STUDY

THE THREAT OF MILITARIZATION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AT EU'S EASTERN BORDERS ( WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE KALININGRAD REGION - GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF THE MILITARY EXERCISES OF RUSSIAN FORCES IN COOPERATION WITH BELORUSSIAN ARMY IN KALININGRAD ENCLAVE, BELORUSSIA AND NORTH WESTERN RUSSIA - ZAPAD 2009 AND LADOGA 2009 )
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**ABOUT THE EDITOR**

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THE SCOPE OF THE PAPER

This paper addresses the current security concerns besetting the European Union with regard to Russia, in particular the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and the Russian-Belarus military exercises Zapad and Ladoga in 2009, and draws some of the implications of these “threats” for the EU’s partnership relations with Russia. It also compares the present strength of the Russian military forces with Russia’s great power rhetoric and comes to the conclusion that the threat perceptions, which exist on both sides, are irrational. The paper concludes with the suggestion to the EU countries to hold joint exercises with Russia on missile defence to defuse tensions and to build trust. Information for the article is drawn from Russian, EU and US sources.

KALININGRAD

Since the break-down of the Soviet Union, the Kaliningrad region emerged, due to its unique geographical position, in the focus of security relations between EU and Russia. Russia was worrying about the integrity of its exclave, which some have called “the fourth Baltic republic”. The EU feared the emergence of a new Russian fortress at the centre of Europe and – on the other hand – soft security risks like a spread of diseases, corruption and smuggling from the economically underdeveloped region. During the 1990s the Russian government, struggling for economic survival, showed few interest for the region and was reluctant to invest in infrastructure and the public sector. While during the Cold War, the Kaliningrad region had been transformed into a military bastion and totally sealed off from the outside world, it gradually lost its military character. The region saw a comprehensive reduction of armed forces and military equipment, the breakdown of big parts of the local military industry and the handover of numerous military garrisons to civilian use. Even when the economic situation changed in Russia in the 2000s and President Vladimir Putin used the budget revenues from the higher oil and gas prize to strengthen Russia’s state institutions, Kaliningrad was not remilitarized.

The geopolitical significance of the region as a Russian intra-EU enclave is two-fold. Kaliningrad has been characterized by observers as something of a Russian Hong-Kong in Europe, a test region for Russia’s economic incorporation into the EU, or as a possible Russian military bulwark against NATO and EU in Europe. Russian authorities use the geopolitical status of the region in both ways, depending on the state of affairs with the EU. When tensions rise with the West, as it had lately been the case with U.S. missile defence in Poland and Czech Republic, Moscow threatens to deploy Iskander missiles in its most Western region in order to counter the perceived threat from NATO and the US. When, in contrary, Russia needs better economic arrangements with Western business or it wants to use European cooperation to develop the region, it discusses Kaliningrad as a showcase of EU-Russia relations. In both cases, Russia uses the enclave as a strategic bargain chip in relations with the West.

While Kaliningrad was not remilitarized, it also did not become the heaven for investors. The Free Economic Zone established in 1991, replaced by a Special Economic Zone in 1996 and again revised in 2006, never created favourable conditions for investors. The privileged status was simply misused for corruption. After a decade of underfunding of the Kaliningrad regional budget, the Russian government began to directly subsidize the region (since 2004). The inward foreign investments increased between 2005 and 2008 from 75.3 Million USD to 376 Million USD (Kaliningradstat, 2009). The financial crisis led to a deterioration of the situation. In the beginning of 2010, Kaliningrad witnessed mass protests over social-economic issues and against Governor Gregory Boos, which in future could grow into major political protests on the western border of the Russian Federation.

At present there is no reason, neither for the EU nor for Russia, for feeling threatened by the situation in Kaliningrad. All sides should abstain from further measures which might question confidence and disarmament efforts. All states in the Baltic region have the sovereign right to maintain military
presence on order to safeguard their security. Kaliningrad remains a special case, due to asymmetries built into its presence existence. The status of an enclave in the EU permits different perceptions of the security needs of this region. Unfortunately, all military measures in the Kaliningrad vicinity can be theoretically instrumentalized for political purposes.

BELARUS

As of today, the relations between Russia and Belarus can hardly be characterized as those of closest allies. Despite several attempts and mutual assurances, both successor republics of the Soviet Union have never managed to merge into a “union state”. Belarus’ participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Custom Union is considered more symbolical than real. There is a growing self-assurance inside the Belarus elites in favour of true sovereignty and political distance from Moscow. The Belarusian elite tries to use its participation on Russian made multilateral instruments like the Custom Union and its EU rapprochement to bargain with Moscow and the Brussels for economic benefit.

With increasing Russian prices for oil and gas, the financial fundament of President Aleksandr Lukaschenko’s authoritarian system is challenged. For Moscow the regime of Lukaschenko has a high strategic importance, because it secures Russia’s Western borders. The Kremlin understands that under its present-day status, Belarus will never join NATO. In turn, Belarus uses its geopolitical location as a transit country between Russia and the EU for its own interests in negotiations with Moscow. The relationship often resembles a bazaar, not an alliance.

It is true that Russia keeps military bases on Belarus’ soil -- however, only for air surveillance reasons, and it is not present there with any combat troops. Military cooperation with Russia is in the Belarusian perception an important reassurance for a perceived threat from NATO. Belarus does not charge Russia for using the former Soviet air defence base and skilfully uses that argument as a tool in negotiations with Moscow over energy subsidies. However, after the oil conflict in 2007, Minsk has sacrificed its Moscow-centred policy in favour of more commercial benefits by approaching the EU. It is therefore irrational to speak about a possible Russian-Belarus military aggressiveness towards the West.

ANALYSIS OF EXISTING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

NATO’s threat assessments explicitly discount the idea of war with Russia, even if the Baltic States fear that the alliance may not have formal contingency plans to defend them in case of Russian aggression. With NATO focused on the fighting in Afghanistan, they want a clear assurance that collective defence of NATO territory remains the highest priority of NATO’s new strategic concept. While Russia seems neither willing nor able to fight a real war with NATO, the Kremlin, frustrated of NATO’s enlargement to Russia’s borders and U.S. plans to install missile defence in Central Eastern Europe, flexes rhetorically its muscles reminding the West that its army and its nuclear arsenal are again a force to reckon with.

The huge military exercise in western Russia and Belarus in autumn 2009, which so much alarmed neighbouring countries in the EU, pursued that external goal. At the same time, Moscow’s rhetoric was also aimed at domestic consumption. President Medvedev wanted to demonstrate to his public that despite the fact that Russia could not prevent a NATO expansion, it was still strong enough to prevent NATO from creating a new military infrastructure at Russian borders. The sharp rhetoric against US plans to deploy missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic served yet another purpose. The Georgian war demonstrated that the army was ill-prepared for the tasks of modern warfare. Both Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009 were exercises to test the new structure of the Russian army under the new military reform (started in autumn 2008).
The ideological conflict between East and West that characterized the Cold War does not apply any longer, but fundamental differences in values continue to exist. The Russian perception is that because the West thinks that Russia has lost the Cold War, Moscow is being regarded as a second-rate power. The EU’s perception is that Russia is striving to revive its great power status by appealing to Soviet legacy which contradicts liberal European values. The EU will counter resurgent Russian great power ambitions, particularly if Russia seeks to use its energy resources to blackmail its consumers in the EU. Some new EU member states go as far as suggesting that Russia’s objective was to intimidate Europe and create a psychological atmosphere similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, when a number of Western states were opposed to the U.S. Strategy of deploying Pershing and Cruise missiles. Consequently, they argue in favour of a containment policy versus a “neo-imperialistic” Russia. Other member states, however, make good business with Russia and promote the idea of a “strategic partnership” with Moscow. In order to become a global player in future and successfully compete against increasing rivalry from Asia, the EU has no choice but to arrange itself with Russia. The same common sense dictates Russia to manage its domestic modernization in the context of a European architecture.

What about Russian threat perception regarding the EU? The economical and political strength of the EU is making Russia feel increasingly insecure and vulnerable. Russia perceives the EU increasingly as a geopolitical competitor. Russia, which refuses to be treated as a defeated nation, is nevertheless surrounded by NATO. The two main pillars on which the new European architecture rests are EU and NATO. Russia is no member of these institutions and consequently not anchored in the architecture of the Occident — to which Russia historically belongs. Russia remains isolated in the new European institutional order — despite the fact that it is the largest country in Europe in terms of territory and population, and has the resources Europe needs to secure its future economic existence. That bares the danger of a new rift on the continent.

The negative shift in Russian foreign policy emerged from the understanding that the West has a different perception of security and international law, as the NATO-led war in former Yugoslavia in 1999 demonstrated. Especially after the colour revolution in Ukraine, Russia found itself in a competition with the West in the post-Soviet space. Examples of the new conflict lines were the so-called gas-conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and the Russian-Georgian war.

**ENERGY SECURITY AND NORD STREAM**

Energy security is another hot issue which raises threat perceptions regarding Russia. It hardly requires a profound analysis to understand that EU’s energy dependence on Russia will rise during the years to come. Considering the fact that within 15 to 20 years’ time, the EU will be importing 80 per cent of its energy demands because the Norwegian gas fields will be exhausted, it cannot lose sight of energy cooperation with Russia. Russia is home to a quarter of globally exploited natural gas. Therefore, the argumentation goes, Russia and EU need more pipelines to connect each other.

However, considerable disputes exist in the EU regarding the laying of new pipelines from Russia. Thus, the Central and Eastern European EU countries, notably the traditional transit countries, hotly contest the idea of ‘Nord Stream’, a Russian-German pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Besides fearing economic losses and political disadvantages, they suspect Russia to build up its military presence in the Baltic Sea in order to “protect” the Nord Stream pipeline. This year the Nord Stream project has been finalized in the face of bitter opposition from the Baltic countries and Poland. Such complaints are ignored by many in Germany as further evidence that the Poles and Balts remain mired in Cold War enmity and therefore are incapable of developing harmonious relations with Russia. In reality, Nord Stream should not be seen as a Russian-German project but as a project of all-European importance since the pipeline will secure bigger parts of gas supply to Western and Northern Europe in future.
The general tone in the EU stipulates that Russia is closest to the European markets and had been over decades a reliable partner in energy supply. What is more, it is easier to bind Russia to Europe than the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East. The latter countries would be endangered by political instability. In case of massive shortages in energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, only the Russian oil and gas reserves would constitute a realistic alternative source of supplies.

Some suspicions were raised in Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states over the aims of the Russian navy to guard the construction work of Nord Stream and subsequently take the functions of “protecting” it. Russian Defence Minister Anatoli Serdyukov ended these speculations during his visit to Helsinki where he firmly stated that Russia does not see any serious threats to the pipeline. He added that “it is an economic project, and Gazprom and other companies that are putting it into effect will themselves provide security for the pipeline” (Interfax February 19, 2010). Serdyukov, however, concluded that his ministry would get involved in the process “only within the limits of its functions and powers”. He may have referred to previous reports saying that the Russian Navy was commissioned by Gazprom to support the cleaning of the seabed in the Russian economic sector of the Baltic Sea from explosive waste, such as chemical weapons of World Wars I and II. The Russian General Staff had previously declared its readiness to protect the pipeline, the Russian oil derricks in Kaliningrad region and oil export- and trade routes across the Baltic Sea from terrorist attack. Such openly declared intentions alarmed all other literal states of the Baltic Sea (Larsson, 2007; Oldenberg, 2009).

The Baltic Fleet will not get any orders to protect Nord Stream. The existing Baltic Maritime Law Convention prohibits that. Nord Stream will be built along the economic sectors of Russia, Denmark and Germany and each of these countries will take individual responsibility over the ecological security in connection with the pipeline. Presently, a private British company – BACTEC – has been tasked with the removal of explosive garbage from the bottom of the Baltic Sea along the route of future Nord Stream.

The discussion over threats from military involvement in the Nord Stream business could be conducted in reverse. Russia is worried about the current debate of the future NATO strategic concept because NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen has openly raised the question whether NATO can take responsibility for protecting energy supply routes to the Western markets. Does this mean that NATO intends to interfere in non-NATO-states’ territorial waters in case of supply disruptions?

RUSSIAN MILITARY

How dangerous is Russia in terms of hard security? Russia remains the second most powerful nuclear power on earth and the only power capable of destroying the superpower USA. In its new edition of its constantly changing military doctrine, Russia does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons even in a conventional war, in case the very existence of the Russian state is threatened. In other words, Russia will use its nuclear military arsenal against any foreign army which may try to occupy the heartland of the Russian state. But such a scenario seems totally unimaginable today.

Russia’s current re-armament and the upgrading of its conventional armed forces were entirely to be expected. As long as Russia remains within the ceilings of the CFE treaty, it can modernize its armed forces without upsetting the overall balance. Nonetheless, its current power projection capability must be considered insufficient to fight outside the space of former Soviet Union. Even the war in Georgia showed severe shortcomings in Russia’s operational capacities. The equipment is mostly more than 20 years old and the Russian military industry lacks the skills to produce modern high-tech. Therefore Russia now starts to buy modern weapons in France and Israel. But in case of a military conflict, NATO air force could neutralize the entire infrastructure that is needed to transport Russian troops from east to west in the first hours of any war.
Only its nuclear weapon potential gives Russia a true basis for its great power ambitions. Since the demise of the Soviet army 20 years ago, the Russian forces continue elements of disorientation and disillusion, followed by cynicism, amorality and corruption. The path of the army in the painful transition from communism to something else was more precipitous and more disastrous than for most others segments of post-communist society. A true military reform has only started in the end of 2008, right after the Georgian war but against a massive resistance of the military community.

The break-up of the USSR had also a serious impact on the equipment and facilities structure of the former Soviet Army. The deployment pattern of the Soviet Army had placed a good deal of military equipment in Soviet border areas. This equipment and its infrastructure naturally became the property of the post-Soviet countries. Russia was left with only half of the airfields and one third of the military air planes of the former USSR, and many of them continue to be in need of maintenance. 40% of all repair facilities of the former armed forces were left outside Russia. As a whole, some 75% of all military equipment was reported by General Staff analysts to be second generation of obsolescent (Klein, 2009).

Russia had to reduce the size of the inherited forces but did so without changing the structure, making reforms both expensive and inefficient. All that pushed the army now towards either a massive rebuilding effort or an essential fundamental reform. The army could have reformed itself to meet the needs of a new Russian national state, and reflect a new social contract between government and people. Or it could have rebuilt itself in an imitation of its earlier Soviet form. It looks today, as if the army is struck in the middle of the process. The high incomes from energy export since 1999 have filled the state budget and allowed the Kremlin to allocate considerable financial resources for the military budget and restructuring. The military budget has grown by about 25% a year on average since 2003 (from 14 to 38.2 Billion US-Dollar between 2000 and 2008). In international terms this is an unusually rapid and large increase. But Russia faces severe economic limitations, because it has to reform not only its armed forces but modernize its entire economy. The modernization deficit after the fall of the empire is huge. The command structure and Soviet-style mass army is not only inflexible for the today’s challenges but very expensive. Furthermore, the modernization of the arms did not overcome Russia’s backwardness in high tech equipment and information systems. In other words, Russia lacks financial means to rearm itself properly.

There are severe limits of Russia’s geo-political power and its military influence. Russia relies almost exclusively on its energy resources; as such it lacks both the soft power that is necessary to build and maintain political alliances and the hard power to challenge U.S. hegemony. The U.S., in turn, still has much of the ability to project both soft and hard power and its soft power is still more attractive that Russia’s. Moscow’s hard power is linked to the oil prizes which are cyclical.

**MILITARY POTENTIAL OF KALININGRAD REGION**

In Soviet times Kaliningrad city became the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet. The region was developed as an outpost of the Cold War against NATO. As a result, Kaliningrad became one of the most militarized regions of the Soviet Union with well over 100,000 troops, a considerable military industry and a civil structure working for military needs. As a result, the region was fully subordinated to Moscow and closed for foreign visitors.

The situation for the region changed fundamentally with the end of the Soviet Union. Kaliningrad became an exclave divided from the Russian motherland, Russian authorities had to ask permission for military flights and transport across NATO and EU member state Lithuania. The economic and political crisis of the 1990s resulted in a dramatic reduced national military budget which led to a radical reduction of forces in Kaliningrad region. The number of ground forces fell from more than 100,000 troops to approximately 14,500 up to 1998; all types of weapons were cut. The Baltic Fleet
shrunk considerably. Between 1988-2000 the number of cruisers fell from 4 to zero, destroyers from 13 to 2, submarines from 39 to 2, amphibious ships from 19 to 5, patrol and coastal ships from 150 to 26. The Baltic Fleet was now equal to the navy forces of Germany, Sweden and Poland and ten times weaker than NATO in the Baltic Sea (Oldenberg, 2009). Today, the age of the different types of ships of the Baltic Sea range from 17 to 26 years (Kommersant, 25.02. 2008). Its tasks became merely defensive.

With the economic growth in the first decade of 2000 Russian defence budget increased about 15 percent per year in real terms, which was mostly spend on personnel and training. The economic and social situation of the whole region and the military in Kaliningrad improved and the number of forces was stabilized (2007 by 10.500). In 2007 a 8-year-defence development program was launched in which the navy was promised new ships and equipment. The Baltic Fleet was, however, neglected. Other maritime regions with a higher conflict potential like the Black Sea became priority of the military planners. According to a recent reform plan for 2009-2012, the Baltic Fleet will be modernized and the ground forces, air forces and air defence in Kaliningrad re-equipped. At the same time the military personnel in the region will be reduced by half. Only units of permanent readiness of about 200 officers will remain. Such a Baltic Fleet is no threat to NATO.

In line with the technical modernization process which is legitimate for any army, Russia plans to deploy Iskander missiles in Kalingrad in the next 5 years, irrespectively of the outcome of the stationing of U.S. missile defence in Poland (Wilk, Zochowski, OSW, 2009). However, the Russian military industry lacks the capacity to produce enough of these weapons which are much more needed in the South of Russia than in the Baltic region.

**ZAPAD-2009 AND LADOGA-2009**

In end September 2009, Russia launched two main exercises -- Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009. They were the largest on the borders of Russia with NATO countries since the end of the Cold War. A total number of at least 30.000 soldiers and navy servicemen participated on the field exercises in the Russian and Belarus’ border districts’ between Murmansk and Brest, in the Kaliningrad region and on the Baltic Sea. Although the Zapad-2009 and Ladoga-2009 exercises were formally independent of each other, they should be analysed as a whole because they involved the same structures of command, and their culmination took place within the same period.

The Zapad-2009 exercise, organized with the Belarusian army, referred back to the analogous Zapad-1999 drill. The 1999 exercise involved 7000 army and navy troops in all military districts and fleets in the European part of Russia. In Zapad-2009, a similar number of Russian troops exercised alone on the territory of Belarus. The whole exercise involved a total number of 12.600 soldiers and navy servicemen, including 6.500 Belarusian and 6.000 Russian troops. They were equipped with 228 tanks, 470 armoured fighting vehicles and 234 self-propelled artillery as well as tube artillery, multi-rocket launchers, ground based SAM systems and at least 100 combat planes, helicopters and 20 battleships (Wilk, OSW, 30.09. 2009).

The exercise was split in two parts, the second one focusing on air defence operation (Krasnaya Zvezda, September 26, 2009). The air defence involved the interception of enemy airplanes and the firing of S-200 air defence missiles. Russian President Medvedev stated that such exercises will be held every two years in order to promote Russian and Belarusian interoperability in forming a joint defence system. Minsk invited observers from Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine to attend the event. From a military point of view the manoeuvre was mostly defensive: the exercise scenario concentrated on repelling a NATO-led attack on Belarus (McDermott, EDM, September 30, 2009).

A similar number of troops and weapons were involved in the Ladoga-2009 exercise, organized by the Russian Armed Forces without Belarus. From a military perspective, the exercises were a test of the Russian army’s new organisational structure after the beginning of the military reform. Most of
the units taking part in the exercise were newly-formed brigades. The drills on the Baltic Sea involved battleships from the Northern and Black Sea Fleets, which was the largest marine exercise since 1981. (Wilk, OSW, 30.09.2009).

By organizing this two huge exercises Russia demonstrated the largest use of force since the end of the Cold War towards its western neighbours NATO and EU. The hypothetical frontline in the exercise involved the entire border between Russia and the Baltic States plus Finland. The preparations of Zapad-2009 exercise were neither affected by the trade and energy disagreements between Russia and Belarus nor by Belorussian periodical refuse to foster closer co-operation inside the Collective Operational Response Force within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. The exercise was aimed at strengthening a closer cooperation of the “Union state”. The western observers concluded that despite disagreements in economic relations, Moscow and Minsk remained firmly committed to joint defence (www.belta.by, Sept. 29).

The interpretation given by the Polish Ministry of Defence of Zapad-2009 as a “warning” to Poland (www.charter97.org, Sept. 25, 2009) is misleading. Such a simplistic threat perception distracts from reality. The exercises were primarily about preparing the Russian forces for future demands. The troops tested the new brigade-formations in the ground forces, involved the implementation of the concept of “network-centric warfare”, which has been copied from a U.S. military concept regarding the use of large-scale electronic reconnaissance and target acquisition, such as satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles etc. By abandoning the mass conscript principle and transmitting the army into smaller mobile units of permanent readiness formation which could move quicker around the theatre of military operation and attack the aggressor’s flanks or rear, the Kremlin departed from its traditional plans of deterring NATO. It has become clear to every military planner in Russia that in the western strategic direction the Russian army will face innovative NATO armies employing methods of non-contact warfare. So Russia has to invent a more maneuverable high-technological force capacity for rapid deployment, to conduct non-linear precision-strike warfare and to global positioning its troops with the help of digital maps provided by GLONASS (Krasnaya zvezda, September 23, 2009). The exercises proved that the Russian military structures were in transition towards a new armed forces command system; the evolution also involved air defence and air force. (McDermott, EDM, 30.09.2009). Zapad 1999 ended with a first use of nuclear weapons to stop NATO from invading into Russia after a conventional defence failed. Zapad 2009 extended the conventional phase of the warfare, but nevertheless indicated that Russian military planners know that they cannot win a traditional war against NATO without using the nuclear weapon (Jacob W. Kipp, EDM, 29.09.2009).

Zapad-2009 should be interpreted as an element of the evolving internal debate within the Russian defence and security establishment on the fundamental reform of the army. The “Western threat” perception is being used as a means to justify the costs of the military reform in the eyes of the public, like the latest military doctrine (published on the 5th of February 2010, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461) which focuses on NATO as the main threat for Russia. The doctrine is also directed towards domestic consumption. The analysis of the current Russian National Security Strategy and the Foreign Policy Strategy indicate that in reality, Kremlin regards not NATO but terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as main threats (Kommersant, 26.02.2010). That has been recently underscored by Medvedev himself.

**THREAT ASSESSMENT**

The EU faces a choice: It can continue to demand from Russia to develop in the framework of EU’s value system and ignore the Russian threat perception that Moscow has increasingly with the EU in the post-Soviet space, or it can accept the current incompatibility of Russian and Western value systems and attempt to establish a strategic partnership on the basis of common interests that will incorporate Russia into a “partnership of necessity” (Barysh, CER, 2010).
The EU and its member states must recognize that Russian politics do not follow the same logic as European politics do. Moscow does not view the increasing influence of the EU in its immediate proximity as a win-win situation, because it brings stability and democracy, but rather as a loss of power and influence. It is of no use to repeat continuously the empty claim that Russia benefits from this development. It is much more important to integrate Russia into concrete projects in the region in areas such as energy security, economic cooperation and environment protection. U.S. President Barack Obama, who apparently saw no good reason to continue a confrontation policy with an old adversary, has made concrete proposals on cooperation. After all, while Russia may not be indispensable for the world order, it is essential for European peace. However, Russia will doubtless remain an extremely complicated partner for the EU.

The annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the Georgia conflict in August 2008 enforced Western fears. Meeting in September 2008 with international experts from the Valdai Club, an annual meeting of political analysts at the Kremlin, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that Russia should have been admitted to NATO in the 1990s. If it had, the current conflicts in the post-Soviet region could have been avoided. Moscow’s desire to assert its own claims to power within Europe underlie the current conflicts between Russia and the EU. But the majority of EU countries do not want to pursue a European policy that confronts Russia. If the dispute over Russia continues for any length of time, it is likely to blockade its Russia and Eastern policy an area which is of highest economic and security interest for the Union. More efforts inside the EU should be made to reconcile the different positions and succeed in offering Russia a genuine partnership. But Moscow must agree to abandon its plan to create its own sphere of influence on the post-Soviet space.

Struggling for its own economic survival, Russia has to learn to regard the EU as its sole source of stability. The European Union should move beyond a revamped Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and seek new forms of cooperation with Russia in the following fields:

- Conceptual development of a joint missile defence system to provide equal protection for America, Europe, and Russia against potential attacks by rogue states. The three sides should conduct a joint exercise in defence from ballistic missiles from Iran.

- Establishment of a real and comprehensive energy alliance with Russia with the dual goal of ensuring long-term security for Russian energy deliveries to the West and providing Russia with Western technologies for the long overdue modernization of its energy complex; there should be an establishment of gas consortia between Western and Russian energy groups to prevent pipeline wars. A pipeline interconnector from the German gas pipeline system to Poland should be established in order to assure Warsaw of EU’s solidarity in case of energy disruptions which Poland thinks it may face from Russia. The EU and Russia should develop a plan for modernizing Siberia as a practical tool for achieving the objectives of the energy alliance. It should include also renewable energy and energy saving. This plan will not only promote economic cooperation, but also codify the strategic value of Russian resources for Europe’s future prosperity.

- Further expansion of joint projects between the EU and Russia, including the setup of free trade zones, the dismantling of visa barriers and academic exchanges. The first region which would benefit from the positive changes would be Kaliningrad, but only if Russia is willing to participate on joint-soft power projects as an equal partner. Russia and Lithuania should conclude a long-standing agreement on military and civil transit between Kaliningrad and the Russian heartland.

- NATO and Russia must agree on more military-to-military contacts and a co-operative agenda on the Baltic Sea in concrete terms. The EU could foster negotiations on a renewal of the CFE Treaty and on an extension of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) to the sea. The measures should limit military activities and lead to more naval arms control in the Baltic
Sea. In such a framework, the EU could help Russia to conduct the conversion of the Kaliningrad defence industry including military personnel and infrastructure.
Annex

Bibliographie


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Forces and Weapons in Kaliningrad Region 1993-2007

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Forces/ Airborn</td>
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<td>Main battle tanks</td>
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<td>1.800</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16.300</td>
<td>11.600</td>
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(Source: IISS. The Military Balance 2010, Oldenberg 2009)

Selected battle ships of four Baltic Sea States
(Russia, Poland, Germany, Sweden)

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POLICY DEPARTMENT

Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

Policy Areas
Foreign Affairs
   Human Rights
   Security and Defence
Development
International Trade

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