN’s sanctions regime by adopting supplementary measures, complementing and reinforcing the UN Security Council resolutions. The EU has continued to implement the restrictive measures imposed through resolutions of the UN Security Council and reinforced them through supplementary measures. Sanctions were last renewed on 19 April 2018, adding four individuals involved in nuclear programme financing to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and travel restrictions. The EU’s restrictive measures against the DPRK target its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related programmes. The ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities of the DPRK represent a serious threat to international peace and security. They undermine the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime which the EU has supported for decades. In its 2016 resolution on North Korea, the European Parliament urged Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. MEPs pointed to the human rights situation and called on the international community to bring those responsible for crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court, while imposing targeted sanctions.

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\textsuperscript{101} *Restrictive measures*, European Commission, spring 2008.

\textsuperscript{102} *Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force*, European Union, 4 August 2017.
3. Peace and EU democracy support

3.1. What existing research says about the link between peace and democracy

There is a wide consensus among scholars that democracies tend to avoid war with each other, and are more peaceful in their relations with undemocratic states as well. This is the central thesis of the ‘democratic peace theory’ (DPT) initially promoted by an Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant. The DPT does not deny that war remains possible, even between democracies. Based on existing historic evidence, it can be inferred that 'levels of violent conflict, especially wars, within democratic pairs of states are significantly lower than levels of violent conflict within other pairs of states'. Historically, while democracies have confronted each other in different ways, they have made big efforts to avoid wars and violent conflicts.

Scholars have tried to explain conflicts in which democracies have been involved pro-actively by pointing to their imperfection or to their international environment. Different degrees of democratisation have a varying impact on peace. According to Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström, data on war during the 1816 to 2000 period suggests that 'limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the political regime is changing [...] Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war'. The researchers quoted above have also found that democratic countries are more aggressive in a hostile environment, such as a region dominated by non-democratic countries. It is crucial for democracies also to have a liberal character, i.e. to be respectful of the human rights of their individual citizens and of other people in the world. Illiberal democracies animated by populist and nationalist ideas are not necessarily peaceful. Moreover, an international trade system is required allowing states to exchange goods peacefully and in a mutually beneficial way. This eliminates the temptation to take needed resources away from other countries by force.

The recurrent conflicts between India and Pakistan are a case in point. Although both are electoral democracies holding periodic elections that lead to changes in power, they are imperfect democratic systems. Pakistan in particular has serious democratic flaws and scores low on individual freedoms. The influence of its army on the government reduces the level of government accountability that is crucial according to the democratic peace theory. Both powers have however made efforts to keep conflict intensity low, which is in line with DPT.

Are democracies also more peaceful in the internal conduct of their affairs? This question is equally important. Since the 1950s, interstate wars have been clearly outnumbered by civil conflicts. The dominant view in the international community is that domestic peace can be promoted by supporting democracy. Evidence indeed shows that democracies are clearly more resilient to conflict. A recent report commissioned by the Community of Democracies

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103 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, 1795. Kant stated that republican states, by which he meant states governed by a representative government and characterised by the separation of powers, are generally more inclined towards peace than other forms of government. According to him, such states would be less inclined to go to war since the consent of citizens would be required. Ordinary citizens are quite reluctant to bear the burden of war and accept the inherent risks.


106 The interconnection between democratic, liberal and trade dimensions for guaranteeing peace has been defended by scholars in line with Kant’s original thinking.

107 According to international rankings, such as Freedom in the World by Freedom House and Democracy Index by EIU.


has concluded that consolidated liberal democracies are the best path towards internal and international peace and security. Democracies are less likely to suffer internal armed conflicts or to experience terrorism, because they provide channels for expressing dissent and respond to violence with due respect for human rights. On the other hand, according to the same report, 'states at intermediate stages of democratization – hybrid regimes with mixed features of democracy and autocracy, elite-driven patronage systems, and/or weak institutions – are generally the most vulnerable to insecurity, whether from violent crime, terrorism, or entrenched poverty'. Whether democratising states are more prone to violence remains a matter of controversy among researchers. Recent experience from states where democracy was attempted, such as in North Africa, or Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed suggests that the potential for instability in such situations is considerable.

A further important question is whether political settlements based on democratic mechanisms (such as holding free and fair elections) are an effective way of terminating civil conflicts. In fact, most civil wars end with decisive military victories either by the government or by the rebels, with only about a quarter ending through negotiated settlements. Even in such cases, the resulting democratic structures may remain fragile, as for example in Bosnia.

### 3.2. EU support to democracy and its link to peace

Both democracy and peace are enshrined in the EU Treaties as fundamental principles. Article 2 TEU recognises democracy as one of the values on which the EU is based, and Article 3 defines peace as one of the EU’s primary objectives. According to Article 21 of the same Treaty, outlining the Union’s external policies, the EU’s action on the international scene has to be guided by democracy, as one of the values that inspired its creation, and its external policies and international cooperation shall aim at fostering both democracy and peace in the world. The Council conclusions from November 2009 on ‘increased coherence in the EU’s support to democracy’ – a guiding document which gave an important impetus to EU democracy support at the time of the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force – recommended that EU partnerships and dialogues should aim at promoting democracy and peace, along with human rights, the rule of law and good governance. The strong connection between peace and democracy was explicitly acknowledged in the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted in 2012: ‘Sustainable peace, development and prosperity are possible only when grounded upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law’. In the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019), the EU emphasises ‘the key contribution that civil society actors and human rights defenders make to peace and security, stability and prosperity.’ The strong link between democracy and peace comes to the fore in the EU Global Strategy. The strategy mentions the imperative of pursuing consistency with EU fundamental values, and it describes democracy as an indispensable aspect of ‘resilient societies’. The integrated approach to conflicts and crises advocated by this strategy focuses on the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution. The Global Strategy acknowledges that the connection between democracy and peace is a bidirectional one, with democracy and peace presupposing and reinforcing each other. The concept of resilience best expresses this mutually reinforcing relation:

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110 Collier and Rohner (Democracy, Development, and Conflict, 2008) argued that democracy makes rebellion easier, but this effect only appears in poorer democratic countries. Wealthy democracies are made safer by democracy. Gleditsch and Ruggery (Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war, 2007) found that democracy in itself does not increase the risk of civil conflict onset. The risk of civil war depends on other factors, such as state weakness as assessed by irregular political leader changes. Uwe Sunde and Matteo Cervellati (Democratising for peace, 2014) found that the character of the democratic transitions matters: peaceful transitions to democracy are more likely to reduce conflict than violent transitions.

111 B.F. Walter, The Four Things We Know About How Civil Wars End, October 2013.
A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.

In line with the obligations enshrined in the Treaties, the EU has developed a wide array of tools for supporting democracy in third countries. These range from political and human rights dialogue, to support for civil society and human rights defenders, to development aid for good governance and the rule of law, and to the conditionality enshrined in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements and in its unilateral trade preferences. In many of these fields, EU efforts in favour of democracy have a more or less direct impact on peace and stability. Conceptually, the EU takes a comprehensive approach to democracy ('deep democracy'), emphasising a multiplicity of aspects that it supports.

### EU support for democracy in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans are a test case for the EU's capacity to support democracy in third countries in post-conflict situations. The region witnessed the most significant episodes of war in post-WWII Europe in terms of casualties and duration, the states in the region having been affected to varying degrees. Tensions still remain in most states in the region. Western Balkan states are candidates or potential candidates for accession, which gives the EU the strongest leverage in promoting democratic values. More concretely, four countries have candidate status: Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina has applied for it, while Kosovo has not. All six countries have concluded stabilisation and association agreements (SAA) with the EU.

The current situation in the region illustrates the tension between the search for stability and respect for democratic standards. Based on democratic indicators, the status of democracy in the region is declining. A number of worrying developments have been identified, such as erosion of democracy, rule of law and media freedom and fast-rising nationalist sentiments. This has happened despite EU efforts to uphold democratic standards in the region using the tools at its disposal. The EU has strengthened its monitoring of the countries' progress towards compliance with the fundamental values, namely the rule of law, economic governance, strengthening of democratic institutions and fundamental rights. However, the EU has been criticised for promoting stability at the expense of democracy.

At global level, the EU, together with its Member States, is an important provider of official development aid (ODA) specifically targeted at government and civil society. Together, their share represented more than 50% of ODA disbursed in the world for this sector in 2017 (see Figure 17).

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112 European Neighbourhood policy (ENP) introduced a commitment to promote ‘deep democracy’ in the EU’s neighbourhood as part of its reframing following the 'Arab Spring' in 2011. Deep democracy includes free and fair elections, freedom of association, expression and assembly, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, security and law enforcement reform, democratic control over armed and security forces, civil society, gender equality and anti-discrimination.
Peace and Security in 2019 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

Figure 17 – Official development assistance worldwide for government and civil society in 2017

Data source: OECD, CRS data, disbursements.

EU development aid in the field of government and civil society funds a wide range of measures that have the potential to strengthen the resilience of societies to conflict. EU support for measures to improve the accountability and transparency of public administration, to fight corruption, to reform and strengthen judiciaries, to reform the security apparatus, including through training in human rights, increases the legitimacy of state institutions and reduces the potential for civil conflict.

As can be seen in Figure 18 above, an important share of EU development aid for government and civil society is granted to states in situations of fragility.\(^\text{113}\) This share has represented

\(^{113}\) As the data about the sectorial amount of EU development aid come from OECD, the classification of fragile states for the purpose of the statistical calculations is done by the OECD, taking into account data from other multilateral financial institutions and the Fund for Peace Fragility Index. For more information, see the OECD list of states of fragility.
between 30% and 40% of total EU development aid for government and civil society since 2008. This highlights the importance attached by the EU to supporting good governance and civil society in fragile states. The share of EU governance aid granted specifically to ensuring peace and security has been around one quarter since 2007 (see Figure 19), which highlights the importance of the issue in EU development policy.

The democracy conditionality enshrined in EU trade and cooperation agreements is another important tool for supporting democracy in the world, and can play a decisive role in conflict prevention and resolution. A clause referred to as a ‘human rights clause’ or ‘democracy clause’ ensures that human rights, democracy and usually also the rule of law are essential elements of most EU trade and cooperation agreements concluded since the 1990s. In response to their violation, the EU or its partners can take a series of measures ranging from consultations to the suspension of all or part of the agreements. The recently concluded Strategic Partnership Agreement with Canada contains the most explicit description – linking democracy and peace – of the circumstances under which the suspension of the agreement can take place (or the termination of the trade agreement with Canada, to which the clause is also applicable). The gravity and nature of such a violation ‘would have to be of an exceptional sort such as a coup d’état or grave crimes that threaten the peace, security and well-being of the international community’. In practice, the clause is very unlikely to be applied as both Canada and the EU are deeply committed to democracy and human rights. Even with partners less committed to democratic principles, the EU has a clear preference for dialogue and consultation as a first step towards addressing problematic situations. To date the clause has been applied only under the Cotonou Agreement with ACP countries and its predecessor convention. In the more than 20 cases in which the EU has suspended its development aid, it has mostly done so in response to coups d’état or flawed elections, i.e. clear breaches of democratic principles with a big potential to lead to internal conflict. Development was reinstated after partner countries complied with EU recommendations. In response to coups in particular, EU sanctions have generally been considered effective in helping to restore constitutional order.\textsuperscript{114}

Undoubtedly, a central instrument of democracy support is represented by the EU’s electoral observation missions (EOMs). For more than two decades, the EU has sent EOMs to many regions of the world. The effectiveness of these missions in building trust among opposing groups in society, and therefore in preventing conflicts, has been recognised. An evaluation report\textsuperscript{115} for the European Commission (covering EOMs from July 2016 to January 2017) has found that EU election observation activities can contribute to the identification of irregularities and fraud and to the deterrence of fraud and malpractice, thereby fostering confidence in the electoral process and mitigating the potential for election-related conflict. The report concludes that EU election observation activities contribute to reducing the risk of future electoral conflict and violence in both the short and long-term. The EU EOMs take a comprehensive approach to the entire electoral cycle, putting forward recommendations for improving the overall electoral environment in third countries. The EU’s contribution to electoral reform ‘likely has a peace dividend’ too.

According to the study quoted above, ‘in elections with a high risk of security and stability issues, there can sometimes be heightened internal and external pressure to deploy an EOM’. Many EOMs have in fact taken place in countries that had experienced some degree of external and internal conflict, or in countries that were still prone to instability and civil conflict. Based on the annual state fragility scores by the Fund for Peace,\textsuperscript{116} EU EOMs since 2006 have mostly taken place in countries with some level of fragility, at either warning or alert level (see Figure


\textsuperscript{116} Fund for Peace.
Figure 20 – Countries that have received EU EOMs between 2006 and 2018, and their level of fragility in the respective year

The EU does not send electoral observation missions to the regions covered by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (encompassing Europe, Central Asia and North America), as this organisation observes elections itself using a similar methodology. A European Parliament delegation is, however, often involved in the International Electoral Observation Missions (IEOM) organised by the OD IHR – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – of the OSCE. Note that Figure 20 does not include such missions, including those in which the European Parliament participated.

The European Parliament has established its own measures to support parliamentary democracy in third countries identified as priority partners for democracy assistance. Some of these measures aim specifically at building trust and facilitating dialogue and consensus-building on legislative issues among conflicting political forces, in parliamentary environments characterised by a lack of political trust, such as in Ukraine. The European Parliament also plays a central role in the EU’s electoral observation missions, which enjoy a high degree of independence in conducting their electoral monitoring and have thus acquired a reputation for impartiality. It is consulted on the planning of EU EOMs and on follow-up missions. The European Parliament delegation is integrated into the EU EOM, which is always chaired by a Member of the European Parliament.

117 Excluding the countries/territories for which the Fund does not provide data: Fiji, Kosovo and Palestine.

118 The following countries/territories have also received EOMs, but the Fund for Peace does not provide fragility data for them: Fiji (2006), Kosovo (2017, 2014, 2013), Palestinian Territory (2006). They do not therefore appear on the map.
4. Peace and EU development cooperation and humanitarian aid

Development cooperation and humanitarian aid are long-standing EU commitments, enshrined in the Treaties. Aid cannot prevent or end conflicts by itself, but has a conspicuous place in conflict-affected zones, as half of the world's poor live in fragile or conflict-affected states. There is a strong correlation between development issues and conflict-affected situations. Youth unemployment, lack of economic opportunities and difficult access to resources are often combined with the rise of violent armed groups, drug trafficking, social or ethnic conflicts. Conflicts hinder development, reducing GDP growth by two points a year on average. Most of the world's 68.5 million refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum-seekers originate from conflict zones. In addition, almost all humanitarian crises arise in conflict situations. Conflict-prone 'fragile states' all combine economic development issues with weak legitimacy, a limited capacity to deliver services to the population, and security issues; but each fragility or conflict situation involves a complex matrix of deficits in those various areas. This complexity has to be taken into account in the context of development and humanitarian programmes where actions undertaken must be carefully planned and coordinated, to avoid any possible negative impacts.

Demographics and conflict likelihood

Is there a relationship between countries with high fertility and therefore with a large young population and the state of peace or conflict? Intuitively, societies with young populations seem to be more inclined to violent conflicts, particularly when economic conditions are dire. Young people struggle to find employment and generally to find a place in society. They may also offer an easy pool for recruitment by extremist organisations as well as by militias and armies. However, youth bulges are not always associated with conflict and violence. An analysis of the 20 countries with the largest youth bulges in the world in 2015 shows that only around half of them were characterised by a low state of peace. These included some of the most conflict-affected countries in the world, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Mali, Central African Republic, Niger and Burundi. On the other hand some other countries in the group have been peaceful or relatively peaceful, such as Malawi, East Timor, Zambia, Uganda or Tanzania.

Large youth populations may be a blessing or a curse on the respective societies, depending on other factors coming into play. A large young population available for the labour market coupled with a simultaneous significant reduction in birth rates easing dependency rates can be a blessing for the economy, creating what is referred to as a 'demographic dividend'. This was considered one of the drivers behind quick economic growth in East and South-East Asia in the recent past. When such opportunities do not occur, or are not exploited, societies with a youth bulge face considerable risks. Statistical studies show that such societies have a significantly higher likelihood of experiencing conflicts, but this is explained by a combination of other unfavourable factors, such as poor governance, absence of economic growth and rising inequalities. Creating enough jobs for the numerous young people joining the labour force every year is becoming increasingly difficult in the current age of declining manufacturing and increasing automation.

119 Treaty on European Union, Article 21; Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Article 4(4) and Title III.
120 Data source on conflict and fragility: World Bank.
121 Data: UNHCR, June 2018.
123 We calculated the ‘youth bulge’ as the proportion of the 15-24 years old in the total population above 14 years, based on the UN Population Division 2017 data. In the 20 countries ranking highest, this proportion was above 35 %.
124 Based on the data provided by the Global Peace Index 2015.
125 According to a report from Population Action International entitled 'The Security demographic – Population and conflict after the Cold War', countries with a high number of young adults (at least 40 % of the adult population between the ages of 15 and 29) were 2.3 times more likely to suffer a civil conflict during the 1990s.
and poorly managed cities and scarcity of cropland and water because of population pressures may contribute significantly to the risk of deadly civil violence, but again do not necessarily have such an effect.\textsuperscript{127}

**Figure 21 – Demographic structure in the world’s most conflict-affected countries**


### 4.1. The EU approach

#### 4.1.1. Focusing on fragile and conflict-affected states

In June 2017, EU institutions and Member States renewed their 'consensus on development', originally adopted on 20 December 2005. The new consensus clearly targets fragile and conflict-affected countries.\textsuperscript{128} Streamlined with the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the concept of 'resilience' outlined in the EU Global Strategy,\textsuperscript{129} the new consensus highlights that development cooperation is a pivotal instrument for preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences, or recovering from them. The EU also strives to build its own resilience to shocks mainly driven by external conflicts, namely the migration ‘crisis’ and terrorist attacks on its soil.

On the global stage, the EU is also committed to most aid effectiveness frameworks.\textsuperscript{130} It endorsed the new deal for engagement with fragile states (November 2011) which focuses on five peacebuilding and state-building goals, where employment and access to social services

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\textsuperscript{127} Ibidem.


\textsuperscript{130} E. Pichon, Understanding ‘development effectiveness’, EPRS, 2017.
are placed on an equal footing with inclusive politics, justice and security.\textsuperscript{131}

### Table 22 – A quarter of EU aid goes to the most fragile states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSI ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU aid (institutions + Member States, current US$, million)</th>
<th>% of total EU aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>594.85</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>725.90</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>258.95</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>283.16</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>481.25</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1 887.26</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>217.18</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>748.71</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 593.39</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>224.54</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>907.78</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>196.57</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>770.09</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>970.52</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>207.90</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>280.74</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>146.45</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>433.10</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>699.19</td>
<td>1.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU aid to 20 most fragile states in 2016</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11 646.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.63%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>47 286.49</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: EU aid: 2016 Official development aid (ODA) from EU institutions and Member States (gross disbursement, current US$); \textbf{EU Aid explorer} (OECD data, accessed 4/03/2019). FSI ranking: \textbf{Fragile state index}, 2016 (more recent editions exist, but 2016 has been chosen for the sake of consistency with EU aid data).

Central African Republic (CAR) ranks 130 in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. The constitutional republic has struggled through ongoing episodes of civil war since 2003.

**Traditional sources and indications of conflict**

Despite numerous ceasefire and peacebuilding efforts, including the Brazzaville Agreement in 2017 and democratic election of President Touadera in 2016, violence between armed groups remains common and the country is de facto partitioned between the Anti-Balaka in the southwest and ex-Séléka in the northwest.

In 2018, CAR ranked sixth globally on the Fragile States Index, reflecting the weakness of the central elected government. The security vacuum that has emerged as a result has contributed to CAR’s high violent conflict score. CAR has the 15th highest score for impact of terrorism globally. The second and third deadliest attacks recorded in the 2018 Global Terrorism Index were carried out by Séléka- and Anti-Balaka-affiliated groups, respectively. Both sides of the civil war have demonstrated the capacity and will to attack civilians, internally displaced persons and even United Nations personnel. There have been instances of ethnic cleansing carried out by both factions.

**New security and hybrid threats**

Limited central government capacities and authority make CAR vulnerable to emerging threats in areas including cybersecurity and press freedom. These shortcomings have resulted in the country’s low score for democratic processes. In addition to this, attacks on the media are common and the central state authority is often opposed to media criticism, leading to a [2019 World Press Freedom Index](#) rating of 112, below the sub-Saharan African average.

**EU involvement**

The EU helped the CAR government to draw up the 2017-2021 national recovery and peacebuilding plan and the EU comprehensive approach in the CAR is in line with this plan. The CAR is part of the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries)-EU partnership. In this context, EU aid to the CAR is financed by the European Development Fund and totals €327 million for the 2014-2020 period. In addition, the EU Békou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic is designed to improve both the coordination of EU donors and the approaches taken by CAR so as to reduce aid fragmentation. At the end of 2016, pledges to the Békou Trust Fund amounted to €146 million, mostly from the EU budget and the European Development Fund. Parliament has called on the Member States and other donors to ‘scale up their contributions’. One military mission, EUTM RCA, is currently operating in the country, helping to restructure national forces. The EU has committed to support the implementation of the peace deal signed in February 2019 between the CAR government and armed groups; however the EU was not a prominent actor in this peace deal, which signals the emerging role of Russia on the African continent.
Somalia ranks 133 in the Normandy Index. It is considered more at risk than the sub-Saharan African average. Its performance is below average for sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to the indicators measuring terrorism, resilience to disinformation, state fragility and cybersecurity.

**Traditional sources and indications of conflict**

Somalia has struggled with the impact of the civil war that began in 1991 with the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre. The country is also trying to cope with the insurgency of terrorist organisation al-Shabaab, which has been plaguing the country since 2008. Partly as a result of this instability, the country is divided into autonomous and semi-autonomous regions. Somalia has been operating as a federation since 2012.

Somalia saw the second biggest increase in scores on the 2018 Global Terrorism Index, after Egypt, with a 93% increase in deaths on the previous year. It was ranked as the country with the sixth highest impact of terrorism. This is almost exclusively due to the activity of al-Shabaab, a jihadist and al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group based in Somalia.

Somalia ranks second on the Fragile States Index. This reflects weaknesses in the central government, which has little practical control over much of its territory, not least over the self-declared state of Somaliland.

**New security and hybrid threats**

In response in part to the weaknesses of the central government, Somalia has adopted a decentralised federal model. As the federal government does not have significant territorial control or influence over policy, Somalia is vulnerable to the threats that generally accompany weak states. These include threats in the areas of cybersecurity and press freedom.

**EU involvement**

Somalia is one major focus of the EU’s strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, which aligns various external policy programmes and instruments to tackle insecurity in the area, in particular the piracy attacks off the Coast of Somalia, and its root causes. EU aid to Somalia is financed primarily by the European Development Fund, up to €286 million for the 2014-2020 period, of which one third is dedicated to peace building and state building. Peace-building efforts are also financed by means of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, for projects worth €292 million, with a view to mitigating the root causes of irregular migration. Two EU military operations and one CSDP civil mission are based in Somalia: EUNavfor Operation Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia. While the EU’s direct naval action has helped to secure the Coast of Somalia, international efforts to help improve Somali military and political governance, to which the EU has made a significant contribution, have yet to bear fruit.
4.1.2. Comprehensive strategies

The 2019 report on EU policy coherence for development\textsuperscript{132} takes stock of the efforts of EU institutions and Member States to assess the impact of all their policies on developing countries. One chapter lists some achievements in the area of 'peace as an indispensable condition for development' such as the EU's contribution to: gender and transitional justice networks in Nepal, with the support of an Italian organisation for development; security sector reform in Ukraine; and the adoption of a global arms trade treaty. This commitment to 'policy coherence for development' (PCD) has materialised in some common strategies, as is the case for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa\textsuperscript{133}. However, the funding is 'siloed' so that these strategies still have to be financed through a mix of EU budgetary resources, European Development Fund money (mostly through the African Peace Facility), and trust funds combining public and private contributions.\textsuperscript{134}

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**Food crises**

Food insecurity is on the rise: 804 million people faced chronic food deprivation in 2016, 821 million in 2017; 108 million people faced famine or very acute food insecurity in 2016, 124 million in 2017.\textsuperscript{135} Conflict and insecurity were the primary drivers for food crises in 18 countries, with 74 million food-insecure people in need of urgent action – 17 million of whom in Yemen alone (the second set of main drivers are climate shocks, mainly droughts, which affect 39 million people in 23 countries). In fragile states, coupled with climate change, rapid demographic growth and unsustainable agriculture, conflicts put more pressure on the availability of a nutritious diet for all, as they intensify population displacement and land grabbing. Health and sanitation services are also affected or destroyed, so that food insecurity is often combined with epidemics (Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and other conflict-affected countries have been hit by severe cholera outbreaks). Food insecurity decreases resistance to illness, which in turn aggravates malnutrition.

The UN sustainable development goals have reaffirmed the human right to food (SDG2). EU institutions and Member States have also highlighted this concern anew, through the EU Global Strategy and the new EU consensus on development. Already in 2010, the common policy on food security promoted a comprehensive approach,\textsuperscript{136} focusing EU support on the sustainable development of smallholder farms in developing countries.

In fragile states, the EU response to food crises links relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). For example, in line with the EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, the EU Commission's Directorates-General for Development (DEVCO) and for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) have launched a common programme: ‘Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience’ (SHARE). SHARE targets food crises by linking short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term development policy. A comprehensive approach also includes forging partnerships beyond EU stakeholders. In the framework of its strategy for security and development in the Sahel, the EU is involved in the global alliance for resilience initiative (AGIR)\textsuperscript{137} in the Sahel and West Africa. AGIR is a common framework for a set of initiatives aimed at combating food insecurity. It consists of a regional objective, broken down into ‘resilience priorities’ in each of the countries concerned, drafted following a dialogue between all actors concerned (institutional, non-governmental, civil society).

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\textsuperscript{133} See E. Pichon, Le Sahel: un enjeu stratégique pour l'Union européenne, EPRS, 2017 and EU strategy in the Horn of Africa, 2016.

\textsuperscript{134} See Introduction and Chapter 2.3 on the EU budget.

\textsuperscript{135} The Global report on food crises 2018, Food Security Information Network, 2018. This report deals with the most severe food insecurity issues: Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5) – IPC: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.

\textsuperscript{136} EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges, COM(2010) 127.

\textsuperscript{137} European Commission, AGIR (the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative), 2017.
At a broader level, the EU is part of the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)\footnote{Global Network Initiative, Food Security Information Network website, n.d.} since its inception in 2016 together with the World Food Programme, UN bodies (FAO, UNICEF, OCHA), African regional organisations and other partners: the GNFC helps inform decision-making on the humanitarian and development cooperation during food crises, by means of quantitative and qualitative analyses.

The support for EU farmers should of course not contradict EU international commitments: the proposed reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) for 2021 to 2027 clearly takes into account EU development cooperation objectives of poverty eradication and sustainable development in developing countries,\footnote{Proposal for a regulation ... establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the Common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans), COM(2018) 392.} through favourable trade conditions for less developed countries’ agricultural products, and climate-friendly and resource-efficient agricultural methods.
Colombia ranks 93 in the Normandy Index, indicating that the country faces some risk. It is considered more at risk than the South American regional average, and performs below the regional average for homicide, terrorism, violent conflict and resilience to disinformation.

**Traditional sources and indications of conflict**

Colombia has struggled with organised crime and the impact of terrorism. A peace agreement between the government and the biggest terrorist group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), was signed in 2016. However, there are an estimated 2 500 active FARC dissidents. In March 2019, hundreds of Colombians were displaced after a key drug trafficking region experienced increased fighting between ex-FARC groups. It is likely organised crime and terrorist groups will continue to pose a threat to peace in Colombia. This includes knock-on effects to other aspects of society, such as homicides. The homicide rate in Colombia is higher than the South American regional average and among the 20 highest in the world.

**New security and hybrid threats**

Colombia performs below the South American regional average for new security threats. However, the country does show resilience in a number of areas, including energy insecurity, being a net exporter of energy. It also performs higher than the South American regional average in cybersecurity. Colombia performs relatively poorly in press freedom and access to information. The country ranks 129 in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, largely owing to high numbers of death threats towards journalists and resultant self-censorship.

**EU involvement**

EU support for Colombia's peace process has shaped the EU-Colombia relationship in recent years. Since 2000, this support has reached almost €2 billion (including €575 million announced by the EU for the post-conflict period, and €910 million allocated bilaterally by Member States between 2010 and 2015). In December 2016, the EU set up a Trust Fund for Colombia, totalling €95 million from the EU budget and 19 Member States; and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) mobilised an extra €40 million for critical elements of the peace process, such as achieving an effective transitional justice system. EU cooperation covers areas such as victims' rights, reintegration of ex-FARC guerrillas into civilian life, de-mining, rural development, land restitution, environment, conflict resolution, projects relating to peace and the post-conflict period, and the establishment of a special investigation unit in the prosecutor-general's office to combat crime and protect activists. The EU has also appointed a special envoy, Eamon Gilmore, who considers the EU's role in the Colombian peace process to have been a great success, and a model for EU external policy. The EU also has a Comprehensive Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru, provisionally applied since 2013. Regional cooperation between the EU and the Andean Community aims to help cement regional ties in Colombia's neighbourhood.
4.2. Conflict sensitivity and aid

4.2.1. The discussion on conflict and aid

Research challenges the intuitive notion that aid and relief necessarily appease tensions. Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC)\(^{140}\) show, for example, that in the Philippines, increases in employment led to further violence, possibly because better living conditions empower citizens to resist. Investments in infrastructure also correlated with further violence, because the government adopted tougher measures to protect a source of taxes and jobs, or because insurgents attempted to seize or sabotage the projects. If they focus only on certain populations (e.g. religious minorities, women) or geographic areas, development programmes risk aggravating dissent and rejection. Other researchers have shown that a humanitarian presence in the Central African Republic contributed to economic distortions: for example, it caused an increase in rents, thus further weakening the local population; better job opportunities and wages offered by aid agencies attracted local civil servants – often unpaid for months – thus hindering the EU efforts to support better governance. In-kind or financial aid may also be diverted by the government and/or armed groups, reinforcing their grip over populations.\(^{141}\)

By contrast, other findings show that aid can be efficient in reducing the level of violence when it is informed by a good knowledge of the social context that led to conflict, for example, sectarian divisions. Small-scale assistance, carefully targeted and implemented, such as conditional cash transfer, has proved efficient in Iraq and the Philippines. However, research also shows that similar conclusions cannot be drawn for all conflict zones: avoiding negative impacts requires an understanding of the context of each conflict in its historic, political and socio-economic dimensions, and an analysis of the potential impact of every planned intervention (‘conflict sensitivity’). Political commitments, reflected in the new consensus on development, must be supported by appropriate expertise and tools, broadly referred to as the ‘do no harm approach’.\(^{142}\) The EU has been able to draw lessons and provide guidelines for staff working in conflict areas.\(^{143}\)

4.2.2. Conflict prevention: early warning for better efficiency

The Treaty on European Union identifies conflict prevention as a key mission of the EU’s external action. Addressing the root causes of a potential violent conflict before it erupts is indeed vital, since emerging from an entrenched conflict is a long and costly process: conflicts that ended in 2014 and 2015 had lasted on average respectively 26 and 14.5 years.\(^{144}\) The deployment of a conflict early warning system (EWS)\(^{145}\) has been a way of fulfilling the Treaty’s commitment. The EWS involves all concerned actors across the relevant Member States’ and EU services, both centrally (EEAS, DEVCO, ECHO) and in the field (EU delegations, ECHO field offices, EU Special Representatives, Member States’ embassies). Every year, based on statistical risk information and input from the field, EU staff establish priorities for EU action, based on EU interests and benefit. For each priority country, a conflict prevention report proposes relevant actions, which are monitored and revised during the following yearly EWS iteration. This makes

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140 See the Empirical Studies of Conflict project website. See also: ‘Aid for Peace: Does Money Buy Hearts and Minds?’ ForeignAffairs.com, 21.1.2015.
142 Although ‘do no harm’ originally refers to a specific framework, the expression now often encompasses all conflict-sensitivity approaches, see for example Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, Council conclusions, 19 May 2017.
143 Resilience and Fragility – Analytical tools, European Commission, International Cooperation and Development.
144 Source: World Bank Group, United Nations,
Peace and Security in 2019 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

it possible for interventions to target inequalities, weak governance and security issues where they are most urgently needed and most likely to be efficient.146

4.2.3. Ongoing conflict: challenges of the comprehensive approach

At the heart of conflicts, the peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) methodology provides for a two-way assessment of the possible impacts of a conflict on external intervention, as well as the possible impacts of an intervention on the dynamics of the conflict. Other methodologies focus on the peacebuilding relevance of development interventions (aid for peace) or of the gender aspects of conflicts and interventions (gender and conflict sensitivity).

The EU has a manifold role, and tensions between its various mandates are unavoidable: development actors insist that addressing the root causes of migration is not the same as tackling illegal migration;147 the humanitarian response endeavours to limit the effects of armed conflicts but does not seek to address the parties' responsibilities, while development projects aimed for example at setting up transitional justice do. However, when the conflict is ongoing, streamlining interventions is vital to ensure that there is no gap between urgent interventions and predictable aid. Most stakeholders acknowledge that better coordination would foster the complementarity of short-term humanitarian interventions and longer-term development programmes (the 'humanitarian-development nexus'). Joint analyses are already performed within the EU services, and the Council has advocated 'new approaches in policies and legal frameworks'.148 This 'operationalisation' has been tried out in Darfur (Sudan) where various EU services are brought together to help ensure a better transition from emergency assistance to sustainable development, when conditions are met.149

4.2.4. Post-conflict interventions: making recovery possible

In areas emerging from conflicts, the recovery and peacebuilding assessment methodology (RBPA) is designed to analyse the drivers of the conflict and to assess its impacts, in order to draw up a roadmap for the implementation of recovery measures. RBPA is a process rather than a set of tools. In this process, the EU and other international organisations play a crucial role: they coordinate their actions to create the conditions for effective recovery under the ownership of a legitimate government. Conducted under the Joint EU-World Bank-United Nations Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning,150 RBPA was used in 2015, for example, at the request of the Nigerian government, to stabilise the north-east of the country, after the region was recaptured from a Boko Haram insurgency. The Central African Republic requested a RBPA from those three international institutions to help draft its National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding, presented in November 2016 at the Brussels conference for the Central African Republic.

4.3. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)151 is one of the external financing instruments that were adopted as a package in 2014,152 as part of the
implementation of the CFSP. The idea behind the IcSP, which replaces the Instrument for Stability (IfS), was to increase the efficiency and coherence of the European Union’s actions by creating a more explicit link between security and development policies. The focus was specifically on crisis management and peacebuilding (i.e. crisis preparedness, crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding), and on addressing global and trans-national threats (i.e. terrorism, cybersecurity and illicit trafficking). In doing so, the IcSP’s objectives link two major EU policy areas, namely foreign policy, and international cooperation and development. A list of cross-cutting issues, such as promotion of democracy, climate change and gender equality, are to be taken into consideration wherever possible.

**Figure 23 – IcSP projects: Distribution of funds per sector (as of January 2019)**

Data source: European Commission, 2019; EPRS.

### 4.3.1. Rationale

The 2011 World Bank report on Conflict, Security and Development explored the theoretical link between conflict, security and development issues. The report noted that at least 1.5 billion people globally were (at that time) affected by ongoing violence or its legacies. It found that organised violence increased when other factors were present, such as youth unemployment, income shocks, tension among ethnic, religious or social groups, and trafficking networks. Risks of violence were greater when high pressures combined with weak capacity or a lack of legitimacy among key national institutions. Societal, economic, technological and geopolitical developments point to the growing vulnerability of the world’s population to shocks and stresses, including: interstate conflicts, natural disasters, extreme weather events, water crises, state collapse and cyber-attacks. In such a rapidly changing environment, complex and interconnected risks do not fit neatly into categories defined by geographical borders or legal

managed partly by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and partly by the Commission DG for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).


boundaries. In turn, they challenge the usefulness of traditional funding instruments that aim to maintain clear dividing lines between peace and security on the one hand, and development on the other. Moreover, the increasingly complex security environment is having a direct impact on the definition of the development objectives, requiring a redefinition of the respective missions of actors involved in delivering security and development functions.

While the EU recognises a clear link between security and development – as reflected in the 2006 European consensus on development, the EU’s support for the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, and the Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach – like other international donors, it faces a number of constraints when committing funding for peace and security through traditional development channels. Therefore, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace was created to support security initiatives and peacebuilding activities in partner countries. The instrument can provide short-term assistance, for example in countries where a crisis is unfolding, or long-term support to global and trans-regional threats.

The IcSP was amended in 2017 to strengthen the EU’s role as a security provider, by introducing new funding opportunities for military capacity-building in third countries. An extra €100 million has been allocated to the IcSP for that purpose. The amendments extend the Union’s ability to support capacity-building of partners through training and mentoring, provision of non-lethal equipment and improvements in infrastructure. Moreover, the amendments will allow the Union to help to build the capacity of military actors in partner countries to deliver development assistance and provide security for development activities. Such help will be provided only in exceptional circumstances, and only if EU objectives cannot be achieved by recourse to non-military actors, and if the functioning of state institutions and human rights and fundamental freedoms are threatened. The EU position that Union assistance may not be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunition, or training which is solely designed to contribute to the fighting capacity of the armed forces, remains unchanged.

4.3.2. Projects funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

The IcSP has so far funded 373 projects in over 80 countries. Figure 24 shows the geographical distribution of the funds in 2018. The largest proportion of the funds in 2018 went to Africa, followed by projects covering multiple regions.

A large single-country project funded by the IcSP sought to address the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The €20 million project aimed to strengthen the operational capacity of the Turkish coastguard to manage migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to end illegal migration and trafficking, and rescue castaways. Better life-saving equipment and training provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has allowed the Turkish coastguards to enhance their search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea. The project began in August 2016 and ended in February 2018.

155 P. Pawlak, Risk and Resilience in Foreign Policy, EPRS, September 2015.
158 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, Council of the European Union, 12 May 2014.
In response to the war in Syria, the IcSP is funding a project to promote civil society leadership in Syria, in preparation for a post-conflict transition in the country. The project, which began in 2016 and is now in its second phase, has been instrumental in supporting the UN-led peace talks in Geneva, the consolidation of the Syrian opposition’s negotiation platform, as well as efforts to promote an inclusive vision of transition for Syria – including through direct support to civil society networks, women and human rights organisations. The new phase, which has a budget of €9 million until July 2019, will also provide financial, technical and analytical support for the overall work on reaching a negotiated political transition in Syria.

The largest multi-country project under the IcSP is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) Risk-Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, a worldwide programme involving 56 partner countries. The initiative aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN material and promote the establishment of a culture of security. The causes of CBRN incidents are either natural (e.g. pandemics), accidental (e.g. industrial accidents) or intentional. The intentional or malevolent use of CBRN materials for terrorist attacks is of particular and increasing concern to the international community. It is an issue which this project seeks to address, through the development of risk mitigation activities aimed at critical areas of CBRN security such as border control, field detection and response, forensics and adequate waste management. The project — which has an overall budget of €250 million — started in 2010 and is currently scheduled to run until December 2020.

In the area of counter-terrorism, funds from the IcSP fund technical assistance to law enforcement and judicial officials in an area stretching from Africa, via the Arabian Peninsula, to Pakistan. Projects include training aviation administrations and law enforcement authorities in aviation security; training counter-terrorism, law enforcement, and investigation and prosecution officials; and advising on the optimal inclusion of a human rights approach in counter-terrorism strategies. In the Horn of Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen, IcSP-funded projects seek to enhance the capabilities of intelligence officials, law enforcement agents and prosecutors to disrupt terrorist activities and prosecute terrorism suspects. In Pakistan, the IcSP funds training of judicial officials responsible for investigating, prosecuting, convicting and detaining terrorists.

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160 Website of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative (EU CBRN CoE).

161 B. Immenkamp, JSIL/Da’esh and ‘non-conventional’ weapons of terror, EPRS, May 2016.

162 Until 2014, funds came from the Instrument for Stability (IFS).

The European Parliament’s contribution to IcSP

The adoption of an instrument providing funding opportunities for military capacity-building in third countries marked an important step for the EU, in general, and for the European Parliament, in particular.

Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) was responsible for drafting a report on the proposal to amend the IcSP. Published in March 2017, it welcomed the proposal to amend the IcSP. Alongside the report, the Committee on Development (DEVE) submitted an opinion in which it insisted that the proposed assistance to build the capacity of military actors in partner countries should not come from funds allocated to development assistance. Specifically, DEVE asked that funding should come from instruments other than the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) or the European Development Fund (EDF), in order to maintain those funds primarily for poverty alleviation and eradication. In its legislative resolution of 30 November 2017, the European Parliament approved the proposal to amend the IcSP. Moreover, at the demand of Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed not to use appropriations allocated to the DCI to finance the capacity building in support of development and security for development foreseen under Regulation 2017/2306. A declaration to that effect – albeit not legally binding on the Commission – appears in the annex to Regulation 2017/2306.

4.4. Evaluation and prospects

In June 2017, the European Commission and the High Representative evaluated the implementation of the EU resilience policy framework. This evaluation recognises the closer working relationships between EU services, but points out that the current mandates and instruments of DG DEVCO and ECHO do not allow for a consistent division of labour. The Commission and High Representative highlight the need to strengthen the EU’s analytical capacities and for greater ‘active consideration on how the EU could contribute to conflict reduction’.

According to an external evaluation policy coherence for development (PCD) was not always taken into account in policies likely to affect developing countries. The evaluation also finds few synergies between EU bodies and Member States in the field. However, PCD allowed EU and its Member States to improve their coordination at political level, which proved effective as regards the EU’s commitments in international fora. As concerns the specific challenge of ‘strengthening the links and synergies between security and development’, three initiatives were assessed: the raw materials initiative (2008), responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (2014), and the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Package (2014). All three are considered to address development objectives, in particular as concerns the impact on governance in developing countries.

Better streamlining of financial instruments might foster an improved security-development nexus. For the future financing of the Union (2021-2027 multiannual financial framework) the European Commission has proposed to merge eight existing EU budget sources and part of

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164 EU resilience policy framework, SWD(2017) 227 final, European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 7 June 2017.
169 The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries (PI), the European Instrument for Democracy and
the European Development Fund into a Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)\(^{170}\) in order to allow for greater flexibility in the use of funds and to avoid gaps and overlaps.\(^{171}\) In the same vein, the aforementioned amendment (2017) to the regulation governing the IcSP allows for the EU budget to be used to support third countries’ militaries in their efforts to strengthen peace and security.

| The European Parliament has insisted that EU development cooperation policy should address the root causes of forced displacement and migration, and has called for improvements in the EU’s conflict prevention and conflict management policies and tools. Parliament has also called for better linkage between EU humanitarian aid and development cooperation, while emphasising that this should not be detrimental to humanitarian neutrality, critical in conflict zones. In a number of resolutions, Parliament has stressed that the eradication of poverty and respect for human rights should not be hindered by security considerations.\(^{172}\) |

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Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the External Lending Mandate (ELM), and the Guarantee Fund for External Action, and part of the European Development Fund.


5. EU security and defence policy

5.1. Peace and security in the CSDP

As analysed in chapter 2, 'the EU's work on security and defence is part of a broader picture where security and development go hand in hand'. These were the words of HR/VP Federica Mogherini addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 12 December 2017.\(^{173}\) In the face of the new unstable security environment, the EU has boosted its efforts to enhance and develop its security and defence policy, particularly following the launch of the EU Global Strategy. But the founding principle behind these efforts is the link between defence and security and peace, as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, Article 42(1) TEU, which sets out the context and overarching purpose of the common security and defence policy (CSDP), stipulates that:

> The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

In this context, defence is seen as a means for security and peace. The progressive framing of an EU defence policy is incorporated in Article 42(2) TEU.\(^{174}\) Together, these articles underpin the EU's internal collective defence efforts. Decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the Council of the European Union by unanimity. However, there are some exceptions, for instance when the Council adopts certain decisions implementing an EU decision, or relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting. The HR/VP is responsible for proposing and implementing CSDP decisions.\(^{175}\)

The Global Strategy recognises the undeniable link between a stronger and more autonomous EU defence policy and the EU's capacity to provide peace internally and externally. It thus argues that:

> In full compliance with international law, European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism. It must be able to provide security when peace agreements are reached and transition governments established or in the making.

This premise is linked to the assessment that in the current geopolitical context, soft power must go hand in hand with hard power, i.e. with an enhancement of the EU's security and defence policy and the associated credibility. The Strategy maintains that, in order to achieve its goals of crisis-response, building capacity and resilience and protecting Europe's peace and security, Member States must boost defence expenditure (see Figure 25), make the most efficient use of resources, and meet a collective commitment of '20 % of defence budget spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and research and technology'.\(^{176}\) The emergence of security threats, particularly of Russian aggression in the Eastern

\(^{173}\) EU High Representative.

\(^{174}\) Article 42(2) TEU underlines that the ‘common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy’. Article 42(2) requires the EU to frame a common defence policy which can be established without further treaty changes. Through a ‘passerelle’ clause, the TEU envisages in Article 42(2) that such a ‘common defence’ will be put in place if the ‘European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.’ Article 42(2) para. 2 further stipulates opt-outs. For example, the EU’s policy ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’ (a reference to the neutrality policies of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); moreover, it ‘shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’.

\(^{175}\) See, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EUR-Lex glossary.

\(^{176}\) EU Global Strategy.
Neighbourhood, has indeed led to an increase in defence budgets in eastern European EU Member States. At the same time, significant efforts are being made to boost and – where possible – pool together EU capabilities towards more effective and efficient spending.

**Figure 25 – Defence spending in the EU, 2016-2018**

Data source: IISS *Military Balance*, 2019; EPRS.

### 5.2. From the Global Strategy to the new security and defence initiatives

In December 2016, the European Council discussed a defence package presented by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), including: 1) specific actions to implement the security and defence component of the Global Strategy; 177 2) the European Commission’s European defence action plan (EDAP); 178 and 3) proposals to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Joint Declaration. 179 At the December 2016 European Council meeting, EU leaders

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179 *EU-NATO joint declaration*, European Council, July 2016.
set a timetable for specific actions related to the package; the HR/VP was tasked to submit proposals for a permanent operational planning and conduct capability, aimed at streamlining the conduct of both civilian and military EU operations, and on further improving the development of civilian capabilities. The European Council also invited the Commission to make proposals for the establishment of a European defence fund, including a financing structure (‘window’) on the joint development of capabilities commonly agreed by the Member States in the first half of 2017. Significant progress on all fronts was made during 2017 and 2018 with the cooperation of all EU institutions.

In June 2017, the Council established a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC). The MPCC will serve as a command and control structure for non-executive EU military training missions. It will work under the political control of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with the aim of improving the EU’s crisis management structures, as the lack of such a structure undermines its capacity to plan and run its own operations independently. The Council also decided to create a civilian/military joint support coordination cell that will increase synergies between civilian and military work. The MPCC, in collaboration with CSDP, works closely to enhance the efficiency of current missions in Somalia, RCA, Mali, and ongoing projects in the Western Balkans.

In 2017 the Council also welcomed the work launched on the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), a voluntary Member State-driven tool for deepening cooperation, fostering capability development, and ensuring optimal use and greater coherence of defence spending plans. Essentially, CARD is a process of monitoring the defence plans of EU Member States to help coordinate spending and identify possible collaborative projects. A trial run of CARD began in autumn 2017.

5.2.1. Permanent structured cooperation

PESCO was launched in December 2017 with the participation of 25 EU Member States. It operates on the basis of concrete projects and commitments, several of which are geared towards a strengthening of the EU defence sector. For example, PESCO members commit to increase national defence budgets in real terms, increase defence investment expenditure towards 20% of total defence spending, and invest more in defence research and technology – towards 2% of total defence spending (see Figure 25 for EU-28 defence spending compared to the 2% target). In addition, they pledge to develop and provide ‘strategically relevant’ defence capabilities in accordance with the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review (CARD) and the European Defence Agency (EDA), and to act jointly and make use of the financial and practical support provided by the EDF. Finally, they assume the obligation to contribute to projects that boost the European defence industry and the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB).

185 E. Lazarou, Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO): From notification to establishment, EPRS, 2017.
The decision to launch PESCO was in line with the EU’s new ‘level of ambition’ enshrined in the Global Strategy. The political intent to activate PESCO formed part of the implementation plan and, on 22 June 2017, the European Council acknowledged the ‘need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation’. HR/VP Federica Mogherini referred to this as ‘a historic moment in European defence’. Indeed, while proposals for the EU to move towards common defence have been around since as early as the 1950s, the vigour and speed with which security and defence initiatives have progressed in the past couple of years has been unprecedented, particularly in the case of PESCO.

On 11 December, PESCO was established, with 25 EU Member States undertaking to act within the PESCO framework and to issue an initial list of 17 projects, which were adopted by the Council in March 2018. In November 2018 17 additional programmes were added (see Figure 27).

PESCO has been built into a wide range of pre-existing EU institutions, instruments and mechanisms in the field of security and defence. Thus, the coordinated annual review, the European Defence Agency and the European Defence Fund are meant to assist PESCO participants in providing ‘strategically relevant’ defence capabilities. This entails a commitment to a strengthened European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which is essential for the EDA. PESCO will be complementary to NATO; military capacities developed within PESCO remain in the hands of Member States that can also make them available in other contexts such as NATO or the UN. PESCO’s added value lies in its modular design, which allows for more flexible cooperation. Non-EU states may exceptionally participate at the level of PESCO projects.

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187 Speech by Federica Mogherini on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) on defence, European External Action Service, November 2017.
188 E. Lazarou, Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO): From notification to establishment, EPRS, December 2017.
189 Notification on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), European Council.
190 Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, European Defence Agency.
Data source: Council of the EU, 2018; Council of the EU, 2017.

5.2.2. Military mobility

In the event of an unpredictable crisis at any border of the EU, military personnel and equipment must be able to move swiftly across the territory. Training and the movement of military assets across Europe is currently severely hampered by the lack of appropriate infrastructure and cumbersome customs procedures. Military mobility is thus meant to ensure the seamless movement of military equipment across the EU by reducing physical, legal and regulatory obstacles. Among the first steps taken by the Commission towards this purpose was the adoption in November 2017 of a joint communication on improving military mobility in
the EU.\textsuperscript{192} This was later followed by the action plan on military mobility.\textsuperscript{193} The plan states the strategic need for better mobility of forces in order to boost European security and strengthen the CSDP, and proposes concrete operational measures regarding military requirements, transport infrastructure, and regulatory and procedural issues. In 2019 and 2020, the Commission plans to identify those parts of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) that are suitable for military transport and to upgrade existing ones in order to accommodate military vehicles. Other planned actions include determining civ-mil synergies on transporting dangerous goods, speeding up cross-border movement permissions and developing overall military mobility with a view to also countering hybrid threats. In its communication on the MFF for 2021 to 2027, the Commission proposed a €6.5 billion envelope for military mobility under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in order to enhance strategic transport infrastructure.\textsuperscript{194} Besides being a Commission action plan, military mobility is also one of 34 PESCO projects\textsuperscript{195} with 24 participating members, and a binding commitment for all 25 PESCO members. In the framework of EU-NATO cooperation, military mobility has been identified as a priority area for cooperation in 2017,\textsuperscript{196} this area being an example of the complementarity between the two organisations. The European Parliament has also been vocal in its support for military mobility, most notably in its 11 December 2018 resolution on military mobility.\textsuperscript{197}

5.2.3. The European Defence Fund: Boosting the EU’s capacity in procurement and R&T

In November 2016, the Commission unveiled the European Defence Action Plan, which would involve setting up the European Defence Fund to support collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and the development of defence products jointly agreed by the Member States. The Fund was launched in June 2017, consisting of two legally distinct, but complementary, windows: (a) the research window\textsuperscript{198} and (b) the capability window, supporting joint development and joint acquisition of key defence capabilities. Through the Defence Fund, the EU will – for the first time ever – dedicate part of its budget to defence research, but also, through the provision of co-financing, give Member States incentives to increase their defence spending.

The EU therefore offers grants for collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and products, fully and directly funded from the EU budget. Projects eligible for EU funding will focus on priority areas agreed by Member States, and could typically include electronics, metamaterials, encrypted software or robotics. Essentially, research funding is already operational in the form of the preparatory action on defence research (PADR), which aims at demonstrating the added value of EU supported defence research and technology (R&T). Financing for the PADR (€25 million for 2017) was approved in April 2017.\textsuperscript{199} The EDF aims to address concerns about weak R&T and the need for more defence cooperation and innovation.

Through the funding allocated to development and acquisition, the EDF will promote Member State cooperation on joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology, through co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission (see Chapter 7 for budget specifics). Only collaborative projects will be eligible, with a proportion of the budget earmarked for projects involving cross-border participation of SMEs. Studies suggest that up to 30% of annual defence expenditures could be saved through the pooling of procurement at EU level. The fund will also help Member States reach two of the benchmarks established in 2007, namely: (1) to invest 20% of total collective defence spending

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{193} European Commission, \textit{Action Plan on Military Mobility}, March 2018.
\bibitem{194} European Commission, \textit{Communication on the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027}, May 2018.
\bibitem{195} Council of the EU, \textit{Decision establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO}, March 2018.
\bibitem{196} NATO, \textit{Common set of new proposals}, December 2017.
\bibitem{197} European Parliament resolution on military mobility, December 2018.
\bibitem{198} This is already delivering, in the form of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (launched on 11 April 2017).
\bibitem{199} \textit{Preparatory action on defence research}, European Defence Agency, 2017.
\end{thebibliography}
on equipment procurement, including R&D and R&T; and (2) to invest 20% of total R&T spending on European collaborative defence.

5.2.4. EU-NATO cooperation

The Global Strategy underlines the fact that the EU’s efforts to strengthen its defence and security policy and its identity as a security provider should advance in close partnership with NATO. Yet, it recognises a fundamental difference between the two organisations: ‘while NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary’. Therefore, the strategy understands the partnership between the EU and NATO as being essential, but allowing for an ‘appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy’ on the part of the EU in order to be able to ‘foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its border’. It also recognises NATO as the primary framework for collective defence for most Member States, but views the strengthening of the EU itself as a security community as an undeniable necessity for the security and defence policy of non-NATO EU Member States. One example in this context was the first ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU following the terrorist attacks in France in 2015. Article 42(7) incorporates a collective self-defence clause in the rules applicable to the CSDP. It stipulates that when an EU country is the target of armed aggression on its territory, the other EU countries must assist it by all the means in their power. While such commitments are to be consistent with the commitments made by EU countries as members of NATO, the added value of the article is that it also applies for non-NATO EU members.

The EU and NATO share 22 members (see Figure 26). Overall, the CSDP respects the obligations of those Member States that see their common defence realised in NATO and provides for complementarity with NATO. The NATO Secretary-General meets regularly with his EU counterparts and has addressed the European Council, the Council and the European Parliament on several occasions. Meetings also take place at the level of ministers, ambassadors and staff. The NATO-EU Capability Group, established in 2003, aims to ensure coherence between the two organisations in the area of capability development.

As a result of the challenges emanating from Europe’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, greater cooperation between the EU and NATO was agreed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, in the form of an EU-NATO Joint Declaration. On 6 December 2016, the Council endorsed a set of 42 specific proposals for the implementation of the Joint Declaration and adopted conclusions for its implementation. These will see enhanced cooperation in the areas of countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation; interoperability; irregular migration; cybersecurity; the defence industry; joint exercises; and supporting partners’ capacity-building efforts in the Western Balkans as well as the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. The Global Strategy takes note of the importance of the EU’s partnership with NATO. In December 2017 the original projects were complemented by 34 new proposals, covering new topics such as counter-terrorism, women, peace and security and military mobility.

In May 2018 the third progress report on EU-NATO cooperation highlighted continued progress in the areas of hybrid threats, maritime security, cyber security and defence, defence...
capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, capacity building and political dialogue.206

In July 2018, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, President Juncker and President Tusk signed a second joint declaration on NATO-EU relations establishing a continued commitment to bolster security implementation efforts through collective defence principles. The renewed commitments focused particularly on counter-terrorism, border control via means of military mobility and burden sharing, increased PESCO collaboration, and the promotion of the women, peace and security agenda.

5.3. CSDP missions and operations

In 2014, the then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, requested that the UN set up high-level panels to deliberate on the future of peace operations and the peacebuilding architecture. The ensuing report noted, among other things, that ‘a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed to respond to the more challenging crises of tomorrow. […] The United Nations system too must pull together in a more integrated manner in the service of conflict prevention and peace’.207

Through the CSDP the EU has developed a broad crisis management agenda which includes conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, in accordance with the principles of the UN. The UN has recognised the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping. Currently, the EU has 16 CSDP missions and military operations on three continents, with a wide range of mandates (e.g. military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, rule of law and security sector reform, border assistance, etc.) and deploying over 5 000 civilian and military personnel (see Figure 28). The majority of these missions have been in Africa and, as mentioned earlier, in many cases they have operated in parallel with UN PKOs or to African Union (AU) missions. EU civilian missions carry out tasks consistent with the Global Strategy’s commitment to strengthening the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries recovering from or threatened by conflict and instability. Military missions are currently focused on areas such as countering terrorism, irregular migration, piracy and capacity-building of armed forces.

According to the 2017 report on CSDP missions, in 2017 EU civilian missions conducted around 530 training events for almost 11 000 people (of whom at least 1 720 were women) on topics such as combating arms and people trafficking, forensic techniques, crime scene management, human resource management, recruitment, legislative drafting, public order policing, community

Women in CSDP

The EU has committed to increasing the number of women in institutions dealing with crisis management and peace negotiations by signing the UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. HR/VP Federica Mogherini pledged to work to increase the percentage of women involved in CFSP by the end of her mandate. A recent study shows that there have been increases in the number of women in defence posts, not only in highly visible CDS missions but also in executive and crisis management positions as well.

In November 2018 the Council welcomed the new EU strategic approach to women, peace and security. This approach emphasises the need for systematic integration of a gender perspective into all fields and activities in the domain of peace and security. The European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the need to apply a gender perspective in CSDP action, considering the role that women play in war, post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building processes. Research shows that women deployed abroad help to challenge gender stereotypes and demonstrate the EU’s commitment to gender equality. Studies also indicate a correlation between gender inequality and armed conflict.

206 Third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, May 2018.

207 Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, United Nations, June 2015.
policing, combating corruption, identifying document fraud, the application of local laws on irregular migration, civil registration, integrated border management, maritime security, human rights and gender.\textsuperscript{208}

Executive and non-executive military missions and operations held multiple short-term and long-term training events for around 4 400 people on topics such as mortar firing, infantry skills, force organisation, sniper skills, engineering, logistics, tactical air control and intelligence gathering. Among their activities the report includes mentoring senior military officials on security sector reform (SSR); and supporting SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities; delivering mine awareness training to 17 786 citizens, and ensuring that 313 000 metric tonnes of World Food Programme aid reached Somalia safely by sea.

In order to benefit the success of CSDP missions, the EU adopted the Civilian CSDP Compact in November 2018.\textsuperscript{209} The compact is designed to enhance mission capabilities in terms both of response time and access to relevant training. It aims to boost responsiveness and flexibility, seeking to reduce state military mobilisation reaction time. Finally it aims to increase integration among Member States, whether via programming, implementation or information sharing. One such example of this partnership is a proposed collaboration with the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-budget fund with a working budget of \texteuro{}10.5 billion that would create increased access and opportunity to promote peacebuilding in third countries.\textsuperscript{210} Full delivery of the compact is expected at the latest by summer 2023, with the implementation of action plans due in early spring 2019.


\textsuperscript{209} T. Latici, \textit{The Civilian CSDP Compact}, EPRS, 2018.

\textsuperscript{210} Currently support for military operations not led by the EU is possible only through the EDF’s African Peace Facility, for operations led by African regional organisations, see: B. Immenkamp, \textit{MFF- European Peace Facility, Legislative Train Schedule}, European Parliament, updated monthly.
In 2017, CSDP missions and operations cooperated with over 150 national counterparts (local ministries of the interior, security, justice, and foreign affairs, and law enforcement associations such as judicial councils and policing boards, as well as local civil society organisations), and almost 180 international partners (for example, EU delegations in-theatre, EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol, the United Nations, OSCE, Interpol, the African Union, non-governmental organisations, such as the International Organization for Migration, and other country development agencies both EU and non-EU, such as Japan, the US, and Canada).

CSDP naval operations
The EU has two CSDP naval operations, one in the Mediterranean (EUNavfor MED – Operation Sophia) and one in the Western Indian Ocean (EUNavfor Somalia – Operation Atalanta), with a total fleet of around 30 ships and helicopters that intervene to counter piracy and to combat human trafficking and smuggling. The most recent operation, EUNavfor MED, was established by the Council in May 2015 to disrupt the business model of human smugglers and traffickers in the southern central Mediterranean Sea. The second phase of the operation, now renamed Operation Sophia, was launched in October 2015, with the UN Security Council giving a one-year mandate to intercept vessels on the high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of migrant smuggling. The Council has extended the Operation Sophia mandate (currently to 30 September 2019). In the process it has added two supporting tasks: training for the Libyan coastguard and navy; and a contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. In July 2017, it amended the operation’s mandate to: set up a trainee monitoring mechanism to ensure the long-term efficiency of training for the Libyan coastguard; conduct new surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya; and enhance the possibilities for sharing...
Information on human trafficking with Member States' law enforcement agencies, Frontex and Europol. In 2017, 27 Member States contributed to the operation, which rescued 10,759 people at sea, handed over 30 suspected smugglers to the Italian authorities, and decommissioned 155 smuggler vessels.

Operation Sophia takes places alongside Frontex joint operations Themis (formerly Triton) and Poseidon in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, which aim to save lives at sea, strengthen border control and disrupt the business model of traffickers and human smugglers.


The European Parliament is a longstanding advocate of a stronger and more effective CSDP. It has called for more spending (2% of GDP) on defence, and a fairer and more transparent defence industry. Parliament has highlighted the importance of compatibility and cooperation with NATO, but has also stated that the EU should aspire to be truly able to defend itself and act autonomously if necessary, taking greater responsibility in cases where NATO is not willing to take the lead, a statement that is in line with the idea of 'strategic autonomy' as embodied in the EU Global Strategy. The European Parliament has urged the Council to move towards the harmonisation and standardisation of European armed forces, so as to facilitate the cooperation of armed forces personnel. It has also called for a white paper on security and defence and a roadmap with clear phases and a calendar for the establishment of a defence union and a more effective common defence policy.

5.4. Cybersecurity and cyber-defence

5.4.1. A role for cyber in peace and security

The internet has transformed the world into a global village, surpassing physical borders and distances. While opening countless social, economic and political opportunities, cyberspace has also become a space for conflict and geopolitical rivalries. Often described as 'fog',<sup>211</sup> cyberspace is extremely complex, accessible to everyone and difficult to pin down. Societies' dependency on the internet is increasing proportionally with cyber threats and with the

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sophistication of cyber-attacks. The perpetrators of these attacks range from individuals to criminals, state and non-state actors, given the wide accessibility and relatively low cost of operations. One report\textsuperscript{212} has estimated that the cost to victims of cybercrime worldwide however amounts to about €530 billion. As such, attacks are increasing not only in numbers but also in their disruptive potential and financial cost, and at a higher speed than governments’ ability to deal with them. In 2017, President Juncker said that cyber-attacks pose more danger to democracies and economies than guns and tanks.\textsuperscript{213}

Cyber-attacks can be damaging\textsuperscript{214} not only to the economy of the EU but also to the democratic foundations in which it is rooted. One way in which cyber threats affect peace and security is by manipulating the online sphere in order to undermine citizens’ trust in institutions, politicians, the state, media or other elements targeted by the perpetrators. This is usually done in parallel with other malicious activities such as disinformation, economic pressure and sometimes even conventional armed warfare – a cocktail known as hybrid threats. Risks from the digital realm have the ability to destabilise governments and political systems, to sow societal divisions and increase the risk of internal and external conflict. The 2019 global risk report\textsuperscript{215} of the World Economic Forum listed cyber-attacks in the top five likely risks and in the top ten risks in terms of their impact. Also part of the global commons together with space and climate change among others, cyberspace is seen as an increasingly contested political space and a potential source of international tension and even interstate conflict.

A key challenge\textsuperscript{216} faced by law enforcement bodies lies in the difficulty of attributing and tracing cyber perpetrators. Another is posed by legal and ethical questions regarding the appropriate state response. One of the most notable examples is the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonian public services, which also served as a wake-up call for other countries in terms of the reach of such attacks and the paralysing effects they can have. Others include the WannaCry attack which spread to 300 000 computers in 150 countries and the Petya and NotPetya which caused financial losses of hundreds of millions.\textsuperscript{217}

These attacks illustrate a growing trend of targeting strategic sectors and critical infrastructure for the functioning of a society, such as hospitals, government systems or energy companies, as they all depend on online networks. Such societal disruptions also have effects on peace and security as they can result in violent civil unrest, government distrust as well as geopolitical tensions given that some of the biggest cyber-attacks are suspected of being state-sponsored. It is an increasingly accepted fact that resilience to cyber threats requires a collective, collaborative and wide-ranging approach. For example, in November 2018, French President Macron launched a new initiative to establish common international norms for tackling cyber

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\textsuperscript{212} J. Lewis, \textit{Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down}, McAfee, 2018.


\textsuperscript{214} C. Mortera-Martinez, \textit{Europe’s cyber problem}, Centre for European Reform, 2018.


\textsuperscript{216} B. Jones et al, \textit{Managing the new threat landscape}, Brookings Institution, 2018.

\textsuperscript{217} A. Greenberg, \textit{The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History}, 2018.
threats, the 'Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace'. Though not legally binding, the Paris Call is a high-level declaration for cooperation in cyberspace that was endorsed by 64 countries, but also NGOs, universities and hundreds of private companies. Another example is the Tallinn Manual.\(^{218}\) Written by an independent group of experts, the manual is a living document examining conflict in cyberspace from an international law perspective. Distinguished academics, government officials and private sector representatives alike seem to agree on the fact that a joined-up approach to cyber is the way forward. As Joseph Nye\(^{219}\) argues that the diffusion of power from governments to non-state actors is one of the great shifts of this century, the realm of cyber is a good example of the urgent need to develop tools and responses to engage with emerging technologies and the vulnerabilities that come with them.

5.4.2. The EU as an emerging global cyber actor

In recent years, the EU has been putting more and more emphasis on managing the strategic and economic challenges posed by cyber threats. This is in line with EU citizens’ concerns about cybercrime, with over eight in ten (87 %) seeing cybercrime as an important challenge.\(^{220}\) The EU global strategy starts by saying that ‘our union is under threat’ – this includes cyber threats.\(^{221}\) The strategy pledges the EU to be a ‘forward-looking cyber player’ who will engage in cyber diplomacy and partners’ capacity building. This represents progress, given that the EU’s 2003 security strategy made no mention of cyber. Since its first cyber-security strategy in 2013,\(^{222}\) the EU is gradually developing wide-reaching cyber ambitions and its own tools to manage the challenge. 2017 was a landmark year for cyber in the EU given the launch of the Commission’s cybersecurity package in the joint communication on cybersecurity.\(^{223}\) The package includes plans to: offer a permanent mandate to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA); set up an EU cybersecurity certification framework; implement the Directive on the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) in full; draw up a blueprint for rapid emergency response; establish EU-wide cyber research centres; improve cyber-defence training and education; improve law-enforcement responses – including additional support for Europol; and improve overall political response and deterrence across the EU. The Commission itself does not have operational capabilities but is supported by agencies and bodies, including ENISA, Europol – in particular through its European Cyber Crime Centre, the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) and the Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). As regards the Council, its 2017 conclusions on the ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’\(^{224}\) established a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities, including an EU approach to consistent use of CFSP measures and instruments in this regard.

Cyber-defence aspects have also been subject to EU action by being included in the 2016 European Defence Action Plan, prioritised in the European Defence Agency’s 2018 Capability Development Priorities, addressed through several projects under the permanent structured cooperation and listed as one of the seven concrete areas of EU-NATO cooperation.\(^{225}\) With regard to CSDP, cyber defence has implications for the EU’s solidarity and mutual assistance clauses as well as for the functioning and protection of EU missions and operations.


\(^{219}\) J. Nye, Cyber War and Peace, Belfer Center, 2012.

\(^{220}\) European Commission, Europeans’ attitudes towards cybersecurity, 2017.

\(^{221}\) European Union Global Strategy, 2016.


\(^{223}\) European Commission, Joint Communication: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU, 2017.


\(^{225}\) European External Action Service, EU-NATO cooperation, 2018.
In June 2018, the European Parliament welcomed the Commission’s cyber package and emphasised the need for Member States to coordinate their response to cyber threats. Parliament also stressed the EU and NATO’s ‘special responsibility and capacity’ to address cyber-security and cyber-defence issues. Most recently, on 12 March 2019, Parliament adopted the cybersecurity act which established the first EU-wide cyber certification scheme and gave ENISA a permanent mandate and increased resources.  

The EU recognises the importance of cyber dialogue with other international organisations such as the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE and OECD among others, as well as with partners such as the United States, Canada and Japan, to name but a few. An overall challenge for the EU in the cyber realm is to ensure effective deterrence of malicious actors and to put robust systems in place. Harnessing peace and security through cyber defence requires a whole-of-EU approach, given that cyber touches upon all policy areas, from health, trade and transport to supply chains and defence. Experts also consider that the effectiveness of EU action on cyber could be honed through deeper Member State engagement and ownership, requiring a more systematic approach to fixing weak links and gaps. As such, pan-European efforts for resilience, deterrence and defence should be further strengthened and streamlined.

EU-NATO cooperation on cyber threats

Both the EU and NATO are targets of the same cyber perpetrators who aim to undermine peace and security in the political, economic, military and civilian spheres. The EU-NATO joint declaration of 8 July 2016 highlighted the need to expand coordination on cyber security and cyber defence through a cyber defence pledge. Some of the measures adopted by the EU and NATO in December 2016 include: integrating cyber-defence aspects into planning, and conducting missions and operations to foster interoperability; harmonising training requirements; fostering cyber defence research and technology innovation cooperation by further developing the links between EU, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to explore innovation in the area of cyber-defence; and strengthening cooperation in cyber-exercises through reciprocal participation in respective exercises, including ‘cyber coalition’ and ‘cyber Europe’ in particular. Information exchanges, cooperation on hybrid threats and coordinated exercises are instrumental to EU-NATO cyber cooperation, as the 10 July 2018 joint declaration states. Staff-to-staff level cooperation is ongoing regarding good practice on cyber matters as well as on threat analysts and crisis management. Cross-briefings on cyber issues are also a regular activity among the EU’s Political-Military Group and the relevant NATO committees.

Cyber-defence cooperation remains a key priority for the EU and NATO when it comes to complementarity of efforts and work to ensure civil-military synergies. One example includes the technical arrangement between CERT-EU and NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability. Since the 2016 joint declaration, the two organisations have both organised exercises together and acted as observers in each other’s exercises. Lastly, EU-NATO cooperation on hybrid threats is taking place in the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and through coordination between the EU’s Hybrid Fusion Cell and NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Branch.

5.5. The fight against terrorism

The international terrorist threat has grown significantly over the past two decades. Groups with an explicitly anti-Western and anti-European ideology, such as al-Qaeda and Da’esh, have expanded in size and importance. Virtually all terrorist acts that Europe has witnessed since the Madrid train bombings in 2004 have been perpetrated by individuals either directly linked to or inspired by extremist groups with centres of activity outside Europe’s borders. The realisation that there is a connection between internal and external security has come to shape

227 EPRS, Cybersecurity in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, 2017.
EU action. Hence, the EU has addressed the terrorist threat both within the EU and beyond its borders.

Primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security within the EU lies with the Member States. However, the EU makes tools available to assist with cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation between Member States. It also provides financial support to address this borderless phenomenon. EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years and is set to grow in the future, to provide for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support from the EU bodies in charge of security. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted since 2014 range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing and regulating firearms.

The EU has also stepped up cooperation with third countries to combat the terrorist threat, and mobilised significant resources in recent years to fund the efforts. There has been a marked increase in the exchange of information with third countries, and a counter-terrorism dialogue is now held with several countries, including in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans and Turkey. Moreover, the EU provides certain countries with technical assistance and training to fight terrorism and has helped to set up a joint force in the Sahel region to fight terrorist and organised crime groups. Funds for these initiatives have come both from the EU budget and from individual Member States. Of particular relevance are the Union trust funds – multi-donor trust funds for emergency, post-emergency or thematic action that the Commission is entitled to launch and administer in the field of external action. The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, set up in 2015, covers counter-terrorism-related expenses and helps partner countries improve their capacity to fight terrorism and organised crime.

5.5.1. EU policy developments

The roots of EU counter-terrorism policy can be traced back to the TREVI group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence internationale), an intergovernmental network of representatives of justice and home affairs ministries set up in 1976. Its subsequent development was however hugely influenced by the 11 September 2001 attacks in US, which triggered the perception of the terrorist threat as global and borderless. In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU adopted its first action plan and, in June 2002, a fundamental piece of legislation: the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, providing a common EU-wide definition of terrorist offences across Europe.

In 2005, following the Madrid and London attacks of 2004 and 2005, the EU adopted an overarching counter-terrorism strategy based on four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit and response. The strategy was also designed to have global reach and emphasised the importance of cooperating with non-EU countries and international institutions. In 2004, the EU appointed a counter-terrorism coordinator for the Union to monitor the strategy’s implementation and support cooperation between Member States and with international partners. The strategy was last updated in 2014.

The fight against terrorism is a main priority in broader strategic documents, such as the EU's internal security strategy, adopted in 2010 and renewed in 2015 on the basis of the Commission's communication on a European agenda on security (see below). It is also part of the EU Global Strategy adopted in 2016 with the idea of joining up internal and external policies.

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231 Counter-terrorism strategy, 2005.
232 EU internal security strategy, 2015.
233 European agenda on security, 2015.
5.5.2. International cooperation

In the fight against terrorism, the EU cooperates with international organisations and bodies including the United Nations (UN), the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Global Coalition against Da’esh, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Council of Europe. The EU is actively implementing the UN’s global counter-terrorism strategy234 adopted in 2006, and relevant UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions regimes for suspected terrorists (individuals or groups). The EU has acceded to the 19 UN conventions dealing with terrorism that have been issued since 1963. The UN has set standards on preventing and combating terrorism, including criminal law measures and tools to address terrorist financing, as well as foreign terrorist fighters. The EU and seven individual Member States belong to the Global Counterterrorism Forum, an informal, multilateral counterterrorism platform launched in 2011 to promote a strategic long-term approach to counter terrorism and the violent extremist ideologies that underpin it. The EU and 27 individual Member States are members of the Global Coalition against Da’esh, set up in 2014 to counter the group’s spread and ensure its defeat. In addition to military campaigns in Iraq and Syria, the coalition seeks to tackle Da’esh’s financing infrastructure, counter its propaganda and stem the flow of foreign fighters. The EU strategy for Syria235 adopted in 2017 (and re-endorsed in 2018) and the EU strategy for Iraq236 adopted in 2018, are also part of the EU’s efforts to combat Da’esh. The FATF issues anti-money laundering (AML) recommendations that also cover terrorist financing and that are recognised and implemented by many countries around the world. The EU has implemented the FATF’s recommendations through successive AML directives. The Council of Europe (CoE) has adopted several major conventions setting legal standards on law enforcement and human rights in the area of counterterrorism. In 2018, the EU ratified the CoE Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, as well as its Additional Protocol. The convention aims to strengthen the fight against terrorism, while reaffirming that all measures taken to prevent or suppress terrorist offences must uphold the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU cooperates bilaterally with third countries in the field of counterterrorism. Since 2001, the EU has included counter-terrorism clauses in bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as the partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements, and stabilisation and association agreements with the Western Balkans countries. The scope of the agreements differ, but the provisions on countering terrorism are phrased similarly and include references to the relevant UN resolutions and to the sharing of information and best practices. The EU has also concluded sectoral agreements with non-EU countries (on police and judicial cooperation). These include counter-terrorism objectives: mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements, passenger name record (PNR) agreements, and Europol and Eurojust cooperation agreements. In 2010, the EU concluded the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) Agreement237 with the US on the exchange of financial information to allow law enforcement agencies access to financial transaction data. Specific counterterrorism action plans238 are meanwhile in place with Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel and Tunisia, and the Western Balkans.

234 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006.
238 EU actions to counter Da’esh, 2018.
EU action in the current parliamentary term

The EU has taken a wide range of measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Recent EU action has developed following a two-pronged approach, aiming, on one hand, to deny terrorists and criminals the means to act while, on the other, building resilience against the attacks and enhancing the response. Some of the newly adopted legislation is described below.

- **Harmonising criminal law:** In March 2017, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Directive on Combating Terrorism to update the 2002 framework and to implement new international standards. Among other things, the directive adds new provisions on the rights and needs of victims of terrorist attacks.

- **Combating terrorism financing:** the Fifth Anti-Money-Laundering Directive complements the existing EU framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Three other pieces of legislation harmonise or update existing rules: a directive on counteracting money laundering by criminal law, a regulation on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union and a regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders.

- **Regulating weapons:** to prevent terrorists from easily acquiring firearms or reactivating deactivated ones, the co-legislators adopted a directive on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons and a regulation on deactivation standards to ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable.

- **Protecting EU borders:** to prevent terrorists from circulating freely within the EU, several countries have introduced temporary controls at their borders, and the Commission has proposed new rules on the possibility to adopt such temporary measures.

- **Exchanging information:** data is an important tool in the fight against terrorism, but it is crucial that law enforcement authorities in different EU countries share information. Several steps have been taken to enhance the collection and exchange of data. These include the EU PNR Directive of April 2016, which established an EU system to collect flight passenger data in order to detect suspicious travel and counter the foreign fighters’ phenomenon.

- **Enhancing cybersecurity:** EU legislators have taken important steps to increase the Union’s resilience to cyber-attacks (see Chapters 5 and 6).

- **Exchange of information with third countries:** Europol has concluded operational agreements with non-EU countries, allowing for the exchange of information. Since 2015, new agreements have been concluded with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Georgia and Ukraine. New Europol strategic agreements have been concluded with Brazil, China and United Arab Emirates. In 2018, Council authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.

- **Support for joint forces in the Sahel:** the G5 Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad – are increasingly threatened by terrorists and organised crime groups involving trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings. To help address the situation, the EU has contributed €100 million to help set up a joint force, comprising 5 000 troops.

- **EU counter-terrorism dialogues** are held with a number of countries; since 2015, the focus has been on counter-terrorism cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, the Balkans and Turkey.

- **Counter-terrorism capacity building:** the EU provides certain countries with technical assistance and training, including support for counter-terrorism capacity building efforts and CVE (countering violent extremism) initiatives.

- **EU-US cooperation:** the US is the EU’s main partner in the field of counter-terrorism. There is substantial political dialogue on justice and home affairs issues, including counter-terrorism, with regular meetings at ministerial and senior official level.
6. Information operations and foreign influence: a new threat to peace and security

The visibility of disinformation – typically combined with other influence techniques as a tool to undermine democracies – increased in the context of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine. It gained notoriety as a global challenge during the UK referendum on EU membership as well as the United States presidential election campaign in 2016.239 The EU has been active in making attempts to curb pro-Kremlin disinformation since 2015, when HR/VP Federica Mogherini set up a StratCom Task Force in 2015 to counter pro-Kremlin disinformation in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood in response to the March 2015 European Council, which had stressed the need to counter ‘Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns’.240 The European Union and the European Parliament have been stepping up efforts significantly to tackle online disinformation ahead of the May 2019 European elections.

6.1. Projecting power: The soft and the sharp approach

Efforts to influence opinion and political decisions beyond one’s own territory are an integral part of the nature of power and geopolitics. Genghis Khan and his men planted rumours about their cruelty and the number of their horsemen, to spread fear and to weaken the enemy's resilience, long before the printing press made it possible to mass-produce information. Today, social media combines traditional oral communication with new electronic means of dissemination, and enables messages (including false news and disinformation) to spread at the speed of light.

The success of soft power (defined by Joseph S. Nye as ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes’)241 as opposed to military power, hinges on communication. Via public diplomacy, a country or an entity 'seeks to build trust and understanding by engaging with a broader foreign public beyond the governmental relations that, customarily, have been the focus of diplomatic effort'. It has been argued that states whose ideas and dominant culture correspond with the prevailing global norms (democracy, pluralism, international rule of law), and whose credibility is underpinned by their values and policies, are most likely to be attractive. By contrast, authoritarian states struggle to balance attraction with disruptive behaviour and/or operations.

Having had limited success with their soft power efforts, both Russia and China – according to a 2017 study by the National Endowment for Democracy – recognise the potential for reaching their goals by making democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms appear less attractive through ‘sharp power’ (which some researchers see as ‘forced attraction’ based on coercion, as opposed to soft power, which is based on attraction and persuasion). At the same time, the focus of leading democratic public diplomacy state actors, such as the US, on countering third-country propaganda, has declined since the Cold War ended (whilst the 9/11 attacks sparked new measures to counter propaganda from non-state actors such as Al-Qaida and, more recently, ISIL/Da'esh).

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239 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 3 July 2018.
240 European Council conclusions, 19-20 March 2015.
‘Sharp’ influence efforts aiming to undermine the adversary are not new; but the information disruption ‘toolbox’, which includes a number of often overlapping covert and some overt instruments, keeps growing. New technologies have increased the speed at which disinformation can be spread, for example, often in combination with cyber-attacks (including hacks and selective leaks). The expanding hybrid toolbox also includes assaults, corruption, energy coercion, and ideological and religious influence.

6.2. Online platforms as facilitators for ‘polarisation entrepreneurs’

Online platforms facilitate the high-speed, large-scale and targeted spreading of conspiracy theories, disinformation and junk news. Attention-based business models often encourage polarised, emotional debates in which users are automatically fed information confirming existing cognitive biases. The resulting fragmented information sphere inadvertently assists actors who benefit by exploiting wedge issues. The disclosure that user data from Facebook, including that of 2.7 million EU citizens, was improperly shared with consultancy company Cambridge Analytica (which used the data to micro-target and mobilise UK and US voters) reignited the debate on the compatibility of online platforms’ business models with the principles of democracy.

6.2.1. Active measures then and now: the case of the Kremlin

It is well documented that the Soviet Union combined covert and overt influence techniques. Soviet leaders saw the conflict with the West as a continuum and did not differentiate between peacetime and war. Active measures, (a translation of the Russian term акти́вные меро́приятия), disinformation, agents of influence, reflexive control (feeding an opponent selected information to elicit the desired decision), forgeries, propaganda and controlled international front groups were used to target key elite and public audiences to promote Soviet goals. The long-term aim was to stimulate already existing opinion, define the terms of the political debate, ‘provide significant ammunition’ in that debate, or ‘deposit an ideological residue that eases the path for subsequent influence operations’. The intelligence budget for active measures and disinformation was US$3-4 billion annually, involving over 15,000 personnel. In recent years, Moscow has revived and boosted its toolbox, adding new cyber techniques among other means. It has also developed a new ideology to restore ‘Russian greatness’, including by protecting Russian speakers abroad. According to some analysts, this ‘empire of diaspora’ relativises borders and creates an ‘imagined community’ of Russian-speakers seen as an organic part of the Russian cultural nation.

6.2.2. Hybrid attacks on Russia’s neighbours

Russia’s neighbouring countries have witnessed Moscow’s revamped active measures for over ten years. In April 2007, Estonia (a member of both the EU and NATO) was one of the first countries to witness massive cyber-attacks, following the decision of the Estonian government to move a Soviet monument. Protests among Russian speakers were exacerbated by false Russian media reports alleging that the statue, as well as Soviet war graves, were being destroyed. Soon after, Estonia experienced large-scale cyber-attacks for weeks, affecting banks,

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242 K.N. McCauley, Russian influence campaigns against the West, 2016, p. 3.
media outlets and government authorities. One year later, ahead of the conflict in Georgia in 2008, Moscow granted citizenship to a number of Abkhazians and South Ossetians, preparing a 'Russian population' to protect. Moscow justified the incursion as a 'peace operation' to protect Russian soldiers and civilians under attack in Georgia, whereas Georgia asserted that it attacked the city of Tskhinvali in response to shelling from South Ossetia into Georgia, as well as to Russian arms shipments into South Ossetia. Russia's military operation was accompanied by cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. Five years later, Moscow responded to Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution and the ousting of Ukrainian pro-Kremlin President Viktor Yanukovich by sending unmarked Russian soldiers to take control of Crimea in March 2014 (President Putin later admitted to deploying troops in Crimea) and launching a hybrid war against the country. In response, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures on Russia. Since then, Moscow has used Ukraine as its biggest testing field abroad for disinformation.

6.2.3. Disinformation and cyber-attacks in the European Union

Analysts point out that contemporary Russian propaganda is responsive to events, adapting to the targeted country's local circumstances, narratives and audiences. Russian state media, such as Sputnik and RT, show little commitment to objectivity. As a result, they get a head start in persuading audiences: first impressions are resilient; repetition creates familiarity, and familiarity leads to acceptance. The messages can then be amplified by Kremlin-sponsored trolls and bots, as well as by pro-Kremlin civilians. Narratives that may not resonate with Scandinavians may work well in Slovakia or other countries with traditionally closer linguistic and cultural ties to Russia. A recent report by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies notes that Russia's strategic communications have been effective in shaping people's perceptions of the EU inside Russia, in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, as well as in the EU itself; particularly among native Russian speakers.

The EU's East StratCom task force, the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, and Ukrainian fact-checkers StopFake, are documenting the ongoing pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns. In Ukraine, following the Euromaidan revolution, disinformation campaigns included: denials of Russia's involvement in the illegal annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine; undermining of Ukraine's credibility as an independent state; false news about alleged cruelty by Ukrainians, such as the falsified crucifixion of a three-year old boy by a Ukrainian soldier; and conspiracy theories about the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions being Western plots and the pro-Western government in Kyiv a 'puppet regime'. The 2014 downing of the MH17 passenger jet over Ukraine sparked a wave of conspiracy theories to distract from Russia's involvement. When a Dutch-led investigation in May 2018 concluded that the weapon used to down MH17 had been provided by a Russian military unit, Kremlin and pro-Kremlin actors and outlets launched a new counter-offensive, not only denying Russian involvement, but also dismissing the investigation, calling it 'openly biased and lopsided' and claiming that it solely used 'images from social networks that have been expertly altered with computer graphic editing tools'. However, digital forensic experts in 2016 detected that the Russian Ministry of Defence had itself published altered photos to claim that Ukraine was responsible.

While narratives may differ from country to country, analysts agree that Moscow seeks to undermine unity, destabilise democracies and erode trust in democratic institutions. This pattern has been repeated in the EU: from the influence operations in the run-up to the 2016 referendum in the Netherlands about the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; continued cyber-attacks to further reduce trust in the wake of the UK EU membership vote; Kremlin-affiliated media promotion of polarising issues during the 2017 German election; and pro-Kremlin bots engaging in a coordinated 'disruption strategy' over Catalonia in 2017, along with Kremlin-backed news platforms. EU Security Commissioner Julian King has openly called the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign an 'orchestrated strategy' and said that disinformation poses a 'serious security threat to our societies'.

As already noted, disinformation and cyber-attacks often go hand in hand. The Danish Defence Minister in April 2017 said that ATP or Fancy Bear, a group that also gained access to email
accounts of US Democrats during the US presidential election, had hacked the emails of select Danish defence staff for two years. He said the hacker group was ‘tied to the intelligence services’ and ‘the Russian regime’.

6.2.4. (Attempted) assassinations accompanied by information campaigns

Disinformation campaigns often accompany violent actions, such as ‘wet affairs’ including assassinations and kidnappings. A British government inquiry into the poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko, who was killed in London in 2006 by radioactive polonium-210, concluded in 2016 that President Putin probably approved his assassination. The conclusion was met with a Russian-language Twitter campaign mocking its wording, #ПутинВозможноОдобрил (‘PutinPossiblyApproved’). The attempted murder of a former Russian spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter, on UK soil in March 2018, quickly sparked accusations of Russian state involvement. Prime Minister Theresa May called it ‘highly likely’ that Russia was responsible for the attack. Reacting to the alleged involvement of Russia’s Intelligence Services (RIS) (an important instrument in Moscow’s hybrid toolbox and in peacetime most often used in a non-violent way), some 150 Russian diplomats were expelled from Western countries, including 18 EU Member States. In May 2018, British intelligence agency MI5 Director Andrew Parker pointed to the Skripal case as the most recent example of the Russian state’s ‘now well-practised doctrine’ of blending different tools. The attack, he noted, was followed by a ‘cynical’ information campaign to sow confusion and doubt: Russian state-sponsored media have propagated ‘at least 30 different so-called explanations in their efforts to mislead the world and their own people’. Parker explained that two-thirds of social media output at the peak of the Salisbury story came from Russian government-controlled accounts.

6.2.5. Energy coercion

Scholars have shown that Moscow’s use of energy as an offensive or defensive tool of foreign policy dates further back than the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 – the Kremlin is said to have interrupted oil supplies to the Baltic States as far back as 1990 in a bid to quash their independence aspirations. By contrast, Moscow rewarded ‘friendly’ leaders in Belarus, Ukraine before 2005, and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia, North Ossetia and Transnistria, with cheap gas and oil. Moscow’s use of its ‘petro-stick’ has been particularly visible not only in Ukraine, but increasingly also in Belarus. A recent study has found that 15 EU Member States remain dependent on Russia for over half of their gas supplies and that ties with Moscow have discouraged some from supporting more stringent EU sanctions on Russia’s gas sector over the illegal annexation of Crimea and its actions in eastern Ukraine. There is concern that the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline could make Europe vulnerable to energy coercion. Other energy-rich authoritarian states, such as Azerbaijan, Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia, are also using energy as a foreign policy tool.

6.2.6. ‘Outsourced’ influence operations

Moscow’s influence operations are, according to experts, often outsourced to an ‘adhocracy’ of oligarchs, trolls, criminal networks and hackers to minimise or delay the risk of exposing the involvement of the Kremlin. For example, trolls from the Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg are thought to be directly controlled not by the Kremlin but by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has close ties to President Putin and is involved in a number of pro-Kremlin projects. Despite this and the trolls’ task to flood the internet with pro-Kremlin messages, Putin maintains that the Russian state has ‘nothing to do’ with the agency and that Prigozhin (who in February 2018 was indicted by the US for his role in the US presidential elections) is acting as a private citizen. Similarly, Putin continues to downplay the role of hackers in cyber-attacks and election meddling, describing them as ‘Russian patriots’ who ‘fight against those who say bad things about Russia’, and whom he does not control.243

Think-tanks and GONGOs

This pattern can also be seen in a more subtle layer of influence, namely the use of academic experts and spiritual leaders to further Moscow's foreign policy objectives. According to a 2017 report published by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Russia seeks to influence expert communities, in line with the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, which encourages the involvement of Russia's academic community, cultural and humanitarian associations in Moscow's public diplomacy efforts. The report analyses efforts to influence expert communities and public opinion in the West through think tanks and government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). Institutes specifically targeting English-speaking expert audiences include the Valdai Club (launched in 2004), the Russian International Affairs Council (launched in 2010) and Rethinking Russia (founded in 2015). FOI explains that experts from these think tanks are in high demand as speakers at conferences across the world; their access to Moscow 'adds to their attraction as cooperation partners'. The report concludes that explicitly propagandistic think tanks create networks with 'less mainstream' experts, organisations and institutes in the West.

The power of religion: Instrumentalisation of 'spiritual-moral values'

Even during the Soviet era, the Kremlin attempted to influence international religious organisations and further Soviet policy goals through a religious propaganda apparatus. The actions and statements of the regional heads of the local Committees on Religious Affairs were expected to adhere to official Kremlin positions. The oversight process involved the KGB and the Soviet foreign policy structure, such as the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institutes abroad. In recent years, the Orthodox Church has played an increasingly visible role in the Kremlin's narrative. Mass demonstrations in Russia in the winter of 2011-2012 highlighted the need to renew the 'base of support' for the Kremlin. In response, the Kremlin strengthened its ties with the Orthodox Church, promoting a patriotic narrative involving conservative values, according to which the Kremlin protects all Russians against Western moral threats. In 2015, spiritual-moral values were explicitly defined as a matter of Russian national security. The 2015 Russian National Security Strategy suggested building Russia's 'spiritual potentiality ... in the polycentric world', and labelled the 'destruction of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values' as a key security threat.

Following the illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russian forces took control of churches affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), which was set up after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and rivals the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). In Crimea, some churches were looted, and UOC-KP leaders were called 'Nazis' (in line with the Kremlin's disinformation narrative about Ukraine) and 'those who broke away'. In April 2018, Ukraine's parliament adopted a resolution to ask the spiritual leader of the world's Orthodox Christians to recognise the autocephaly of the UOC-KP. President Poroshenko hopes that the independent UOC-KP may emerge by the 1030th anniversary of the Christening of Rus celebrated in July 2018. The Kremlin continues to oppose the independence of the UOC-KP.

6.3. European responses to disinformation campaigns

6.3.1. EU and NATO: Coordinated efforts to counter hybrid threats

EU-NATO cooperation is increasing, in accordance with the July 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy, which envisaged stronger ties and cooperation with NATO, and with the July 2016 EU-NATO joint declaration. In line with the April 2016 joint communication on a joint framework on countering hybrid threats, Finland initiated a new European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), inaugurated in October 2017. The decision by 10 EU Member States, Norway and the US to open the centre jointly is in itself seen as a sign that tensions with Russia over its influence campaigns in the West can no longer be ignored. Whereas other centres of excellence have been established under NATO auspices in EU Member States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Hybrid CoE is the first to link NATO and the EU. The unprecedented level of cooperation between the EU and NATO to address hybrid threats is in line with the July 2017 joint report on the implementation of the joint framework
on countering hybrid threats. The Hybrid CoE maintains close contact with the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, set up within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre structure and fully operational since May 2017.

6.3.2. EU steps up anti-disinformation efforts to protect democracy

In the EU, responses to foreign disinformation and related influence campaigns fall within a number of different policy areas, including communications networks, (cyber) security and culture. The Facebook data breach disclosure reignited and expanded the ongoing debate on the role of online platforms in the spread of conspiracy theories, disinformation and false news. In its June 2017 resolution on online platforms and the digital single market, the European Parliament had already called on the Commission to analyse the legal framework with regard to ‘fake news’, and to look into the possibility of legislative intervention to limit the dissemination of fake content. President Jean-Claude Juncker tasked Mariya Gabriel, Commissioner for the Digital Economy and Society, to look into the democratic challenges that online platforms create as regards the spread of fake information, as well as to reflect on possible action at EU level. In October 2017, the Commission launched a public consultation on fake news and online disinformation. It also set up a high-level expert group (HLEG) representing academia, online platforms, news media and civil society. The Commission’s April 2018 communication ‘Tackling online disinformation: a European approach’ took the recommendations of the HLEG into account and proposed an EU-wide code of practice – signed by the online platforms – to ensure transparency by explaining how algorithms select news, as well as improving the visibility and accessibility of reliable news. The communication also recommended support for an independent network of fact-checkers as well as actions to boost quality journalism and media literacy.

6.3.3. Coordinating the response to disinformation ahead of the European elections

With a view to the 2019 European elections, the Commission has encouraged national authorities to identify best practices for identifying, mitigating and managing risks to the electoral process from cyber-attacks and disinformation. In the Cooperation Group established under the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive, Member States are mapping existing initiatives on the cybersecurity of network and information systems used for electoral processes. The NIS Cooperation Group has produced guidelines for Member States to facilitate effective and coherent implementation of the NIS Directive across the EU and to address wider cybersecurity policy issues.

6.3.4. The action plan against disinformation

Responding to the June 2018 call by the European Council to protect the EU’s democratic systems and ‘combat disinformation, including in the context of the upcoming European elections’, the Commission and the HR in December 2018 presented an ‘action plan against disinformation’ with specific proposals for a coordinated European response. The action plan builds on existing Commission initiatives as well as the work of the East StratCom Task Force, set up in 2015 under the European External Action Service (EEAS, see below). The action plan focuses on four main areas.

**Improved detection.** Strategic Communication Task Forces and the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in the EEAS, as well as the EU delegations in the Neighbourhood countries will receive additional specialised staff and data analysis tools. The EEAS’s budget for strategic communication to address and raise awareness about disinformation is planned to more than double, from €1.9 million in 2018 to €5 million in 2019.

**Coordinated response.** A dedicated rapid alert system was set up in March 2019 among the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate data sharing and to provide alerts on disinformation threats in real time.

**Online platforms and industry.** The signatories of the EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation (signed on 26 September 2018) have been urged to swiftly and effectively implement the commitments, focusing on actions that are urgent for the European elections.
This includes deleting fake accounts, labelling messaging activities by 'bots' and cooperating with fact-checkers and researchers to detect disinformation and make fact-checked content more visible. Ahead of the May elections, the signatories have been updating the Commission on their progress on a monthly basis.

**Raising awareness and empowering citizens.** In addition to running targeted awareness campaigns, the EU institutions and Member States promote media literacy and support national teams of independent fact-checkers and researchers to detect and expose disinformation on social networks.

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**The EU's 'myth-busters' and the European Parliament**

In 2015, the [European Council](https://eur.parl.europa.eu) asked the HR to prepare an action plan on strategic communication to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns. As a first step, the [East StratCom Task Force](https://euvsdisinfo.eu) was set up in September 2015 under the EEAS. Since then, the team has collected more than 4 000 disinformation stories, which it has analysed, debunked and published on euvsdisinfo.eu as well as on its Twitter account, @EUvsDisinfo. The team also communicates EU policies in the Neighbourhood. Two other teams are focusing on the EU's Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans.

The European Parliament has consistently and with broad political consensus been pushing the issue to the top of the agenda, urging the EU to provide sufficient tools and resources with a view to responding adequately to the pressure on the information ecosystem in its Member States and its Neighbourhood. In its [23 November 2016 resolution](https://www.europarl.europa.eu) on strategic communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties, Parliament called for the StratCom Task Force to be turned into 'a fully fledged unit within the EEAS [...] with proper staffing and adequate budgetary resources, possibly by means of an additional dedicated budget line'.

The European Parliament's amendments to the EU budget for 2018 included the pilot project 'StratCom Plus', aiming to increase capacity to fact-check disinformation in and beyond the EU. Thanks to this proposal, the East Stratcom TaskForce was allocated its first real budget of €1.1 million. In addition, €800 000 were allocated to the EEAS for strategic communication.

In a January 2018 debate on the influence of Russian propaganda on EU countries, Members of the European Parliament warned that the upcoming EU elections in May 2019 are likely to be the next big target for Russian disinformation. The Parliament has set up a special unit to respond to fake and incorrect information about the institution, in anticipation of the expected increase in such activities.

In its [13 March 2019 resolution](https://www.europarl.europa.eu), the European Parliament urged all Member States to second national experts to the StratCom teams. It called for strategic communication to become a matter of high priority in the EU, and for a greater focus on propaganda aiming to 'undermine the foundations and principles of European democracy, as well as the sovereignty of all Eastern Partnership countries'. Highlighting data misuse in the 2016 UK referendum, it called for legislation to safeguard future election campaigns from 'undue influence'.

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244 [2018 general budget](https://www.europarl.europa.eu), Legislative Observatory (OEIL), European Parliament.
6.3.5. Focus on evolving tools and actors

New artificial intelligence-driven techniques such as manipulated sound, images or video (‘deep fakes’) are on the rise. In the hands of unpredictable actors with substantial cyber capabilities (see Figure 30), increasingly challenging scenarios could emerge.

At the same time, existing tools are (re-)activated. Turkey has repeatedly mobilised its diaspora for political gains. Prior to Germany’s 2017 general election, President Erdogan discouraged German Turks from voting for Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, the Socialists and the Greens, calling them ‘enemies of Turkey’. He urged Turks to vote for parties who are not enemies of Turkey. Ahead of the presidential election in June 2018, Erdogan was banned from holding rallies in EU Member States Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, home to large Turkish diasporas. Instead, he held a rally in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), in May 2018, bringing in some 10 000 supporters from EU Member States and attracting another 10 000 Bosniaks. The move to rally in BiH reigned concern over Erdogan’s ability to reanimate Turkey's deep-rooted influence efforts in the Balkans. Russia has long used ethnic Russians abroad as an influence tool and a pretext for military action. Experts recommend supporting Russian-language media outlets in order to engage with these minorities.

6.3.6. China’s influence efforts in and beyond Europe

Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has expanded its global information strategy, increasing its efforts to influence political and economic elites, media, public opinion, civil society and academia in liberal democracies across the world. According to a February 2018 report by the Global Public Policy Institute and the Mercator Institute for China Studies, Beijing (like Moscow) is seeking to weaken Western unity. China – promoting its own political and economic system as a ‘viable alternative to liberal democracies’ – is attempting to build global support on specific policy issues via ‘layers of active support’ in academic, political, media and business circles. The report warns that EU Member States are increasingly adjusting their policies to ‘curry favour with the Chinese side’. China's divide and rule tactics have borne fruit in the area of liberal values and human rights, the report asserts, as European elites are increasingly embracing Chinese rhetoric and interests.

The 16+1 format (a group of 16 central and eastern European countries launched in 2012, initiated and led by China) has sparked concern over the strategy behind Chinese investments in poorer European countries. China allegedly views central Europe as ‘an avenue through which it might influence EU decision making’, to secure compliance with the One China policy through pressure to limit contact with Taiwan, the Dalai Lama and Uyghur groups in return for infrastructure projects such as the Hungary-Serbia railway and similar investments in the Western Balkans as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Further south, Greece has become a key Chinese investment target since the financial crisis, with the port of Piraeus as a hub for an ‘informal web of Chinese companies’. Some see the decision of Greece, Hungary and Croatia to oppose criticism of China in a 2016 EU statement on the South China Sea Dispute as dictated by China in return for investments. In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU statement to the UN that criticised China’s human rights record.

6.3.7. Media and academic activities

In 2015, Reuters mapped a list of radio stations worldwide, including in Finland, Italy, Hungary, Romania, and the Western Balkans, that are part of networks backed by the Chinese government and broadcast pro-Beijing programming. In addition, Chinese state broadcaster...
China Global Television Network (CGTN) is reportedly working to recruit over 350 journalists in London, as part of its plans to establish a European hub of operations. In one job advertisement, CGTN said it aimed to report on 'nations, regions, and stories often ignored by western media' from a Chinese perspective.

In the 'soft' academic sphere, China has established 516 Confucius Institutes (CIs) in 142 countries around the world, including in the EU. The Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) typically funds the establishment of the CI, providing teachers and material, whereas the local university provides infrastructure, administration and management. CIs promote Chinese language and culture, including the official Chinese narrative on Tibet and Taiwan, which often clashes with academic research at the hosting institutions. Some critics assert that CIs work to spread a favourable vision of the 'China model' of development, silence discussions about issues censored in China (such as the Tiananmen Square massacre) and 'correct' the perception of China as a hard authoritarian state that violates human rights. In Sweden, the Stockholm University CI (established in 2005 as the first CI in Europe) was closed in 2015 following criticism from staff and the public.

Asia-Pacific democracies seek stronger cooperation with the US on Chinese influence
Increasingly, outside Europe, Western democracies such as the US, Australia and Canada are scrutinising Chinese influence operations and vehicles. The Canadian Association of University Teachers in 2013 urged Canadian universities and colleges to close down their Confucius Institutes. In 2014, the American Association of University Professors recommended the same for US universities. In 2017, the US National Association of Scholars urged all universities to close their Confucius Institutes. US lawmakers in January 2018 introduced a bill on Countering the Chinese Government and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act, requiring investigations and a subsequent unclassified report. The bill would require CIs to register as foreign agents. Australia (one of the first countries to recognise the challenges of Chinese influence) in 2017 announced a ban on foreign donations to political parties, and is scrutinising foreign investments with potential national security implications. A May 2018 report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service said that Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US are seeking stronger cooperation to address China's influence, as anxiety about the challenges is 'clearly deeper' in these countries than in the EU.
7. Looking ahead

7.1. The geopolitical context

Looking to 2019 and beyond, the EU is preparing for great challenges, but also potentially remarkable achievements in the field of peace and security. A number of initiatives in the policy areas analysed in this paper are already delivering, and more are in the process of formulation and implementation. At the same time, EU citizens share strong support for EU external action, especially if it relates to security and defence. They expect and rely on the EU to be a major actor in defending them from external threats. Despite some differences among Member States, the perceptions of the EU’s external action – including in peace and security – is improving, but there is still more work to be done in order to meet the expectations of EU citizens.

At the same time, the global and regional environment remains uncertain and instability continues to grow. The forecasts are challenging. The 2018 US national defence strategy signals a shift of the global geopolitical environment towards the re-emergence of long-term inter-state strategic competition, listing revisionist powers (Russia and China) and ‘rogue regimes’ (North Korea and Iran) as primary competitive threats for the destabilising of prosperity and security. Experts and strategic forecasting agencies are cautious, and their analyses point to a world of multiple threats – in terms both of nature and of geography. Illustrating the high level of insecurity and fear for the state of peace, global defence spending grew by 4.9% in 2018, the fastest growth rate since 2008, reaching a total of $1.78 trillion, the highest level since the end of the Cold War. It is expected to continue growing in 2019, in a period of probable profound changes in the very nature of warfare, with more drones, more robotics, more artificial intelligence and a space dimension.

Violent conflicts are likely to persist in 2019 and beyond. According to the International Crisis Group, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Venezuela are among the top 10 conflicts to watch. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to engage in a proxy war for control of the region, and relations between Israel and several of its Arab neighbours continue to deteriorate. The withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA causes great concerns about the implementation of the agreement and about the deterioration of regional security. Heightened geopolitical risk in the Middle East increases the likelihood of volatility in global energy markets.

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), among many other sources, predicts that EU-Russia relations are likely to remain difficult and conflict-prone in 2019 and beyond. Stratfor envisages that US withdrawal from the INF will intensify military build-ups by the US and Russia throughout 2019, particularly in eastern Europe. Among the threats with highest probability and potential impact, the EIU evaluates cyber-attacks and data integrity giving cause for most concern, noting that although cyber-attacks (such as those blamed on Russia) ‘have been relatively contained so far, there is a risk that their frequency and severity will increase to the extent that corporate and government networks could be brought down or manipulated for an extended period’.

The management of migration will continue to challenge the EU and the world. According to the Spanish think-tank, CIDOB there are two parallel processes that will continue growing stronger in 2019: the militarisation and fortification of existing borders and the externalisation of border control. Based on CIDOB’s forecast, this phenomenon may lead to an even greater

250 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Analysis.
risk of violence for migrants en route, while also potentially growing dynamics of conflict in urban spaces.\textsuperscript{251} CIDOB also notes that in 2019 Latin and Central America may play a more prominent role in the global discussions on violence than in the past due to the growing profile of the violence levels in their society evidenced by the migrant caravans leaving Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador in autumn 2018. In terms of larger trends, most studies and foresight agencies predict that 2019 will be a year of intensified great power rivalry and continued challenges to the rules-based international order; this is likely to continue beyond the end of the decade.

As highlighted in the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) 2019 report ‘Global Trends to 2030’, the EU will continue to face major external challenges in its neighbourhood and beyond. Moreover, the Trump administration has signalled, so far at least, that the US – the EU’s traditional ally in issues of security and peace – is likely to be less engaged in global matters as it reconsiders its approach to multilateralism.\textsuperscript{252} In addition, the multifaceted nature of new types of challenge – such as foreign disinformation and related influence efforts – require correspondingly multifaceted responses. The growing visibility in the EU of mainly pro-Kremlin online disinformation has produced a range of different solutions and proposals. With an increasing number of state and non-state actors attempting to impact and/or undermine decision-making in the EU – paired with the rapid evolution of means and methods – a growing number of Member States, sectors and policy areas will likely be affected by these developments. These evolving foreign influence operations call for a broader European and interdisciplinary approach.

The EU remains committed to delivering on the basis of the EU Global Strategy. The approach of joining up internally – among institutions, Member States, agencies – and externally through diplomacy, mediation and missions, which has been built up in these first two years, will be maintained and reinforced. Several questions exist with regard to how Brexit will affect the EU’s policies on peace and security, particularly in the context of defence capabilities.\textsuperscript{253}

In security and defence matters, the years 2019 and 2020 will see the implementation of PESCO, the funding of defence research and development, closer coordination in capability development and procurement, and EU-NATO relations. They will also, however, be fundamental years for the debate on the future of Europe\textsuperscript{254} as a provider of peace and security. This will also mean working towards a common strategic culture, a common understanding of the strategic environment, alongside practical efforts to coordinate or join capabilities and develop further the EU’s joint operations.\textsuperscript{255} Finally, as reflected in the words of UN Secretary-General António Guterres, 2019 will continue mark an intensification of UN efforts to address the current and future geopolitical environment through reform. In the spirit of the Global Strategy, the EU will be an active participant in supporting this process and working for a more effective UN delivering peace and security.

Looking forward, it is important to keep in mind that in spite of the deteriorating environment described above, not all prospects are grim and challenging. As illustrated by the Normandy Peace Index, positive developments in Ethiopia, Colombia, North Macedonia or South Caucasus have set these regions and countries on a promising course towards a more prosperous future. In this, they will need the EU’s support and assistance, in order to foster peace and security. This is also true of countries and regions for which major change is on the cards, such as Algeria or Central Asia.

\textsuperscript{251} E. Soler i Lecha, The World in 2019: Ten Issues that Will Shape the International Agenda, CIDOB, 2018.

\textsuperscript{252} Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order, Speech delivered by Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, German Marshall Fund, Brussels 2018.


\textsuperscript{254} R. Drachenberg and Silvia Kotanidis, Future of Europe Debates III, EPRS, January 2019.

\textsuperscript{255} State of the Union 2018 – Our future in our hands, European Commission.

The discussion of the 2019 budget took place in the context of the most complicated and uncertain security environment the EU has faced for decades, and, from a budgetary point of view, in the context of the preparation of the 2021-2027 MFF. A major goal of peace and security spending is to allow for the building of more effective foreign policy and defence instruments and capabilities, as well as maintaining the EU’s role as the world’s leading provider of development and humanitarian aid, and promoter of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and sustainable economic development. The security of the EU itself is addressed as part of stability and security abroad, in particular in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood, and tackling the root causes of global challenges, such as irregular migration and violent extremism. In order to deliver on all these goals, EU spending could look for intelligent synergies with Member States’ programmes, and with international financial institutions, mobilise private investments, and introduce innovative financial instruments where possible and appropriate.

7.2.1. Outlook until the end of the 2014-2020 MFF

Most of the 2019 expenditures under heading 4 are devoted to development cooperation (73.2% of the allocation) and a significant share targets humanitarian aid (14.6%). Other instruments under heading 4 contribute to addressing the external dimension of migration challenges, by directly assisting the countries and communities hosting refugees and tackling the root causes of migration in the regions of origin.

Although the 2019 and 2020 budgets fall under the 2014-2020 MFF and its general ceilings, there are certain amendments to the financing of peace and security in the EU. Compared to the 2018 budget, there have been significant increases in some envelopes in heading 4, which are mostly related to a decision to finance the second tranche of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (€1 450 million) and support for humanitarian actions, development and resilience in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (€560 million).

In line with both the policy context and the budgetary procedure, there are several legislative changes that have started and will realise their full impact on the peace and security field over the coming years. Examples of such changes are the adopted amendment of the IcSP Regulation, the Defence Fund, the GFEA and increased cooperation between Member States in the area of peace and security.

With the amendment of the IcSP Regulation, activities aimed at enhancing cooperation with the defence sector and the military in third countries are included in the scope of the instrument. The IcSP can now therefore offer support for capacity-building programmes in third countries aimed at training and mentoring, provide non-lethal equipment and assistance with infrastructure improvements, and help with strengthening the capacity of military actors in order to contribute to the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies and sustainable development.

Complementing its NATO commitments, the EU has been intensifying its involvement in the peace and security field, which led to the creation of a European Defence Fund in mid-2017. In the coming years, the European Defence Fund will intensify its activities and will reach the full projected capacity in coordinating, supplementing and amplifying national investments in defence research, in the development of prototypes and in the acquisition of defence equipment and technology. It is expected to contribute significantly to the strategic autonomy and competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry. Treaty limitations mean that the EU budget is not able to cover all EU areas of action in the field of security and defence. Therefore, the

funding is distributed between research, development and acquisitions. The research branch, devoted to innovative defence technologies and products, will gradually receive more funding – starting with €25 million allocated for 2017, €90 million until the end of 2019, and €500 million per year after 2020. It is devoted to grants for collaborative research in innovative defence technologies and products, fully and directly funded from the EU budget, especially in electronics, metamaterials, encrypted software and robotics. In the development and acquisition branch of the EDF, funding will also increase from €500 million in total for 2019 and 2020 to €1 billion per year after 2020. It is focused on co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission for joint development and acquisition of defence equipment and technology by Member States.

According to the Commission’s 2021-2027 MFF proposal, the European Defence Fund will be the largest component of the new Heading 5 – Security and Defence. The proposed budgetary allocation for it for the whole seven-year period is €11 453 million. These significant budgetary investments would contribute to the establishment of a true European Defence Union. According to an agreement between the Member States, 35% of their equipment spending will be used for collaborative projects. Such financial regulations will encourage further cooperation between Member States. National armies will benefit from the EU Defence Fund, as will private research companies and institutes. Cooperation will be further stepped up under the recently established PESCO, not only through common policies, but also by pooling resources and providing for more efficiency in spending on peace and security. PESCO will enhance collaboration in the areas of investment, capability development and operational readiness – areas that have been underfunded in some EU countries in the past. PESCO is underpinned by the new coordinated annual review on defence (CARD) and the EDF, which will provide financial incentives to foster defence cooperation from research to the development phase.

The mid-term revision of the 2014-2020 MFF called for more flexibility in order to further increase the EU’s capacity to respond to unforeseen events. It also called for simplified rules and procedures for programming and delivering EU assistance in order to boost its effectiveness. The aim is to increase the capacity of the EU budget to address unexpected events and new priorities, against a backdrop of persistent challenges inside and outside the EU. Following the mid-term review of the MFF, more resources are envisaged in two areas – jobs and growth and addressing the migration crisis. In particular, for the years 2017 to 2020, €2.55 billion will be available to address migration, enhance security and strengthen external border control, and €1.39 billion will be available for tackling the root causes of migration. This budgetary increase results from an acknowledgement of the significant pressure on programmes, such as those falling under the Global Europe heading, that has resulted from the migration and refugee crisis, also causing security challenges. Measures to tackle these challenges include using special instruments (the Flexibility Instrument and Emergency Aid Reserve), setting up instruments, such as the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and the EU Trust Funds for external action, and pooling EU budget resources and other contributions. In addition, initiatives such as the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard, the reinforcement of Europol and of the European Asylum Support Office, and the creation of the Instrument for Emergency Support within the EU and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSI) will all have budgetary implications.

The European Border and Coast Guard’s 2018 annual budget of €292 million should be gradually increased to €335 million annually by 2020. This new EU spending reflects the security challenges faced by the EU as well as the political understanding that cooperation would provide a more efficient and effective response. The future development of the European Border and Coast Guard is a policy priority in the 2021-2027 MFF proposal together

with the connected Border Management Fund and Asylum and Migration Fund. Decentralised agencies linked to the Integrated Border Management Fund, including Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, would have their budget almost tripled, allowing Frontex to create a standing corps of around 10 000 border guards by the end of the next MFF period.

A new challenge to the EU in the area of peace and security is cybersecurity; the lack of sufficient capacities to counter cyber-attacks at Member State level demands enhanced cooperation and pooling of resources at the EU level. Failing to invest enough resources in this area, or failing to do so quickly, might undermine EU security. The establishment of a European Cybersecurity Agency would respond to that demand, building on the existing European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). In budgetary terms, this would mean a gradual increase of the agency’s annual budget from €11 million per year in 2018 to €23 million in 2022. Member States are also encouraged to include cyber-defence within the framework of PESCO and the EDF, in order to support cyber-defence projects. The total revenues of ENISA for 2019 amount to €16 932 952 and consist of a subsidy from the general budget of the European Commission, EFTA countries’ contributions, a subsidy from the Greek government for the rent of ENISA’s offices in Greece (set to a maximum of €640 000.00) and interest on cash deposits.

Another factor that may have an impact on the future EU budget is the expected withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The settlement of the ongoing financial liabilities of the UK has been a priority in the withdrawal negotiations. Under the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK has agreed to honour its share of the financing of all the obligations, including in relation to the EU budget and the whole duration of the 2014-2020 MFF.

At the time of drafting, however, it is yet to be decided what the conditions of a UK withdrawal would be (on the basis of the Withdrawal Agreement or in a ‘no deal’ situation; on 31 October or on another date). Therefore, it is not clear what the possible consequences on the EU budget will be.

7.2.2. Outlook for the 2021-2027 MFF

The preparation of the 2021-2027 MFF takes place in the context of numerous challenges and opportunities for change. The Commission adopted its overall proposal for the post-2020 MFF on 2 May 2018 and subsequently published detailed proposals for individual programmes. Although the European Parliament has addressed the proposal and adopted an interim report on it in November 2018, an agreement with the European Council has not yet been reached. Therefore, the final adoption of the 2021-2027 MFF will take place under the next European Parliament after the May 2019 European elections. The overall approach of the proposed 2021-2027 MFF, which would affect spending on peace and security programmes as well, is to fund and do ‘more with less’, and therefore to put more emphasis on performance and spending efficiency. Increased flexibility is also a trend that is expected to be strengthened, particularly with regard to the peace and security area.
Together with employment and growth, areas such as security and military cooperation, and management of migration flows into the EU are outlined as priorities. These areas are considered as delivering EU added value and a truly European public good. Therefore, more EU level cooperation is encouraged.

**Figure 31 - Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, Heading 5 (in million euros)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2021-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2022-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2023-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2024-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2025-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2026-2027 MFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>2,420</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>2,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Mobility</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>2,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Fund</td>
<td>1,242</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>1,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Civil Protection Mechanism (RescEU)</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>4,441</td>
<td>5,231</td>
<td>6,021</td>
<td>6,811</td>
<td>7,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>


According to the Commission’s proposal, peace- and security-related funding can be found under Headings 5 (Security and Defence) and 6 (Neighbourhood and the World). Heading 5 represents 2.1% of the MFF, and the largest item under the heading is the European Defence Fund, which brings together the current European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and preparatory action on defence research. Their increased importance means that their collective budget may increase almost twenty-fold (from €575.3 million to €11.5 billion). Other fund under this heading covers internal security programmes such as the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the Union’s civil protection mechanism ‘RescEU’. The proposal to increase EU spending in these areas, and to introduce a separate heading for security and defence in the MFF structure, reflects mounting pressure for the EU to take action in this area.

**Figure 32 - Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, Heading 6 (in million euros)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Cluster</th>
<th>2021-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2022-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2023-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2024-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2025-2027 MFF</th>
<th>2026-2027 MFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instruments</td>
<td>12,865</td>
<td>12,976</td>
<td>13,086</td>
<td>13,196</td>
<td>13,306</td>
<td>13,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-accession assistance</td>
<td>9,760</td>
<td>9,870</td>
<td>9,980</td>
<td>10,090</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>10,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common foreign and security policy</td>
<td>4,439</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>4,469</td>
<td>4,479</td>
<td>4,489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Heading 6 covers policy clusters external action and pre-accession assistance. The former includes a new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, which brings together eight separate instruments and funds within the current MFF, as well as part of the European Development Fund (EDF), presently outside the MFF. In so doing, it increases the amount budgeted in this policy area by 10%. It is part of the trend towards the ‘budgetisation’, or integration into the EU budget, of the off-budget mechanisms and streamlining of the financial mechanisms, which is expected to contribute to efficiency and synergies in their application, but also to their transparency and accountability.

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Also within the external action policy cluster, the Humanitarian Aid Fund brings together the current MFF instrument of the same name and another part of the EDF, and is roughly stable (-1%) compared with the same policy area under the current MFF in EU-27 terms.

There is also a proposal to introduce innovative financial instruments, external trust funds or facilities more widely, but only where appropriate; these would also be able to attract private resources. In the area of peace and security, the Guarantee Fund for External Action (GFEA) is one example of such an instrument.

The Commission has proposed two new instruments outside the MFF and one of them - the European Peace Facility is part of the EU peace and security policy. It is a new extra-MFF budgetary facility (€9.2 billion over seven years) to finance operations under the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and other international operations, and to train and support third countries’ armed forces in peace-keeping operations. The facility will financed outside the MFF, because the Treaty on European Union (Article 41) does not allow CFSP operations with military or defence implications to be financed under the EU budget.

All these characteristics of the 2021-2027 MFF proposal are expected to further enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to external challenges and to maintain its role on the international scene from international cooperation, migration management, investment, governance, human rights and the rule of law, to promoting the sustainable development goals, humanitarian assistance, crisis response and conflict prevention.

7.3. The EU: An actor for peace and security in a changing world

The world today is more peaceful than it has been in past centuries. Europe in particular has been experiencing a protracted period of ‘long-lasting peace’ since the end of the Second World War, and it remains world leader in quality of life.268 This period coincides with the lifetime of the European Union, itself the product of a commitment to peace and security through functional cooperation and integration – in short, to an ‘ever closer’ union. Yet, the increasing complexity of the environment in which the EU operates has raised concerns regarding the preservation of security – including within its own borders – and about the efficiency of the EU as an actor in the promotion of peace globally. These concerns are not only reflected in the policy initiatives launched by the EU institutions in recent years, but also in EU public opinion polls in which citizens increasingly refer to security as a top priority for EU-level policy-making.

The EU’s external action, which includes the common foreign and security policy, as well as other areas of engagement with the rest of the world (such as trade, development and humanitarian aid), has always been guided by its own model of integration, collective security and multilateralism and a commitment to the principles of the United Nations. The 2016 Global Strategy, which guides the EU’s foreign policy, reiterates the dedication to the promotion of ‘a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle’, echoing the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. This dedication is emphasised continuously by the European Parliament, which, empowered by the Treaties in the area of EU foreign policy, has brought a stronger element of legitimacy and democratic representation to the EU’s global action.

In line with the Treaties’ provisions and with the Global Strategy, the pursuit of peace and security by the EU is carried out through a holistic view of the international system. Acknowledging the link between democracy and peace, the EU has developed a wide array of tools for supporting democracy in third countries. These range from political and human rights dialogue, and support for civil society and human rights defenders, to development aid for good governance and the rule of law, and the conditionality enshrined in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements and in its unilateral trade preferences.

At the same time, the EU has refocused its development policy to clearly target fragile and conflict-affected countries through the new consensus on development (2017). In line with the

268 ESPAS report 2019, Global Trends to 2030
UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the concept of ‘resilience’ outlined in the EU Global Strategy, the new consensus highlights that development cooperation is a pivotal instrument for preventing violent conflicts and minimising their negative consequences. The EU also strives to build its own resilience to shocks driven mainly by external conflicts, namely the migration ‘crisis’ and terrorist attacks on its soil.

Within this context, the Global Strategy has been part of a renewed vigour in the pursuit of a more effective and efficient EU security and defence policy. Initiatives such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund, and the modernisation of EU CSDP missions and operations to respond to new threats such as cybersecurity, are only some of the steps in that direction. Through the progressive framing of an EU defence policy, the EU aims not only to work in cooperation and complementarity with NATO, but also to add value to European defence, for example by coordinating EU Member States’ efforts for more efficient defence procurement and capability development, and by committing EU funds to defence research – for the first time ever.

Geopolitical and financial challenges, emanating from external and internal factors and from new security domains, such as technology and the environment, will continue to preoccupy policy-makers in the EU institutions and Member States in the coming years. New types of threats and destabilising factors such as climate change, terrorism and uncontrolled migration, call for innovative thinking and new types of resources and solutions. Yet, as this study has illustrated, these challenges have in many ways reinforced the EU’s commitment to preserving and promoting peace and security, and have led to renewed determination on all policy fronts. The proliferation of new strategies and initiatives in all EU policy areas related to peace and security, ranging from development, humanitarian aid and defence to EU-UN relations and nuclear non-proliferation, is more than evident from the preceding sections. Based on the existing timelines for the unveiling and execution of the various actions involved, the years ahead are projected to continue along the same lines. The focus will be firmly fixed on rendering the EU a more efficient, holistic actor for peace and security, bringing together elements of normative, soft and hard power and adapting to the rapidly transforming world with strategy, steadfastness and resilience.
8. Main references

This is the second EU Peace and Security Outlook produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). The series is designed to analyse and explain the contribution of the European Union to the promotion of peace and security internationally through its various external policies.

The study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment. It then focuses on the centrality of the promotion of peace and security in the EU’s external action and proceeds to an analysis of the practical pursuit of these principles in three main areas of EU policy: development, democracy support, and security and defence, as well as in the increasingly relevant area of disinformation and foreign influence. It concludes with the outlook for the future.

A parallel study, published separately, focuses specifically on EU peacebuilding efforts in Colombia. The studies have been drafted with a view to their presentation at the Normandy World Peace Forum, in June 2019.