

## Policy Department External Policies

# SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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**STUDY**

**SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION  
EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**Contents:**

Although migrants within the African continent number over 16 million, so far very little consideration has been given to the diverse nature of this migration. All the attention is focused on migration from South to North. It is true that the diversity and the rapid changes in regional and sub-regional situations make South-South migration difficult to classify. However, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration still applies when the accent is on the factors that prompt people to leave their homes. Also, the links between migration and development seem more complex in the case of South-South migration than in the case of migration from South to North. The former does not generate any significant revenue and has to be seen as a resource, in other words as revenue integrated into local activity systems.

*The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Parliament.*

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# **SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION**

## **EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

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### **Summary**

Although migrants within the African continent number over 16 million, there has so far been very little research into the nature of this migration as most attention is focused on migration from South to North.

Migration in Africa is currently structured around the main urban centres with good links with the rest of the world, which are connected both to the secondary centres and to changing rural areas. South-South migration between countries is relatively difficult to classify because of its diversity and the rapid changes in national and sub-regional conditions. Whether voluntary or forced, this migration is of long standing and involves every sector of the population, men and women of all age groups. However, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration still applies when the accent is on the reasons that prompt people to leave home. Within each of those categories, it is possible to identify types of migration based on the purpose of the migration in the case of voluntary migration and the diversity and intensity of the crises in the case of forced migration.

In South-South migration, the relationship between migration and development seems more complex than with migration from South to North, in that the former does not generate any significant investment revenue. Such migration must be seen more as a resource, in other words as revenue integrated into local activity systems. It is also necessary, when taking action on a group of people, to have a knowledge of all the individuals in the group, in all the places they inhabit or are likely to inhabit.

Finally, migration within Africa cannot be studied without taking account of migration from South to North. Migration plans change constantly as individual circumstances change. Opportunities, crises or social and geographical changes might cause migrants suddenly to alter their routes.

## CONTENTS

SOUTH-SOUTH Migration	1
EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	1
SOUTH-SOUTH migration	3
EXAMPLE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	3
Summary	3
CONTENTS	4
Introduction – MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION	5
1. Africa's place in international migratory movements	5
2. Migratory movements within Sub-Saharan Africa	5
3. Migration/development in Africa	6
Chapter I – VOLUNTARY MIGRATION	6
4. Centres of Sub-Saharan migration	7
5. Circular migration	8
6. Temporary migrants	9
7. Permanent migrants	10
8. Skilled migrants	12
Chapter II – FORCED MIGRATION	13
9. Ecological refugees	13
10. Refugees from violence and displaced persons	15
11. Forced expulsion and repatriation	18
12. The urbanisation of poverty	19
Conclusion – MIGRATION, POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT	19
13. Migration and development in Africa	19
14. Should the European Union act on migration within Africa?	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	22
International migration in Africa, 2002	25
Flows of refugees from African countries, 2002	29

## Introduction – MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

According to Eurostat, the European statistics office, migration throughout the world has increased significantly over the past few years. In 2005, migrants numbered 200 million, nearly 3% of the world's population, and the number has doubled in the last 20 years (L. Van Eeckhout). Movements are becoming more varied and international and the profile of the migrants is changing. They now include people from every social class and occupation, increasingly from urban backgrounds. The media, academic researchers and political authorities have focused on the flow of migrants and asylum seekers from countries in the South to countries in the North. Although they are a minority among migrants from the South, all the emphasis is on migration 'in which the people involved, including those from the most modest backgrounds, are driven by ambition, by plans to better themselves' (C.-V. Marie). Because of the major social issues this migration raises, most of the research is carried out in the host areas and societies in the North. Very little is known about the varied nature of South-South migration, although such migrants outnumber those migrating from South to North.

### 1. Africa's place in international migratory movements

Sub-Saharan Africa occupies a marginal place in international migratory movements, at least in terms of numbers. In 2000, the number of migrants was 16.3 million, whereas the figure for the developing countries was 64.6 million (IOM 2005). Few people come from outside Africa to settle there (apart from groups of expatriates and Syrian-Lebanese, Indian and Chinese trading communities) and most migrants are individuals travelling within Africa. However, the migration figures need to be qualified. Firstly, so few figures are available that it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of continent-wide migration and, secondly, they are no more than estimates because of the deficiencies of national statistical systems and the large number of illegal border crossings.

However, Africa does have migration centres of an international scale. The 20 countries in the world with the largest numbers of migrants include three African countries: Uganda (mainly refugees), Côte d'Ivoire (migration of very long standing, due to the use of foreign labour) and South Africa (developed country on a continent-wide scale) (IOM). A significant number of migrants in Africa are refugees, representing 20% of all African migrants in 2005 (IOM, 2005)

### 2. Migratory movements within Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa has had a mobile population for centuries. The traditional nomadic migration of pastoralists and hunter-gatherers has gone together with the rural exodus, large-scale migration to the coast and then Europe for work, mass forced migration and migration to neighbouring areas because of drought and war. All the old types of voluntary and forced mobility, internal and international, are still continuing. Although people have for a long time been migrating from overcrowded rural and urban areas, opening up new farmland and contributing to urban growth, empty areas are being filled by land clearance and taken over by agriculture, often leading to conflicts over land.

Migratory movements within Sub-Saharan Africa have changed in the following ways: the trend is towards travelling greater distances and there is a wider range of departure, transit and destination points. Furthermore, migrants are not just from the rural areas; they include people from the cities, from all socio-professional categories. More women are also involved; the migratory behaviour of women is not very different from that of men (whether they migrate on their own or with men, husbands, parents or friends), except in particular situations where they are more vulnerable than men (trafficking). Lastly, refugees mostly move to adjoining countries and they both leave and arrive in many countries in crisis (Sudan, Uganda).

Internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be studied without also looking at international migration to the North (Europe, North America) and the Arab world (North Africa, the Middle East), since the two types of migration are closely linked.

### **3. Migration/development in Africa**

There has been very little research so far on internal migration within Africa, but the following are known facts. It is not the poorest who migrate; on the contrary, the very poor are confined to one place, unless forced to migrate. Migratory movements are not always synonymous with social breakdown or exile, except in the case of refugees and deportees. There are many reasons why people leave home. The four major factors in mobility are demographic growth, poverty, shrinking natural resources and conflict. In order to address the impact of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is necessary to understand the global dimensions of the phenomenon (economic, social and political), at different levels (local, regional, international), to appreciate how complex and variable is the connection, or lack of connection, between migration and 'development'.

In order to understand the global dimension of migration, we have decided to use a classification based initially on a simple standard distinction between voluntary and forced migration. Secondly, within each of those two main categories, sub-categories distinguish between types of migration: circular, temporary or permanent in the case of voluntary migration, refugees, deportees, forced repatriations in the case of enforced migration. This classification, which is necessarily simplistic, merely shows the limitations of the existing sources and the varying types of individuals concerned and movements. However, the interconnection between the reasons for migration and the types of migration makes it possible to go beyond a pure cause and effect analysis. Migratory movements, including forced migration, have a range of causes, rather than a single cause. Thus it is always possible to shift from one category to another in the course of the same migratory movement. The classification should be seen as a continuum reflecting a variety of migratory situations, rather than a set of unconnected categories.

## **Chapter I – VOLUNTARY MIGRATION**

The category of voluntary migration encompasses a wide variety of types of migrant: men and women of all social classes and ages. However, most of them are under 40, i.e. of working age. A large proportion of them migrate to find work; whether or not their main reason for leaving home is economic, their aim is to work and earn money, with a view to either returning home or settling permanently in another country.

Voluntary migration has been a major factor in urban growth in Africa over the past 50 years, contributing to the development of centres of migration. Although urban growth was mainly in the larger cities between the 1950s and the 1980s, that growth has nevertheless slowed down in the last 20 years and it is the small and medium-sized towns that are now growing. The percentage of the total urban population living in the national capitals is tending to level off above the threshold of 40% (S. Traoré and P. Bocquier). Although the major cities still play a fundamental role in migration, that role extends beyond Africa itself: those cities have become transit points within a global system, because of their size, their position on major air and sea routes and their facilities. Towns that are smaller but still attract people from all over the continent are essential connecting points between the rural areas or other towns drawing people from different parts of the country and the migration centres. Because urban growth and migration are closely linked, we need to define the various centres before discussing in detail the types of migration occurring in Africa.

#### **4. Centres of Sub-Saharan migration**

Centres of migration may be defined as places where flows of voluntary migrants converge and diverge. They can be considered the most stable elements in a constantly changing migratory pattern. However, their role in attracting flows of refugees is purely marginal. They have a role not only in Africa but also in Africa's relations with the rest of the world. They are countries and large cities with transport systems (particularly air and sea) and modern communications (efficient links to new information and communication technologies) which are arrival, departure and transit points for migrants.

The continental centres offer opportunities that are not available elsewhere in Africa. Usually in a location favouring international trade – they all have outlets to the sea – they are linked to the rest of the world. Their locations, combined with the development of transport and the new communication technologies, connect them with international migration patterns. Furthermore, these centres are the few areas that have developed industries and a modern services sector (banking, business), which draws people to them. However, only six countries fall into that category: South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya.

South Africa differs considerably from the other countries, in that it is much more developed and can attract migrants not just from Africa but from other parts of the world. Gabon and Nigeria are economically developed because of their oil revenue and their situations, making them important centres for migration. However, that could be jeopardised by the latent political instability in Nigeria and uncertainty about the future of Gabon after President Bongo. Moreover, both countries deport foreigners on a more or less regular basis. The Côte d'Ivoire is also a continental centre, but more because of its past; its present and future situations are uncertain.

Until the end of the 1990s, it was the major economic and migration centre in West Africa, one of the few countries to attract migrants from both Africa and other continents (French and Lebanese). It has one of the highest proportions of foreign residents in the world. At present, Abidjan is relatively stable and remains a centre of migration for the whole of Africa, but that could change with the serious economic crisis it has been suffering since the start of the war. Senegal is not only stable, but has a worldwide diaspora; it is playing an increasingly important economic role in the globalised world, through both foreign investment (the establishment of telephone call centres, for instance) and investment by Senegalese living

abroad. Lastly, Libya has a special position in this group: connecting Sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe, it is emerging as a centre since it has been accepted back into the international community. With its growing economy and oil revenue, Libya attracts migrants from the southern Sahara and at the same time is gradually establishing links with Europe. However, its emergence as a transit and host country could be brought to a halt by the growth of illegal immigration to Europe and forced settlement by those migrants.

The regional centres connect with international migration through the continental centres. As national capitals with fairly buoyant economies, they generally attract large numbers from all over the continent. However, they do not have the resources to go beyond that, either because they are located in the interior of the country (Nairobi), or they are close to the continental centres (e.g. Accra, Douala, Cotonou).

The major transit centres, the last category, are a rather special case. Unlike the previous centres, they are not large cities or economic centres. These areas become centres because of migratory routes that acquire importance at a particular time. They are often on illegal immigration routes, where movement is restricted and requires short-term settlement (J. Brachet, 2005 (b)). This category includes, for example, small and medium-sized towns in the Sahara (Nouadhibou in Mauritania, Agadez in Niger, Dongola in Sudan).

These migration centres are the basic framework of voluntary migration. In turn destination, transit and departure points, they are part of the structure of the migratory routes, even if not the only components. Focusing on those centres can lead us to overlook the rural areas, in a continent where the rural population is in the majority. The distinction between migration from rural to urban areas, between rural areas, from urban to rural areas and between cities is too simplistic. In fact, it is clear from the types of migration that those categories are very fluid; at the same time, they show that rural areas also have a place in African migration.

## 5. Circular migration

Circular migration is undoubtedly the oldest form of migration (in the form of seasonal migration); it has been continuing since pre-colonial days. It is defined as '*a specific form of temporary migration, characterised by repeated movement between several places of residence*<sup>1</sup>' (F. Dureau and C.E. Florez).

Circular migration, unlike temporary migration, involves repeated movements between various places of residence, with the length of time spent at any of those places not predetermined. Even if the term 'residence' is always used, it refers not to a single place but to the idea of passing through.

This category covers people of working age, mainly men, who move between two or more places of residence. They take advantage of complementary areas and resources. This type of migration is particularly common in West Africa, especially between the Sahel and the urban areas on the coast (such as Dakar, Freetown and Lomé). For instance, circular migration by Nigerians to the city of Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) is mainly for the purpose of buying clothes, shoes, blankets and other goods that are cheaper on the coast than in their local area. Added to

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<sup>1</sup> Translated by the authors of this report

that are social factors that prompt young people to leave home temporarily to escape the supervision of their elders (F. Boyer). In the city, the migrants, who are semi-skilled or unskilled, are restricted to occupations that are poorly paid but require only a small initial outlay. The men work as itinerant vegetable and clothes sellers or small-scale coal merchants, the women as traders or maids. Moreover, they give up the work when they return home, so that they have no opportunity to better themselves in either the place they migrate to or the place they came from. Each time they return, they repeat the same economic pattern and start up their business again.

In West Africa, this migration has been going on for so long and is on such a scale that it might be described as institutionalised (C.Z. Guilmoto and F. Sandron). These movements have become the norm, accepted and supported by society as a whole (provided that the migrant stays within the agreement, i.e. that he returns). Migration has become a resource, in the same way as those created or exploited locally. Economically, circular migration is a form of dual activity, whose aim is not so much to save money as to find work and earn an income. Accordingly, circular migration does not generate any migratory revenue<sup>1</sup>, precisely because it is just a resource.

Within this circular migration, traders are a separate category. They travel for their work, in other words they take advantage of differences in prices between two countries or the scarcity of goods in a particular country. For example, a trade in cereals and petrol has developed between Nigeria and Benin, through cross-border migration whose direction varies according to which country offers the most favourable customs terms (F. Galtier and Z. Tassou). This category includes a large number of women, like the Mina women from Togo or the Nigerian Yoruba women who, taking advantage of a long tradition of trading by women, have established themselves as successful businesswomen and are nicknamed the 'Nanas Benz'. The female railway traders in Mali are another example. This business is based on transnational social and family networks (between Senegal and Mali) (D. Poitou, A. Lambert de Frondeville and C.M. Toulabor). Like the migration mentioned earlier, these movements are a resource, even an occupation; they are not aimed at building up savings.

Apart from the characteristics of the migrants and their reasons for leaving home, the feature common to all circular migration is that the movements become a resource. Although shortcomings in local production systems, especially in the rural areas, have encouraged the growth of this type of migration, it is also, and above all, rooted in a tradition and custom of very long standing.

For migrants, the institutionalised nature of circular migration is a form of safeguard. The risk involved is minimal, since the regularity of the trips ensures that they have a place to return to in town where they are accepted by the group and have a ready-made social and cultural circle.

## **6. Temporary migrants**

Temporary migrants differ from other categories of voluntary migrants because of their varying socio-economic backgrounds and their ability to 'break away' from their communities:

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<sup>1</sup> Revenue from migration includes all forms of transfer, material and non-material, that enable a group to subsist, other types of resources being relegated to second place.

they leave home for their own benefit and not that of the group. Their aim in migrating, often ill-defined when they set out, develops as they are en route, according to what opportunities present themselves. Thus South-South migration can turn into South-North migration as the opportunity arises, and vice versa. Because of that, they travel by many different routes and the length of the migration varies considerably (between a few months and several years). Temporary migrants, who come from all social classes, from the richest to the poorest, are mainly young men (between 18 and 35) from urban backgrounds.

Although they migrate partly for economic reasons, that is by no means the main incentive. Building up a small amount of capital to set up a business or get married might be an aim for temporary migrants, but their primary purpose seems to be to pursue a personal ambition, to become independent of their community. Thus the social and cultural aspects of temporary migration seem as important as the economic aspect (I. Bardem).

This migration has a limited impact on the regions they travel from and to, because the numbers involved are small. On the other hand, temporary migration affects the dynamic of some transit points where these flows converge and migrants stay and sometimes work, building up the resources to continue their journey. The main impact is on the labour market. Temporary migrants are cheap labour, prepared to take on any type of work that allows them to earn money to continue travelling (J. Brachet, 2005a). A significant proportion of these temporary migrants are women. They differ from men in that they are more vulnerable, especially when travelling across the Muslim Northern Sahel. Although some find legal employment (working in bars or as hairdressers), they are more likely than men to be forced into prostitution to earn money, cross a border or find accommodation, sometimes becoming involved in international trafficking or prostitution networks (V. Samarasinghe)<sup>1</sup>.

These migrants, whether male or female, are unlikely to contribute to the development of the regions they come from, particularly since migrants of this type are acting individually and seeking independence. The aim of any action in the areas they leave has to be social rather than economic; in other words they need to be given the chance of independence in their local area and helped to achieve their aims in society without the need to travel.

## **7. Permanent migrants**

This category is also very diverse. It includes men, women, old and young. Permanent migrants are part of the migratory pattern, in that they can offer accommodation and support to other migrants.

Migration, particularly economic migration, can only function if members of the group live in different places. Permanent migrants gravitate to the migration centres in particular and have played an important role in urban growth.

Labour migration has led to concentrations in industrial towns from Nigeria to South Africa, including the Côte d'Ivoire. Although these movements were enforced in the colonial period (forced and conscripted labour), particularly in the Côte d'Ivoire, in the 1960s and 1970s they began on a massive scale. These migrants were a factor in the development of the commercial sector, particularly the informal sector (A.C. Dossou-Yovo), the craft sector and small

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<sup>1</sup> Because of their mobility, male and female migrants are more likely than others to be involved in prostitution and hence the spread of sexually transmitted infections and diseases across the continent.

industries. In the Côte d'Ivoire and also in Gabon, the pattern is for nationals to be employed mainly in the public sector and similar jobs, whereas migrants – foreign or naturalised – are largely concentrated in the private sector.

This permanent migration has also shaped the landscape of the urban centres. For example, many towns between Ghana and Nigeria, from the savannah to the forest, have districts called zongos. Nowadays these are the districts where foreigners tend to live, but when they were first established they were home to traders from the Sahel, who resold goods that other people brought them locally. Because the social networks in the zongos are strong and close, they have become crossroads for migration. To some extent it is only possible to move in there because other people are moving on, and that movement only continues because other people have moved in. The most extensive research has been into the zongo district in Lomé (M. Agier).

Permanent migrants do not only go to the towns. Farmers are drawn to rural areas, particularly the areas where cash crops are grown (such as coffee and tea in East Africa, groundnuts in Senegal). Access to land is also a major factor in migration; this land migration is either in the context of movements organised by the State (irrigated Office du Niger areas) or on the migrants' own initiative (Burkina Faso coffee and cacao planters in Côte d'Ivoire).

The impact of that migration on the areas they leave depends on the maintenance of links between the places; money, goods and people can then move between them. These migrants can organise themselves to take joint action, either short term when there is a food crisis in their home area, for example, or more long term, by contributing to the building of communal facilities (such as places of worship, schools, dispensaries). For instance, Nigerian migrants from the west of the country have clubbed together in Cotonou and Abidjan to help their home village (H. Mounkaïla). However, this type of action is marginal in the case of South-South migration, because the migrants have low incomes.

On a more individual or family basis, migrants can transfer part of their income to their home area and/or invest in urban property outside their home areas. Their contribution to the local economy may be direct or indirect; for example, property investments help to create a dynamic building sector in cities such as Ouagadougou and Accra.

The connection between circular and permanent migration raises the question of the dispersal of the social group as a resource for the group and for all the places they settle in, which are linked together (Ma Mung, 1999). Not only do people move between the different places, so also do money and goods. Burkina Faso is a notable example; family groups migrate both within the country and to other countries, travelling between each of the places concerned and providing a mutual support system (J.Y. Marchal and A. Quesnel).

This pattern is also found outside Burkina Faso, in areas where migration is traditional and especially where several types of migration coexist: internal and international, of short and long duration. In view of this dual phenomenon of mobility and dispersal as a resource, two issues have to be considered in any future action:

- from the point of view of institutional development, any action needs to take account of the fact that the places concerned are numerous and widely scattered. Purely local action is likely to create imbalances that might exacerbate the situation with areas and population groups that are connected but are not included in the action. The social group cannot be defined in local terms;

- it is necessary to look at the economic and especially the social situations of the migrants to understand the reasons for the migration (forced or voluntary, role of the economy). In the latter case, it would be advisable to try and capitalise on the fact that this movement is a resource, rather than trying to put a stop to it.

## 8. Skilled migrants

The migration of skilled people between African countries is a specific type of permanent migration, differing in many respects from the types discussed up to now, particularly because it is organised and legal. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are particularly attractive to the most highly skilled. The migration rate for skilled workers in Africa has risen steadily over the last few decades (in relation to the overall increase in the number of skilled people on the continent). However, the proportion of skilled migrants remains minimal compared with that of unskilled workers. This phenomenon, known as 'the brain drain' or 'the international movement of skills', occurs more in South-North migration than in South-South migration. More skilled jobs are available in the North, backed by immigration policies that offer incentives (cf. in France the immigration bill tabled by Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, in the United Kingdom the policy to encourage immigration by nurses and doctors from the developing countries, particularly former British colonies such as Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria).

However, the selective policies of European countries, which encourage immigration by skilled workers, can have the effect of increasing the shortage of skilled workers in Africa, especially in countries with good higher education systems. These countries would have to train a labour force that would not be available to them for their own development, since they are unable to offer salaries as attractive as those in the North. Investment in higher education would be to some extent wasted.

In Africa, mobility by skilled workers takes three main forms:

- Students who study abroad (in African university towns which are often also centres for migration and in the Arab world) and stay on after the end of their course. Some countries try to prevent this 'brain drain'; the government of Gabon, for instance, finances studies abroad (scholarships), but the students have to come back to Gabon to work.
- Students who study abroad and come back to their home countries after the end of their courses but then, when they are unable to find jobs, leave again to go to countries where skilled workers are more in demand or better paid, for instance to South Africa and some Arab countries which use skilled foreign migrants in various spheres.
- Skilled workers who work in their home countries and leave to go and work abroad. There are various reasons for this mobility: political crises or instability, economic crises/unemployment, job opportunities in the development field (e.g. NGOs, UN organisations). In the latter two categories, political crises and a high unemployment rate amongst graduates in the countries concerned are factors that encourage migration.

This migration by skilled workers has very varied effects on the home countries of the migrants and the countries they move to. It may be seen as either a 'drain' or a 'movement'.

- Drain: this is usually called a drain because the movement is unbalanced. For the home countries of skilled workers who emigrate, the manpower shortage in certain key economic sectors can be socially and economically damaging. Malawi for instance, according to the

Nurses and Midwives Council, is facing one of the most serious shortages of nurses in Africa, with nearly two-thirds of posts unfilled in the public health service. In recent years, more qualified nurses trained in Malawi have gone to work abroad (particularly in South Africa) than are left in the country's hospitals.

Action in this area should focus in particular on strengthening capacity in certain key sectors, such as health and education, to enable countries to train qualified people and offer them employment of a high standard.

- Movement: in certain fields, including the development field (e.g. NGOs, UN, decentralised and bilateral cooperation) and higher education and research, the movement of skilled workers between countries is fairly balanced, sometimes establishing cooperation networks between their home countries and the countries they move to. In such cases, movement has a positive impact on both the home country and the destination country.

## Chapter II – FORCED MIGRATION

Forced migration has for a long time been an important part of migration within Africa. It has occurred throughout Africa's history, with mass deportation and flight from raids by slave traders, the levying of taxes, forced labour and forced farming during the colonial period, exodus in decolonisation wars and the national and international political conflicts that have become more and more frequent since the 1980s, and, lastly, natural disasters. 'Forced migration is increasingly common in South-South migration, often in regions with no longstanding migratory tradition' (O. Pliez).

Forced migration differs from voluntary migration in that it occurs in serious crises and is characterised by a breakdown in the functioning of a society and its living space. It is submitted to and not initiated or managed by the individual or the group. Thus, forced migrants are not leaving to seek a better life or carry out a plan to emigrate, but purely to survive a crisis when the only solution is to leave. Their situation is very unstable.

This category of migration includes all members of a group, men and women, young and old, from every class of society. Its characteristic is that people flee temporarily or permanently, often suddenly and in large numbers. At present, the largest forced migrations are caused by natural disasters (ecological migration), wars and persecution (refugees and displaced persons), forced deportations and repatriations, which we shall discuss in turn.

### **9. Ecological refugees**

Twenty years ago, the UN identified a new category of forced migrants, particularly in the reports published by the UNEP, the United Nations Environment Programme. These are ecological refugees, or 'eco-refugees', who are not fleeing from violence and persecution but when the environment they depend on to survive has been damaged or destroyed. In the 1980s and 1990s, this category included people who had either had to leave their homes temporarily because of a natural disaster (earthquake, cyclone, flood) or industrial accident, or had been driven out permanently by infrastructure projects such as dams, or had been forced to emigrate because the balance between resources and humans had been destroyed.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, cyclical droughts threaten harvests, livestock and people. In the Sahel, invasions of locusts periodically devour the harvests. These disasters cause famine and exodus, but their effects are worsened by the inadequacy of preventive measures and local organisations and by political inefficiency. Firstly, anti-locust measures are systematically put in place after crises (financed in particular by the European Union), when it would be sensible, since it is possible to predict these crises, to introduce these measures before the locusts swarm rather than after they have caused havoc in rural areas. Secondly, the disorganisation of social structures, government bodies and commercial channels (currently, for instance, in Angola) prevents supplies being brought in from neighbouring regions. The effects of famine are also exacerbated by civil wars and other political conflicts. Lastly, food insecurity is sometimes created deliberately, because depriving people of food has always been the best way of controlling them, shifting them, even wiping them out (Darfur and Southern Sudan, for instance).

The largest group amongst the ecological refugees are pastoralists. They are the groups most vulnerable to environmental damage, whether it results from development projects (dams or ranches), drought or war. During the 1983-1984 drought, the nomadic Peul and the Tuareg in Niger had to abandon their usual routes to find grazing land towards the savannah in the South, which was occupied by farmers with whom they came into conflict. Edmond Bernus describes what he calls the drought exodus by the Illabakan Tuareg to the Maradi region in the south of Niger. When they moved into a region inhabited by Hausa farmers, it created tensions because of livestock thefts and the exorbitant prices of animal fodder. On the return journey, they let the herds roam through the crops: '*...the nomads' revenge, away from any control, on the farmers who had treated them badly and taken advantage of a situation that was in their favour*' (Bernus, 1999). Although most of the Tuareg nomads returned home, this was not the case with the Peul from the Djelgodji region of Burkina Faso who fled to Côte d'Ivoire after they had had to sell their remaining livestock. Employed as herdsmen by stock farmers, they never managed to re-establish their herds (Boutrais, 1999). Pastoralists become ecological refugees when they are forced to migrate in search of grazing, leaving their local area permanently and having to give up the herds that are part of their identity. These migrations of last resort affect the most vulnerable and occur when all local solutions to the food problem have been exhausted.

At present the definition of migration for environmental reasons relates only to global warming, but the figures quoted are still enormous. '*Whilst the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that by 2025 one African in 10 could be living outside their country of origin, the Institute for the Environment and Human security (linked to the UN) estimates the number of people who will have to move as a result of desertification, floods and storms caused by climate change between now and 2010 at 50 million*' (C. Fouteau).

Focusing on the threats from climate change obscures the other causes of environmental damage or destruction, in particular government action and warring factions. There are currently instances of the environment being taken over to prevent population groups using its resources. During the war in Mozambique, for example, anti-personnel mines were scattered around the border area, so that the people that were to be repatriated were unable to return. Under the new environmental protection policies, national parks and nature reserves are set up and their inhabitants driven out, thus becoming refugees from an environment that has been seized from them.

## 10. Refugees from violence and displaced persons

Wars are widely reported by the media and are the strongest image we have at the moment of Sub-Saharan Africa. Wars are going on in about 20 African countries, mainly civil wars, whether they are conflicts between groups for the control of resources, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or internal struggles for power, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia (M. Gaud.). There are unresolved crises in West Africa (Western Sahara, the Casamance region of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Southern Sudan, Darfur, Ethiopia/Eritrea), the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi) and Central Africa (Angola, DRC, Central African Republic).

The causes of these conflicts lie in both the fragility of these new States, divided up by the colonialists, and in factors of instability, whether related to action by foreign, neighbouring or European countries or the superpowers, to economic recession or the hazards of the weather. Because of the violence, which is usually internal, civilians flee desperately to other places within the country (displaced persons) or to neighbouring countries (refugees). Most of the people fleeing stay nearby, usually in the countries bordering on the conflict zones.

Africa is second only to Asia in the number of refugees, asylum seekers, repatriated and displaced persons and other population groups affected by conflicts recorded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR helped over 4 million people there in 2004 (UNHCR statistics, 2004). That figure falls far short of the true situation, which is much more dramatic. Darfur in Sudan is currently suffering a serious humanitarian crisis affecting over 2 million people, most of whom have fled their devastated region. The UN estimates that there have been 300 000 victims. At least 200 000 have found refuge in Chad, in camps run by the UNHCR, whilst the largest number, over 2 million, have moved to other parts of Darfur (M. Lavergne).

The map 'Flows of refugees from African countries, 2002' (see Annexe) illustrates the main trends in the asylum-related flows. As this shows, a minority of the refugees are admitted to the countries in the North, whilst the majority find refuge in neighbouring countries. It must be remembered that the dangerous journeys to Europe by asylum seekers that the media and politicians focus on in the North account for only a minority of the movements by refugee Africans.

Africa is unusual in that it takes in most of the refugees it generates, the majority going to the countries bordering on the conflict zones. Countries like Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, DRC, Sudan and Guinea open their doors to thousands of fugitives, who are collectively granted *prima facie* refugee status. Some countries, like Uganda and Sudan, are unusual, although not unique, in that they both generate and take in refugees.

The economic dimensions of asylum are numerous and complex. The host countries always regard it as a cost, whose effects they exaggerate. They see refugees as a burden to be shared with the countries in the North. However, there is no doubt that, whilst taking in thousands of refugees has a political, economic and environmental cost, it also produces gains that are all too often overlooked. In fact, the activity generated by the presence of the humanitarian organisations, the investment by the international community in setting up the camps and the work by the refugees promote development.

The arrival of huge numbers of refugees inevitably affects the labour market. Whether or not they are skilled, the refugees manage to bypass the restrictions on access to employment and,

because of their precarious situation, are a cheap and available labour source. Thus they compete with nationals in certain sectors of the economy.

### 10.1. Refugee camps

The vast majority of refugees from countries in the South are in the South and remain there and refugee camps are the most common form of aid, as Luc Cambrézy points out in an article with the hard-hitting title: 'Stagnating conflicts and entrenched refugee camps: a containment policy, not political asylum' (L. Cambrézy, 2003).

Camps are the most usual method used by the authorities to aid and control foreigners coming into the country, whether they are without residence permits or are seeking protection. All too often, the camps are looked upon as a single enclosed model, when in fact they can vary widely. They may be closed or open, depending heavily on international aid or taking the form of agricultural settlements on which arable land is made available to the refugees (Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, Tanzania). They are at the same time places of protection and confinement, support and control, refuge and violence, especially for women (L. Cambrézy, 2001)

It must be remembered that the people in these camps are 'legals', refugees who are recognised and therefore helped, protected and properly registered, those who are 'visible', as opposed to the 'invisible' who are greater in numbers and hide in the cities or on the rural margins near the borders. There is no shortage of reports and information on the refugees in the camps, whereas very little is known about the situations and living conditions of those who disperse into the host country as illegal immigrants.

The camps, which are sometimes close to borders even though under international rules they should be more than 150 kilometres away, can become a threat (because of military incursions or because the camps themselves become militarised). The host countries use the refugees as a way of putting political and military pressure on the leaders of their countries of origin.

The camps raise the issue of the role of humanitarian action. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and funding from the superpowers no longer available, State development aid has increasingly become humanitarian aid. It has been considerably reduced, falling from 26.6 billion dollars in 1990 to 16.4 billion in 2000 (S. Smith, J.-P. Tuquoi, 2004) and has been replaced by humanitarian action.

The neutrality of the humanitarian agencies creates an impossible situation for them, because it is forgotten that refugees are not just victims but also active participants and, having been made refugees for political reasons, they become a political issue. Describing the situation in the Tutsi refugee camps in Uganda and the Hutu camps in Congo-Zaire, Roland Pourtier shows how the camps are inseparable from the conflicts that gave rise to them and help to prolong those conflicts because the presence of the HCR provides *'a system of protection and support that turns the camps into centres for political reorganisation, as a basis for regaining lost power'* (R. Pourtier, 2006).

Large refugee camps have an impact on the environment. Much has been said about the widespread damage in the Virunga national park in North Kivu, particularly through intensive woodcutting and poaching when thousands of Rwandan refugees were brought together there in 1994. But this environmental impact must be seen in relative terms. It has recently become a matter of concern to the host countries and the HCR. The HCR started to attach greater

importance to environmental issues when planning refugee aid programmes. In 1994, an environmental unit was set up in the body that drafted environmental directives. For the host countries, protection of the environment has become an excuse to win compensation from the international community and in particular to speed up the repatriation process. Tanzania, for instance, held out the spectre of destruction of its environment to send back the thousands of Rwandan refugees who flooded into the country in 1994, accusing them en masse of destroying and wasting another country's environmental resources (R. Black.). The risk of destruction of the environment has become a pretext for threatening to expel refugees. Nowadays, the environment is used as a political weapon.

Furthermore, the environmental damage laid at the door of the refugees is an excuse to conceal the failure of humanitarian action. Research at the Ukwimi agricultural settlement in Zambia showed that the 25 000 refugees from Mozambique were directly dependent on environmental resources for their daily needs and to earn a small income. Although they certainly placed heavy pressure on resources, attracting protests from local people, the tension between the two groups was caused more by the unequal distribution of humanitarian aid. Apart from its primary purpose, feeding people who have nothing, food aid has a number of functions that are sometimes conflicting.

## 10.2. Food aid

For the international community, feeding refugees is a requirement of aid. That means providing help to people who are seen as victims, who need help and are unable to help themselves. However, feeding people is also a way of counting refugees and keeping control over the camps. The refugees are counted because the HCR needs to produce figures to justify its existence and its action, in order to ensure its survival. It also needs to control and keep a check on the refugees. The camps are on settlements ceded by the authorities to the humanitarian organisations, which take over and compete for their land.

Feeding people also creates a category outside the rules, a category labelled refugee which groups them all together and stigmatises them, thereby separating them from the surrounding community. Between 1987 and 1994, long-term aid was distributed to all Mozambican refugees on the Ukwimi agricultural settlement in Zambia without exception, and only to them. Despite the fact that some of them had grown rich and had over the years become better off than the local villagers, they were still recognised as refugees and continued to receive aid on that basis.

Feeding people also creates dissension with the local population, who are not taken care of and are sometimes in dire poverty. Between 1987 et 1994, two communities living side by side on the Ukwimi agricultural settlement – refugees from Mozambique and Zambian villagers – were administered by two authorities, one of which, the international community, was extremely generous, whilst the other, the Zambian Government, was very short of resources. This was a major cause of tension between the two groups.

For the host countries, the fact that refugees receive food and aid from the international community is the sharing of a burden that should be short-lived. Feeding people to some extent avoids them having access to local resources and thus prevents them settling permanently. Feeding them is also a way of prolonging and justifying international aid. It is noticeable that an agricultural settlement like the one at Ukwimi in Zambia has constantly taken in new arrivals to justify the need for food aid and hence the role of the HCR until the mass repatriation of the Mozambicans. The HCR usually only withdraws from a settlement

when the refugees leave, because of pressure from governments for international aid to continue while the refugees are still there.

Feeding people also makes countries secure. Host countries sometimes claim that the international community is putting them at risk when it cuts back on food rations, arguing that the starving refugees will riot, causing unrest in the host areas. In 2003, Tanzania, for example, threatened to forcibly repatriate over 530 000 refugees from the Great Lakes on the pretext that rations were being halved. It was a matter of national security. In those circumstances, food becomes a strategic weapon, a tool used to deter people from staying.

In addition, the cuts in the HCR and WFP budgets for Africa, coupled with the development of other humanitarian crises in Asia in particular, have meant that refugee crises that have been going on for many years are being overlooked. The food rations distributed in the Sahraoui camps have been considerably reduced, against a background of general indifference. Reducing the quantities distributed in a desert area forces the refugees in these 'forgotten crises' to return 'home'. Reducing rations also means that the refugees have to work for the local population.

Thus the food aid distributed to refugees has many functions apart from its primary purpose. For the international community and the host country, it is an instrument for counting and controlling the whole group and keeping it under supervision. Depending on the quantities distributed, groups are either marginalised from poor local communities, or obliged to work for those communities, or pressurised to return home. Food aid can therefore be used as a strategic weapon.

## **11. Forced expulsion and repatriation**

Migration for work within Africa is vulnerable to the hazards of political and economic developments in the host country. In crises, governments order mass expulsions of immigrants or even national ethnic and religious groups. The 50 000 Ugandan Asians expelled and stripped of their property by president Idi Amin Dada in 1972 are a typical example. The two million migrant workers, mostly Ghanaians, deported from Nigeria in 1983 are another example. In Senegal, too, tensions with Mauritania led to the expulsion of Mauritanian traders, people from Burkina Faso have recently fled Côte d'Ivoire in a hurry after being persecuted, and in Gabon illegal workers are regularly deported.

In 1995, Gabon sent back 80 000 aliens from West Africa. These sudden mass forced repatriations of immigrant workers have long-term effects on both their home countries and the host regions.

Lastly, population groups are repatriated by force. Often people are repatriated prematurely, while conflicts are still going on or the reasons for fleeing the country still apply. Forced to return home, the exiles are exposed to the risks they fled from and they may be doubly uprooted. Their premature return turns them into refugees in their own country, once again in need of assistance. That was the case with the Angolans who had been living in agricultural settlements in Shaba province in the south of Zaire since 1983 and were then flown back in 1990, not to the regions they had originally come from but to transit points. In that case, political and diplomatic considerations prevailed (A. Bartoli). For refugees in the camps, cutting or stopping humanitarian aid is a way of forcing them to leave the host country.

## 12. The urbanisation of poverty

Nowadays most African migrants gravitate to the cities, the majority of them working in the informal sector of business, transport, crafts and services. For instance, a quarter of the population of Libreville in Gabon is from another country, from Central Africa (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, the two Congos) and West Africa (Mali, Senegal, Togo and Benin, Nigeria). So many Africans from other parts of Africa are working as small traders that they are a vital part of the urban economy. *'These temporary migrants establish transnational networks, contribute to regional money distribution, spread religious and cultural practices, fashions in clothing, etc, thereby contributing to the urbanisation of Africa'* (R. Pourtier).

Forced migration is also a factor in the urbanisation of countries in the South. War and ecological or economic crises lead to major population redistribution, especially towards the towns, where people take refuge. There are apparently more than 2 million Somalis in Mogadishu, mostly refugees driven out by the fighting and seeking the protection of the NGOs or the warlords. Many refugees fleeing from war zones or areas of insecurity have added to the flow of people to towns in Sierra Leone, Sudan, DRC and the periphery of Rwanda and Burundi. Khartoum has become a typical example of the use of State violence as a means of regulating urban growth. Migrants flood in from all over the country, victims of drought, famine, the civil war in Darfur and Southern Sudan. The first victims of these forced movements are the 'displaced persons' of the South, non-Arab, non-Muslim groups unable to integrate into the city. It is difficult for them to return to their home region when it is being ravaged by civil war. Yet between 1987 and 1995 the authorities expelled 712 000 people from Khartoum (M. Lavergne). These forced migrants bring poverty to the cities, leading a hand-to-mouth existence in settlements on the outskirts that grow uncontrollably.

## Conclusion – MIGRATION, POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT

### 13. Migration and development in Africa

Transfers (of money and trade) by migrants are becoming increasingly important in African national economies, although it is difficult to place a precise value on them because they are rarely through conventional channels (such as banks).

They are mainly informal transfers which, in a number of countries, are the main source of foreign currency. However, their scale is related more to movements to countries in the North than countries in the South.

The relationship between migration within Africa and development seems more complex because, unlike South-North migration, South-South migration between countries at similar levels of development does not generate sufficient revenue for migration to be profitable. That is why, as explained above, this migration has to be seen as a resource and not a means of saving money. It is the actual circumstances of the migration (dispersal of individuals in the same group, the diaspora principle and different types of movement by individuals) that affect the development of the countries concerned. In order to understand a social group, its means of survival and its level of development, account has to be taken of all the individuals in that group and all the places in which they live.

Migration can sometimes have an adverse effect on the country of origin (manpower shortages) or the development of a region can stabilise the population (by creating jobs), but generally speaking, as we have just shown, international migration assists the development of the departure, transit and arrival countries, just as development encourages international mobility by the individuals concerned, whatever legislation is put in place. *'Hence the two new paradigms for international migration, "control" as a means of containing migration and "development" as a means of stopping it by eliminating the basic cause, poverty, do seem to be based on a simplistic view of the factors involved'* (J.-P. Guengant, 1996).

#### **14. Should the European Union act on migration within Africa?**

This summary of international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa identifies several basic factors that need to be considered before taking any action:

- Diversity: the profile of migrants in Africa is diverse; so too are the causes and forms of migration and its impact. Since there are so many different types and cases, action cannot be standardised.
- Complexity: migration 'connects': it establishes links between places, people and economic sectors. Acting on one component of the system will have repercussions for the whole system.
- Legality: international mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa is based more on the practical possibilities of travelling, by negotiating transport and border crossings, than on the legality of people's situations while they are travelling. The connection between migration policy and international mobility is not direct, but variable and complex.
- Imagination: there is a dimension to migration that is not quantifiable or even classifiable. It relates to the imagination of individuals and is a vital factor in the decision to take the risk of migrating.

General guidelines for action might be as follows:

- In view of the link between the spread of sexually transmitted infections and diseases in Africa, it might be possible to take action on this along the migration routes and in the migration centres, specifically targeted at the migratory populations. Similar action in the refugee camps should also be considered.
- Migration would be more of a resource and a tool in the development of African States if there were actually official freedom of movement throughout the continent, or at least regionally. In areas with official freedom of movement (such as ECOWAS), people still have to pay to cross an international border, and in many cases foreign migrants are taxed even within the countries they travel in, regardless of their circumstances. In many countries, furthermore, foreign migrants (whether or not they entered the country legally) are allowed to settle and work, but not officially. In such cases they can remain in an illegal and uncertain situation for a very long time, which limits their ability to contribute to the development of both their host country and their country of origin. The European Union should encourage African States to coordinate their practices and laws for the management of international migration and keep their officials who check and tax international migrants, particularly at the borders, under tighter supervision.

- The closure of EU borders, and the very costly control policy that that entails, restrict legal immigration (right to asylum, possibility of bringing in families, short-term visas, opportunity to acquire citizenship, etc.), encourage the development of illegal immigration networks, indirectly cause a large number of deaths at European entry points<sup>1</sup>, and prevent movement and voluntary return by migrants. Would opening up Europe's borders significantly increase the number of potential immigrants? Would it not make it easier for African migrants to contribute to the development of their country of origin and their host country? At the conclusion of this report, these are questions that are worth considering.

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<sup>1</sup> cf. Monde Diplomatique Atlas 2006.

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## ANNEXES

### International migration in Africa, 2002

Country or continent	Total population	Migrant population		Number of refugees	Migration policy	
		Number of migrants (thousands)	Percentage of total population		On immigration	On emigration
<b>World</b>	<b>6056715</b>	<b>174781</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>15868</b>	..	..
<b>Developed countries</b>	<b>1191429</b>	<b>104119</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>3012</b>	..	..
<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>4865286</b>	<b>70662</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>12857</b>	..	..
<b>Least developed countries</b>	<b>667613</b>	<b>10458</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>3066</b>	..	..
<b>Africa</b>	<b>793627</b>	<b>16277</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>3627</b>	..	..
<b>East Africa</b>	<b>250318</b>	<b>4515</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1662</b>	..	..
Burundi	6356	77 B	1.2	27	No action	No action
Comoros	706	18 B	2.5	0	No action	No action
Djibouti	632	28 I	4.4	23	Limited action	No action
Eritrea	3659	13 I	0.4	2	No action	No action
Ethiopia	62908	660 B	1.0	198	No action	No action
Kenya	30669	327 B	1.1	206	Limited action	No action
Madagascar	15970	61 C	0.4	0	No action	No action
Malawi	11308	280 B	2.5	4	Limited action	No action
Mauritius	1161	8 B	0.7	0	Limited action	No action
Mozambique	18292	366 B	2.0	0	No action	No action
Réunion	721	106 B	14.7	..	..	..
Rwanda	7609	89 B	1.2	28	No action	No action
Seychelles	80	5 B	6.3	..	Strong action	Strong action
Somalia	8778	22 I	0.3	1	No action	No action
Uganda	23300	529 B	2.3	237	Strong action	No action
Tanzania	35119	893 B	2.5	681	Limited action	No action
Zambia	10421	377 B	3.6	251	Limited action	Limited action
Zimbabwe	12627	656 B	5.2	4	Limited action	No action
<b>Central Africa</b>	<b>95404</b>	<b>1490</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>603</b>	..	..
Angola	13134	46 B	0.4	12	No action	No action
Cameroon	14876	150 B	1.0	44	Limited action	No action
Central African Republic	3717	59 C	1.6	56	No action	No action
Chad	7885	41 I	0.5	18	Strong action	Strong action
Congo	3018	197 B	6.5	123	Limited action	No action
Democratic Republic of Congo	50948	739 C	1.5	333	Limited action	No action
Equatorial Guinea	457	1 C	0.2	0	No action	No action
Gabon	1230	250 C	20.3	18	Limited action	Limited action
Sao Tome and Principe	138	7 C	5.1	..	No action	No action
<b>North Africa</b>	<b>174150</b>	<b>1945</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>606</b>	..	..
Algeria	30291	250 C	0.8	170	Strong action	No action
Egypt	67884	169 B	0.2	7	Limited action	Increasing action
Libya	5290	570 C	10.8	12	Limited action	Strong action
Morocco	29878	26 C	0.1	2	No action	Limited action
Sudan	31095	780 B	2.5	415	Increasing action	Limited action
Tunisia	9459	38 C	0.4	0	Limited action	Strong action
Western Sahara	252	113 I	44.8	..	..	..
<b>Southern Africa</b>	<b>49567</b>	<b>1544</b>	<b>3.1</b>	<b>47</b>	..	..
Botswana	1541	52 C	3.4	4	Limited action	No action
Lesotho	2035	6 C	0.3	0	No action	No action
Namibia	1757	143 B	8.1	27	Limited action	No action
South Africa	43309	1303 B	3.0	15	Strong action	No action
Swaziland	925	42 B	4.5	1	Strong action	No action

<b>West Africa</b>	<b>224189</b>	<b>6782</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>..</b>	<b>..</b>
Benin	6272	101 B	1.6	4	No action	No action
Burkina Faso	11535	1124 B	9.7	1	No action	Limited action
Cape Verde	427	10 B	2.3	0	No action	Strong action
Côte d'Ivoire	16013	2336 B	14.6	121	Limited action	No action
Gambia	1303	185 B	14.2	12	Limited action	No action
Ghana	19306	614 B	3.2	13	No action	No action
Guinea	8154	741 C	9.1	427	No action	No action
Guinea Bissau	1199	19 B	1.6	8	No action	Limited action
Liberia	2913	160 B	5.5	69	Strong action	No action
Mali	11351	48 C	0.4	8	Strong action	Strong action
Mauritania	2665	63 C	2.4	0	No action	No action
Niger	10832	119 B	1.1	0	Limited action	No action
Nigeria	113862	751 C	0.7	7	Strong action	No action
Senegal	9421	284 B	3.0	21	No action	No action
Sierra Leone	4405	47 C	1.1	7	Limited action	No action
Togo	4527	179 B	4.0	12	No action	No action

Source: International Migration 2002, United Nations, Population Division

B = birthplace

C = citizenship


I = imputed (estimates based on a model)

This table, drawn up by the United Nations, can only be an estimate of the current migration situation in Africa. The standard of African censuses varies considerably. Moreover, the figures are not entirely comparable, because of differences in both the method of counting migrants (those who were born abroad and those who are actually foreign) and the length of residence. For some countries, migrants who have been in the country for six months are counted, for others, migrants who have been there for nine months. No distinction is made here.

Also, the column showing action or lack of action on migration policy refers to the situation in 2002. Many countries have changed their migration policies recently, notably Côte d'Ivoire.

The two maps below have been drawn up on the basis of that information; they are therefore subject to the same provisos as the table. The first map, showing migrants as a percentage of total population, indicates the main migration centres; however, these are clearer from the second map, which shows the number of migrants for each country.

Part de la population migrante en Afrique dans la population totale de chaque Etats africains en 2000




Migrant population as a percentage of total population of each African State, 2000

Migrants as percentage of total population

Percentage of migrants in Africa: 2%

Répartition de la population migrante en Afrique selon les Etats en 2000




Source : International Migration 2002. United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
Fait avec Philcarto - <http://perso.club-internet.fr/philgeo>

Conception et réalisation : F. Boyer, 2006

Breakdown of migrant population in Africa by country, 2002  
Migrant population in Africa: 16 141 000

Flux de réfugiés originaires des pays d'Afrique en 2002



Flows of refugees from African countries, 2002

Canada/United States/Brazil/Russia/Australia

Number of refugees

Host country / Country of Origin

Over 50 000 / 10 000 to 50 000 / under 50 000