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POOLING OF EU MEMBER STATES ASSETS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESDP

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Authors: **Jean-Pierre Maulny,** Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), and **Fabio Liberti**, Research Fellow, IRIS
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Responsible Official: **Gerrard Quille**
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union
Policy Department
WIB 06M081
rue Wiertz
B-1047 Brussels
E-mail: gerrard.quille@europarl.europa.eu

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Executive Summary

In the defence arena, 'non-Europe' represents a huge and irrational cost for European taxpayers. There is far too much duplication of defence effort spread across the Member States of the EU. Yet they are all meant to be trying to find common solutions to common problems. No-one expects European armies to become truly interoperable for the foreseeable future but, nevertheless, the pooling of capabilities would be a huge step in the right direction. There are already a handful of initiatives of this kind in Europe, but much more could be done.

There are three factors working in favour of pooling: budgetary pressures that can compel governments to seek procurement savings; the fact that the cost of maintaining pooling capabilities would be much lower than when acting independently; and the prospect that a pooling of resources would offer the benefits of interoperability on the battlefield, and thereby help foster harmonization.

There are four types of pooling: (i) *sharing of capabilities* – whereby member states create common capabilities through the provision of national capabilities, and there is no structure to organize their use; (ii) *pooling of capabilities*: which involves an integrated structure to organize the use of national capabilities: the most concrete example being the European Airlift Centre (EAC); (iii) *pooling through acquisition*: where national capabilities do not exist and are substituted in favour of multilateral capabilities, and the multilateral organization owns the assets (as is the case with NATO AWACS); and (iv) *role sharing*: whereby certain capabilities are relinquished on the assumption that another country will make it available when necessary.

The core issue around pooling seems to be the political will of member states. Are they ready to accept and integrate the concept and, if so, to what extent? What happens to the different foreign polices and defence procurement organizations of member states? What if a pooled capability has to be used in purely national operations? This study aims to answer these questions.

Future pooling efforts should draw on the lessons of past experiences and - given the different pooling options available, the types of asset being pooled and the potential pitfalls - caution is required. Nevertheless, this study sets out to define the outline of a future pooling strategy accompanied by an action plan. The study indicates that it is imperative that a pooling policy is pro-active and, ideally, that it is promoted by a powerful institution. The European Parliament could champion this cause.

The same type of approach is not applicable to all capabilities. In some cases, sharing capabilities would work better than actual pooling and vice versa. Whatever the scenario, the objective should be to transform today's sharing of capabilities into tomorrow's actual pooling, and tomorrow's actual pooling into tomorrow's pooling through acquisition.

Despite political sensitivities, therefore, achieving a greater pooling of capabilities is a pre-requisite of Europe becoming an effective security and defence actor.

1. Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is still in its formative stage. After the failure of the European Defence Community, an idea rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, the combination of the words 'defence' and 'Europe' became taboo, that is until the Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998 where the idea for a European defence policy that would enable the European Union (EU) to act autonomously in military matters was successfully launched.

This idea was accepted by all European partners and then formalized at the European Council of Cologne in June 1999, marking the birth of the ESDP. Since its creation, much progress has been achieved. In June 2000, the European Council at Feira launched the civilian dimension of ESDP, which was followed by the creation of ESDP institutions and the integration of the Western European Union (WEU) during the European Council meeting in Nice. Then in 2001, the Laeken European Council announced the operational capability of the policy and in 2002, the 'Berlin Plus Agreements' were concluded with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2003, four ESDP missions were launched (two military and two police), and in 2004 a major military mission to Bosnia was launched (Operation Althea). At the end of 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS)[1] provided a common political frame for further evolution of European action.

In 2004, following a decision made at the Thessaloniki European Council of 2003, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established, thus demonstrating the urgency to develop European military capabilities. The Treaty of Lisbon includes a mutual defence clause, solidarity clause and includes the possibility for structured cooperation[2].

So, how can we define the current state of ESDP? It helps to examine the question in for parts: scope, institutions, already achieved or ongoing missions, and current capabilities.

1.1 The scope of ESDP

Why an ESDP? There are various answers to this question according to different national sensitivities. ESDP goals are contained within the ESS, which contains an analysis of the major threats faced by European countries and the means by which these should be addressed. The ESS tackles security issues in a multi-dimensional way, combining civil and military action. At the same time, however, its scope is limited because although it concerns collective responsibilities, it remains up to individual states to determine their cooperation with, and implementation of, the strategy.

[1] For the full document see *'A secure Europe in a better world : European security strategy'*, Brussels 12 December 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

[2] Gerrard Quille, '*The Lisbon Treaty and its implications for CFSP/ESDP'*, Policy Department External Policies, European Parliament, February 2008.

1.2 ESDP Missions

From an operational standpoint, ESDP has performed or is currently performing 16 different missions. The missions cover not only peacekeeping operations, but also civilian missions for legal assistance, observation, security forces training, etc. EU Member States, or at least most of them, have no ambition to transform the EU into a military superpower. Nevertheless, lessons learned from initial operational engagements have shown the importance of the EU in peacekeeping. For instance, there are occasions when the EU – unlike the US and NATO - is accepted as an impartial actor in crisis situations. More importantly, the general approach of EU Member States towards overseas missions is quite different from that of the US: the Europeans tend to deploy a complex mix of civilian and military actions and to concentrate on winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population.

1.3 ESDP capabilities

Since the 1990s, certain downward trends have emerged vis-à-vis European defence. Consequently, the EDA named 2007 its 'year of capabilities' as a precursor to the adoption of a *European Capability Development Plan* whose aim is helping European countries nurture their national capabilities.

Foremost, the level of defence spending in Europe has fallen significantly. According *to EDA Facts and Figures*, in 2005, €193Bn was spent on defence by 25 EU Member States. While this represents a huge sum, it is less than half the €406Bn spent by the US. More importantly, this figure masks the lack of synchronization at the European level, which leads to redundancy and dramatically lowers spending efficiency. Today, except for France and the United Kingdom (UK), no European country is able to perform a major defence operation independently.

Furthermore, the downscaling of defence budgets[3] has caused a huge restructuring of the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), especially in the land and sea armaments sectors. This has still not been completed. For decades, European defence manufacturers have worked within national frameworks, with budgets significantly lower than that of the US and with a low level of Research and Technology (R & T) spending. This, in turn, has created a significant gap between US defence and industrial capabilities and those of Europe.

During the 1990s, European governments became aware of the inadequacy of European defence capabilities. This was exemplified in the Balkans where only US intervention prevented failure. Consequently, to maximize and improve European capabilities, several initiatives were launched. In December 1999, the European Council of Helsinki decided on the creation of the Helsinki Headline Goals 2003 (HHG2003), which includes the creation of an EU Rapid Reaction Force, comprised of 60,000 soldiers, deployable within 60 days, and capable of staying in the theatre of operation for up to one year. The "official" success of this initiative (which has never been tested in a real operational theatre) has led to many others, namely the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP, linked to the HHG2003), the EU Battle Groups (BGs), and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[3] See NATO defence expenditures facts & figures http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2007/p07-141.pdf

Last but not least, a brand new global goal called the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 (HHG2010) was launched in May of 2004, which focuses more on quality than quantity. France, the UK and Germany launched the BG concept after the success of Operation *Artemis*. The BGs take into account the fact that HHG 2003 was not the appropriate answer to crisis response, and that more units are needed that are capable of deployment in a shorter timeframe. Hence, the key idea is to create a series of 'entry forces' composed of 1,500 soldiers capable of being projected into a crisis area with as a little as three days warning. Currently, 15 BGs have been or are being created[4].

The principle of ECAP was to address shortcomings[5] in European capabilities. In response to these shortcomings, nineteen priority areas with a corresponding number of Project Groups were created in order to implement solutions. Today, those Project Groups have been incorporated into the EDA, which is responsible for launching a Capability Development Plan, which has the following four goals:

1) To identify shortfalls
2) To perform capability studies in key areas
3) To build a database of national programmes currently in progress
4) To learn lessons from past experiences so as to better identify future capability needs

The plan was conceived with the view of helping Member States foster their national capabilities instead of constraining member state action. The plan follows the creation of a European Capability Defence Mechanism (ECDM), adopted in 2003. The four main goals of which are to:

1) Reach a better definition of military needs and member state contributions
2) Follow-up on current military capabilities and evaluate progress
3) Fill in any existing gaps
4) Improve the organization of the EU/NATO relationship vis-à-vis capabilities

Clearly, many policy changes and tools have been created and instituted during the nine years of the ESDP's existence. Yet EU capabilities are still insufficient to achieve the EU's political goals, which, in turn, threaten to undermine the EU's influence within the international community e.g. the inability to provide sufficient helicopters for the planned Chad mission. In the defence arena, 'non-Europe' represents a huge and irrational cost for European taxpayers, as underlined by a report for the European Parliament, published in June 2006[6].

So, how can this situation be improved? One possibility might be the development of a policy of pooling (defined below) of capabilities at the European level. There are already several initiatives of this kind in Europe such as the European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven and others taking place within the NATO framework, including the pooling of early warning aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control System - AWACS) and of C-17 strategic transport capability.

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[4] See Yves Boyer, *'Battlegroups: Catalyst for a European Defence Policy'*, Policy Department external policies, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, October 2007.

[5] By shortfalls we mean the difference between the requirements of the Petersburg Tasks and the national commitments to the EU for the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force.

[6] *'The cost of non-Europe in the area of security and defence'*, Policy Department external policies, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, June 2006.

But much more could be done, especially given that pooling and cooperation can drastically reduce capability gaps, thereby reducing the costs of procurement and in-life support.

In an ideal world, European armies would be fully interoperable; they would use the same standards, equipment, doctrines, etc[7]. Yet the reality is very different, and in the short term, no one expects the ideal to be realized. Nevertheless, the pooling of capabilities would be a huge step in the right direction. The core issue, however, seems to be the political will of Member States. Are they ready to accept and integrate the concept of pooling, and, if so, to what extent? What about the varying defence procurement organizations of Member States? What if a pooled capability has to be used in purely national operations? This report aims to answer these questions.

2. Pooling of Assets

2.1 Definition

It is essential to agree upon definitions before beginning to identify the various resources that could be pooled within the European framework. The first series of questions relates to military assets that could be pooled. What would they consist of? Are Member States concerned with capability or the number of assets? Do they share the same definition of capability?

The second series of questions relates to the type of pooling. Here, four possible solutions can be considered:

- sharing of capabilities
- pooling capabilities
- pooling capabilities through acquisition
- role sharing

For the moment there is no common definition of pooling. From the discussions between Member States within the EDA, one can see that the UK prefers 'role sharing' as a solution whereas France prefers genuine pooling.

2.2 Capability approach versus force approach

2.2.1 Roots of the capability approach

It is essential to grasp the significance of what one wants to pool before undertaking the process. New means of assessing military power have, however, been introduced in the past few years that have revolutionized the way we think about military equipment planning. These innovations are the products of lessons learned from experiences in previous conflicts and, from a doctrinal

[7] See Yves Boyer and Julian Lindley-French, *'Euro-interoperability: the effective military interoperability of European armed forces'*, Policy Department external policies, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, November 2007.

point of view, the opportunities provided by new military information and communication technologies.

The first Gulf War, in which the Iraqi army - the third largest in the world at that time (including 4,000 tanks), was destroyed within a few weeks – demonstrated the necessity of reassessing military capability. This made it very clear that military strength could not be adequately assessed or relied upon simply by quantitative measurement. It also proved that victory on the battlefield would not of itself bring peace and stability.

New information and communication technologies have enabled the networking of various types of military equipment. This in turn has led to the creation of a real synergy in the use of such equipment, which allows for the possibility of creating a 'system of systems' where military effect would be far greater than the sum of individual parts. Hence, it has become necessary to use a new approach for assessing military power. Rather than counting items of equipment, a more useful approach is to specify the effect that can be achieved within a given time frame, or to evaluate the quantity of equipment that can be deployed in a given place and timeframe. This approach, contingent on the desired military effect, leads one to define military capability as that which is required to achieve the given effect.

The UK and France introduced this 'capability' approach within the EU as a way to communicate their national military planning.

2.2.2 Capability approach of the main EU Member States

The United Kingdom
Since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) military planning has been based on the principles of 'Effects-based Operations'. Instead of planning according to numbers of assets, planning is oriented around the principle of effect. Armies have to be able to combine various means in order to deliver a range of effects within the framework of a specific mission. The Defence White Paper of December 2003 listed eight principle effects sought by the MoD: prevent, stabilize, contain, deter, coerce, disrupt, defeat, and destroy.

Once the desired effects have been identified, it then becomes necessary to translate them into a more concrete plan to realize how the armed forces will produce the right results (i.e. by which means and what equipment). In order to achieve this, the Strategic Defence Review conducted an inventory of the general tasks that armies perform in order to fulfil their missions and concluded that there are 18 general categories of military tasks. These tasks embody the basic principles of operational military capability for British forces. They represent the link between the 'capability approach', 'the conceptual approach' - based on the effects-based principle, and the 'operational dimension' of military planning (decisions in relation to required forces, means, and equipment). In order to delineate these capabilities, the British military plans out scenarios, translates these into operations, and then into force packages based on four main functions: capability to generate forces; deployment capability; effectual operational capability; and sustainability. Three capability managers who work under the direction of the Directorate of the Chief of Defence staff are in charge of the equipment as it relates to precision attack, battlefield manoeuvre, and information superiority.

France
France defines its military planning according to its capabilities - meaning a wide range of equipment, personnel, logistics, support, and training. Like other countries, however, France has not moved from 'force planning' to 'capability planning' overnight. In presenting its own planning papers - especially the prospective plan for the next thirty years (PP30) - the French Ministry of Defence highlights the slowness of its progress. The planning objectives for military programming are defined according to quantitative logic and not along the lines of capability planning. The capability approach – which hinges on four strategic functions: deterrence, prevention, protection and force projection - will not come into effect until at least 2015.

Germany
In planning papers[8], the German military refers to a capability approach. Six capabilities that have been identified in the Bundeswehr Concept are reiterated in the White Paper of 2006: command and control; intelligence collection and reconnaissance; mobility; effective engagement; support and sustainability; survivability and protection. The White Paper states that the capability categories are interdependent and of equal importance. Moreover, sub-capabilities can be dispensed with only if it is certain that allies or partner nations will keep such capabilities available. Conversely, this also requires the Bundeswher to place its specific capabilities at the disposal of allies and partners[9].

2.2.3 European Union capability approach

The HHG 2010 catalogue *a priori* includes the ability to deploy and train a force. It outlines the capabilities that should be made available by the Member States. These are not defined by types of forces or means, but rather by the ability to carry out a given action. This is different to the 2003 HHG Catalogue. For instance, in 2003 there was a requirement for an Anti-Air Frigate. In the 2005 catalogue, however, the requirement was to deliver the effective execution of an air defence mission by equipment with at least a 300 km range. The nature of the statement of requirement makes the quality of the supplied items controllable and open to discussion.

A study of the tools and techniques used for operational analysis, as well as information gathering for the support of the EU military capability development process, continues in line with the Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM)[10] and involves the EDA's participation. Unlike the HHG 2003, this is clearly a capability approach, as the CDM's primary objective is to *qualify* the forces provided by EU Member States.

The only limit in the HHG 2010 stems from the fact that the 'Forces Catalogue' is based upon five generic scenarios (the same as those used in the original Headline Goal):

- Separation of belligerents by force
- Stabilization and reconstruction
- Conflict prevention

[8] Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (Defence Policy Guiding Principles) and *Bundeswehr Concept* published on the 9th August, 2004.
[9] *White Paper 2006* on German security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr.
[10] The creation of the CDM was decided at the European Council of 23 February 2003.

- Evacuation operations in hostile environments
- Support for humanitarian operations

These scenarios are an elaboration of the Petersberg Tasks. The CDM was created in order to make this a durable process[11]. It is a type of methodology that provides a constant update on the statement of requirements and the catalogue of EU forces, and acts as a tool for identifying capability deficiencies at any time. Article 2 of the new Lisbon Treaty says that Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall bring their defence apparatus in to line with each other as far as possible; particularly by harmonizing the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities[12].

NATO experts participated in the preparatory process in order to avoid policy duplication. For the time being, it has been necessary to face the problem of harmonizing concepts. The capability approach, which depends on the production of an effect, can only be implemented by states who are accustomed to planning overseas operations, either within a national or EU framework. Only a small number of EU countries are able to adopt this approach, although the EU itself is now also attempting to do so. However, the reference to generic scenarios - as opposed to operational ones - cannot hope to capture the reality of a military operation and is, therefore, extremely limited. Smaller countries that try to improve their forces by the substitution of one asset for another have difficulties in quantifying their real capacities since their estimations and acquisitions have not been calculated by the standards of the capability approach.

Even in countries already using the capability approach, the nomenclature that is used often varies. A compatibility problem arising from this difference exists between France, Germany, and the UK. Moreover, the cycles of strategic planning and consequently the budgetary procedure, vary by member state.

Among the project groups of the ECAP, the word ‘capabilities’ relates only to elementary sub-capabilities, like ‘Strategic Air Mobility’ while an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), cannot really claim to be a ‘capability’. The difficulty in agreeing on the concept of ‘capability’ has negative consequences for ‘pooling’ because it means that only elementary military capabilities can be pooled. The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) initiative provides a good example of this. On the other hand, when referring to elaborate capabilities based on operational effect, it is harder to develop a common capability as in reality this would be a coming together of disparate capabilities.

When considering whether or not to relinquish one capability in favour of another, countries will have to assess the situation comparatively.

In conclusion, two possibilities seem to exist: First, in the shorter term, countries have to define roughly the same capabilities in order to create more opportunities for co-operative programmes. Second, for the longer term it would be useful to integrate the Letters of Intent (LoI) [see section 4.4.1] process to reach common requirements in the CDM. It is for people working in this LoI

[11] Document 6805/03 du conseil de l’Union européenne, 26 février 2003.
[12] Gerrard Quille, *op. cit.*, p.7.

process to identify best practice, define common requirements and then to establish co-operative programmes that pool capabilities.

2.3 Sharing capabilities, pooling and role sharing

As it is impossible for every member state to be able to afford to buy everything it might require, pooling can provide them with access to a larger spectrum of capabilities than would be possible if each state continued to act individually. This process should also help to rationalize overall military potency. This does not imply that Member States would spend less money, but that they would spend it in a better, more advantageous fashion.

Different ways exist to carry out the pooling of military tools, since there is no official process delineated for the organization of capabilities on a multilateral level. Past experience, however, provides several guidelines and one can thus identify four types of 'pooling':

2.3.1 Sharing capabilities

Sharing capabilities occurs when Member States create common capabilities through the provision of national capabilities. In such cases, there is no structure to organize the use of these capabilities. At present, very few examples exist for this type of pooling and it is considered as pooling 'by default'.

In this case, Member States usually define their equipment needs in order to meet the Headline Goals or DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) goals defined by NATO. Currently, the HHG Force Catalogue describes the capabilities that EU Member States must hold collectively and what is to be achieved by the process of pooling, namely peacemaking operations involving the separation of warring factions. There is one important limitation to the ESDP, however. While it is proficient in crisis management, it has no competency for collective security, a task delegated to NATO.

EU Member States are not used to basing their strategic planning on the HHG Force Catalogue and even less so on NATO's Defence Requirements Review (DRR). According to the EDA Director Nick Whitney, the EU has sufficient battle tanks and non-smart munitions[13], but lacks assets for the 18 project groups defined with the ECAP process and remains unable to fulfill the objectives determined in the Force Catalogue.

2.3.2 Pooling capabilities

The pooling of capabilities occurs when several Member States decide to organize the use of their capabilities on a collective basis. This involves an integrated structure to organize the use of national capabilities: the European Airlift Centre and the Sealift Coordination Centre (proficient in air and naval mobility) are good illustrations of this kind of pooling. Here, the *property* of assets is still national but Member States decide whether or not to delegate the *use* of their assets to an integrated organization. This type of cooperation enhances the coordination of capability utilization and improves efficiency. Since Member States still have control over their own assets,

[13] See keynote address delivered at the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 8 September 2005.

this kind of pooling provides them with a certain amount of autonomy and the freedom to choose whether or not they will participate in a military operation.

2.3.3 Pooling through acquisition

National capabilities do not exist and are substituted in favour of multilateral capabilities, where the multilateral organization owns the assets (as is the case with NATO AWACS). To ease comprehension, we have decided to use the generic term 'pooling' also to cover those instances when a multilateral organization decides to acquire an asset for the benefit of all its Member States. This can also be referred to, more specifically, as 'pooling through pooling acquisition'. At present, NATO is the only organization to own assets that belong in part, or in whole, to its collective members. Capabilities are shared, for example, in the field of military telecommunications, AWACS early warning observation, strategic airlift capability, and missile defence.

Where it concerns strategic airlift capability, thirteen countries[14] agreed to buy three or four C-17 aircraft. Since they are owned jointly, multinational crews fly them. Problems can arise, however, when one state does not want to participate in a military operation. In 2003, for example, the US wanted to use the AWACS for the invasion of Iraq but several countries were hesitant to give authorization. The German government, which had initially refused to allow its crew to fly the AWACS, finally relented - explaining that the operation was in order because it was taking place on the Turkish border and would therefore serve to protect the Alliance.

2.3.4 Role sharing

Role sharing occurs when certain capabilities are relinquished on the assumption that another country will make it available when necessary. Several EU Member States have decided to relinquish some of their capabilities in the interest of reducing redundancy and on the assumption that these capabilities would be made available by other Member States. While this approach provides many financial advantages, it might also lead to a reduction in strategic autonomy on a national level. As a result, nations would have to build reciprocal relations based on trust which, in turn, necessitates both transparency and communication.

Based on past experience, role sharing can be divided into two cases and a *sine qua non* condition.

First case: *niche capabilities*
This refers to 'rare useful capabilities' such as bridge layers, hospital aircraft, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) units. Since these capabilities are rarely used, it would be more advantageous and cost efficient for one country to possess these capabilities on behalf of the others. France, for example, requested the use of the German hospital aircraft A330 to repatriate victims of the Karachi terrorist attack in 2002. Another example would be the Czech Republic's significant capabilities in protection against CBRN attacks.

[14] Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the US.

Second case: *the rare and costly capability*
Certain capabilities are extremely difficult and expensive to procure, and the lack of international capability in this realm renders potential sharing impossible. From a national point of view, for example, it is difficult for France and the UK to share their aircraft carrier capabilities seeing as they each use different types of carrier aircraft (the *JSF F-35* version V/STOL of the UK, versus the *Rafale* of France). From a European standpoint, it would be possible to have three or four real aircraft carriers (two from the UK or France, plus those of Italy and Spain) that would be sufficient for EU and NATO military operations. The same applies in relation to intelligence satellites. In this case it would be necessary to define the global capability and its contributors within the EU framework.

The role sharing condition: *security of supply of capabilities*
The main condition behind role sharing is the necessity of security of supply between Member States. For example, France does not have to have a hospital aircraft if Germany agrees to lend its plane (if available). It would be unnecessary for every country to acquire spatial intelligence within the EU if those assets were already available through the capabilities of another member state.

3. Existing experience of capability pooling

During the Cold War, the level of defence spending in European countries reached historic highs because of the threat perception. Given that the integration process was not nearly as developed as it is today and countries felt a greater need to maintain a national DTIB, there were not many examples of pooling. Important lessons can be learned, however, from the few experiences there have been.

There are three pressures for pooling[15]: budgetary pressure on defence spending that can compel European governments to seek procurement savings; the fact that the cost of maintaining pooling capabilities would be much lower than when acting independently; and the prospect that a pooling of resources would offer the benefits of interoperability on the battlefield, and thereby help foster harmonization.

Working under these assumptions, pooling capabilities should not be limited to weapon systems, but should be enlarged to encompass personnel as well (with possible extension to the creation of a European army). In light of the sensitivity of the subject, it is not realistic to conduct any scientific analysis in this respect. It is political will that is going to determine the pace of developments in this sphere. Still, it should not be forgotten that the pooling of soldiers could provide financial benefits as well a means of improving proficiency on the battlefield.

The Battlegroups (BG), Franco-German *Eurocorps*, Benelux Deployable Air Task Force, the UK/Netherlands amphibious force and the Nordic agreement for NH-90 procurement and are all examples of this type of capability pooling: all of which can help fill existing capability gaps within the EU framework.

[15] See on this topic, *'The future of ESDP: Defence capabilities for Europe'*, Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden, RIIA, paper given in Rome on 6 April 2003.

3.1 What is currently in place?

The best example of capability pooling is the European Airlift Coordination Centre (EACC) at Eindhoven[16], which provides coordination for existing airlift capabilities for eight European countries (France, Germany, UK, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway). In 2000 the Euro Air Group - comprised of the aforementioned eight countries (except Norway) - decided to launch a study on European airlift capabilities because of an evident shortfall in this domain. The result was the creation of the EACC - which became operational in 2002 – the goal of which is to coordinate strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling. Despite its utility, some questions persist about its future. For instance, although the Member States (with the exception of Italy), agreed on the common procurement of A400M for the future strategic airlift platform, no further agreements of this nature have been reached since.

The example of the EACC is the best way to show the limitations of such a facility. One of the potential problems might be that the centre is used simply to fill the transitional period before new national capabilities come into service. Although this has not been the case, a pooling of capabilities from the beginning would have been preferable. The lack of a common contract vis-à-vis the A400M planes might create interoperability problems due to different national upgrades of the same platform. Likewise, European countries should seek to understand why capabilities available through the Eurofighter have not been pooled at all. Instead, there has been a multiplication of national versions that have reduced both interoperability and export potential. While the EACC is an excellent idea, it is unfortunate that this kind of process has not been applied and mobilized on a larger scale.

The Benelux Deployable Air Task Force, though less ambitious, is an excellent example of capability coordination. As an agreement between Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and based on the US F-16 aircraft[17], the task force was created in 1996 and deployed successfully during the Kosovo war. This experience shows the importance of having countries of similar military cultures wishing to pool their capabilities.

Task sharing is another option, exemplified by the German-Dutch Air Transport Agreement, which offers the Netherlands the possibility of using German A400Ms in exchange for a €50m financial contribution. The Dutch government, thereby, was able to avoid what would have been a very expensive procurement process while gaining access to strategic airlift capability. Germany obtained a welcome financial contribution for an expensive programme that will be beneficial to its national industrial and technological defence bases.

Other examples include multinational agreements, such as the one that links the French Helios II system with the German SAR Lupe, and the NATO communication satellite system (based on SkyNet V, Sicral and Syracuse III). In the case of the NATO system, three European countries offer their national capabilities to NATO, which will in turn provide these countries with

[16] On different capability pooling options see: Sven Biscop (ed.), *'E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the EU'*, academia Egmont Papers, 7, May 2005.
[17] On this issue see *'The Benelux Deployable Air Task Force: a model for EU / NATO Defence Force Integration'*, Lt Col Dave L. Orr, USAF, Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 2003.

financial grants. The three aforementioned systems benefit from this co-operation and national governments are enjoying a return on their investments.

NATO's AWACS are the best current example of acquisition pooling. The multinational airbase at Geilsenkirchen, Germany, operates 17 Boeing NATO E-3A aircraft (as well as three Trainer Cargo Aircraft). International crews from fourteen different countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the US operate the E-3A squadrons, which have been operating from Geilenkirchen since February 1982. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located in Trapani, Italy; Aktion, Greece; and Konya, Turkey. A Forward Operating Location (FOL) also exists in Orland, Norway[18]. AWACS is the first historical example of pooling but no such practice within NATO has been attempted since.

3.2 Pooling in areas other than equipment

If the core idea behind pooling is to reduce costs and improve interoperability and effects/ capability, then multinational agreements such as the BG, co-operative arms programmes, and/or common procurement agreements can all produce the desired outcome. Apart from the Lithuanian water purification unit[19] and the EAC agreement, co-operation has only involved weapons systems. Yet if the parameters of capability planning are accepted, discussions about pooling should be enlarged to include other components such as soldiers, training, etc.

Since 2004, France and Belgium have decided to train their fighter pilots jointly at Tours and Cazaux. The idea of establishing a common training school for air-force pilots has also been suggested. Despite the interest, the so-called 'Euro-training platform' has not been realized because of divergent industrial interests. In order to create a common European training system, European countries will need a common training jet. The immediate question, however, is which aircraft should it be: the Italian Aermacchi 346, French Alpha-jet, British Hawk, or German Mako? Again, without political agreement, this kind of cooperation can only be marginally successful.

The Battlegroups - launched in 2004 by France, Germany and the UK - represent another example. These are intended to serve as entry-forces in crises and as a precursor to the intervention of EU Rapid-Reaction Forces. They must be ready to be deployed within 15 days and be sustainable for up to 30 days. To date, 15 BGs have been, or are being, created. Forward planning for BG availability over successive six-month periods has been determined up until 2011. Only five BGs are formed by one nation alone; all the others contain at least two participant states.

[18] For further details on NATO AWACS see the website http://www.e3a.nato.int.

[19] Lithuania has committed to develop and make available for NATO operations specialized units. Following this commitment in 2005 a water purification unit was on six-month stand-by within NRF-4 and a special operations unit carried out a six month duty within NRF-5. Following that, when the European BGs were established, some countries offered niche capabilities to integrate BGs. Lithuania offered its water purification unit as a contribution, as well as Cyprus offering a medical unit, Greece the Athens Sealift Co-ordination Centre, France the structure of a multinational and deployable force headquarters.

BGs can prove beneficial for national armed forces for a variety of reasons, including helping to develop a better understanding of cultural differences, improvement of interoperability, consolidation of European defence culture, and so on. Clearly, this mechanism will require a significant amount of common training and, at least initially, could lead to misunderstandings in the field because of language and cultural barriers.

Co-operative procurement agreements provide another interesting experience. Take the case of the Nordic Standard Helicopter Programme Office, which came into being when Sweden, Finland, and Norway decided to procure a transport helicopter together. They managed to acquire this joint capability at the best price and optimum specification, which enabled interoperability and created a common maintenance programme.

Finally, there are cooperative programmes – in existence since the 1990s. Although these have experienced problems - for example, indecision over initial purchases, late deliveries, cost overruns (due to divergent industrial interests), and practices such as *juste retour* – nevertheless, they are essential to the further development of ESDP. The ideal cooperative programme would be cost-efficient, delivered on time, based on common requirements, and would be followed by a common 'in-life' support programme for all participating Member States. These states would create capabilities that could be pooled at a later point in time – thereby helping to reduce the number of national weapons systems - and offer guaranteed capabilities to European Rapid Reaction Forces.

3.3 Other elements for global pooling

Role sharing, particularly adapted to small European states willing to hold some niche capabilities, could also become part of a global pooling strategy. The example of the Lithuanian water purification capability contribution to the BGs demonstrates a good example of a pooling practice that has dramatically improved EU proficiency. Such contributions, and other similar ones, will improve EU abilities in operational theatres.

Member States also have certain capabilities, such as in bridge-building, which are costly to duplicate across a number of states. Unfortunately, specializing in these areas lies in the lack of a common strategy among smaller countries. A clear pooling strategy, involving as many Member States as possible, is needed to avoid duplication. Consequently, the niche (albeit limited) capabilities of smaller European Member States would have higher value within a pooling and/or task-sharing framework.

Moreover, this sort of specialization strategy at the EU level would enable small states to offer the use of their capabilities in exchange for participation in a pooled asset. To regulate the system, a protocol to govern the access to such niche capabilities can be studied. This, in turn, would allow them to participate in missions that would otherwise have been beyond their scope.

4. Different positions of EU Member States and Institutions

4.1 Political problems that have yet to be solved

The main ESDP actors do not have a real pooling strategy at either a European or multinational level, despite setting up a European Defence Agency (EDA) with a mandate that includes pooling of capabilities. Foreign and defence policies are still considered as the preserve of national sovereignty. Countries like France, Germany, the UK, and also medium-sized military powers such as Italy, Spain, and Sweden still define their policies according to national interests. Smaller states rarely if ever take part in operations and so, for them, sovereignty concerns are not an issue.

4.2 EU Member States and institutions perception of capability pooling

The EDA is not an independent actor. It was created collectively by the Member States and requires consensus by a board of national delegates to implement decisions. It does not have a medium-term strategy to achieve capability pooling as some Member States feel that this would be premature and that it is better to proceed on the basis of better understanding i.e. capability pooling will come about either as the result of national strategies converging or it will not happen at all. Three examples of national strategies, however, demonstrate the difficulties inherent to the process:

UK
The UK is a central actor in the EU capability development process, even though NATO remains the core defence forum for UK planners. It is heavily engaged in NATO naval forces and - with Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and France - has created an amphibious force. It also provides 25 per cent of NATO's AWACS force. Instead of pooling, the UK prefers to use the term 'role sharing'. This preference reflects the UK's skepticism about all supranational solutions, especially in relation to defence. The UK government also tends to believe that multinational solutions do not provide value for money.

France
Conversely, France prefers capability pooling, although it remains unsure of whether or not it wants to pursue acquisition pooling as well (despite its support of the proposal for common acquisition of heavy airlift helicopters). France is still able to conduct national military operations, specifically in Africa, even if these operations are becoming increasingly less frequent. France is also capable of being pragmatic vis-à-vis pooling. For example, after experiencing little success in co-operative programmes in the fields of reconnaissance and intelligence satellites in the 1990s, today France promotes a role sharing solution through the six-nation 'Musis' project.

Germany
The German Defence White Paper, meanwhile, does not touch upon the possibility of capability pooling. On the other hand, a clear political willingness to realize co-operative programmes is explicitly stated. Because no purely national military operations are envisaged (apart from search and rescue), German doctrinal documents often underline the multilateral nature of its army.

Links with NATO are historically very strong but Chancellor Merkel has already expressed her willingness to participate in the creation of a future European Army.

Italy
For historical and budgetary reasons, Italy now seems ready to participate in an initiative for capability pooling within an EU framework. This political willingness is evident in the Euro-Trainer project[20], which would benefit Italy's national defence industry.

While there is no prospect of a European army in the near future, certain Member States appear more ready than others to accept a higher degree of integration. Despite countries such as like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain conveying "integrational" rhetoric on defence issues, they do not always share basic principles of foreign policy. Moreover, each of the aforementioned countries has some form of defence technology industrial base (DTIB), and tries consistently to preserve its national interests in this sector. Only six of the 27 EU Member States can be considered as having major military capabilities and important 'cleavages' still exist among all Member States. For instance, many of them have different procurement and industrial strategies, devoting very different levels of resources to defence.

At the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, Spain provided military support to the US-led operation, while Italy was prepared to send peacekeeping forces once major military operations had finished. France and Germany, on the other hand, were opposed to the operation. If at that moment any pooling of capabilities had been in place, these policy differences would have caused major political problems.

Learning from the Iraq War, and in order to arrive at a coherent ESDP/CFSP, European countries need to realize that they have to achieve greater harmonization. As this evolution occurs, certain instruments can be used to catalyze capability pooling. The provisions for structured cooperation contained in the Reform Treaty provide an ideal framework for further development with this concept.

As a result of current procurement programmes causing increased budgetary pressures, pooling may well become a necessity in the medium term. Pooling priority should be given to capabilities that are of a significant cost and that are based on technologically 'mature' systems. These capabilities should be labeled as a 'banc d'essai' for further developments.

4.3. Role of the European Defence Agency

Since its creation, one of the EDA's main goals has been to help participating Member States foster their national capabilities. Its 'functional approach' is different, however, from that of the EUMS. While the EDA's approach is top-down; the EUMS uses generic scenarios to develop a bottom-up approach with Member States. The EDA's capability approach is based on three sources:

[20] The Euro-training project was aimed at realizing an Advanced European Jet Pilot Training project. This would have provided a common training to all European jet fighter pilots. Italy supported strongly the project to impose its nationally-built Aermacchi M-346 as the common European training fighter. The project failed for a lack of political agreement at the European level.

1. The experiences of past EU missions are used to determine those capabilities that are lacking and that require priority acquisition;
2. The HHG process: The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)[21] group has been integrated into the EDA in order to centralize its experiences and, whenever possible, to translate them into cooperative programmes;
3. The Long Term Vision document (approved by the EU Council in October 2006), which seeks to define the strategic framework for the evolution of ESDP up until 2025. From this, a Capability Development Plan has been created. On 28 June 2007, the EDA's steering board agreed upon a roadmap and timetable that focused on opportunities for cooperation in carrying out the plan. Action here is highly significant, although it is too early to say whether the plan will provide concrete results for future capability pooling, despite this being a core objective of the EDA according to its terms of reference.

Pooling of capabilities is discussed between the participating Member States (PMS) inside the capability directorate of EDA. EDA officials consider this process to be in its early stages. To date, their only real success has been the European Airlift Capability (EAC) project, based on ATARES experimentation, which involves a system whereby flying hours are exchanged for transport and refueling.

Otherwise, work continues on trying to reach solutions and achieve cooperation on pooling, but difficulties have arisen because of the differing definitions and concepts adopted by different nations, for example, the UK and France. Areas where success may be most feasible are those of logistics and maintenance (the EDA is organizing a major conference on these subjects in February 2008[22]. The EDA is also currently working on pooling satellite communication files during multinational operations. The idea is to offer common capabilities to pMS during multinational operations and to identify the possibility to rent civil satellite communication.
Other projects are still at the conceptual stage, and have yet to show any practical results. The only real prospect for 'pooling by acquisition' has been promoted by the new director of the EDA, Alexander Weis, and concerns the idea for a Franco-German heavy airlift helicopter.

4.4 Technical problems to solve

Resistance to major capability pooling may be overcome in the next few years through a combination of factors, including lower levels of defence spending, industrial interest, and the multiplication of transnational companies and cooperative programmes. Working under this assumption, EU institutions should prepare solutions for potential problems that might arise, which fall into the following three categories:

4.4.1 Management

Upon pooling a capability, problems will arise in relation to its use. For instance, what happens if a pooled capability is required for an operation that is agreed on by one country but not by

[21] ECAP was launched at the Laeken European Summit in December 2001 in order to address capability shortfalls.
[22] On 27 February EDA held its annual conference on the topic: 'Commercialising logistics? Third party logistic support for EU crisis management operations'.

others? Who will decide whether it can be used? And what are the procedures for allowing a state to use its capabilities for purely national purposes?

This question is also related to the security of supply. In 2006, in the Letters of Intent (LoI) agreement, six Member States decided to facilitate mergers within the European arms industry. To reach successful agreement on the establishment of new European companies, however, it will be necessary to share technological and industrial information. As a consequence, to a certain extent, the states involved will become dependent on each other and will need to provide a guarantee of the security of supply of their resources and equipment. If Member States appear willing to relinquish their control over a series of major weapons programmes in this way, there is no reason why they should not eventually follow suit vis-à-vis capabilities.

4.4.2 Budgetary

A *pro rata* system should be used to finance pooled capabilities. The Athena mechanism[23] used to finance ESDP missions represents an interesting precedent, but it is difficult to imagine that it could be adopted in the realm of capabilities. According to industrialists, financing an operation is easier than developing a capability. In ESDP, Athena covers common costs that fund less than 10 per cent of an operation. The remaining 90 per cent is covered by states involved in the operation.

If a particular capability is genuinely pooled, the cost of the assets that provide that capability represents more or less half of the total cost of that capability. The other half covers the in-service and in-life cost and use of those assets in military operations. Consequently, a state that does not want to use a capability in a given military operation is not going to want to pay for half of the costs. There are three different ways to deal with this question:

- Reproduction of the Athena mechanism: a simple *pro rata* system whereby it would finance about 10 per cent of military capabilities – but only in relation to European cooperative programmes.

- Another solution is to have a more efficient way of sharing costs for cooperative programmes. For these programmes the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR)[24] could develop a global fund rather than relying, as it does now, on contributions from Member States on a programme-by-programme basis. The organization would have more flexibility in dealing with programmes and could produce more efficient financial results.

- The third way is to have a common strategy for Research and Technology (R&T). While a common EU defence budget seems unlikely, much progress can be made on R&T

[23] This was established by Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP in 2004 to administer the financing of the common costs of ESDP operations without establishing a standing pool of funds.
[24] The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR) was established by an Administrative Arrangement on 12 November 1996 by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Its aim is to provide more effective and efficient arrangements for the management of certain existing and future collaborative armament programmes.

budgets. Currently, only 12.4 per cent of collective national R&T budgets of EDA participating Member States are spent on multinational cooperative programmes - three-quarters of which is spent on European projects, and the rest on cooperative programmes with non-European partners.

Spending on bilateral and multilateral programmes will need to increase if security and defence capabilities are to remain up to date. The EDA should initiate pilot projects in a broader range of technologies and work more closely with the European Commission, particularly vis-à-vis information exchanges. Projects that are supported by both the EDA and the Commission's 'security research budget', like the software defined radio (SDR), should continue.

4.4.3 Doctrinal

Although the ESS lists the goals of the EU as part of its international actions, no link is made between the strategic framework and the capabilities necessary to achieve these goals. HHG2010 is considered as the appropriate framework for capability development and, consequently, EDA action is aimed at enhancing the military proficiency of EU Member States. Nevertheless, states should look towards creating more ambitious goals in this area.

Finally, capability pooling cannot be achieved without a global agreement between at least some EU Member States within the PSC framework. The agreement should cover areas as diverse as industrial strategy, the creation of a common R&T strategy, and goals for foreign and defence policies at the strategic level. At the tactical level, initiatives such as the BG and the formation of other multilateral units should be catalyzed to ensure the harmonization of weapons systems, doctrines and standards.

5. Future policy

The future of pooling needs further discussion. There is no magic formula for achieving the optimum policy but consideration should focus on creating pooling initiatives within the EUMS and/or the EDA. Bilateral initiatives, as well as multilateral ones, should also be considered.

5.1 Do we need a pooling doctrine?

Experience indicates that new ideas do not also emanate from a panel of experts. The Atares programme, for example, - created by personnel involved in field operations -eliminated instances where planes were returning empty during airlift rotations. This gave birth to a very pragmatic pooling solution.

The Capability Development Plan (CDP) sets up a mechanism to develop ESDP capability and enables a new pooling of assets. It aims, starting with the capability development process, to obtain a comprehensive and systematic "translation" of politico/military requirements into delivered capabilities: identify any lack of capabilities; perform capability studies; establish global data for national military planning and procurement programmes; and use past experiences to define future capabilities.

At its meeting in November 2007, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) noted with satisfaction:

"…continued progress on the elaboration of a Capability Development Plan, with agreement on a Methodology and a Roadmap for this purpose. The CDP will aim at identifying priorities for capability improvement and at bringing out opportunities to pool resources and to cooperate. More particularly, decisive progress was made on the two strands under the Agency's lead: work on the identification of longer-term trends beyond the Headline Goal 2010, and collection of pMS' national plans and programmes in a common database in view of identifying early opportunities for collaboration." [25]

The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) that was incorporated into the EDA has not yet been able to create new common programmes. It should be recognized here that initial interest in developing capabilities does not inevitably lead to the definition of a common solution.

The real problem of the Project Groups within the EDA is that the Capability Development Mechanism and Plan set forth by the EDA Board is not supranational. Pooled capabilities, therefore, will not be created without specific willingness on the part of EU Member States. These project groups try to identify long-term needs and help structure possible multinational ventures. Yet, there are no guarantees that at the end of a project, the participants will choose a pooling solution. For instance, if, within the air-to-air refueling project groups, the UK opts for a private finance initiative (PFI), France will buy its own aircraft instead and Poland will do the same thing than France.

For the moment there is no systematic way to create pooling, even though initiatives exist inside the EDA. Pooling relies on national initiatives like those launched by France with the A400M. The French government would like to create a European strategic airlift capability and hopes for progress in this area during its Presidency in the later half of 2008. In the short-term at least, without the strong will of national governments, no advancements will be made in pooling.

For the time being, it is unrealistic to think that the EDA will have the power to *create* the conditions for pooling, yet it is necessary to establish this as an organizational goal. It should be able both to launch studies concerning pooling projects, in order to have a better understanding of past experiences, and to suggest new solutions.

A table should then be created, indicating all pooling possibilities - such as multinational BGs, procurement pooling, and the pooling of training.

5.2 Future pooling of assets: an Action Plan

Future pooling efforts should draw on the lessons of past experiences. It is imperative that a pooling policy is pro-active and, ideally, that it is promoted by a powerful institution. The European Parliament could champion this cause. Caution is required, however, given that the

[25] General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97169.pdf

different pooling options available, the types of asset being pooled and the potential pitfalls. Nevertheless, it is possible to define a future pooling strategy that is accompanied by an action plan. The outline of such a plan could contain some of the following elements:

5.2.1 Pooling of soldiers: multinational Battlegroups

Past experience suggests that in order to succeed pooling requires basic conditions:

- Multinational BGs must adopt a common language at the lower level: this can only be English. Hence, it will be necessary for all national war colleges to require candidates to speak English as a primary or second language;
- there must be a common command system;
- EUMS must be able to determine the effectiveness of these BGs through the HHG2010 process via a certification and lessons learned process.

The creation of multinational BGs is particularly important when capabilities not affordable for all countries are involved. This has been the case, for example, with the amphibious BG involving Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal. Specific CBRN BGs might also be needed to deal with terrorist attacks, or environmental disasters.

5.2.2 Four main options

The same type of strategy cannot exist for all capabilities. In some cases, sharing capabilities would work better than real pooling and vice versa. Whatever the scenario, the objective should be to transform today's sharing of capabilities into tomorrow's pooling, and tomorrow's pooling into tomorrow's pooling with acquisition.

Sharing capabilities

Sharing capabilities can be much more effective than simply relying on individual member state capabilities. To achieve progress, however, the amount of capability required for the pursuit of a collective security action on behalf of the EU must be determined beforehand. This cannot be done without cooperation between the EU and NATO. In the initial stage, EU Member States should co-ordinate their national strategic military planning so as to mitigate, if not eliminate, the risks for under-capacity or over-capacity. The EDA should be involved in this process and should work towards harmonizing national military planning through the CDP and PSC. Ultimately this could lead to a truly European strategic military planning process and European defence budget.

Pooling capabilities

Here, EU Member States would still own their capabilities but delegate those capabilities to a common entity (while keeping control over the decision to use weapons). This requires the designation of a simple definition for a particular capability, enabling members to come to an agreement more readily. It also requires the consideration of logistical or 'sustenance' capabilities, excluding those used for war-fighting (EU Member States still have difficulty delegating the use of war-fighting capabilities). Pooling also offers good opportunities to develop sustenance and logistic capabilities.

Pooling through acquisition

This is the most integrated form of asset pooling, whereby multilateral organizations rather than states actually hold the assets. The most important advantage is economic: all members of the 'pool' own the same capabilities (NATO's AWACS fleet is the first example of real pooling, whereby the fleet belongs to NATO and multinational crews operate the aircraft). This type of pooling is made possible because of AWACS' generic battlefield ability and their significant cost making it difficult for any one state to own. Although 14 countries take part in the AWACS pooling, the most militarily important European states - France and the UK - do not (each operates their own fleets). But only the UK contributes to the pool by participating in the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF). The NATO AWACS are only used in NATO operations.

In future, sectors that use pooling, such as the air- and sea-lift sectors, could evolve to use acquisition pooling. This is already the case with the C17 aircraft and would also be easy to apply to a fleet of MALE UAVs (Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), which only deal with observation. The co-operative A400M programme will encourage the launching of future deployment assets like the heavy airlift helicopter, but in this case through acquisition pooling.

Role sharing

Either for political or technical reasons, it is sometimes impossible to pool capabilities: politically, when a Member State wants to protect its national technological and industrial base; and technically when it is impossible for a Member State to acquire the whole capability alone. In these cases, a plan to share capabilities might be established. In fact, EU Member States already do share capabilities in two ways:

"Niche" capability sharing

This relates to the sharing of so-called 'niche' capabilities, such as CBRN capabilities in the Czech Republic, hospital aircraft in Germany, and mine-hunters in Belgium. In these cases, there is no need for all EU Member States to possess identical capabilities because it would create over-capability. It is necessary, however, to specify as a pre-condition, the security of supply between those Member States who own these capabilities and those who do not. Member States with specialized niche capabilities can become more involved within the ESDP. Progress in niche capability sharing will help to eliminate over-capacity and offer EU Member States the possibility of specializing in such capabilities. Setting up a database on specific capabilities in order to provide information on their availability would also be useful.

Sharing capability for high cost assets or very complex systems

The second possible case for capability sharing occurs when the capability covers a complex 'system of systems' requiring large sums of money. The best existing example is space observation capability, for which many assets are needed and that would be impossible for Member States to possess on their own. Consequently, capability sharing arrangements for major programmes should be discussed at an early stage.

Where space observation is concerned, another possibility exists. Since the co-operative programmes failed, the major payers involved in space observation - France, Germany, Italy, and

Spain - decided to 'role share' capability rather than pool it. More than anything, this looks like a way of protecting national industry.

Concerning the EDA group project on space observation, the French Defence Ministry is currently trying to structure a role sharing arrangement in the launching of the Musis programme (the Multinational Space-based Imaging System). The programme should replace the national systems *Helios* and *Pleiades* of France, *SAR Lupe* of Germany, and *Cosmo SkyMed* for Italy. Moreover, the cooperation has enlarged to include six countries (France, Italy, Germany Belgium, Spain, and Greece). Each country participates in the common capability by role sharing. In this case, pooling of the ground system has created a common image database.

Conclusion

There is far too much duplication of defence effort spread across the Member States of the EU. Although it can be politically sensitive for national governments, much progress towards a greater pooling of capabilities has been achieved in recent years: more needs to be done if Europe is to become an effective security and defence actor. Defence market economics are driving Member States towards finding common solutions to common problems. The great majority of Member States are unable to launch autonomous military operations. So, if they already need to rely on allies to pursue their security interests, Member States should try to do so through the most cost-effective means. This requires sharing and pooling defence assets in order to maximize European defence capability.

"… we must point out the fact that the duplications between the members states are the main problem on our way to improve our capabilities and that we must improve our ability to spend better together." [26]

The European Parliament has the right to be informed, consulted and to make recommendations about developments in ESDP. As a budgetary authority and assembly that is accountable to Europe's citizens, it is important that the European Parliament continues to press the case for more efficient defence and security expenditure to ensure that European taxpayers receive the best returns for their money and that unnecessary waste of 'non Europe' is avoided. This work is conducted primarily by the Security and Defence Subcommittee:

In the Sub-committee we have… focused upon responding to some of the key issues in the international press. This has included the… "the costs of non Europe" through the waste of tax payers' money on inefficient and duplicative defence capability procurement.[27]

[26] General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 19-20 November 2007, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97169.pdf

[27] Karl von Wogau: Parliamentary Scrutiny of the European Security and Defence Policy: the role of the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, available at: http://www.wogau.de/07/action=sec/2_sec_8_EN.htm

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