

Environmental liability of companies



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Abstract

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, aims at gaining deeper insights into the environmental liability of companies in the European Union. It analyses the role of companies within the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and pays attention to potential hurdles that may limit the possibility to hold companies liable for environmental harm. Various remedies to the limited liability of the corporation are discussed and suggestions are formulated to improve access to justice for victims of environmental harm. Specific attention is paid to a balanced regime of mandatory solvency guarantees to support the ELD liabilities of companies.

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs.

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Manuscript completed in May 2020

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATE	After The Event insurance
BP	British Petroleum
BTE	Before The Event insurance
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CER	Corporate Environmental Responsibility
COM	Communication
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DJSI	Dow Jones Sustainability Index
EC	European Commission
EC	European Community
ECD	Environmental Crime Directive
ECLE	European Company Law Experts
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ELD	Environmental Liability Directive
EMAS	Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EU	European Union
GCCF	Gulf Coast Claim Facility
IMPEL	Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law
IPPC	Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control
ISO	International Standard-Setting Organisation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JSC	Joint Stock Company
LEI	Legal Expenses Insurance
LLC	Limited Liability Company
LLP	Limited Liability Partnership

MAWP	Multi-annual ELD Work Programme
MNE	Multi-National Enterprise
MS	Member State(s)
NAOC	Nigerian AGIP Oil Company
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRW	Natural Resources Wales
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OJ	Official Journal
PETL	Principles of European Tort Law
PC	Private Company
PPP	People Profit and Planet
REFIT	Regulatory Fitness and Performance
RESA	Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act
SA	Société Anonyme
SAM	Sustainable Asset Management
SME	Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TPF	Third Party Funding
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UTKL	Unilever Tea Kenya Limited

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Environmental liability should serve two goals: it should provide incentives for the prevention of environmental harm to operators and it should lead to remediation of environmental harm, meaning compensation of victims and clean-up of the pollution caused. At EU level this has been regulated in Directive 2004/35/EC of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (ELD). An important role in this ELD is provided for companies, who are usually the operators upon which many ELD obligations are imposed. A problem could arise, however, if operators do not meet their ELD obligations. That could be the result of the potential insolvency of the operators, but it could also be that there are barriers to access to justice.

The aim of this study is to analyse the environmental liability of companies, more specifically within the framework of the ELD, but also in a broader perspective. In order to do that the study starts with a theoretical framework explaining that the primary instrument to control environmental harm often is *ex ante* regulation. However, given the limits of regulation, liability rules have to play an important complementary role. But they can only play this complementary role when operators are truly exposed to the environmental harm they are causing.

In order to set the stage, the study first analyses the scope of the liability of operators under the ELD and sketches previous studies and reports issued by the Commission with respect to the liability of companies. In the ELD there is a crucial role for companies, in their role as operators, to prevent and remedy environmental harm as defined in the ELD. Various studies show that the ELD has not been widely applied in practice, mainly due to a low awareness. The availability of insurance and other financial security products has seriously increased. To a large extent operators do collaborate with administrative authorities in the remediation of polluted sites. However, there are a few catastrophic events where environmental harm causes large losses that may lead to the insolvency of operators.

That insolvency problem can especially arise within the framework of the limited liability of corporation. Limited liability is often considered as the backbone of corporate law, but it also causes serious risks of externalisation of harm to involuntary creditors (more particularly tort victims such as the environment) and it may lead to reduced investments in prevention on the side of the corporation. Many remedies for these negative effects of limited liability have been reviewed (such as mandatory capital requirements, unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts and veil piercing), but each of those have their particular disadvantages. The preferred solution is not to search for remedies within corporate law, but to directly deal with the insolvency risk by imposing mandatory solvency guarantees upon operators in order to meet their environmental liability in general and their ELD obligations specifically. In addition, a few innovative instruments could improve the environmental responsibility and accountability of companies. An important role in that respect may be played by internal compliance mechanisms. Those mechanisms can provide beneficial effects for environmental compliance if they are embedded in a robust regulatory framework. Internal compliance mechanisms can also play an important role within CSR/CER which is increasingly interpreted as an obligation for companies towards sustainable value creation as an alternative for shareholder primacy. Increasingly CER is no longer merely considered as a merely voluntary exercise, but specific norms (such as a duty concerning non-financial reporting) now also have legal consequences and may even lead to environmental liability.

Even though the main focus of this study is on environmental liability, it should be stressed that in practice the liability mechanism cannot be separated from the other essential tools to prevent and remedy environmental harm, being administrative and criminal law. There is certainly scope for an

increased use of more particularly administrative financial penalties (fines) as an alternative for the criminal law. The importance is therefore to search for an optimal mix between administrative, civil and criminal enforcement, whereby the different instruments can, ideally, reinforce each other.

There are, moreover, also several ways in which private enforcement can be improved (thus reducing the need for public enforcement) and increasing the exposure of companies to environmental liability. Private enforcement suits in environmental liability are often not brought because of the wide-spread nature of the harm, which may lead to a rational apathy problem. That may lead to the paradoxal situation that when the social harm is large, the damage of each individual is so small that no one has a sufficient incentive to bring a lawsuit. This can be remedied by providing standing to NGOs and allowing them access to justice via a representative action. Individuals may also refrain from bringing an environmental liability suit because of high cost aversion. Several instruments may remedy this, such as the introduction of conditional fees, legal expenses insurance and third party funding of litigation.

Making an overview of the ELD cases is not that easy as the data in that respect are largely lacking. But the information available reveals that there are so far no major issues of insolvency or risks of externalising harm to thinly capitalised subsidiaries. But in a few rather spectacular cases (like Kolontár and Moerdijk) the damage was so substantial that immediately an insolvency problem arose as a result of which harm was externalised to the tax payer. Those cases lead immediately to the most important recommendation of this study, being that it is important to make the search for financial guarantees in the ELD (which is currently optional) mandatory. Without the availability of financial security there is, especially under the strict liability regime of the ELD, a serious risk of undercompensation and underdeterrence. This plays a role especially in the cases where harm is large and the tendency to externalise (and abuse corporate structures) may be larger. However, it is recommended to introduce the obligation in a flexible manner whereby the EU level can mandate the obligation for Member States to force operators to seek financial security to cover their ELD obligations, but at the same time to leave the decision concerning the precise types and amounts of the financial security to the authorities in the Member States. The situation of specific risks and operators can diverge and Member States authorities may have better information to judge the necessity of a particular amount of financial security and the adequacy of the instruments offered by the operator to cover this amount. The EU level can, however, support Member States by providing a guidance note which could *inter alia* indicate how via smart instruments of risk management, the environmental risks of particular operators could be assessed and how administrative authorities could in a dynamic and flexible manner judge the adequacy of the financial security offered by the particular operator.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study: general

Environmental harm has been a major problem for several decades now. Legal systems have used a variety of legal instruments to remedy environmental harm, one of those being environmental liability. The liability mechanism has probably first been developed in the United States,¹ but became increasingly used in Member States of the EU in the 1980s as well, especially after in many Member States hotspots of pollution were discovered, usually soil pollution of orphaned sites, leading to huge costs often for the governments (and thus for the tax payer).

The goal of this environmental liability regime is usually twofold: on the one hand environmental liability aims at providing compensation (or cost-recovery) by letting polluters pay the compensation due related to the environmental damage they caused.² That duty is of course in line with the polluter-pays-principle, at least with the interpretation of the principle that polluters should pay for the environmental damage they cause. That shows that environmental liability has on the other hand another function as well (although it is stressed to a lesser or greater extent in various jurisdictions), being to provide incentives to potential polluters for the prevention of environmental harm. Of course the idea was never that environmental liability alone would be able to serve those functions (of compensation and prevention via deterrence). Compensation may also be achieved through other mechanisms like (first-party) insurance or compensation funds, whereas prevention may be the primary goal of public law-oriented instruments (such as conditions in permits) and market-based instruments (like emission trading and environmental taxation).³ Still, environmental liability may play at least an important complementary role in achieving the objectives of compensation and prevention.

Notwithstanding these starting points it can be observed in many countries, that environmental liability often has difficulties in achieving its goals. This is on the one hand partially due to general difficulties for victims to use the liability mechanism. Barriers to access justice may be high; environmental damage may sometimes be wide-spread (as a result of which there may not be one individual victim able to bring a suit); problems of uncertainty over causation and latency (the long-time lapse between an emission and the damage) may all contribute to difficulties in applying the liability mechanism in addition to general difficulties in access to justice (such as the high cost of the legal system).⁴ On the other hand, in addition to these difficulties, it appears that especially when companies cause environmental harm, the liability mechanism often remains ineffective for the simple reason that companies *de facto* do not have to pay for the harm they have caused through their activities. The main reason for this is that companies are often organized as corporations and enjoy therefore the limited liability of the corporation. To the extent that the harm caused by the corporation is larger than the corporate assets, a liability suit may result in insolvency as a result of which the liability mechanism is unable to fulfil its compensatory and preventive functions.⁵

Environmental harm can of course also be caused by other actors than companies. Households may contribute to pollution as well and other organization forms than companies (or even public authorities) may cause environmental harm as well. Yet, most of the infamous environmental incidents

¹ See for an overview of those early developments *inter alia* Revesz & Stewart 1995 and Boyd 2003.

² See *inter alia* Bergkamp 2001, 73-85; Liu 2013, 50-51 and Wilde 2013, 8-9.

³ Also Skogh has repeatedly argued that the goals of prevention and compensation can be reached by either a system of liability (for prevention) and insurance (for compensation) or safety regulation (for prevention) and public insurance/social security (for compensation). See Skogh 1982 and Skogh 1989.

⁴ See for an analysis of the barriers to access justice and for potential remedies the contributions in Tuil & Visscher 2010.

⁵ Liu 2013, 87-89.

that could give rise to environmental liability have occurred in the corporate sphere, which merits a specific focus on the environmental liability of companies. Indeed, a problem that has often been identified in the literature is that corporate actors may, by (ab)using the corporate form often escape the clutches of liability law which undoubtedly reduces the effectiveness of the liability mechanism.

1.2 The EU context

In the European Union environmental liability has been regulated in Directive 2004/35/EC of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (ELD).⁶ This ELD explicitly refers to the already mentioned polluter-pays-principle as its basis for establishing an environmental liability regime.⁷ The ELD has chosen for an approach whereby administrative duties are imposed on public authorities to prevent and remedy environmental damage as defined in the ELD. It has therefore chosen for a different system than the civil liability systems for traditional damage, which existed till then in many Member States. The idea of the ELD is not to focus on so-called traditional damage (damage to property, economic loss and personal injury), but rather on so-called pure ecological damage.⁸ The Directive therefore defines environmental damage as damage to protected species and natural habitats, damage to water and damage to the soil.

Still, the ELD has specific liability regimes. The first is a strict liability regime that applies to operators of certain activities that are deemed to be of actual or potential concern, listed in Annex III to the ELD. Those can be held (strictly) liable in the event of damage to protected species and natural habitats, water damage and land damage. For those cases liability is in principle strict, although under particular circumstances the operator may be relieved of his financial responsibility.

A second liability regime applies to damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by any occupational activities, other than those listed in Annex III whenever the operator has been at fault or negligent.

The Directive has particular definitions of environmental damage as a result of which it does for example not apply to the liability and compensation which is already covered by international conventions listed in Annex IV of the Directive.

It may be clear that, although not explicitly mentioned in this way, companies are liable under the ELD. The ELD does not explicitly refer to "companies" but to operators upon whom particular duties can be imposed by public authorities according to the ELD. In reality those operators (often licence holders) will be corporations.

For the reasons already mentioned earlier, there is therefore a danger that the effectiveness of the liability regime under the ELD could be jeopardised to the extent that operators are not able to meet their obligations. The problem that the potential insolvency of the operator may limit the effective application of the ELD is recognised as a result of which Article 14(1) encourages Member States to develop financial security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with the aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under the Directive. However, there is no formal duty to provide financial guarantees under the ELD. As a result, in many of the studies with respect to the ELD, examples are provided of major industrial disasters where operators are unable to cover the costs.⁹ Such an incident occurred for example in October 2010 in Western-Hungary where the operator

⁶ OJ L143 of 30 April 2004.

⁷ The polluter-pays-principle is set out in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

⁸ See on this notion of pure ecological damage, Liu 2013, 24-25.

⁹ EEB 2020, 15.

was unable to cover the costs.¹⁰ These and other incidents merit a specific research into the role of companies in environmental liability generally and within the ELD more specifically.

As a result, the goal of this study is to gain deeper insight into the role of companies in environmental liability and to examine whether there are specific ideas and ways to improve the effectiveness of the ELD, more particularly taking into account the role of enterprises in creating environmental harm.

1.3 Scope and limits of the study

In line with the objectives of the study, I will provide an impression of studies from various sources regarding the specific role of enterprises in environmental liability generally and the ELD in particular. In that respect the research will *inter alia* focus on the following topics:

- a general account of the state of the art regarding the liability of enterprises for environmental damage according to the ELD;
- an overview of literature and prior studies concerning the ELD, regarding enterprise liability;
- an analysis of the mechanisms for controlling environmental liability of companies at EU level and any measures to improve their quality;
- an analysis of the concept of enterprise liability in the literature with an exploration of innovative instruments in that respect;
- an account of civil, criminal and administrative liability of enterprises;
- a presentation and analysis of some relevant cases and examples of Member States, also with a view on potential innovative solutions;
- a focus on instruments to improve remedies and access to justice in the light of the steps already taken by the EU regarding *inter alia* collective action, standing of NGOs, third party funding of litigation and damage assessment;
- the formulation of suggestions and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the ELD, more particularly regarding enterprise liability.

The study aims at developing ideas, which could therefore lead to recommendations and policy proposals with respect to the mentioned topics, thus stimulating the agenda setting with respect to this important topic.

Environmental liability of companies is not only a very complex, but also a very broad topic, as it touches on the one hand on issues of environmental law, liability law, but also company law. Moreover, as indicated, it is impossible to address environmental liability in isolation; the function of environmental liability should be viewed in relation to other liability mechanisms of criminal and administrative nature. However, given the breadth of the topic, it is impossible to elaborate the wealth of literature in this domain in a lot of detail. Merely providing for example an overview of the many studies that have been undertaken with respect to the ELD could already in itself easily fill a study. The idea is rather to work in a problem-oriented manner, to provide the reader an insight in policy developments, key questions and challenges and suggested solutions in the literature. In that respect the goal of this study is obviously not to be comprehensive, i.e. to discuss every single article that has been published in this domain, but rather to discuss the main lines of thought in the literature which could stimulate agenda setting for potential further policy action at EU level.

¹⁰ This case is further discussed in 8.3.1.

1.4 Approach/method

Given the importance and breadth of the topic, a variety of different approaches will be used. In the first place the literature with respect to the role of enterprises in the ELD will of course be analysed; in addition, also the concept of enterprise liability will be analysed whereby there will be a focus on the current problems created by limited liability of corporations and potential solutions that will be reviewed.

The several aspects of enterprise liability will not only be analysed from a legal perspective, reviewing legal literature and policy documents, but an economic approach will also be used. An economic approach is very suitable to address environmental liability as it has more particularly been the economic literature that has pointed at the fact that environmental liability not only has a compensatory function (as often stressed in legal literature), but that liability rules also provide an incentive effect: by exposing the polluter to a potential liability, the polluter will obtain incentives for prevention resulting from the deterrent effect of the liability rules. That (economic) idea is even explicitly mentioned in the Preamble of the Environmental Liability Directive and was also mentioned in the White Paper¹¹ (2000) preceding the ELD. In section 3.6 of the White Paper it was mentioned that "It is expected that liability creates incentives for more responsible behaviour by firms". Moreover, the basic premise of economic analysis, being that corporations are rational actors striving for wealth (profit) maximisation could in some cases be debated when applied to individuals, but usually poses no problem when it is applied to corporations who are supposed to maximise shareholder value.

In addition to this economic approach, to the extent possible, a review will also be provided of EU action in particular domains. Again, in some cases there have been that many initiatives that, especially given the breadth of the topic, comprehensiveness is simply impossible. I will simply indicate the state of affairs concerning particular topics (such as for example collective action) at EU level in order to make the reader aware of the fact that concerning particular topics action has already been taken at EU level.

1.5 Structure

After this introduction first a theoretical framework will be provided simply sketching why environmental liability of companies is of importance and which are the limits of applying liability rules to companies (2); next, the liability of enterprises under the ELD will be summarized, discussing briefly the history of the ELD, its application and the Commission and other reports on the effectiveness (3). The concept of enterprise liability will be introduced and the difficulties related to the limited liability of corporations will be sketched as well as potential solutions (4); various innovative instruments related to the role of corporations will be discussed (5) as well as the role of environmental liability in the light of criminal and administrative liability (6). Then I turn to instruments to improve remedies to access justice (7). Then a "reality check" will be provided by discussing examples from Member States. Those will be cases of environmental pollution whereby it will be discussed to what extent environmental liability could effectively be applied to the companies liable for the environmental harm (8). Section 9 provides recommendations for further actions to improve the effectiveness of the ELD regarding enterprise liability and section 10 concludes.

1.6 Word of thanks

I am grateful to Csoban Göcze and Inés Pina García-Galán, student fellows at METRO (Faculty of Law, Maastricht University) for their highly valuable research assistance, to Yu Haiyang (Maastricht) for

¹¹ COM(2000) 66 final. The White Paper is also published in Faure 2003a, 365-389.

providing information on single ship companies, to Francesca Leucci (Rotterdam) for providing information on the Ilva-case in Taranto, to Ludo Veuchelen, former contract officer at the Study Centre for Nuclear Research at Mol (Belgium) for providing useful documentation, to Professor Kid Schwarz (Rotterdam/Maastricht) and Professor Mieke Olaerts (Maastricht) for providing useful insights on recent developments in company law as well as to Marina Jodogne (METRO, Maastricht) for excellent editorial assistance.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

KEY FINDINGS

- Environmental pollution constitutes a negative externality, which is a market failure.
- Companies should be confronted with the social costs related to environmental pollution in order to provide them with incentives to internalize that externality.
- Environmental liability can both have a preventive as well as a compensatory effect.
- Generally a strict liability rule is the preferred liability regime for environmental pollution, but strict liability is efficient only when the insolvency risk (the environmental damage being higher than the wealth of the operator) can be controlled.
- Generally environmental liability may have many limits as a result of which *ex ante* safety regulation is the primary instrument to control environmental pollution.
- Yet, given the inherent limits in safety regulation, environmental liability of companies plays an important supplementary role to provide incentives for prevention.
- For that reason it is important to improve the functioning of environmental liability where possible.

2.1 Why Environmental liability of companies?

It seems important from the outset to first explain the (economic) importance of environmental liability rules, more particularly in relation to companies. Providing this (economic) foundation of environmental liability will be important as it allows to explain the important (but supplementary) role of liability rules and it equally lays the foundation to explain the potential limits of liability rules. These foundations will be of importance as they will enable a further clarification of the problems that may arise in applying environmental liability to companies and can equally help in searching for potential solutions.

2.2 Environmental pollution as an externality

From an economic perspective environmental pollution is a negative external effect, also referred to as an externality. Since polluting companies do not feel the negative consequences of the harm they inflict outside of their enterprise, this is described as an external effect. It is, moreover, a negative external effect as it imposes costs rather than confers benefits on third parties. Such a negative external effect can create a market failure.¹² If polluters are not forced to pay for the external effects they create through their activities, the problem arises that the social costs created by pollution would not be incorporated in the relative products and services of the particular company. Since the externality is not taken into account and the polluter does not invest in pollution abatement, relative prices will be too low and consumers will demand too much of a product or service that creates high costs for society. Pollution creates in other words, a market failure. Companies would in that hypothesis be allowed to externalize costs, in other words to impose the costs of pollution on society.

¹² See Faure 2016a, 114.

The reason is that polluters are not forced to pay for the external effects they create through their activities. As a result they lack any incentive for efficient cost abatement. The negative external effect would, in other words, not be incorporated into their decision-making process.

As an example, a company that would emit waste water into the surface waters would not install a costly water treatment plant. As a rational actor the company would not incur the costs to deal with the externality as there is no legal rule forcing the company to do so.

This very basic insight has a number of important consequences, also for the scope of this study. First of all, one has to realize that externalization of harm generally and of pollution specifically is a natural behaviour of rational utility maximising individuals and of companies. There is no moral connotation to the fact that companies pollute (externalisation of harm is not as such considered “bad”). The point is that a company, when having this opportunity, will externalise harm to society in order to raise its profits and maximise shareholder value. It is in other words, in the absence of legal rules, a behaviour that can be expected.¹³ Second, Nobel Prize Winner Ronald Coase has shown that if transaction costs were sufficiently low, the externalities resulting from pollution would be efficiently internalised by companies as a result of bargaining between the parties.¹⁴ However, in many cases the conditions from the Coase theorem (absence of transaction costs) will not be met, as there may be multiple polluters and many victims involved which inhibits efficient bargaining. Moreover, the Coase theorem only refers to efficiency and not to distributional effects. For the Coase theorem it is immaterial whether the prevention costs are paid by the polluter or by the potential victims. For an environmental lawyer it may be unacceptable (and a violation of the polluter-pays-principle¹⁵) that potential victims (under a no-liability regime) would have to pay for the installation of efficient abatement technology by the polluter. In other words, legal rules are necessary to force an internalisation of the externality. Third, the exposé also makes clear what the goal is of environmental policy in general, but of environmental law more specifically, being to correct the market failure caused by environmental pollution.

2.3 Goal of environmental liability

One of the potential legal instruments that can be used to achieve this internalisation of the externality is environmental liability. For economists the importance of a liability rule is that a finding of liability can provide incentives for careful behaviour by those who may be involved in an accident setting, i.e. in environmental pollution. At the same time, under particular conditions, liability rules can equally provide compensation to the victim.¹⁶

The main goal of liability rules is the minimisation of what Guido Calabresi called the primary accident costs, being the costs of accident avoidance and of the expected damage.¹⁷ Liability rules should according to him provide incentives to adopt efficient care levels, i.e. the care where the marginal costs of care-taking equal the marginal benefits of accident reduction.¹⁸ The legal rule should in other words not provide incentives to avoid every possible accident that might occur, but only those accidents that could be avoided by investments in care where the marginal costs of avoidance are lower than or equal to the marginal benefits of accident reduction. This is equally important in the area of environmental

¹³ It are, moreover, not only individuals and companies that will externalise harm. In the transboundary context, also states will externalise harm to neighbouring (downstream) states, as this will enable them to obtain the socio-economic benefits, but to export the negative effects to neighbouring countries. That explains why much of the pollution has a cross-border character. See Faure 2014a, 236-238. That is also why EU action is especially needed to internalize transboundary externalities (Faure 2017a).

¹⁴ Coase 1960.

¹⁵ Faure 2016a, 118-119.

¹⁶ See for an evaluation of the goals of environmental liability, Liu 2013, 84-90.

¹⁷ Calabresi 1970.

¹⁸ See Shavell 1987, 7.

harm: the goal of environmental liability is certainly not to prevent all environmental damage at all cost (for the simple reason that it would be too costly). Environmental liability should provide incentives to follow optimal prevention levels with respect to environmental harm.¹⁹

2.4 Strict liability versus negligence

2.4.1 Strict liability for environmental harm

One of the fundamental questions in environmental liability, also faced by the ELD, is whether a strict liability or a negligence regime should be applied. Environmental pollution cases are often considered so-called unilateral accident situations, being those where only the care taken by one of the parties (the injurer) can influence the accident risk.²⁰ Most environmental pollution cases are considered unilateral, because the contribution of the victim to the accident risk will be less important than that of the injurer.²¹

According to the economic literature, if a negligence rule is adopted in a unilateral accident situation, the injurer will take optimal care, provided the due care required by the legal system is equal to the optimal care as defined by the economic model.²² This can easily be understood. If the courts set the due care standard correctly, the polluter can avoid liability by taking due care. If the polluter does so, he can avoid paying the costs of expected damage. A negligence rule will therefore lead to an efficient outcome, provided the legal system defines the due care as equal to the optimal care of the model. However, it has to be recalled that in this case, if the polluter follows the due care level required in the legal system, he will not be found liable and victim compensation will not take place.

Also a strict liability rule leads to the optimum. It basically states that the injurer has to compensate for all damage irrespective of the level of care taken. The injurer has to bear all social costs of an accident under strict liability, not only the injurer's own costs of taking care, but also those of the expected damage.²³ Accordingly, the polluter will reach exactly the same decision, being to minimise the total expected accident costs.

Even though the influence of the polluter on the pollution risk will generally be much more important than the influence of the victim, in some cases the victim may also have an influence on the accident risk, most often not in reducing the probability of the pollution itself, but in mitigating the damages. In those cases, the accident situation would not be unilateral, but rather bilateral (as both parties can have an influence on the accident risk). That is not a reason to move to a negligence regime (since the polluter will still be the one having the most important influence on the accident risk). However, in those cases it is important to provide a legal rule that gives incentives to the potential victim as well to mitigate the accident risk or the damages through optimal preventive measures. Usually a rule of comparative negligence suffices to provide those incentives. That simply entails that the victims' claim on damages will be reduced to the extent to which he/she contributed to the harm. If such a comparative negligence defence is added to the strict liability rule, efficient incentives for prevention can be provided to both the polluter and the victim.²⁴

¹⁹ Faure & Partain 2019, 107.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ See further justifications for strict liability at Bergkamp 2001, 119-150.

²² Shavell 1980.

²³ Shavell 1987, 8 and 11.

²⁴ Shavell 1987, 11-14.

2.4.2 Nuances

In principle, in this particular setting (of a unilateral accident), both negligence and strict liability therefore provide incentives to take optimal care. There are nevertheless important nuances to discern.²⁵ So far, the discussion has been limited to the relevance of care levels. However, the number of times a particular injurer engages in an activity (referred to as the activity level) can also influence the accident risk. For example, the more a company produces, the higher is the risk of environmental harm. In this respect there is an important difference between strict liability and negligence. Strict liability places all the costs on the injurer and therefore provides incentives to adopt both efficient care as well as efficient activity levels. According to the standard of negligence, the injurer will be immune from liability, as soon as the level of efficient care is achieved. The reason is that a court cannot incorporate optimal activity levels into the due care standard required by the legal system. Consequently, if activity levels have to be controlled, strict liability may be preferred to negligence.

Another difference between both rules concerns information costs. The application of the negligence rule requires the court to set the due care standard with the ancillary burden of obtaining the relevant information, probably at a high cost. The information necessary to weigh the costs and benefits and to fix the optimal care may not be readily available to the courts. On the other hand, the strict liability rule shifts all the costs to the injurer who will then have to define the optimal care level. It may well be that in relation to environmental harm, the information on optimal precaution is more readily available from within the industry. If so, this reduces the burden on the court and thus constitutes an argument in support of the strict liability rule.

Finally, it should equally be repeated that if one not only considers the preventive function of liability rules, but also the compensatory effect, there is also a large difference between both rules: under the negligence rule, even if it is applied correctly (and provides optimal incentives for care taking), the environmental damage suffered by the victims is in principle not compensated. Under strict liability victims are compensated by the polluter. This distributional difference may yet constitute another argument in favour of applying strict liability to environmental harm. In the next chapter, I will review how these arguments apply to the division of negligence and strict liability under the ELD.

2.4.3 Effects of insolvency

There is yet one other important difference between strict liability and negligence. Under strict liability it is crucial that the polluter is exposed to the full social costs of his activity. That implies that the polluter needs to be able to fully compensate the harm he has caused. That may cause a problem if the amount of the damage exceeds the injurer's wealth. In that case the polluter will consider the accident as one which is equal to his total wealth and will therefore only take the care necessary to avoid an accident with a magnitude equal to his total wealth. If that wealth is lower than the magnitude of an accident, he will take less than the optimal care and therefore a problem of underdeterrence arises under strict liability.²⁶ Insolvency is less of a problem under negligence, since under that rule the injurer will still have an incentive to take the care required by the legal system as long as the costs of taking care are less than his individual wealth. Taking due care remains a way for the polluter to avoid having to pay compensation to the victim. Strict liability is therefore efficient only if an injurer is always held to fully pay for the consequences of the accident. If the injurer were insolvent, or if the judge were to underestimate the amount of the damage, underdeterrence would follow.²⁷

²⁵ Faure & Partain 2019, 154-161.

²⁶ Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 35.

²⁷ Cooter & Ulen 2000, 316-318 and Cooter 1984, 1523.

A simple example can illustrate this: suppose that we have three different optimal care levels, which correspond to different amounts of damage. It is hence assumed that the higher the amount of the expected damage will be, the higher the optimal care that the injurer should take to avoid the damage. Thus the three care levels have a corresponding optimal care level (y^*) that varies with the amount of the damage (D):

Table 1: Strict liability versus negligence under insolvency

Care level	Costs of optimal care (y^*)	D
1	10.000	1.000.000
2	5.000	500.000
3	2.000	200.000

Assume now that the potential injurer only has 200.000 at stake, but that society faces an accident with a potential magnitude of 1.000.000. What will the injurer *ex ante* decide?

Under strict liability, the injurer will consider the accident not as one where he can lose one million, since he has only (given insolvency) 200.000 at stake. In order to avoid the accident with a magnitude of 200.000 under strict liability the injurer will chose the lowest care level (3) and only invest 2.000, the optimal care necessary to avoid an accident with an expected damage of 200.000. Hence, a serious problem of underdeterrence arises since from society's point of view, the injurer should take the high care level (1) and spend 10.000 in order to avoid the risk that a damage with 1.000.000 could be caused.

That is precisely the result which is reached under negligence. Under negligence, the injurer is only interested in the costs of taking care. The legal system will require him to take the high care (1). If he invests the high care (which costs him 10.000), he will not have to compensate the 1.000.000 to the victim. Given that the injurer has 200.000 as assets, he will invest the 10.000 and optimal deterrence is achieved.

If there were therefore an insolvency problem or is there is uncertainty concerning the precise amount of the damage, negligence may provide better incentives.²⁸ This is therefore an important conclusion for any environmental liability regime based on strict liability: it provides efficient incentives to companies only, if companies are exposed to the total damage caused by their activity under the strict liability regime.

2.5 Limits of environmental liability

Precisely there problems may arise as often polluters may not be exposed to liability for the environmental harm they have caused. A famous article by Shavell identifies difference between *ex ante* regulation of safety via government regulation and *ex post* liability rules.²⁹ He points at particular limits of the environmental liability regime, which are equally crucial for this study. He points at three groups of potential problems with liability rules.

2.5.1 Information asymmetry

A first problem with liability rules relates to information asymmetry. As was explained before, liability rules function on the basis of information available with either the judge (under negligence) or with the polluter (under strict liability) which enables them to set efficient care levels. However, in some cases there may an information advantage with the regulator. The regulator may in some cases acquire

²⁸ Cooter 1984, 1523.

²⁹ Shavell 1984.

the information at the least cost, compared to the market participants. For market participants the costs to engage themselves in research to find out optimal care standards can often be too high. The government can moreover generate economies of scale by doing the research for the entire market and passing on the acquired information via regulation.

2.5.2 Insolvency

A second problem relates to the already mentioned insolvency risk. If the potential damage is so high that it exceeds the wealth of the individual polluter, liability rules will not provide optimal incentives. The reason is that the costs of care are directly related to the magnitude of the expected damages. If the expected damages are much greater than the individual wealth of the polluter, the operator will only consider the accident as having a magnitude equal to its wealth. It will therefore, only take the care necessary to avoid an accident equal to its wealth, which can be lower than the optimal care.³⁰ This is an application of the general insight that the deterrent effect of environmental liability works only if the operator has assets to pay for the damages he causes. If the operator is protected against such liability, by insolvency the problem of underdeterrence arises.³¹

2.5.3 Missing liability litigation

A third group of limits of environmental liability relate to missing liability litigation. That relates to the fact that even though some activities can cause considerable environmental harm, a lawsuit to recover these damages may never be brought. If this were the case, there would of course be no deterrent effect of liability rules. There can be a number of reasons why a lawsuit is never brought, even though considerable damage has been caused.³²

A first problem is that the harm can be thinly spread among a number of victims. As a consequence, the damage incurred by every individual victim is so small that no victim has sufficient incentives to bring a suit, i.e. the costs of litigation may exceed the anticipated recoveries. This problem will in particular arise if damage is not caused to an individual, but to common property, such as surface waters or a forest. Individual victims may suffer from a problem of so-called rational apathy³³ as a result of which a lawsuit is not brought and the injurer can escape liability.

A second problem may relate to the long time-lapse that might have elapsed before the damage becomes apparent. It is sometimes referred to as latency. In this case, much of the necessary evidence may be either lost or not obtained. Another problem is that if the damage only manifest itself years after the activity the injurer might have gone out of business.

A third problem is that it is often hard to prove a causal link between an activity and a type of damage.³⁴ Often a victim will not recognise that the harm had been caused by a particular tort, but might think that their particular ailment, e.g. cancer, has another non-tortious origin. In addition, in some cases multiple injurers may be involved as a result of which there is uncertainty over which particular injurer caused the harm. This problem of causal uncertainty³⁵ may again imply that sometimes an injurer can escape environmental liability.³⁶

A fourth issue relates to the difficulties for victims in accessing justice. Access to justice is often costly, as a result of which also meritorious suits are in some cases not brought. Especially when victims of

³⁰ Shavell 1984, 360.

³¹ See generally Shavell 1986.

³² Shavell 1984, 363.

³³ Schäfer 2000.

³⁴ Wilde 2013, 74-97.

³⁵ Porat & Stein 2002.

³⁶ Liu 2013, 75-79.

environmental harm are risk averse, they may want to avoid the high upfront costs of a lawsuit and refrain from a liability claim, again entailing that the operator will not be held liable even though he did cause environmental harm.

2.6 Remedies

2.6.1 Regulation

In the literature several remedies have also been advanced to cure the limits of environmental liability, just discussed. One major remedy, although admittedly rather radical, is to primarily rely on an alternative to the liability system to provide incentives for prevention. That is the result of applying Shavell's criteria for safety regulation to environmental harm: as the government can often have better information on optimal technologies to reduce environmental harm, and as environmental liability may have a limited deterrent effect as a result of insolvency and since the chance of an environmental liability suit being brought is naturally very low, it has been argued that some form of government regulation of environmental pollution is necessary.³⁷ Liability rules alone cannot suffice to prevent environmental harm (or in other words to internalise the externality caused by pollution) as a result of which *ex ante* safety regulation may be necessary.³⁸ One can therefore notice that in practice *ex ante* safety regulation (consisting of licences, but also of environmental taxation and environmental criminal law) are in practice in most Member States (MS) the primary instrument to control environmental harm. Some studies have also generally attempted to examine the effectiveness of safety regulation in controlling environmental harm and demonstrated that the quality of the environment in North-America improved substantially as a result of regulatory efforts, not so much in response to legal action in tort.³⁹

2.6.2 But no exclusivity

Even though *ex ante* safety regulation may be the primary instrument to control environmental harm, this does not per se suggest that environmental liability should not be used any longer for its deterring and compensating functions. Regulation may have many weaknesses as well. Regulation is dependent upon enforcement, which may be weak. In addition, the influence of lobby groups on regulation can to some extent be overcome by combining safety regulation and liability rules. Safety regulation can also become outdated fast and often lacks flexibility. Environmental liability is more dynamic and flexible. For those reasons it is important that environmental liability supports safety regulation; this complementary role of environmental liability is crucial given the many weaknesses to which safety regulation can be exposed.⁴⁰ Tort law for environmental harm therefore has an important function to play as a response to regulatory failure.⁴¹

2.6.3 Need to improve environmental liability

Given the inherent weaknesses in safety regulation, the overview of the limits of environmental liability (provided in the previous section) should not only lead to an argument in favour of using safety regulation. It is at the same time of crucial importance to improve the functioning of environmental liability in order to enable liability rules to effectively provide incentives to prevent environmental harm where safety regulation may have too weak standards. Some of the mentioned limits of the liability system can indeed be overcome by improving environmental liability.

³⁷ Faure & Partain 2019, 189-190.

³⁸ Faure & Partain 2019, 189-190.

³⁹ Dewees 1992 and Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996.

⁴⁰ Faure 2014b.

⁴¹ So Wilde 2013, 170-172.

For example the insolvency risk which is inherent in any case of harm caused by companies (given the limited liability of corporations) can lead to remedies for the problem of limited liability (to be discussed in further detail in chapter 4). But some of the problems in material tort law, such as the difficulties related to latency and causal uncertainty can equally be remedied within liability law itself. Causal uncertainty could be overcome by applying a proportional liability rule as one can now increasingly see in many legal systems.⁴² Finally, problems related to access to justice and rational apathy (the so-called collective action problem) following from the widespread nature of environmental harm could be remedied by lowering the barriers to access justice (for example through contingency fee arrangements or third party funding) or by allowing for collective actions or standing by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who would act on behalf of the environment. Those procedural innovations will be discussed in further detail in chapter 7.

⁴² Spier & Haazen 2000, 146-147.

3 LIABILITY OF COMPANIES UNDER THE ELD

KEY FINDINGS

- The ELD developed from an environmental liability model presented in a Green Paper and a White Paper towards a regime of administrative liability and thus a hybrid regime.
- The ELD is based on the polluter-pays and the preventive principle.
- The scope of the ELD is limited to operators, to particular types of damage and in time.
- ELD liability applies to operators as defined in Article 2(6) of the ELD.
- Various previous studies found that Member States were late in implementing the ELD and that the number of cases applying the ELD in MS is relatively low.
- As there was insufficient awareness of the ELD among operators, the demand for insurance to cover ELD liabilities was low, but availability of insurance and financial cover is increasing.
- From a 2010 report by the European Commission it appears that 8 MS have introduced a system of mandatory financial security.
- A 2016 report by the Commission reports that some Member States (Hungary and Poland) have many reported cases, whereas 11 MS had no ELD cases whatsoever.
- Average remedial action costs were € 42.000, however, with a few outliers above € 50 million.
- Operators to a large extent collaborated with authorities in the remediation of polluted sites and fulfilling their ELD obligations.

3.1 Setting the scene

The central focus of this study is the liability of companies for environmental harm and the problems that may arise in that respect. But, although the topic is also analysed from a more general angle, there is, within the European context, a clear focus on Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage,⁴³ also referred to as the Environmental Liability Directive (abbreviated ELD). The question to be examined in this study is whether particular problems arise in making companies liable to fulfil their duties under the ELD, in other words, to respond to environmental harm via the environmental liability measures imposed via the ELD.

I will first briefly introduce the general approach taken in the ELD (3.2). This will necessarily be brief as one could (again) easily fill a complete study just with a legal analysis of the ELD itself.⁴⁴ I will just focus on the main provision in order to briefly recall the approach and working of the ELD. That will make clear which types of obligations can be imposed upon companies under the ELD. Next, more importantly, I will focus more clearly on the role of companies within the ELD (3.3). The ELD itself has given rise to an amazing amount of legal literature, but also studies commissioned by the European Commission. Again, many of those studies focus more generally, for example on the implementation of the ELD in the various Member States and on the effectiveness of the ELD. However, I will merely focus on those aspects of the studies that are of interest to this topic, the environmental liability of companies (3.4). Many of those studies have been commissioned by the European Commission as the

⁴³ OJ L 143, 30 April 2004.

⁴⁴ As has for example been done in the book of 360 pages by Bergkamp & Goldsmith 2013a.

basis or background for official reports issued by the European Commission on the basis of the ELD. Of course it is important to examine to what extent attention is paid to the specific position of companies within those official reports (3.5).

3.2 General approach of the ELD

3.2.1 Development

The ELD was adopted on 21 April 2004 but only after “a turbulent development process that lasted for more than 20 years”.⁴⁵ Starting point for EU interest in environmental liability was the accident at the industrial site in Seveso in Italy in 1976.⁴⁶ Various proposals were launched, *inter alia*, one dealing specifically with liability for damage caused by waste.⁴⁷ A subsequent important step was the Commission Green Paper on remedying environmental damage, published in response to a request by the Council.⁴⁸ The Green Paper outlined a broad civil liability regime covering environmental damage and presented the broad concepts upon which a European liability regime could rely.⁴⁹ The Green Paper provoked negative responses from industry groups and from some Member States that were generally against harmonisation of civil liability.⁵⁰ The next important step was the adoption in 2000 of a White Paper on environmental liability.⁵¹ The White Paper argued that an EU environmental liability regime was crucial to implement the key environmental principles of the Treaty, above all the polluter-pays-principle. If that would not be applied “either the environment remains un-restored or the state, and ultimately the tax payer, has to pay for it. Therefore, a first objective is making the polluter liable for the damage he has caused. If polluters need to pay for damage caused, they will cut back pollution up to the point where the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the compensation avoided. Thus, environmental liability results in prevention of damage and in internalisation of environmental costs”.⁵² This quote nicely shows that the White Paper is fully in line with the (economic) theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter: environmental liability is seen as an important tool to internalise the externality caused by environmental harm. The White Paper continued that it was expected that liability creates incentives for more responsible behaviour by firms. However, it also argued that “experience with the US Superfund legislation (liability for cleaning up contaminated sites) shows the need to avoid loopholes for circumventing liability by transferring hazardous activities to thinly capitalised firms which become insolvent in the event of significant damage. If firms can cover themselves against liability risk by way of insurance, they will not tend to resort to this perverse route”.⁵³ Again, one can notice that the White Paper recognises the danger of using the limited liability of the corporation to externalise harm,⁵⁴ as well as the need to remedy this through compulsory financial security.⁵⁵ The White Paper proposed contents-wise a civil liability system for traditional damage and an administrative law system for damage to biodiversity and the contamination of sites.⁵⁶ Again, the White Paper was subject to considerable criticism, especially focusing on the initiative to

⁴⁵ So De Smedt 2015, 168. For a detailed analysis of the history of the ELD, see also Cassotta 2012, 39-104.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Commission “Proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste”, COM(89) 282, amended by COM(91) 219. See further Van Calster & Reins 2013, 10.

⁴⁸ COM(1993) 47 final.

⁴⁹ De Smedt 2015, 168.

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

⁵¹ COM(2000) 66 final.

⁵² White Paper (COM(2000) 66 final), No. 3.1.

⁵³ White Paper (COM(2000) 66 final), No. 3.6.

⁵⁴ An issue which will be extensively dealt with in the next chapter.

⁵⁵ Again, a point I will equally stress below in section 4.6.

⁵⁶ See Liu 2013, 287-288.

harmonise environmental liability regulation.⁵⁷ As a result, the Commission changed its strategy in a 2001 Working Paper on prevention and restoration of significant environmental damage and chose for a public law regime to be enforced by competent authorities instead of a civil liability regime. As a result the ELD is, probably for historical reasons, still called an environmental *liability* Directive, although contents-wise it is not structured as a liability regime, but as an administrative law system imposing particular obligations of prevention and remediation upon operators to be enforced by administrative authorities.⁵⁸

3.2.2 Principles the ELD is based on

the polluter-pays and the preventive principle.⁵⁹ Recital 2 of the ELD makes clear that the prevention and remedying of environmental damage should be implemented through the furtherance of the polluter-pays-principle. "The fundamental principle of this Directive should therefore be that an operator whose activity has caused the environmental damage or the imminent threat of such damage is to be held financially liable". Recital 18 of the ELD continues that according to the polluter-pays-principle "An operator causing environmental damage or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, in principle, bear the cost of the necessary preventive or remedial measures". Article 1 of the ELD itself clearly states that "The purpose of this Directive is to establish a framework of environmental liability based on the polluter-pays-principle, to prevent and remedy environmental damage".

Both the polluter-pays and the preventive principle can be found in Article 191 TFEU and are considered pillars of European environmental policy.⁶⁰ Legal doctrine doubted whether the ELD would really provide incentives for developing preventive measures. It was doubted whether the costs of preventive research would not be higher than the costs of paying for the damage caused and it was equally argued that prevention could often be more effectively achieved through direct regulatory tools.⁶¹ This is in line with what I equally argued in chapter 2, being that *ex ante* safety regulation will often be the primary tool to control environmental harm. Environmental liability often plays a secondary role as far as prevention is concerned.⁶²

The question arose before the Court of Justice of the EU in the Fipa case⁶³ whether others than the polluter (more particularly new owners of plots of land) could be held liable for pollution costs, even though the contamination was not caused by them. The Court held that on the basis of the polluter-pays-principle incorporated in the ELD, only the responsible operator could be held liable when it was identifiable. The ELD can therefore not be extended to impose liability on the innocent owner who was not the polluter. However, De Sadeleer in a case note argues that Article 16 ELD provides Member States with the possibility to adopt more stringent provisions in relation to the prevention and remediation of environmental damage and that in practice in many Member States competent authorities also impose remedial measures on land owners rather than on the former polluters.⁶⁴

3.2.3 A hybrid regime

Within the current ELD there is a crucial role for public authorities. Article 5(1) imposes an obligation on an operator to take necessary preventive measures where environmental damage has not yet

⁵⁷ De Smedt 2015, 169.

⁵⁸ For a further analysis of the legal history of the ELD and especially for the influence of the various stakeholders in the lobbying process, see De Smedt 2007, 263-297.

⁵⁹ Van Calster & Reins 2013, 26-29; Jans & Vedder 2012, 383-384. See further on the goals and ambitions of the ELD, Cassotta 2012, 142-147.

⁶⁰ See De Sadeleer 2002, 27.

⁶¹ Van Calster & Reins 2013, 28.

⁶² So also Van Calster & Reins 2013, 28.

⁶³ Decision of 4 March 2015, C-534/13 in the case of Fipa Group and others.

⁶⁴ De Sadeleer 2015, 232-237.

occurred, but there is an imminent threat of such a damage occurring. When environmental damage has occurred Article 6(1) applies and the operator has to inform the competent authority of all relevant aspects and take practical steps to control the relevant contaminants and take the necessary remedial measures. It is the authority that can require the operator to take the necessary preventive and remedial measures.⁶⁵ According to Article 8(1), the operator shall bear the costs of the preventive and remedial actions taken pursuant to the Directive. The obligation to compensate for the costs (in other words the liability) is constructed in a complicated manner: for so-called Annex III-activities there is strict liability, whereas for all other occupational activities a fault/negligence regime applies.⁶⁶

The literature holds that the ELD therefore adopts a system of a more administrative nature, rather than a pure civil liability approach;⁶⁷ the ELD opted for a system of public liability with a competent authority being primarily responsible for making the environmental liability work in practice.⁶⁸ Although the ELD uses legal terms that are characteristic for civil liability, such as fault and strict liability, it is in essence a public or administrative law regime.⁶⁹ The liability regime is solely enforced by public authorities; private parties cannot bring any claim against a liable operator.⁷⁰ There is, however, no formal obligation for administrative authorities to take action against operators. The extent to which the goals of the ELD (implementing the polluter-pays and preventive principles) can be met, thus depends upon the action taken by administrative authorities. Jans and Vedder indicate that according to Article 8(2) the competent authority is obliged to recover the costs arising from preventive or remedial measures it has implemented itself.⁷¹ However, Article 8(2) continues that the competent authority may decide not to recover the full costs where the expenditure required to do so would be greater than the recoverable sum or where the operator cannot be identified. Jans and Vedder argue that the reference to cost effectiveness in this context is misplaced. Since environmental liability should have a preventive effect and implements the polluter-pays-principle "It is our opinion that the costs should always be recovered".⁷² However, there is no formal way to force the competent authority to take action. Natural persons or NGOs can on the basis of Article 12(1) of the ELD submit observations relating to environmental damage or an imminent threat to the competent authority and according to Article 13 there should be judicial review of the legality of decisions, acts or failure to act of the competent authority.

3.2.4 Scope of the ELD

The ELD has a particular limited scope which seriously limits the application of the Directive.

First, the personal scope is limited to operators. Operator according to Article 2(6) means "any natural or legal, private or public person who operates or controls the occupational activity or, whether this is provided for a national legislation, to whom decisive economic power of the technical functioning of such an activity has been delegated, including the holder of a permit or authorisation for such an activity or the person registering or notifying such an activity". Occupational activity is defined in Article 2(7) as "any activity carried out in the course of an economic activity, a business or an undertaking, irrespectively of its private or public, profit or non-profit character". As this concept is crucial to determine which companies fall under the scope of the ELD, I will discuss this aspect of the scope of the ELD in more detail in the next section.

⁶⁵ Jans & Vedder 2012, 387.

⁶⁶ Jans & Vedder 2012, 386.

⁶⁷ So Liu 2013, 219.

⁶⁸ So Jans & Vedder 2012, 387.

⁶⁹ So Brans 2013, 38.

⁷⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹ Jans & Vedder 2012, 388.

⁷² Ibidem.

The material scope of the ELD is limited by the definition in Article 2 of the ELD. Damage is defined in Article 2(2) as a “measurable adverse change in a natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural resource service which may occur directly or indirectly”.⁷³ Environmental damage means (a) damage to protected species and natural habitats which is according to Article 2(1) any damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining the favourable conservation status of such habitats or species. The significance of such effects is to be assessed with reference to the baseline condition, taking account of the criteria set out in Annex I. In addition, environmental damage also includes (b) water damage and (c) land damage. These three constituent parts are exhaustive. There is therefore only environmental damage in the sense of the Directive when it concerns damage to protected species and habitats, water damage and land damage within the specific (narrow) definitions of the ELD.⁷⁴

The third limitation in scope relates to the temporal scope: the ELD only applies on the basis of Article 17 to an emission, event or incident that took place after the date for implementing the Directive, i.e. 30 April 2007.⁷⁵ The ELD has, in other words, no retrospective effect,⁷⁶ which is equally in line with the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 as a retroactive application of liability could not provide any incentives for prevention.

The relatively narrowly defined scope of the ELD has, as a consequence, that in case of environmental harm unavoidably also other rules may be applicable to remedy the harm which does not fall within the scope of the ELD.⁷⁷

3.2.5 Exclusions

There are various exclusions in the ELD which should only be briefly mentioned as a detailed discussion would be beyond the scope of this study.⁷⁸ The exceptions can be briefly listed as follows:

The ELD is not applicable to:

- damage caused by an armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection;⁷⁹
- damage caused by a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character;⁸⁰
- damage covered by international conventions listed in Annex IV (regarding liability for and compensation of oil pollution damage);⁸¹
- nuclear risks;⁸²
- diffuse pollution;⁸³
- activities related to national defence or international security.⁸⁴

Liability is also excluded in case of:

- damage caused by a third party;⁸⁵

⁷³ See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013a, 55-57.

⁷⁴ See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013a, 57-62 and Jans & Vedder 2012, 384-385.

⁷⁵ Jans & Vedder 2012, 385-386.

⁷⁶ Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013a, 71-72.

⁷⁷ De Smedt 2007, 189.

⁷⁸ For a more detailed analysis of the exceptions and defenses under the ELD, see Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b.

⁷⁹ Article 4(1)(a) ELD. For further details see Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 81-82.

⁸⁰ Article 4(1)(b) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 82.

⁸¹ Article 4(2) ELD. See Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 82-83.

⁸² Article 4(4) ELD. See Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 83-84.

⁸³ Article 4(5) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 84-85.

⁸⁴ Article 4(6) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 85-86.

⁸⁵ Article 8(3)(a) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 87-88.

- compliance with a compulsory order or instruction.⁸⁶

In addition Member States have the possibility to allow the operator to invoke the following defences:

- the compliance with permit defence;⁸⁷
- the state of the art defence.⁸⁸

There are further issues which are certainly of importance related to the application of the ELD, but which remain further undiscussed here.⁸⁹ I will now focus on the issue, which is most important within the scope of this study, being how companies and their potential liability are viewed within the ELD.

3.3 Companies in the ELD

3.3.1 Central notion “operator”

As I already indicated Article 2(6) provides a definition of an operator as anyone who operates or controls “the occupational activity”.⁹⁰ That concept is defined in Article 2(7) as an activity carried out in the course of an economic activity, a business or an undertaking. Jans and Vedder indicate that this definition may be problematic with regard to public entities as they may not be involved in an economic activity. Their activities could well result in environmental damage, but they are outside the scope of the Directive.⁹¹ But there is no doubt that the companies that are central to this study are usually the operators under the ELD. But to be clear: the concept operator in Article 2(6) ELD is broad and therefore certainly not limited to legal entities. Also a natural person could be an operator in the sense of the ELD. The operator usually is the holder of the permit/authorisation related to the occupational activity that would be at the source of the environmental harm. However, the definition of operator is broader than that and therefore also not limited to the holder of a permit.⁹² But under the ELD there is no channelling of liability to any specific party. Anyone who therefore had a substantive contribution to the risk can be held liable under the ELD.⁹³ The definition of operator refers to the person who controls the operation, not (only) the actual operator. Bergkamp and Van Bergeijk argue that this could, at least in theory, also make claims possible not only against the actual operator, but also against a parent company. If that were the case, parent corporations would have a strong incentive to take all measures not to be deemed to be “controlling” the activities of the subsidiary. This may lead to a perverse incentive, for example to discontinue a corporate environmental and health programme and compliance auditing. The latter could be considered as an element of control and therefore lead to ELD liability of a parent corporation. Bergkamp and Van Bergeijk therefore argue that such an expansive interpretation of the concept of operator could lead to pervert incentives as the enforcement of corporate standards and the monitoring of actual compliance can obviously be in the public interest.⁹⁴ They argue that Member States are able to prevent those adverse effects by not treating parent companies and other affiliates as operators for purposes of ELD liability.

⁸⁶ Article 8(3)(b) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 88.

⁸⁷ Article 8(4)(a) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 91-92.

⁸⁸ Article 8(4)(b) ELD. See further Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013b, 92.

⁸⁹ For details see Jans & Vedder 2012, 383-390; De Smedt 2007, 188-195; Liu 2013, 287-293 and especially all contributions to Bergkamp & Goldsmith 2013a.

⁹⁰ Cassotta 2012, 147-148.

⁹¹ Jans & Vedder 2012, 384.

⁹² Liu 2013, 289.

⁹³ Ibidem.

⁹⁴ Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013a, 53.

3.3.2 Broadening the operator

They equally argue that the operator definition could be interpreted too broadly if it covers the person that has registered or notified the activity. That may be problematic to the extent that it may not be the person that actually controls the activity. And that could be the case if for example a chemical manufacturer would be exposed to liability for downstream damage caused by a chemical substance he produced.⁹⁵ Again, they argue that those types of broad interpretations should be avoided by Member States limiting the operator concept to only those entities that exercise effective control over the relevant part of the activity that caused the damage.⁹⁶

Interestingly, since the operator definition also covers natural persons and therefore not only corporations, in principle also a manager who directs a covered activity could be exposed to ELD liability.⁹⁷ The operator definition is therefore certainly a critical issue of the ELD regime. Some scholars, like Bergkamp and Van Bergeijk strongly argue against a broad interpretation, expanding ELD liability to parent companies, arguing that that may render the ELD regime ineffective in achieving environmental restoration.⁹⁸ They argue that such perverse side-effects could be prevented if national authorities consider as the operator primarily the holder of the permit for the specific activity that caused the damage, excluding in principle all others. Only when the operator definition would not correspond with the person effectively controlling the operation, that other person should be identified as the operator.⁹⁹ Others, however, have no difficulties in applying the operator definition broadly and in pleading in favour of parental liability for ELD obligations. Cassotta and Verdure argue that parent companies could perfectly fit into the definition of Article 2(6) of the ELD as they would control the professional activity involved.¹⁰⁰ They therefore argue in favour of a joint liability of a parent company and a subsidiary for ELD obligations. However, they argue that this would need a modification of the ELD as the current version of the ELD would not allow such a joint liability.¹⁰¹ Another solution they examine is to hold a parent company liable for the obligations of the subsidiary, in the line of similar developments in European competition law, where a parent company can be held liable for the fines incurred for competition law violations by a subsidiary based on a rebuttable presumption that the parent controlled the activities of the subsidiary.¹⁰² Whereas Bergkamp and Van Bergeijk seem to warn against such a parental liability for ELD obligations, Cassotta and Verdure see more benefits in such a solution. However, both seem to agree that such a joint liability of a parent company and a subsidiary would not fit within the current formulation of the ELD.

3.3.3 Evasive strategies?

In an interesting publication Bergkamp analyses how companies manage their ELD exposure.¹⁰³ Bergkamp argues that if the ELD applies and the operator is aware it does, regulatory evasion may occur if the operator is able to avoid the ELD's effective application and the related liabilities.¹⁰⁴ Virtually all companies are potentially subject to the ELD. Any company engaged in a commercial occupational activity is exposed to (fault) liability (if not listed in Annex III) for damages to natural resources arising

⁹⁵ Ibidem.

⁹⁶ Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk 2013a, 54.

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

⁹⁸ Ibidem.

⁹⁹ Ibidem. This argumentation is also developed by Bergkamp in another publication: Bergkamp 2016, 184-185.

¹⁰⁰ Cassotta & Verdure 2012, 242.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem.

¹⁰² Cassotta & Verdure 2012, 242-243. This potential solution will be discussed in the next chapter in section 4.5.3.

¹⁰³ Bergkamp 2016, 183-190. The same observations can also be found in Bergkamp & Goldsmith 2013b, 334-337.

¹⁰⁴ Bergkamp 2016, 186.

from its activity.¹⁰⁵ That implies that no company should ignore the ELD.¹⁰⁶ One consequence might indeed be that regulatory evasion might occur which may, more particularly arise in the context of corporate limited liability. In theory limited liability entities could be used to avoid liabilities under the ELD. That would effectively mean that the operator would create its own insolvency through limited liability of the corporation.¹⁰⁷ There is, however, so Bergkamp argues, no evidence that corporations are already pursuing this strategy to avoid effective ELD application and related liabilities.¹⁰⁸ Recall, however, that in the White Paper it was suggested that the ELD might cause corporations to spin off risky operations into separate legal entities.¹⁰⁹ However, there are ways of controlling abuses of limited liability.¹¹⁰ The EU legislator has not attempted to address the use of limited liability companies, but rather focuses on financial security as a means to address problems of insolvency.¹¹¹ Bergkamp concludes that there is little evidence of companies using limited liability to avoid excessive exposure under the ELD. To the extent that limited liability is used to avoid ELD liabilities, there is according to Bergkamp reason to believe it is less likely to be deployed by corporate groups.¹¹²

Summarizing, according to Bergkamp, there is under the ELD no room for imposing parent company liability. Parent company liability would only be possible if legislation would be introduced holding the parent to be an operator of the activities of its subsidiary.¹¹³ However, Bergkamp is not in favour of that solution and rather pleads in favour of mandatory financial security.¹¹⁴

3.4 Previous studies

As I already mentioned there has been a plethora of studies contracted by the European Commission concerning the implementation and working of the ELD. Many of those studies contain interesting information *inter alia* on the implementation of the ELD within the Member States, particular problems that arose during the implementation stage and the application of the ELD in practice. I will review some of those studies in the light of the central focus of this study, being the environmental liability of companies. In that respect I will especially pay attention to the issues discussed previously, being if there is a likelihood that companies may escape ELD liability through their limited liability or through insolvency. I will examine to what extent those particular issues are addressed in some of the studies that were performed.

3.4.1 Financial security. BIO. 2008

A first report to be mentioned is produced by BIO in August 2008 and deals with financial security in the Environmental Liability Directive. Article 14(1) of the ELD provides that Member States shall take measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with the aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under the ELD. Article 14(2) obliges the Commission to present a report on the effectiveness of the Directive in terms of actual remediation of environmental damages, on the availability at reasonable costs and on conditions of insurance and other types of financial security before 30 April 2010. It is in the light of

¹⁰⁵ Bergkamp & Goldsmith 2013b, 334.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷ Bergkamp 2016, 186.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁹ White Paper (COM(2000) 66 final), No. 3.6.

¹¹⁰ Bergkamp 2016, 186 and Bergkamp & Pak 2001, 167-188. The potential remedies against abuses of limited liability will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter in section 4.2 and following.

¹¹¹ So Bergkamp 2016, 186.

¹¹² Bergkamp 2016, 187 and Bergkamp & Goldsmith 2013b, 336-337.

¹¹³ Bergkamp 2016, 189.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem.

that reporting obligation that this report by BIO was drafted.¹¹⁵ The report mentions that at that moment (August 2008) a compulsory financial security system had been chosen by six Member States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Spain). Some operators in particular Member States have the possibility to choose among different mechanisms to cover their risk. Consequently, the introduction of a mandatory financial security scheme would not only have to rely on insurance products, but could also make use of other forms of financial security, such as bank bonds and asset deposits.¹¹⁶ The report concludes in favour of a compulsory financial security, arguing that it would promote a faster development and penetration of insurance products and other forms of financial security instruments.¹¹⁷ However, the report equally argued that there is little awareness of the ELD among operators as a result of which they do not demand products to cover their environmental risks.¹¹⁸

3.4.2 Implementation effectiveness. BIO – Stevens & Bolton. 2009

A next report is from November 2009 and drafted by BIO in association with Stevens & Bolton and deals with the implementation effectiveness of the Environmental Liability Directive and related financial issues.¹¹⁹ This report provides an overview of the ELD cases, which have occurred since 30 April 2007 in the Member States and that are publicly available. It became clear to the researchers that ELD cases remained rare.¹²⁰ They report on a few cases from various Member States, but given the low number of actual and potential ELD cases and the little information available on each case, they can only reach preliminary conclusions. They noticed inter alia that there is a potential for the ELD to miss out on large polluting incidents, if these are not caused by activities under legislation in Annex III.¹²¹ As far as operators are concerned, this report again argues that they are being largely unaware of the ELD. And to the extent that operators are aware they generally do not believe that their environmental risks have changed as a result of the implementation. The majority of operators cover their environmental risks through insurance products and believe (according to the researchers perhaps incorrectly) that their environmental liabilities are sufficiently covered by these.¹²² The researchers formulate several recommendations to increase the awareness of operators of the ELD and recommend especially to provide operators with information on financial security products for ELD liabilities.¹²³ The researchers also argue that both MS authorities as well as operators strongly focus on insurance to cover ELD-related liabilities. Often stakeholders are not even aware of the availability of other instruments.¹²⁴

3.4.3 Implementation challenges. BIO – Stevens & Bolton. 2013

A third report jointly produced by BIO and Stevens & Bolton is from May 2013 and deals with the implementation challenges and obstacles related to the ELD.¹²⁵ This report pays in a detailed way

¹¹⁵ European Commission, Service Contract 070307/2007/485399/G1, BIO Intelligence Service, Final Report on Financial Security in Environmental Liability Directive, August 2008. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/eld_report.pdf.

¹¹⁶ BIO 2008, 107.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹¹⁸ BIO 2008, 108-109.

¹¹⁹ BIO & Stevens & Bolton, Contract 070307/2008/516353/ETU/G.1, Final Report November 2009, European Commission DG ENV, Study on the implementation effectiveness of the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and related financial security issues. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/others/pdf/implementation_efficiency.pdf.

¹²⁰ BIO 2009, 81.

¹²¹ BIO 2009, 87.

¹²² BIO 2009, 91.

¹²³ BIO 2009, 92-93.

¹²⁴ BIO 2009, 94.

¹²⁵ BIO Intelligence Services & Stevens & Bolton LLP, Implementation Challenges and Obstacles of the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD), Final Report, European Commission-DG-ENV, 16 May 2013, contract No. 07.0307/2012/623289/ETU/A.1. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/liability/eld/eldimplement/pdf/ELD%20implementation_Final%20report.pdf.

attention to the integration of the ELD into existing national legal frameworks. It also has an overview of the level of application of the ELD regime in seven Member States that were studied (Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom). The conclusion is that to date there are only very few cases of environmental damage for which the ELD regime has been applied. Moreover, in the majority of the cases it was not possible to apply the ELD regime because of specific legal issues (such as the impossibility to show that the damage exceeded the significant threshold set by the ELD regime or that the specific activities were not included in Annex III). As a result, in several cases the pre-existing legal frameworks in the Member States were used rather than the ELD.¹²⁶ The report also mentions that “the relationships between the business sector and public institutions, and the level of lobbying of the business sector can contribute (or not) to encouraging authorities to apply the ELD regime”.¹²⁷ For the case of Spain it is argued that there is no adequate correspondence between environmental risks and existing financial instruments. The French Federation of Insurance and the German Insurers Association argue that it is an advantage not to have mandatory financial instruments as it permits the insurance market to develop on a free basis, thereby allowing more flexibility. These stakeholders therefore argue that “the ELD should not impose mandatory financial security, but the market for ELD insurance should be allowed to develop on its own”.¹²⁸ In the recommendations various tools to promote the taking out of ELD insurance policies are suggested and again, the importance of rising awareness about the ELD is mentioned.¹²⁹ Annex Part B provides an overview of cases of environmental damage treated under the ELD and under national legislation.¹³⁰ The Annex provides an interesting overview of the (relatively few) cases where the ELD was applied. Some cases were apparently of relatively minor (financial) importance, as a result of which the operator cooperated throughout the implementation. This is for example the case for a UK incident, where the costs of the primary remediation measures were £ 41.000 and the estimated costs of the compensatory remediation was £ 39.000.¹³¹

Also, a French case which was dealt under national legislation because the conditions of the ELD were not met, was one where the liable party (SPSE) cooperated and accepted to bear all costs. The overall costs of remediation pursuant to a prefectural order were estimated at € 6.562.000, but the global costs for the site clean-up and repair of the pipeline that was at the origin of the damage were evaluated at around € 48.000.000. In that case the operator paid for the compensation and the costs were covered by insurance.¹³²

The same was the case for an harbour spill in the United Kingdom treated under national legislation where the costs were paid by the operator and the operator cooperated.¹³³ The same was the case with a contamination of the river Alz in Germany, purely treated under national legislation, causing an estimated cost of approximately € 3.000.000 where the operators again cooperated with the authorities and other stakeholders.¹³⁴

¹²⁶ BIO 2013a, 96-97.

¹²⁷ BIO 2013a, 134.

¹²⁸ Ibidem.

¹²⁹ BIO 2013a, 139.

¹³⁰ BIO Intelligence Services & Stevens & Bolton LLP, Implementation Challenges and Obstacles of the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD), Annex-Part B, 16 May 2013b.

¹³¹ BIO 2013b, 13-16.

¹³² BIO 2013b, 17-23.

¹³³ BIO 2013b, 25-29.

¹³⁴ BIO 2013b, 31-33.

3.4.4 Integrating the ELD. Stevens & Bolton. 2013

A December 2013 report by Stevens & Bolton provides a study on the integration of the ELD into eleven national legal frameworks.¹³⁵ The report mentions that the number of ELD incidents is especially high in Hungary and Poland, whereas some Member States (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia) did not have one single ELD incident so far. The number of ELD incidents in other Member States varied from 1 and 10 to between 10 and 20.¹³⁶ The report also presents a survey of members of the Federation of European Risk-Management Associations which showed that 52% of the companies surveyed had obtained insurance or other financial security for ELD and other environmental risks. However, the companies surveyed were large companies: of the 89 respondents, 72% had 1.000 or more employees, 41% had 5.000 employees or more.¹³⁷ The study also provides an interesting overview of the definition of operators under legislation transposing the ELD.¹³⁸ Although some Member States have a very broad definition of operator, most Member States choose a definition which is essentially equivalent to the ELD.¹³⁹ This is obviously of importance for the questions discussed in the previous section on the possibility to enlarge the definition of operator to include for example also parent companies. Most Member States apparently did not use the possibility of such an enlarged definition.

3.4.5 ELD effectiveness. BIO – Stevens & Bolton. 2014

A next report to be mentioned is a study by BIO and Stevens & Bolton of February 2014 on the ELD effectiveness: scope and exceptions.¹⁴⁰ This report analyses the scope of strict liability, of environmental damage, significance, thresholds and the application of permit and state of the art defences in the various Member States. The report also analyses the application of the international conventions and instruments listed in Annexes IV and V of the ELD and analyses the possibility to incorporate other international instruments into Annexes IV or V. The notion of operator is not explicitly addressed, as a result of which this interesting report is less relevant for this study. However, the report does examine the scope of strict liability as well as potential extensions of ELD liabilities in view of the potential effects of those extensions on financial security. The report recommends that the European Commission should take into account concerns expressed by some stakeholders regarding the additional financial burden which an extension of the scope of strict liability would represent for operators through, potentially, an increase in insurance premiums for those operators who have taken out environmental liability insurance.¹⁴¹ Therefore the report equally recommends that any extension of environmental liability and any revision of the ELD would need to consider the implications on insurance and other financial security instruments.¹⁴²

¹³⁵ Stevens & Bolton, Study on analysis of integrating the ELD into 11 national legal frameworks, 16 December 2013, ENV.A.1/ETU/2013/AresNo1258127. Available at: <https://op.europa.eu/nl/publication-detail/-/publication/a00dc4f9-876e-409d-9bd2-98378f817e14>.

¹³⁶ Stevens & Bolton 2013, 5-6.

¹³⁷ Stevens & Bolton 2013, 7.

¹³⁸ Stevens & Bolton 2013, 69-70.

¹³⁹ Stevens & Bolton 2013, 69-71.

¹⁴⁰ BIO & Stevens & Bolton, Study on ELD effectiveness: scope and exceptions, final report, 19 February 2014, ENV/A.1/ETU/2013/0038r1. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/BIO%20ELD%20Effectiveness_report.pdf.

¹⁴¹ BIO 2014, 258.

¹⁴² BIO 2014, 259.

3.4.6 ELD biodiversity damage. Milieu and IUCN. 2014

A final report to be mentioned in this respect concerns a study by Milieu and the IUCN of February 2014 concerning the experience gained in the application of ELD biodiversity damage.¹⁴³ The main goal of the report is to analyse the implementation of the ELD concerning biodiversity damage. It has an interesting overview of case studies, although the case studies merely concern a discussion of specific topics and not really incidents to which the ELD would be applied as the reader might expect.¹⁴⁴ One of the “case studies” deals with insurance and financial securities and mentions that only eight Member States have opted for mandatory financial security. The report recommends that a further analysis and exchange of information should be ensured in order to determine whether a harmonised mandatory financial security regime is needed and which obstacles are encountered in that respect by Member States.¹⁴⁵ The same recommendation is repeated in the conclusions to the report.¹⁴⁶

3.5 Official reports

Many of the reports concerning the implementation and the effectiveness of the ELD that were discussed in the previous section were commissioned by the European Commission to enable the Commission to draft the official reports that the Commission was supposed to present on the basis of the ELD itself. Not surprisingly the reports presented by the Commission are therefore largely in line with the findings from the studies presented in the previous section.

3.5.1 Effectiveness of the ELD. 2010

A first report is of 12 October 2010¹⁴⁷ and is in execution of Article 14(2) of the ELD, which was already mentioned. The Article obliged the Commission to present a report on the effectiveness of the ELD in terms of actual remediation of environmental damages, on the availability at reasonable costs on the conditions of insurance and other types of financial security. The Article explicitly mentions: “The report shall also consider in the relation to financial security the following aspects: a gradual approach, a ceiling for the financial guarantee and the exclusion of low-risk activities. In the light of that report, and of an extended impact assessment, including a cost-benefit analysis, the Commission shall, if appropriate, submit proposals for a system of harmonised mandatory financial security”.

The report from the Commission obviously bases itself on the earlier studies and mentions *inter alia* that the transposition of the ELD remained slow, as a result of which the Commission had to start infringement procedures against 23 Member States.¹⁴⁸ The Commission also notices that the framework character of the Directive resulted in a broad divergence on several key implementing provisions among the Member States. Interesting for this study is that the report mentions: “Another key definition, that of ‘operator’ was extended by all but one of the Member States, with some opting to give this definition a particularly broad scope (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden)”.¹⁴⁹

This is a rather surprising statement as the report that analysed this provided a table concerning the notion of operator from which it appeared that most Member States in fact literally copied the

¹⁴³ Milieu & IUCN, *Experience gained in the application of ELD biodiversity damage. Final report*, February 2014, ISBN 978-92-79-35535-6. Available at: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/95433298-9437-42b9-b1dc-668ed7294d8e>.

¹⁴⁴ Milieu 2014, 22-40.

¹⁴⁵ Milieu 2014, 40.

¹⁴⁶ Milieu 2014, 95-96.

¹⁴⁷ COM(2010) 581 final.

¹⁴⁸ COM(2010) 581 fCOMinal.

¹⁴⁹ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 4.

definition from the ELD itself.¹⁵⁰ It is therefore not totally clear what the basis is for this argument that the definition of operator would have been extended by "all but one of the Member States".

The report repeats that eight Member States have introduced a system of mandatory financial security up to 2014 (Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania).¹⁵¹ There is also only a limited number of cases treated by the competent authorities. At the beginning of 2010 only 16 cases were identified, with an estimate that the total number of ELD cases across the EU would be around 50. The report blames this on the slow transposition of the ELD¹⁵² and on the limited knowledge of the ELD by operators.¹⁵³ The Commission therefore concludes that there is insufficient data to draw reliable conclusions on the effectiveness of the Directive in terms of actual remediation of environmental damage.¹⁵⁴

The report also holds: "Despite awareness-rising efforts, business and particularly those industry sectors more susceptible to risks and damage falling under the ELD (Annex III operators) are generally not aware of the ELD provisions. This applies in particular to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Interviews with operators in the second half of 2009 showed that the majority had not yet adapted their insurance policies to cover the ELD extended liabilities, while some were not even aware of its entry into force.

A report from Business pointed out the need to examine all options available to provide financial security and suggested that Member States work on improving the national environmental liability regimes in place".¹⁵⁵

Regarding specifically the financial security for the ELD the report provides an overview of the available coverage in various Member States, but concludes that it is at present difficult to assess whether the current capacity of the (re)insurance industry is large enough to cover ELD liabilities efficiently.¹⁵⁶ The general focus to cover ELD liabilities is still on insurance products although a range of alternatives exists.¹⁵⁷ The Commission addresses explicitly the need for a harmonised mandatory financial security system at EU level. Given that the transposition of the ELD resulted in divergent implementation rules, that the Member States opting for mandatory financial security do not yet have their systems in place, so that mandatory approaches cannot be evaluated yet and that more financial security products are becoming available, the Commission holds that it is premature to propose mandatory financial security at EU level.¹⁵⁸

An interesting point is that the Commission discusses the possibility to exclude low-risk activities from the mandatory financial security scheme based on a risk assessment of the potential environmental damage. Low-risk activities are also considered those where companies have an EMAS or ISO environmental management system in place (that is apparently the case in mandatory systems in Spain and the Czech Republic). The Commission rightly argues that this might be disputable as other factors may play a more significant role in determining the operator's actual environmental risk, such as the nature of the activity and its location.¹⁵⁹ Also stakeholders considered excluding operators on the

¹⁵⁰ BIO & Stevens & Bolton 2013b, Table 7, p. 70-71.

¹⁵¹ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 4

¹⁵² COM(2010) 581 final, p. 4.

¹⁵³ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 5.

¹⁵⁴ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 6.

¹⁵⁵ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 6.

¹⁵⁶ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 8.

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁹ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 9.

grounds that their activities are perceived as low-risk to be controversial as those activities could in reality still cause significant environmental damage.¹⁶⁰

The report concludes that since the ELD transposition was only finalised on 1 July 2010, the available information does not yet allow for concrete conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of the Directive in remedying environmental damage. There is simply too little practical experience available.¹⁶¹ The report also takes over various recommendations from the studies carried out for the Commission to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the Directive. Regarding companies it is suggested that the competent authorities should continue to promote awareness of individual operators and financial security providers through awareness-raising actions.¹⁶² Regarding financial security the Commission concludes that there is not yet sufficient justification for introducing a harmonised system of financial security.¹⁶³

This report has also been commented upon and discussed in the literature whereby the authors mostly stress the fact that implementation was apparently difficult as only three Member States (Italy, Lithuania and Latvia) met the transposition deadline of 30 April 2007.¹⁶⁴ Implementation of the ELD therefore proved to be difficult.¹⁶⁵ Also the fact that the general awareness of the ELD is low especially with SMEs and that only very few cases concerning the ELD reached the court is highlighted in the literature.¹⁶⁶

3.5.2 REFIT report 2016

A next report dates from 14 April 2016 and is based on Article 18(2) of the ELD, which obliged the Commission to submit a report (before 30 April 2014) which shall include any appropriate proposals for amendment.¹⁶⁷ The report was delayed *inter alia* due to the late submission of the Member States national reports and due to the decision to include a regulatory fitness and performance (REFIT) evaluation of the Directive.¹⁶⁸ The 2016 report (in the literature referred to as the REFIT evaluation report)¹⁶⁹ mentions that between April 2007 and April 2013, 1.245 confirmed incidents of environmental damage took place, which triggered the application of the ELD.¹⁷⁰ But the number of cases varied greatly between the Member States: more than 86% of all reported cases came from two Member States: 563 from Hungary and 506 from Poland.¹⁷¹ Eleven Member States reported no ELD damage incidents since 2007, possibly because they dealt with the cases exclusively under their national system. The dangerous occupational activities (to which strict liability applies) mostly concern waste management activities and to some extent treating dangerous substances and activities under the Industrial Emissions Directive.¹⁷² The available evidence indicates that the costs of remedial action averages around € 42.000. There are, however, a few outliers to more than € 50.000.000 for large-scale

¹⁶⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁶¹ Ibidem.

¹⁶² COM(2010) 581 final, p. 10.

¹⁶³ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁴ Liu 2013, 290.

¹⁶⁵ Jans & Vedder 2012, 383.

¹⁶⁶ Liu 2013, 291.

¹⁶⁷ Article 18(3) ELD provides a more detailed account of what the report should specifically contain.

¹⁶⁸ De Smedt 2016. Technically I should mention that in addition to this Commission Report of 14 April 2016 (COM(2016) 204 final) on the same date there was equally a Commission Staff Working Document issued with a REFIT evaluation of the ELD (SWD(2016) 121 final). But most of the conclusions of the REFIT-study were incorporated in the Commission Report; that is why I suffice here with discussing the Commission Report rather than the Staff Working Document.

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁰ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 3.

¹⁷¹ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 3; see also De Smedt 2016, 7.

¹⁷² COM(2016) 204 final, p. 4.

losses due to major accidents (such as in the Kolontár case in Hungary or the Moerdijk case in the Netherlands).¹⁷³

More insurance products would be available and more environmental liability insurance would be purchased by European companies, but the report concludes “Despite progress in financial security developments, problems persist regarding the application of the Directive to large-scale accidents and insolvency among liable economic operators”.¹⁷⁴ As one of the major challenges the report again mentions the lack of awareness and information of stakeholders on the ELD, but on the positive side the report holds that industry and other stakeholders contributing to the evaluation are largely satisfied with the current legal framework.¹⁷⁵

Comments from the literature on this report stress the significant variations between the Member States¹⁷⁶ and also discuss again the topic of mandatory financial security. In a REFIT evaluation report, the Commission states that the situation has changed in the period from 2010 (where the previous report was presented) to 2016 in the sense that more products are now available on the insurance market to cover ELD liability.¹⁷⁷ Given the steady upward trend in the offer of insurance across the entire EU it is held that the case for the introduction of a harmonised financial security instrument is still weak and that the adoption of tailor-made solutions at the national level are the better solution.¹⁷⁸

3.5.3 MAWP

Another document to be mentioned is the Multi-annual ELD Work Programme (MAWP) for the period 2017-2020 “making the Environmental Liability Directive more fit for purpose” issued on 28 February 2017.¹⁷⁹ This MAWP contains ideas on how to develop the ELD in the light of the REFIT evaluation. The conclusion from REFIT was that the ELD is working, but to a much lower extent compared to the original expectations and with a great variation between Member States.¹⁸⁰ One of the key activities suggested in the MAWP is to promote the availability of financial security for ELD liabilities across the EU.¹⁸¹ The baseline according to the Commission is the largely sufficient availability of financial security products for ELD liabilities, but a demand that is sufficiently lagging behind.¹⁸² The Commission more particularly mentions the need to take a closer look at liability cases involving bankruptcy and unknown operators.¹⁸³ The European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) launched a project on financial provisions in 2016 and the Commission suggests to cooperate with the IMPEL project and then to investigate more systematically with the possible help of external studies the situation with regard to the demand for insurance and sufficiency of financial security.¹⁸⁴ The crucial question for such a possible future IMPEL project is whether financial security for ELD liabilities is available at reasonable costs in all EU Member States to cover all types of environmental damages, in particular also major accidents and bigger losses.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷³ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 5.

¹⁷⁴ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 6.

¹⁷⁵ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 9.

¹⁷⁶ De Smedt 2016, 9.

¹⁷⁷ De Smedt 2016, 13.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁹ European Commission, Multi-Annual ELD Working Programme (MAWP) for the period 2017-2020, “Making the Environmental Liability Directive more fit for purpose”, version 28/02/2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mawp_2017_2020_1_en_0.pdf.

¹⁸⁰ European Commission 2017, 3.

¹⁸¹ European Commission 2017, 8.

¹⁸² European Commission 2017, 12.

¹⁸³ European Commission 2017, 13.

¹⁸⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁸⁵ European Commission 2017, 14.

3.6 Concluding

Companies play an important role in the system of the ELD as they will often be the operators upon whom the specific ELD obligations are imposed. Given the administrative nature of the ELD there is a crucial role for administrative authorities to take the initiative, but the obligations to prevent and remedy environmental harm as defined in the ELD will ultimately lay with operators.

There has been a question in the literature whether the concept of operator in the ELD could be interpreted in a broad way to include for example also parent companies. Some seem to welcome such an expansion, whereas others point at potentially pervert effects as parent companies may then take measures to avoid controlling subsidiaries (for example via internal compliance mechanisms) whereas that could precisely promote environmental performance within the subsidiaries. The White Paper preceding the ELD was aware of the fact that operators will often be corporations which raises the question whether there is a danger to spin off hazardous activities to thinly capitalised corporations, thus creating an insolvency risk.¹⁸⁶ To deal with that insolvency risk, the ELD encourages Member States to develop financial security instruments as there was at the time no consensus to introduce mandatory financial security.¹⁸⁷

The various studies drafted on behalf of the European Commission and those issued by the European Commission itself stress that the ELD has not been widely applied in practice, mainly due to a low awareness. That low awareness among companies may also explain a relatively low demand to cover ELD related liabilities. The most recent ELD report stresses that the availability of insurance and other financial security products has spectacularly increased as a result of which the Commission still prefers to promote a gradual development of insurance and financial security markets rather than mandatorily imposing financial security for ELD obligations.

The few cases presented in the various reports show that to a large extent operators did collaborate with authorities in the remediation of polluted sites and in fulfilling their ELD obligations. The average costs of liabilities mentioned in the last EU Commission ELD report was also not of that magnitude that companies would not be able to meet those amounts. However, problems may arise in the case of catastrophic events where environmental harm causes large losses and may equally create insolvency. That insolvency is then often related to the limited liability of the corporation, which will therefore be addressed in further detail in the next chapter. The extent to which insolvency risks are real, is obviously an empirical matter which is difficult to assess given the relatively small number of ELD cases so far. Some of the cases will be reviewed in chapter 8.

¹⁸⁶ White Paper (COM(2000) 66 final), No. 3.6.

¹⁸⁷ Article 14(1) ELD: Member States shall take measures to encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with the aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under this Directive.

4 LIMITED LIABILITIES AND ITS REMEDIES

KEY FINDINGS

- Limited liability is considered the backbone of corporate law, facilitating diversification of portfolios and the development of capital markets.
- However, limited liability has the disadvantage that it may lead to externalisation of risks to involuntary creditors, more particularly tort victims, such as the environment.
- Many examples also illustrate that the limited liability of the corporation is used to reduce risk of third party liability in tort.
- Minimum capital requirements are not a very attractive remedy as they are not very flexible, lead to high enforcement costs and may be ineffective in protecting involuntary creditors.
- Pro rata unlimited shareholder liability could be an attractive remedy, but has so far not received a lot of support.
- Many legal systems allow under particular conditions a piercing of the corporate veil, although there are important differences in that respect between the Member States.
- Some Member States have specific forms of veil piercing like enterprise or parental liability.
- An alternative remedy (outside of the scope of corporate law) would be the imposition of compulsory solvency guarantees.
- Provided that this is imposed via guidelines in a flexible manner, allowing a wide variety of different instruments to be used and adapted to the specific risks posed by the activity and the operator, mandatory financial securities are, of all options studied, the preferred remedy for the insolvency risk created by the limited liability of corporate entities.

4.1 Relevance

The previous chapter dealing with the ELD made clear that obligations related to environmental liability under the ELD are imposed upon operators, but that in many cases those operators will be companies. In the theoretical framework of chapter 2 I already discussed that an important limit of any environmental liability system is the potential insolvency of the defendant.¹⁸⁸ Insolvency arises from the moment that the total environmental damage is larger than the assets of the operator. In that particular case the operator is referred to as “judgment proof”¹⁸⁹ referring to the fact that a judgment forcing the polluter to compensate the harm cannot affect him as the operator may simply be unable to pay the (full amount of the) damage. Insolvency obviously has as problematic consequence that victims will not be compensated and that the environmental harm will not be restored as envisaged in the ELD. Moreover, I already indicated that insolvency can also lead to underdeterrence, i.e. lacking incentives to prevent environmental harm. That effect is, so I argued, stronger under strict liability than under negligence.¹⁹⁰ Since the ELD introduced strict liability for most cases of environmental harm, insolvency can therefore seriously undermine the deterrent effect of the ELD.

¹⁸⁸ *Supra* section 2.5.2.

¹⁸⁹ See Shavell 1986.

¹⁹⁰ *Supra* 2.4.3.

Insolvency may be a problem irrespective of who the particular defendant is, a natural person or a legal entity. Also natural persons may have limited assets and can cause environmental damage larger than their personal wealth. The problem is, however, even more serious in the case of companies, as they benefit in many legal systems (if they are incorporated) from a limited liability. That simply means that shareholders having contributed assets to the corporation can only lose the value of their shares, but nothing more than that.¹⁹¹ As a consequence, when a corporation causes environmental harm of a larger magnitude than the total assets of the corporation, bankruptcy could follow and tort victims can in principle not call upon individual shareholders to recover their losses. Given the limited liability of the corporation and the fact that corporations often engage in the type of ultra-hazardous activities that can give rise to ELD liability, insolvency is a realistic problem. Moreover, there is not only the risk that a corporation may accidentally cause environmental harm of a magnitude beyond its assets and thus face insolvency; in fact, there is even a risk that the corporate form is (ab)used to put ultra-hazardous activities into separate legal entities as a result of which the firm in fact organises its own insolvency. The increased liabilities imposed upon companies as a result of the introduction of the ELD could lead to regulatory evasion. And one way to evade liabilities is to use corporate limited liability.¹⁹² Recall in this respect that in the theoretical framework it was held that externalisation of harm is a “natural” phenomenon in the sense that when companies have the possibility to maximise profits by reducing costs, they will not refrain from doing so. Using the corporate structure to externalise harm to society is such a technique to minimise costs.

This danger of limited liability has been widely recognised and discussed in the corporate literature. Again, many volumes have been filled just discussing this issue. Within the framework of this study I will limit myself to point at the main issues raised in the literature, explaining what the basic justification is for limited liability (4.2) and then discussing several remedies that have been advanced, like minimum capital requirements (4.3), unlimited shareholder liability (4.4), enterprise liability (4.5) and compulsory solvency guarantees (4.6). The first three remedies all fit within the corporate law framework; the last one leaves the corporate law framework basically untouched, but looks for a solution within liability and insurance by mandating the corporation to provide a guarantee to cover its environmental liability. An evaluation of the various remedies will conclude the chapter (4.7).

4.2 Limited liability

4.2.1 History and ratio of limited liability

Limited liability has certainly not always existed. Even though some already trace back limited liability to ancient Rome¹⁹³ some contractual forms of limited liability emerged in the Middle Ages concerning international shipping ventures.¹⁹⁴ However, until 1850 the general rule was that shareholders would face joint and several unlimited liability.¹⁹⁵ There was a lot of discussion concerning the desirability of limited liability and its introduction was very much debated.¹⁹⁶ It was only by the 1850s that a company's Act in England introduced limited liability¹⁹⁷ and around that time several states in the US also started introducing limited liability.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ Kraakman et al. 2009, 9-11.

¹⁹² Bergkamp 2016, 186.

¹⁹³ Dari-Mattiacci et al. 2017, 193-236.

¹⁹⁴ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 7-8.

¹⁹⁵ Halbern 1998, 582.

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁷ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 7.

¹⁹⁸ Halbern 1998, 582.

Posner explains the ratio of limited liability by showing first of all that the corporation is a method of solving problems encountered in raising substantial amounts of capital.¹⁹⁹ The disadvantage of a partnership is that it can be easily dissolved and is automatically dissolved in case of the death of any partner. Moreover, each partner is personally liable without any limit which excludes the possibility for a mere partnership to raise capital from investors. The major advantage of the corporation is that it has perpetual existence and that shareholders liability for corporate debts is limited to the value of his shares. This has the major advantage that passive investment becomes possible as equity interests in a corporation can be broken up into shares of relatively small value, which can be traded in organised markets. The corporate form therefore enables an investor to make small equity investments and to reduce risk through diversification. The shareholder may have little information about the business in which he has invested. Without limited liability a shareholder would have high costs of monitoring the managers in every corporation in which he invests. Moreover, unlimited joint and several liability of all shareholders for corporate debts would equally force all shareholders to monitor each other as well. Without limited liability, transfer of shares would not be possible either, for example if the shareholder would sell his share to an insolvent person, thus increasing the insolvency risk.²⁰⁰ Limiting the liability of a shareholder to its investment was therefore crucial in order to make passive investment possible. Shareholders no longer needed to have detailed information on the performance of the particular firm in which they would invest (in order to reduce their risk). By simply diversifying their portfolio (buying shares from many different companies) they could diversify and reduce their investment risk. Limited liability also implied that the specific qualities of the shareholder (very poor or rich) became irrelevant. Limited liability allowed passive, anonymous investment and thus facilitated raising capital for corporations. A major advantage of limited liability is that it can be used to partition investor assets into distinct pools. Limited liability permits firms to isolate different business lines or ventures for purposes of obtaining credit by separately incorporating them.²⁰¹

Compared to unlimited liability with joint and several liability, limited liability has many advantages for investors. It reduces the costs of monitoring for shareholders and limited liability facilitates diversification of portfolios and efficient risk bearing through the stock market.²⁰² Limited liability also avoids the administrative costs of proceeding against many shareholders in case of a company's insolvency.²⁰³ Limited liability therefore has many positive attributes. The most important one is that it facilitates the functioning of the capital market. Limited liability tells investors that, in the absence of special circumstances, they will not have to use their personal assets to indemnify creditors in case of the insolvency of a company.²⁰⁴ In short: without limited liability of shareholders the development of capital markets would have been impossible.

Empirical research also shows that limited liability did indeed promote the development of capital markets and thereby increased social welfare. Belenzon, Lee and Pataconi examined the concept of enterprise liability in a great deal of legal systems and found that the propensity of legal systems to hold an entire group liable for the losses incurred by one of its affiliates, affects the growth of the corporation. They show that weaker enterprise liability (in other words a stronger reliance on limited liability) encourages corporations to more finely partition their assets into separate legally independent units. This better compartmentalisation of assets also tended to spur investment and

¹⁹⁹ Posner 2014, 536.

²⁰⁰ Posner 2014, 540-542.

²⁰¹ Kraakman 1998, 649.

²⁰² Easterbrook & Fischel 1985, 89-117.

²⁰³ Kraakman 1998, 649.

²⁰⁴ Cheffins 1998, 499-501.

growth.²⁰⁵ They therefore conclude that limited liability spurs entrepreneurship and is therefore likely to increase overall social welfare.²⁰⁶

4.2.2 Consequences and dangers

So far, it seems as if limited liability of corporations only has advantages: it makes passive investment possible, allows firms to attract capital and thus spurs entrepreneurship and increases social welfare. But a consequence of limiting the liability of a shareholder to its investment is that in case of insolvency of the corporation, creditors can no longer (fully) be paid back. Limited liability therefore makes risky ventures possible, but in fact shifts the risks from investors to creditors. This may in fact be an efficient risk transfer. Creditors who stand in a contractual relationship with the corporation will be paid to bear the risk (for example via the interest rates paid to a bank). The lender may be a superior risk barer, compared to a passive shareholder: the lender (for example a bank) can specialise in risk appraisal and may therefore have superior information; second, the shareholder is likely to be more risk averse than the bank.²⁰⁷ The interest rate charged by the bank (or other creditor) will reflect the risk of default.²⁰⁸ Problems, however, arise in case of involuntary creditors, such as for example victims of environmental pollution. The problem is that they have no *ex ante* opportunity to contract with the corporation and are therefore confronted with the risk that the corporation externalises harm to them.²⁰⁹ This undesirable consequence of limited liability is widely recognised and discussed in the literature and the environmental case is explicitly mentioned in that respect. In case of involuntary creditors (like in case of damage done to the environment) there are serious concerns over the inadequate incentives to reduce risk provided by limited liability.²¹⁰ Involuntary creditors are not compensated for the additional risks that they incur under limited liability.²¹¹ Limited liability may therefore engender a risk of opportunism and moral hazard. Limited liability may encourage entrepreneurs to take on social excessive levels of risk. This is problematic, especially if the company is undercapitalised, suggesting an intent to externalise losses on others.²¹² Limited liability can provide an incentive to shareholders to gamble with creditors' money as shareholders reap all the benefits as residual claimants and involuntary creditors bear the losses.²¹³ The most familiar inefficiency created by limited liability is the incentive it provides for shareholders to direct the corporation to spend too little on precaution; underdeterrence in other words.²¹⁴ Limited liability also encourages overinvestment in hazardous industries as it permits cost externalisation.²¹⁵

The literature also indicates that these dangerous consequences of limited liability depend on two specific issues, being the creditor classes and the different ownership structures of the firm.²¹⁶ Considering the creditor class, I already indicated that limited liability is generally not problematic for voluntary creditors as they can *ex ante* take into account the default risk, for example in the price they charge for a particular product they deliver or in the interest rate they will charge. Involuntary creditors, and more particularly tort victims, do not have the possibility of this *ex ante* bargaining and therefore the externalities related to limited liability remain with them. As far as the ownership structure is

²⁰⁵ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 3.

²⁰⁶ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 9.

²⁰⁷ Posner 2014, 541.

²⁰⁸ Posner 2014, 541-542.

²⁰⁹ Posner 2014, 543.

²¹⁰ Halbern 1998, 582.

²¹¹ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 10.

²¹² *Ibidem*.

²¹³ Cheffins 1998, 497-498.

²¹⁴ Kraakman 1998, 650.

²¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁶ Halbern 1998, 582.

concerned, the danger of externalisation and abuse is according to some especially present in case of close corporations and especially sole proprietorships. In that case the owners of the firm are usually also involved in the management and may have large incentives to externalise harm to involuntary creditors. The management in a widely held firm to the contrary generally receives little direct benefit from shifting wealth from creditors to shareholders.²¹⁷ Problems of limited liability (and their remedies) are therefore often discussed in the context of the close corporation. On the one hand it is held that for most close corporations, the entrepreneur has invested a substantial amount of its personal wealth in the venture. Often the portfolio is undiversified and the ability to bear losses is limited. Those would at first blush be arguments in favour of limited liability for the close corporation.²¹⁸ However, the problem is that the owner/manager of the close corporation obtains the full benefit of any opportunistic behaviour with respect to involuntary creditors, thus providing him a strong incentive for such opportunistic behaviour. That explains why cases of piercing the corporate veil (enabling a creditor to reach the personal assets of the shareholder) very often involve a close corporation.²¹⁹

4.2.3 Examples

The fact that companies may abuse the limited liability structure to incorporate hazardous (environmentally unfriendly) activities into separate legal entities, is also well demonstrated in the literature. Halbern refers to the owner of a fleet of taxicabs who separately incorporated a company for each taxicab. The result is that in case of a tort claim, the liability exposure is limited to the assets within that individual company (which only contains one cab).²²⁰ That obviously can result in an incentive to increase opportunistic behaviour.²²¹ In hazardous industries, firms often follow a strategy to remain small in order to minimise the risk that tort liability might reduce investor return.²²² Ringleb and Wiggins found that between 1960 and 1980 the rate of formation of small businesses was significantly higher, as compared to overall trends, in industries characterised by particularly hazardous activities, more specifically in the chemical industry.²²³ Alberini and Austin also noticed that the imposition of strict liability in state environmental policies resulted in a greater spill severity and frequency. This was associated with smaller production units and thus reduced assets compared to states following negligence-based liability.²²⁴ The shift to strict liability led firms apparently to organise themselves in smaller production units with reduced assets, thus being able to externalise harm. Also in the maritime industry, this phenomenon is well known in the form of so-called single ship companies. Large shipping companies often create separate legal entities, especially for tankers, which run large risks of third party liability. As a consequence, if a pollution incident happens, creditors can only execute against the company in which the single ship was brought.²²⁵ These few examples show that the risk that especially companies engaging in environmentally hazardous activities would use the limited liability to create separate entities and to shield their assets from creditors is not at all imaginary.

4.2.4 Remedies

In the remainder of this chapter, I will address a variety of remedies that could be used against the phenomenon of limited liability, some within company law (4.3-4.5) and some outside of company law.

²¹⁷ Ibidem.

²¹⁸ Halbern 1998, 589.

²¹⁹ Easterbrook & Fischel 1985, 109.

²²⁰ Halbern 1998, 590. It concerns the case *Walkovszky v. Carlton*, 223 N.E.2d6 (N.Y. 1966), which determined under which conditions courts may pierce the corporate veil.

²²¹ Ibidem.

²²² Kraakman 2013, 253.

²²³ Ringleb & Wiggins 1990, 574-595.

²²⁴ Alberini & Austin 2001, 112.

²²⁵ For a discussion of the legitimacy of this in maritime law, see *inter alia* Christodoulou 1999 and Christodoulou 2002, 278-279.

In theory a wide variety of remedies is possible, also some that I will not discuss within the scope of this study. One possibility is to provide environmental claims priority in bankruptcy. That could provide a (partial) remedy, but of course only to the extent that there are at least some assets available to satisfy (environmental) creditors.²²⁶ Another possible remedy is to focus on the liability of companies' directors or controlling officers, holding them liable for excess liability.²²⁷ However, directors' liability is very debated as it is said that it could dilute incentives of directors to engage in beneficial risk-taking to the benefit of the shareholders. That is why most systems (in line with law and economics predictions) are relatively restrictive as far as directors' and officers' liability is concerned.²²⁸ Moreover, often there is either indemnification or insurance of directors' liability, which may equally limit deterrence.²²⁹ Some even mention the possibilities of criminal liability of directors.²³⁰ I will briefly discuss criminal liability below in chapter 6, but as such not too much is to be expected from that.

Some authors are even relativistic and wonder whether the limited liability is really such a major problem in practice. Cheffins for example mentions that only a small fraction of tort victims ever seeks any form of legal redress, that a vast majority is settled out of court and that a liability insurer will anyway intervene. He therefore concludes that the "presence or absence of limited liability will be irrelevant to the victim".²³¹ That is true of course only to the extent that, as Cheffins apparently assumes, tort victims will anyway be compensated as he assumes there is a liability insurer present to do so. But that may of course not always be the case, as a result of which he is probably overoptimistic. The literature therefore still pays a lot of attention to the various remedies that tort victims could use to deal with the adverse aspects of limited liability.²³²

4.3 Minimum capital requirements

4.3.1 Advantages and drawbacks

Minimum capital requirements are mentioned in many of the studies dealing with the problematic aspects of limited liability as one of the potential remedies.²³³

The technique is in principle relatively simple: it is based on a statutory duty that specifies that for particular corporations a minimum capital needs to be available. It could either be a general lump sum amount that would be mentioned or the requirement could relate to a fixed ratio of equity to the liabilities.²³⁴ In theory, such a minimum capital requirement could guarantee that at least some capital would be available to satisfy the claims of the creditors, including the involuntary creditors, such as (environmental) tort victims.

Although this proposal sounds attractive, it clearly also has many potential drawbacks. One problem is that it may lead to huge administrative costs and significant difficulties in identifying the correct levels of intervention.²³⁵ After all: if such a general minimum capital requirement would be introduced, it needs an administrative agency to control whether the amount was indeed available. A problem is, moreover, that one would have to determine what for a specific corporation, given the nature of its activities, an appropriate amount would be. If the amount would be fixed at a too high level, it could

²²⁶ Kraakman 1998, 653.

²²⁷ Ibidem.

²²⁸ Leyens & Faure 2018, 769-808.

²²⁹ For details, see Gaber 2015.

²³⁰ Ong 2001, 707.

²³¹ Cheffins 1998, 506.

²³² See for example Halbern 1998, 590.

²³³ See *inter alia* Kraakman 1998, 653; Halbern 1998, 590.

²³⁴ Posner 2014, 543-544.

²³⁵ Halbern 1998, 590.

function as a barrier to market entry which could limit the possibilities of especially small- and medium size enterprises to enter the market. It might serve as a barrier to market entry and a reduction in competition would be the result. Theoretically, the amount should not be fixed at a general level determined in the statutes, as the riskiness of the activities of particular corporations can well vary. In the ideal case an administrative authority would have to determine the potential amount of liabilities and determine the minimum capital accordingly. But to do so for each and every separate company would of course lead to huge administrative costs. In addition, the problem is of course that merely requiring minimum capital may not provide an adequate protection for creditors, if there would be no guarantee that the amount would still be available at the moment of insolvency. In other words: the minimum capital as such could be satisfied, but the relevant question is obviously whether it is sufficient to satisfy the liabilities towards (involuntary) creditors. In order to answer that question that would in theory require an almost permanent monitoring of the financial situation of the company, again leading to huge costs. Minimum capital requirements are therefore often considered too rigid and unlikely to be appropriate for all firms, even in a narrow industry.²³⁶ If they are set low relative to the potential tort liability the problem of cost externalisation is not solved. And if the minimum capital is set relatively high, the coverage requirement can be very intrusive²³⁷. Moreover, a general minimum capital requirement would not necessarily guarantee that funds are available to restore environmental harm.

4.3.2 Effectiveness

For minimum capital requirements to really provide an effective protection to tort creditors, there should be a perfect monitoring and enforcement which would lead to huge costs. It is, according to Posner, "a statist solution that has thus far been resisted in most financial industries in the United States".²³⁸

The minimum capital requirement had as goal to take care of a safety buffer of a minimum magnitude for the creditors. In (European) Member States that had such a minimum capital requirement the effect of this in practice was almost neglectable as the amounts of the minimum capital were relatively limited and therefore did not provide any real protection against company losses, nor against fraudulent erections of corporations.²³⁹ The minimum capital requirement also did not show to have a positive impact on the behaviour of shareholders. Given the relatively low amounts of minimum capital, the losses that would result from risky investments were small anyway.²⁴⁰ The minimum capital requirements also did not prove to be able to prevent the bankruptcy risk.²⁴¹ It was already mentioned that limited liability can especially have the risks of externalisation in case of closely held corporations.²⁴² Nevertheless, one can notice that in many European Member States minimum capital requirements only apply to widely held corporations and not to closely held corporations. And in some countries where also for closely held corporations minimum capital requirements applied (such as for example in Belgium and the Netherlands) as a result of recent legislative changes, the minimum capital requirement for closely held corporations were abrogated.²⁴³

²³⁶ Kraakman 1998, 653.

²³⁷ Ibidem.

²³⁸ Posner 2014, 544.

²³⁹ So Marescau & Vander Elst 2020, no. 38.

²⁴⁰ Ibidem.

²⁴¹ For an empirical analysis, see Van der Elst 2019, 45-68.

²⁴² Kraakman 1998, 653.

²⁴³ A new Belgian Code of Company Law which entered into force on 1 May 2019 abrogated the minimum capital for closely held corporations (see Marescau & Vander Elst 2020, no. 38) and in the Netherlands there is also no longer a minimum capital requirement for closely held corporations since 1 October 2012. See Schwarz 2012.

4.3.3 Law and policy

Minimum capital requirements were already imposed by the EU since Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies.²⁴⁴ The Directive has been amended many times. Originally Article 6(1) of that Directive required that a company in order to be incorporated had to subscribe a minimum amount of € 25.000. But the minimum capital requirement only applies (see Article 1) to the public company limited by shares. The Member States implemented this minimum capital requirement in different ways, that means that there was considerable variation between the Member States as far as the amounts required are concerned.²⁴⁵ The provision currently in force, providing for a minimum capital requirement, is Article 45 of Directive 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects of company law.²⁴⁶ The amount still is € 25.000. However, Member States may impose higher requirements and many Member States in fact do. Recall that also this Directive is only applicable to public limited liability companies, not to private companies.

An overview of minimum capital requirements in European Member States put together by DLA Piper and incorporated in Annex 1 to this study, equally shows the same point: for closely held corporations, there is either no or a very low minimum capital; only for joint stock companies are there slightly more substantial amounts required, but never higher than EURO 80.000. It may be clear that these amounts are of such a nature that they can never be able to seriously deal with any substantial environmental claims. Not only will the value of an environmental claim (for example in case of soil clean-up) often be of a much larger magnitude, the minimum capital is also not specifically reserved for environmental claims, but needs to satisfy all creditors in case of insolvency. And as there is no rule under which environmental claims would have priority in bankruptcy, it may be clear that in the current regime the minimum capital requirements cannot provide any adequate protection to satisfy environmental liability claims. But given the high information, monitoring and enforcement costs, it is not likely that this is an attractive remedy at all.

4.4 Unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts

4.4.1 Basic idea

It was already mentioned that limited liability of the corporation does not so much create problems for voluntary creditors (such as banks and others who stand in a contractual relationship with the corporation) as they can protect themselves *ex ante* via contracting. The situation is, however, different for involuntary creditors such as tort victims and more particularly victims of environmental harm. A rather revolutionary proposal has been launched to solve this problem in a famous paper by Hansmann and Kraakman of 1991 where they propose to extend shareholder liability in an unlimited way for corporate torts.²⁴⁷ In a way it could be considered as a case of piercing the veil of the corporation, i.e. extending liability to shareholders and abrogating the limited liability for corporate torts. Veil piercing cases, as will be discussed in the next section, usually relate to situations of either a small and undercapitalised firm that is managed by a controlling shareholder who holds the real wealth of the enterprise or a parent company of a corporate group who keeps its operating companies thinly capitalised by dividending out most of their profits.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ OJ L 26 of 31 January 1977.

²⁴⁵ For an overview, see Dorresteyn et al. 2017, 162-164.

²⁴⁶ OJ L 169/46 of 30 June 2017.

²⁴⁷ Hansmann & Kraakman 1991.

²⁴⁸ Kraakman 2013, 251.

The Hansmann/Kraakman 1991 proposal is a specific case of veil piercing, but only applicable to corporate torts. Their basic idea is that shareholders are the residual claimants of the firms' cash flows. Any savings that result from externalising costs by the corporation accrue to its shareholders. They argue that the traditional doctrine of vicarious liability in tort (of a corporation or an employer for torts committed by his employee)²⁴⁹ should be extended to a vicarious liability in tort reaching the assets of the shareholder.²⁵⁰ They argue that the control rights of shareholders would be a sufficient legal basis for extending tort liability to shareholders when a corporate bankruptcy threatens to leave tort victims uncompensated.²⁵¹ They argue that it is simply because involuntary creditors (like tort victims) are politically powerless that limited shareholder liability has generally survived notwithstanding the inherent inefficiency associated with shareholder liability for company torts.²⁵²

4.4.2 Specific features

Kraakman stresses that the main reason why limited liability was originally introduced was that the alternative under the old regime (or for example with partnerships) is that shareholders were not only liable with all assets, but that there would be joint and several liability as well. Joint and several liability obviously has the disadvantage that it forces every shareholder not only to monitor the management of the corporation, but all other shareholders as well. Joint and several liability leads to high monitoring costs and also makes transferring shares difficult. Limited liability thus reduces shareholder monitoring costs by decoupling the value of the firm from the wealth of its shareholders.²⁵³ But the rule Hansmann and Kraakman argue for in their 1991 paper is a so-called *pro rata* liability, under which each shareholder is personally liable for a tort judgment in proportion to the equity ownership in the company.²⁵⁴ Unlimited liability should therefore not automatically be equated with joint and several shareholder liability.²⁵⁵

Hansmann and Kraakman also distinguish the need for *pro rata* unlimited shareholder liability depending upon the nature of the firm. It was already mentioned that abuses of the corporate firm are most likely with closely held firms.²⁵⁶ Investors in small companies often lack access to capital markets, which would rather be an argument to say that they might have higher risk aversion (as shareholders in a closely held company often do not diversify), which would provide an argument for limited liability in closely held companies. However, as mentioned, often small undercapitalised closely held corporations are used as a vehicle for externalising liability costs.²⁵⁷ Also, small businesses may deal with their risk aversion by obtaining adequate insurance coverage.²⁵⁸ That would be strong arguments in favour of unlimited shareholder liability precisely in the case of closely held corporations. It may drive some inefficient closely held companies out of business, but in fact that may be a desirable effect as they are effectively being subsidised by externalising social costs.²⁵⁹ The administrative costs of *pro rata* unlimited shareholder liability are, however, more serious in publically traded companies. However, Hansmann and Kraakman argue that these costs should not be prohibitive at all. The *ex ante* possibility to assess the *pro rata* access tort liability is, so they hold, not impossible (differently than in the case of joint and several liability). *Pro rata* liability is independent of the wealth of the fellow

²⁴⁹ See generally on vicarious liability, Kraakman 2009, 134-149.

²⁵⁰ Kraakman 2013, 252.

²⁵¹ Ibidem.

²⁵² Kraakman 1998, 648.

²⁵³ Kraakman 1998, 649.

²⁵⁴ Kraakman 1998, 650.

²⁵⁵ As for example Easterbrook & Fischel 1985 do.

²⁵⁶ See also Halber, Trebilcock & Turnbull 1980, 117-150.

²⁵⁷ Ringleb & Wiggins 1990, 574-595.

²⁵⁸ Kraakman 1998, 651.

²⁵⁹ Ibidem.

shareholders. But of course unlimited shareholder liability would lead to a closer monitoring of the company's tort risks, but that may well be a desirable effect. In sum, also for publically held company they argue that *pro rata* unlimited shareholder liability may have beneficial effects.²⁶⁰

4.4.3 Drawbacks

Of course there may be difficulties in enforcing unlimited liability as there could be attempts to evade unlimited liability through various strategies, for example selling equity to shareholders in foreign jurisdictions that do not recognise unlimited shareholder liability.²⁶¹ It is for this and other reasons that although the proposal by Hansmann and Kraakman has been discussed by many, it has not reached introduction at the policy level. Some argue that enforcement costs of unlimited liability would be huge for tort victims²⁶² evasion techniques are very real, also for environmental claims. Some individuals referred to as "high rollers" would be ready to purchase the risky assets of companies and thus remove the tort risk exposure from the original company. That already exists under a limited liability regime, but may be more serious in case of unlimited shareholder liability.²⁶³ Others argue that it may be practically difficult to implement the *pro rata* unlimited shareholder liability.²⁶⁴

It is for those reasons that most authors reject the Hansmann/Kraakman 1991 proposal as being too radical.²⁶⁵ However, they do recognise that especially with closely held corporations, the owner/manager may have strong incentives for opportunistic behaviour towards involuntary creditors, as a result of which veil piercing may be an attractive remedy in that situation. However, in general courts may be more inclined to pierce the veil in order to hold a parent corporation liable for debts of a subsidiary, rather than reaching the personal assets of shareholders.²⁶⁶ But generally authors doubt that in case of mass torts it would be the limited liability of the defendant company that would have a substantial impact on the amount available for recovery.²⁶⁷ Even in situations where a company may not provide suitable redress for tort victims, allowing them to sue shareholders personally might not be much of benefit in practice as this may lead to important procedural and logistical difficulties.²⁶⁸ It is therefore that one can, at best, argue that the theoretical proposal of unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts has sparked off new ideas concerning remedies for limited liability. The idea itself is generally considered too radical and impracticable, but it has led to an increased debate on the social costs of limited liability²⁶⁹ and to a debate on alternative remedies (other than unlimited shareholder liability) to deal with the inefficiencies created by limited liability.²⁷⁰

4.5 Veil piercing and enterprise liability

4.5.1 The case for veil piercing: theory

Whereas a general *pro rata* unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts may still be a bridge too far, there are of course circumstances where the courts will not recognise the limited liability and reach assets, for example of an owner/manager in a closely held corporation or a parent company (in a corporate group).²⁷¹ Veil piercing is, in the words of Sjøfjell et al., "A doctrine which is marred by

²⁶⁰ Kraakman 1998, 652.

²⁶¹ Alexander 1992, 387-445.

²⁶² Leebron 1991.

²⁶³ Halbern 1998, 588.

²⁶⁴ Alexander 1992.

²⁶⁵ For example Bergkamp 2001, 324-327 and Halbern 1998, 589-590.

²⁶⁶ So Leebron 1991, 1628.

²⁶⁷ Cheffins 1998, 506-507.

²⁶⁸ Cheffins 1998, 507.

²⁶⁹ Kraakman 1998, 653.

²⁷⁰ Ibidem and Cheffins 1998, 506-508.

²⁷¹ For a discussion of the conditions for veil piercing in the environmental context, see Bergkamp 2001, 306-329.

confusion and inconsistency".²⁷² In law and economics scholarship piercing the corporate veil is considered to promote efficiency in two situations. The first is where the corporate form is used in order to limit tort liability to accident victims.²⁷³ It would be the example of a taxi corporation incorporating each taxicab separately. Still, Posner argues that permitting tort victims to reach the shareholders assets imposes additional risk on the shareholders. Moreover, "piercing the corporate veil is an administrative nightmare when there are many shareholders and shares turn over frequently".²⁷⁴ An alternative would be to require from the corporation engaged in a dangerous activity to post a bond equal to the highest reasonable estimate of the probable extent of its tort liability.²⁷⁵ This is to a large extent equal to a compulsory solvency guarantee which I will discuss in the next section.

The less problematic case for veil piercing is where separate incorporation misleads creditors. Again, Posner distinguishes between the publicly held corporation and the close corporation. The case is much stronger with closely held small firms where the danger of abuse of the corporate form is greatest.²⁷⁶ But even if a large publicly held corporation operates through wholly owned subsidiaries, as long as those subsidiaries are in unrelated businesses, maximisation of the enterprise's profits, will require that the profits of each subsidiary be maximised separately. In other words, the subsidiaries should be treated as if they were in separate firms, as creditors are not prejudiced by being limited to their rights against the particular subsidiary with which they dealt.²⁷⁷ The situation is different when creditors are misled into thinking that they are dealing with one single corporation (for example when a subsidiary has a name confusingly similar to that of the holding company).²⁷⁸

The normal justifications for limited investor liability²⁷⁹ (like the advantage that shareholders no longer have to monitor the solvency of other shareholders, nor the performance of the board and the assurance that their personal assets will not be exposed to liability) do not apply where the shareholder in question is a parent company or a controlling shareholder.²⁸⁰

Typical veil piercing cases are those where there is a small and undercapitalised firm that is managed by a controlling shareholder who holds the real wealth of the enterprise or the parent company of a corporate group keeps its operating companies thinly capitalised.²⁸¹ Courts are likely to pierce the corporate veil when wealthy shareholders appear to have shifted assets to frustrate creditors. Veil piercing can deter shareholders from externalising harm to tort victims.²⁸² But legal systems impose strict conditions for veil piercing. Undercapitalisation or undertaking risky but legitimate activities are as such not a sufficient reason to set aside the corporate veil on behalf of tort creditors.²⁸³ Depending upon the legal system usually additional requirements are necessary, showing that the limited liability of the corporation was "abused" to disadvantage tort creditors. In some cases models of vicarious liability are extended by treating the aggregation of different firms as a single enterprise or an enterprise-wide guarantee of any residual tort liability left unpaid by an asset constraint individual firm is imposed.²⁸⁴ These types of models encourage integrating related businesses into a single firm and

²⁷² Sjøfjell et al. 2015, 137.

²⁷³ Posner 2014, 558.

²⁷⁴ Posner 2014, 559.

²⁷⁵ Ibidem.

²⁷⁶ Posner 2014, 560.

²⁷⁷ Ibidem.

²⁷⁸ Posner 2014, 561.

²⁷⁹ Discussed in detail in 4.2.1.

²⁸⁰ Sjøfjell 2015, 137-138.

²⁸¹ Kraakman 2013, 251.

²⁸² Kraakman 2013, 252.

²⁸³ Kraakman 2013, 257.

²⁸⁴ Kraakman 2013, 258.

they encourage mutual monitoring between different entities.²⁸⁵ Piercing the corporate veil is therefore a mechanism whereby the courts ignore the corporate entity and hold shareholders directly liable.²⁸⁶ The justification is usually an abuse of limited liability, more particularly in relation to involuntary creditors (like tort victims). Again, this type of veil piercing is especially advocated in the context of closely held corporations, but there are always dangers of evasive behaviour to escape the veil piercing.²⁸⁷ Law and economics scholars hold that veil piercing can be seen as a situation where the courts trade off the benefits of limited liability against the costs.²⁸⁸ In other words: when the costs of limited liability (more particularly for involuntary creditors) exceed the benefits, there is a high likelihood that the veil will be lifted.

4.5.2 Law and policy: enterprise liability

Most of the law and economics literature with respect to this issue relates to the common law and more particularly to US law. There are, however, many different forms of veil lifting and, moreover, many differences between the jurisdictions. A situation where an entire group is held liable for the losses incurred by one of its affiliates is usually defined as enterprise liability.²⁸⁹ There is some confusion concerning this notion: in corporate law enterprise liability is used to describe a situation where several corporate entities within a group could be held jointly and severally liable for the debt of one of the members in the group. The entire group is seen as one enterprise that is made liable. However, in tort law, enterprise liability has also been developed in accident law as a way to increasingly introduce strict liability for harms caused by companies within American common law.²⁹⁰ That development of enterprise liability within tort law has been heavily debated by law and economics scholars such as, for example, George Priest.²⁹¹ That second (tort law) interpretation of enterprise liability is less interesting for the scope of this study, as the nature of the liability regime in the ELD is given.²⁹² I therefore focus on enterprise liability as it is discussed in the corporate law literature. Enterprise liability in that sense is just a form of veil piercing and setting aside the limited liability of the separate corporations.

The literature mentions that a problem with the piercing the corporate veil doctrine (generally, but also in the creation of enterprise liability) is that in many legal systems the specific conditions under which it can be applied are vague and discretionary.²⁹³ Usually (case) law allowing piercing the corporate veil is intended to eliminate the protection of limited liability in cases where owners are considered to abuse the rationales of incorporation. But still, in many countries it is difficult for courts to formulate precise conditions under which this would be possible. Courts rather work with a list of variables that can be applied, such as 1) undercapitalisation of the firm; 2) comingling of corporate and personal assets; 3) assets stripping, transfer of assets; 4) disregard for corporate formalities; 5) owners control or domination over management issues; 6) fraud or misrepresentation of business operations.²⁹⁴ But the conditions under which veil piercing is possible largely differ between the EU Member States.

A country which is representative for a legal system that easily accepts enterprise liability is Germany. The German *Konzernrecht* is recognized as the most sophisticated regulatory scheme applicable to corporate groups with explicit standards for parental liability.²⁹⁵ German law relatively easily accepts

²⁸⁵ Kraakman 2013, 258-259.

²⁸⁶ Kraakman 1998, 653.

²⁸⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸⁸ Easterbrook & Fischel 1985, 109.

²⁸⁹ See Bainbridge & Henderson 2016, 194-198.

²⁹⁰ See in that respect for example Keating 2001.

²⁹¹ Priest 1985.

²⁹² For details, see chapter 3.

²⁹³ So Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 11.

²⁹⁴ Ibidem.

²⁹⁵ So Sjøfjell et al. 2015, 138.

liability of a parent company for obligations of a controlled subsidiary.²⁹⁶ At the other end of the spectrum is the United Kingdom which views companies as distinct legal entities, even when they operate under the direction of a parent firm. British courts therefore persistently rejected the application of the enterprise approach.²⁹⁷ In the UK the role of piercing the corporate veil is therefore very limited and in fact only applied as a sanction against fraudulent behaviour.²⁹⁸ In Germany to the contrary, when a subsidiary is completely dominated by the parent or subordinated to its interests, the parent will be held liable for losses incurred by the subsidiary.²⁹⁹

There is currently no harmonised rule with respect to enterprise (group) liability within the EU. However, a European Company Law Experts (ECLE) group has formulated a proposal for reforming group law in the European Union. But that proposal mostly aims at regulating the relationships between the controlling shareholder (the parent company) and the subsidiary and does not explicitly deal with the potential liability of the group towards third parties.³⁰⁰ A Draft Proposal for a 9th Company Law Directive was created in the 1970s and eventually abandoned in the 1990s.³⁰¹ That seems to be the only piece of major legislation covering corporate groups specifically, but never formally enacted. Sjøfjell et al. rightly stress that a distinction should be made between on the one hand direct liability schemes (whereby a parent can be held liable solely on the formal basis of its relationship with its subsidiary) and indirect liability schemes (where the parent company is held liable for its own wrongdoings through the use of the concept of the duty of care).³⁰²

In an elaborate study Belenzon, Lee and Pataconi analyse enterprise liability in many countries, including many European Member States, and score their intensity as far as the easiness to pierce the corporate veil is concerned.³⁰³ Some Member States, such as for example Italy, France and the Netherlands, are considered intermediate cases, but with a stronger tendency towards the (German) enterprise approach.³⁰⁴ Cheffins for example noticed concerning English law that a court can lift the corporate veil and declare a shareholder personally liable for companies' debts when there is evidence of an unlawful purpose or deliberate concealment of the true state of affairs. With public corporations, courts rarely disregard corporate personality; for closely held companies veil piercing suits will be more successful when defendants served as directors or officers.³⁰⁵ Ong notices that US law and practice regarding veil piercing should alert both UK and continental European companies to the potentialities of far-reaching tendencies of corporate environmental liability affecting an entire group.³⁰⁶ There could be a positive incentive effect as the possibility of shareholder liability for corporate environmental damage may lead to pressure from shareholders on company directors.³⁰⁷ One weakness of parental liability schemes is the lack of extraterritoriality. It is rare that enterprise liability can apply to all affiliated companies, also cross-national borders whereas environmental harm often has a cross-border character.³⁰⁸

²⁹⁶ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 5.

²⁹⁷ Ibidem.

²⁹⁸ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 13.

²⁹⁹ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 14.

³⁰⁰ European Company Law Experts, A proposal for reforming group law in the European Union. Comparative observations on the way forward, available at: <https://europeancompanylawexperts.wordpress.com/publications/reforming-group-law-in-the-eu/>. See also ECLE 2017, 1-49.

³⁰¹ It only remained in the status of an internal document. See ECLE 2017, 3.

³⁰² Sjøfjell et al. 2015, 140-141.

³⁰³ For details, Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 12-15.

³⁰⁴ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018, 14.

³⁰⁵ Cheffins 1998, 505.

³⁰⁶ Ong 2001, 721.

³⁰⁷ Ibidem.

³⁰⁸ Sjøfjell et al. 2015, 142-143.

Belenzon, Lee and Pataconi also analysed the effects of enterprise liability, i.e. the propensity of courts to hold an entire group liable for the obligations of one of the subsidiaries. They found that where enterprise liability is weaker, groups tend to partition their assets more finely into distinct legally independent subsidiaries and grant their subsidiaries more autonomy.³⁰⁹ Their study does therefore underscore the point that there is a relationship between enterprise liability and the internal organisation of corporate groups. In countries with strong enterprise liability asset partitioning into separate legally independent subsidiaries may make less sense, but the contrary is true in legal systems where enterprise liability is weaker.

4.5.3 Parental liability

There is one interesting development worth mentioning here at EU level. It was already indicated that regarding veil piercing and enterprise liability there are important differences between the Member States. There are also no binding rules of EU company law (Regulations or Directives) in this respect. However, there has been an important evolution in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU in the domain of competition law. Already for a long time in EU competition law the possibility to hold a parent company liable for violations of competition law by a subsidiary where highly debated. In a landmark judgment of 10 September 2009 (*Akzo Nobel*)³¹⁰ the Court of Justice endorsed the attribution of liability to Akzo Nobel for the conduct of its fully owned subsidiary on the ground that they were part of a “single economic unit”. In a later decision the court held “what counts is not whether the parent company encouraged its subsidiary to commit an infringement of the EU competition rules or whether it was directly involved in the infringement committed by its subsidiary, but the fact that those two companies constitute a single economic unit and thus a single undertaking for the purpose of Article 101 TFEU which enables the Commission to impose a fine on the parent company”.³¹¹ The Court moreover established in *Akzo* a rebuttable presumption of decisive influence for fully owned subsidiaries. In that situation the burden of proof is reversed and the parent company must demonstrate the autonomy of the subsidiary in conducting its commercial policy.³¹² The literature has examined to what extent this parental liability based on the “single economic unit” approach is compatible with the principle of personal liability and has found that this is indeed the case, although criticism is formulated as well.³¹³ Some argue indeed that the parental liability under *Akzo Nobel* amounts to an almost strict liability as rebutting the assumption of control over its subsidiaries would be almost impossible. Some authors consider this unfair towards the parent company and violating fundamental rights and principles, such as the personal character of the penalty.³¹⁴

This approach is obviously far-reaching as there is, moreover, a presumption of decisive influence (sufficient to justify parental liability) in the case a subsidiary is fully owned. This reversal of the burden of proof is in line with suggestions by Antunes³¹⁵ and supported by other literature³¹⁶ arguing that when a victim of environmental harm had proved that a subsidiary company has caused environmental harm, the company would be required to bring evidence as to whether the challenged decisions have originated from its control or were taken autonomously by the subsidiaries.³¹⁷ There have not yet been cases regarding parental liability in the context of corporate groups for

³⁰⁹ Belenzon, Lee & Pataconi 2018.

³¹⁰ *Akzo Nobel v. Commission of the European Communities* (C-97/08 B), judgment of 10 September 2009. For a commentary see Briggs & Jordan 2009.

³¹¹ Judgment of 20 January 2011, *General Química and others v. Commission*, C-90/09. See Bellamy & Child 2013, 1142.

³¹² See further Kalintrini 2018.

³¹³ See Amory 2019, 69-79.

³¹⁴ This is for example argued by Leupold 2013, 570-582 and by La Rocca 2011, 68-76.

³¹⁵ Antunes 1994, 132-384.

³¹⁶ Sjäffjell et al. 2015, 143.

³¹⁷ Ibidem.

environmental liability to the court, but it may be interesting to consider whether this concept of parental liability as applied in EU competition law could also be extended to environmental liability, thus holding parent companies liable for environmental liability obligations under the ELD incurred by their subsidiaries. It has already been suggested in the literature related to the ELD that such a jurisprudential development, whereby a parent would also be presumed to control the 100% daughter with determinant influence in the environmental domain should be welcomed. As a result of which the parent company would equally be liable to fulfil the obligations of the subsidiary under the ELD.³¹⁸

4.6 Compulsory solvency guarantees

4.6.1 Relevance

So far, I discussed three possible remedies for the inefficiencies that could result from limited liability, still sticking within the boundaries of company law (minimum capital requirements, unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts and veil piercing). Even though there are some proponents of those solutions in the literature, each of those also have serious limitations. Another type of solution equally advanced within the literature is to look for remedies not necessarily within company law, but rather in the sphere of environmental liability and insurance itself. The problem of potential insolvency related to limited liability (but also in other contexts) could be remedied by *ex ante* forcing corporations, but in fact more generally operators, to provide financial security to cover their third party liabilities in relation to the ELD. Also in the corporate law literature, the regulatory strategy to require firms pursuing hazardous activities to carry a certain minimum level of insurance is explicitly mentioned.³¹⁹ In this section I will review the possibilities and challenges of compulsory solvency guarantees.

4.6.2 Criteria for mandatory financial security

In law and economics research, several criteria have been advanced to indicate where mandatory financial security may be indicated.³²⁰ Insolvency is considered the most important reason for introducing mandatory financial security. As was indicated in the theoretical chapter³²¹ insolvency will not only lead to a failing compensation to the victim, but also to underdeterrence. Insolvency, in other words, will result in the goals of the ELD not being met. The problem is especially relevant within the context of the ELD as the most important liability rule chosen in the ELD is strict liability. Insolvency leads to more risks of underdeterrence under strict liability than under negligence.³²²

The law and economics literature pointed out that by introducing a duty to purchase insurance cover for the amount of the expected loss better results will be obtained than with insolvency, where the magnitude of the loss exceeds the injurer's assets.³²³ When an operator is under a duty to provide mandatory financial security (for example liability insurance) the provider of the security (for example an insurer) will have incentives to control the behaviour of the operator. The way in which insurers do this is by controlling the so-called moral hazard risk. Moral hazard will be controlled through a detailed risk differentiation (*ex ante* monitoring and *ex post* adaptation of the premium to the accidents) in combination with exposing the insured still partially to risk (via deductibles).³²⁴ As the provider of financial security will control the moral hazard, incentives are again provided to operators to invest in

³¹⁸ This has more particularly been suggested by Cassotta & Verdure 2012, 242-243.

³¹⁹ Kraakman et al. 2009, 121; Cheffins 1998, 508; Halbern 1998, 590.

³²⁰ For a summary, see Richardson 2002, 357-371.

³²¹ *Supra* 2.4.3.

³²² See on the different effects of insolvency on strict liability and negligence the example provided *supra* in 2.4.3.

³²³ See *inter alia* Jost 1996 and Faure 2006.

³²⁴ Shavell 1979.

prevention of environmental liability. Thus under mandatory financial security underdeterrence can be cured and better results can be attained than under a judgment proof scenario.

4.6.3 Conditions and challenges

However, the literature has equally formulated a number of conditions and warnings when introducing compulsory financial guarantees.³²⁵ A first issue is that the moral hazard problem should of course be adequately controlled. In the words of Richardson: "The potential for improving deterrence and facilitating compensation may be enhanced when insurance is made by the state a compulsory condition of engaging in specified developments. To require this, however, insurers must be able to effectively differentiate and price insureds' risks, and cost-effectively monitor loss prevention".³²⁶ In the normal case, the provider of a solvency guarantee (like a liability insurer) will have incentives to adequately control the moral hazard risk as otherwise the likelihood of the accident occurring would increase. However, an adequate control of moral hazard supposes that the provider of financial security has adequate information in order to be able to control moral hazard. Moreover, when insurance markets are highly concentrated, the incentives to adequately control moral hazard might be distorted.³²⁷ If the moral hazard problem could not be adequately controlled the solvency guarantee may do more bad than good and the regulator should in such a case even consider a prohibition of liability insurance.³²⁸

A second issue is that it may be wise not to limit the duty to provide solvency guarantees to insurance. It is therefore on purpose that I referred to compulsory solvency guarantees and not to compulsory liability insurance only. The disadvantage of just referring to liability insurance is that it may make the policy-maker completely dependent upon the insurance market to fulfil the duty to insure. This could also create an undesirable situation whereby insurers would become *de facto* licensors of the industry which should be avoided from a policy perspective. This may therefore be a strong argument for a flexible approach, i.e. not to limit the provision of mandatory security necessarily to insurance, but to allow the market itself to suggest a wide variety of financial and insurance instruments as long as they can guarantee the fulfilment of the obligations of an operator under the ELD. Insurance may of course well be able to do so, but there is in addition a wide variety of other instruments that could do so as well, such as self-insurance, using the capital market, guarantees and a variety of risk pooling schemes. All of those mechanisms may theoretically have advantages and particular limits and are *de facto* also used to cover environmental risks.³²⁹ From a policy perspective it is important to keep a wide variety of different instruments available to cover environmental risks, which can equally provide incentives to the market to develop further financial security instruments, also beyond (liability) insurance. The advantage of such a broad, flexible, approach is that it makes the policy-maker less dependent upon the insurance market. Otherwise the risk always exists that industry will argue (as is currently also the case in relation to the ELD) that compulsory solvency guarantees cannot be implemented as there is no sufficient availability of insurance. By opening up the duty to provide solvency guarantees, also beyond insurance, a more flexible approach is followed, making the policy-maker less dependent from the insurance market.

That could also solve problems when in the insurance market within a particular Member State there would be (*de facto*) restrictions on the competition in the supply of insurance cover. That could result for example from high entry barriers and a limited number of insurance companies providing cover for

³²⁵ See for a summary of those warnings, Faure 2006.

³²⁶ Richardson 2002, 332.

³²⁷ Faure & Van den Bergh 1995.

³²⁸ So Shavell 1986.

³²⁹ See for an overview of the employment of those instruments to cover liability following a major offshore pollution accident, Faure & Wang 2017, 237-265.

the liability regime under the ELD. A small number of players would lead to high concentration with the risk of high premiums and a danger that this would reduce the incentives of insurers to control the moral hazard risk.³³⁰ Even though those types of concentrations on the environmental liability insurance market may remain problematic, it is as such not an argument against introducing compulsory solvency guarantees as long as sufficient other financing techniques are available to operators to provide financial security. An interesting example of the wide variety of different financing techniques is provided at the occasion of the geological storage of carbon dioxide, also referred to as carbon capture and storage (CCS). This is regulated in the EU through Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide. In order to implement this Directive, a Guidance Document 4 has been issued. Interestingly that Guidance Document provides a wide overview of all possible techniques that could be used to provide financial security.³³¹

It has to be recalled that the obligations stemming from the ELD relate to all operators, not only large players, but also small- and medium size operators. For them, there is a serious risk of insolvency i.e. the inability to financially meet their obligations under the ELD. That could, as already often stressed, lead to underdeterrence and therefore to a too high environmental risk. For that reason it is crucial that the ELD obligations imposed upon operators are supported by compulsory solvency guarantees. That of course plays an important role to the extent that insolvency may arise from the limited liability of the corporation (largely discussed in this chapter), but again, it are obviously not only corporations that may be insolvent (related to limited liability); insolvency could arise with other organisational forms (like partnerships) as well and operators could also be natural persons for whom there equally could be an insolvency risk.

4.6.4 Solvency guarantees in the ELD

There was a lot of debate preceding the ELD on whether there should be compulsory solvency guarantees to support the operators' obligations. The 2000 White Paper preceding the ELD was cautious concerning the introduction of a regulatory duty to seek financial coverage. It states:

*"Moreover, the EC regime should not impose an obligation to have financial security, in order to allow the necessary flexibility as long as experience with the new regime still has to be gathered. The provision of financial security by the insurance and banking sectors for the risks resulting from the regime should take place on a voluntary basis".*³³²

But the European Commission asked a study to examine the financial assurance issues of environmental liability and the Technical Annex for that study explicitly stated the question whether there should be a duty to provide financial security.³³³ The study clearly advised in favour of an obligation to seek financial security, arguing "The theoretical case is relatively simple: without financial security against insolvency, strict liability may lead to underdeterrence. Insolvency indeed poses larger problems under strict liability than under negligence... The desirability of a strict liability rule decisively hinges on the availability of financial security. Simply trying the new strict liability regime and waiting for financial and insurance markets to develop the necessary mechanisms to provide security seems like a dangerous route to take".³³⁴

However, it seemed in practice much more difficult to implement this also at the policy level as there was large opposition from particular Member States. Although many NGOs and a few Member States

³³⁰ See further Faure & Van den Bergh 2002, 279-306.

³³¹ For details, see Faure & Partain 2017, 149-184.

³³² White Paper on environmental liability, p. 24.

³³³ See the Technical Annex in Faure 2003a, 391-398.

³³⁴ Faure 2003a, 249.

supported such a mandatory system, it was politically not feasible.³³⁵ This reluctance is also reflected in the final text.³³⁶ Article 14 of the ELD only requires the Member States to promote the development of financial security instruments and the Commission to present a report on the availability of such instruments.³³⁷ The result is that in some Member States there is a duty to seek financial cover, but in others there is not.³³⁸ Meanwhile there have been a variety of studies addressing the possibility to improve financial security in the context of the ELD,³³⁹ the most recent one of March 2020.³⁴⁰

4.6.5 Implementation

How could a compulsory solvency guarantee mechanism be shaped for the ELD? I had sketched a mechanism in my report to the European Commission following the White Paper 2000³⁴¹ and I have more recently sketched a similar model for a financial security mechanism to compensate for offshore oil and gas activities.³⁴² In short it comes down to the following: starting point is that insolvency is a serious risk, creating the market failure of externalisation of social costs and that therefore some regulatory action mandating financial security is needed. The EU policy-maker has clearly already taken up this advice by prescribing in the ELD that Member States should stimulate financial cover for the ELD obligations. The problem, however, still remains that some Member States may not require any financial cover at all and others could require very low amounts of financial cover. The EU level should therefore go one step further by also mandating under what type of circumstances particular amounts should be required in security and what types of securities should be deemed sufficient. Obviously specific amounts cannot be mandated on an EU-wide basis, nor can the EU prescribe which security would be sufficient in which circumstances. This may very much depend on location specific circumstances. A one-size fits all approach at EU level would therefore not be feasible.³⁴³ Also De Smedt argues that tailor-made solutions at national level constitute the better option.³⁴⁴ This calls in other words for a regulatory framework at the EU level, still allowing sufficient flexibility to regulators at the Member States. An example of this could be a Guidance Note. A similar Guidance Note on financial responsibility issued within the framework of the Directive on carbon capture and storage provides an interesting example.³⁴⁵ This Guidance Note provides information to regulators in Member States on the type of financial security that would be acceptable. That could guide the regulator in Member States on the amounts and types of financial security to be required. A guidance has the advantage of doing what it says, which is to guide local regulators in Member States and at the same time still leaving sufficient flexibility with the Member States to access the amount and form of financial security in a particular case, taking into account location specific circumstances.

There are still a few issues to be discussed related to this proposal. First: recall that when discussing minimum capital requirements it was mentioned that the literature considers those as rather ineffective for the simple reason that they are often general amounts applying to all companies and that, moreover, the mere fact of having a minimum capital at the start of a corporation does not

³³⁵ De Smedt 2009, 11.

³³⁶ The necessity to have a mandatory insurance mechanism in the ELD is considered “one of the most controversial and crucial focal points in the development process of the ELD” (so Cassotta 2012, 198).

³³⁷ Liu 2013, 290.

³³⁸ For an overview see *inter alia* Bergkamp, Herbatschek & Jayanti 2013, 132-135.

³³⁹ See for a discussion of some of those studies chapter 3.

³⁴⁰ See study by Fogleman 2020.

³⁴¹ Faure 2003a, 248-250.

³⁴² Faure 2017d, 335-339.

³⁴³ So Bergkamp 2016, 187, also referring to a report by Insurance Europe, arguing that a mandatory harmonized approach could impede the current encouraging development of insurance products in the Member States.

³⁴⁴ De Smedt 2016, 13.

³⁴⁵ European Commission, Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, Guidance Document 4, 2011. For comments, see Faure 2016c.

guarantee that money would also be available if it would be needed to remedy environmental harm. For that to be the case, it would require a constant monitoring of which the administrative costs would be huge. Moreover, the amounts were of such a low magnitude that they cannot be considered as a serious remedy against the insolvency risk.³⁴⁶ The question could then be asked if the same problem would not arise with mandatory financial security. The answer is that precisely in order to avoid those problems (of lacking flexibility and high monitoring costs) the decisions on the amount needed for financial security and the adequacy of the security offered by the operator should be decentralised to local authorities who have better information. That guarantees that only once costs are made to verify which amount would be needed for the potential environmental risks of the particular operation. Moreover, the advantage of this decision-making at the local level is precisely that flexibility and differentiation are possible to align the type and amount of financial security to the risk posed by the specific activities and operator. In that respect it is maybe no problem that it is today reported that many operators still do not have a specific demand to cover their ELD liabilities, for example via insurance.³⁴⁷ It may well be that those are large operators that have a sufficient balance sheet to be able to deal with the risks themselves via so-called self-insurance. In such a case it makes obviously no sense to force an operator to purchase costly financial security without added value for them. The crucial issue is that competent authorities verify the nature and magnitude of the risk as well as the financial security offered. There is wide experience with that model to cover the risks related to the civil liability for offshore oil and gas activities. Operators dispose of a wide variety of possibilities to offer security and the competent authorities verify (and follow up on a yearly basis) whether the offer of security made by the operator can be considered adequate for the risk involved.³⁴⁸

Summarising:

- Financial security has to be mandated to cover the strict liability obligations imposed upon the operator under the ELD.
- The policy-maker could indicate that a wide variety of mechanisms may be used to provide this financial security.
- A Guidance Note can be issued at the EU level, guiding local licencing authorities in Member States on the required amount and type of financial security to cover ELD obligations.
- The type of financial security should therefore not be regulated in a general matter, but its adequacy may be assessed by the administrative authorities who can decide on the type and the amount of the financial security when issuing the licence.
- As far as the amount is concerned, this Guidance Note should be based on an objective assessment of the environmental liability risk, taking into account technical criteria that relate a specific operation and operator to particular amounts of potential damage.
- The guidance should allow sufficient flexibility as far as the forms of financial security are concerned and not necessarily limited those to insurance. The only condition would be that local regulators accurately verify whether the form and the amount of the financial security offered by the operator would be adequate to cover the potential damage emerging from ELD obligations.
- Such an approach allows sufficient flexibility and also avoids unnecessary costs (for example forcing major operators to transfer risks to lower rated insurance companies or to immobilize large amounts of capital), encourages a level playing field for operators and avoids an externalisation of social costs (and thus a market failure) in the case of insolvency.

³⁴⁶ *Supra* 4.3.2.

³⁴⁷ See chapter 3.

³⁴⁸ For details, see Faure & Wang 2015, 25-36 and Faure & Wang 2017, 263-266.

4.7 Evaluation

This chapter reviewed problems that may arise in case of the inability of ELD operators to meet their financial obligations. That could result from the limited liability of the corporation, but could arise in other circumstances as well.

I reviewed a variety of options to remedy limited liability within corporate law, but each of those had their own specific problems. Mandatory capital requirements are not considered very effective mechanisms to protect the interests of creditors, are moreover considered rigid and either easily to avoid or leading to high monitoring and enforcement costs. Unlimited *pro rata* shareholder liability for corporate torts is an interesting thought experiment, but could equally lead to high litigation costs if it would mean that tort victims would have to sue a variety of different shareholders. Also in that case, problems of evasion and enforcement may arise, especially when shares would be shifted to foreign jurisdictions. A third possibility, piercing the corporate veil, is applied in some EU Member States (when particular conditions are met), but there are in that respect still large differences between the Member States. Moreover, some consider the litigation related to veil piercing “an administrative nightmare”. However, the Court of Justice case law in EU competition law (Akzo Nobel) leading to parental liability for competition law violations committed by subsidiaries, could lead to inspiration in the environmental liability context as well.

Of course many other solutions within corporate law have been mentioned in the literature as well. One possibility is to focus more strongly on (civil and criminal) liability of directors; another one is to award victims of environmental tort a higher priority in case of bankruptcy of the corporation.³⁴⁹ Each of those different options undoubtedly leads to differing costs and benefits. What is the cheapest option among all alternatives available is by the end also an empirical issue.³⁵⁰ But the fundamental question can of course be asked whether it is desirable to fundamentally adapt principles of corporate law “just” to deal with the problem of environmental liability of companies. It was already noticed that in some of the remedies I discussed within corporate law (like veil piercing or minimum capital requirements) solutions between the EU Member States largely diverge. Company law is also a domain of which economists argue that there is great benefit in divergence and many drawbacks from harmonisation.³⁵¹ Some argue that environmental interests are penetrating corporate law and can lead to an adaptation of corporate governance;³⁵² this is most clearly visible probably in the domain of corporate environmental responsibility,³⁵³ which will be addressed in further detail in the next chapter.³⁵⁴ But the question still arises whether it is really feasible to adapt corporate law and corporate governance to regulate a problem of environmental liability. The political feasibility of fundamental changes in that domain at the EU level seems low to say the least.

Weighing all the different options I therefore argue that the last remedy, mandating solvency guarantees, is the most attractive one. It has a number of advantages: it is already (to some extent) mentioned in the ELD (albeit that there is no clear obligation yet); many Member States moreover already have mandatory financial security for environmental (ELD) obligations. The advantage is, moreover that this not only solves an insolvency problem related to the limited liability of the corporation, but also potential insolvencies that may arise in other contexts (like with partnerships or natural persons). It is also what EU law has done. The European Union legislature has not attempted to

³⁴⁹ Kraakman et al. 2009, 120; Kraakman 2013, 252.

³⁵⁰ Halbern 1998, 590.

³⁵¹ See in that respect especially Enriques 2006a, 59-82.

³⁵² See for example Ong 2001, 686.

³⁵³ Ong 2001, 687-689 and Lu 2018.

³⁵⁴ See 5.4.

address the use of limited liability companies, but rather focused on financial security to address problems of insolvency.³⁵⁵ That is not to say that some of the other options (like parental liability for ELD obligations of subsidiaries or priority for environmental liability claims in bankruptcy) should not be examined as well. But the most promising and probably most effective strategy seems to be to focus on supporting the operators' obligations under the ELD with mandatory financial security. That is, moreover, also in line with recent policy developments at EU level.

³⁵⁵ So Bergkamp 2016, 186.

5 INNOVATIVE INSTRUMENTS

KEY FINDINGS

- Environmental (civil and criminal) liability of companies can have potentially perverse effects of underinvesting in monitoring and detection.
- A system whereby companies are rewarded for self-policing and reporting could remedy this potentially perverse incentive.
- An internal compliance mechanism could play an important role in that respect if sufficient benefits are provided of self-reporting.
- But one always has to be careful that an internal compliance mechanism does not merely consist of window-dressing.
- Companies may have an interest in going beyond compliance via corporate environmental responsibility (CER).
- CER is increasingly promoted at international, European and Member State level.
- However, particular duties (such as non-financial reporting) should also be seriously enforced.
- Violation of CER norms has the potential of leading to environmental liability and thus no longer being merely voluntary.
- Although CER and voluntary compliance programmes can be important in providing companies with incentives to improve environmental quality, they function optimally in the shadow of the law, in other words, in combination with regulation.
- In addition it remains important always to watch out that voluntary programmes do not merely amounts to window-dressing.

5.1 Introduction

The central focus of this entire study is on the environmental liability of companies. In the previous chapter I addressed problems that can arise from insolvency in general and from the limited liability of the corporation in particular. Several remedies to increase the environmental accountability of corporations were already discussed in that respect, some within the framework of corporate law (minimum capital requirements, unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts and enterprise liability), some outside of corporate law (compulsory financial guarantees). To some extent those could also be considered as “innovative” instruments in the sense that they certainly do not exist in all EU Member States. However, in this chapter I want to focus on a few other instruments that received a lot of attention in recent literature and to some extent at the EU policy level as well, but which are not, at least not directly, related to corporate law, in the strict sense. These instruments, again, do not only affect environmental liability, but are general instruments that may improve the environmental compliance of enterprises and thereby also reduce the likelihood of environmental harm, thus contributing to reaching the goals of the ELD. Precisely for that reason they are worth a brief discussion.

I will start with the question of why companies breach environmental regulation. It has especially been Jennifer Arlen who has, from an economic perspective, looked into the black box of the corporation, analysing the question why some persons within the corporation cut corners and breach

environmental law and how law enforcement may affect the behaviour of the corporation, more particularly the likelihood of compliance (5.2). Admittedly, this topic is closer to corporate crime, which will be addressed in the next chapter 6, but the general question how environmental compliance by companies can be promoted is obviously crucial for environmental liability as well. The question even arises whether the lessons from that literature with respect to corporate compliance (and crime) should be translated at the policy level, either by forcing companies to adopt an environmental compliance mechanism or to reward companies that not only have such an environmental management scheme, but that equally actively engage in self-policing and reporting of violations (5.3). A related yet different literature is the well-known domain of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in this context corporate environmental responsibility (CER). It is not in the core of corporate law, but of course addresses the environmental behaviour of corporations. But the core difference with the previous topic (compliance assurance) is that CER by definition strives to go beyond mere environmental compliance. Again, it can be argued that if that instrument is correctly implemented, it can prevent environmental liability and therefore merits a brief discussion within the scope of this study. Of course it could be argued that the debate on CER is surely not new, but it is increasingly receiving a prominent role, not only at the policy level, but also in academic literature where especially Beate Sjøfjell has recently formulated interesting proposals towards a fundamental reform of corporate law, away from shareholder primacy and calling on the societal responsibility and accountability of companies (5.4). And that brings the topic again in the core of the environmental liability of companies.

5.2 Environmental compliance by companies

5.2.1 Potentially perverse incentives

In the next chapter I will explain that there are strong arguments to apply under particular circumstances, not only civil liability, but also criminal liability for environmental harm. Moreover, I will equally explain that there are strong arguments in favour of criminal responsibility of the corporation. That is how in reality (both civil and criminal) liability regimes are structured: they address primarily the corporate entity, usually via a vicarious liability regime. It is not the corporation itself that commits environmental harms, but natural persons, employees acting on behalf of the corporation. Still, the corporate entity will be held liable for environmental harm caused to third parties or for environmental crime.³⁵⁶

In a 1994 paper Jennifer Arlen has shown that this vicarious liability regime, whereby corporations are *de facto* held strictly liable for any wrongs committed by their employees, can lead to potentially perverse incentives for the following reason.³⁵⁷ If a corporation is able to monitor its employees and if it does so in an optimal way, it may automatically detect more environmental violations. But given the strict (civil or criminal) liability of the corporation for acts of the employees, these increased monitoring efforts by the corporation would only lead to more potential liability for the corporation. The logic is that when the corporation increases enforcement expenditures, it will equally increase the probability that violations will be detected, thus increasing the expected liability of the corporation. Better and additional enforcement by the corporation could therefore only increase the firms' expected liability. As a result, Arlen holds that strict vicarious liability can lead to the perverse incentive that the corporation will reduce the monitoring of its employees in order to avoid the detection of corporate (environmental) crime.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁶ Kraakman 2013, 245-248.

³⁵⁷ Arlen 1994.

³⁵⁸ Kraakman 2013, 245.

5.2.2 Remedies

A lot of the subsequent literature, especially by Arlen, but also in other papers by Arlen and Kraakman³⁵⁹ examines how the law could be shaped differently to provide better incentives to the corporation to monitor and detect violations. An optimal liability regime should not only induce a firm to investigate and self-report the torts of its agents *ex post*, but it should also motivate the firm to take the right preventive measures *ex ante*.³⁶⁰ The problem is that liability, on the one hand should induce firms to invest in preventive measures until the marginal social benefits of doing so equal the marginal costs of the investment. On the other hand liability should be sufficiently large to incentivise firms to monitor employees and report possible torts. That means that in fact two liability regimes would be necessary: one to provide incentives to invest in preventive measures and another one to induce the cooperation of the firm in monitoring and reporting of torts.³⁶¹ Arlen and Kraakman argue that the nature of the two liability regimes should be different: the first might be a vicarious liability, holding the firm liable if it did not invest in efficient measures to prevent environmental harm. But the second regime would rather be a negligence standard inducing a firm to take reasonable steps to monitor and report the torts committed by its employees. The result would be that the corporation that invests reasonable efforts in monitoring and reporting the torts of the employee would escape liability for violating its *ex post* duties, but the corporation would still have to pay for the environmental harm (social costs) of the tort caused.³⁶²

The problem is that a simple vicarious liability of the corporation cannot satisfy all objectives at the same time: incentivising preventive measures *ex ante*, stimulating cooperation and information *ex post* and ensuring that the firm bears the social costs of its activities.³⁶³ Administering such a liability regime that would provide correct incentives would equally lead to high administrative costs.³⁶⁴ The crucial point from this literature is that a traditional rule of strict corporate liability can result in excessive wrongdoing since it does not provide firms with sufficient incentives to implement policing measures, such as monitoring, investigating and reporting misconduct.³⁶⁵ The best regime proposed is a multi-tiered regime whereby a corporation faces a high default penalty, which can be reduced to a much lower residual penalty if the firm satisfies its monitoring, investigating and reporting duties. The corporation receives in other words an implicit reward by monitoring, investigating and reporting. If that reward is large enough (the difference between the default penalty and the penalty in case of cooperation) it will provide an incentive to the corporation to monitor, investigate and report.³⁶⁶

5.2.3 Example

This general idea implies that the liability regime needs to be structured in such a way that corporations are incentivised to cooperate, in other words that they can gain by cooperating (detecting, investigating and reporting) and that it cannot only lead to a higher probability of incurring civil or criminal corporate liability. This idea has strongly influenced US federal policies under which the adoption of compliance management systems by corporations may be considered a mitigating factor of civil penalties. In 1995 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a policy *Incentives for self-policing: discovery, disclosure, correction and prevention of violations*. It has been slightly revised and reintroduced later, but the bottom-line remains that the policy aims to encourage corporate

³⁵⁹ Arlen & Kraakman 1997.

³⁶⁰ Kraakman 2013, 247.

³⁶¹ Kraakman 2013, 248.

³⁶² Arlen & Kraakman 1997, 712-717.

³⁶³ Kraakman 2013, 248.

³⁶⁴ Ibidem.

³⁶⁵ Arlen & Kraakman 1997, 753.

³⁶⁶ Ibidem.

compliance with federal environmental laws.³⁶⁷ The general idea is that when corporations exert meaningful compliance efforts, they will be rewarded by liability mitigation when a violation occurs in spite of those efforts. Several incentives are built in for self-policing, each of which alleviate the corporations' exposure to liability for non-compliance.³⁶⁸ This United States model of corporate crime control, strongly influenced by these publications by Arlen and Kraakman, has had an important impact on policy. In the first place it led, as mentioned by the example of the EPA audit policy, to incentives for corporations to develop compliance management systems; but also more generally, this US model of corporate crime control with a practice of reducing sanctions, and often with holding convictions for corporations that assist enforcement authorities by detecting, reporting and helping to prove criminal violations, has also had its influence around the globe and is now affecting criminal policy in many legal systems.³⁶⁹ Given the importance of compliance management systems, also for environmental liability I will focus on those systems in the next section.

5.3 Environmental compliance mechanisms

5.3.1 Objectives

An internal compliance mechanism (or a compliance management system) is basically a device which allows a corporation to signal that it is willing to take compliance with regulatory duties seriously. This signal can be reinforced by the engagement towards the earlier mentioned self-auditing and self-policing. By adopting an internal compliance mechanism, a corporation can signal to the regulatory authorities a willingness to take compliance with (environmental) regulation seriously.

An internal compliance management system fits into the earlier mentioned strategy to provide positive incentives to corporations to self-monitor and self-police. The approach recognises that corporations may as such be willing to comply with environmental legislation, but that, when looking into the "black box" of the corporation, one can notice that there may be individual employees who, contrary to company policy (because of a variety of motifs) violate environmental legislation. The primary goal of developing a compliance management system is to create a model of responsabilisation within the corporation as a result of which all employees work together to execute the company's policy of complying with environmental legislation. If executed correctly, such a compliance management system could lead to a self-policing within the corporation as a result of which violations are discovered at an earlier stage and can thus be adequately remedied, but, more importantly, compliance can generally be promoted and violations thus avoided.

Kaplow and Shavell observed increasing tendencies of law enforcement authorities to ask self-reporting in exchange for a mitigation of penalties. Without putting this directly into the framework of an internal compliance mechanism, Kaplow and Shavell argue that from the perspective of minimising the social cost of enforcement, such a model of self-reporting makes a lot of sense. The primary advantage from the government (and therefore for the social cost) perspective is that self-reporting obviously reduces enforcement costs. In the words of Kaplow and Shavell: "Self-reporting does not merely reduce enforcement costs, it eliminates them: once someone confesses, others need not be investigated".³⁷⁰ The other major advantage of self-reporting that Kaplow and Shavell see is that it reduces risk. From the individual's perspective the self-reporting avoids the uncertainty of being detected and sanctioned, but creates the certainty of a sanction. Similar advantages are equally

³⁶⁷ See Oded 2013, 128.

³⁶⁸ For further detail, Oded 2013, 129-132.

³⁶⁹ See further Arlen & Buell 2020.

³⁷⁰ Kaplow & Shavell 1994, 601.

stressed by Innes.³⁷¹ Innes stresses that violators often engage in costly “avoidance” activities. Those are activities which lower the probability of detection and punishment. Self-reporting will avoid that violators have to engage in these costly avoidance activities that they would otherwise undertake. Moreover, as a result of self-reporting the government will be able to deter offences with less enforcement efforts and thus at lower costs.

So far, the literature therefore signals two major advantages of developing internal compliance mechanisms. A first is the Arlen/Kraakman³⁷² point that some incentive needs to be provided to corporations to monitor their employees; the other advantage³⁷³ is that self-policing can reduce enforcement costs for the government.

In the environmental area an internal compliance mechanism relates also to an inspection method that differentiates between companies with different levels of compliance management. This is based on a so-called *ex post* targeting strategy. In short, a tit-for-tat strategy refers to a game played in different phases whereby one party (the firm) would signal its willingness to engage in cooperative behaviour to which the other party (the enforcing government) would react with cooperative behaviour as well. Various variations of what is now referred to as a “targeting strategy” in enforcement have been developed in the literature. Scholz developed a targeting strategy, offering the enforcement authority the choice between a deterrent-based and a cooperative enforcement style based on the initial behaviour of the firm in the first game in which the firm would either signal cooperation or defection and based on that, be treated with a cooperative or a deterrence-based enforcement style.³⁷⁴ The targeting strategy has been modelled by Harrington who showed that enforcement agencies can increase compliance by dividing firms into different groups depending upon their compliance performance in previous periods. Enforcement on the group that signalled “good” behaviour in the first period would be based on cooperation whereas the firms belonging to the “bad” group would be confronted with a more deterrence-based, hence tougher approach.³⁷⁵ Also Arlen and Kraakman have suggested an enforcement strategy whereby firms would be required to self-report a violation of pollution standards. Voluntary reporting would subsequently be rewarded with lenient treatment, whereas prosecutors focus their enforcement efforts on violations which are not self-reported.³⁷⁶ Adopting an internal compliance mechanism can therefore be a strategy for a corporation to signal cooperation.

An internal compliance mechanism can have a discernible impact on corporate governance.³⁷⁷ A corporate environmental management system can also protect the corporation and its officers from potential environmental liability.³⁷⁸ There may be external pressure for the establishment of a corporate environmental management system, but this may in turn require internal changes to corporate management structures.³⁷⁹

One (empirical) question is to what extent the mere fact of having such a compliance management system will indeed encourage compliance within the corporation; another (legal) question is whether compliance with an internal management scheme will either be a mitigating factor or completely shield the corporation from either civil or criminal liability.³⁸⁰ The final question is obviously how these

³⁷¹ Innes 2001.

³⁷² Arlen & Kraakman 1997.

³⁷³ Kaplow & Shavell 1994.

³⁷⁴ Scholz 1984.

³⁷⁵ Harrington 1988 and Rousseau 2010, 197.

³⁷⁶ Arlen & Kraakman 1997.

³⁷⁷ Ong 2001, 707.

³⁷⁸ Ong 2001, 708-709.

³⁷⁹ Ong 2001, 714.

³⁸⁰ The latter aspect is discussed in detail by Oded 2012, 107-170.

two relate, i.e. whether rewarding a corporation for adopting a compliance management scheme will also increase compliance. These questions will now be examined in turn.

5.3.2 Internal compliance mechanisms and compliance

Does an internal compliance mechanism also lead to a better environmental performance by the corporation?

De Bree holds that the problem is that companies are not alike. There may be companies which well implemented compliance management systems, but others where the system is merely "window dressing". He argues that regulators and inspectors can positively stimulate the process of self-regulation and thus stimulate the intrinsic motivation of corporations towards compliance.³⁸¹ Also some practitioners from inspection agencies argue that government "should use the governance structure and the management systems of the companies in a smarter way".³⁸² Meerman holds that public authorities should "maintain continuous dialogue about violations, as well as risks and risk management", whereby inspections would also rely on compliance management systems on a more regular basis. "If companies perform well managing their own compliance and this can, on the basis of track records, indicate a level of justified confidence, then authorities can save a lot of time and focus more on the front runners who just need that push to perform (at compliance)".³⁸³

These quotes hence show the willingness from (at least some) inspection agencies to engage in a constructive dialogue with the regulated communities, but also to use internal compliance mechanisms in their inspection activities.

The findings from the academic literature on the effectiveness of internal compliance mechanisms provide a mixed picture. One study by Telle³⁸⁴ found that violations were under-reported in self-audits. He therefore holds that "softer monitoring and enforcement practices, like self-reporting and voluntary disclosure programmes, could undermine compliance with environmental regulations". Also Gunningham indicates that the soft approach (by him referred to as advice and persuasion) may constitute a "negotiated non-compliance"³⁸⁵ and may even reduce compliance altogether (also among better actors) "if agencies permit law breakers to go unpunished".³⁸⁶ An empirical study by Darnall and Sides on voluntary environmental programmes implemented by 30.000 firms in the US showed that voluntary environmental programmes do not improve the environmental performance compared to non-participants. They even found that non-participants improved their environmental performance by 7,7% more than the participants in the voluntary environmental programmes.³⁸⁷

Other studies are more positive, although they also tend to indicate that voluntary compliance will only have the expected positive effects under particular conditions (more particularly when the voluntary compliance programme is embedded in an adequate regulatory framework). Earnhart and Harrington did an empirical research of the effectiveness of self-audits and held that they lead to improvements toward and beyond compliance. The empirics relate to the behaviour of the US chemical manufacturing sector between 1999 and 2001 and relates to EPA data. They argue (cautiously) that self-audits improve compliance with effluent limits (emission standards) for one but not for all pollutants.³⁸⁸ Khanna and Widyawati hold that facilities that self-audit are more likely to be in

³⁸¹ De Bree 2015.

³⁸² Meerman 2015.

³⁸³ Ibidem.

³⁸⁴ Telle 2013.

³⁸⁵ Gunningham 1987.

³⁸⁶ Gunningham 2011, 187.

³⁸⁷ Darnall & Sides 2008.

³⁸⁸ Earnhart & Harrington 2014.

compliance with clean air regulations. They equally found that firms that had been subject to inspections in the past and those that face a stronger threat of liabilities under so-called Superfund legislation and that are more visible due to size, are also more likely to undertake environmental audits. They equally analysed the effects of different legal consequences for self-policing: a so-called audit privilege policy (mitigating penalties in case of self-reporting) had a statistically negative impact on compliance whereas immunity laws (providing a shield against liability in case of self-policing and self-reporting) had an insignificant impact on compliance.³⁸⁹ Arimura et al. use Japanese facility-level data concerning the effects of complying with ISO 14001. They hold that ISO 14001 appears effective in reducing environmental impacts, except for waste water. Assistance programmes offered by local governments on a voluntary basis also promote facilities to adopt ISO 14001. The authors therefore hold that governments can use command and control and voluntary approaches concurrently.³⁹⁰

A few other studies are worth mentioning. Murphy and Stranlund argued that the reduced penalty could lead to less care and thus to a reduction of overall environmental quality.³⁹¹ Lange and Gouldson discuss compliance mechanisms within the framework of “trust-based environmental regulation”.³⁹² They argue that another EPA’s initiative with respect to self-auditing the EPA’s National Nitrate Compliance Initiative (200/2001) yielded an improved toxic release inventory compliance reporting for nitrate compounds from 60% to 98%, as a result of self-reporting. It reduced time and cost investments for both the regulated and the regulator in comparison to the traditional inspection and enforcement actions.³⁹³

Innes indicates that firms still face substantial risks when they self-report their environmental violations. He argues that if one wishes to improve the success of those programmes, steps should be taken to further protect operators who self-report. That could for example imply immunity for corporate officers from criminal liability, but equally to limit or bar citizens’ suits in connection to self-closed violations.³⁹⁴ It shows that the success of self-reporting programmes is strongly related to the certainty of a reward for the self-reporter in terms of reduced expected costs. If that is not the case, the effectiveness of the self-reporting mechanism may fail. That raises of course the question under what conditions self-policing will also lead to self-reporting.

5.3.3 Does self-policing lead to self-reporting?

From the work of Arlen it appears that corporations may have reduced incentives to self-police as it could increase the probability of detection and therefore their own liability. Arlen and Kraakman therefore suggest that a multi-tiered enforcement system whereby corporations would be rewarded (with lower liability) for self-policing and self-reporting. A crucial element of the costs in case of self-reporting of course relate to the applicable sanction when companies self-report. The larger the mitigation of a potential penalty, obviously the larger the propensity to self-report will be. It is as point equally mentioned by Kaplow and Shavell. They argue that the benefits of self-reporting are not fully realised in practice. According to them the reason is that incentives to self-report may be weak for the simple reason that the reduction in penalties for parties who self-report is often too modest.³⁹⁵ An important lesson therefore is that self-auditing will only lead to self-reporting if the related reduction in the expected penalty is indeed substantial. That is also what seems to be the result of the elaborate literature that has studied this question.

³⁸⁹ Khanna & Widyawati 2011.

³⁹⁰ Arimura, Hibiki & Katayama 2008.

³⁹¹ Murphy & Stranlund 2005, 16.

³⁹² Lange & Gouldson 2010.

³⁹³ Lange & Gouldson 2010, 5240.

³⁹⁴ Innes 2001, 253-254.

³⁹⁵ Kaplow & Shavell 1994, 603.

A number of studies on the effectiveness of voluntary compliance programmes have been executed by Short and Toffel.³⁹⁶ The main message of their many studies is that self-audit policies that do encourage companies to self-disclose violations of environmental laws to lead to self-reporting on the condition that corporations were subsequently provided with immunity from prosecution for the self-disclosed violations.³⁹⁷ They moreover found that the legal environment, more particularly the enforcement activities of regulators, significantly influence the likelihood that companies will effectively implement the self-regulatory commitments that they symbolically adopt. Under those conditions (i.e. that agencies provide an effective threat of sanctioning) self-regulation can be a useful tool for leveraging the normative motivations of corporations, but it cannot replace traditional deterrence based enforcement.³⁹⁸ They therefore hold that self-regulation is most likely to occur when government regulators have sufficient resources to monitor and to sanction and when regulators and companies have a reasonable consensus about the norms or standards to be complied with. Self-regulating firms that either are themselves heavily inspected or are in industries that are heavily inspected are more likely to improve their compliance records. Firms will therefore take their self-regulation commitments more seriously when regulators are more likely to catch them shirking.³⁹⁹ When self-regulation is, however, not embedded in a robust regulatory framework, but implemented in a "regulatory void", this is doomed to lead to regulatory failure.⁴⁰⁰

A few other studies are worth mentioning in this respect. Murphy and Stranlund argue that the reduced fine necessary to induce voluntary disclosure can be viewed as the "price" that society pays for the revelation of privately held information about a firm's environmental performance.⁴⁰¹ They find that reducing the penalty for disclosed violations to motivate more self-reporting also reduces the care taken to avoid these violations; it increases the frequency of violations and reduces overall environmental quality.⁴⁰² They also argue that the use of disclosure policies clearly extends beyond the environmental area also to regulations concerning occupational health and safety.⁴⁰³ The propensity of subjects to voluntarily discover and disclose violations, so they found out in a laboratory experiment, depends very much on the risk attitude of the individuals involved.

Interesting research has equally been done on the self-policing policy of the US Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA issued audit policies in 1995 and 2000 which to some extent reward self-reporting.⁴⁰⁴ Under the audit policy, operators that voluntarily self-disclose a violation are eligible for significant penalty reductions. However, the audit policy does not apply to the portion of the penalty that is based on the economic benefit gained from non-compliance. Various studies have examined the effectiveness of this audit policy. Pfaff and Sanchirico found that the policy led indeed to self-reporting, but that a problem is that many of the self-reported violations concern violations related to reporting and are not related to emissions.⁴⁰⁵ Most of the self-reported violations did not concern emissions. They provide a few possible explanations for this result. One possibility is that the structure of the fine reduction is simply not attractive for operators. Since the fine reduction does not apply to the economic benefit component of the fine, self-reporting provides most benefits to firms for violations for which the largest part of the penalty is not related to cost savings. Reporting and

³⁹⁶ Short and Toffel 2007; Short & Toffel 2010; Toffel & Short 2011 and Short 2013.

³⁹⁷ Short & Toffel 2007.

³⁹⁸ Short & Toffel 2010 and Toffel & Short 2011.

³⁹⁹ Short 2013, 25.

⁴⁰⁰ Short 2013, 26-27.

⁴⁰¹ Murphy & Stranlund 2005, 16.

⁴⁰² Ibidem.

⁴⁰³ Murphy & Stranlund 2005, 17.

⁴⁰⁴ These policies were already mentioned above (in section 5.2.3). For details, see Oded 2013, 128-132.

⁴⁰⁵ Pfaff & Sanchirico 2004, 415.

recording violations most likely do not lead to huge cost savings, that could explain why there is a preference to report those.⁴⁰⁶ Another possibility is that firms use the audit policy strategically: they could disclose relatively minor reporting violations in order to distract attention from major unreported violations. That is a hypothesis that was, however, not further tested.⁴⁰⁷ One other problem is that the self-reporting could lead to private citizen suits against the operator which the audit policy cannot prevent.⁴⁰⁸ This would have indicated that the audit policy is not that often used for the simple reason that the reward from self-reporting are not sufficiently large. Pfaff and Sanchirico also point at the fact that the audit policy may have a perverse effect on cost saving: if a firm only turns in minor violations, it could lead to the opposite effect that the agency becomes obliged to deal with those minor violations, thus having less time to investigate serious violations. If that were the case (which they could not investigate) the audit policy could lead to an unwanted reallocation of regulatory funds.⁴⁰⁹

5.3.4 Law and policy

Corporate environmental management systems are also stimulated through guidelines issued at various levels. For example, the OECD Guidelines on Multi-National Enterprises⁴¹⁰ invite enterprises to establish and maintain a system of environmental management appropriate to the enterprise that includes, *inter alia*, collecting data on its environmental impact, setting objectives and targets and monitoring progress. For European policy the most important document is undoubtedly the Council Regulation 1836/93 on the voluntary participation of commercial enterprises in a community system for environmental management and the environmental management audit,⁴¹¹ commonly known as the EC Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). The regulation has been replaced several times, *inter alia* by the EMAS Regulations 761/2001⁴¹² and Regulation 1221/2009.⁴¹³ Participation in EMAS is voluntary, but the organisation applying to qualify for EMAS must be willing to continually improve the environmental performance. The organisation must adopt an environmental management system, carry out environmental auditing and prepare an environmental statement.⁴¹⁴ The compliance with the EMAS Regulation has to be verified and the results have to be sent to the competent authority of the Member State. The environmental verifiers have to be accredited. If all conditions of the Regulation are met, the organisation that applied for EMAS can be placed on a list of registered sites. In that case, the organisation may use the EMAS logo.⁴¹⁵ Environmental assessment and audits are also regulated in the laws of various Member States.⁴¹⁶

The appropriate legislative environment may have acted as a catalyst for corporate environmentalism. However, it is mentioned that there is no proof of any causality between environmental regulation on the one hand and the introduction of internal corporate environmental management systems on the other.⁴¹⁷ In addition, as was already mentioned above, there is always the danger that environmental management systems are merely used as a smoke screen for continuing degradation of the environment.⁴¹⁸

⁴⁰⁶ Pfaff & Sanchirico 2004, 426.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁸ Pfaff & Sanchirico 2004, 427-428.

⁴⁰⁹ Pfaff & Sanchirico 2004, 428.

⁴¹⁰ www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guideline/mnetext.html. For details, see Ong 2001, 690.

⁴¹¹ OJ 1993 L10.

⁴¹² OJ 2001 L114/1.

⁴¹³ OJ 2009 L342/1.

⁴¹⁴ Article 4(1) of the EMAS Regulation 1221/2009, see further Jans & Vedder 2012, 381-382.

⁴¹⁵ Article 10 of the EMAS Regulation. See further Jans & Vedder 2012, 382.

⁴¹⁶ For details, see Ong 2001, 710-714.

⁴¹⁷ Ong 2001, 715.

⁴¹⁸ Ong 2001, 716.

It is especially in the US where the standards for corporate compliance programmes have been developed in a lot of detail and where they are regularly updated. There are various memoranda of the US Department of Justice that have as goal to assist prosecutors in making informed decisions as to whether and to what extent a corporations compliance programme was effective for purposes of *inter alia* the appropriate remedy or monetary penalty.⁴¹⁹

There is one other aspect of self-monitoring, discussed in this section, which still should be mentioned. I so far assumed that self-monitoring and policing would be voluntary, thus asking the question how rewards (carrots) could be provided to encourage self-policing and self-reporting. However, there is also a scholarship that argues that self-monitoring and –reporting should become mandatory, thus placing the initial burden of detection on the regulated corporate entity instead of on the agency.⁴²⁰ For now I just signal this literature, but it would lead me too far of the core of this study to develop this in detail.

5.4 Beyond environmental compliance: CER

5.4.1 Going beyond compliance

On the one hand CER can hardly be considered as an innovative instrument as it has been on the policy agenda, increasingly also in corporate governance, since the famous work of John Elkington on the so-called triple bottom-line of people profit and planet (PPP) which should each get equal attention and be balanced within corporate policy.⁴²¹ On the other hand in traditional law and economics, CSR and CER were not very popular. The position of Milton Freedman in this respect is well-known. He held that the only responsibility of managers in a corporation is to maximise profits.⁴²² And also the pope of law and economics, Posner held that especially in a competitive market CSR would not have a bright future for the simple reason that, for example additional investments in pollution reduction technology would only lead to higher prices, because of which customers would turn away from firms that engage in CSR.⁴²³

The reality is of course slightly more balanced as the concepts of CSR and CER enjoy increasing popularity today⁴²⁴. Many firms engage in environmental reporting and sustainability indices are published where firms compete to score high on these indices.⁴²⁵ One of the reasons for firms to engage in CER is the so-called strategic CER, meaning that the promotion of environmental interests could simply be a strategic decision to promote the business interests. There may be a variety of reasons why that could be the case.⁴²⁶ CER could reduce nuisance for the immediate environment, thus leading to satisfaction with the local community and good relations between the corporation and the local community, many of whom may also be working for the corporation. CER could also be an advertising strategy from which the corporation could benefit via increased sales. CER and self-regulation may also be a strategy to reduce the likelihood of government regulation.⁴²⁷ Finally, CER

⁴¹⁹ See in that respect for example the latest Guidance Document from the US DOJ Criminal Division of April 2019, Evaluation of corporate compliance programmes to be found at: <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download>.

⁴²⁰ Kakade & Haber 2020.

⁴²¹ Elkington 1998.

⁴²² Freedman 1970.

⁴²³ Posner 2014, 577-578. Moreover, a general minimum capital requirement would not necessarily guarantee that funds are available to restore environmental harm.

⁴²⁴ Moreover, a general minimum capital requirement would not necessarily guarantee that funds are available to restore environmental harm.

⁴²⁵ A well-known sustainability index is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) which was launched in 1999 to track the stock performance of the worlds' leading companies in terms of economic, environmental and social criteria. See <http://www.sustainability-indices.com>.

⁴²⁶ For details, see Lu & Faure 2016, 248-249 and Lu 2018, 71-77.

⁴²⁷ So Vogel 2006, 16.

could also fit in the tit-for-tat strategy in regulatory compliance and enforcement, discussed earlier. Firms that present themselves as complying voluntarily with a high standard CER (and implementing an internal compliance assurance mechanism) could thus benefit from reduced pressures from environmental enforcement. There are, in other words, many reasons why corporations may engage in this strategic CER and why they could benefit from it.⁴²⁸

The argument that strategic CER could be profit-maximising also fits into the work of Michael Porter who argues that firms that move beyond environmental compliance will automatically not only do more investments in environmental protection, but become more innovative in general. The innovation needed to reach higher environmental standards would, according to Michael Porter, also provide other benefits to the firm and thus make firms in the end more profitable.⁴²⁹ A literature review shows that the empirical evidence of the Porter hypothesis to a large extent supports it. There is fairly clear evidence that stricter environmental regulation also leads to more innovation; the fact that stricter regulation would also enhance business performance has led to mixed evidence: some studies find a negative effect between environmental regulation and business performance; others provide support for the Porter hypothesis.⁴³⁰

It is, in other words, for those reasons understandable that there is an increasing interest in the business community (and at the policy level as well) for CER. There is equally a link between CER and environmental liability as compliance with CER can obviously reduce the likelihood of environmental harm and therefore of environmental liability; at the same time the question could also be asked whether non-compliance with CER could also be a ground of environmental liability.

5.4.2 Measuring and reporting

CER has become popular to such an extent that consumers may now be overloaded with sustainability reports and reports on CER performances of a variety of corporations. For consumers it may be very difficult to verify the environmental claims that are made for example in sustainability reports. One can now increasingly notice the emergence of rating indices whereby a variety of sustainability reports are evaluated and indexed.⁴³¹

The first index, launched in 1999, was the already mentioned Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI). This DJSI is based on the cooperation between standards & poor Dow Jones indices and sustainable asset management (SAM) research, later Robeco SAM.⁴³² DJSI encompasses a series of global, regional and national indices. Robeco SAM is one of the most influential rating agencies with a global reputation in the field of sustainability rating.⁴³³ There is now an increased number of CSR rating agencies that assess the social and environmental performance of corporations. However, there is also growing concern over the transparency and credibility of the rating agencies.⁴³⁴

One of the problems, however, has been that reporting on non-financial issues has not been based on a clear legal duty. In the words of Sjøfjell: "When the decision-makers in companies are not required to integrate environmental concerns into the decisions of how the core business of the company is to be run and there is no hard law stating that companies must be run in a socially responsible manner, there is a risk that environmental reporting is neither relevant, nor reliable".⁴³⁵ That makes clear that for

⁴²⁸ So also Kitzmueller & Shimshack 2012, 74-75.

⁴²⁹ See Porter & Vanderlinden 1995, 99-100.

⁴³⁰ Ambec et al. 2013, 9-16.

⁴³¹ See in that respect *inter alia* Dommerholt 2012.

⁴³² Lu 2018, 108-109.

⁴³³ Lu 2018, 110.

⁴³⁴ See Scalet & Kelly 2010.

⁴³⁵ See Sjøfjell 2011, 56.

environmental reporting to give important and reliable signals to the market, there should equally be a legal duty towards non-financial reporting.⁴³⁶

5.4.3 Law and policy

A first question that could be asked, at least from a theoretical perspective is why there should be any task for law, policy or regulation at all, if CER is after all defined as an approach voluntarily adopted by corporations to go beyond environmental obligations as incorporated in regulation. There may be many reasons in which (supplementary) legal rules could assist the CER process. Environmental reporting by corporations could be incomplete, resulting in a market-failure and even information asymmetry. Consumers may be overloaded with sustainability reports and would be unable to verify the environmental claims that are made in those reports.⁴³⁷ There is in other words a serious risk that without supplementary regulation concerning environmental reporting, that corporations may misrepresent their environmental performance leading to information asymmetry between the corporation and the consumer. That may be an important reason in favour of some legal intervention whereby the government could also play an important role in promoting CSR/CER.⁴³⁸ Different types of instruments can be used by the government to promote CSR/CER.⁴³⁹

In practice, one can also notice that both at the international, at the European and at the Member State level a variety of different instruments have been developed to promote CSR/CER. At the international level I should mention the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the UN Principles for Responsible Investment.⁴⁴⁰ In addition, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, first adopted in 1976 and reviewed and updated several times, are of great importance. The ultimate goal of those Guidelines is to encourage multinational enterprises "to contribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable development".⁴⁴¹ To achieve this goal the OECD Guidelines provide a set of voluntary and non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conducts of MNEs. A third document, issued by a standard-setting organisation, the International Standard-Setting Organisation (ISO) is the ISO 26000 Guidance on Social Responsibility. It is again a voluntary standard in promoting socially responsible conduct. The ISO has moreover developed ISO 14000 for environmental management. However, whereas ISO 14000 is a management system standard, ISO 26000 only provides guidance, rather than requirements and it cannot be used for certification.⁴⁴²

Also at the EU level, several key initiatives with respect to CSR have been taken.⁴⁴³ In 2001 the European Commission already issued its first CSR policy, the Green Paper on promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility.⁴⁴⁴ The aim of this Green Paper was to "stimulate a wide debate on new ways of promoting corporate social responsibility at both the European level and at the international level".⁴⁴⁵ The probably next most important step derived from the EU Strategy 2011/2014, was launched in October 2011.⁴⁴⁶ Whereas in the 2001 Green Paper CSR still was defined as "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in

⁴³⁶ Ibidem.

⁴³⁷ Lu & Faure 2016, 260.

⁴³⁸ See in that respect especially McBarnet 2007.

⁴³⁹ For details, see Lu 2018, 155-157.

⁴⁴⁰ For details, see Lu 2018, 175-177.

⁴⁴¹ OECD Guidelines 2011, 19.

⁴⁴² Lu 2018, 179-180.

⁴⁴³ For a detailed account, see Lu 2018, 186-192.

⁴⁴⁴ COM(2001) 366 final.

⁴⁴⁵ COM(2001) 366 final, p. 23.

⁴⁴⁶ COM(2011) 681 final.

their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”⁴⁴⁷ in the 2011 Strategy CSR was redefined as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society”.⁴⁴⁸ The literature considers this an important shift since on the one hand CSR now refers to any possible impacts of the business operations and on the other hand CSR is no longer restricted to the traditional voluntary approach, but certainly has more mandatory connotations as well.⁴⁴⁹ In this (2011) new Agenda for Action the Commission also explicitly refers to the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ISO 26000.

Finally, it is also important to mention that the EU adopted a non-financial reporting requirement. Under Directive 2014/95/EU companies of a certain size are required to include in their management report non-financial information relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.⁴⁵⁰ It is the Directive 2014/95/EU, also called the non-financial reporting Directive, which lays down the rules on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by large companies, amending the accounting Directive 2013/43/EU.⁴⁵¹ The Directive forces large undertakings with 500 employees on average during the financial year to include in the management report a non-financial statement containing information to the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertakings development, performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. It therefore requires large companies to disclose particular information on the way they operate and manage social and environmental challenges. Companies may use international, European or national guidelines to report, such as the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or ISO 26000. In fact, the Directive leaves significant flexibility for companies to disclose relevant information in the way that they themselves consider most useful. The regulatory principle chosen in the Directive is that of “comply – or – explain”. That means that if a company does not pursue any policies in relation to environmental, social, and employee matters, it is not obliged to do so by the Directive, but it must provide an explanation for not doing so.⁴⁵²

In June 2017, the Commission published guidelines to help company disclose environmental and social information and equally published guidelines on reporting climate-related information. But it is therefore important to recall that for particular large undertakings in the EU non-financial reporting has become mandatory; the idea that CSR/CER is completely voluntary has therefore changed. There is, however, still criticism on the Directive, as there is no enforcement or sanctioning mechanism to support the reporting requirements. That may, in the words of Sjøfjell and Taylor “undermine the legislative aim of shifting businesses onto a sustainability path”.⁴⁵³

There are many other developments at EU level, for example also related to the encouragement of the long-term shareholder engagement and proposals to changes to the Shareholder Rights Directive, but a detailed discussion of those is beyond the scope of this study.⁴⁵⁴ It is, however, important to recognise that in many reforms at EU level, there is certainly a tendency to include societal and CSR-related issues.

⁴⁴⁷ COM(2001) 366 final, p. 6.

⁴⁴⁸ COM(2011) 861 final, p. 6.

⁴⁴⁹ See Lu 2018, 189-190.

⁴⁵⁰ See Sjøfjell 2016 and Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 19-20.

⁴⁵¹ OJ L 330 of 15 November 2014.

⁴⁵² For details, see Villiers & Mähönen 2015, 223.

⁴⁵³ Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 20.

⁴⁵⁴ For details, see Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 20-21.

Finally, it should be mentioned that also within the Member States there are many developments in the direction of an increasing importance of CSR/CER.⁴⁵⁵

5.4.4 Recent developments

From the sketch of the recent developments at the policy level, it already appears that CSR/CER is now well established. It also has had an important influence on corporate governance. Decisions concerning the environment now belong to the corporate boardroom⁴⁵⁶ and environmental law has therefore made inroads into corporate governance reform.⁴⁵⁷ The environment is now considered as one of the stakeholders that should play a role in corporate policy.⁴⁵⁸

There are, moreover, recent developments that may push the importance of CSR/CER even further. An important project is undertaken by Oslo professor Beate Sjøfjell and her team for a few years now. She is strongly arguing for replacing the traditional shareholder primacy paradigm by a different paradigm of sustainable value creation within the framework of her sustainable companies' project.⁴⁵⁹ She argues that companies today are expected to play the role of drivers of value creation and innovation. "A company law, which remains open to the social norm of shareholder primacy is a serious impediment to sustainability".⁴⁶⁰ She argues that the corporate purpose should be redefined as "creating sustainable value within the planetary boundaries while respecting the interests of its investors and other involved parties".⁴⁶¹ As a consequence, she equally argues that the duties of the corporate board should be redefined to create or promote such sustainable value within the planetary boundaries through a life-cycle based sustainable business plan. Central to her proposal is the displacement of the social norm of shareholder primacy with a legal norm of sustainable value creation.⁴⁶² Although these are at this moment mere academic proposals, they are strongly based on international environmental principles and international conventions, as a result of which one can notice a stronger tendency to make CSR (or in Sjøfjell's words sustainable value creation) also a legal norm. Sjøfjell et al. argue that this reform of corporate law towards sustainability is also necessary as far as the current interpretation of CSR is concerned. She for example argues that the current sustainability reporting has been a failure as a result of a lack of stringency and of verification requirements in the above mentioned Directive concerning non-financial reporting. Moreover, unsustainable businesses still can greenwash without being detected. Her solution is to clarify and strengthen sustainability reporting requirements, to make them more stringent and with specific requirements for external verification.⁴⁶³ She is also critical of corporate governance codes, created by financial actors without legislative control and without a sound research basis. They are, according to Sjøfjell et al., mere "drivers of shareholder primacy". This needs fundamental reforms other than simply continuing relying on the investor groups behind the codes to implement sustainability in a meaningful manner.⁴⁶⁴ The research group formulates various SMART reform proposals, supporting the transition to sustainability.⁴⁶⁵ It is clear that the law plays an important role in realizing these objectives as Sjøfjell et al. make clear that sustainability can only be achieved "if we dismantle regulatory barriers and reinforce positive trends".⁴⁶⁶ Needless to say that

⁴⁵⁵ For an overview, see Lu 2018, 192-210 and Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 20-21.

⁴⁵⁶ Ong 2001, 686.

⁴⁵⁷ Ong 2001, 688.

⁴⁵⁸ Ong 2001, 689.

⁴⁵⁹ See Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015.

⁴⁶⁰ Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 24.

⁴⁶¹ Sjøfjell & Taylor 2015, 25.

⁴⁶² Ibidem.

⁴⁶³ Sjøfjell et al. 2019, 2.4.

⁴⁶⁴ Sjøfjell et al. 2019, 2.5.

⁴⁶⁵ Sjøfjell et al. 2019.

⁴⁶⁶ Sjøfjell et al. 2019, 5.

these proposals all go in the direction of making CSR/CER much stronger as binding sustainability concepts that go far beyond the voluntary character that CSR nowadays often has⁴⁶⁷.

Another interesting development is that increasingly private lawyers also become interested in CER, more particularly in the so-called North-South relationship. Some, such as the Dutch tort lawyer Van Dam, but equally Enneking⁴⁶⁸, argue that corporations, especially multinational corporations from the North doing business in the developing countries in the South, have to comply with CSR, more particularly as far as respecting environmental norms and human rights is concerned. A problem is that often relocation to developing countries takes place from the North, because of the lower standards and norms in developing countries, which precisely reduces production costs for industry from developed countries. This has led to quite a few conflicts, for example with indigenous communities for violation of human rights in developing countries by multinational corporations.⁴⁶⁹ It has also led to elaborate questions with respect to the due diligence required by enterprises through global supply chains.⁴⁷⁰ Van Dam has held that multinational enterprises can be held liable under international law, or even under national tort law for violations of human rights or environmental pollution, which would occur in the South.⁴⁷¹ This is an important and interesting development as, also outside of the North-South relationship, it shows that CSR/CER has the potential to create norms which could, in case of violation, lead to civil liability. In the environmental sphere this would entail that CER could be interpreted as a duty of care under a fault/negligence regime. The moral obligations under CSR/CER "could easily become legal obligations once a sufficiently egregious case presents itself".⁴⁷² Violation of CSR/CER norms could then give rise to environmental liability if the other conditions are met.⁴⁷³ For the ELD this may not be directly of importance, given that the most important liability rule under the ELD is strict liability. Yet, this may open interesting perspectives for other environmental liability cases at the level of Member States.⁴⁷⁴

In short: one can increasingly notice that CSR/CER no longer is merely an engagement voluntarily taken by corporations to go beyond compliance with environmental regulations (as it originally started), but that there is a strong tendency to increasingly see mandatory obligations being imposed upon corporations in the framework of CSR/CER, either through an interpretation of the corporate purpose as sustainable value creation (Sjåfjell) or by considering a violation of CSR/CER norms as a basis for environmental liability. This seems to be a general trend: CSR is no longer only seen as voluntary, but increasingly replaced by an institutional framework for corporate accountability introducing clear rights and duties for companies based on an institutional framework.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁷ Of course there is equally criticism on these proposals. For example in a recent paper Fisch and Davidoff Solomon are critical of the fact that a corporation should have a purpose at all and argue that, at least as a default, the purpose of a corporation should be understood as maximizing the economic value of the firm (Fisch & Davidoff Solomon 2020).

⁴⁶⁸ See her powerful exposé on the role of tort law in promoting international CSR and accountability (Enneking 2012).

⁴⁶⁹ For an overview and various examples, see Choukroune 2013.

⁴⁷⁰ See in that respect the interesting study performed by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, CIVIC Consulting and the London School of Economics on due diligence requirements through the supply chain (Smit et al. 2020).

⁴⁷¹ See Van Dam 2011.

⁴⁷² So Bergkamp 2016, 189. See in that respect also Sheehy who equally argues the CSR does encompass environmental liabilities (Sheehy 2019, 1-23).

⁴⁷³ See equally Yan & Zhang who also argue that via the duty of care in tort law victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour can hold companies accountable. Yan & Zhang 2020, 107-109.

⁴⁷⁴ A different, though slightly related issue, is that increasingly also (legal) obligations are imposed on enterprises related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in order to mitigate climate change. See in that respect the interesting proposals by the Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises 2018.

⁴⁷⁵ See also the recent work by Yan & Zhang 2020, 101-123.

5.5 Concluding

This chapter focused in a broad sense on various developments both in the literature and at the policy level, which have as central theme: why do companies violate environmental regulation and how can companies be given an intrinsic motivation towards compliance? I started by presenting the work of Jennifer Arlen who showed that an outright (civil or criminal) liability mechanism may have potentially perverse effects as it could reduce incentives for corporations to monitor their employees. More self-policing and monitoring could lead to more detection and potentially to more liability. That led to the question whether the law can be shaped in such a way that companies who cooperate via self-policing and self-reporting could in some way be rewarded.

An important aspect of that quest relates to the introduction of so-called internal compliance mechanisms. There is an increasing tendency in the business world, partially driven by internal motives, partially driven by external pressure, to introduce internal compliance mechanisms. Whether the introduction of those mechanisms has been effective in promoting environmental compliance is not that easy to judge. That is as such not surprising since the effectiveness of internal compliance mechanisms may well depend upon the types of industries and the specific environment in which internal compliance mechanisms are implemented. The effectiveness may, moreover, be culturally dependent. Two important conclusions seem nevertheless to result from this empirical literature: first, internal compliance mechanisms (implying self-policing and self-reporting) can have a beneficial effect on compliance, but on the condition that those mechanisms are embedded in a robust regulatory framework. This means in practice that companies need to be aware of the fact that in case they would fail to comply with the internal management scheme, there is a credible threat of enforcement action by the agency, based on the deterrence approach. Second, a consequence of the previous point is that most studies agree that internal compliance mechanisms can never provide a complete alternative for regulation, but will always be used in combination with regulation. Most studies do show that, as the literature predicts, internal compliance mechanisms are useful tools upon which monitoring agencies can rely and which can hence improve the effectiveness of the enforcement efforts. The empirical evidence on whether self-policing is only effective if accompanied with legal consequences (such as mitigating or shielding from liability) is, however, mixed.

The introduction of an internal compliance mechanism is often also advocated within the second topic discussed in this chapter, CSR/CER. However, the introduction of an internal compliance mechanism is often merely seen as a minimum, whereas the core of CSR/CER is that companies should go beyond mere compliance. I showed that there are tendencies towards an increasing importance of CSR/CER, especially for large corporations. For example, the work of Beate Sjøfjell interpretes CER as an obligation for companies towards sustainable value creation as an alternative for shareholder primacy. CER is also increasingly reaching the policy level, for example in the obligation to provide reporting on non-financial issues as well. Moreover, there can be a relationship between CER and environmental liability and a violation of CER norms could potentially give rise to environmental liability. There is also the potential for tort law to promote international corporate social responsibility.⁴⁷⁶ Some have even advocated that a finding of environmental liability of the company, due to irresponsible conduct of the management, may lead to a duty of corporate directors to personally compensate their companies on the basis of their fiduciary relationship.⁴⁷⁷ These examples show that CER is no longer merely a voluntary exercise in the sense that there would be no legal consequences whatsoever. Violating CER

⁴⁷⁶ So Enneking 2012, 625-637.

⁴⁷⁷ Ong 2001, 718.

norms and creating environmental harm could lead to both environmental liability of the company and even (under specific circumstances) individual liability of corporate directors.

I indicated that there is some empirical evidence showing that voluntary compliance programmes can, under particular circumstances, indeed have positive effects of reducing environmental impacts. Yet, an important lesson from the empirical evidence is that those effects are only reached when the voluntary compliance programme is developed in the shadow of environmental regulation, in other words, if there is a realistic threat of enforcement in case of non-compliance. Otherwise, there is always the danger that the compliance management tool will amount to a “negotiated non-compliance”⁴⁷⁸ and that the internal compliance mechanism will not lead to substantial environmental improvements.

The same danger also exists as far as CSR/CER is concerned. Many duties, for example concerning reporting on non-financial issues are increasingly imposed, also at EU level, but enforcement remains weak. Moreover, there always remains the danger that voluntary compliance programmes and CER may simply function as smoke screens for a continuing degradation of the environment by the company concerned.⁴⁷⁹ It therefore remains of utmost importance to always judge the effectiveness of compliance programmes and CER⁴⁸⁰ not only in terms of whether investing in CER pays off for the corporation,⁴⁸¹ but also related to the more important question whether all innovative mechanisms discussed in this chapter effectively lead to an improved environmental performance of the corporation involved. In reality the many (voluntary) compliance mechanisms discussed in this chapter, will certainly not be an alternative for command and control regulation, but will rather function “in the shadow of the law”, in other words, in combination with an effectively enforced and deterrent environmental law.

⁴⁷⁸ Gunningham 1987.

⁴⁷⁹ Ong 2001, 716.

⁴⁸⁰ See generally Scheltema 2014, 383-405.

⁴⁸¹ Lu & Faure 2016, 257-259.

6 CIVIL, ADMINISTRATIVE OR CRIMINAL LIABILITY?

KEY FINDINGS

- Given the limits of private enforcement, safety regulation and public enforcement may play a primary role to remedy environmental pollution.
- Private law remedies may not suffice if the probability of detection is lower than 100%.
- In that case, administrative high fines may provide a counterweight for the low probability of detection.
- However, when the benefits of the violation are substantial and the probability of detection is low, a fine of such a high magnitude would be needed that it could reach the solvency limits of the perpetrator. In that case, non-monetary sanctions would have to be imposed. Given error costs, that should be done via a criminal law and the criminal procedure.
- However, there is ample scope to make large use of administrative fines for the enforcement of environmental law, which is also largely done in many Member States.
- Criminal liability of companies is important in order to be able to apply monetary sanctions to companies (given potential insolvency of employees).
- However, as monitoring by companies may be imperfect, corporate liability should be combined with liability of employees.
- Administrative liability of companies can on the one hand extend to measures and remedies and on the other hand to administrative fines, which may play an important role to enforce environmental law.
- At EU level, the Environmental Crime Directive (2008/99) forces Member States to create particular offences that are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. However, the sanctions imposed on legal entities should not necessarily be criminal in nature.
- The ECD is silent on administrative fines and administrative enforcement, although those could constitute an important alternative to criminal enforcement.

6.1 The relevance

Although this study focuses on environmental liability of companies, in the introduction it was already sketched that this topic cannot be analysed in isolation. Especially since I stressed that environmental liability serves two functions: compensation and prevention, it has to be recalled that the preventive function can also be achieved by other legal instruments than liability rules. Moreover, in the theoretical chapter (2) it was stressed that there are important limits in environmental liability which explain why *ex ante* safety regulation by the government would be the preferred instrument to control environmental pollution. Moreover, this is also what can be observed in practice. Environmental regulation is enforced through administrative and criminal sanctions. The question therefore arises to what extent companies are also exposed to administrative and criminal liability in case they would violate environmental regulation. The question is of importance as it could shed a light on the extent to which administrative and criminal liability could remedy some of the failures of exposing companies to environmental liability, which I have discussed in the previous two chapters. It could be examined

whether, if environmental liability would fail to provide adequate incentives for prevention (given the limited liability of corporations and a failure of legal instruments to remedy this), administrative or criminal liability could constitute a valuable alternative. If that were the case, then these alternative instruments could play a role in incentivising companies to take optimal preventive measures, aiming at the reduction of environmental harm.

In the following I first discuss the reason why generally environmental pollution needs a combination of civil, administrative and criminal sanctions (6.2); I then specifically ask the question whether companies should be held criminally liable (6.3) and what, in the alternative, the role of administrative liability could be (6.4). Section 6.5 focuses briefly on an important EU instrument addressing the issue, being the Environmental Crime Directive.⁴⁸² Section 6.6 summarises.

6.2 Civil, administrative or criminal law? Theoretical perspective

6.2.1 Private versus public enforcement

A first point that can be addressed is the difference between private and public enforcement of regulations. This comes down to the differences between liability rules and regulation as they were explained in the theoretical chapter 2. The main argument in favour of public enforcement is that private law remedies will as a general rule not sufficiently deter. The arguments have been explained in the standard work of Shavell who developed criteria for regulation,⁴⁸³ explained above:⁴⁸⁴ environmental pollution often has no individual victim that could file a liability suit; there may be insolvency problems and a liability suit is often not brought. The reasons may be that causation may be difficult to prove and there can be a long-time lapse, which makes it difficult to recognise that, for example, damage to nature has been caused through environmental pollution, let alone that a tort claim could still successfully be brought. These are the arguments traditionally advanced in favour of regulation. It are equally arguments why public regulation and public enforcement may be necessary to cure the negative externality caused by environmental pollution.

There is, however, also a second reason in favour of public enforcement and public sanctions, which is related to yet another inherent weakness in civil liability. The sanction of civil liability (having to pay compensation equal to the loss suffered by the victim) works well in cases where the probability of detection is 100%. A major problem with violations of (environmental) regulations is that the probability of detection may in fact be much lower than 100%.

Applying the economic model of crime of Nobel Prize Winner Gary Becker⁴⁸⁵ one can understand why the low probability of detection may lead to underdeterrence. According to Becker's model, the potential criminal (violation of environmental regulation) is faced with the following choice:

$$B \leq p \times S$$

Whereby:

B = benefits of the offence

p = probability of detection

S = severity of the actual sanction

Based on this deterrence hypothesis, the rich and abundant literature on economics of crime and law enforcement suggests that potential offenders respond to the incentives created by the criminal

⁴⁸² Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L 328 of 6 December 2008.

⁴⁸³ Shavell 1984.

⁴⁸⁴ See section 2.5.

⁴⁸⁵ See Becker 1962 and Becker 1968.

justice system and crime rates, hence *inter alia* depend on risks and benefits of crime.⁴⁸⁶ The problem with the remedies provided by private law can easily be understood:

Suppose that an offender could obtain a benefit (B) of 1.000, that the p would be 10% and that S would equally be 1.000. In that case the expected sanction would be 10% of 1.000, being 100 and underdeterrence would result. This is exactly the situation with the remedy in private law (which would be limited to the harm done). This is simply due to the fact that within liability the tortfeasor is in principle only forced to compensate the victim for the amount of the damage suffered and no more. Private law remedies therefore do not suffice where the probability of detection is less than 100%. For optimal deterrence a higher sanction (in this example of 1.000) has to be imposed in order to compensate for the low detection rate. This cannot be provided through private law, and hence explains the need for public sanctions which permit compensation for the low detection rate.⁴⁸⁷

Of course it may be clear from this presentation that there are also ways of dealing with the limits of civil law. If the main problem with liability law is that it limits compensation to the amount of harm done to the victim, one way of counterbalancing the low detection rate is to increase the amount of compensation payable by the injurer under tort law. That is precisely the idea behind the concept of punitive damages.⁴⁸⁸ Introducing punitive damages may therefore be an important instrument to improve the effectiveness (more particularly the deterrent effect) of (environmental) liability, which could for that reason certainly be considered. The problem is, however, that most Member States today reject the idea of punitive damages and it is not very popular in EU policy documents either.⁴⁸⁹ That implies that other remedies are needed in cases where the probability of detection is less than 100%. One obvious possibility is to impose financial penalties through an administrative agency. According to the example above, an administrative fine of 10.000 could, given the detection rate of 10%, lead to an expected sanction of 1.000 and thus provide optimal deterrence. The problem of insufficient deterrence related to a low probability of detection can therefore be cured by public enforcement with administrative financial penalties, thus increasing deterrence and the conditions for compliance.⁴⁹⁰ Even though administrative fines can therefore provide optimal deterrence, there may be some limits to administrative financial penalties as well. That may then be a reason to use the criminal law in particular cases.

6.2.2 Administrative or criminal law

So far I explained the traditional argument why environmental regulation cannot merely be enforced via private law and why public enforcement with public sanctions is indicated. The main reason relates to the low probability of detecting violations of environmental regulation.⁴⁹¹ This does not yet explain why administrative fines could not be the perfect remedy and why in particular cases the criminal law equally has to be used. All things being equal, the administrative procedure has the major advantage that it is far less costly than the criminal procedure. Administrative fines can be imposed by administrative authorities after a relatively simple procedure, usually requiring a lower threshold of proof, certainly compared to the criminal law and the criminal procedure.⁴⁹² Administrative law can therefore easily be used to deter environmental pollution.⁴⁹³ There are, however, two important reasons while not all efficient penalties necessary to deter environmental pollution can be imposed

⁴⁸⁶ See Garoupa 1997.

⁴⁸⁷ Skogh 1973 and Skogh & Stewart 1982.

⁴⁸⁸ Cooter 1982.

⁴⁸⁹ Punitive damages will be further discussed as a potential remedy below in 7.2.

⁴⁹⁰ See also Faure, Ogus & Philipsen 2009, 173-176.

⁴⁹¹ See also Faure 2009, 324-326.

⁴⁹² Faure, Ogus & Philipsen 2009, 174.

⁴⁹³ See in this respect especially Ogus & Abbot 2002.

through administrative law and why criminal law is therefore necessary as well.⁴⁹⁴ A first reason is that since the probability of detecting environmental pollution is in practice often very low, the optimal sanction to deter pollution may become very high as well. The likelihood that this optimal fine might outweigh the individual wealth of the offender is relatively high, precisely given the often mentioned insolvency risk. If the optimal fine (to outweigh a low detection rate) would be higher than the assets of a firm, the fine may not deter. Take the following example:

$B = 1$ million

$p = 1\%$

In the environmental context this is not unimaginable. Suppose that a company would have to install a water treatment plant (which is often very costly, running costs can be in the several tens of millions). Suppose that it has to borrow money from the bank and that it is able to negotiate with administrative enforcement authorities in order to delay the installation of the water treatment plant (*de facto* violating the conditions of its permit). If it would, in this example, have to pay an interest of one million to the bank in a period of one year, delaying the installation of the water treatment plant (again, which would *de facto* be a violation of environmental regulation) would therefore create a benefit of 1 million. Given the detection rate (p) of 1%, the optimal fine in that example would be 100 million euro. Very few environmental laws in the Member States have these types of high sanctions. There may also be no willingness with administrative authorities to impose fines of those magnitudes and, most importantly, even if this optimal fine were imposed, there is a great likelihood that the operator would not be able to pay. That explains that when the optimal fine is higher than the ability to pay of the company, non-monetary sanctions (such as imprisonment or community service) have to be imposed to provide deterrence.⁴⁹⁵

Still the question could be asked why the criminal law would be needed to impose non-monetary sanctions. This is exactly the second reason for criminalisation: the goal of the enforcement system is to apply sanctions to the guilty, but also to avoid punishing the innocent. This is referred to as the goal of reducing error costs.⁴⁹⁶ There is therefore a clear justification why society does not want to impose very stringent sanctions (such as imprisonment, but also high fines) through an administrative procedure. The reason is that the costs of the administrative procedure may be lower than the costs of the criminal procedure, but the accuracy of the latter (where the investigations are often undertaken by professional lawyers) may be a lot higher as well. Error costs are higher when very serious sanctions, like imprisonment, can be imposed, rather than monetary sanctions only. The less costly administrative proceedings can therefore only be used in all cases where the consequences (and thus the error costs) will not be too high in the event of a wrongful conviction.⁴⁹⁷

6.2.3 Criteria

If one were to summarize the previous expose, one could argue that administrative fines (with the advantage of being a lower cost system) could be applied when:

- there is a first time offender
- who committed a breach of regulation unintentionally
- where the B is relatively low
- where there is a relative high p and
- a relatively modest administrative fine (S) would thus suffice to reach optimal deterrence.

⁴⁹⁴ See in that respect generally Bowles, Faure & Garoupa 2008.

⁴⁹⁵ Shavell 1985a.

⁴⁹⁶ On the importance of error costs, see Miceli 1990.

⁴⁹⁷ Faure 2009, 326; Faure, Ogus & Philipsen 2009, 176.

The example might be the case where a small- or medium-size company out of ignorance forgot to appoint an environmental coordinator (assuming that the regulation required to do so). In such a case there is no direct environmental harm or emission; the failure of reporting does not provide great benefits to the company (especially in the case where the coordinator was appointed, but the company merely failed to report this). For controlling agencies it is relatively easy to detect this failure to report. In such a case, a modest administrative fine (if sanctioning is needed at all given that the breach took place unintentionally) would suffice.

If, however:

- there is a repeat offender
- who committed a breach intentionally
- leading to high B
- and a relatively small p
- a high S would be needed, which can be probably not be reached through an administrative fine. A criminal sanction would be appropriate in this case.

Again, this can relatively easily be understood: the fact that it is a repeat offender makes clear that it is not an unintentional breach. The operator might intentionally breach regulation in order to gain profit (for example in case of trade in waste) and the possibilities for authorities to discover the breach might be small, hence a small p. This is a typical case where a reaction by the criminal law might be needed.⁴⁹⁸

6.2.4 Practice

Traditionally the criminal law was basically the only instrument used to enforce environmental regulation in the Member States. For example in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, for a long time alternative mechanisms that could equally aim at deterrence (more particularly administrative fines) were not available.⁴⁹⁹ Only in Germany and legal systems inspired by the German example (like Austria) systems of administrative penal law, allowing for the imposition of fines (so-called *Geldbußen*) were available. This model of "criminal law only" became subject of criticism, more particularly in the United Kingdom where a 2002 article by Anthony Ogus and Carolyn Abbot asked "Do we have the right regime?",⁵⁰⁰ referring to the fact that the United Kingdom almost exclusively relied on the criminal law to enforce environmental law. They influenced the work of Richard Macrory, who carried out a wide-ranging review of regulatory enforcement regimes for the UK cabinet office.⁵⁰¹ He came to the conclusion that enforcement systems should involve less reliance on criminal law and greater use of administrative penalties. Similar views were expressed in Belgium – more particularly in the Flemish Region – during revision of environmental law in a Draft Decree on Environmental Policy.⁵⁰²

Different streams of literature therefore pleaded in favour of a "toolbox" approach, whereby a variety of different tools (civil penalties, administrative fines and criminal law) are at the disposal of enforcers.⁵⁰³ A main reason for this plaidoyer was also that data increasingly made clear that criminal sanctions were rarely imposed in practice. For example, for the Flemish Region, the environmental inspectorate collected data on the number of cases that were dismissed out of the total number of violations. For the period 1998-2004 the environmental inspectorate noticed that of all of its notices of violation on average 64% of the cases were dismissed, whereas approximately 7% were prosecuted.⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁹⁸ See further for a summary of those criteria Faure & Svatikova 2012, 258-260.

⁴⁹⁹ Faure 2017b, 330.

⁵⁰⁰ Ogus & Abbot 2002.

⁵⁰¹ Macrory 2006.

⁵⁰² Bocken & Ryckbost 1996.

⁵⁰³ Faure 2017b, 339.

⁵⁰⁴ For a further discussion of these data on the Flemish Region, see Faure & Svatikova 2010.

Similar data points came from the United Kingdom. Bell and McGillivray report that for the period 2000-2007 around 25.000 pollution incidents were reported, but less than 5% were prosecuted.⁵⁰⁵ Also the other data (although in most Member States data on enforcement of environmental law are not available), all pointed into the same direction: many violations of environmental regulation were not prosecuted, but rather dismissed and the number of cases that came before the courts was very limited.⁵⁰⁶

As a result of these developments in many Member States, initiatives were taken deciding that particular violations would no longer be handled by the criminal law, but exclusively through administrative penal law. For example the United Kingdom, following the recommendations of Macrory in 2008-2009, introduced administrative fines. As a consequence the environment agency can impose either a fixed monetary penalty or a variable monetary penalty. The idea of applying those fines is to fill the gap in enforcement where prosecutions do not seem to be in the public interest.⁵⁰⁷ Similar changes took place in the Brussels, Flemish and Walloon Regions in Belgium, where some environmental crimes have been declassified as administrative offences, which are no longer subject to the criminal law. Data on the enforcement policy after the introduction of the administrative fining system in the Flemish Region in Belgium show that dismissals (i.e. cases where no enforcement reaction whatsoever took place) had been considerably reduced. Those cases that the prosecutor dismisses are now sent to the administrative authority for imposing an administrative fine, as a result of which the number of cases where no reaction takes place at all, has substantially decreased.⁵⁰⁸ However, even though in some Member States there are thus indications that a toolbox approach is followed, this is certainly not the case for all EU Member

6.3 Criminal liability of companies

6.3.1 Theory

The central thesis of this study is that violations of environmental regulation are often committed, not by an individual actor, but by persons acting on behalf of a company. Many cases of environmental pollution take place within corporate entities. That raises unavoidably the question whether the corporation, the employee or both should be held liable.

The argument for holding a company liable rather than (only) the individual within the company is *inter alia* related to the insolvency problem: when the company is held liable, the less costly fines can longer be applied in reaction to environmental crime; the company (employer) can in turn apply sanctions to the employee who committed the violation, such as refusing promotion or termination of the contract.⁵⁰⁹ Since the employee cannot bear the full burden of the optimal penalty, the government might still be able to impose the optimal penalty on the company.⁵¹⁰

The importance of the possibility to address criminal enforcement also against corporations has often be stressed in the literature.⁵¹¹ If there is no liability of the corporate entity, prosecutors (and other enforcers) are either forced to look for the specific natural person that committed the environmental crime (in the absence of which no prosecution would be possible) or would automatically charge individuals having a particular function (like a director or corporate officer), which may violate the

⁵⁰⁵ Bell & McGillivray 2005, 291.

⁵⁰⁶ For an overview of enforcement in the Member States, see Faure & Svatikova 2012.

⁵⁰⁷ Faure 2017b, 353.

⁵⁰⁸ In that respect see the Flemish High Council for Environmental Enforcement, <http://www.vhrm.be/publicaties>, consulted on 18 May 2020.

⁵⁰⁹ Faure 2009, 331.

⁵¹⁰ Cohen 2001, 208-209.

⁵¹¹ See the contributions in Eser, Heine & Huber 1999.

principle of guilt in criminal law. For that reason it is important to have a system in place where criminal enforcement can also be applied against companies.

Recently David Roef also provided a powerful overview of the reasons why corporate criminal liability should exist:⁵¹²

- since corporations are viewed as a legal entity separate from its employees and shareholders, this personality should also be subject to the rules of criminal law;
- the general objectives of criminal law (like retributive justice and utilitarian goals like general deterrence) can also be reasonable justifications for punishments of corporate entities. Corporate criminal liability may therefore discourage other companies from disobeying the law;
- without corporate criminal liability there would be a risk of only a few individuals being prosecuted for offences that were in reality caused by corporate policies and practices that transcend individual actions and
- finally: if through an illegal practice a company enjoys a financial or other benefit, like a better market position, the legal entity should be the one to pay the price and not the employees who have contributed to the commission of the offence.

Although the (economic as well as legal) literature indicates that there are strong arguments in favour of corporate criminal liability⁵¹³ there are reasons to combine the criminal liability of the corporation with the liability of individuals within the corporation. One problem is that corporate entities may equally be unable to pay for the damage caused by their pollution. Monetary sanctions can equally exceed the corporations' assets and thus not be an effective deterrent. The problem is that in that case non-monetary sanctions, which would be needed to deal with the insolvency problem, cannot be applied to the corporation, but must be applied to individual employees. Moreover, Polinsky and Shavell indicate that monitoring by firms may often be imperfect. If employees only face fines (and not incarceration) they may not be induced to exercise socially optimal levels of care. It is therefore argued that in addition to the fines applied to corporations, also non-monetary sanctions (imprisonment) should deter employees.⁵¹⁴ The legal entity and the natural person are relatively independent agents acting within their own sphere. Corporate and individual liability are therefore no competing strategies, but rather complementary approaches to fighting corporate crime.⁵¹⁵

6.3.2 Practice

In 1994 the general report of the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal on environmental criminal law still held that the majority of continental European countries adhered to the principle of personal liability and that as a result, corporations cannot commit a crime.⁵¹⁶ A lot has changed since 1994, as many European Member States have now introduced corporate criminal liability.⁵¹⁷ Member States' point of view differ, however, as to whether the nature of that corporate liability should be criminal or administrative. Many Member States have developed side-systems, so called administrative penal law (as an alternative to criminal corporate liability) to impose sanctions on enterprises.⁵¹⁸ More particularly, as a result of strong opposition in legal doctrine, Germany (and a few others under its influence) has always opposed criminal liability of legal entities. Although this distinction may

⁵¹² Roef 2019, 333-334.

⁵¹³ See for example Friedman 2000; Kahan 1998.

⁵¹⁴ Polinsky & Shavell 1993; Kornhauser 1982.

⁵¹⁵ Roef 2019, 340-341.

⁵¹⁶ Prabhu 1994, 715.

⁵¹⁷ For an overview, see Faure & Heine 2005, 41-44.

⁵¹⁸ Faure & Heine 2005, 42-43.

dogmatically be very important, as a practical matter, the most important question is whether it is possible at all to address enforcement actions to the corporation, no matter what label one attaches to the particular penalty that may be imposed (criminal or administrative). Some Member States, like for example France, Belgium, Poland, Spain (and the United Kingdom), accept criminal responsibility, but Member States like Germany and Italy (as well as a few others) do not. Those differences may perhaps not be that relevant in practice, since even countries that reject corporate criminal liability have other systems in place that effectively allow the imposition of similar penalties as under a criminal liability regime. Germany takes the position that “*societas delinquere non potest*”.⁵¹⁹ They therefore adopt an alternative approach of administrative liability of legal entities as they are considered to lack the capacity to act in a blameworthy way.⁵²⁰ But the label “administrative” sanctions should not mislead into thinking that that system would be less punitive than traditional criminal law approaches. Administrative penalties can often be quite substantial and as deterrent as criminal sanctions.⁵²¹ There is some movement in Germany in the sense that criminal liability of companies is at least debated. Most Member States also allow a cumulation between the liability of the corporation with the liability of natural persons.

Dogmatically a great deal of importance is paid to the question whether the liability of a company is constructed as criminal or administrative. However, it may in practice not make that much of a difference, as in both cases it will result in monetary penalties (fines) to be imposed on corporations as obviously the main criminal sanction (imprisonment) cannot be imposed on corporations. One important difference that remains is that the criminal sanction is also supposed to lead to a “shaming” of the criminal. An administrative fine would lack that moral connotation. If one believes that the imposition of a criminal sanction does have an added value (in the sense of imposing stigma on the corporation), that would be an additional argument to still insist on making the liability of corporations criminal. The empirical evidence concerning the stigmatising effect of the criminal sanction is, however, debated. Karpoff and Loth showed that whereas the stock value of publically traded firms could fall after the announcement of a bad environmental outcome, such as an oil spill or criminal prosecution, these “stock price” sanctions are approximately equal to government imposed penalties, clean-up costs and private settlements.⁵²² It is therefore doubtful whether a criminal conviction of a company would cause an additional reputational loss. The mere fact of being labelled as a “criminal” apparently does not lead to additional costs. However, the mere fact that in some countries companies can still not be held criminally liable (but only exposed to civil or administrative liability) remains a problem within the framework of the Environmental Crime Directive where it is argued that only criminal penalties “demonstrate a social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature compared to administrative penalties or a compensation mechanism under civil law”.⁵²³

6.4 Administrative liability of companies

As I already made clear earlier, companies may equally be exposed to administrative liability in different forms.

6.4.1 Administrative fines

Here it can be recalled that administrative financial penalties imposed by administrative agencies can under specific conditions provide adequate incentives for deterrence. The administrative fine should

⁵¹⁹ Corporations are not able to commit crimes.

⁵²⁰ Roef 2019, 340.

⁵²¹ Ibidem.

⁵²² Karpoff & Loth 1993.

⁵²³ Recital 3 preceding the Environmental Crime Directive 2008/99 of 19 November 2008.

be reasonably high if it is to exceed the profit accruing from the violation and discounted by the probability of detection, which often is relatively low. Administrative financial penalties can also give rise to high error costs as they lack the high evidentiary thresholds required for liability in the criminal and justice systems.⁵²⁴ At the same time it was equally argued that administrative fines can constitute a low-cost alternative to the costly criminal procedure. In those countries where the criminal law cannot be applied to corporations (like in Germany) administrative fines will be applied to behaviour committed within the framework of a corporation and which is formally considered a crime.⁵²⁵

6.4.2 Measures and remedies

In many Member States administrative authorities have the ability to impose particular remedies (measures or sanctions), after they have discovered environmental crime.⁵²⁶ Many of those measures and sanctions aim at restoration of environmental harm or prevention of future harm. The advantage of the administrative authorities is that they may proceed to a speedy response, especially in cases where speed is of utmost importance. When, for example, waste has been illegally deposited or a dangerous installation is continued to be used in an unlawful manner, it may be clear that it would be unacceptable to wait for the outcome of a civil or criminal trial that could last for many years until a particular action is taken. Administrative authorities may then (through administrative measures and sanctions) have the possibility of reacting rapidly in order to force the perpetrator to reverse the harm done or prevent future harm.⁵²⁷ In many Member States, those administrative remedies are primarily referred to as “measures” for the reason that their primary goal is restoration or prevention of future harm and not inflicting intentional pain on a perpetrator with a view to deterrence. The latter is usually called a sanction or penalty.

6.4.3 Practice

Many Member States have a variety of measures and sanctions that can be imposed by environmental authorities. For example France refers to a variety of “administrative controls and administrative police measures” allowing the authority to issue a particular ruling and oblige operators to exercise particular duties or to execute, *ex officio*, measures themselves, but at the expense of the operator.⁵²⁸ The authorities can, moreover, order the payment of a fine of not more than Euro 15.000 and a daily fine of not more than Euro 1.500, which is due until the conditions imposed have been fulfilled.⁵²⁹

A classic example of the fining system can be found in the well-known German *Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz* (Administrative Offences Act), which created a system of administrative penal fines applicable to administrative penal offences. It is the type of sanction that Germany will apply to corporations. It allows the imposition of a substantial fine up to Euro 10 million.⁵³⁰ Empirical evidence in Germany shows that administrative fines are in practice more often used for environmental offences than criminal law.⁵³¹

I already mentioned earlier that as a result of the 2008 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (RESA), it is possible to impose in the United Kingdom civil sanctions as an alternative to criminal prosecutions. The environment agency can issue a compliance note (requiring compliance within a specified time-limit), a restoration notice (requiring measures to restore the damage caused) or an

⁵²⁴ Faure, Ogus & Philipsen 2009, 174.

⁵²⁵ Faure 2017c, 299.

⁵²⁶ Faure & Heine 2005, 49-50; Prahbu 1994, 724-726.

⁵²⁷ Faure 2017c, 299.

⁵²⁸ Bianco & Lucifora 2017, 89-91.

⁵²⁹ Ibidem.

⁵³⁰ Sina 2017, 114-115.

⁵³¹ See Meinberg 1988 and Faure & Svatikova 2012, 274-279.

enforcement undertaking (whereby the offender offers to undertake specific steps to amend non-compliance).⁵³² It was already indicated that the 2008 Regulatory Reform in the United Kingdom moved the enforcement system away from a system that traditionally largely relied on criminal enforcement to a system of administrative fines.⁵³³

In sum, many current and former (like the UK) Member States provide possibilities to administrative authorities to impose measures aiming at a speedy remediation of the particular environmental problem, which would be cumbersome for the civil or criminal justice system. In addition, there seems to be a tendency in many Member States to move towards the use of other remedies than merely the criminal law. Many Member States now rely less on the criminal law and move to systems of financial penalties. As those can undoubtedly be regarded as cost-effective reactions for minor offences, this tendency can be welcomed.⁵³⁴

6.5 Environmental Crime Directive

6.5.1 Brief sketch

On 19 November 2008 Directive 2008/99 on the protection of the environment through criminal law was promulgated.⁵³⁵ Within the framework of this study, focusing on environmental liability of companies, this Environmental Crime Directive (ECD) should of course not be discussed in detail. This would, moreover, not be possible as there have already been so many publications dealing with this Directive.⁵³⁶ It is, however, interesting to sketch some of the main features of the ECD, more particularly in the light of the current chapter dealing with the choice between civil, administrative and criminal liability. It is more particularly interesting to verify to what extent the ECD also fits in the new trends described in this chapter, being to increasingly impose criminal liability also on corporations and to increasingly use administrative fines rather than criminal penalties.

The Directive had a long history and even gave rise to an institutional conflict between the Commission and the Council.⁵³⁷

The ECD starts by mentioning in Recital (2) that the Community is concerned “at the rise in environmental offences and at the effects, which are increasingly extending beyond the borders of the states in which the offences are committed. Such offences pose a threat to the environment and therefore call for an appropriate response”. The next Recital (3) is interesting within the scope of our study. It reads: “Experience has shown that the existing systems of penalties have not been sufficient to achieve complete compliance with the laws for the protection of the environment. Such compliance can and should be strengthened by the availability of criminal penalties, which demonstrate a social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature, compared to administrative penalties or a compensation mechanism under civil law”.

As a starting point it is therefore clear that the drafters of the ECD have a strong belief in the importance of the criminal law, which has a stronger deterrent effect than administrative or civil liability. As a result, Member States have to provide for criminal penalties in their national legislation in respect of serious infringements of provisions of community law on the protection of the environment. The legislation

⁵³² Fasoli 2017, 256-263.

⁵³³ Ibidem and Faure & Svatikova 2012, 266-271.

⁵³⁴ Faure 2017c, 301-304.

⁵³⁵ OJ L 328/28 of 6 December 2008.

⁵³⁶ See for a recent overview of the literature Vagliasindi 2017.

⁵³⁷ This is undoubtedly interesting, but less relevant within the framework of this study. Those interested can for example consult Heidemann-Robinson 2008; Ryland 2009 and Vagliasindi 2017, 33-40.

which is listed in the Annexes to the ECD contains provisions which should therefore be subject to criminal law measures in order to ensure that the rules on environmental protection are fully effective.

The text of the Directive equally makes clear (in Recital 10) that the Directive obliges Member States to provide for criminal penalties in their national legislation in respect of serious infringements of provisions of community law on the protection of the environment, but that the Directive "creates no obligations regarding the application of such penalties, or any other available system of law enforcement, in individual cases".

The way in which the Directive functions is as follows: Article 3 of the ECD provides a detailed list of particular behaviour that should be criminalised "when unlawful and committed intentionally or at least with serious negligence". The unlawfulness refers in Article 2(1) to infringing legislation adopted pursuant to the EC Treaty and listed in the Annexes to the ECD or to national Member State law or regulation that gives effect to the mentioned community legislation.

Article 5 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are punishable by "effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties".⁵³⁸ The ECD also has specific provisions with respect to legal entities. The ECD requires in Article 7 that Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons are held liable and punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. But, differently than in Article 5, for legal entities it is not mentioned that those penalties should be criminal in nature. This had been done to facilitate the introduction of a form of corporate liability for environmental crime in those legal systems where the admissibility of a truly criminal liability of legal entities is constitutionally controversial.⁵³⁹ In other words: the penalties that have to be introduced according to Article 5 of the ECD have to be criminal penalties, but the penalties for legal persons which are liable under Article 6 of the ECD should not necessarily be criminal in character (based on Article 7).

6.5.2 Critical points

Again, it should be stressed that within the framework of this study, it is not the objective to provide an comprehensive analysis of the ECD, but merely to formulate a few remarks in relation to the topic of this study. A first issue to repeat is that legal persons can be held liable for offences listed in the ECD, without requiring the liability to be criminal. One could criticise this, on the other hand it is mostly valued positive in the literature⁵⁴⁰ as by the end legal persons are held liable for environmental crime; it is only not required that the sanctions should be criminal in nature. As mentioned earlier, the difference in practice will not be that large, except that the administrative (or civil) penalties may lack the shaming effect of the criminal law, which the drafters of the ECD (according to the Recital) apparently found important. That "social disapproval of a qualitatively different nature" will therefore not be reached, as far as the sanctions imposed on legal entities are concerned, at least in those Member States that resist the criminal liability of legal entities. But it is doubtful whether that is really a major issue in the practical enforcement of environmental law. This approach is, moreover, in line with the approaches towards corporate liability in other documents emanating from the Council of Europe and the European Union. Those generally require Member States to provide for corporate liability within their legal system. However, they take a pragmatic approach and take into account the different doctrinal positions regarding corporate liability. As a result, it is left to the individual Member

⁵³⁸ For a further analysis of the contents of these notions, see Faure 2010a.

⁵³⁹ Vagliasindi 2017, 49.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibidem.

States to provide for either criminal or administrative sanctions, as long as they are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.⁵⁴¹

A second issue, not so much related to the topic of this chapter, but to the ECD generally, is that the ECD contains a lot of vague notions. This is already clear in Recital 5 preceding the Directive stressing that “In order to achieve effective protection of the environment, there is a particular need for more dissuasive penalties for environmentally harmful activities, which typically cause or are likely to cause substantial damage to the air, including the stratosphere, to soil, water, animals or plants, including to the conservation of species”. These vague notions are of course problematic from the perspective of drafting criminal law provisions and therefore need a more precise formulation in the national implementing legislation.⁵⁴² Vague notions are often the result of a political compromise. An evaluative study on the ECD just finished by Milieu Consulting, is *inter alia* suggesting to further define the current vague notions in the ECD.

Of course, even though the penalties imposed on legal entities should not necessarily be criminal in character, they still have to be dissuasive, proportionate and effective. An OECD report raised doubts on whether the penalties against legal entities in Germany were indeed effective, proportionate and dissuasive as required by Article 7 of the ECD.⁵⁴³ If penalties imposed in practice on legal entities would be too low, serious questions concerning the dissuasive character could obviously be asked.⁵⁴⁴ Incidentally, a study concerning the implementation of the ECD in Member States discovered that it was apparently extremely difficult for Member States to correctly implement the Directive. In none of the seven examined Member States it was argued that the transposition had been flawless. In several Member States there was also criticism in legal doctrine on the way in which the ECD was transposed.⁵⁴⁵

There is one striking feature of the ECD which has to be mentioned in the framework of this chapter, which is the strong reliance on the criminal law. Recall that in many Member States there is, following the literature and the data on the bad performance of environmental enforcement via criminal law; a trend to rely increasingly on administrative financial penalties and no longer merely on the criminal law. It is in that respect striking that the ECD, especially in Recital 3, attaches a strong belief to the criminal law and moreover holds that specific violations need to be regarded as criminal offences in the national legislation implementing the Directive. There is no mentioning whatsoever of administrative penalties (either fines or measures) or of a toolbox approach. Obviously, that does formally not exclude the possibility for Member States to retain administrative penalties and also administrative fines. However, it is clear that in order to implement the Directive correctly, at least the infringements mentioned in the Directive should be threatened by the legislature with criminal penalties. Given the weaknesses in the criminal enforcement system, one could have imagined that the Directive would also have given attention to administrative enforcement.

6.6 Summary

This chapter has analysed environmental liability in a broader framework. Environmental damage can indeed cause harm to individual victims, thus justifying private enforcement. But in many cases environmental harm may be wide-spread and could damage a large area and many victims; there may be some cases that cause no direct harm to individuals at all. That shows an important limitation of the environmental liability system and of private enforcement in general.⁵⁴⁶ Many breaches of

⁵⁴¹ This approach is taken in many other legal instruments as well. For example, see Roef 2019, 370-371.

⁵⁴² See further on those vague notions, Faure 2010b; Faure 2010c.

⁵⁴³ Sina 2017, 114-115.

⁵⁴⁴ Faure 2017c, 309.

⁵⁴⁵ Faure 2017c, 308-309.

⁵⁴⁶ Faure & Weber 2017, 868-869.

environmental regulations can be deterred via administrative fines. That is especially the case for so-called administrative violations, for example, where administrative rules are violated, but no concrete environmental harm has been caused – yet. The benefits (B) of those administrative violations may be limited and public authorities may easily discover the violation as a result of which the probability of detection (p) should not be low. In those cases, administrative fines may also suffice because there is no need to impose stigmatising sanctions. In some cases, however, the benefit to the perpetrator and the social cost to society may be substantially larger. These could well be cases where criminal enforcement may be indicated.

It is striking that European environmental law represents to some extent a mixture of private and public enforcement with, however, a much stronger tendency towards the use of criminal law. As far as private enforcement is concerned, the ELD, crucial to this study, is the most important one; criminal enforcement is regulated in the ECD. The Environmental Crime Directive is completely silent on the issue of administrative enforcement. This plays, however, an important role in the practice of the MS. Administrative fines are not discussed at the EU level.⁵⁴⁷

The exposé in this chapter has taught that in the choice of different instruments to remedy environmental harm, there are possibilities for improvement, such as:

- improving collective action to deal with the rational apathy in case of collective (environmental) harm;
- to examine punitive damage to increase the effectiveness of private enforcement in case of a low probability of detection;
- to further examine administrative enforcement and more particularly administrative fines as alternatives to the criminal law.

In general, it is important to realise that civil, administrative and criminal law instruments, are alternative ways of remedying breaches of environmental law by companies. Each of those instruments has strengths and weaknesses and the key issue is to search for optimal mixes, smart mixes in the use of those instruments.⁵⁴⁸ Moreover, the separate instruments (civil, administrative and criminal) should not (as is often the case) be analysed in isolation as there are mutual interdependencies between those instruments in practice. A careful analysis of those instruments may again allow an optimal instrument mix in order to guarantee a more effective enforcement in practice.

⁵⁴⁷ Faure & Weber 2017, 842-845.

⁵⁴⁸ See in that respect further on smart mixes of instruments to remedy environmental harm Van Erp, Faure, Nollkaemper & Philipsen 2019.

7 IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

KEY FINDINGS

- The conditions for environmental liability may limit the possibility to hold companies liable, but there are potential remedies.
- The introduction of punitive damages could remedy the situation where a probability of detection is less than 100%.
- Problems related to uncertainty over causation could be remedied by applying a proportional liability regime.
- When a long time lapse emerged between an emission and the occurrence of the harm, the polluter should only be held liable if the emission was already considered wrongful at the time when it was committed. Otherwise compensation should be provided through other means than liability.
- In case of widespread pollution a market failure could occur related to rational apathy.
- This can be solved through a representative action by NGOs.
- To implement this in the EU, the third pillar of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention should be implemented in EU law as well.
- Problems related to high cost aversion may lead to a market failure as a victim would not bring a suit, but various remedies are possible.
- A conditional fee arrangement makes the lawyer a gatekeeper and shifts risk to the lawyer.
- Legal expenses insurance could equally protect potential victims against risks related to litigation.
- Third party funding of litigation could equally enable liability suits.
- Finally, it is desirable that a rapid claims mechanism is available to avoid that follow-on losses would occur as a result of the time lapse in litigation.

7.1 Importance

In the theoretical framework in chapter 2, it was made clear that prevention of environmental harm can be achieved, either through *ex ante* safety regulation or through *ex post* liability rules. If it were possible to improve the functioning of liability rules, society would be less dependent on the effectiveness of *ex ante* safety regulation to guarantee environmental quality. In addition, it was equally sketched that safety regulation also has important limits and that environmental liability therefore has an important supplementary role to fulfil.

However, it was equally noticed that in some cases environmental liability may not be able to fulfil its preventive and compensating functions. An important reason that was explained in more detail in chapters 4 and 5 is that, especially when environmental harm is caused by companies, the limited liability of the corporation may restrict the possibilities to hold companies liable for the total environmental damage they may have caused. There can, however, also be other reasons that limit the effectiveness of environmental liability. Those reasons obviously not only play a role in case of environmental liability of companies, but also there. This chapter will focus more on those reasons for a potential lacking effectiveness of environmental liability and will equally advance potential solutions.

A first issue relates to limits in liability itself, such as for example, causal uncertainty. Some of those issues have already been discussed in earlier chapters, but they will be brought together also to indicate potential solutions (7.2).

A next important problem in case of environmental liability is that there may be widespread pollution, as a result of which no individual victim can be identified and no one may bring an individual liability suit. That could result in a market failure as a liability suit will not be brought and social costs will not be internalized (7.3). However, there are many possibilities to solve this collective action problem (7.4).

Finally, environmental liability suits are often not brought for the simple reason that the potential victim may have an aversion against high costs. As a result, even meritorious claims (that have a positive net present value) are in some cases not brought. Again, solutions to this problem have been advanced as well (7.5). Even though generally access to justice is of course of importance to increase environmental accountability and liability of companies, one has to recall that Recital 14 of the ELD clearly states that "This Directive does not apply to cases of personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect any right regarding these types of damages". In other words: the ELD does not provide for any personal rights to victims to claim compensation for the losses that they suffer. Therefore, the search to improve access to justice is rather of general importance for the environmental liability of companies, also outside the context of the ELD.

One particular problem in case of environmental liability is that the damage may increase simply as a result of time. When for example a nature reserve was seriously polluted through hydrocarbons, the nearby restaurant may go bankrupt, simply because compensation may take a long time. It is therefore of importance not only that compensation is paid, but also that it is paid rapidly. Some rapid claims mechanisms have been developed to provide (advance) payment in order to avoid that through the mere lapse of time damage would increase (7.6).

7.2 Remedies in liability law

In the different chapters I already discussed particular conditions in material liability law, which may limit the possibilities of environmental liability. As these issues were discussed in different chapters, they will now simply be brought together briefly, in order to avoid repetition:

7.2.1 Punitive damages

A first limit of liability law is that the remedy can only be equal to the harm done, in other words, it brings the victim back in the position where the victim was without the tort. That is a general principle in the law of damages of many Member States. That remedy works well in cases where the probability of detection is 100%. But, as indicated in the previous chapter, as soon as the probability of detection is lower than 100%, a remedy which merely forces the tortfeasor to compensate the harm may lead to underdeterrence. That was why public enforcement and higher monetary penalties (or even non-monetary penalties) were needed in order to outweigh the low detection rate. One obvious possibility to increase the effectiveness of liability law is to allow for punitive damages. However, traditional European civil law systems have fundamentally rejected punitive damages.⁵⁴⁹ But some authors see a growing European attention for punitive damages.⁵⁵⁰ An important development in that respect was the decision of the Court of Justice of the EU in *Manfredi* where the Court held that national courts can award punitive damages for violations of community law if their national legal system awards such

⁵⁴⁹ Meurkens 2012, 13.

⁵⁵⁰ Meurkens 2012, 31-32.

damages for domestic claims.⁵⁵¹ The Court affirmed that “In accordance with the principle of equivalence, if it is possible to award specific damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, in domestic actions similar to actions founded on the community competition rules, it must be possible to award such damages in actions founded on community rules”. The punitive part of the award is therefore treated as a purely national peculiarity, but which is respected at European level.⁵⁵²

It is *inter alia* under the influence of economic analysis⁵⁵³ that there has been an increasing interest for punitive damages also at the EU level.⁵⁵⁴ In a Proposal concerning private antitrust lawsuits in a 2005 Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules,⁵⁵⁵ the Proposal called for the awarding of double damages for horizontal cartel cases and was considered as an incentive to stimulate private enforcement of competition law.⁵⁵⁶ But in later drafts the punitive damages disappeared⁵⁵⁷ and also in the final Directive 2014/104 punitive damages seemed to have completely disappeared,⁵⁵⁸ which was also criticised in the literature.⁵⁵⁹

Generally it is fair to say that there is a rather hostile attitude at the European level against punitive damages. Significant in this respect is for example a recent Proposal for a Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers of 28 November 2019.⁵⁶⁰ Recital 15A of this proposal holds “This Directive should not enable punitive damages being imposed on the infringing trader or overcompensation being awarded to consumers affected by an infringement”. This shows that the question that was the title of a book in 2012 “The Power of Punitive Damages. Is Europe Missing Out?”⁵⁶¹ should still be answered in the affirmative.⁵⁶² As was mentioned earlier, there are reasons for a more positive attitude towards punitive damages as it may improve private enforcement and therefore the functioning of environmental liability; it can provide additional incentives for victims to use the liability mechanism and it can reduce the need to call on public enforcement and the criminal law. In that sense the introduction of punitive damages can even be considered as a mechanism of decriminalisation.

7.2.2 Causal uncertainty

Uncertainty over causation can be an important limitation on environmental liability. There can be uncertainty concerning the identity of the tortfeasor (the polluter). That is more particularly the case when more than one company has contributed to the environmental harm and it cannot be distinguished which company exactly caused the loss. There may also be cases where there is uncertainty concerning the status of a victim. This plays a special role in so-called toxic torts, whereby

⁵⁵¹ Joint Cases ECJ 31 July 2006, *Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA*, (C-295/04), *Antonio Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA* (C-296/04) and *Nicolò Tricarico* (C-297/04) and *Pasqualina Murgolo* (C-298/04) v. *Assitalia SpA*, ECR 2006, p. 6619. See also Koch 2009, 206.

⁵⁵² So Vanleenhoven 2012, 347.

⁵⁵³ So also Meurkens 2012, 44-45.

⁵⁵⁴ For a summary of the economic justification for punitive damages, see also Visscher 2012, 471-497. See generally on punitive damages in European law, Koch 2009, 197-209.

⁵⁵⁵ COM(2005) 672 final of 19 December 2005.

⁵⁵⁶ Vanleenhoven 2012, 347.

⁵⁵⁷ Vanleenhoven 2012, 347-348.

⁵⁵⁸ Directive 2014/104 of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L349/1 of 5 December 2014.

⁵⁵⁹ Van den Bergh 2013, 12-34 and Weber 2018, 1-23.

⁵⁶⁰ Proposal for a Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interest of consumers and the repealing Directive 2009/22/EC of 28 November 2019

(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_14600_2019_INIT&from=EN).

⁵⁶¹ Meurkens & Nordin 2012.

⁵⁶² Although Koziol argues that the EU is inconsistent concerning punitive damages, reflecting the contrast between the common law and the continental civil law (Koziol 2009, 288-289).

some of the population have been exposed to hazardous substances or radiation and subsequently a certain disease, such as cancer is discovered.⁵⁶³ In that case the identity of the injurer is certain, but there is uncertainty about who the victim is. Some may well have got the disease from some background risk and not from the toxic tort.⁵⁶⁴ The problem may arise that experts could indicate a likelihood that a certain activity may cause certain damage expressed in a percentage, say 30%. The question then arises how, within the legal system, one should deal with this uncertainty if expert opinion cannot provide certainty on the causation. The traditional approach was to award compensation only when the probability that the damage was caused by the tort passed a certain threshold of, say, 50%. This threshold rule is a kind of “all or nothing” approach: if the probability is lower than the threshold, the victim receives no compensation, if the probability is higher than the threshold, the victim receives full compensation.⁵⁶⁵ The victim must, in other words, convince the judge that it is “more probable than not” that its damage was caused by the tort.⁵⁶⁶ The disadvantage of this approach is that an operator could systematically create danger of environmental harm, but as long as the probability of causation remains below 50%, the operator would never be held liable. This threshold liability rule is therefore undesirable, both from a deterrence and from a victim compensation perspective.⁵⁶⁷ A more fine-tuned alternative can be found by translating the probability of causation by awarding the victim a proportionate amount of his damage.⁵⁶⁸ If the probability were 30% that the operator’s activity caused the victim’s environmental harm, the victim would be compensated for 30% of his damage. From an economic perspective, the advantage of this proportional liability is that it exposes the injurer precisely to the access risk and provide optimal incentives for prevention.⁵⁶⁹

The ELD mentions in Article 9 that it is “without prejudice to any provisions of national regulations concerning cost allocation in cases of multiple party causation especially concerning the apportionment of liability between the producer and the user of a product”. In other words: the ELD does not regulate this issue of causal uncertainty.⁵⁷⁰ There is, however, another document of interest, being the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) drafted by the European Group on Tort Law.⁵⁷¹ The Group provides the example of two factories that discharge poisonous wastewater into a river and, as a result, fish in the river die. The wastewater of each factory separately was sufficient to kill the fish. It is a case of so-called “concurrent causes”.⁵⁷² In this particular case, Article 3:102 of the Principles prescribes solidary liability. It reads: “In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the victim’s damage”. Article 9:101(2) explains what the consequences of solidary liability are: “The victim may claim full compensation from anyone or more of them, provided that the victim may not recover more than the full amount of the damage suffered by him”.⁵⁷³ However, a different solution is stated in case of causal uncertainty. This occurs where two or more causes may or may not have caused a loss.⁵⁷⁴ In that case there is uncertainty about whether or not the respective events do fulfil the *condition sine qua non* requirement. This is referred to as a situation of “alternative causes”. In that case the Principles of

⁵⁶³ See for example Trauberman 1983, 177-296.

⁵⁶⁴ See also Estep 1960, 259-304 and Gardner 1990, 423-434.

⁵⁶⁵ See further on the threshold rule Ben-Shahar 2009, 92-93.

⁵⁶⁶ Faure 2003b, 83-84.

⁵⁶⁷ Ben-Shahar 2009, 94.

⁵⁶⁸ Ben-Shahar 2009, 93-96.

⁵⁶⁹ So Shavell 1985b, 587-609. For a detailed analytical and comparative account of proportional liability, see Gilead, Green & Koch 2013, 1-73.

⁵⁷⁰ De Smedt 2007, 222-224.

⁵⁷¹ European Group on Tort Law 2005.

⁵⁷² See Spier 2000, 6.

⁵⁷³ For further detail, Faure 2016b, 609-611.

⁵⁷⁴ European Group on Tort Law 2005, 47-48.

European Tort Law opt in Article 3:103 for proportional liability: "In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim's damage".⁵⁷⁵ This shows that now, in case of uncertainty over causation, proportional liability is accepted, which is in line with the literature discussed earlier.

7.2.3 Latency

In case of environmental pollution there is often a long time lapse between the moment of the emission and the moment the damage occurs. It concerns risks with a so-called "long-tail". In that case victims may still desire compensation, but the question arises whether the behaviour of the operator was unlawful at the time when it was committed. What should be avoided is to hold an operator liable according to the standards of today, whereas the behaviour was not considered wrongful at the time when the emission took place. The problem with such a retroactive liability is that it may fail to provide incentives for prevention.⁵⁷⁶ Moreover, such a retroactive liability may be an uninsurable.⁵⁷⁷ The better solution is to determine from which moment operators should have had a knowledge, for example that depositing waste in soil was not allowed (and therefore unlawful) and to allocate liability proportionally only for the damage that occurred from that moment on. For damage that still appears today, but that was caused at the moment when the behaviour was not unlawful, it is better to finance this historical pollution from the public purse (via the government) than via a liability rule, which could anyway no longer provide incentives for prevention.⁵⁷⁸

This is also the approach which is followed in the ELD. Already the White Paper preceding the ELD argued that for historic pollution the Member States should install funding mechanisms instead of relying on liability.⁵⁷⁹ It is also the approach followed in the ELD: as far as the temporal application is concerned, Article 17 clearly states that it shall not apply to damage caused by an emission, event or incident that took place before the date referred to in Article 19(1), being the date by which the Member States had to implement the ELD.⁵⁸⁰ In addition, Article 10 provides for a limitation period for the recovery of costs based on the ELD of five years.

7.3 Widespread pollution and market failure

Suppose that multiple operators emit noxious substances, which lead to damage in a particular nature reserve. The damage is that serious that trees start dying, there is acidification of a lake and a rare species start disappearing. The nature reserve which was touristically very attractive because of its ecological value and biodiversity has, as a result of the emissions completely lost its biodiversity. There is substantial ecological and economic damage.

The problem in this particular case is that the social loss, as argued, can be substantial. Nevertheless, there is a substantial danger that a lawsuit in environmental liability will never be brought. The reason is simple: the costs to start a liability suit are considerable and entail high risks. Suppose that there is a victim who enjoyed the nature reserve and now experiences a loss of utility as she can no longer enjoy the beauty and biodiversity in the nature reserve. If she were to start an environmental liability suit, she would have to pay a lawyer and moreover invest a lot of time in a procedure (so-called opportunity

⁵⁷⁵ European Group on Tort Law 2005, 47.

⁵⁷⁶ Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 49-50.

⁵⁷⁷ Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 169-170.

⁵⁷⁸ Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 178-179.

⁵⁷⁹ White Paper 2000, 16.

⁵⁸⁰ The ELD therefore clearly has no retroactive liability. So De Smedt 2007, 214-216.

costs). There is a large danger that the individual costs for the nature loving victim may be substantially higher than the potential gains. There is a large likelihood that, even though the victim is upset and suffers a real loss as a result of the tort, she will take the rational decision not to file a liability suit.⁵⁸¹ The reason that the victim will not use the liability system is in the first place related to a high risk aversion against the costs of the procedure. Many victims will be so-called one shooters and file a liability suite only once.⁵⁸² As a result it is difficult for the victim to predict *ex ante* what the precise costs of a procedure will be. An additional problem in this particular case is that there is in fact no individual loss, but rather a collective, ecological damage. As a result, the individual interest to bring a lawsuit may be limited. If the individual victim would support high costs to file a lawsuit against the emitters, that one victim would suffer all the costs whereas all the advantages would be for the entire community that would benefit from an improved biodiversity in the nature reserve. In that case, a so-called free-riding problem would arise, meaning that one individual has all the costs, but others can benefit. The free-riding problem will prevent the one individual to invest in the lawsuit. The result is that if remedies are lacking, no individual will file a lawsuit and operators will not be exposed to the social costs of their activity. They are able to externalise harm to society and the market failure caused by their negative externalities prevails. Finding a remedy for this collective action problem is therefore crucial in order to solve the market failure problem that arises.

7.4 Solving the collective action problem

7.4.1 Options

There are, in theory, a wide variety of options available to solve the problem that appeared from the example.⁵⁸³ A first remedy would be the use of property rights. In the example the problem arose because the lady enjoyed the nature reserve, but with her so did many others which she could not exclude as a result of which she lacked sufficient incentives to bring a lawsuit. The problem would be solved if property rights could be allocated to the nature reserve.⁵⁸⁴ Private property rights may give the owner (an individual, a collectivity or company) incentives to act against third parties that cause harm to the nature reserve.⁵⁸⁵ And one particular type of property right could be the allocation of public property rights. A public authority, like a community, province or the state) could own the nature reserve and in many legal systems (also EU Member States) nature reserves are public property. However, even though that may in theory provide the public authority incentives to take action to protect the nature reserve, those incentives may not be perfect. Public authorities may be subject to lobbying, inefficiencies and collusion as a result of which they may sometimes lack incentives to take action in the public interest and to use liability law.⁵⁸⁶ The specific incentives of the individual who walks in the nature reserve every weekend can be much stronger than the incentives of a bureaucrat who may be at a far distance of the nature reserve that deserves protection.

A second alternative often mentioned in the literature, but probably less relevant for our case, is to solve the problem of rational apathy by granting the right to a group to act on behalf of all individuals that suffered a loss. It is the so-called collective action or group litigation.⁵⁸⁷ Bundling of claims allows

⁵⁸¹ See Schäfer 2000, 183.

⁵⁸² See on this difference between the so-called one shooters and repeat players, the famous article of Gallanter 1974, 95-160.

⁵⁸³ For an overview see Miller 2013, 262-278.

⁵⁸⁴ Cole 2002, 131.

⁵⁸⁵ Cole 2010, 229.

⁵⁸⁶ Liu, Faure & Mascini 2018, 11-12.

⁵⁸⁷ See Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, 59.

a lower cost per individual. The theory predicts that more claims would be filed and therefore deterrence would be increased.⁵⁸⁸

This group litigation (in the US referred to as a class action) is especially useful when there is a large number of victims that suffers from comparable losses and that each have a financial claim. In that particular case an attorney may act as an entrepreneur who will represent the class. After judging the merits of the case, the attorney may make a substantial upfront investment, hoping to collect a substantial fee out of a positive judgment or settlement. Although collective actions surely have many advantages and allow remedying rational apathy in case of so-called scattered losses, they also have particular limits. One problem is that the attorney representing the group may have different interests than the victims he represents (a so-called principal-agent problem may therefore arise). Questions also arise concerning the financing of the claim and the formation of the class.⁵⁸⁹ The major issue for our example is that collective actions may remedy the problem of dispersed losses in case of a wide number of consumers that all suffer a relatively small loss. Bringing together all those financial claims in one group litigation can reduce the litigation costs and thus bring substantial benefits. However, in the case of the nature reserve, there are no individual claims of the various nature lovers that feel harmed as a result of the ecological losses. A group action can therefore not provide a remedy in this particular case. Moreover, it has to be mentioned that in the recent EU policy documents, it is also clear that the EU is not charmed by the idea of a group litigation, but what rather like to go for the following alternative:

A third possibility is to opt for a so-called representative action. I will first briefly discuss the representative action⁵⁹⁰ as it comes from consumer law and then focus in the next subsection on the environmental case.

The representative action basically comes down to granting the right to a representative organisation, such as an NGO or consumer organisation to file a suit on behalf of the victims. It is well-known in the domain of consumer losses, where for example a national consumer organisation would act on behalf of all the victims that suffered a particular loss. Questions can again be asked on whether the association really acts to represent the interests of the victim in an adequate manner.⁵⁹¹ The danger of a divergence of interests between the representative organisation (like the Consumer Union) and the victims, may especially be large in the situation that the consumer organisation is *de facto* a monopoly. That plays especially a role with consumer organisations in many EU Member States. A lot has meanwhile been published on this so-called compensatory collective redress for low-value consumer claims.⁵⁹² As I already indicated earlier, in the most recent Proposal from the General Secretariat of the Council of 28 November 2019, there will be a Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interest of consumers.

But of course the representative action could also relate to an environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO) that would have standing to represent the interests of the environment, in our particular example, the damaged natural reserve. In the following subsection I will develop the arguments in favour of a generous standing for NGOs in environmental cases.

⁵⁸⁸ Micklitz & Stadler 2006, 1473-1503.

⁵⁸⁹ Faure 2013, 48-49.

⁵⁹⁰ Miller 2013, 263.

⁵⁹¹ Keske, Renda & Van den Bergh 2010, 67-72.

⁵⁹² See *inter alia* Van Duin & Leone 2019, 1227-1250; Loos 2019, 1219-1227 and Ioannidou 2019, 1367-1388.

7.4.2 Justifications for environmental public interest litigation

The case where damage is widespread leads to small private incentives for victims of pollution to bring a lawsuit. This provides a strong argument for a representative action in environmental cases, especially in case of widespread nature of the harm.⁵⁹³ This can provide a remedy for the widespread nature of environmental damage, which would otherwise no longer lead to private incentives to bring litigation.⁵⁹⁴ It is hardly thinkable that a nature lover who feels damaged as a result of the loss of biodiversity of the nature reserve, would file an environmental liability suit. It is not only the rational apathy and free-rider problems that arise; it may equally be difficult to determine who would be a member of the group; as a result, the collective action discussed earlier will often not be possible.⁵⁹⁵ Precisely ecological damage is often defined as damage caused to non-individualised goods.⁵⁹⁶ As the victim cannot claim any property rights, she will not have the possibility to use an environmental liability suit. That is exactly the reason why, also from an economic perspective, standing should generously be granted to environmental NGOs.⁵⁹⁷ It comes down to a situation where the NGO represents the nature reserve and files a suit to end the damaging activities.

The traditional economic justification in favour of *locus standi* in private law is not to overburden courts and not to create overdeterrence of operators.⁵⁹⁸ However, more particularly where the public interest is at stake, a too strict standing requirement may not always work in the interest of justice. The lawsuit filed by an NGO representing a large number of stakeholders takes on the nature of a public good. That would not be provided for, or risk, at best to be undersupplied by a rational victim.⁵⁹⁹ In that case, *locus standi* can become an impediment to the redress process.

Of course, also in case of a suit by an NGO principal-agent problems could arise. Even when an NGO claims to represent the damaged nature reserve, the question can arise on what that claim is based and to which extent the NGO is effectively representing the interests of the damaged nature reserve. In most EU Member States this is solved by granting standing to particular environmental NGOs only, when they meet specific conditions. It will usually be required that the NGO needs to be in existence for a longer time (in order to avoid *ad hoc* NGOs). In addition, it will also be required that the claim filed by the NGO corresponds with the social goals as laid down in the articles of incorporation of the NGO. But if these conditions are met, allowing standing to NGOs offers the possibility to still use private law and to reinforce environmental liability.⁶⁰⁰

Of course also in case of standing of NGOs to represent the interests of the damaged nature reserve, questions can arise concerning the financing of the NGO and the related incentives. The basic financing for an NGO will usually be provided by membership fees. As long as the NGO acts to realise the interests for which the NGO was created, financing by its members is unproblematic. The NGO itself will of course have to use representation (by a lawyer) in a lawsuit. One advantage of the NGO is that it cannot be considered as a one shotter, but will often be a repeat player and therefore well able to adequately monitor the quality of the lawyer they would hire. Environmental NGOs have an advantage (compared to consumer associations) of homogeneity of the group.⁶⁰¹ Therefore, financing the lawsuit through membership fees is, as mentioned, unproblematic. The lawsuit will, if successful, also lead to

⁵⁹³ NGOs can undertake representative actions on behalf of the public interest. So Wilde 2013, 261.

⁵⁹⁴ See Faure, Mühl & Philipsen 2014, 41.

⁵⁹⁵ Faure & Visscher 2015, 28.

⁵⁹⁶ Liu 2013.

⁵⁹⁷ See *inter alia* Faure & Raja 2010, 293-294.

⁵⁹⁸ Faure, Mühl & Philipsen 2014, 50.

⁵⁹⁹ Van Aaken 2006, 50.

⁶⁰⁰ Faure & Visscher 2015, 28-29.

⁶⁰¹ Faure & Visscher 2015, 29-30.

internalisation of social costs by the operator and can thus assist in correcting the market failure caused by the collective action problem.

7.4.3 Collective action at EU level

As already mentioned, collective action is widely discussed in the literature with respect to consumer claims. Even though the law and economics literature generally favours group actions, the EU, in its latest (November 2019) Proposal goes in the direction of a representative action (again, for consumer claims). In various Member States there is a generous approach towards group actions when there is a communality of interests or issues.⁶⁰² However, despite developments in various Member States towards group actions, as a general rule, class actions remain unpopular at the EU level.⁶⁰³

As far as environmental liability is concerned, the predecessor of the ELD, the 2000 White Paper, was in favour of empowering civil society to share the burden of enforcing environmental law. It took a proactive role by affording NGOs *locus standi* to seek injunctive relief. The White Paper adopted a two tier approach whereby “Member States should be under a duty to ensure restoration of biodiversity damage and the contamination in the first place (first tier) by using the compensation or damages paid by the polluter”.⁶⁰⁴ But in urgent cases “interest groups should have the right to ask the court for an injunction directly in order to make the (potential) polluter act or abstain from action, to prevent significant damage or avoid a further damage to the environment. They should be allowed, for this purpose, to sue the alleged polluter, without going to the state first”.⁶⁰⁵ This provided in other words a possibility of NGOs to go directly against the polluter in civil proceedings.⁶⁰⁶ The ELD, however, which replaces the tort based approach contained in the White Paper with a public law based cost recovery system affords no special status to NGOs.⁶⁰⁷ The ELD indirectly recognises the role of NGOs as Article 12(1) mentions that natural or legal persons (b) having a sufficient interest in environmental decision-making relating to the damage ... shall be entitled to submit to the competent authority any observations relating to instances of environmental damage or an imminent threat of such damage. Article 12 equally holds “To this end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national law, shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of subparagraph (b)”.⁶⁰⁸

This means that under the ELD NGOs can submit to the competent authority observations relating to instances of environmental damage.⁶⁰⁸ Article 12(3) holds that where the request for action and the accompanying observations show in a plausible manner that environmental damage exists, the competent authority shall consider any such observations and requests for action. Moreover, should the request of the NGO not be successful, then there is a possibility of review under Article 13 ELD as “The persons referred to in Article 12(1) shall have access to the court or other independent and impartial public body competent to review the procedural and substantive legality of the decisions, acts or failure to act of the competent authority under this Directive”.

However, the ELD does not grant any direct right to NGOs to directly file a lawsuit against the operator liable for the environmental harm, as was the case in the White Paper. The role of NGOs is therefore

⁶⁰² For an overview, see Wilde 2013, 268-271.

⁶⁰³ So Wilde 2013, 271.

⁶⁰⁴ COM(2000) 66 final, 4.7.1.

⁶⁰⁵ COM(2000) 66 final, 4.7.2.

⁶⁰⁶ Wilde 2013, 260.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁰⁸ In other words: “The way by which this provision entitles environmental associations and NGOs to act, is through making them first pass, through the competent authorities” (Cassotta 2012, 170).

very limited. That is an issue, which has also been criticised in the literature.⁶⁰⁹ But then again, the ELD does not grant that right to natural persons either.

Access to justice is more generally regulated in Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The so-called "third pillar" of the Aarhus Convention calls for a reasonable entitlement to access (also referred to as *locus standi*) and reasonable conditions of access (i.e. fair and effective procedures in terms of time and costs). Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention provides that:

"Each party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, ensure that members of the public concerned

- (a) having a sufficient interest
or, alternatively,
- (b) maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of a party requires this as a precondition,
have access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission subject to the provisions of Article 6".⁶¹⁰

Some of these obligations under the Aarhus Convention have also been transposed in EU law.⁶¹¹ Two Directives from 2003 implement the two first pillars of the Aarhus Convention in EU law.⁶¹² Directive 2003/35/EC guarantees access to justice in two distinct areas of environmental law, cases where an environmental impact assessment (EIA) is necessary and cases related to integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC) (now replaced by the Industrial Emissions Directive).⁶¹³ The scope of Directive 2003/35 is therefore relatively limited. However, at the same time, as the promulgation of this Directive (with its limited application to EIA and IPPC) a Proposal was launched to provide a broader access to justice.⁶¹⁴ Many arguments in favour of this broad access to justice in environmental matters were advanced.⁶¹⁵ The Proposal mentioned explicitly that greater compliance by operators and public authorities with environmental provisions was expected. In addition, the Commission Proposal also mentions that they expected that there would be higher preventive effects, leading to lower expenditures for public authorities in the field of environmental protection.⁶¹⁶ A lot of those arguments in favour of an enlarged access to justice are precisely in line with the economic arguments concerning the importance of standing. However, the Commission apparently had difficulties convincing the Member States. Many Member States already during the consultation rounds preceding the 2003 Proposal raised substantial concerns related *inter alia* to the requirement to provide standing to groups

⁶⁰⁹ Wilde 2013, 260-261. Especially critical is Krämer who argues that the position of NGOs in the ELD is particularly weak as they in fact only have the possibility to ask the competent authority to take measures. But as the competent authority does not have an obligation to take remedial measures itself, the only "right" for NGOs is to force the competent authority to consider particular remedial measures and to take a decision. But the discretionary power of the competent authority in that respect is very large. So Krämer 2005, 89.

⁶¹⁰ See further on the specific obligations under the Aarhus Convention, Backes, Faure & Fernhout 2014, 8.

⁶¹¹ For a detailed discussion see Jans & Vedder 2012, 228-237.

⁶¹² Directive 2003/4/EC (Access to Information Directive) and Directive 2003/35/EC (Public Participation Directive). Regulation 1367/2006 covers the implementation with regard to the EU institutions.

⁶¹³ Directive 2010/75 on industrial emissions, OJ L 334 of 17 December 2010.

⁶¹⁴ Proposal COM(2003) 624. For a discussion, see Backes, Faure & Fernhout 2014, 9-11.

⁶¹⁵ I do not have the possibility within the framework of this study to provide a full account of the implementation of the Aarhus-Acquis in the EU. For a detailed account see the interesting contribution by Nagy 2018, 19-69.

⁶¹⁶ COM(2003) 624 final, p. 8.

without legal personality.⁶¹⁷ The opposition from some Member States was apparently so strong, that in their Handbook of 2012 Jans and Vedder argued that this Proposal is “politically speaking, ‘dead’”.⁶¹⁸

There has, however, been increased pressure, especially from the European Parliament. The Parliament stressed the need to adopt the proposed Directive on access to justice and called on the Council to respect its obligations resulting from the Aarhus Convention and to adopt a common position on the corresponding Commission Proposal before the end of 2012.⁶¹⁹ Notwithstanding those clear calls the Proposal has not yet turned into a Directive.

7.5 Solving high cost aversion

A failure to hold companies liable for the environmental harm they caused cannot only be related to the rational apathy and collective action problem discussed in the previous section, but also to high cost aversion. High cost aversion can, moreover, also be a problem for when the environmental harm is not widespread and just one or a few victims suffer the harm. In the literature (and in various EU Member States) a variety of different instruments has been developed to enable victims access to justice, notwithstanding the potential high costs. Some of those remedies will now briefly be reviewed. Again, this topic is so broad that one could easily fill a book just dealing with those remedies. I will mainly focus on three (conditional fees, legal expenses insurance and third party financing). However, other mechanisms which could also play a role are for example a transfer of claim; public funding of litigation (public aid) as well as the allocation of legal fees (the loser pays versus each party pays its own costs). Those issues will not be further discussed here.⁶²⁰ I will in turn discuss conditional fee arrangements, legal expenses insurance and third party funding of litigation.

7.5.1 Conditional fee arrangements

The traditional way of paying a lawyer is based on an hourly fee. This system has two disadvantages, both from society’s perspective and for the individual client. A first problem is that under this hourly fee system, lawyers may not have adequate incentives to critically decide whether the suit is meritorious or not. There is therefore a danger under the hourly fee system that also non-meritorious suits would be taken up by lawyers, leading to social costs of litigation (where it would not be merited) and to costs for the individual client who equally pays for cases that are not meritorious. The second problem is that it may be difficult for clients (especially one shotters) to monitor the performance of the attorney. If the client does not know what a reasonable amount of hours is to be spent on a particular case, there is a danger of overbilling. The only way of controlling the adverse selection that exists in that respect between the lawyer and his client is either by repeat players (who use an attorney more often) or to have regulation. Reputational pressures and regulation of attorneys could monitor and reduce abuses to some extent,⁶²¹ but certainly not perfectly. Hourly fee systems lead therefore to the danger that unmeritorious suits with a negative expected value will be brought and that lawyers spend too much hours on the case.⁶²² The major advantage of an alternative fee system, a conditional fee arrangement is that in that case the interests of the lawyer and the client are better aligned. A

⁶¹⁷ COM(2003) 624 final, p. 8-9.

⁶¹⁸ Jans & Vedder 2012, 236.

⁶¹⁹ European Parliament Resolution of 20 April 2012 on the review of the 6th environmental action programme and the setting of priorities for the 7th environmental action programme – a better environment for a better life (2011/2194(INI), 68). For a further discussion, see Backes, Faure & Fernhout 2014, 11.

⁶²⁰ For a more detailed account of various possible remedies, see also Tuil & Visscher 2010; Hodges & Stadler 2013 and Tillema 2017.

⁶²¹ However, there is always a danger that the regulation of lawyers (and other professions) rather creates barriers to entry and protects the private interests of the profession instead of the public interest of the public at large. See in that respect the contributions in Faure, Finsinger, Siegers & Van den Bergh 1993.

⁶²² Faure & Visscher 2015, 16-17.

conditional fee arrangement basically means that the lawyer is paid on the basis of the result obtained. Various different models exist of conditional fee arrangement, but they usually come down to a system where the lawyer receives no remuneration if there is no positive result obtained for the client (so-called no cure no pay).⁶²³ From the perspective of the consumer the main advantage would be that it reduces his risk aversion, certainly if the result-based fee is constructed like a “no cure, no pay” model. An advantage of a result-based remuneration system is, moreover, that it provides strong incentives for lawyers to *ex ante* monitor the quality of cases and that thus excessive or frivolous litigation would be avoided, since lawyers would only have an incentive to accept meritorious cases.⁶²⁴ Empirical research confirms that conditional fees discourage the filing of low quality suits and hence increase the legal quality of cases. Lawyers do therefore effectively function as gatekeeper to guarantee that only meritorious suits are brought.⁶²⁵ Empirical evidence also shows that many forms of result-based fees are applied on both sides of the Atlantic and this happens apparently without any alleged problems as a result.⁶²⁶

The payment system for lawyers can also generally have an influence on the incentives of a lawyer to accept a settlement. Again, if a lawyer is paid on an hourly basis, this may have the undesirable effect that the lawyer may have incentives not to accept a reasonable settlement and hence to litigate too many cases. This will only be reduced through legal ethics or through reputational mechanisms. However, those reputational effects may mostly work in cases of repeat players and not with one shotters. A result-based compensation system provides better incentives for a lawyer to accept a settlement. They will only continue to negotiate (or decide to litigate) when it is cost-effective.⁶²⁷

In sum, allowing a result-based remuneration system (like conditional fees) is an important tool as it can cure the high cost aversion of victims and therefore improve access to justice. From society's perspective it has, moreover, the advantage that the lawyer will, as a gatekeeper, monitor the quality of the cases as a result of which only meritorious cases will be brought.

So far, there has not been a lot of intervention at the EU level with the payment system of lawyers, as this strongly diverges between the Member States. Of course I do not argue that all cases should only be handled on the basis of conditional fees. But it would be important that the many regulations (in statutes or in legal ethics) that prohibit lawyers to charge result-based fees would be abrogated. If result-based fees would be available (next to hourly fees) at least the client would have a choice, which is not the case in many systems today. It is interesting that in some Member States, like the Netherlands, the prohibition to use contingency fees was held to violate competition rules.⁶²⁸ It is therefore possible that competition authorities may, in their attempt to apply competition rules also to liberal professions (such as attorneys) challenge national rules containing prohibition of result-based remuneration for lawyers. From both an economic perspective and from the perspective of increasing access to justice for victims, this development can be supported.

7.5.2 Legal expenses insurance

Another way to solve the risk aversion of the consumer and hence to give potential plaintiffs incentives to bring meritorious claims is to use insurance techniques. The principle is relatively simple: the insurer takes over the risk of having to pay legal expenses from the plaintiff with risk aversion and can in that way stimulate that meritorious claims would be brought. The classic legal expenses insurance is a

⁶²³ See Faure, Fernhout & Philipsen 2010, 33-56.

⁶²⁴ Faure 2013, 43; Faure & Visscher 2015, 18-19.

⁶²⁵ Helland & Tabarrok 2003, 517-542.

⁶²⁶ See Faure, Fernhout & Philipsen 2010, 33-56, as well as Faure, Fernhout & Philipsen 2009.

⁶²⁷ Faure, Fernhout & Philipsen 2010, 37; Faure & Visscher 2015, 21-23.

⁶²⁸ See Faure, Fernhout & Philipsen 2009, 21-22.

before the event insurance (BTE) whereby a risk averse individual *ex ante* seeks coverage against the risk of being engaged in a trial and incurring legal expenses.⁶²⁹ The way in which legal expenses insurance (LEI) works is that the risk of the expenses to be incurred in a procedure are shifted to an insurance company. Again, the advantage is that an insurer will function as a gatekeeper and screen the case on the merits. As a result only meritorious claims will be brought.⁶³⁰

A rather surprising empirical fact is, however, that notwithstanding the theoretical advantages of LEI, in most EU Member States relatively few individuals in fact conclude those insurance policies. Even in systems where insurability should be relatively easy (for example in Germany where there is fixed fee system for lawyers), the scope of the coverage is not very high.⁶³¹ Only in Sweden legal expenses insurance is having a high coverage. But the reason is that in that country LEI is mandatorily added on to healthcare insurance.⁶³² In the literature various potential explanations for this lacking demand for LEI have been explored.⁶³³ Whatever the reason may be, the problem is that in practice in most Member States individuals do not possess LEI, as a result of which it may not help victims of environmental harm.

Another possibility is to conclude insurance after the event on an *ex post* basis. This is referred to as after the event insurance (ATE). In fact, it is no longer an insurance contract, since the premium in fact amounts to a contingency (a proportion of the proceeds) that the winning insured would have to receive from the operator, once winning the case after the event.⁶³⁴ ATE is in practice limited to the UK, but would be used rather frequently in that country.⁶³⁵

Finally, it should be mentioned that there have been various EU Directives in this domain. Directive 87/344 of 22 June 1987 coordinated the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance. That Directive has, however, been repealed and is no longer in force since 31 December 2015.

7.5.3 Third party funding

A model which is now becoming increasingly popular is a system whereby a third party simply finances litigation. It is called third party funding (TPF). The third party receives a payment which can consist in a part of the proceeds in case of success.⁶³⁶ The way TPF works is that a private company offers a plaintiff cash in exchange for a property interest in an unresolved lawsuit. The cash will usually be provided to pay for the litigation costs. TPF was originally only popular in the US⁶³⁷ but now it has become increasingly popular in Europe as well.⁶³⁸

TPF can be an important instrument to enlarge the possibility for European citizens to access justice and to enforce their rights.⁶³⁹ It is therefore no surprise that TPF is especially used in the EU in the private enforcement of competition law. The Directive on actions for damages in the field of competition law has explicitly mentioned the possibility of transferring a claim to third parties which would succeed in the claim. Article 2(4) of Directive 2014 of 26 November 2014⁶⁴⁰ defines "action for

⁶²⁹ For details see Van Boom 2010, 92-108.

⁶³⁰ See Visscher & Schepens 2010, 7-32. And see Faure & Visscher 2015, 24-25.

⁶³¹ See *inter alia* Killian 2003, 36.

⁶³² See Regan 2003, 49-65.

⁶³³ See *inter alia* De Mot & Faure 2016, 751-778 and De Mot, Depoorter & Faure 2016, 1-31.

⁶³⁴ Van Boom 2010, 92-108.

⁶³⁵ Fenn & Rickman 2010, 142.

⁶³⁶ For a comparison between LEI and TPF see Faure & De Mot 2012 and see especially the dissertation dealing with TPF by Solas 2019.

⁶³⁷ See Hensler 2010, 153.

⁶³⁸ See Steinitz 2011, 1268-1338 and especially Solas 2019, 38-122.

⁶³⁹ Solas 2019, 86.

⁶⁴⁰ OJ L349/1 of 5 December 2014.

damages" as an action "... brought before a national court by an alleged injured party, or by someone acting on behalf of one or more alleged injured parties where union or national law provides for that possibility, or by a natural or alleged legal person that succeeded in the right of the alleged injured party, including the person that acquired the claim".

In practice TPF is actively used in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands in cartel damage claims.⁶⁴¹ Also, as far as collective redress mechanisms are concerned, the different proposals that have circulated mentioned the possibility of TPF as legal and useful for collective actions. On the other hand the proposals equally make efforts to enhance transparency in order to prevent abuses.⁶⁴² For example, the most recent version of the Proposal for a Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interest of consumers (of November 2019) mentions that the qualified entities (consumer organisations) should not be influenced by any third party, other than their legal counsel and the consumer concerned in taking the procedural decisions in the context of the representative action. It also mentions that in order to prevent a conflict of interests Member States should be able to set out rules according to which courts or administrative authorities could examine whether a qualified entity bringing a cross-border representative action for redress is funded by a third party having an economic interest in the outcome of a specific cross-border representative action and, if this is the case, reject the legal capacity of the qualified entity for the purpose of that action.

This shows that at EU level the importance of TPF as a tool to increase access to justice is recognised, but that at the same time there is also concern for conflicts of interests. Provided that those concerns can be taken care of in an adequate manner, TPF might also be a useful tool to potentially finance environmental liability claims as a result of which meritorious suits will be brought.

7.5.4 Summary

This brief overview shows that various arrangements do exist, not only in theory, but also in practice to deal with the aversion of victims against the potential high costs of litigation and the resulting risks. Any of the arrangements discussed above could remedy that risk aversion and hence make sure that a meritorious environmental liability suit is nevertheless brought. The mere fact that so many alternatives are in principle available should be welcomed from both an access to justice and an economic perspective. The more options available, the better it can guarantee access to justice and exposure to environmental liability of companies.

In practice, one will, however, often notice that not in all Member States the theoretically possible options are available. Some legal rules in particular Member States may prohibit particular solutions (like TPF). In other cases problems may arise on the supply side of legal services (for example many European legal systems still prohibiting particular forms of result-based remuneration for lawyers). In still other cases a theoretically available option is simply not used because of problems on the demand side (like LEI which is in many EU Member States purchased to a very limited extent).

It has to be recalled that the more mechanisms are available to finance litigation, the better it is to guarantee access to justice and to expose companies, via environmental liability suits, to the social cost of their activity. At the European level there should hence be no limitation on those alternatives to financing litigation and Member States rules (in statutes or in legal ethics) that prohibit those, should be critically reviewed. If in particular Member States the many theoretically possible alternatives to remedy risk aversion following from high litigation costs will not be available in practice, the result is that meritorious suits will not be brought and the resulting market failure may continue. In many Member States there have now also been positive experiences with many of the instruments sketched.

⁶⁴¹ Solas 2019, 89.

⁶⁴² Solas 2019, 90-94.

That empirical evidence can also be used to show that there is no justified fear for negative effects of particular instruments not yet employed in a particular Member State (like conditional fees or TPF). The competition that in that respect exists between Member States has the major advantage of providing scope for mutual learning with respect to the potential benefits of alternative mechanisms.⁶⁴³

7.6 Rapid claims mechanism

7.6.1 Importance

A problem that arises with the application of liability rules and the following litigation is that could potentially take many years. The civil procedure related to a liability case may take a substantial amount of time in order to review whether the conditions for environmental liability are actually fulfilled in the particular case. The problem is, however, that when victims may have to wait for a long time, the resulting losses could increase. Take again the case of a polluted nature reserve and a nearby restaurant which benefitted every weekend from the tourists coming by, enjoying the nature reserve and relaxing in the restaurant or hotel. Often those establishments have financed their activities based on credit. The pollution may imply that clients no longer come and that the restaurant or hotel owner loses income as a result of the business interruption. That could have devastating consequences and potentially lead to bankruptcy. Income is lacking and loans still need to be paid back. The question therefore arises if it is possible to guarantee a rapid claims settlement in order to prevent further damage resulting from the insolvency. In that respect it may be important to go beyond traditional environmental liability (via civil procedures) as the court procedure in order to establish liability may take long with potentially devastating consequences for the financial situation of the victims.⁶⁴⁴

7.6.2 Examples

There are many different examples of risk pooling schemes, funds and others that allow some form of rapid claims settlement. Usually those consist in not providing full compensation to the victim (which would only be possible in a liability case), but in an advanced payment that could at least avoid further damage which would result in case of insolvency and bankruptcy of the victim.⁶⁴⁵ I will just provide two examples in order to make clear that this could be important also in the domain of environmental liability in order to guarantee a rapid compensation to victims in cases where a long time lapse may lead to increasing damage.⁶⁴⁶

A first case concerns the compensation model after the Deepwater Horizon incident, which happened on 20 April 2010. Following the spill the Gulf Coast Claim Facility (GCCF) was created which took over the administration of the claims on 23 August 2010. Claimants received the option to file either with the GCCF or in court.⁶⁴⁷ Choosing the GCCF route was entirely voluntary. The GCCF allowed for three types of payment: a quick payment,⁶⁴⁸ an interim payment⁶⁴⁹ or a final payment.⁶⁵⁰ In other words, the

⁶⁴³ See on those positive learning effects regarding different solutions in various Member States, Van den Bergh 2000, 435-466.

⁶⁴⁴ See further on the need for this rapid claims mechanism, De Smedt, Wang & Faure 2017, 359 and 369 and see also Faure & Weber 2015, 1-26.

⁶⁴⁵ See for examples of those rapid claims mechanisms for damage resulting from offshore oil and gas activities, De Smedt, Wang & Faure 2017, 359-369.

⁶⁴⁶ In the framework of this study the examples will be briefly presented; for further details, see Faure & Weber 2015, 1-26.

⁶⁴⁷ See Schoenbaum 2012, 408.

⁶⁴⁸ This implied just filling out a form without any further documentation of damage and receiving a check within two weeks of \$ 5.000 for individuals and \$ 25.000 for businesses and a corresponding obligation not to sue BP (see Feinberg 2012, 168).

⁶⁴⁹ Based on past damage, while remaining their right to sue and to return to the GCCF (Feinberg 2012, 169).

⁶⁵⁰ This covered past, present and future damage on the condition of a full release, promising not to sue and no right to return to the GCCF (Feinberg 2012, 171).

quick and final payments by the GCCF excluded compensation from the court; with interim payments that was not the case.⁶⁵¹

On 16 June 2010 BP established a fund of Euro 20 billion with an open-ended commitment should the amount turn out to be insufficient.⁶⁵² The GCCF was administered by Kenneth Feinberg and two independent trustees.⁶⁵³ The GCCF issued a protocol for emergency advance payments on the day it started its activities (23 August 2010). On 22 November 2010, the GCCF issued a protocol for interim and final claims. Within 1,5 years, the GCCF proceeded over one million claims and paid a total of more than \$ 6,2 billion to over 220.000 individual and business claimants.⁶⁵⁴ In addition to the establishment of the GCCF litigation in court equally took place. Although there has been criticism on the GCCF in various legal publications,⁶⁵⁵ the advantage of this model is that it could provide speedy low cost recovery.⁶⁵⁶ The GCCF has at least been able to provide compensation quickly and at less costs to the claimants.⁶⁵⁷ Moreover, the system was entirely voluntary, but did provide the possibility for victims who needed money quickly to be paid within a relatively rapid time. On the whole, the GCCF was therefore valued positively. The strength was especially that the mechanism allowed to deal with a large number of claims in a relatively short term, thus avoiding further damage just resulting from a time lapse.⁶⁵⁸

Another example constitutes a Belgian Act of 13 November 2011 concerning the compensation for victims of technological accidents. The need for this Act was related to a disaster of an exploding gas pipeline on 30 July 2004 in Ghislenghien. As a result of the accident 24 people died and more than 150 were injured. Most of the victims were only compensated many years after the accident which explained the need for a new act with the specific aim of accelerating victim compensation.

The Act applies to a technological disaster of great extent. Compensation is taken care of by the Belgian Motor Insurance Guarantee Fund. The Fund in principle only compensates bodily injury. Victims are free to chose to claim under the Act or under the Belgian civil liability regime. Within three months after the Fund has received the list of the victims an advice will be formulated explaining whether the damage is of such a nature that it should be compensated. If the advice is positive, the Fund will provide an offer of compensation.⁶⁵⁹ The financing is based on prepayment by insurance companies. Private insurers pay to the Fund on the basis of their market share. The Fund is subrogated in the rights of the victim against the liable tortfeasor and his insurer.⁶⁶⁰ When no liable tortfeasor can be identified, the Fund requests repayment from the National Disaster Fund.

For victims this procedure is very attractive as the costs are low. There are in fact no costs whatsoever. Speedy compensation is the goal and that has to prevent large follow-on damage. The Fund is also guaranteed by relying upon wealthy contributors, the insurance sector.⁶⁶¹ Victims can chose between tort law or the Fund, which is of course positive. This Belgian model shows an interesting example whereby an administrative agency provides speedy compensation to victims, but still recovers the costs from the liable tortfeasor. Victims are paid speedily and the procedure against the tortfeasor can

⁶⁵¹ Feinberg 2012, 167-172.

⁶⁵² Feinberg 2012, 130; Wilde 2013, 270.

⁶⁵³ Kenneth Feinberg was also known for having administered the September 11 victim compensation fund and to have overseen a large number of other funds.

⁶⁵⁴ Faure & Weber 2015, 11.

⁶⁵⁵ See for example Mullenix 2011, 819.

⁶⁵⁶ So Greenspan & Neuburger 2012, 97.

⁶⁵⁷ Greenspan & Neuburger 2012, 99.

⁶⁵⁸ Faure & Weber 2015, 18.

⁶⁵⁹ Article 13 of the Belgian Act of 13 November 2011.

⁶⁶⁰ Article 9, § 4 of the Act of 13 November 2011.

⁶⁶¹ Faure & Weber 2015, 19.

take a long time (via litigation). The advantage is that rapid compensation is provided to victims, but that tortfeasors are still deterred as they finally pay the bill.

These two examples can also be very important for environmental liability, especially when it is feared that a long time lapse until payment may lead to follow-on damage. A facility which rapidly pays the damage to a specific category of victims for which substantial follow-on harm can be prevented, has large societal benefits. It would merit to examine whether also for particular environmental liability cases, such a rapid claims mechanism should be created.

7.7 Summary and recommendations

This chapter reviewed various limits in environmental liability which may reduce the likelihood that companies would have to respond for environmental harm. At the same time, also potential remedies to those problems were advised.

First of all, limits related to the conditions for liability were reviewed, equally leading to particular remedies:

- the fact that the traditional remedy (of fully compensating the victim equal to the damage suffered) does not provide deterrence in case of a probability of detection of less than 100% could be remedied by introducing punitive damages;
- problems related to uncertainty over causation could be remedied by applying a proportional liability regime;
- problems related to the long time lapse between an emission and the occurrence of the harm (latency) should lead to an examination of whether the behaviour of the tortfeasor was already wrongful at the time when it was committed; if that is not the case, public compensation of the victim should be provided in order to prevent retroactive liability.

Second, I reviewed the fact that widespread pollution may lead to the paradoxical situation that on the one hand the total social loss may be huge, but that on the other hand the damage of each individual may be so small that no one has a sufficient incentive to bring a suit. It is the classic rational apathy or collective action problem, resulting in a market failure. The best remedy is a representative action by an NGO. Granting access to justice, also in liability cases in line with the Aarhus Convention is what therefore should be strived for.

The third type of problems related to the high cost aversion, which may prevent a victim from bringing a lawsuit. A variety of different instruments (also already applied in several Member States) were introduced, more particularly conditional fees, legal expenses insurance and third party funding of litigation. It was argued that a wide area of different instruments should be made available in Member States in order to stimulate litigation. Existing restrictions with respect to several of those instruments within Member States should therefore be removed.

Finally, it was mentioned that some cases of environmental harm may lead to large follow-on losses for the simple reason that the victim may have to wait a long time until compensation is provided. It was therefore argued that mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution should be developed, allowing a rapid compensation of the victim (either through an alternative mechanism like in the case of the GCCF or via an advancement fund like in Belgium) in order to avoid those follow-on losses.

8 RELEVANT CASES AND EXAMPLES

KEY FINDINGS

- Previous studies concerning the implementation of the ELD show that the number of cases where the ELD is applied is relatively low.
- Average costs of remedial action are € 42.000.
- But in a few large-scale cases (Kolontár and Moerdijk) costs were substantially higher and in those cases cost recovery was impossible as a result of insolvency of the operator.
- In most ELD cases, operators cooperate with administrative authorities towards remediation.
- There are increasing (non-ELD) cases of liability of parent companies for (environmental) harm caused by their subsidiaries outside of the EU (often in developing countries).
- In many cases of large pollution, not just liability, but a multitude of instruments (administrative, criminal) is applied to remedy the problems.
- Many pollution cases still apply domestic liability rather than the ELD.
- As data with respect to environmental harm and cases are scarce, further data collection is highly indicated.

8.1 Introduction

When discussing the various studies that have been executed for the Commission regarding the implementation of the ELD in chapter 3, some attention was already paid to the practical application of the ELD. In this chapter, I will focus more closely on some cases and examples. It is, unfortunately, impossible to do a full-fledged empirical study for the reason that data regarding the application of the ELD in all Member States are simply lacking. There are, however, via various sources (such as the mentioned studies and equally the Commission reports) some indications on specific cases. It is interesting to pay some attention to these cases as it can provide some information on the question whether in the specific cases the company concerned was able to fulfil its ELD obligations and actually did so. To the extent that it would not be the case, it is equally important to analyse what the specific reason would be for the company being unable to follow ELD liabilities. That equally raises the question whether other tools or remedies have been employed.

The cases can therefore provide information, for example on whether the limited liability of companies (discussed in chapter 4) constituted a particular problem with respect to the obligation of the company to fulfil its ELD liabilities. The cases can also illustrate whether in a specific situation where civil liability was not employed, perhaps other instruments such as administrative or criminal liability intervened (as discussed in chapter 6) or whether particular barriers to access to justice existed and whether there were particular remedies to solve them (discussed in chapter 7). But it should be recalled that the cases are simply selected because they appeared either in previous studies, Commission reports or in the literature. There is therefore certainly no claim that they are representative for the way in which the ELD is applied in Member States. But even with that caveat, some insight into specific problems that played a role could be useful as it could illustrate whether some of the issues raised in the literature do indeed seem to arise in practice or not.

Empirics have also fueled the coming into being of the ELD itself. Van Calster and Reins refer to the many cases that arose during the ELD's long gestation process, such as the Aznacollar spill in Spain in 1998, the Baia Mare spill in 2000 in Romania and the Erika tanker incident in 1999 in France.⁶⁶² These cases undoubtedly played an important role in making the time ripe for action with respect to environmental liability at the EU level.⁶⁶³

8.2 Previous studies and reports

The studies and reports with respect to the ELD, already introduced in chapter 3, provide some information on the cases in Member States that applied the ELD. The 2009 study on implementation effectiveness by BIO and Stevens & Bolton provides an overview of the ELD cases that occurred until that moment.⁶⁶⁴ The study mentions the difficulty in collecting cases as even when environmental liability cases are reported in the media, it is usually not even mentioned that the particular case might be an application of the ELD.⁶⁶⁵ The study mentions a total number of 9 cases from 6 Member States. Of those 9 cases 5 did not involve an application of the ELD. The study therefore concludes that there is indeed a very limited number of ELD cases which makes an assessment of the effectiveness impossible. It also mentions that quite a few cases do not fall under the ELD as they are not caused by activities under legislation in Annex III.⁶⁶⁶ In the cases that were mentioned in the study, operators seemed mostly to collaborate with the authorities, as a result of which insolvency did not seem to be an issue in the few cases discussed in the study.⁶⁶⁷ This study provided input for the first report by the European Commission of 12 October 2010.⁶⁶⁸ The Commission concluded that given the low number of ELD cases, there is insufficient data to draw reliable conclusions on the effectiveness of the Directive in terms of the actual remediation of environmental damage.⁶⁶⁹

A second study that provides information on the cases applying the ELD is equally from BIO and Stevens & Bolton from 2013 and deals with implementation challenges.⁶⁷⁰ The study provides a chapter summarizing the practical application of the ELD for 7 Member States (Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom).⁶⁷¹ Of the 7 Member States examined, 2 had no ELD cases so far (Denmark and France); others had cases varying between 1 and 20; only Poland reported a high number of cases.⁶⁷² The study concludes that there were only few cases of environmental damage for which the ELD regime was applied and that in the majority of cases it was not possible to apply the ELD regime because of specific legal issues.⁶⁷³ Of special interest is the Annex Part B to this report as it provides more details concerning 5 specific environmental liability cases that occurred in the Member States. In 4 out of the 5 cases the operator apparently cooperated throughout the procedure and agreed to bear the costs of clean-up. It was only in 1 case (in Poland) that the operator did not cooperate and contested the decisions by the administrative authorities. He contested the results of the experts' assessment and did not take preventive or remedial measures. Again, even though it only concerns 5 cases, in 4 out of 5 the operator apparently cooperated with the authorities.

⁶⁶² Van Calster & Reins 2013, 12.

⁶⁶³ Ibidem.

⁶⁶⁴ BIO 2009, 81-87.

⁶⁶⁵ BIO 2009, 81.

⁶⁶⁶ BIO 2009, 87.

⁶⁶⁷ It could have been a problem in a Spanish pollution case regarding wetlands and lagoons at Las Tablas de Daimiel National Park, but there was no further information on the potentially liable operators (BIO 2009, 86).

⁶⁶⁸ COM(2010) 581 final.

⁶⁶⁹ COM(2010) 581 final, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁰ BIO 2013a.

⁶⁷¹ BIO 2013a, 95-115.

⁶⁷² BIO 2013a, 96.

⁶⁷³ BIO 2013a, 97.

In the second implementation report of 14 April 2016, the European Commission mentions an average cost of remedial action of around € 42.000.⁶⁷⁴ Only in two large-scale losses (to be discussed in further detail below), more particularly Kolontár in Hungary and Moerdijk in the Netherlands, were the costs more than € 50 million. The Commission concludes that "Problems persist regarding the application of the Directive to large-scale accidents and insolvency among liable economic operators".⁶⁷⁵

8.3 Kolontár, Moerdijk and ILVA

8.3.1 Kolontár

Two cases which are often mentioned as examples of catastrophic environmental harm are the cases of Kolontár (Hungary) and Moerdijk in the Netherlands.

The Ajka Alumina sludge spill was an industrial accident at a waste reservoir chain of the Ajkai Alumina plant in Western-Hungary. On 4 October 2010 the north-west corner of the dam of the reservoir No. 10 collapsed, freeing approximately 1 million m³ (35 million cubic feet) of liquid waste from red mud lakes. The mud was released as a 1-2 meter wave, flooding several nearby localities, including the village of Kolontár and the town of Deceser. Ten people were killed and hundreds were injured. Of more than 1.000 hectares affected by the disaster, 47 fell within the Natura 2000 network and 44 were designated as nature protection areas.⁶⁷⁶

Apparently there were many issues in the Kolontár incident including the wrongful reclassification of the waste in the dams as "non-hazardous" and the failure of the Hungarian authorities to determine that the extractive waste directive applied to the facility.⁶⁷⁷ The magnitude of the liability faced by the operator, MAL, without sufficient insurance covering third party liability finally led to its declaration of bankruptcy in 2013. The insurance policy of MAL was limited to € 40.000 and only covered traditional damages, but not remedying environmental harm.⁶⁷⁸ The Hungarian government renationalized the company and became the ultimate guarantor of the environmental liabilities. The Hungarian government submitted an application to the European Commission for solidary fund assistance under the "extraordinary regional disaster" criteria, claiming that the total damages attributable to the disaster amounted to € 174,32 million. The application of Hungary was rejected inter alia on the grounds that the occurrence was insurable.⁶⁷⁹ The executive director of the company was arrested and the investigation finished in November 2011 with 14 employees being criminally charged.⁶⁸⁰

8.3.2 Moerdijk

On 5 January 2011 a large fire occurred at Chemie-Pack, a company on the Moerdijk in the Netherlands that dealt with storage, processing and packaging of chemicals. It caused significant environmental damage, in particularly soil pollution. Large quantities of chemicals were involved in the fire, and the fire extinguishing water was heavily polluted. Around 8 hectares of land and water were contaminated including two ports at the river Hollandsch Diep.

Administrative, civil and criminal proceedings have been conducted on the legal aspects of the fire at Chemi-Pack. The company which performed the activity (the operator) was also the authorization holder, Chemie-Pack Nederland B.V. It did, however, not have sufficient financial resources to cover the costs of all necessary measures. Therefore a duty under administrative law was imposed upon the

⁶⁷⁴ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 5.

⁶⁷⁵ COM(2016) 204 final, p. 6.

⁶⁷⁶ See Fajardo del Castillo & Fuentes Osorio 2014, 27. See also De Smedt 2016, 14.

⁶⁷⁷ So Fajardo del Castillo & Fuentes Osorio 2014, 30.

⁶⁷⁸ EEB 2020, 15.

⁶⁷⁹ Fajardo del Castillo & Fuentes Osorio 2014, 39-40 and Liu 2013, 293.

⁶⁸⁰ EEB 2020, 15.

director the company and upon the owner of the land. In addition, property belongings were seized and a large number of trials followed. Chemie-Pack went bankrupt and the insurance of Chemie-Pack did not provide adequate coverage. As a result, only a fraction of the costs could eventually be recovered from Chemie-Pack.⁶⁸¹ Total costs were estimated at € 70 million, but a settlement was reached with Chemie-Pack for a total amount of € 4,2 million. The insurer of Chemie-Pack did not cover as specific laws and regulations had been violated and in that case the insurance does not cover.⁶⁸²

The case is interesting as it raises the question whether imposing a duty to seek financial cover could have provided a solution; in addition the case shows that not merely one approach (environmental liability under the ELD) suffices to handle such a major incident, but that it requires a combination of administrative, civil and criminal liabilities, as argued in chapter 6.

8.3.3 ILVA

ILVA is Europe's largest steel and iron plant (an operation in Taranto (Italy) since 1965). There have been problems with pollution due to emissions from ILVA since the 1990s. In 2005 the Supreme Court of Italy (Corte di Cassazione) condemned ILVA, the holding company RIVA Fire, her president (Emilio Riva) and the local director in Taranto for air pollution, rejection of hazardous materials and emission of particles. Just before the end of the limitation period, the local municipality asked in 2010 compensation for environmental harm, due to the emissions until 2006. It claimed the following heads of damages:

- € 2 billion for environmental damage (clean-up costs);
- € 1 billion for the damage to the image of the public body (non-economic damage);
- € 300 million for damage to movable and immovable goods.

In March 2015 ILVA entered into insolvency proceedings. In August 2017, the judge in charge of the insolvency proceedings in Milan denied the compensation asked by the municipality of Taranto (of a total of € 3,3 billion) because they held that the causality between the activity and the damage was not proven. The court only awarded the municipality € 17.000 for tax credits (that the companies did not pay) and € 14.000 for unsecured credits. The municipality appealed the decision. On 9 April 2019 the Court of Appeal of Milan established that the municipality of Taranto was entitled to receive a compensation for the environmental harm caused by ILVA until 2005, at that time managed by the RIVA group. In February 2020 the civil tribunal of Milan awarded a compensation of € 15.000 to two families claiming damages. They owned real estate in the area adjacent to the polluting plant.⁶⁸³ This particular case is interesting as the total amount of damages could not be paid as the polluter went bankrupt. The municipality was only entitled to claim compensation until the entry into force of the new Italian law that implemented the ELD. The case is equally interesting because the claims were not only directed against the company in Taranto (ILVA), but also against the holding company, RIVA Fire. In this case again, not only a civil proceedings was filed (which basically failed due to the bankruptcy),

⁶⁸¹ For further details, see De Smedt 2016, 8.

⁶⁸² Bergkamp 2016, 188.

⁶⁸³ I am grateful to Francesca Leucci (Rotterdam) who provided me detailed information on this case. For details see *inter alia* Website of the Committee in charge of the Extraordinary Administration of ILVA S.p.A. <http://www.gruppoilvaines.it/>; latest dossier on the state of the insolvency proceedings with overview of all legal proceedings: http://www.gruppoilvaines.it/pdf/ilva/Relazione_Trimestrale_IV_Trim_2019.pdf; <https://www.tuttoambiente.it/sentenze-premium/danno-ambientale/>; <http://lexambiente.it/>; <https://archiviodpc.dirittopenaleuomo.org/d/6572-ambiente-e-diritti-umani-nella-sentenza-della-corte-di-strasburgo-sul-caso-ilva>; <https://www.corriereditaranto.it/2019/04/09/22inquinamento-ex-ilva-il-comune-sara-risarcito/>; https://bari.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/03/17/news/-ex-ilva-inquinamento-a-taranto-giudice-ordina-risarcimento-di-15mila-euro-per-2-famiglia-il-legale-ma-non-arriveranno-m-251499437/?refresh_ce.

but a criminal lawsuit as well. In 2018 ILVA merged with ArcelorMittal. The merger was approved, also with reference to the fact that it might facilitate the restoration of the environmental harm. The involved commissioner (Vestager) mentioned: *"the sale of Ilva's assets to ArcelorMittal should also help accelerate the urgent environmental clean-up works in the Taranto Region. This essential de-pollution work should continue without delay to protect the health of Taranto's inhabitants"*.⁶⁸⁴

8.4 United Kingdom cases⁶⁸⁵

There are several cases regarding environmental harm that played in the UK that are extensively reported and therefore worth mentioning. An article in The Guardian of 30 January 2017 mentions that the Environment Agency collected more than £ 1,5 million for breaking environmental laws.⁶⁸⁶ The companies pay between £ 1.500 and £ 375.000 in "enforcement undertakings". It is an alternative to prosecutions for breaching environmental laws. The money is directly invested in cleaning up stretches of rivers and to restock water waste with native species. Northumbrian Water paid *inter alia* £ 375.000 for pumping raw sewage into a tributary of the river Tyne while Anglian Water Surfaces made two separate payments of £ 100.000 for pollution incidents that killed fish. The Environment Agency praised the instrument of "enforcement undertaking" as very suitable to restore the environment quickly, improve company practices and avoid longer criminal court cases. Moreover, the payments are said to comply with the polluter-pays-principle.

The total amounts mentioned in the article paid by the various companies are:

Northumbrian Water	£ 375.000
Filippo Berio UK	£ 253.906
Anglian Water Surfaces: two payments of £ 100.000	£ 200.000
Heineken UK	£ 160.000
Carry Ingredients UK	£ 127.975
Sandoz	£ 120.932

Of course, based on the newspaper article it is unknown whether any of these cases involved an application of the ELD. But it is interesting to see that the administrative authority (Environment Agency) in this case uses its newly acquired powers (since 2015) to impose what are *de facto* administrative penalties on polluters. This is completely in line with the suggestion made in chapter 6 to increasingly use administrative financial penalties as a low-cost deterrent, which avoids the costly route to the criminal court.⁶⁸⁷

Another interesting case is mentioned in a recent (March 2020) study by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) on crime and punishment.⁶⁸⁸ The study reports on a fresh water pollution case involving Thames Water Utilities, a private company responsible for UK water supply and waste water treatment. They were fined a record-breaking £ 20.361.140,06 for a series of pollution incidents on the river Thames caused by their negligence. The case combines 6 separate incidents causing significant and repeated pollution from 2012 to 2014, making it the largest freshwater pollution case in the

⁶⁸⁴ See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_3721.

⁶⁸⁵ I explicitly still include these United Kingdom cases notwithstanding Brexit, for the simple reason that these cases emerged when the UK was still an EU Member; moreover, the cases are of general interest and should therefore not be ignored in this study, notwithstanding Brexit.

⁶⁸⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/30/companies-pay-out-more-than-15m-for-breaking-environment-laws>.

⁶⁸⁷ See *supra* 6.4.

⁶⁸⁸ EEB, *Implement for life. Crime and punishment*, March 2020, available at: <https://eeb.org/library/crime-and-punishment/>, last consulted on 13 May 2020.

Environment Agency's 20 years history.⁶⁸⁹ The Environment Agency's investigations revealed several reckless failures by Thames Waters that disregarded warnings by its staff and ignored over 1.000 high priority alarms. 1.4 billion liters of untreated sewage in total was discharged, which made it an unprecedented case. In this case, it was the Crown Court that imposed the record fine, applying new sentencing guidelines, leading to these high penalties.⁶⁹⁰ Again, it is not known whether the ELD played any role at all in this particular case, but it shows an effective intervention by the Environment Agency and the imposition of a spectacular fine, hopefully inducing the defendant towards compliance.

Finally, I should mention an interesting case before the Cardiff Administrative Court against Natural Resources Wales (NRW). The case dealt with a specific lake in Wales (Snowdonia) called Llyn Padarn. The lake became famous among anglers *inter alia* for the presence of a rare species of fish, the Arctic Charr. Discharges of treated and untreated sewage by Welsh Water endangered the quality of the ecosystem and could potentially lead to the extinction of the Arctic Charr. It is an anglers association, Fish Legal, that took action for the court. The interesting point, extensively mentioned in an article by Fogleman, is that the Cardiff Administrative Court gave direct effect to temporal provisions of the Environmental Liability Directive instead of applying the regulations that had transposed the ELD into Welsh law.⁶⁹¹ As a consequence, the provisions of the ELD prevailed over the Welsh regulations that transposed the ELD (with a later date for its implementation and enforcement). Discussing the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, Fogleman indicates that ELD liabilities already arise in case of a progressive environmental damage resulting from an activity that began before 30 April 2007 and continued after that date unless the operator can prove that the damage entirely occurred before 30 April 2007.⁶⁹²

8.5 Parental liability

There is now in many Member States an increasing number of cases where victims of pollution outside of Europe (or NGOs) allegedly caused by subsidiaries of European companies try to bring environmental liability lawsuits against parent companies before courts in the EU. As the ELD has no territorial effect beyond the EU, those cases obviously do not come within the scope of the ELD. It is, however, interesting to briefly mention some of those cases as they constitute examples of parental liability discussed in chapter 4,⁶⁹³ but also of the increasing tendency to make European companies liable in the North-South relationship for environmental harm occurring in the South.⁶⁹⁴ The activism of some NGOs is moreover in line with environmental standing discussed in chapter 7.⁶⁹⁵

An interesting case was *inter alia* brought by the King of the Ikebiri community in the Niger delta in Nigeria against ENI in Milan (Italy), supported by Friends of the Earth Nigeria and Friends of the Earth Europe.⁶⁹⁶ ENI, an Italian based company, had a Nigerian subsidiary, the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (NAOC), having activities in Nigeria. On 5 April 2010, an oil pipeline operated by NAOC bursted 250 m from a creek north of the Ikebiri community. The spill affected the creek, fishing points and trees. Some initial payments were made by NAOC/ENI (of approximately € 14.000), but that was rejected as being

⁶⁸⁹ EEB 2020, 25.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibidem.

⁶⁹¹ Fogleman 2014, 137.

⁶⁹² Fogleman 2014, 155.

⁶⁹³ See *supra* 4.5.3.

⁶⁹⁴ See section 5.4.4.

⁶⁹⁵ See section 7.4.2.

⁶⁹⁶ Friends of the Earth Europe, *ENI and the Nigerian Ikebiri case*, Press briefing, 4 May 2017, available at: https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/extractive_industries/2018/foee-eni-ikebiri-case-briefing-update.pdf, last consulted on 13 May 2020.

insufficient. The Ikebiri community launched a case against ENI in the Court of Milan, seeking clean-up and compensation for damages from the oil spill that affected their community in the Niger delta. In Court the community is seeking damages of approximately € 2 million. The plaintiffs brought the case to Italy as they consider ENI, the parent company, the one who is ultimately liable as the parent also profits from the oil production in Nigeria. The plaintiffs did not want to bring their case to a Nigerian Court because of lack of access to justice and poor enforcement.⁶⁹⁷

The case is interesting as it shows an attempt to make parent companies in Europe liable for environmental harm caused by its subsidiary in the south. This could make parental liability realistic. In this particular case, given the assets of ENI, the potential insolvency did not appear to be a problem and neither was the potential limit of liability of NAOOC the reason to bring the case in Italy, but rather the lack of trust in the court and enforcement system in Nigeria.

At the moment of writing, the case was not decided yet. The trial was adjourned to 25 March 2020 and a verdict was expected in July or September 2020.⁶⁹⁸

Many similar cases have been brought with variable success for the plaintiffs. Another case concerned the Swedish mining giant Boliden and dates from longer ago: the 1980s. Boliden was accused of having disposed 20.000 tons of lead and arsenic contaminated smelter waste in Chile.⁶⁹⁹ Not realizing the toxic nature of the deposits, housing developments took place within yards of the waste and children played on a toxic playground. Even though the case originated from the 1980s, the public uproar only started at the beginning of this century when the damage, more particularly to human health, became clear. A lawsuit had been brought for the damage which occurred in Chile, in September 2013 against Boliden in Sweden. The Swedish Court passed judgment in March 2018 in favour of Boliden for a variety of reasons, but an appeal has been filed.⁷⁰⁰

A number of interesting cases were also filed in the UK on parent company liability.

In the case of *Okpabi v. Shell*, the London High Court rejected in a decision of January 2017, jurisdiction over the claims against the parent company, finding that the claimants failed to present an arguable claim that the parent company was responsible for the systematic pollution caused by its subsidiary. The decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeals on 14 February 2018, ruling that there is no arguable case that the parent company (Royal Dutch Shell) could be held legally responsible for the actions of its Nigerian subsidiary.⁷⁰¹

Another case of *Lungowe v. Vedanta*, dealt with damage that occurred in Zambia by a UK mining firm Vedanta, leading to a claim by Zambian villagers against Vedanta. Vedanta was the parent company of Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) an extractive resources company active in Zambia. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the case could be heard in English courts.⁷⁰² The case went to the UK Supreme Court where it was confirmed that it could be heard by UK courts.⁷⁰³ An author concludes "that it is now harder for UK parent companies to deny that they have a duty of care for the acts of their

⁶⁹⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁹⁸ Tricariccol 2020, available at: <https://shellandenitrial.org/2020/02/07/eni-opl245-trial-a-shadow-stretches-over-the-court-of-milan/>, last consulted 18 May 2020.

⁶⁹⁹ Boliden/Environmental Law Defender Law Center (ELDC), available at: <https://edlc.org/cases/remedying-health-and-environmental-harms/mining-waste-from-sweden-poisons-chileans/>, last consulted 13 May 2020.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibidem.

⁷⁰¹ <https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Shell%20Approved%20Judgment.pdf>,

last consulted 13 May 2020. See also www.bhrinlaw.org/key-developments/58-united-kingdom, last consulted 13 May 2020.

⁷⁰² See also www.bhrinlaw.org/key-developments/58-united-kingdom, last consulted 13 May 2020.

⁷⁰³ See Lloyd 2019, available at: <https://www.freshlawblog.com/2019/05/01/uk-supreme-court-considering-parent-company-liability-for-environmental-harm-caused-by-overseas-subsidiaries/>, last consulted 13 May 2020.

subsidiaries... This case could act as an important weapon for claimants to mitigate environmental impacts which can be linked to multinational companies operations”.

A third case dealt with ethnic violence of which Kenyan nationals were victims following the 2007 Kenyan presidential election. 218 Kenyan nationals brought together in a group (AAA) sued Unilever Tea Kenya Limited (UTKL) as well as Unilever PLC. UTKL was the Kenyan domiciled subsidiary whereas UPLC the UK domiciled parent. The argument of the victims was that ethnic violence was carried out on the plantation whereas the risk of violence was foreseeable and the defendants owed them a duty of care to protect them from these risks.⁷⁰⁴ In that particular case the Court found that the claims concerning a duty of care did not have arguable merit and so the case could not be heard in English courts. Meade argues that these cases all show that the question arises whether the parent company with a separate legal entity has sufficient control over the subsidiary to be held liable for harm caused by the subsidiary outside of the EU.⁷⁰⁵ There is in general, so he argues, an important development towards improved access to remedy in the UK for victims of overseas corporate related harm which calls for reforms “thereby mitigating against risk of parent companies distancing themselves from subsidiaries and enable victims of environmental and human rights abuse to access justice”.⁷⁰⁶ And these developments are certainly not limited to the UK, but can be found in many other EU jurisdictions as well, indicating an increased likelihood of imposition of a duty of care on parent companies located in the EU for environmental harm (or other violations) caused by their subsidiaries outside the EU.

8.6 European Environmental Bureau

I already referred to a recent (March 2020) study by the European Environmental Bureau on crime and punishment which provides also an interesting presentation of several cases.

One case mentioned in the report deals with Doñana, an important wetland located in Spain, but where the underground aquifer was exploited by suspicious irrigation points and illegal wells.⁷⁰⁷ Greenpeace estimated the costs of this water theft to be nearly € 15 million between 2013 and 2017, yet the probability of detection seems to be low. In 2014 a plan was made to close 3.000 hectares of illegal farms, but it was not implemented. Illegal and unsustainable agricultural practices and the related water usage have been mentioned as the main driver of the reduction of the aquifer. In this particular case the Commission took Spain to court for its failure to protect the Doñana wetlands, as Doñana is part of the Natura 2000 network.

One important problem mentioned concerning this case is that there could be as much as 510.000 illegal wells, but that the adequate number is simply unknown. It is the wide-spread immunity that leads to a continuation and increase of illegal wells, threatening the habitat.⁷⁰⁸

This case was not examined under the ELD framework, but under the Water Framework Directive and the Environmental Crime Directive. It shows (again) that in these particular cases of serious and continuous pollution, the liability instrument itself may not suffice and effective enforcement, supported by the criminal law (as argued in chapter 6) may be indicated.

Another case discussed by EEB concerns illegal logging that took place in Romania, again in Natura 2000 areas by an Austrian timber company.⁷⁰⁹ In May 2018 the damage caused by the illegal logging

⁷⁰⁴ www.bhrinlaw.org/key-developments/58-united-kingdom, last consulted 13 May 2020.

⁷⁰⁵ Meade s.d., 1, available at: <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/recent-decisions-in-the-uk-on-parent-company-liability-cases-show-the-need-for-law-reform>, last consulted on 13 May 2020.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibidem, 4.

⁷⁰⁷ EEB 2020, 7.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibidem.

⁷⁰⁹ EEB 2020, 17.

was estimated at € 25 million. Approximately 20 million m³ would be illegally logged each year, estimated to be worth at least € 4 billion in a 4-year period. In this case the traceability of the timber is mentioned as an impediment for effective corporate accountability and liability. Again, it is a case where there could be a violation of the EU Timber Regulation, which amounts to environmental crime. However, significant enforcement gaps and a lack of criminal prosecution made it difficult, even to apply the criminal law in this particular case.⁷¹⁰ NGOs who tried to challenge the activity of the Austrian timber company were even sued, claiming compensation for legal costs as an act of intimidation.⁷¹¹

8.7 Concluding

In this chapter I discussed some of the cases with respect to the application of the ELD and environmental liability in general. The case selection was selective, based on the available material and therefore certainly not representative. Therefore one has to be cautious with drawing too strong conclusions based on such a small sample.

Most informative are the studies performed for the European Commission and the Commission Reports themselves. They already provide a few interesting conclusions. One of them is that there are so far not many cases applying the ELD. In the cases that were reported often the operator seems to cooperate; the average amount of the damage (restoration costs) was also relatively low. On the basis of that one could conclude that there should not be a major worry that operators (try to) escape the application of the ELD; there are apparently no major issues of insolvency or externalizing harm to thinly capitalized subsidiaries. However, there are also a few rather spectacular exceptions (like the cases of Kolontár, Moerdijk and ILVA) where the damage was substantial and immediately an insolvency problem arose. The consequence in both cases was that insurance was either not available or insufficient and that by the end of the day it was the government (and therefore the general tax payer) that picked up the bill. That could justify the conclusion that financial security instruments⁷¹² are especially needed in cases where the expected damage could be substantial.

Moreover, it became also clear that in really large pollution cases multiple instruments need to be applied. One could often see not just the application of environmental liability instruments, but also administrative measures, financial penalties and in some cases criminal prosecution. Some of those more spectacular cases also illustrate that one would be wrong to think that within the EU there would not be large pollution cases anymore. Unfortunately, they apparently still do exist and in that case need an coordinated and integrated mix of different instruments (administrative, civil and criminal) as suggested in chapter 6.

One could also notice that especially in cases of cross-border pollution or rather pollution taking place in countries outside the EU by subsidiaries of European companies, there is increasingly a search for possibilities to hold the European parent company liable⁷¹³. Increasingly it is argued that the European parent has a duty of care to prevent (environmental and other) harm to be caused by its subsidiaries active outside of the EU. In that relationship parental liability therefore becomes a reality and increasingly EU courts also accept those cases even though the damage occurred outside the EU and the foreign subsidiaries were domiciled outside of the EU.

It is equally striking that many of the environmental harm and environmental liability cases discussed either in the literature or in press reports do not refer to the ELD. That does not always mean that the ELD is not of importance; in some cases one may not even be aware that *de facto* legislation is applied,

⁷¹⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹¹ Ibidem.

⁷¹² As suggested in section 4.6.

⁷¹³ This fits into the continued trend of foreign direct liability. For a more detailed analysis see Enneking 2012, 77-266.

which constitutes a transposition of the ELD. Moreover, given the limited scope of the ELD and the fact that it does not award a right to sue to individual victims, it is as such not surprising that those individual victims rather call on instruments of domestic law in cases of environmental liability. And obviously the crucial question is not so much whether the ELD is effectively applied, but rather whether in general companies within the EU are held liable for the environmental harm they are causing, either based on instruments transposing the ELD or on the basis of other instruments.

Data with respect to environmental harm and the cases to which they give rise are apparently still scarce. One important recommendation would therefore consist of collecting reliable data on environmental incidents within the EU (whether or not they give rise to application of the ELD) as well as of the instruments (civil, administrative, criminal) that were applied to deal with those incidents.⁷¹⁴ Only when more reliable data become available will it be possible to examine whether today a combination of different legal instruments is able to adequately respond to environmental harm, or whether serious gaps still exist that would have to be remedied.

⁷¹⁴ This is in line with the literature that increasingly pleads in favour of a so-called smart mix between different instruments to deal with environmental harm. See in this respect Van Erp, Faure, Nollkaemper & Philipsen 2019.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

Coming almost to the end of this study, there will be two concluding chapters. In this chapter I will present the main recommendations following from this study; in the next chapter (10) I will present a few concluding remarks of a more general nature, to some extent explaining some aspects of the recommendations, but equally providing a few broader reflections.

The recommendations presented below are built on the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 and on the conclusions that were formulated at the end of the previous chapters. Generally, the recommendations focus on the core of this study, being how to improve the environmental liability of companies, especially for their obligations under the ELD. The core of the recommendations therefore focuses on improving the effectiveness of the ELD. Some recommendations therefore focus on environmental liability, others are of a more general nature and focus on improving access to justice. Those therefore not only apply to liability of companies and not only to environmental liability. Most recommendations are based on the previous study of the literature as presented in the chapters. In some cases issues are still debated in the literature or relatively innovative. In those cases the recommendation will either be formulated more cautiously (like using the terminology "consider") or it will be suggested to first devote more research to particular topics before coming with strong policy recommendations.

Fifteen recommendations will be presented. They will be presented in italics followed by a brief explanation or a reference to the parts in the study on which the recommendation is based.

Starting point for the recommendations is the theoretical guideline presented in chapter 2 that companies should be exposed to the full social costs of the environmental harm they are causing in order to provide them incentives to internalize environmental externalities optimally. Most recommendations focus on situations where companies may not be exposed fully to the social costs they are causing. The remedies therefore aim at proposing solutions to remove those limitations:

1. Consider the introduction of punitive damages for environmental liability

As explained in chapter 6 an important limitation of current remedies in private law is that they only force the operator to compensate the harm. In cases where the probability of detection less than 100%, that leads to underdeterrence and to a need for higher penalties which private law can currently not provide. That would then necessitate public enforcement and in some cases the criminal law.⁷¹⁵ Punitive damages could improve private enforcement generally and the effectiveness of environmental liability in particular.⁷¹⁶

2. Improve access to justice for NGOs in order to solve collective action problems in case of wide-spread pollution

As environmental harm often has a wide-spread nature, rational apathy may limit the incentives of victims to bring a liability suit, thus reducing the effectiveness of private enforcement.⁷¹⁷ Granting generous standing to NGOs by facilitating representative actions can remedy this collective action problem.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁵ See 6.2.1-6.2.2.

⁷¹⁶ See 7.2.1.

⁷¹⁷ See 7.3.

⁷¹⁸ See 7.4.2.

3. *Stimulate the admissibility of conditional fee arrangements and act against Member States that prohibit the use of conditional fee arrangements*

The often used hourly fee system to pay lawyers has a strongly restrictive effect on access to justice as it lays the entire litigation risk with the client. Conditional fee arrangements shift the risk to the lawyer, having also the advantage that lawyers will act as gatekeepers, *ex ante* monitor the quality of the cases and in principle only accept meritorious cases.⁷¹⁹

4. *Allow and stimulate third party funding of litigation*

Third party funding of litigation is again an important tool to solve high cost aversion of plaintiffs, thus stimulating private enforcement.⁷²⁰

5. *Consider the introduction of a rapid claims mechanism*

Environmental pollution could lead to serious economic losses and, if civil procedures take a long time, even to bankruptcy. In those cases the mere lapse of time unnecessarily leads to higher harm. A rapid claims mechanism providing a (partial) compensation could avoid follow on losses.⁷²¹

6. *Expose companies to administrative, civil and criminal liability*

Chapter 6 made clear that an optimal mix of civil, administrative and criminal liability of companies is necessary to provide adequate incentives to companies to optimally prevent environmental harm. There is no reason to exclude companies from criminal liability.⁷²²

7. *Consider the introduction of administrative penalties and more particularly administrative fines in the Environmental Crime Directive*

Theoretical literature and criminological studies showed that criminal penalties only are often ineffective as they may lead to large dismissals of environmental cases. For those reasons administrative financial penalties are necessary and can even suffice for minor cases of environmental violations.⁷²³ In many Member States administrative financial penalties are increasingly used,⁷²⁴ so mentioning the option of administrative financial penalties would make the ECD more in line with these trends in Member States.⁷²⁵

8. *Make financial guarantees for ELD liabilities mandatory, but do it in a flexible manner*

Given that the insolvency risk will lead to serious underdeterrence in case of strict liability⁷²⁶ financial security for ELD obligations has to be made mandatory.⁷²⁷ But it has to be done in a flexible way whereby the EU level can provide general principles in a Guidance Note, but leave the decision concerning the precise type and amounts of the financial security to the authorities in Member States.⁷²⁸

⁷¹⁹ See 7.5.1.

⁷²⁰ See 7.5.3.

⁷²¹ See 7.6.

⁷²² See 6.3.

⁷²³ See 6.4.1.

⁷²⁴ See 6.4.3.

⁷²⁵ See 6.5.2.

⁷²⁶ See 2.4.3.

⁷²⁷ See 4.6.2.

⁷²⁸ See 4.6.5.

9. Reward internal compliance mechanisms in order to give positive incentives to companies towards self-policing and self-reporting

Environmental compliance mechanisms can play an important role in CER/CSR. An unbalanced civil/criminal liability of companies could lead to potentially perverse effects of reducing monitoring efforts.⁷²⁹ If an environmental compliance mechanism is sufficiently rewarded by lowering expected penalties in case of self-policing and self-reporting, such a mechanism could increase compliance.⁷³⁰ At the same time, it is important that it is always verified that an internal compliance mechanism leads to real environmental improvements as it could otherwise merely be an instrument of "green washing".⁷³¹

10. Consider enforcing non-financial reporting obligations

Increasingly requirements to report also on non-financial issues are imposed upon companies. It is supposed that these reporting requirements could lead to improved environmental performance. However, the current structure of those reporting requirements is criticised as there is no enforcement in case of non-performance.⁷³²

11. Consider to replace the social norm of shareholder privacy with a legal norm of sustainable value creation

The social norm of shareholder primacy is increasingly criticised as being a serious impediment to sustainability. CER/CSR are increasingly stressed and interpreted as a norm of sustainable value creation, which should not merely remain voluntary, but become a legal norm.⁷³³

12. Consider using the CSR/CER obligations also as a basis for (environmental) liability

Increasingly CSR/CER obligations are not merely voluntary commitments any longer. Moreover, the specific norms under CSR/CER could play a useful role, especially in a fault regime as they could create a duty of care in liability.⁷³⁴

13. Examine empirically how many companies in the EU can escape the clutches of environmental liability through their insolvency or through constructions using the limited liability of the corporation

Limited liability was seen as potentially jeopardizing both compensation of victims and the preventive effect of environmental liability.⁷³⁵ However, from the overview of cases⁷³⁶ it became clear that there are indeed a few cases where companies are insolvent as a result of which they cannot meet their obligations under environmental liability. But in other cases companies could. It would be necessary to have a good insight in the extent to which insolvency is in practice a serious problem in environmental liability cases. Such a research should focus on ELD liabilities, but also be broader and therefore also address environmental liabilities in Member States generally, equally focusing on domestic law.

⁷²⁹ See 5.2.1.

⁷³⁰ See 5.3.2.

⁷³¹ See 5.3.3.

⁷³² See 5.4.3.

⁷³³ See 5.4.4.

⁷³⁴ Ibidem.

⁷³⁵ See 4.2.2.

⁷³⁶ See chapter 8.

14. Examine the desirability of giving priority to victims of environmental harm in bankruptcy proceedings

One of the potential remedies for limited liability which was discussed in the literature and briefly mentioned in this study⁷³⁷ is to provide victims of an environmental tort a high priority in case of bankruptcy of the corporation. That could potentially be an interesting remedy against the problematic consequences of limited liability of corporations for involuntary creditors and would therefore merit further research.

15. Undertake further research into the desirability of enterprise liability for ELD obligations

In the literature there is an increasing attention for veil piercing and liability of corporate groups and more particularly parental liability generally. Especially after the Akzo Nobel decision in the area of competition law, the question could be asked whether extending environmental liability concerning obligations of subsidiaries to parent companies would also be desirable for ELD obligations or for environmental liability generally.⁷³⁸ Within the framework of the ELD the question has even been asked whether the concept of operator could be enlarged to include parental liability.⁷³⁹ It may be interesting to engage in further research into the possibilities of formalising either generally enterprise liability (liability of corporate groups) or specifically parental liability for ELD obligations. The literature has, however, also warned that such an extension of liability could lead to potentially perverse effects.⁷⁴⁰ For that reason the research should not only address the potential benefits of extending the notion of operator in the ELD (to include enterprise or parental liability), but should equally address potential disadvantages or perverse effects.

⁷³⁷ *Inter alia* in 4.2.4 and 4.7.

⁷³⁸ See 4.5.

⁷³⁹ See 3.3.

⁷⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

10 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having come to the final chapter of this study and after having presented the recommendations, I will conclude by formulating a few more general reflections on the object of this study, environmental liability of companies.

10.1 Limits

In this study I broadly addressed the possibilities to hold companies liable for environmental harm under the ELD from the perspective of the potential limits as a result of which companies could in some cases not be fully exposed to environmental liability. In that respect this study addressed those limits from the perspective of company law as well as from the perspective of environmental and liability law. That relatively broader, legal multidisciplinary perspective certainly had particular advantages, but undoubtedly limits as well. A consequence is that of course particular issues could be touched upon, supported by literature, but not be examined in full depth. Readers interested in further information can consult the many references provided in footnotes and in the list of references.

Another limit concerns the fact that for many of the aspects dealt with in this study (for example remedies to limited liability of corporations, lowering the barriers to access to justice) I briefly presented not only the theory behind particular solutions, but also the extent to which (steps towards) those solutions could already be found in European law and policy and sometimes in particular Member States. However, it may be clear that in that respect this study could obviously not be exhaustive. At the EU level alone, there are on each of the topics addressed in this study a plethora of different studies, recommendations and initiatives, too many to be mentioned. I usually tried to just mention either the most important or the most recent ones.

Another limitation concerns the fact that this study addressed environmental liability of companies at EU level and therefore focused on the European instrument addressing environmental liability, being the ELD. But the study merely addressed the potential limits that today exist in holding companies liable under the ELD. That leads to particular limits in at least two respects. The first one is that the ELD is for the European level undoubtedly an important instrument, but it also has a relatively limited scope⁷⁴¹ as a result of which the many studies concerning the effectiveness of the ELD also indicate that (in fact only with the exception of two Member States) the ELD is certainly not the main instrument applied in practice to environmental liability. In reality victims of environmental harm in Member States will call on domestic environmental liability law to receive compensation for the damage they suffered, irrespective of whether that national law was the result of the implementation of the ELD or not. That important point means that in order to provide an integral assessment of the state of environmental liability of companies within the EU, one obviously would have to look beyond the ELD and ask more generally whether companies in the EU can be held liable for environmental harm, whether that is on the basis of legislation implementing the ELD or on the basis of other rules. That would obviously require an investigation into domestic environmental liability law of the Member States which was beyond the scope of this study.

The second limit concerns the analysis of the ELD itself: I limited myself to those aspects of the ELD that directly concern the environmental liability of companies, in other words mostly the definition of operator and the (mandatory) financial security. But there are obviously many other aspects that determine the scope of environmental liability of companies and that equally could be and have been criticised in the literature as they could equally determine the effectiveness of an environmental

⁷⁴¹ See 3.2.4.

liability regime. Just to mention a few examples: the strength of an environmental liability regime depends often crucially on whether compliance with a permit excludes environmental liability of the operator.⁷⁴² That would entail that liability would no longer be possible when the operator has complied with the conditions of a permit. In the literature it has been stressed that that could seriously reduce the effectiveness of an environmental liability regime, especially in case where the permit (conditions) would be inefficient, too lenient or simply outdated.⁷⁴³ But that issue has not been decided by the ELD; Article 8(4)(a) ELD allows Member States to introduce such a compliance with permit defence.⁷⁴⁴ That aspect could easily be criticised as it does have a crucial influence on the scope of a liability regime. Highly problematic is of course also the fact that the ELD is still called an *Environmental Liability Directive*, it does in fact not deal with the most essential of the environmental liability features, being harm caused to individual victims. Recital 14 clearly states that “This Directive does not apply to cases of personal injury, to damage to property or to any economic loss and does not affect any right regarding these types of damages”. That of course seriously reduces the practical value of the ELD from the perspective of a victim of environmental harm.⁷⁴⁵ Another crucial aspect of any environmental liability regime is causation.⁷⁴⁶ Again, cost allocation in cases of multiple party causation is according to Article 9 ELD not regulated by the ELD, but left to “national regulations concerning cost allocation in cases of multiple party causation”. Those aspect of the ELD could and have been criticised in the literature.⁷⁴⁷ This study was not the place to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ELD and to study all those aspects. But it should therefore be kept in mind that in order to assess the effectiveness of the ELD, also in creating an environmental liability regime for companies, those specific aspects of the ELD that have been criticised in the literature may affect the extent of the liability of companies as well.

10.2 Is there a problem (I)? Cases

Referring to the famous proverb “if it ain’t broken, don’t fix it”, one could wonder whether today within the EU there is any specific problem with the environmental liability of companies. A first way of approaching this question is by looking at the number of cases. The various studies that consultants drafted for the European Commission⁷⁴⁸ and the reports presented by the European Commission⁷⁴⁹ both make clear that the number of cases is relatively small: only Hungary and Poland report a lot of cases where the ELD is applied, but the number of cases generally is low and 11 Member States even report no case whatsoever where the ELD is applied.

In the reports presented by the Commission one sometimes senses a slight disappointment when these numbers are presented. The question, however, arises whether that disappointment is justified. After all, the mere fact that Member States report few cases does not necessarily say anything about the effectiveness of the ELD or even of the environmental liability regime in general within the Member State. The few cases applying the ELD could be related, as the Commission reports also indicate, to the fact that many Member States were late in implementing the ELD. In this respect it is typical that only 3 Member States succeeded in transposing the ELD within the correct time frame. The reports also refer to the low awareness of the ELD among operators. That in itself would not explain the low number of cases, but it is possible that also among plaintiffs and their lawyers the awareness is not large. One important possibility, also addressed in the Commission reports is that plaintiffs, lawyers and the

⁷⁴² For a theoretical discussion of the effects of compliance with public law on liability, see Bergkamp 2001, 239-257.

⁷⁴³ See Faure & Grimeaud 2003, 55-58.

⁷⁴⁴ See *supra* 3.2.5.

⁷⁴⁵ Faure 2005, 16.

⁷⁴⁶ See Bergkamp 2001, 298-306 And Liu 2013, 75-80.

⁷⁴⁷ See *inter alia* Faure 2005, 14-17.

⁷⁴⁸ Some of those summarized in section 3.4.

⁷⁴⁹ See 3.5.

judges in the Member States simply apply domestic law. Given the many limitations in the scope of the ELD, that should as such not be a surprise and of course not even be considered problematic. It may be that particular Member States had already a strong and effective environmental liability regime in place, which practitioners (plaintiffs and judges) continue applying, also after the transposition of the ELD. If that is indeed the case, the goal of exposing companies within the EU to environmental liability is still reached, even if it is not via legislation implementing the ELD. After all, the ELD should not be considered as a holy grail that should at all costs be applied. If effective Member State legislation can reach the same goals of prevention and compensation⁷⁵⁰ the mere fact that the ELD is not applied should not be considered as problematic.

And finally, if there were in a particular Member State few environmental liability cases generally (not just a few cases applying the ELD), that could also mean that the general environmental regulatory framework has been effective in preventing environmental harm and/or that the applicable environmental liability rules had a supplementary deterrent effect providing adequate incentives for the prevention of environmental harm. But whether that is really the case is of course an empirical question that certainly merits further attention.

10.3 Is there a problem (II)? Insolvency

The second effectiveness question relates to the issue whether, if a company is held liable for environmental harm, it is also able to pay the compensation due. It is interesting to see that the studies that analysed the cases within the Member States mention several cases in which operators fully cooperated with the authorities and were able to pay the remediation costs.⁷⁵¹ One case is even mentioned of repair costs of a total of € 48 million which were equally paid by the operator and his insurer.⁷⁵² Unfortunately the number of cases reported is so small that it is impossible to draw any serious conclusions with such a small number. However, also the reports issued by the European Commission mentions average costs for remedial actions of € 42.000⁷⁵³ which are obviously costs which would be compensable by most operators. There is mention of a few problematic cases where the losses were higher than € 50 million, but these cases seem to be relatively few in number.⁷⁵⁴ That would probably justify the conclusion (again, one has to be cautious given the limited availability of data) that in the majority of ELD cases operators are apparently able to meet their obligations. Not surprisingly it is only in case of disastrous accidents that insolvency may arise.

In the many studies and reports the related question is asked whether operators in Member States seek insurance coverage for their ELD obligations. Again, one notices that several studies mention that operators often do not have a specific demand for financial cover (for example via insurance) to deal with their ELD liabilities.⁷⁵⁵ Again, the reports by the European Commission do mention with some sense of disappointment that demand for specific financial products to cover ELD liabilities is still relatively low.⁷⁵⁶ However, one has to caution that the mere fact that demand to cover ELD liabilities would be low should as such not necessarily come as a surprise and not under all circumstances be considered as problematic either. The crucial question is indeed whether the particular operator expects large losses for which it would have a particular risk aversion. Given the mention of an average

⁷⁵⁰ Stressed as the main goals of an environmental liability regime in section 1.1 in the introduction.

⁷⁵¹ See 3.4.3.

⁷⁵² Ibidem.

⁷⁵³ See 3.5.2.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁷⁵⁵ See 3.4.

⁷⁵⁶ See 3.5.1.

cost of remedial actions of €42.000,⁷⁵⁷ one should as such not be surprised that operators do not have a demand to seek protection for these kind of costs. The economic logic is simple: they would simply not have a risk aversion to pay remedial costs of € 42.000. Many operators may well be able to cover those costs with their own balance sheets and therefore have no specific demand to seek cover for relatively low costs of remediation. Logically operators only have a demand for financial cover for accidents which would create high costs going beyond the financial capabilities of the operator for which they might have risk aversion. But that demand for financial cover therefore strongly depends upon the nature of the particular operator, the type of activity involved and the magnitude of potential losses that could be created. A differentiated, balanced solution is therefore indicated.

10.4 A balanced solution needed

I just indicated that one should as such not be surprised that operators do not have a demand to seek financial cover for relatively low expected costs. However, the flipside is that they may have a demand when environmental harm would lead to large losses, but there exactly the problem arises that when the losses become very high (beyond the magnitude of the corporation) there would not be a demand for financial cover either, for the simple reason that the insolvency related to the limited liability of the corporation would then allow an externalisation of losses to involuntary creditors. That is precisely the reason why exactly for those higher magnitude losses, mandatory financial security has to be introduced.⁷⁵⁸ Yet, as I just explained: given the differentiated character of operators, risks and potential losses, there should not be a generalised duty (for example with specific amounts) mandating financial security at the EU level. That would basically mean that also operators are forced, for example to pay insurance premiums, where insurance would have no added value to them (for example because they have a stronger balance sheet than the insurance company involved). For that reason, the EU level should mandate financial security, but leave it to the Member States to implement this in a differentiated manner. The Guideline could of course make clear which elements administrative authorities within the Member States should take into account in order to assess the type and magnitude of a particular financial security needed. That has the advantage of on the one hand allowing sufficient flexibility and on the other hand guaranteeing that financial security is available, precisely for the large disastrous losses where the danger of externalisation of harm to involuntary creditors is the largest.

10.5 Adapting corporate law?

One general problem discussed at length in chapter 4 is the limited liability of the corporation. The remedy I suggested in this study is to find the solution within the framework of environmental liability and insurance by mandating financial security in a differentiated, flexible and balanced manner. Yet, many remedies have also been proposed within corporate law. But each of those particular remedies had their own specific problems. For example, minimum capital requirements did not seem to be very effective in protecting creditors and the idea of pro rata unlimited shareholder liability was considered to be difficult to implement. More generally, several scholars⁷⁵⁹ are very critical of a further European intervention concerning corporate law and generally argue that the harmonisation of corporate law at EU level has not been very effective.⁷⁶⁰ The question also arises whether it is necessary to revolutionise the entire domain of corporate law just to solve one particular problem of environmental liability. The advantage of mandating financial security in a balanced manner is that it focuses on the particular

⁷⁵⁷ See *supra* 3.5.2.

⁷⁵⁸ As argued and explained in 4.6.

⁷⁵⁹ See more particularly Enriques 2006a.

⁷⁶⁰ Enriques 2006b.

problem of environmental liability without touching upon the totality of corporate law, which could potentially have adverse effects as well. Examining the possibilities of extending financial cover for ELD liabilities is moreover, what is currently also examined at EU level. This recommendation (8) is therefore also in line with the current tendency at EU level.

Of course one could imagine some adaptations of corporate law to strengthen environmental liability of companies. Several interesting ideas have in that respect been formulated in the literature which certainly merit further research.

10.6 Further research

For example, the idea of expanding ELD liabilities to corporate groups or to parents (for ELD liabilities of a subsidiary) is an interesting thought, discussed but debated in the literature. The Court of Justice has taken important steps in that respect in *Akzo Nobel* in the domain of competition law and the question could be asked whether environmental liability would merit a similar solution. However, that depends of course on the empirical question whether today subsidiaries often escape ELD liability because of corporate structures and whether as a result companies could not meet ELD liabilities. It should first be examined whether that is today really the case before such a revolutionary step would be recommended. The literature has also warned that a too generous parental liability might lead to perverse effects (for example of limiting the control of subsidiaries via internal compliance mechanisms). Another solution mentioned in the literature to deal with the negative consequences of limited liability for involuntary creditors is to award tort victims a higher priority in case of bankruptcy. Again, that would merit further research. The question for example arises whether that would really help in cases where companies intentionally organise their own insolvency and there are no assets left whatsoever for creditors. It is certainly worth further examining these and other solutions,⁷⁶¹ but generally mandating financial security for environmental liability seems to be the optimal way to guarantee effective compensation of environmental harm and an effective internalisation of externalities.

⁷⁶¹ As suggested in Recommendations 12-15.

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ANNEX 1 - MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT⁷⁶²

Austria

General Partnership and Limited Partnership: no minimum capital requirement.

Limited Liability Company: €35,000 minimum share capital, with at least €17,500 paid up in cash

Stock Corporation:

- €70,000 is the minimum share capital, with 25% of the minimum issue amount fully paid up in cash
- Formation by contribution in kind is possible

Belgium

Public limited company (société anonyme/naamloze vennootschap):

- Minimum capital: EUR 61,500 fully paid-up at the time of incorporation.

Limited company (société à responsabilité limitée/besloten vennootschap) : there is no capital requirement.

Czech Republic

Limited liability company: there is a minimum of CZK1.

Joint stock company: there is a minimum of CZK2 million or €80,000.

Denmark

Limited liability company (Kapitalselskab)

Limited liability companies must have the following minimum share capitals respectively:

- Entrepreneur company (iværksætterselskab): DKK 1
- Private limited company (anpartsselskab): DKK 40,000
- Public limited company (aktieselskab): DKK 400,000
- Limited partnership company (partnerselskab): DKK 400,000

Finland

Osakeyhtiö (Oy):

- Private Limited Liability Company (Oy): €0
- Public Limited Liability Company (Fi: Julkinen osakeyhtiö, Oyj): €80,000

France

Société par actions simplifiée (SAS) : the minimum is €1.

Société à responsabilité limitée (SARL) : there is a minimum of €1.

Société anonyme (SA): €37,000.

Germany

GmbH – limited liability company: there is a minimum of EUR 25,000.

Greece

Societe anonyme (S.A.): the minimum share capital is currently €25,000.

Limited liability company (L.T.D.): no minimum capital requirement.

Private company (P.C.): no minimum capital requirement.

Hungary

Private company limited by shares (Zrt.): at least HUF 5,000,000 (approx. US\$20,000).

Limited liability company (Kft.): at least HUF 3,000,000 (approx. US\$12,000).

⁷⁶² DLA Piper, Minimum capital requirements around the world, available at:
<https://www.dlapiperintelligence.com/goingglobal/corporate/index.html?t=03-minimum-capital-requirement>

Ireland

Private company limited by shares (LTD): no minimum capital requirement.

External company: determined by the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation.

Italy

Società a responsabilità limitata (S.r.l.) :

- Minimum capital requirement of €10,000.

- The corporate capital is at least equal to €1

Società per azioni (S.p.A.): minimum capital requirement of €50,000.

Luxembourg

Private limited liability company (Société à responsabilité limitée or S.à r.l.) : €12.000, fully paid-up upon incorporation.

Public limited liability company (Société anonyme or S.A.): €30.000, fully subscribed and at least ¼ of each share must be paid up.

Special limited partnership (Société en commandite spéciale or SCSp): no minimum capital requirement.

Netherlands

B.V. (private company with limited liability): no minimum capital requirement. Issued capital can be as small as €0.01 (or one cent in any other currency).

Co-operative U.A.: no minimum capital requirement.

C.V. (a limited partnership): no minimum capital requirement.

Norway

Private LLCs: NOK30,000.

Public LLCs: NOK1 million.

Partnerships with liability: no minimum capital requirement.

Poland

PLN 5,000 for limited liability companies

PLN 100,000 for joint-stock companies

PLN 1 for simplified joint-stock companies

PLN 50,000 for limited joint-stock partnerships. No limits exist in respect of other organizational forms.

Portugal

Sole shareholder private limited liability company (LDA with 1 shareholder): minimum share capital of €1.

Private limited liability company (LDA): minimum share capital of €2.

Joint stock company (SA): minimum share capital of €50,000.

Romania

Joint stock company (JSC):

- Minimum share capital of RON 90,000

- Minimum nominal value per share of RON 0.1

Limited liability company (LLC):

- Minimum share capital of RON 200

- Minimum nominal value per share of RON 10

Spain

Branch (Sucursal): there are no minimum capital (fund allocation) requirements.

Limited liability company (Sociedad Limitada): minimum of €3,000.

Joint-stock company (Sociedad Anónima): minimum of €60,000.

Sweden

Trading partnership (Sw. handelsbolag, HB): no minimum capital requirement.

Limited partnership (Sw. kommanditbolag, KB): no minimum capital requirement.

United Kingdom

Private limited company: companies must have a share capital, which can be any value above zero.

Limited Liability Partnership (LLP): there is no concept of share capital, and no minimum capital requirement.

PE 651.698

Print ISBN 978-92-846-6686-7 | doi:10.2861/038273 | QA-02-20-330-EN-C

PDF ISBN 978-92-846-6687-4 | doi:10.2861/665255 | QA-02-20-330-EN-N