Towards a More Comprehensive, Strategic and Cost-effective EU Foreign Policy: The Role of National Parliaments and the European Parliament

STUDY

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Towards a More Comprehensive, Strategic and Cost-effective EU Foreign Policy: The Role of National Parliaments and the European Parliament

Abstract

This study explores the powers of the EP and six selected national parliaments (the British, Danish, French, Irish, Italian and Polish) in setting, amending and scrutinising budgets. It then considers European engagement in three conflict regions – Libya, Palestine and Afghanistan – assessing how the selected parliaments have overseen various aspects of foreign policy, including finance for core activities and responses to sudden crises, and considers whether there are possible synergies between national and European budgets in foreign policy broadly defined.
This document was requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. It designated Mr Roberto GUALTIERI and Ms Nadezhda NEYNSKY (MEPs) to follow the study.

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEF</td>
<td>Documento di Economia e Finanza (Economic and Financial Document, IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs (IRL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAV</td>
<td>European Added Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPs</td>
<td>European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Finance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multi-annual Financial Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multi-annual Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIK</td>
<td>Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Audit Office, PL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBR</td>
<td>Office for Budget Responsibility (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLP</td>
<td>Ordinary Legislative Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEGASE</td>
<td>Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-Economique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Public Finances Committee (Sejm)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>Member of the Irish lower house (Dáil Éireann)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United National Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU-ESDA</td>
<td>Western European Union – Security and Defence Assembly</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objectives of the study

- To offer recommendations to the EP based on the budgetary practices regarding foreign policy, broadly defined, in six case study national parliaments, focusing especially on ways in which the EU could be more ‘flexible’ in its budget-making processes;
- To outline potential ‘synergies’ between national and European budgets in the area of foreign policy;¹
- To develop an ‘analytical tool’ to measure the synergies.

The core tasks of this study

- To review parliamentary influence on, and control over, EU foreign policy at national and EU level post-Lisbon. This part of the study was taken to mean essentially parliament’s role in the budgetary aspects of foreign policy, including defence and development aid, as most germane to the work of the EP Committee on Budgets.
- To seek overall budgetary synergies in the area of foreign policies.

This study explores the roles of the EP and six selected national parliaments (the British, Danish, French, Irish, Italian and Polish) in three conflict regions – Libya, Palestine and Afghanistan – to assess the positions the selected parliaments have taken and the way in which they have overseen the various aspects of foreign policy, including finance for core activities and responses to sudden crises. In particular, it addresses the various financial instruments available to national parliaments and the EP to exercise influence on policy. The study makes concrete recommendations for the European Parliament to consider in light of the upcoming MFF negotiations, identifying potential synergies that could be developed between national and European levels to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the CSDP.

Case studies

We have looked in particular at three case studies where the EU and its constituent Member States are engaged through military, civilian and/or development projects:

¹ We were explicitly asked not to look at the European External Action Service (EEAS) in this Study, as the Committee had commissioned other work in this area. However, our findings are directly relevant to the EEAS, particularly with regard to co-location.
• **Palestine**, which represents a long-standing area of concern for European states and the focus of development aid;

• **Afghanistan**, which is a medium-term commitment for European states, initially via military engagement and currently through post-conflict reconstruction, including via the Instrument for Stability;

• **Libya**, representing a recent, short-term case of military intervention by some EU member states within a NATO framework as part of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which will be the object of EU support for reconstruction for the foreseeable future.

In addition, we also refer to other cases which highlight best practice in delivering synergies, whether in reducing costs or adding value, some on a bilateral basis, others on a multilateral basis, including:

• The **Anglo-French Defence Treaty** and **Belgo-Dutch** naval cooperation, **Operation Atalanta**, which uses military capabilities in part related to development ends, and also cooperation on development in **Tanzania**.

**Methodology**

Our work consisted of desk research, including a review of formal budgetary procedures in each of the seven parliaments covered, ascertaining the costs of engagement in the three cases analysed and reviewing parliamentary activity surrounding the cases, including debates and any votes on intervention or to support such activity financially. We also undertook a number of off-the-record, open-ended qualitative interviews with practitioners – elected members, clerks and other officials in the EP, national parliaments, permanent representations and departments in Member States and the European Commission – to assess how far parliaments actually make use of the powers available to them and to assess the feasibility of some of our proposals.

**Key Recommendations**

In order to ensure synergies are found and savings delivered, the Union needs to be clear about the policies it wishes to pursue. It also needs to be aware of what other actors, whether individual member states, other states, international organisations and non-governmental actors, are doing. A considerable amount of prior information is required before specific synergies can be shown. However, there is a clear process that can assist parliaments to identify synergies.

There are two variants of an analytical tool, reflecting the rather different approaches to budgetary politics associated with different aspects of foreign policy-making. Thus in the
context of foreign and defence policy, decision-makers should take the following approach to identifying synergies:

1. Review objectives: what role do they wish to play in the world (or in the region)?
2. Determine the aggregate capabilities required to deliver the objectives, broken down by infrastructure, kit and personnel
3. Calculate current EU capabilities = \( \Sigma \) capabilities of the 27MS + EU
4. Identify the gaps and/or surpluses in aggregate capabilities
5. Seek ways to reduce surpluses and fill the gaps, whether by joint procurement or role specialisation in terms of kit, co-location in terms of buildings and joint training in terms of personnel.

In the field of development aid, the decision-makers need to:

1. Review the policy commitments of each MS and of the EU as a whole against which to assess the effectiveness of the chosen policies/budgetary commitments;
2. Determine the aggregate resources available (Total Money available to spend on aid = Total EU commitments + Total commitments in each MS);
3. Analyse spending in general on aid projects by target country, by type of expenditure by target country, and by donor state, with a particular aim to assess where there is duplication of effort by different actors;
4. Assess outcomes, where the precise mechanism for assessment will depend on the targets, e.g. levels of literacy, child mortality, absence of conflict in the states;
5. Review the data generated in steps 3 and 4 to assess whether there are synergies in their policy-making and budgets in this field and, hence, to make informed choices about where to deliver aid either individually or in partnership with the EU or other MS.

In order to be able deliver synergies, several changes are required:

- **Improved internal coordination and strategy within Member States and the EU**
- **More (and more accessible) information on costs and capabilities**
- **Better communication of such information**
  - Internally within institutions, whether parliaments or governments
  - Horizontally (among parliaments/parliamentary committees)
c. **Vertically** (between the EP and national parliaments)

Such an approach should lead to **Rationalisation**

If these steps are coupled with **Coordination**, clear synergies can be delivered.

The European Parliament and other national parliaments should consider following the example set by the French Parliament, which takes a **systematic** and **methodical** approach to both **ex ante** and **ex post** scrutiny, with representatives of sectoral committees working more closely with the Finance Committee than in other cases examined. In addition, **internal communication and coordination** are enhanced by the Finance Committee’s regular interactions with the *Cour des Comptes*, which ensure that budgets are scrutinised as they are implemented rather than after the fact.

Denmark also offers useful lessons for other EU Member States and for the EP. The Danish European Affairs Committee maintains contact with Danish MEPs, a process that should be standard practice across the Union to ensure more effective **vertical communication**. National parliaments should also seek ways to strengthen relations with their counterparts in other Member States to improve **horizontal communication**.

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**Key Findings**

Fragmented decision-making on foreign policy projects within and between states and organisations, which leads to duplication of effort and of hardware.

Lack of clear strategy at national and EU levels renders the implementation and effective scrutiny of policy difficult.

Lacunae and duplication exist as departmental silos are replicated by silos in parliaments, European or national, with those interested in substance rarely interested in budgets and vice-versa.

Piecemeal scrutiny is the norm, as parliamentarians typically focus on a limited number of issues whether out of personal or political interest and there is a lack of coordination between committees.

There is considerable scope for savings if duplication is reduced, which could be done by taking note of what is being done by others in the field, be it other national ministries, the EU and its agencies including the European Defence Agency (EDA) or third parties such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the OECD, International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank in the case of development.
On the development side, there is more joined-up activity on the ground than at elite level. The Commission’s suggestions for programming are good but are not yet implemented sufficiently. Such coordinated approaches as seen in Tanzania can enhance the leverage of both individual states and the EU.

There is scope for much greater savings if MS are willing to cooperate more creatively; there are already a number of bilateral arrangements such as those between the Dutch and the Belgians or the Dutch and the British on certain naval matters, and between Britain and France or France and Germany, each of which has created or carries the prospect of savings without eroding national sovereignty.

Further savings and European Added Value (EAV) could be found with greater willingness among Member States to pool and share defence capabilities, but such moves are likely to come up against entrenched concerns over national sovereignty, which the promise of monetary savings or even more effective policy outcomes – in other words European Added Value – is unlikely to overcome in many countries.

While European Added Value is a useful concept, it might be necessary but certainly not sufficient to bring about fundamental reforms to the scale or balance of the MFF/budget, particularly in regard to foreign policy-making. A vague concept of the ‘European interest’ is unlikely to be compelling for national politicians seeking to balance their budgets. Rather it is imperative to focus on areas where Member States’ interests and preferences converge, so that the overall benefits of co-ordinating policies and/or uploading further policies and associated budgets are apparent to policy-makers and their domestic electorates.

Any moves towards “pooling and sharing”, a concept endorsed by the EU in Ghent in 2010, create a need for more effective inter-parliamentary approaches to scrutiny to ensure that the savings are achieved and that the practices deliver the policy outcomes desired.

In terms of development aid it is almost impossible to suggest savings in monetary terms since so few are close to the frequently reaffirmed UN target of 0.7% of GNI: depending on the objectives of aid, the possibilities for spending far outweigh development budgets. However, if countries continue to pursue minimum targets for development funding, the effects and effectiveness of money spent would be greater. Putting a greater share of national development money into the European Development Fund might create European Added Value, but Member States have yet to be convinced that this would be sufficient to make a loss of autonomy desirable.

In defence, there are savings to be made through joint procurement, including genuine inter-operability, role specialisation, pooling and sharing. The EDA exists to facilitate such
outcomes but there should be greater involvement in and oversight of it at European and Member State levels.

In sum, to deliver the potential synergies, it is not enough to identify hypothetical financial savings or strategic gains, however significant they might seem from a technical perspective. It is vital first to **understand the aims and objectives of Member States as well as the EU** in order to try to identify synergies. Areas where cooperation and uploading of policy might appear to deliver EAV and cut aggregate costs will not be acceptable to Member States if it appears that the ‘added value’ diverges in any significant way from their own policy preferences. This is especially clear in the area of development aid where, for example, the UK can see benefits to uploading policy but is reluctant to cede control. This is compounded by a belief that unilateral action by a Member State can be important for leveraging additional money from other states in a way that a larger global EU pot might not be able to achieve.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ziele der Studie

- Im weitesten Sinne werden Empfehlungen an das EP anhand der Haushaltspraktiken im Bereich der Außenpolitik in sechs nationalen Parlamenten gegeben, die Gegenstand der Fallstudie sind, insbesondere Empfehlungen im Hinblick darauf, wie die EU bei ihren Haushaltsaufstellungsverfahren „flexibler“ werden könnte;
- es werden mögliche „Synergien“ zwischen nationalen und europäischen Haushalten im Bereich der Außenpolitik aufgezeigt;²

Kernaufgaben dieser Studie

- Suche nach generellen Haushaltssynergien im Bereich der Außenpolitik.


² Diese Studie befasst sich bewusst nicht mit dem Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst (EAD), da dieser in einer Folgestudie behandelt werden wird, die von dem zuständigen Ausschuss in Auftrag gegeben wird.
Fallstudien
Wir befassten uns insbesondere mit drei Fallstudien, bei denen die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten über Militär-, Zivil- und/oder Entwicklungsprojekte in folgenden Regionen beteiligt sind:

- **Palästina** – ein für europäische Staaten seit langem problematischer Bereich, bei der der Schwerpunkt auf der Entwicklungshilfe liegt;
- **Afghanistan** – eine mittelfristige Verpflichtung für europäische Staaten, die ursprünglich im militärischen Engagement bestand und derzeit im Wiederaufbau nach dem Konflikt besteht, u. a. über das Stabilitätsinstrument;
- **Libyen** – ein aktueller kurzfristiger Fall einer militärischen Intervention durch einige EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der NATO in Folge der Resolution 1973 des UN-Sicherheitsrates und in absehbarer Zukunft Gegenstand der EU-Hilfe beim Wiederaufbau.

Darüber hinaus verweisen wir auf andere Fälle, die die bewährten Praktiken bei der Schaffung von Synergien aufzeigen, sei es durch die Verringerung von Kosten oder Schaffung eines Mehrwerts, einige auf bilateraler, andere auf multilateraler Basis, z.B.:

- Der **englisch-französische Verteidigungsvertrag** und die **belgisch-niederländische** Kooperation der Seestreitkräfte, **Operation Atalanta**, bei der die militärischen Fähigkeiten in Teilen zu entwicklungsorientierten Zwecken genutzt werden, aber auch die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in **Tansania**.

Methodik
Grundlegende Empfehlungen

Um sicherzustellen, dass Synergien ermittelt und Einsparungen erzielt werden, muss sich die Union über die Politik, die sie verfolgen will, im Klaren sein. Sie muss sich auch darüber im Klaren sein, was die anderen Akteure tun, seien es die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten, andere Staaten, internationale Organisationen oder nichtstaatliche Akteure. Bevor bestimmte Synergien aufgezeigt werden können, ist ein beträchtliches Maß an Vorinformationen erforderlich. Allerdings gibt es einen klaren Prozess, der Parlamente bei der Ermittlung von Synergien unterstützen kann.

Es gibt zwei Varianten eines analytischen Instruments, die die ziemlich unterschiedlichen haushaltspolitischen Ansätze widerspiegeln, die mit unterschiedlichen Aspekten der Außenpolitikgestaltung verbunden sind. Folglich sollten Entscheidungsträger bei der Ermittlung von Synergien im Zusammenhang mit Außen- und Verteidigungspolitik den folgenden Ansatz wählen:

6. Prüfung von Zielen: Welche Rolle möchten sie in der Welt (oder in der Region) spielen?
7. Bestimmung der für die Ziele erforderlichen Gesamtfähigkeiten, aufgeschlüsselt nach Infrastruktur, Ausrüstung und Personal
8. Aktuelle EU-Fähigkeiten = Summe der Fähigkeiten der 27 Mitgliedstaaten + EU berechnen
9. Bestimmung der Lücken und/oder Überschüsse bei den Gesamtfähigkeiten

Im Bereich Entwicklungshilfe sollten Entscheidungsträger

11. die politischen Verpflichtungen eines jeden Mitgliedstaates und der EU als Ganzes hinsichtlich der Effizienz der gewählten Politik/Mittelzusagen prüfen,
12. die verfügbaren Gesamtresourcen (für Entwicklungshilfe verfügbarer Gesamtbetrag = gesamte Finanzzusagen der EU + Gesamtzusagen jedes Mitgliedstaats) bestimmen,
13. die Hilfsprojekte allgemein nach Zielland, nach Art der Ausgaben nach Zielland und nach Geberland analysieren, um insbesondere zu ermitteln, wo durch verschiedene Akteure doppelte Arbeit geleistet wird,
14. die Ergebnisse bewerten, wobei der genaue Bewertungsmechanismus von den Zielen abhängt, z. B. Alphabetisierungsrate, Kindersterblichkeit oder Konfliktfreiheit in den jeweiligen Staaten,

15. die in den Schritten 3 und 4 gewonnenen Daten prüfen, um zu beurteilen, ob in diesem Bereich Synergien bei politischer Gestaltung und Haushalten bestehen und damit informierte Entscheidungen darüber treffen, ob Hilfe einzeln oder in Partnerschaft mit der EU oder einem anderen Mitgliedstaat geleistet werden soll.

Damit Synergien geschaffen werden können, sind verschiedene Änderungen erforderlich:

- **Verbesserung der internen Abstimmung und Strategie innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten und der EU**
- **Mehr (und besser zugängliche) Informationen zu Kosten und Fähigkeiten**
- **Bessere Kommunikation solcher Informationen**
  - a. *Intern* innerhalb von Organen, seien es Parlamente oder Regierungen
  - b. *horizontal* (zwischen den Parlamenten/parlamentarischen Ausschüssen)

Solch ein Ansatz sollte zu einer Rationalisierung führen.

Gehen diese Schritte mit einer Abstimmung einher, können klare Synergieeffekte erzielt werden.


**Wichtigste Erkenntnisse**

Eine fragmentierte Form der Entscheidungsfindung bei außenpolitischen Projekten innerhalb und zwischen Staaten und Organisationen führt zu Doppelarbeit und Überschneidungen bei der Ausrüstung.

Das Fehlen einer klaren Strategie auf nationaler und EU-Ebene erschwert die Umsetzung und eine effektive Kontrolle der Politik.

Lücken und Überschneidungen existieren, weil neben Abteilungsstrukturen auch parallele Strukturen in Parlamenten auf europäischer oder nationaler Ebene bestehen, wobei sich diejenigen, die sich Sachfragen widmen, selten für Haushaltspläne interessieren und umgekehrt.


Es besteht ein beträchtlicher Spielraum für Einsparungen, wenn doppelte Arbeit verringert wird, was dadurch geschehen könnte, dass man zur Kenntnis nehmen würde, was andere im jeweiligen Bereich tun, seien es die nationalen Ministerien, die EU und ihre Agenturen, etwa die Europäische Verteidigungsagentur (EVA), oder Dritte wie beispielsweise die Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBWE), die OECD, der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) oder im Falle der Entwicklung die Weltbank.

Auf der Entwicklungsseite finden eher vor Ort gemeinsame Aktivitäten statt als auf Ebene der Elite. Die Vorschläge der Kommission zur Programmgestaltung sind zwar gut, aber noch nicht ausreichend umgesetzt. Solche koordinierten Ansätze können, wie am Beispiel von Tansania zu sehen, die Hebelwirkung sowohl einzelner Staaten als auch der EU verstärken.

Es besteht Spielraum für noch viel größere Einsparungen, wenn die Mitgliedstaaten bereit sind, kreativer zusammenzuarbeiten; es gibt bereits zahlreiche bilaterale Vereinbarungen, wie beispielsweise zwischen den Niederlanden und Belgien oder zwischen den Niederlanden und dem Vereinigten Königreich zu bestimmten Aspekten im Zusammenhang mit der Marine und zwischen dem Vereinigten Königreich und Frankreich oder zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland, die jeweils zu Einsparungen geführt haben oder voraussichtlich führen können, ohne die nationale Souveränität zu untergraben.

Weitere Einsparungen und ein europäischer Mehrwert könnten mit einer größeren Bereitschaft der Mitgliedstaaten zur Bündelung und gemeinsamen Nutzung von Verteidigungsfähigkeiten gefunden werden, doch solche Veränderungen werden
wahrscheinlich auf tief verwurzelte Bedenken in Bezug auf die nationale Souveränität stoßen, die die Aussicht auf Kosteneinsparungen oder gar eine effektivere Politik – mit anderen Worten also einen europäischen Mehrwert – in vielen Ländern höchstwahrscheinlich nicht überwinden wird.

Während der europäische Mehrwert ein sinnvolles Konzept ist, ist er für grundlegende Reformen im Hinblick auf Ausmaß und ausgeglichenes Finanzkonzept bei MFR/Haushalt, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Außenpolitik, zwar notwendig, aber sicherlich nicht ausreichend. Ein vages Konzept eines „europäischen Interesses“ wird nationale Politiker kaum in ausreichendem Maße davon überzeugen können zu versuchen, ihren jeweiligen Haushalt auszugleichen. Vielmehr ist es zwingend geboten, sich auf die Bereiche zu konzentrieren, in denen sich die Interessen und Präferenzen der Mitgliedstaaten einander annähern, sodass der allgemeine Nutzen der politischen Abstimmung und/oder die Einbringung weiterer politischer Maßnahmen und der damit verbundenen Haushaltsposten für politische Entscheidungsträger und ihre heimische Wählerschaft klar ersichtlich sind.

Jeder Schritt auf dem Weg zu „Bündelung und gemeinsame Nutzung“, also einem Konzept, das von der EU im Jahre 2010 in Gent befürwortet wurde, erfordert effektivere interparlamentarische Prüfungsansätze, um sicherzustellen, dass die Einsparungen erreicht werden und dass die Praxis die gewünschten politischen Ergebnisse zeitigt.

In Bezug auf die Entwicklungshilfe ist es nahezu unmöglich, Einsparungen in finanzieller Hinsicht vorzuschlagen, da nur wenige der vielfach bekräftigten UN-Zielvorgabe von 0,7 % des BNE nahe kommen: je nach den Zielen der Hilfe übersteigen die Ausgabemöglichkeiten die Entwicklungshilfebudgets bei Weitem. Doch wenn die Länder bei der Entwicklungshilfefinanzierung weiterhin Mindestziele verfolgen, wären die Effekte und die Wirksamkeit der aufgewendeten Geldmittel größer. Einen größeren Anteil der nationalen Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds einfließen zu lassen, könnte zwar einen europäischen Mehrwert schaffen, doch die Mitgliedstaaten müssen noch davon überzeugt werden, dass dies einen Verlust an Autonomie wert ist.


Zusammengefasst: Um die potenziellen Synergieeffekte zu erzielen, reicht es nicht, hypothetische finanzielle Einsparungen oder strategische Gewinne zu ermitteln, wie bedeutend diese aus technischer Sicht auch sein mögen. Es ist zunächst von wesentlicher Bedeutung, die Zielsetzungen sowohl der Mitgliedstaaten als auch der EU zu
SYNTHÈSE

Objectifs de l’étude

- Présenter au Parlement européen des recommandations fondées sur les pratiques budgétaires relatives à la politique étrangère (définies au sens large) dans six parlements nationaux ayant fait l’objet d’une étude de cas, en mettant particulièrement l’accent sur la façon dont l’UE peut «assouplir» ses processus d’é!ablissement du budget;
- Exposer des «synergies» potentielles entre les budgets nationaux et le budget européen dans le domaine de la politique étrangère;
- Élaborer un «instrument analytique» pour mesurer ces synergies.

Missions essentielles de cette étude

- Examiner l’influence et le contrôle qu’exercent les parlements sur la politique étrangère de l’UE après Lisbonne, aux niveaux national et européen. Cette partie de l’étude vise essentiellement à examiner le rôle du parlement dans les aspects budgétaires de la politique étrangère, y compris la défense et l’aide au développement, s’agissant des aspects qui s’apparentent le plus aux travaux de la commission des budgets du Parlement européen.
- Rechercher des synergies budgétaires globales dans le domaine des politiques étrangères.

Cette étude examine le rôle du Parlement européen et de six parlements nationaux sélectionnés (britannique, danois, français, irlandais, italien et polonais) dans trois zones de conflit – la Libye, la Palestine et l’Afghanistan – pour évaluer les positions adoptées par les parlements sélectionnés et la manière dont ces derniers ont supervisé les divers aspects de la politique étrangère, y compris le financement des activités essentielles et les réponses aux crises soudaines. L’étude traite notamment des divers instruments financiers dont les parlements nationaux et le Parlement européen disposent pour exercer une influence sur la politique. L’étude propose en outre des recommandations concrètes que le Parlement européen devra examiner dans la perspective des négociations du CFP à venir, tout en repérant des synergies potentielles susceptibles d’être développées entre le niveau national et le niveau européen dans le but d’accroître l’efficacité et la rentabilité de la PSDC.

3 Cette étude ne traite délibérément pas du service européen pour l’action extérieure, dans la mesure où ce dernier sera couvert par une étude de suivi commandée par la commission responsable. Cependant, nos conclusions sont pertinentes pour le SEAE, en particulier en ce qui concerne la colocalisation.
Études de cas

Nous nous sommes penchés particulièrement sur trois situations où l’UE et ses États membres sont engagés, par le biais de projets militaires, civils et/ou de développement:

- **La Palestine**, qui représente depuis longtemps un sujet de préoccupation pour les États européens et un volet important de l’aide au développement;
- **L’Afghanistan**, qui constitue un engagement à moyen terme pour les États européens, initialement par l’engagement militaire et actuellement à travers la reconstruction post-conflit, notamment au moyen de l’instrument de stabilité;

En outre, nous nous référions également à d’autres cas qui mettent en exergue les meilleures pratiques dans le domaine de la création de synergies, qu’il s’agisse de réduire les coûts ou d’apporter une valeur ajoutée, certains sur une base bilatérale et d’autres sur une base multilatérale, parmi lesquels:

- Le **traité de défense franco-britannique** et la coopération navale **belgo-néerlandaise, Opération Atalanta**, qui utilise des capacités militaires en partie liées à des objectifs de développement, et également la coopération au développement en **Tanzanie**.

Méthodologie

Notre travail a consisté à effectuer des recherches documentaires, y compris un examen des procédures budgétaires formelles dans chacun des sept parlements concernés, à déterminer les coûts liés à l’engagement dans les trois cas analysés et à examiner les activités parlementaires afférentes à ces cas, y compris les débats et les éventuels votes concernant les interventions ou le soutien financier à apporter à une telle activité. Nous avons également entrepris plusieurs entretiens qualitatifs ouverts officieux avec des praticiens – des membres élus, des employés et d’autres fonctionnaires du PE, des parlements nationaux, des représentations permanentes et des services des États membres et de la Commission européenne – afin d’évaluer dans quelle mesure les parlements utilisent réellement les pouvoirs dont ils disposent et d’évaluer la faisabilité de certaines de nos propositions.
Recommandations essentielles

Afin d’assurer la création de synergies et la réalisation d’économies, l’Union doit être claire sur les politiques qu’elle souhaite poursuivre. Elle doit également avoir connaissance des activités des autres acteurs, qu’il s’agisse des États membres, d’autres États, d’organisations internationales ou d’acteurs non gouvernementaux. Avant de pouvoir faire apparaître des synergies spécifiques, il faut au préalable accumulator une quantité considérable d’informations. Il existe cependant un processus clair susceptible d’aider les parlements à identifier des synergies.

Il existe deux versions d’un instrument analytique qui reflètent les approches assez différentes des politiques budgétaires associées à différents aspects de l’élaboration de la politique étrangère. Ainsi, dans le contexte de la politique étrangère et de défense, les décideurs doivent adopter l’approche suivante pour identifier des synergies:

16. Examen des objectifs: quel rôle souhaitent-ils jouer dans le monde (ou dans la région)?
17. Déterminer l’ensemble des capacités requises pour réaliser les objectifs, en les ventilant par infrastructure, dossier et personnel.
18. Calculer les capacités actuelles de l’UE = Σ des capacités des 27 EM + UE.
20. Rechercher des manières de réduire les excédents et de combler les lacunes, que ce soit par des achats conjoints ou par une spécialisation des tâches pour chaque dossier, une colocalisation des bâtiments ou une formation commune du personnel.

Dans le domaine de l’aide au développement, les décideurs doivent:

21. Étudier les engagements politiques de chaque État membre et de l’UE dans son ensemble pour évaluer l’efficacité des engagements politiques/budgétaires choisis;
22. Déterminer l’ensemble des ressources disponibles (montant total pouvant être consacré à l’aide = somme des engagements de l’UE + somme des engagements de chaque EM);
23. Analyser les dépenses généralement consacrées aux projets d’aide, par pays cible, par type de dépense par pays cible et par État donateur, notamment dans le but d’apprécier où il y a chevauchement des activités de différents acteurs;
24. Évaluer les résultats en adaptant le mécanisme précis d’évaluation aux objectifs, par exemple: taux d’alphabétisation, mortalité infantile ou absence de conflit au sein des États;
25. Examiner les données obtenues aux étapes 3 et 4 afin d’évaluer s’il existe des synergies dans l’élaboration des politiques et les budgets dans ce domaine et, ainsi, d’effectuer des choix informés quant à l’opportunité d’apporter une aide individuellement, ou en partenariat avec l’UE ou avec d’autres États membres.

Afin de permettre la création de synergies, plusieurs changements s’imposent:

- Une coordination interne et une stratégie améliorées au sein des États membres et de l’UE
- Davantage d’informations (plus accessibles) sur les coûts et les capacités
- Une meilleure communication de ces informations
  a. interne: au sein des institutions, qu’il s’agisse des parlements ou des gouvernements
  b. horizontale: entre les parlements/commissions parlementaires
  c. verticale: entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux

Une telle approche devrait donner lieu à une rationalisation

En associant ces étapes à une coordination, il est possible de créer des synergies évidentes.

Le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux doivent envisager de suivre l’exemple suivant, défini par le parlement français, qui a adopté l’approche systématique et méthodique de l’examen ex ante et de l’examen ex post, les représentants des comités sectoriels coopérant plus étroitement avec la commission des finances que dans les autres cas examinés. En outre, la communication et la coordination internes sont améliorées par les interactions régulières de la commission des finances avec la Cour des comptes, qui garantissent que les budgets sont examinés lors de leur mise en œuvre plutôt qu’après coup.

Le Danemark offre également des enseignements utiles pour les autres États membres de l’UE et le Parlement européen. La Commission danoise des affaires européennes maintient le contact avec les MPE danois, un processus qui devrait devenir une pratique courante dans toute l’Union afin d’assurer une communication verticale plus efficace. Les parlements nationaux doivent également chercher des moyens de renforcer leurs relations avec leurs homologues des autres États membres afin d’améliorer la communication horizontale.
Conclusions essentielles

Un processus décisionnel fragmenté dans le domaine des projets de politique étrangère, dans et entre les États et les organisations, donne lieu à un chevauchement des activités et du matériel.

L’absence d’une stratégie claire aux niveaux national et européen complique la mise en œuvre et l’examen efficace des politiques.

Les lacunes et les chevauchements sont liés à la reproduction des cloisonnements ministériels au niveau des parlements, européen ou nationaux, les personnes s’intéressant au fond s’intéressant rarement aux budgets et vice-versa.

Les examens sporadiques sont la norme car les parlementaires, par intérêt personnel ou politique, se concentrent généralement sur un nombre restreint de questions et car il existe un manque de coordination entre les commissions.

Il est possible de réaliser des économies considérables en réduisant les chevauchements, ce qui peut être réalisé en prenant note des actions des autres dans ce domaine, qu’il s’agisse d’autres ministères nationaux, de l’UE et de ses agences, y compris l’Agence européenne de défense (AED), ou de tiers tels que la Banque européenne pour la reconstruction et le développement (BERD), l’OCDE, le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) ou la Banque mondiale dans le cas du développement.

En matière de développement, il existe davantage d’activités conjointes sur le terrain qu’aux niveaux les plus élevés. Les suggestions de la Commission en matière de programmation sont bonnes, mais elles ne sont pas encore suffisamment mises en œuvre. Des approches coordonnées telles que celle observée en Tanzanie peuvent renforcer l’effet de levier, à la fois des États et de l’UE.

Il est possible de réaliser des économies bien plus importantes à condition que les États membres soient désireux de coopérer de manière plus créative. Il existe déjà plusieurs accords bilatéraux, tels que ceux conclu entre les Pays-Bas et la Belgique ou entre les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni sur certaines questions navales, et entre le Royaume-Uni et la France ou entre la France et l’Allemagne. Chacun de ces accords a créé des économies, ou implique la perspective d’une création d’économies, sans éroder la souveraineté nationale.

Il serait possible de réaliser des économies supplémentaires et de créer une valeur ajoutée européenne (VAE) si les États membres étaient plus désireux de mutualiser et de partager leurs capacités de défense. Cependant, de telles mesures risquent fort de se heurter à des préoccupations bien enracinées concernant la souveraineté nationale, que la promesse d’économies monétaires ou même de résultats plus efficaces des politiques (en d’autres
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termes, d'une valeur ajoutée européenne) ne suffira probablement pas à surmonter dans de nombreux pays.

Bien que le concept de valeur ajoutée européenne soit utile, il pourrait être nécessaire, mais certainement pas suffisant, d'introduire des réformes fondamentales dans l’échelle ou l’équilibre du CFP/budget, notamment en ce qui concerne l’élaboration de la politique étrangère. Il est peu probable que le concept vague «d’intérêt européen» exerce un attrait irrésistible sur les politiciens nationaux qui s’efforcent d’équilibrer leur budget. En revanche, il est impératif de se concentrer sur les domaines où il y a convergence des intérêts et des préférences des États membres, de sorte que les bénéfices généraux de la coordination des politiques et/ou du transfert de nouvelles politiques et des budgets associés soient apparents pour les décideurs et leur électorat national.

Toute mesure en faveur de «la mutualisation et du partage», un concept adopté par l’UE à Gand en 2010, génère le besoin d’adopter des approches interparlementaires plus efficaces de l’examen, afin de garantir que les économies sont réalisées et que les pratiques apportent les résultats politiques attendus.

Dans le cadre de l’aide au développement, il est quasiment impossible de recommander la réalisation d'économies monétaires puisque très peu de pays sont proches de l’objectif, convenu au sein de l’ONU et fréquemment réaffirmé, de 0,7 % du RNB. Selon les objectifs de l’aide, les occasions de dépenser dépassent largement les budgets consacrés au développement. Cependant, si les pays continuent de poursuivre des objectifs minimaux pour le financement du développement, les effets et l’efficacité de l’argent dépensé seront renforcés. Placer une part plus importante des fonds nationaux consacrés au développement dans le Fonds européen pour le développement pourrait créer de la valeur ajoutée européenne, mais il reste à convaincre les États membres que cela suffit pour rendre une perte d’autonomie souhaitable.

Dans le domaine de la défense, il est possible de réaliser des économies au moyen d’achats conjoints (y compris une interopérabilité, une spécialisation des tâches, une mutualisation et un partage authentiques). L’un des buts de l’AED est de faciliter l’obtention de ces résultats, mais elle doit bénéficier d’une participation et d’une surveillance accrues, au niveau européen et au niveau des États membres.

En résumé, pour créer les synergies potentielles il ne suffit pas d’identifier des économies financières ou des gains stratégiques hypothétiques, même si cela peut sembler très important d’un point de vue technique. Il est essentiel de commencer par comprendre les objectifs des États membres et de l’UE afin de tâcher d’identifier des synergies. Les domaines où la coopération et le transfert de politique semblent apporter une valeur européenne ajoutée et réduire l’ensemble des coûts ne seront pas acceptables pour les États membres s’il apparaît que la «valeur ajoutée» s’écarte de façon significative de leurs propres préférences politiques. Ce phénomène est particulièrement évident dans le
domaine de l’aide au développement où, par exemple, le Royaume-Uni peut trouver des avantages au transfert de politique mais est réticent à céder le contrôle. Cette difficulté est aggravée par la conviction qu’une action unilatérale de la part d’un État membre peut être efficace pour lever des fonds supplémentaires auprès d’autres États d’une manière qui serait peut-être impossible pour une caisse commune européenne plus importante.
RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to ensure synergies are found and savings delivered, the Union needs to be explicit about the policies it wishes to pursue and, especially, the desired outcomes. It also needs to be aware of what other actors, whether individual member states, other states, international organisations or non-governmental actors, are doing. Taking the activities and commitments of others into account, the EU should then create a strategy to deliver its objectives and then decide the budget to pay for it. This more joined-up approach will help it deliver those foreign policy priorities and ensure that Member States are clear at the outset that the budget is being used for activities to which they have committed themselves. It will also help ensure that costs are minimised by reducing duplication and by generating economies of scale. The European Parliament and national parliaments should hold their respective executives to account to ensure that key goals are followed.

Analytical tool

There are two variants of an analytical tool, reflecting the rather different approaches to budgetary politics associated with different aspects of foreign policy-making. Thus in the context of foreign and defence policy, decision-makers should take the following approach to identifying synergies:

1. Review objectives; what role do they wish to play in the world (or in the region)?
2. Determine the aggregate capabilities required to deliver the objectives, broken down by infrastructure, kit and personnel
3. Calculate current EU capabilities = Σ capabilities of the 27MS + EU
4. Identify the gaps and/or surpluses in aggregate capabilities
5. Seek ways to reduce surpluses and fill the gaps, whether by joint procurement or role specialisation in terms of kit, co-location in terms of buildings and joint training in terms of personnel.

In the field of development aid, the decision-makers need to:

1. Review the policy commitments of each MS and of the EU as a whole against which to assess the effectiveness of the chosen policies/budgetary commitments;
2. Determine the aggregate resources available (Total Money available to spend on aid = Total EU commitments + Total commitments in each MS);
3. Analyse spending in general on aid projects by target country, by type of expenditure by target country, and by donor state, with a particular aim to assess where there is duplication of effort by different actors;
4. Assess outcomes, where the precise mechanism for assessment will depend on the targets, e.g. levels of literacy, child mortality, absence of conflict in the states;

5. Review the data generated in steps 3 and 4 to assess whether there are synergies in their policy-making and budgets in this field and, hence, to make informed choices about where to deliver aid either individually or in partnership with the EU or other MS.

In addition to identifying the questions that policy-makers might ask by way of an analytical tool, several other reforms should be introduced to ensure more coherent, joined-up decision-making that is likely to be conducive to delivering synergies, which the analytical tool alone can merely assist us to identify. Specifically, improvements are required in the following areas:

- **Internal coordination and strategy** – policy-makers, whether at the EU or Member State level, need to be clear about what outcomes they are seeking to achieve, be that poverty alleviation, conflict prevention or regime change, when they decide on policy and its possible consequences, intended and unintended. They also need clear aims and objectives and a strategy for achieving them. This necessitates good internal structures whereby the Executive determines a strategy that cascades down to the sectoral ministries and a more strongly coordinated approach among departments within Member States (as well as within the EU institutions).

- **Information** – in order to set their strategy, decision-makers need to understand both what is going at home and elsewhere. Information is required but must be clear and focused. (The problem for policy-makers is not too little information but too much.) Without such information it is not possible to identify synergies.

- **Communication** – In order to identify shared interests and explore synergies, policy-makers must communicate more effectively
  a. Internally (within institutions, whether parliaments or governments);
  b. Horizontally (between/among parliaments/parliamentary committees);
  c. Vertically (between the EP and NPs)

- **Rationalisation** – A clear understanding of the aims of the 27 Member States and the EU coupled with a transparent sense of current commitments in the areas of defence, development and foreign affairs, and associated costs will highlight areas of duplication which could lead to savings and also gaps in provision that need to be filled if executives and parliaments were willing to act.

- **Coordination** – Coordinated policy reviews will enable savings to be made and value to be added. National parliaments and the European Parliament should take a lead in pressing the Executive to look for added value. To do this most effectively,
we recommend members of all the chambers in the Union begin to frame common questions for governments or the Commission. This way there will be scope to identify current practice and costs, which are the necessary first step to generating synergies. Such an approach would entail minimal costs, does not create concerns about the hierarchy of parliaments and would, as far as possible, yield replicable results in a way that third parties cannot.
1. INTRODUCTION

The EU is in the process of establishing a Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-20. This offers scope to review the overall balance and size of the EU budget in light of the changing priorities that have followed treaty reform and changes in the global and regional economic environment. It is the first MFF to be negotiated since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 and it will need to respond to the changed competences of the Union, including those in the area of security and defence policy; it will also be affected by the changed institutional arrangements introduced by that Treaty, which have granted the EP a larger say in setting the EU budget, in addition to enhanced legislative powers. Thus it is an ideal opportunity for the Union to consider what it wants to be able to do and to agree the funding to enable it to achieve its ambitions.

1.1. TASKS AND OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study were:

- To offer recommendations for the EP based on the budgetary practices regarding foreign policy, broadly defined, in six case study national parliaments, focusing especially on ways in which the EU could be more ‘flexible’ in its budget-making processes;
- To outline potential ‘synergies’ between national and European budgets in the area of foreign policy;
- To develop an ‘analytical tool’ to measure the synergies.

The core tasks of this study were:

- To review parliamentary influence on, and control over, EU foreign policy at national and EU level. This part of the study was taken to mean essentially parliament’s role in the budgetary aspects of foreign policy, as most germane to the work of the EP Committee on Budgets.
- To seek overall budgetary synergies in the area of foreign policies.

1.2. BACKGROUND

As the European Union tries to agree the next MFF to cover the period 2014 to 2020, it is timely to consider what role parliaments play in determining budgets, to assess whether there are aspects of budget-setting, amending or scrutinising that could be done better, and whether there are any synergies between the European and national parliaments. This is especially the case given the global and Eurozone crises, which have led to austerity
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budgets in Member States seeking to reduce spending and budget deficits. Changes set in train by the Lisbon Treaty in the field of European foreign, security and defence policy need to be viewed against that fiscal background. There are two divergent logics underpinning the forthcoming MFF: it is the first to be negotiated in the context of the enhanced role of the High Representative and the new External Action Service (EEAS) and might thus be an opportunity for the Union to devote more resources to foreign policy. However, the economic situation means that Member States will be more anxious than ever to hold down the EU budget, as seen in the negotiations for the 2011 and 2012 budgets. Must these twin logics lead to inter-institutional conflict or can they be reconciled? Are there synergies to be found between national and European-level policy and between national parliaments and the EP that can lead to reduced expenditure while at the same time enabling the EU and its Member States to be more powerful international actors? These are among the questions that we address in this study.

1.2.1 The Implications of the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon aimed to increase the coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy and to expand its scope. In order to inject greater consistency and coherence into the EU’s foreign policy-making, the Treaty introduced some innovative changes to the Union’s foreign and security policy institutions.4 For example, the Treaty granted legal personality to the Union as a whole (Art. 47 TEU), enabling it, and not just the Community, to enter into international agreements However, while blurring the distinctions further between the different ‘pillars’ of the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remained subject to specific rules and procedures (Art. 24).

One of the most high-profile institutional changes delivered by the Treaty was the reinforcement of the position of High Representative for CFSP. The High Representative now chairs the Council of Foreign Ministers while at the same time being ‘double-hatted’ as a Vice-President of the European Commission. In terms of the Union, the High Representative becomes more fully its ‘public face’, taking over the role previously played by the Foreign Ministers of the Union’s rotating Presidencies,5 and heading the new European External Action Service.

Despite this new institutional architecture, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains largely unchanged, with the Member States taking any final decisions in the European Council or Council of Foreign Ministers. The enhanced role of the High Representative may allow him/her to share with the Member States the right to propose action, but the latter remain key for any common action to be undertaken. Foreign policy decisions remain largely governed by unanimity although the derogations continue which

allow the Council to take decisions by qualified vote on issues already decided by the European Council or in pursuit of specific request from the European Council (Art 31). Most importantly, from the perspective of the European Parliament, the CFSP is not subject to co-decision. The Parliament’s involvement remains largely confined to information-gathering, debate and consultation, with a limited role in the budgetary sphere relating to administrative and some operating expenditure (see below).  

Even while making the nominal change to a Common Security and Defence Policy and allowing for ‘coalitions of the willing’ to undertake security and defence missions (Art 44) and envisaging more permanent structured cooperation (Art 46), Lisbon ring-fenced the intergovernmental nature of its policy-making to ensure that it would continue to be determined by unanimity. It also recognised the role of NATO in terms of the defence commitments of many Member States, as well as the specific character of others’ defence policies in the mutual assistance clause (Art. 42).

Nor do national parliaments play a large role in European foreign policy-making. The relative exclusion of the European parliament and national parliaments in the area of foreign policy might reflect traditional practice, but it stands in contrast to the broader trend toward enhancing the roles of parliaments in the EU post-Lisbon. The Lisbon Treaty vastly expanded the European Parliament’s role in EU legislation, making co-decision the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (OLP), although the EP notably does not have co-equal powers in CFSP or CSDP. However, the OLP is used for the EU’s annual budgeting process, where the EP enjoys equal co-decision powers with the Council. This makes the EP one of the more powerful legislatures in terms of its impact on budgets and it can play a key role in ensuring that adequate resources are dedicated to the programmes and areas it favours in a way that many national parliaments cannot.

The extension of the OLP to other aspects of external relations – including internal security, energy policy, trade, humanitarian aid and development cooperation – gives the European Parliament even more potential influence over many aspects of the EU’s external relations. Since elements of these areas are also funded by the Union budget, the European Parliament can strongly influence the resources that the EU dedicates to them. Moreover, the establishment of budgetary procedures and staff regulations for the fledgling EEAS has also been subject to the OLP, giving the European Parliament a voice in developing the new institution’s role and direction. Although military and defence expenditures remain exempt from the EU’s annual budget (these are paid for by participating Member States), the fact that the Union’s budget does cover administrative and some operating costs of CFSP gives the EP a direct input into the funding of the policy. This, together with Art. 36 TEU which provides for the EP’s views to be taken into

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7 Missiroli, op. cit., 22
8 Missiroli, op. cit., 19
account, as well as the EP’s scrutiny of the High Representative and the EEAS, may place some potent tools at the Parliament’s disposal for influencing the direction of the CFSP.

In sum, although the Treaty of Lisbon did not significantly empower national parliaments or the European Parliament to play greater roles in the CFSP and CSDP decision-making process, it nevertheless presents a number of opportunities for the Union’s elected institutions to influence the policies’ direction and to scrutinise the actions of national governments and EU institutions.

While the Lisbon Treaty paid a great deal of attention to institutional reform and to the powers of the various institutions, it effectively left open the question of how the CFSP could best be funded so that its coherence, cost-effectiveness and transparency could be maximised and the ‘complex and fragmented’ procedures that exist at the moment could be reduced. The need to negotiate a new MFF offers a unique opportunity to reflect on how the CFSP’s future funding mechanisms might be organised to create synergies between the EU and national levels, and to improve the ability of both national parliaments and the EP to scrutinise the CFSP and its funding. Similarly, questions remain about development aid and the desirability or otherwise of ‘budgetising’ the European Development Fund (EDF). The MFF offers policy-makers an opportunity to review this question and other issues relating to aid policy. In particular, it is the ideal time to assess whether economies of scale or other savings can be achieved by acting at the European level in the foreign, security or development sectors. Certainly, there would appear to be considerable potential for European Added Value (EAV) as well as for straightforward cash savings for Member States pooling resources and/or sharing costs.

1.3. LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY

1.3.1. Literature

There is an extensive academic literature on foreign policy and foreign policy-making. Similarly, much has been written on the role of parliaments generally and on the European Parliament in particular, notably in terms of the debate on the ‘democratic deficit’. However, there is rather less literature on the role of parliaments with respect to foreign policy-making, presumably because this has traditionally been the near-exclusive domain of executives (though see the work of Peters, Wagner and others). There is a marked lack of either academic or policy papers on the more specific areas of budgets, still less on budgets and foreign policy. Exceptions over the last decade or so include the work on legislatures and budgets of Joachim Wehner, although his focus is predominantly on fiscal

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9 See WEU Assembly The financing of external operations: the role of national parliaments 5 December 2007.
10 EAV is not synonymous with reduced costs – rather it assumes that cooperation at EU level leads to greater benefits/more significant outcomes than states can achieve by themselves (environmental policy would fit well into this concept). Nonetheless, cooperation and pooling resources can lead to financial savings.
policy rather than expenditure and his analyses go beyond the European experience to include South Africa; the work of Pieter de Wilde and of Allen Schick, whose work offers the only comparative overview of budgetary powers of national legislatures, albeit dating back almost a decade.12

In addition, work done by other TEPSA members in a previous report for the EP has covered the specifics of the role the EP can, could or should play in foreign policy, though this again is rather dated.13 The brief chapter by Elmar Brok and Norbert Gresch for the EU ISS also dates from 2004. The WEU, in its report The Financing of External Operations: the role of National Parliaments of 2007 inevitably restricted itself to the military dimension of external operations.14 Thus, there is considerable scope for new work in this area that will give a clear understanding of the procedures in various Member States and the state-of-play in the EP post-Lisbon, to which the present study seeks to make an initial contribution. By indicating aspects of the budget decision-making in seven different arenas, this analysis thus provides the framework for assessing whether there is anything that can be described as ‘best practice’ in budget-making, and indicates what is required for policy-makers to measure synergies and to benefit from the savings and/or European Added Value that that may be generated.

1.3.2 Selection of case study parliaments

Alongside analysis of the EP, this study looks at the powers and activities of six national parliaments. The approaches and instruments of parliaments in the United Kingdom, France and Italy are outlined to provide perspectives from large Member States in the EU-15, including both ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ angles. Poland adds the crucial perspective of a ‘new’, middle-sized and Central European Member State. Ireland provides the viewpoint of a non-NATO member and small country. Finally, Denmark adds an intriguing case study, as another small Member State which has opted out of the CSDP, but one which is renowned for the effectiveness of its parliamentary scrutiny of European policy-making.

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1.3.3 Methodology

A mixed methodology has been adopted, covering primary and secondary documentation, analysis of parliamentary debates and questions, and interviews with parliamentarians, officials and others. Much of the material in the report derives from desk-based research, augmented with primary source material from the selected parliaments as well as books, journal and periodical articles written by secondary authorities, we also conducted an extensive series of interviews to ensure a thorough understanding of how budgetary decisions on foreign policy matters are reached in practice. We conducted off-the-record qualitative interviews in London, Brussels and Dublin, as well as telephone interviews. These interviews, which were predominantly undertaken after the desk-based research had been completed, were used to discuss our initial findings and indicative proposals with officials and parliamentarians from the six selected Member States as well as the EP and Commission, in order to evaluate the feasibility of some of the proposals and identify current constraints on budgetary decision-making in practice.
2. PARLIAMENTARY POWERS

Legislatures or parliaments differ considerably in terms of the powers they enjoy and the relationships they have with the executive. Paradoxically their power is typically rather less in so-called parliamentary democracies where the government emerges from among the members of parliament (MP) than in some presidential systems such as the US, where Congress is able to initiate legislation and to block the President’s preferred legislation. Similarly in the budgetary sphere, there is a marked difference in the formal powers parliaments have in setting, amending or scrutinising the budget. How they choose to deploy those powers in practice also differs. This chapter looks at the budgetary powers of the European Parliament and six national parliaments in comparative perspective, drawing out the strengths and weaknesses of each, in order to assess whether there is any ‘best practice’ in budgetary politics that parliamentarians might wish to adopt.

The chapter is divided into seven main sections, each looking at one parliament (both chambers in bi-cameral systems being covered within a single section) and outlining the formal powers of parliaments in setting and amending the budgets, as well as how they can scrutinise expenditure and hold the executive to account before turning to the informal ways in which parliaments (individual members, committees and plenaries) deploy their powers in practice. It concludes with an overview of best parliamentary practice in setting, amending and scrutinising budgets.

Each section explains the formal procedures for introducing, amending, adopting and scrutinising budgets and evaluates how the process works in practice. It also offers a summary of key strengths and weaknesses of the parliament’s budgetary powers. A schematic outline of the budgetary processes in each of the seven can be found in Appendix 1.

The European Parliament’s powers in the budgetary sphere, as elsewhere, have altered considerably over the last forty years, with Lisbon formally according MEPs a greater role, which past experience suggests they will endeavour to use to maximum effect. However, it is worth noting that budgetary powers even of long-established parliaments change over time, with several Member States altering their budget-making procedures in recent years, as has been the case most recently in Italy as a result of the financial crisis. The effectiveness of parliamentary processes in practice depends on a complex mix of the constitutional and political realities (majority, minority or coalition government) and the skills and interests of individual parliamentarians.
2.1. DENMARK

**Strengths**
- Unrestricted powers to amend the government’s proposed budget
- The parliament votes on individual sectoral appropriations

**Weaknesses**
- The Government may increase or overspend mandatory expenditure without legislative approval
- There is no independent budget research office, although committees receive allowances to commission external experts to provide analyses of the proposals.

The Folketing is among the strongest parliaments in the EU with respect to its powers over the budgeting process. This reflects the fact that coalition minority governments are typical in Danish politics, which usually makes it necessary to negotiate with other parties in Parliament in order to obtain support to pass laws.\(^{15}\)

As stipulated in the constitution, the Budget proposal is presented to the Folketing at the end of August.\(^{16}\) Since Parliament is not formally in session during this time, a special provision in the Standing Orders allows the Finance Committee (FC) – considered the senior committee in Parliament – to scrutinise the proposals before they are presented to the plenary session for general debate. During this two-day review, ministers and senior civil servants visit the FC to answer questions on their proposals. This initial process is viewed as ‘technical’ rather than ‘political’, in the sense that it aims to scrutinise the details of planned expenditures rather than to criticise policies from a partisan perspective.\(^{17}\)

When Parliament returns in September, there is a **general plenary debate** on the first reading of the Budget. At this stage, opposition parties outline their views on the proposals and highlight potential areas of disagreement. In October, a **system of negotiations** begins which defines the shape of the final Budget proposal. The four major sets of actors are the Minister of Finance, the sectoral ministers, the senior representative of each political party in the FC, and the senior member of each political party in each sectoral committee. In practice, the Government may have allocated unspecified ‘reserve’ savings as bargaining chips, and may also now introduce politically popular proposals.

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\(^{17}\) Blöndal and Ruffner, op. cit.
specifically designed to strengthen its negotiating position. Non-financial political concessions may also be made in order to reach consensus on the Budget.

The final stage of negotiations produces a series of amendments that reflect the agreements reached. Several hundred amendments are typically proposed at this time, a significant proportion of which originate with the Government itself. Although in theory there are no restraints on these amendments, in practice there remains a cross-party consensus that favours limiting expenditure and maintaining a budgetary surplus, thereby discouraging amendments that would dramatically increase government spending. After the conclusion of the negotiations and publication of the proposed amendments, Parliament meets for the final reading of the Budget. At this stage, usually in mid-December, each amendment to the original proposals must be voted on separately. Parliament then votes on the appropriations for each ministry individually.

Any further expenditures throughout the year that are not covered in the Budget, including virements between line items, must be approved by the Finance Committee. In practice, although such adjustments are common, they do not usually involve major changes to overall expenditures and are rarely rejected by the FC. These changes are bundled into a single supplementary budget at the end of the year and presented to the plenary session, but passing this is merely a formality and no debate takes place.

The Rigsrevisionen (National Audit Office) reports directly to the FC, which is the only body that can commission the Rigsrevisionen to investigate particular topics. All ministries must also produce annual reports linking expenditures to performance targets. However, there is no formal process for integrating the annual reports into the budgeting process, and they are not distributed alongside the Budget proposals. In practice, the reports are analysed by sectoral committees and thus filter back into the Budget scrutiny process in an ad hoc way, through communication between members of particular parties in sectoral committees and the FC.

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18 Ibid, 66.
19 Ibid, 64.
20 Ibid, 65.
2.2. FRANCE

Strengths
- Significant role in setting the budget
- Comprehensive and systematic scrutiny

Weaknesses
- The parliament’s scope for budgetary amendment is constrained

Until the adoption of the loi organique relative aux lois de finances on 1st August 2001, the French parliament’s budgetary powers were limited to voting through the whole expenditure as proposed by the Executive, as happens in the UK. Since then, it has enjoyed significant budgetary powers and is now among the EU’s most powerful legislatures in budget-setting.

The Government presents a multi-annual strategy to parliament alongside its annual budget and both chambers play a role in setting the budget. Once proposed, the budget goes to the Finance Committee of the lower chamber, the Assemblée Nationale, for discussion and then to the Sénat’s Finance Committee before coming to a plenary vote. Members only have a limited right to amend the proposed budget, although they may only propose increases if there is a commensurate cut elsewhere. The budget caps payroll expenditure.

An unusual feature of the French system is that MPs from sectoral committees attend the Finance Committee meetings when relevant appropriations are under discussion. This ensures that there is a balance between the expertise on sectoral and budgetary matters which is lacking in other parliaments where those with an interest in budgets are rarely interested in the substance of foreign policy and those with an interest in policy are not often concerned about the money.

One particular strength of the French system is the comprehensive approach to scrutinising the budget. Whereas in many parliaments scrutiny is quite piecemeal, in France, the work of every minister and every department comes under annual scrutiny. Parliament sets the agenda for meetings, decides who they wish to listen to, and has investigatory powers. Thus the Finance Ministry is expected to reveal documents on request. Moreover, whereas most parliaments use the audit function solely for ex-post

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scrutiny once the budget has been spent, in France the Finance Committee works with the Cour des Comptes on a regular basis so that the budgets are scrutinised as they are being implemented. The nature of the French system however means that while the parliament has significant budgetary power it is typically the bureaucrats rather than the members themselves who develop real expertise in budgetary matters, as members tend to move on to other areas of interest before they have a chance to develop such expertise.

2.3. IRELAND

Strengths:
- Strong *ex post* scrutiny through Public Accounts Committee
- All military (CSDP) missions, including their proposed budgets, must be approved *ex ante* by parliament

Weaknesses:
- Parliament has no power to shape or amend the Government’s proposed budget

Ireland’s Budget process has undergone a number of reforms in recent years aimed at making it more transparent and open to scrutiny, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis. However, the powers of Ireland’s parliament to influence, amend and scrutinise the Budget remain very weak compared to some other EU Member State legislatures.

Since 2007, each December the Department of Finance presents the lower chamber of parliament, the Dáil, with a unified Budget setting out both fiscal plans and expenditure estimates (the upper chamber is not involved in financial matters). During the first few months of the new year, the Dáil is presented with Revised Estimates which give further details of the Government’s spending proposals. After first reading, these Estimates are considered by various sectoral committees of the Dáil. *Neither the Committees nor the plenary have the power to change or amend the Government’s proposals.* In practice, although the Committee members may question the Minister extensively on his or her plans, the Estimates are almost always passed to the Dáil for a general vote without any major delays. The Dáil also does not have an independent budgetary advisory council or institution to provide expert comment and analysis on the Government’s proposals. As a result, Members (TDs) do not always feel they have sufficient expertise to make informed criticisms of the Government’s expenditure plans. While the Budget generates a great deal of public interest, and opposition TDs usually voice objections to aspects of it, in practice the bills *almost always pass easily* through the Dáil.

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Until 2011, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) produced two separate documents in addition to the Estimates - annual output statements and statements of strategy - at other points in the year to facilitate the scrutiny process. From 2012, aspects of these documents will all be incorporated into the Estimates instead. Rather than listing expenditures by service, as was the case in the past, the DFA will list expenditures under specific programme headings. This should enable TDs to link expenditures closely with specific goals and measure proposals for expenditure in these programme areas against past performance.

After the Estimates have been approved by the Dáil, the Irish Government cannot increase spending without first passing a Supplementary Estimate through the parliament. Such additional estimates are relatively rare. Thus, subsequent discussions in the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) and its Sub-Committee on Development Aid, which regularly hear testimonies and evidence from outside experts including Ambassadors and representatives of NGOs, focus on policy rather than finances. This is compounded by the fact that the Committee usually sits as a Joint Committee, featuring members of both Houses, and any discussions relating to financial matters cannot take place when members of the Seanad are present.

Ex-post scrutiny is carried out by the independent Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), which reports directly to the Dáil Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The PAC is perceived as a highly effective institution; departments strenuously endeavour to manage their spending appropriately, in order to avoid attracting the attention of the C&AG and the PAC. PAC hearings on controversial issues are highly politicised and reported in the media, making them effective deterrents against mismanaging spending. However, once an issue has been taken up by the PAC it cannot, legally, be examined concurrently by any other committee. As a result, the Dáil’s various committees often do not share information well, unless there happens to be crossover or informal links between the committee members. There have been turf battles over some issues. Other committees regularly hold hearings and gather evidence from experts on salient topics, but this scrutiny is not carried out in a systematic way (as it is in France, for example). Instead, the issues taken up by the committees depend to a large extent on the particular interests of the Chair and the members.

In practice, neither foreign policy spending nor development aid have been subject to the kind of sustained, intensive scrutiny that other policy areas have faced in recent years. Both budgets have been reduced by approximately 30% since the beginning of the financial crisis, but there is little political pressure to cut spending further. Development aid remains politically popular in Ireland despite the crisis, due in part to the role of Ireland’s powerful NGO sector in campaigning against further reductions in international aid. Transcripts of the Committee and plenary debates on the Budget suggest that most TDs, rhetorically at least, remain committed to meeting the EU’s target of 0.7% of GDP for development aid as soon as possible. TDs appear relatively unwilling to investigate in
great detail how this money is spent, so long as Government policy follows a few general, widely-accepted political priorities.

2.4. ITALY

Strengths

- Parliament has considerable rights to amend the budget
- There is a debate on economic and budgetary priorities before the government introduces its budget

Weaknesses

- After the budget is passed, legislative approval is not required for an increase in mandatory spending

In 2011, Italy amended its budgetary procedures (law no. 39 of 7 April 2011, amending the previous law no. 196 of 2009) to bring them in line with EU provisions establishing the ‘European Semester’, thus allowing better economic coordination with the other members of the Union. According to the new regulations, each year the Council of Ministers approves an Economic and Financial Document (DEF – Documento di Economia e Finanza), including a Stability Programme and a National Reform Programme as required by the European Union. The DEF is transmitted to both Houses of the Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) by 10 April, and is referred for examination to the Budget Committee, which is expected to present a report to the plenary session after receiving the opinions of the other Standing Committees. After being approved by both Houses in plenary session, the DEF is then submitted to the European Commission and to the Council of the European Union by 30 April. A DEF Update Note is submitted to the Parliament by 20 September, while the actual Budget Bill is proposed by 15 October and approved by the both Houses of the Parliament by the end of the financial year (although Art. 81 of the Constitution allows for the possibility that the procedure might take longer, in which case the Parliament is allowed to grant the Government interim budget authority for up to four months).

The norms for the approval of the budget as laid out in the Rules of Procedure of each House of the Parliament are very similar. Each Standing Committee to which the Budget Committee has referred the budget may suggest amendments on the section of the budget for which it is responsible, and these form part of a report which is then submitted to the Budget Committee, together with any minority reports. The Budget Committee may decide whether to include such amendments in its general report, which is then presented to the plenary session together with any minority reports. Reasons must be given for the rejection of any of the proposed amendments; rejected amendments can be
re-introduced in the plenary session ‘even by the proposer alone’. Both the Government and individual MPs may propose amendments to the relevant Committees. The budget is approved line by line by the plenary session of each House, starting with the provisions concerning the limit on net borrowing. Once these are approved, any amendments to sub-articles can only be approved insofar as they only involve off-setting adjustments, and no variation on total expenditures.

Article 81 of the Constitution states that, ‘Any other law involving new or increased spending shall detail the means therefore’. This norm is also valid for any law involving emergency dispositions to extend Italy’s participation to peace missions or to projects of development cooperation. These dispositions are often introduced by means of governmental decrees which are immediately applicable but which ‘lose effect from the beginning’ if they are not converted into law by the Parliament within sixty days (Art. 77 of the Constitution). Normally they include a specific article on financial coverage, which provides for reductions to other previously approved expenditures.

2.5. POLAND

Strengths

- Parliament has the right to amend the Budget and uses this right actively
- Independent analysis of Government expenditure plans is produced and distributed by the Sejm’s Research Office

Weaknesses

- Use of Special Reserve Fund for defence expenditures does not require ex ante approval from Parliament

Poland’s parliament plays quite a significant role in the budgetary process, relative to its counterparts in other EU Member States. Moreover, in order to enhance transparency and accountability, Poland has recently moved toward establishing a performance-based budgeting system in which expenditure plans are closely linked to specific outcomes and targets.

Poland’s Budget is proposed by the Ministry of Finance to the lower chamber of parliament, the Sejm, each September (as stipulated in the Constitution). Members of the Sejm have approximately one week to examine the Budget proposals, after which a plenary debate is held on the overall direction of the Government’s Budget policy.

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25 Art. 128 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate. Art. 121 of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies states that ‘amendments rejected by the Committee can be re-tabled in the House’. 


After the general debate, the Budget is passed to sectoral committees in the Sejm and to its Public Finances Committee (PFC). All committees may propose amendments to the Budget at this stage, so long as these amendments do not alter the total deficit or surplus proposed by the Government. The PFC then drafts a report including both its own proposed amendments and those of the other committees, which goes to the Sejm for a second debate. At this stage, party or group chairs and groups of 15 or more MPs may also propose amendments. The PFC then produces a second report on the bill, after which the Sejm votes on both the Budget and the proposed amendments.

After the Sejm’s vote, the Budget passes to the upper house, the Senat, where it is reviewed by that chamber’s sectoral committees and its Budget and Public Finance Committee. This Committee then prepares a report for the Senat including proposed amendments (the Senat cannot reject the Sejm’s vote or amendments, but it can propose additional amendments of its own). After the Senat votes on the Budget, along with its proposed amendments, the bill passes back to the Sejm, which can overrule the Senat’s changes by an absolute majority vote. The final version of the bill is then sent to the President to sign.

In practice, members of both Houses are very active in exercising their right to amend the Budget. According to OECD data, the two Houses together proposed a total of 210 amendments in 2010, of which 67 were adopted. Inevitably the figures vary – in 2009, there were three times as many amendments proposed in total, yet only 60 were adopted. Most of the amendments that failed did so because they did not meet the legal requirements, for example by proposing to exceed the Government’s deficit target or by requiring multi-year expenditures (which only the Government can initiate). Nonetheless it is clear that Polish parliamentarians do play an active role in the budget-setting process, far in excess of their colleagues in other national parliaments. Throughout the Budget process, members of Parliament have access to independent analysis and commentary on the Budget proposals from the Biuro Analiz Sejmowych (the Sejm’s Bureau of Research) members of which participate in Committee sittings during Budget debates and help deputies to formulate their proposals for amendments.

Aside from the Budget process, the work of committees and the plenary tends to focus on policy rather than on financial matters. However, strong ex-post scrutiny is provided by the Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (NIK - the Supreme Audit Office), which reports directly to the Sejm. Members of the NIK regularly participate in meetings of both Sejm and Senate finance committees, as well as sectoral committees. Each May the NIK submits to the Sejm a

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28 Ibid., 28.
29 Ibid.
30 Szpringer, op. cit., 4.
31 Hawkesworth, von Trapp and Nielsen, op. cit., 35.
general report on the previous year’s expenditures, which has increasingly been linked to performance targets and outcomes. The Sejm may then choose to pass a resolution accepting or rejecting the government’s accounts.32

2.6. THE UNITED KINGDOM

Strengths
- The Public Accounts Committee provides effective ex-post scrutiny based on reports from the National Audit Office

Weaknesses
- MPs have no control over decisions on expenditure

Perhaps surprisingly for a system that originally acquired its powers in return for the king’s right to raise taxes, the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ has very little influence over the budget. The Budget is very much that of the Executive. As Wehner points out, the Westminster system is characterised by executive dominance, with the Chancellor proposing spending in the form of Estimates, which MPs typically vote through with very little debate thanks to the majority the government normally wields in the House of the Commons.33 While there is a major parliamentary debate following the Budget Statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and MPs debate the revenue side of the budget in detail they pay little attention to the expenditure side of the Budget, which they are not permitted to amend. MPs have a chance to vote in detail on taxation (brought forward in the Finance Bill). However, their scope for influencing spending via the Estimates is very limited. They normally debate just one or two Estimates, usually linked to a Select Committee report, relatively frequently on Defence spending, given the size of the defence budget relative to others. The Commons then vote for the government’s entire spending package en bloc.34

The upper chamber, the House of Lords has even less influence on the Budget to which it is required to consent formally but by convention does not have any right to amend.

In addition to the spring budget, the Chancellor makes an Autumn Statement which effectively informs parliament ‘where are the finances going’35 and the government may also request funds on account for the next financial year that this stage. However, while parliament formally has the right to vote on such requests, the expectation again is that members simply vote through this and the main Estimates into what become Appropriation Acts, which give the government the right to draw down funds as required.

32 Ibid., 44.
34 This section draws on the House of Commons Information Office, ‘Financial Procedure’, Factsheet P6 Procedure Series (London: House of Commons, 2003) and insights from a former UK MP.
35 Sources: Stephanie Flanders, The Today Programme, 29th November 2011, 7.35am
The House of Commons does not have a specific budget committee or its own experts on the budget. However, the **Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)** was introduced by the Coalition Government to give an independent expert analysis of the financial and fiscal situation the UK, including the impact of the budget. The OBR is intended to be independent of government interference and the appointment of the first Chair was approved by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons in 2010.

Select Committees typically look at spending after the fact and usually are more interested in the substance of policy than the cost. However, the Public Accounts Committee does take a close look at expenditure. While the PAC does not have many staff, it benefits from the reports of the National Audit Office. Given the scale of defence and ODA spending, the PAC looks at them quite regularly and civil servants are always anxious not to be hauled before the PAC. Nonetheless, how closely expenditure is scrutinised in practice is in part determined by the interests of MPs whether in the PAC, Defence, Foreign Affairs or International Development Committees, and there is a danger that even *ex-post* scrutiny can be somewhat ad hoc.

### 2.7. THE EUROPEAN UNION

#### Strengths
- MEPs have the right to amend the budget on a line-by-line basis
- Members can introduce budgetary lines reflecting their priorities

#### Weaknesses
- there is little flexibility to react swiftly to events once the budget has been set

The European Parliament’s gradual acquisition of power began in the budgetary sphere in the 1970s as Member States accepted that a parliamentary body should have oversight of Community ‘own resources’. Over the years the Parliament’s role has increased as a result of repeated treaty reform and its own struggle to be granted a greater role. Of particular relevance to this study was the EP’s success in 1997 in securing an Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) with the Council ‘to the effect that spending on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy should be considered as non-compulsory expenditure’, which in effect gave it a say in CFSP for the first time. It has enjoyed extensive powers to amend

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37 For further information, see HM Treasury’s website: [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_obr_index.htm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_obr_index.htm), last accessed on 29th November 2011.
individual budget lines and to approve the budget as a whole for some years and gained equal budgetary rights with the Council under the Lisbon Treaty. In this regard, the EP as a co-decider with Council on budgetary expenditure has considerably more power than many national parliaments in the EU. The differences between it and the British and Irish models are particularly marked.

In fact, the European Parliament now more closely resembles the US Congress than any EU model, able both to revise the EU budget and to block the whole budget.\textsuperscript{40} Just as Congress can block the President’s budget very effectively, so the European Parliament can block the Commission’s proposals, particularly if it gets involved in a protracted dispute with the Council. While it is rarely in the Parliament’s interests to delay the budget for very long, in 2010 and 2011 it flexed its muscles in the annual budget negotiations, perhaps seeking to remind the Commission and the Council of its new powers under Lisbon. However, MEPs’ scope for action in the area of foreign and defence policy is severely constrained by the Union’s limited competences in this area and its own relative lack of powers in these fields.

The annual budget is, however, only part of the story in the context of EU spending. Since the late 1980s the framework for budgets has been decided on a multiannual basis. This has the advantage of minimising the annual disputes about the size of the budget that had affected intra-Council relations in the 1980s. However, it does mean that the institutions need to have a clear sense of priorities during the negotiations for the forthcoming MFF as it is much harder to change course mid-term. The negotiation period offers the institutions considerable scope for refocusing spending, which provides the EP scope to set the agenda.

On the Audit side, the EP and Council receive annual reports from the Court of Auditors and have the right of discharge. Thus it has significant scrutiny powers as well as budget-setting powers, with Budgetary Control Committee playing a key role.

Overall, the European Parliament plays a rather more significant role in the budget process than most national parliaments in Europe, at least in terms of agreeing EU spending. However, it does not have any say over revenue.

2.8. CONCLUSIONS

There is a great deal of variation among European parliaments regarding their power to influence, amend and scrutinise budgetary proposals and their implementation. Most, including the European Parliament, have little **formal** power to influence budgetary planning before budgets are proposed to parliament. After that, however, practice varies widely, as some parliaments have considerable influence on proposals and others vote on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis for the whole spending package.

Some parliaments, like those in the UK and Ireland, have almost no ability to amend the proposals put forward by their governments. Others have significant **power to make amendments or changes**, but this ability may be restricted by a need to adhere to overall deficit/surplus targets, or hampered by a lack of access to independent, in-depth analysis of government proposals. The European Parliament and Danish *Folketing* clearly emerge as leaders in this field, with the most unrestricted power to make changes and amendments. Moreover, while some parliaments vote separately on revenue and expenditure plans, others must approve both the revenue and expenditure sides at the same time. In some cases (e.g. Poland and Ireland) proposed sectoral appropriations are explicitly linked to programmes and performance targets at the time the budget is set, while elsewhere such targets are provided at other times of the year (if at all).

The formal roles of parliamentary **committees** in the budgetary process also differ. Some arrangements (e.g. in Poland, Italy and Denmark) are centralised through **Budget or Finance Committees**, which have the power to accept or reject amendments proposed by the sectoral committees and review the budget proposals as a whole. In other cases (e.g. the UK and Ireland), scrutiny of specific appropriations falls more heavily on relevant sectoral committees, although they have no scope to make formal amendments to the budget lines. Informal practices also vary, with France particularly notable for allowing representatives of sectoral committees to sit with the Budget Committee when discussing relevant appropriations. This serves a key purpose in combatting a typical problem in some other parliaments, whereby sectoral committees can prove more interested in scrutinising the substance of policy than the details of finance.

Many of the parliaments studied here must vote to approve appropriations individually for each sector, although Italy and the European Parliament hold detailed line-by-line votes. Practice also varies regarding the appropriation of **additional funds** during the financial year, whether by increasing overall expenditure or through **virements** between line-items. This is particularly relevant in the field of foreign and defence policy, where emergencies like humanitarian aid, disaster relief and new military expenditures (e.g. the 2011 operation in Libya) can often result in **unanticipated and unplanned costs**. The level of flexibility in meeting these costs is different in each parliament. In Ireland and France, additional expenditures must be approved **ex ante** by a **supplementary budget**; Denmark
enters this task to the Finance Committee, while the other parliaments can only approve additional expenditures \textit{ex post}.

Finally, scrutiny practices across these case studies are generally somewhat \textit{ad hoc}, with France’s systematic approach proving a notable exception. Elsewhere the issues taken up by committees tend to reflect the interests of the particular committee members rather than a comprehensive approach to scrutiny. However, although the details of audit practice differ, all case study parliaments have well-respected \textbf{audit institutions}, which report directly to the parliaments.

These wide differences in budgetary procedure make it difficult to standardise approaches to parliamentary scrutiny and information-gathering in foreign, development and defence policy. However, this analysis highlights several clear examples of best practice which can provide a template for improving the effectiveness of parliament scrutiny procedures across Europe.

\textbf{2.8.1. Best practice}

This sub-section highlights best practice at each stage of the budgetary process as they emerge in the seven cases assessed above:

\textit{Before budgetary proposals are finalised:}

- **Italy**: plenaries in both chambers pass a financial and economic strategy document \textbf{before} final budget proposals are made
- **Denmark**: Finance Committee’s \textbf{technical review} of budget proposals is presented to the plenary

\textit{Ability to amend government proposals:}

- **The EP**: Ability to amend \textbf{individual line items}
- **Denmark**: The \textbf{negotiation system} allowing unrestricted amendments
- **Italy and Poland**: Unrestricted amendments within overall deficit/surplus targets

\textit{Role of Committees:}

- **France**: Members of \textbf{sectoral committees attend the Finance Committee} when relevant appropriations are under discussion
- **Italy and Poland**: Finance Committee plays central role in reporting on and \textbf{incorporating proposed amendments}
Voting:

- **The EP and Italy**: line-by-line approval of appropriations
- **The EP**: can block the **entire EU budget**

Approval for additional expenditures throughout the year:

- **Ireland**: requirement for a **supplementary budget** for any additional spending; budget for military missions must also be approved *ex ante*
- **France**: need for *ex ante* approval for government to increase discretionary expenditure

Ex post scrutiny

- **France**: systematic annual scrutiny of each ministry’s expenditure
- **The EP**: annual reports from the **Court of Auditors**
- **Poland**: Sejm can formally **censure** the government if it disapproves of the NIK’s annual expenditure report
3. EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES: THE CASES OF PALESTINE, AFGHANISTAN AND LIBYA

This chapter outlines responses to three foreign policy issues: Palestine, Afghanistan and Libya. It analyses parliamentary behaviour in each of the three cases, including the scrutiny undertaken by relevant committees and other procedures used to elicit information such as oral and written questions. While much of this concerns broader policy perspectives, our focus is on how and where discussion on the funding for action has taken place in each member state and the EU, and whether these cases provide evidence for possible synergies between the EU and its Member States and their respective parliaments.

The European Parliament’s role in CFSP and CSDP remains quite limited. It holds twice yearly debates on the progress in implementing the CFSP and produces reports on particular issues on its own initiative – such as those of 16 December 2010 on a new strategy for Afghanistan, on Libya on 10 March 2011 or on 29 September 2011 on Palestine's UN membership application. At the national level, the degree of parliamentary influence over governments’ involvement in CFSP and CSDP varies widely, from those with the ability to hold their governments to specific positions ex ante (e.g. Denmark or Germany) to those like the United Kingdom which can only pass political judgement on government actions ex post. On the whole, the de facto maintenance of unanimity in CFSP and CSDP decision-making means that the influence of national parliaments remains unchanged in this area since the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, one of the formal mechanisms for inter-parliamentary cooperation in this field has been reduced since the 2011 closure of the Western European Union’s inter-parliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly (WEU-ESDA). As we note below, the attempts to replace that Assembly highlight the sensitivities surrounding inter-parliamentary relations more generally, as parliamentarians jealously guard what they believe to be their prerogatives.

The chapter is divided into three parts, one per case study, each with an introduction on the nature of the case and the foreign policy interest underlying it, in terms of whether the responses reflect foreign, military or development activity. It indicates any key EU-level activity, and outlines the key positions taken by the EP and NPs in each case. We took the tools each parliament has at its disposal and the budgetary decisions it has taken over the years in order to effect its policy commitments. In each case formal powers as outlined in Chapter 2 are evaluated against the actual practice to assess whether parliaments could already be acting more effectively on the basis of their existing powers and rules of procedure. We then draw out points of similarity and difference between the various parliaments and assess whether there are points of best practice that could be extended to the Union more widely.
The chapter does not seek to be comprehensive in outlining every debate held or position taken but rather to highlight the main approaches taken toward each situation in the parliaments, with special reference to budgetary decisions. This is particularly important in cases where Member States have seriously conflicting views on whether to engage or the appropriate type of engagement (e.g. differences between the UK, France and Germany over Palestine and Libya, and Ireland’s reluctance to accept military engagement). The chapter starts with an indication of the size of core defence and foreign budgets in each of the countries and how they can be amended in case of unforeseen engagement, whether military, civilian or financial.

### 3.1. PAYING FOR FOREIGN POLICY

In line with their differing foreign policy priorities and divergent views on intervention, the amount of money each of six countries under discussion in this study devote to foreign policy varies considerably, as does their flexibility to increase budget lines in response to sudden and unexpected international crises. Thus, the UK and France are both willing to engage internationally and have (relatively) large defence and development aid budgets, as does Denmark as a percentage of GNI, although its military activity is via NATO or the UN as it has an opt-out from European defence. Poland has proved to be willing to engage militarily but its development aid budget remains small, while in Ireland the situation is the reverse. Italy has a relatively small foreign policy budget. The role of national parliaments differs in whether they are required to vote on military invention before it takes place and one whether, and to what extent, they can shape budgets for foreign policy.

**France**

A parliamentary vote is not required in France for military interventions, but is likely to be necessary to secure additional funds for military operations. France, along with the UK, has continued to seek a global foreign policy role and has engaged in military interventions in Africa as well as Afghanistan and Libya. Despite its continuing desire to play a leading role, the French defence budget was due to be cut from €96bn to €91.6bn between 2011 and 2013 as the government sought to reduce its deficit. However, the French parliament voted through additional funding for the Libya campaign in 2011. France is a large contributor of development aid, €10.18bn in 2010, just below Germany in the OECD’s list of donors, although it tends to send aid to Africa rather than to the states covered in this study, thus its defence spending in Libya and Afghanistan has been more significant than its aid, in contrast to Ireland and Denmark.

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The UK\textsuperscript{43}  
A formal parliamentary vote is not required in the UK ahead of military intervention, although since the Iraq War of 2003 the expectation is that MPs would be able to vote on intervention. Since MPs have little say in expenditure and the system allows for revised ‘estimates’ within the year, the government has considerable budgetary flexibility in the UK. In addition, there is a Special Government Reserve to be used for ‘the additional net costs incurred on operations’, precisely including operations like Afghanistan and Libya. £18bn (c. €21.7bn at 2012 exchange rate) from this fund was spent on operational costs between 2001-02 and 2009-10. In 2010, the UK was the world’s 4\textsuperscript{th} largest spender on defence, after the US, China and France. However, defence spending, like funding for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is being cut in the UK as the government seeks to reduce the budget deficit, with defence due to fall by 8% in real terms by 2014-15. By contrast, the budget for development aid continues to rise towards to the 0.7% target, having been ring-fenced by the government in 2010. Thus by 2011, the UK was the second largest bilateral donor of development aid, after the US and ahead of both France and Germany, at €10.3bn.\textsuperscript{44}

Denmark  
Denmark has secured an opt-out from EU defence policy but is a committed member of NATO and currently (2011) spends €2.95bn on defence, approximately half of which goes on wages. The budget for the Danish Ministry of Defence is being cut slightly over a five year period.\textsuperscript{45} Denmark’s contribution to ODA is one of the highest in terms of GNI, with a target of 0.8%, which it has surpassed, at around 0.9% or €2.26bn in 2010.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, Denmark has an effective structure for planning development aid which involves a multiannual framework for aid approved by the parliament. Aid is dealt with in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which means that the MFA can set the strategy for aid,\textsuperscript{47} in contrast to many other states where aid and wider foreign policy priorities sometimes seem at variance.

Ireland  
The Dáil has to vote on military invention by more than 12 people. In setting the budget, MPs vote separately on the budget for the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the budget for Development Aid (as Votes 28 and 29 respectively). Funding for Ireland’s participation in UN and EU peacekeeping operations falls under Vote 28, rather than the Department of Defence budget. For 2011, Vote 28 for €160,659,000 was approved –

\textsuperscript{43} This paragraph draws extensively on MOD, ‘About Defence’, available at http://www.mod.uk, accessed on 11 October 2011.

\textsuperscript{44} See www.oecd.org/dac/stats, accessed on 16\textsuperscript{th} January 2012.


\textsuperscript{46} See www.oecd.org/dac/stats, accessed on 16\textsuperscript{th} January 2012.

including salaries and wages – while the estimate for Vote 29 was over three times larger, at €533,197,000 (this represents approximately 0.51% of Ireland's GDP). In 2010 the only Supplementary Estimate concerned appropriating additional funds for Vote 28, i.e. the general budget for the DFA, in order to enable Ireland to meet financial commitments to United Nations peacekeeping operations that had proved to be greater than initially expected. However, these additional funds did not entail new money but rather a virement from the Development Aid budget; the Supplementary Estimate was only necessary because the Votes on Foreign Affairs and Development Aid (Vote 29) are separate. Some of the funds that were required to meet Ireland’s UN commitments were raised by making savings and cuts within the Vote 28 Estimate; these changes did not require legislative approval.

**Italy**

In the budget for 2011, the estimates for the Ministry of Defence amounted to €20,567 million, or 1.23% of GDP, with the actual expenditure for the maintenance of the armed forces at €14,360 million, at 0.896% of GDP, significantly less than the 2010 expenditures of the other major European countries. The estimates for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were €1,882 million, of which development cooperation accounted for €237 million and promotion of international peace and security for €490 million. In contrast to most EU states, Italy has cut development aid significantly since 2009. There is much scope in Italy for supplementary budgets, which gives flexibility in foreign policy but at the expense of long-term planning.

**Poland**

Neither Defence nor Foreign Affairs and Development Aid regularly constitute contentious aspects of Poland’s Budget. Defence, on which Poland spent 1.95% of its GDP in 2011, is generally considered to be a matter of great national importance, and there is little political advantage to be gained from being seen to criticise defence spending. Moreover, should the Government need to spend money on unforeseen defence costs throughout the year – like participation in a CSDP mission, for example – this money can be drawn from a Special Reserve Fund, a small pool of money set aside for the Government to use in case of unexpected spending requirements. Although this allows for flexibility on the Government’s part, the Government is not required to consult the Sejm ex ante to obtain approval for how it decides to spend these funds.

ODA constitutes only a tiny proportion of Poland’s overall expenditure – approximately 0.08% of GDP in 2010 – nearly half of which goes to Poland’s neighbours in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Over three-quarters of Poland’s aid budget is channelled through

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other organisations, including the EU and UN, thus making it even more difficult for members of Parliament to scrutinise expenditures.\textsuperscript{50} However, ODA is likely to be subject to more intensive scrutiny in the near future, as Poland plans to increase its spending in this area in line with the 2012 Development Cooperation Plan produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{51}

**The European Union**

The EU’s budget includes the heading ‘EU as a Global Player’ which covers all external activities except those of the EDF, which have not been budgetised, and the costs of CSDP missions with military implications, which are covered by the ATHENA mechanism. The EU as a Global Player added up to some 6.2% of the EU’s 2011 budget rising to 6.4% of the 2012 budget to cover costs of the EEAS. The ATHENA mechanism covers the common funding elements of CSDP missions (preparation, headquarters etc) on the basis of a GDP index set for each Member State (bar Denmark), whether or not they actually participate in the mission. Other costs of CSDP missions are borne by participating Member States.

The European Union is the world’s second largest donor after the United States and has thus acquired the reputation of being a major international player, albeit as a ‘soft power’, lacking its own military capabilities. Development aid in 2010 was €53.8bn.\textsuperscript{52} The EU has been a significant contributor in each of the three cases reviewed in this report. It committed €610m to Afghanistan in the period 2007-2010 and a further €600m for the period 2011 to 2013 via two Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP) covering those timeframes respectively. Prior to the military invention in 2011, the EU’s bilateral aid to Libya was limited, but it increased in 2011 as a result of the changed circumstances. Funding for Libya is available via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument and, like Afghanistan, Libya receives European funds via the Instrument for Stability. The EU is a major donor to the Palestinian Authority, with a number of well-established projects, including the Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-Economique (PEGASE), as well as a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

In marked contrast to national parliamentarians, except for those in Italy, MEPs are able to propose amendments to EU budget lines, which enables them to have a considerable impact on specific parts of the Union’s aid budget.


3.2. PALESTINE

The EU has long been involved in assistance to Palestine – initially via the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in 1971 and directly since the 1990s. The EC signed an Interim Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 1997. The Palestinian Authority participated in the Barcelona Process from 1995 and has received further assistance through the various elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Palestine Action Plan approved in 2005. Politically, the Venice Declaration of 1980 recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to a homeland, while recognising the right to a secure existence for Israel, a balance key to the EU’s policy in the Middle East. The EU made an explicit commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state in the Berlin Declaration of 1999. The EU has been a member of the Quartet in its efforts to advance the Middle East Peace Process.

The EU and its Member States have been critically important actors in assisting in the creation of a viable state structure in Palestine. In CFSP/CSDP terms, this has been reflected in a number of different forms: an EU Special Representative, the first, Miguel Angel Moratinos (later Spanish Foreign Minister), taking up his position in 1996; the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), which was formally established in April 2005 to advise the Palestinian authorities on long-term training and the development of an improved security capacity and later became an ESDP mission; and after the agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the Rafah crossing in November 2005, the EU undertook an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah) to monitor the border. While the EU has declared its readiness to reactivate the Mission, it has not monitored the border since Hamas took over in Gaza in 2007 (though it has undertaken other tasks in conjunction with EUPOL COPPS). Denmark has an opt-out on CSDP missions (though the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS since 2010 happens to be a Dane).
Individual EU Member States also fund a wide range of bilateral and multilateral programmes in the Palestinian Territories, reflecting their different political positions on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as well as their various priorities and overall approaches to aid and development. One of the more explicit political linkages was made in the 'Background Note' provided by the Irish MFA to the incoming Development Minister in March 2011, which declared that Irish aid had a political as well as a development role 'demonstrating Ireland's support for a viable Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict'. This followed a fairly traditional attitude towards Palestine as pointed out by the Irish Foreign Minister to the Dail's Foreign affairs Committee in March 2011.

Of the six case studies, Italy devotes the largest proportion of its ODA budget to Palestine, spending 1.2% of overall ODA in 2009 on the region. Italy distributes the vast majority of

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54 See http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2011/03/22/00007.asp.
55 2009 is the most recent year for which reliable figures are available for all the EU states under consideration in this Study.
its aid in Palestine through NGOs and multilateral organisations. Moreover, Italy has sought to specialise in particular on conflict and post-conflict situations, and has become an important player in delivering assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.\(^{56}\) In this respect, Italy can provide experience and leadership for other EU Member States operating in the area.

The UK, France, Ireland and Denmark all spend slightly less on Palestine as a proportion of their respective ODA funds – between 0.6% and 0.9% in 2009. These four countries support a variety of different programmes, reflecting broader differences in their general approaches to aid. Unlike Italy, France, the UK and Ireland all prioritise administering aid to Palestine bilaterally rather than through multilateral organisations, though all also contribute significantly to UNRWA. France, Denmark and Ireland also prefer to channel some aid to Palestine through NGOs, usually nationally based, providing a further obstacle to effective cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny, since parliaments have little control over how this money is spent once it has been devolved.\(^{57}\)

On the other hand, some of the six have similar priority areas. Poland, which cites Palestine as a priority country for development aid but designated only 0.22% of its already small ODA budget to the region in 2009, is particularly interested in promoting rural development.\(^{58}\) Ireland also considers this to be one of its major long-term priorities for Palestine, providing both countries with potential opportunities for synergies and the need to coordinate to avoid overlap/duplication, particularly as Poland plans to expand its presence in the region from 2012 onward.\(^{59}\) These programmes can also complement the UK’s interest in promoting urban development. Danish priorities are particularly in the field of democracy promotion and good governance with special focus on fragile states such as Palestine.\(^{60}\)


3.3. AFGHANISTAN

One significant and enduring response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US was the intervention in Afghanistan, which led to the fall of the Taliban regime. Military action gave way to a need for post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian aid coupled with an ongoing need for military presence to ensure stability in Afghanistan and the wider region. The basic rationale for this dualism of military intervention and aid was summed up by the then Danish Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, to the Folketing in October 2010: ‘The altogether basic reason why we do this is to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. We also do it to give the individual Afghan the opportunity of a better life.’

Twelve European Union Member States have participated in the NATO-led action in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was established in December 2001 under the authority of the UN Security Council. Against that background, the EU’s role has been largely one of providing aid and assistance in reconstruction, supporting a whole range of programmes for reconstruction, such as the National Solidarity Programme and the Law and Order Trust Fund, and, after the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, through a Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2011-13.
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approved in 2007. The bulk of this has been used to support cooperation in governance, rural development and health and social protection. The EC had established an office in Kabul in the 1980s, although it was withdrawn during the Taliban period. The European Commission re-established a Delegation in December 2001, while the Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR). In addition, the EU has also played a limited role in seeking to strengthen the rule of law in Afghanistan through an EU Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan) established in May 2007 as an ESDP Mission.

Although all six case study countries contribute some funds for development assistance to Afghanistan, there remain striking differences in their approaches to the region. The first such gap separates Ireland, which did not participate significantly at any stage of the intervention, from the rest of the countries looked at here. Ireland maintains a tiny presence in ISAF in Kabul, with seven troops (mostly bomb disposal experts), but its commitment to military neutrality in any case precludes it from making major contributions to efforts that are closely integrated with military operations. Indeed, the desire to avoid association with ‘militarised’ aid provides a consistent thread in the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee’s debates on the issue in particular.

Even among the nations that participate more actively in ISAF, there remain significant differences in the relative importance they attribute to providing development assistance to Afghanistan. On one end of the spectrum sits France, which contributed just 0.4% of its total ODA in 2009 to Afghanistan, and did not contribute financially to any other ISAF programmes in 2011, although it did provide additional equipment. Conversely, Denmark and the United Kingdom respectively dedicated 3% and 2.8% of their total ODA to Afghanistan in 2009, matching their proportionally large military contributions to ISAF with significant bilateral assistance for long-term development projects and state-building.

Poland and Italy, finally, lie in the middle of this spectrum, contributing 1.7% and 2% of their total ODA budgets to the region in 2009. Poland contributed roughly the same amount of money as Ireland in real terms, but this sum represents a much larger proportion of Poland’s relatively smaller ODA budget; Afghanistan is listed as one of Poland’s six priority countries (along with Palestine and four of Poland’s Eastern neighbours).

Since many of these countries try to integrate their development assistance with broader stabilisation efforts through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), this also lends a highly regional focus to many national projects. Italy, for example, concentrates much of its assistance in Herat province, where its troops are based; similarly, many of the UK’s

63 See, for example, Select Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on Supplementary Estimates, 1 December 2010. Available online at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/FOS/2010/12/01/00003.asp.
projects are focused on Helmand. Meanwhile, in 2009, Poland channelled most of its development assistance through its PRT in Ghazni province. As Member States continue to focus their efforts on improving the long-term security of the areas in which their troops operate, such regionalism presents a barrier to potential budgetary synergies in terms of creating economies of scale, even if it also means that states are not duplicating effort or resources. In this sense Afghanistan appears to work quite well as a model of cooperation. Moreover, individual parliaments scrutinise the activities in their region without having to address the thorny question of whose aid is delivering what.

On the other hand, direct bilateral assistance to the Afghan government – which marks a substantial proportion of both Denmark and the UK’s ODA to Afghanistan – suggests considerable room for cooperation. Both countries have made it a priority to empower Afghan institutions and promote good governance, and both also made large contributions to ISAF’s Afghan National Army reconstruction fund in 2011. Along with the other Nordic countries, the UK has been developing and co-funding civil society promotion programmes. Such cooperation is a clear indication of what can be achieved by like-minded states seeking collaborative solutions. The only down-side from an EU perspective is that such cooperation tends to work better with a small number of states. It is easy to work with a few colleagues but much harder to work at 27 (or 28 if one includes the Commission, as is appropriate here). However, this need not be a problem as it gives states an incentive to coordinate their contributions and to specialise; they do not all need to do everything as long as there is a fair sharing of the burden overall.

3.4. LIBYA

In Spring 2011, humanitarian concerns about the situation in Libya led to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, creating a no-fly zone and a NATO involvement that contributed to the fall of Libya’s long-standing ruler, President Gaddafi. His regime had been subject to sanctions until 2004 when negotiations began on a Framework agreement within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy but sanctions were reintroduced in February 2011. With the regime’s increasing oppression and condemnation by the United Nations, it was NATO that took up responsibility for an arms embargo, a no-fly zone and actions to protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack. Some 11 EU member states participated in either the arms embargo by maintaining maritime patrols or the no-fly zone, or both. The one notable exception was Germany, which had abstained in the Security Council vote, in marked contrast to the EU’s two permanent Security Council members, France and the UK, both of which supported UNSCR 1973 and were among the most active participants in the NATO action.

66 Ibid.
The EU itself had drawn up plans in April 2011 to provide military protection in support of humanitarian assistance if called upon by the UN. As this did not materialise, the EU’s formal efforts were confined to contributing to the evacuation operation of EU citizens - with the EU’s Military Staff liaising with Member States, and providing humanitarian assistance on Libya’s borders. Frontex was also employed to help Italy cope with migratory flows. The EU participated in the Contact Group along with the UN, the Arab League and others from March 2011. The High Representative opened an EU office in Benghazi in May 2011 and a new Delegation in Tripoli in November. The EU’s support for the stabilisation priorities of Libya’s National Transitional Council is part of a very new relationship that has followed the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, and a reflection of the fact that military action undertaken by some of its members in the framework of NATO can have a significant knock-on effect for the Union as a whole in terms of humanitarian aid and support. The 2011 Strategy Paper has as its primary aim the consolidation of ‘Libya’s integration in the rules-based international political and economic system’ within the general framework of the ‘EU’s Response to the Arab Spring’, which emphasised what it terms the “3 Ms: Money, Mobility and Market”. 

The different Member State reactions to NATO’s intervention in Libya illustrate well the ways in which political disagreements between states over foreign policy can be reflected in their expenditures, hampering the potential for budgetary synergies. Indeed, as Figure 3 demonstrates, even states that had similar political stances and made relatively similar contributions to the intervention have drastically diverged with respect to their pledges to the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) fund for post-conflict humanitarian assistance. The United Kingdom and France jointly took the lead, both in calling for intervention in Libya and in orchestrating the NATO operation once it was underway. Although the cited costs for the two missions vary widely among sources, it is estimated that both countries spent in the region of $470 million (USD) on the operation. By December 2011, the UK had pledged over €13.5 million to the ECHO effort, while France had promised only just under €3 million. This latter figure is significantly less than both Italy and Denmark had promised (both of which were also heavily involved in the intervention, with Denmark particularly taking on a ‘lion’s share’ of the operations

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relative to its size and capabilities).\(^{71}\) Italy, having been, as the Foreign Minister put it ‘by virtue of our past and recent history... more exposed than others to the uncertainties raised by regime change’, has since sought to reactivate the Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty ‘an instrument that underscores and preserves Italy’s unique position in the country.’\(^{72}\)

Equally significant was the refusal of Poland to be involved in the operation. Despite Poland’s demonstrated willingness in the past to take part in missions in which it had no direct foreign policy ‘interest’ – including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – when it came to Libya, Poland argued that it had no strategic interest in the area and would therefore abstain from involvement in the operation.\(^{73}\) Poland’s small contribution to the ECHO fund seems to reflect that relative lack of interest, particularly in the context of Poland’s generally small aid budget. Ireland, meanwhile, was never likely to take part in the military operation given its strong domestic opposition to participation in NATO-led operations. Moreover, it promised only €1 million to ECHO, even though the Irish Government, supported by the Oireachtas, has otherwise steadfastly supported maintaining humanitarian and development aid spending despite the financial crisis.

The EP has long treated humanitarian aid as a particular concern – the idea of creating ECHO originated in the EP\(^{74}\) - and it has continuously sought to increase appropriations, not least in terms of administrative as well as financial capacity, to improve disaster preparedness and conflict prevention measures and better coordination of donors involved in humanitarian aid. EU development policy more generally has been regarded as an area where the EP, which has the power of co-decision in this field, has vigorously sought improved oversight of strategy and programmes. While without such competences, the EP has also sought to call the High Representative to account both in terms of CFSP and, indeed, CSDP. There has in general been a wide consensus within the EP on the CSDP. It was active, for example, in pressing the High Representative to take the initiative rather than wait on agreement among the Member States, as in the case of Libya, and to improve coherence in the EU’s political, developmental and commercial policies.

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3.5. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS

European states have differing proclivities to intervene in international crises. Typically it is the high-level decisions on which commentators focus. Which state is willing to engage militarily? Which stays aloof but foots the bill for post-conflict reconstruction and/or development aid in non-conflict areas? Which states prioritise a unified European approach to security and defence issues?

In practice it seems that international responses are far more nuanced than the media would have it. Quite aside from the decision to intervene, states and international organisations need to make decisions about how to intervene, with whom and with what, within the EU, NATO or other multilateral fora, bilaterally or independently.

The UK and France both spend significant sums on money on defence, including personnel and hardware, and are willing to contribute to military interventions in the Neighbourhood and globally. Yet France focuses primarily on the security aspects of foreign policy, whereas the UK may also follow up with development aid as can be seen with their respective contributions to Afghanistan. Indeed, the UK’s cross-party commitment to international development is such that the Coalition Government that took office in May 2010 pledged to raise spending to 0.7% by 2013 at a time when other departmental budgets, notably that of the Ministry of Defence, were being slashed.

Denmark is willing to contribute to both NATO action and development aid. It has been an enthusiastic contributor to both NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan and Libya even though its defence budget is little more than 1.3 per cent of GDP rather than the 2 per cent called for by NATO. On the other hand, its aid budget is well above the average of EU Member States reaching some 0.88% of GNI in 2009. While prepared to work with and through the EU in terms of humanitarian assistance, Denmark has so far retained an opt-out on cooperating with other Member States on CSDP missions.

At opposing ends of spectrum in terms of willingness to intervene militarily and to give aid are Ireland and Poland. Ireland is keen to maintain its neutrality and hence remain outside military interventions. Yet it is strongly wedded to its international development commitments. Thus, even at a time of austerity and budget cuts, Ireland’s aid budget has remained steady at approximately 0.52% of GNI between 2010 and 2011.75 Thanks to the efforts of NGOs this budget appears to be sacrosanct. By contrast, Poland has been a keen NATO member for a decade and is willing both to spend a significant percentage of GNI in

military interventions, yet its development aid is very small and nearly half of this goes to its Eastern neighbours and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{76}

The three case studies, while politically salient for the EU and its Member States, are arguably all examples that demonstrate the constraints on cooperation rather than highlighting best practice or joined-up responses. Largely because European states have differed in their reactions to Palestine over decades, it has been difficult to secure a single EU voice on that issue, as indicated by the different stances taken by the Big Three towards the Palestinian Authority’s bid to for observer status at UNESCO in October 2011. Meanwhile, Libya divides those states that felt intervention was justified in line with UNSC Resolution 1973 and those that did not. Yet even when intervention was led by the two EU permanent members of the UNSC alongside the US as part of a NATO mission, there are clear ramifications for the Union as a whole. Even the case of Afghanistan yields rather mixed in terms of European willingness to engage and remain engaged.

And yet it is clear that the choices of some Member States may impact all – the high-profile NATO action in Libya in response to UNSC Resolution 1973 with significant contributions from France and the UK led to EU post-conflict contributions. Member States cannot act in a vacuum and the effects of their actions are likely to be felt across the Union. All of these issues highlight why creating synergies is desirable but may not be straightforward, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATING AND CREATING BUDGETARY SYNERGIES

Different aspects of foreign, security and defence policy require somewhat different resources to be effective. Successful foreign policy requires persuasive rhetoric but may not entail significant financial commitments – even traditional diplomacy may be enough to achieve the outcome sought. By contrast, defence policy requires credible commitments, which means that rhetoric and diplomacy must be backed up by capabilities, which are dependent on money as well as political will. Meanwhile, development aid has in the past been far less dependent on rhetoric, except at pledging conferences, and heavily dependent on financial commitments to achieve its ends – though the EU's 2011 'more for more' approach to the Mediterranean states may be a harbinger of a new emphasis.77 These different characteristics are mirrored in the way parliaments engage with them, with defence and aid of interest to budgetary control committees given the scale of expenditure.78

Outside the confines of Budget and Budgetary Control committees, parliamentarians appear to pay rather more attention to foreign policy, which demands appropriate rhetoric in support of any substantive policy proposals to succeed but is not necessarily a costly exercise: winning the argument (and the vote) whether within the EU, the UN or NATO is the most important thing. Thus, while a parliamentary role in foreign affairs may be highly sought-after, its relevance to budgetary policy and scrutiny may be less important than that of development or defence policy. Development spending can be a fairly open-ended commitment – goals such as poverty alleviation would require far more resources than the 0.7% of GNI that EU states consistently pledge and for the most part equally consistently fail to deliver. Nonetheless, the amount of money actually spent on ODA is significant and parliaments increasingly tend to scrutinise its delivery in terms of its impact and effectiveness in alleviating poverty and engendering sustainable development. Defence spending tends to entail high costs and thus parliamentary committees tend to devote relatively more time to scrutinising their expenditure, even if with only limited results given the time-lines involved. The choice to focus on some areas more than others makes sense in terms of budgetary control; yet even the very systematic approach to such control used in France leaves one key aspect unexplored: the focus on national priorities and national expenditure. It is a focus that means national governments and parliaments are typically unaware of what other countries are doing and hence ignorant of the potential synergies that exist.

Integration in the areas of security and defence has been difficult both because they reach to the core of what it means to be a nation state and because, unlike the negative

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78 The insights in this paragraph draw on an off-the-record interview with a UK official.
integration seen in moves to complete the internal market, it cannot be achieved just by reducing “technical” barriers to cooperation. The promotion of historic national interests, the protection of nationals overseas, and the defence of the state continue to be seen by Member State governments as an essential part of their contractual responsibility to their citizens whatever the potential efficiency and greater effectiveness of common action. Thus attitudes towards national sovereignty continue to limit the prospects for achieving significant synergies in many areas of European foreign policy-making, as politicians are reluctant to cede (or at least be perceived to cede) sovereignty even in return for savings or added value. This is compounded by a credibility or reputational issue, where states/national governments do not believe that the EU can (or even should) effectively and transparently implement policies. On development aid, for example, states are reluctant to allow further policy and associated funding to shift to the European level, even where monetary savings look possible.79 There have been serious issues here for the Commission, with Member States and the EP sharing concern about the Commission’s role and capabilities in the delivery of aid, as seen by the EP’s repeated refusal to discharge the Union’s annual budget, as well as residual concerns from some Member governments over priorities and control. Such concerns have been shown, too, in the use of military force in support of humanitarian aid and are likely to be even greater in the context of other security and defence policies and in defence procurement. National controls continue, whether in terms of the caveats and various restrictions on the use of armed forces, or national strategic economic or technological concerns and aspirations. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, these concerns, there may be scope for the EP to work with Member States to try to improve delivery of foreign policy priorities via means of budgetary procedures and, most notably, budgetary control procedures. Indeed, this seems to be the thrust of much of a recent House of Lords Report – if only the UK could be persuaded that Europe could bring added value and that the benefits are worth having.80

79 This is clear in the UK context, notably over development aid where the coalition partners are reluctant to see further aid money added to the EU budget to be implemented by the Commission. ‘We don’t want to budgetise EDF because then the UK would lose control of it’ (source: private meeting).
Possible synergies

Whereas the three cases addressed in Chapter 3 highlighted some of the problems associated with coordinating European responses to international issues, there are other more positives examples of coordination working in practice. The EU NAVFOR mission, Atalanta, in which naval action seeks to counter-act piracy off the coast of Somalia, while at the same time the EU is undertaking security training missions, humanitarian and development assistance helping support development goals including governance, education, agricultural development etc. in the Horn of Africa, suggests that EU action can be coherent and effective. In terms of parliamentary control, however, the evidence seems to suggest a more haphazard approach. For example, in their work on EU NAVFOR, Peters et al suggested that one German MP had received information on proposals for the counter-piracy mission from an MEP thereby enabling MPs to ask questions in the Bundestag defence committee earlier than would otherwise have been the case. They also point to the significance of the exchanges of information via party groups at different levels. Such collaboration is one area that parliamentarians from other countries should consider adopting if they have not already done so.

Among Member States, the high-profile bilateral Anglo-French Defence Treaty offers those two countries considerable scope for enhancing their defence capabilities and has been augmented by meetings of representatives of the Defence Committees of the Houses of Commons, Lords (from the relevant EU sub-committee), the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat, which in turn ensures that there is parliamentary oversight. This could therefore provide a useful model for the parliaments of other groups of states cooperating in foreign affairs or defence to consider. Thus, there are ways in which parliaments and executives could find synergies whether in foreign policy and diplomacy, defence or development aid. In particular there are three types of approach that policy-makers should consider:

- Liaison over delivery of aid
- Co-location
- Joint procurement, and pooling and sharing

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82 Dirk Peters, Wolfgang Wagner and Cosima Glahn † Parliamentary Control of Military Missions The Case of the EU NAVFOR Atalanta RECON Online Working Paper 2011/24 p. 17.
4.1. LIAISON OVER DELIVERY OF AID

There is already a degree of cooperation and coordination on the ground in the area of development aid. Interviewees, whether parliamentarians, national officials or members of the European institutions, all stress that locally there is often good, close coordination. The European Commission is also committed to more joint programming to enhance coherence and improve value for money. This has not yet bedded in, not least because it is difficult fundamentally to re-define the relationships of ongoing missions. Moreover, there has been some ‘turf-fighting’ between the Commission and the High Representative and EEAS on the role of aid within a foreign policy framework. However, the case of South Sudan demonstrates how coordination can work. Even if it is heir to a host of conflicts and continuing violence, the emergence of South Sudan as a new country offers a profoundly important as well as urgent opportunity for the EU and other donor states to move in with a coherent approach. While this is clearly not a circumstance that can be readily replicated it does show the scope for coordinated work. So, too, does Tanzania where the European Commission and the British and German development departments, DfID and GIZ respectively, have a degree of role specialisation, which enhances leverage. This coordination is enhanced by the fact that DfID and GIZ share a building with Swedish and Dutch representatives, an example of a second area where synergies could be significant:

4.2. CO-LOCATION

The costs of diplomatic and trade representation in third countries are high and present particular problems for small EU Member States. Many potential savings are to be found from Member States and the EU thinking more creatively about where they have diplomatic representation. So far there are very few examples, though one is in Dar es Salaam, where several EU Member States, including the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, have their Missions in the same building. Similarly, in Almaty the French have joined the British, Germans and Dutch. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office is also looking at co-location but too often only in terms of bringing together Embassies, Trade, International Development and the British Council.83 A more ambitious approach might include co-location and sharing of facilities, though this has been achieved so far by, for example, the Nordic countries only in Berlin. Further development of the habit of sharing could be of particular benefit to the EU especially as the European External Action Service develops. Co-location of the Service with other embassies is an option that the European Union should explore further. Whether this can be extended to consular issues remains more open, at least at present. As we understood that there would be a Budget Committee hearing on the European Added Value stemming from coordination of diplomatic and consular services in January 2012, we have not commented further on this

idea in this Study, although we do believe there is considerable scope for synergies in this area, both in terms of budgetary savings and more efficient and effective working practices.

4.3. JOINT PROCUREMENT, AND POOLING AND SHARING

It has long been held that joint defence procurement should be an area where clear savings would be possible for states that cooperate from the outset of a project. Yet the practice of joint procurement to date has frequently raised questions for practitioners who have seen the costs of equipment such as Eurofighter Typhoon or the A400M escalate while Member States, caught up in pork-barrel politics, have squabbled over where the kit should be manufactured.84 While, there therefore continues to be considerable wariness on the part of Member States of joint procurement beyond cooperation among a very small number of countries, it remains a suitable area for developing synergies, since it does not entail any loss of sovereignty. The very creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) – established under a Joint Action in 2004 and strengthened by inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty – was indicative of that continuing belief. The EDA has among its aims the development of capabilities, promoting R&T and arms cooperation. But, as the EDA itself admits, any improvement in defence capabilities ‘can only succeed when its shareholders – the participating Member States – deliver these capabilities’.85

Moving from joint procurement to deeper cooperation including pooling and sharing of military resources offers further scope for reducing costs as a degree of duplication can be cut, for example there need only be one training or maintenance budget instead of two, as the Belgians and Dutch have shown over the years with their naval cooperation.86 In addition to the headline financial savings that can accrue from such cooperation there are further, less immediately obvious gains to be made from the enhanced interoperability that will be generated. Savings could be generated by extending the range of military hardware included in such practices and increasing the number of European states involved in such practices.

Ministers of Defence have often committed themselves to the idea of pooling and sharing, most recently in the Ghent Initiative agreed at the informal meeting of EU defence Ministers in December 2010, but have not yet acted upon it.87 Parliaments could encourage governments to deliver on the potential synergies available from cooperation

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84 Such concerns emerged in off-the-record interviews. Similarly, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee noted in 2011 that ‘The project began in the 1980s and the Department was over-optimistic on costs. In particular, it failed to anticipate significant cost increases and delays from the rigid and complex collaborative arrangements.’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts ‘Management of the Typhoon project Thirtieth Report of Session 2010–12’, Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed Monday 4 April 2011 (London: the Stationery Office Ltd, 2011).


if they adopted a more pro-active approach to agenda-setting in terms of defence or development, lobbying governments to take notice of the options available, and the savings to be made rather than simply responding to their respective government’s agenda. While this is not always possible – most parliamentary committees are reactive to what the governments do or propose doing rather than creating proposals for what they could or should do – the fact that ministers have already committed themselves in this area means that parliaments have an opportunity to press them on whether and when they will move forward in this area, which could offer savings and increase capacity.

So how can we identify potential synergies? What should governments and parliaments be looking for?

4.4. IDENTIFYING SYNERGIES: AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

Finding synergies in Foreign Policy is in part constrained by Member States’ recognition of the convergence or otherwise of national interests and preferences as well as a sense of their place in the world or in the region. If the costs of traditional diplomacy may be relatively predictable, those of defence and particularly humanitarian aid can be open-ended and can potentially consume vast amounts of national and/or EU budgets. In reality, the amount of money to be spent on development aid is often ring-fenced, with a target of 0.7% of GNI set as a (rarely achieved) target; expenditure on defence is determined by the costs of procurement and state-specific views of their military requirements, with neither minimum nor maximum expenditure typically agreed in advance as percentages of the national budget or GNI. Existing commitments, whether in terms of infrastructure in third countries (embassies, consulates and representations of trade or development departments), aid or military capabilities, ensure the positions of European states are quite divergent, thereby reducing the opportunities and scope for pooling resources. Nonetheless, there are sufficient points of shared interest to make closer cooperation highly attractive and the search for synergies in foreign policy-making worthwhile, particularly at a time of fiscal austerity. The challenges of finding synergies in the different components of foreign policy are somewhat different, depending on whether decision-makers focus mainly on infrastructural or personnel commitments for which funding must be found, e.g. diplomatic representation or military hardware, or commit to a certain level of expenditure and look for ways of spending it, as in aid.

With development aid, the sums of money available to spend are known at least in broad terms, as most states have minimum targets for spending (even if few apart from Denmark reach, far less surpass, their targets). Even at a time of financial crisis and budget cuts there has been widespread reluctance to cut aid budgets, although some states such as Italy have done so. On the other hand, the UK is increasing spending towards its 0.7% target. The guiding principle for most states is not to cut expenditure but to ensure that the money spent is effective and delivers significant outcomes. The question is thus how
best to deliver aid projects in order to meet stated aims and objectives, e.g. poverty alleviation, eradication of particular diseases or even conflict prevention. There has been a problem of ‘aid darlings’ where the plight of certain states, or their willingness to adopt Western forms of governance, captures the imagination of the international community, which falls over itself to pour aid into those countries, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the monies committed as activities are duplicated and it becomes difficult to quantify the impact of any one state or actor’s activity in the country. Moreover, excessive attention to some countries or regions means that other fragile states (the aid ‘orphans’) are regularly neglected by donor states. If states coordinated their activities in practice, this could have a hugely beneficial effect. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which precisely addressed this issue, has reduced the problem but it has not been wholly alleviated.

While coordination by donors is best done at a global level along the lines sought by the OECD in the Paris Declaration, including the World Bank and IMF, co-ordination among EU states and between the EU and the member states could already offer synergies and help reduce duplication, thereby increasing the impact of the aggregate European aid budget. One way of reducing this problem would be to follow the lead of the German Party Foundations in their approach to democracy-building, which is that they will focus on different countries rather than all focusing on the same few states, or specialising in certain sectors, as already happens with DFID, GIZ and ECHO in Tanzania. This ensures that expertise can be shared far more effectively to a wider range of countries in total. If European states were to coordinate their aid more systematically than at present they could similarly increase overall effectiveness by reducing potential duplication in terms of the countries they target and the types of aid they deliver in the countries targeted.

In order to improve coordination and increase the impact and effectiveness of European development aid whether from the Union or the individual Member States, it is essential that actors coordinate their activity. In order to do so this information needs to be easily available and transmitted to relevant parties, whether within nation states, horizontally to other states or vertically to the EU level.

In terms of an analytical tool is it is important for policy-makers collectively to be aware of the total expenditure on aid by the EU and its Member States, where the commitments are going both in terms of geography and type of aid given, and the outcomes. If much of this is already gathered by the OECD both on a national and comparative basis, as the Paris Declaration and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee seek to do, it remains underused by parliaments at all levels.

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The tool requires comprehensive information concerning both financial commitments and the aims and objectives of the EU and its 27 (soon to be 28) MS as well as current outcomes, which will assist in assessing how far changes to the delivery of aid can create synergies. In using OECD and World Bank information that is already freely available, parliaments need to explore further both financial and rhetorical commitments of their governments as well as qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the outcomes, ideally drilling right down to the level of individual projects. In summary they need:

1. A qualitative evaluation of the policy commitments of each MS and of the EU as a whole against which to assess the effectiveness of the chosen policies/budgetary commitments;

2. An assessment of the aggregate resources available (Total Money available to spend on aid = Total EU commitments + Total commitments in each MS), to be augmented by;

3. Specific information on spending in general on aid projects by target country, by type of expenditure by target country, and by donor state, with a particular aim to assess where there is duplication of effort by different actors;

4. An assessment of outcomes, where the precise mechanism for assessment will depend on the targets, e.g. levels of literacy, child mortality, absence of conflict in the states;

5. Reviewing the data from 3 and 4 would then allow policy-makers to assess whether there are synergies in their policy-making and budgets in this field and, hence, to make informed choices about where to deliver aid either individually or in partnership with the EU or other MS.
Figure 4: Analytical tool for development aid

Synergies might include deciding to co-locate in a single building if more than one actor, whether a state, NGO or international institution, feels that their presence in the third country remains necessary following a thorough review of commitments. This would reduce infrastructure and running costs of their activities. Equally, states and/or the EU might decide to withdraw from certain countries, meaning that they focused their expenditure on a smaller number of states. The advantage of a systematic approach to reviewing commitments, resources and outcomes is that any such withdrawal could be done in a planned way that did not leave sudden gaps in provision as recently occurred when the Danes unilaterally pulled out of Burkina Faso.90

The European Commission clearly recognises the benefits of creating a more stream-lined approach to delivering aid in third countries. This is an oft-repeated aim in a recent

90 Source: off-the-record interview.
publication on the Union’s Instrument for Stability. The Union is beginning to have a more joined-up approach in third countries in line with the Paris Declaration. However, the view of officials in the Commission and national capitals is that this could go further.

A similar tool and set of recommendations emerge in the areas of defence and other aspects of foreign policy, although the specific questions to be addressed differ somewhat, since in this area states tend to have a sense of what capabilities they deem necessary – military and/or diplomatic – depending on their respective sizes and aspirations to play regional or global roles, and, hence, what commitments they want to make, at least in terms of equipment and manpower. They then seek to find the money in their budgets to meet these ambitions, rather than setting the budget first as in the case of aid. Costs frequently overrun, as do delivery times, not least when sophisticated technologies are introduced or modified to meet the changing demands of allies, strategies and/or circumstances. As with aid there is a danger of duplication arising from individual actors, whether states, international organisations or NGOs, making decisions in isolation. In the case of defence this manifests itself in duplication of equipment and manpower, with all the dangers of non-interoperability, which means that the EU and its Member States enjoy considerably less power projection for their total expenditure in comparison with the US.

In terms of finding synergies, the key issues to address are the role the EU and its Member States seek to play in the world before assessing the aggregate capabilities across the Union required to meet these objectives, and then to identify the funds to procure the kit and pay for the armed forces. However, the subject is complicated in practice by the fact that the costs of military equipment are not necessarily fixed: joint procurement might lead to economies of scale and thus reduce the costs for any state seeking to procurement jointly with others and thus ensure that the aggregate European capabilities can be increased at the same or lower cost. Yet, paradoxically, this rarely happens as each state adds its own individual specifications, and social, employment or strategic technological considerations lead to multiple production sites regardless of manufacturing logic. If parliaments are often sympathetic to the latter considerations, governments seem incapable of even framing joint procurement needs on any systematic basis - hence the difficult task facing the EDA. The European Security Strategy and the Implementation Report of 2008 may have given an indication of the threats and challenges facing the EU – many of which were also enunciated in national reviews – but it did little to provide much guidance on how they should be met beyond “effective multilateralism”.

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Thus in the area of defence and diplomacy the analytical tool would need to assess EU foreign policy priorities/objectives and what sort of resources would be required to deliver them. Specifically it should:

1. **Review objectives**
2. **Calculate the aggregate capabilities required to deliver the objectives, broken down by infrastructure, kit and personnel**
3. **Determine current EU capabilities = \( \Sigma \) capabilities of the 27MS + EU**
4. **Identify the gaps and/or surpluses in aggregate capabilities**
5. **Seek ways to reduce surpluses and fill the gaps, whether by joint procurement or role specialisation in terms of kit, co-location in terms of buildings and joint training in terms of personnel**

**Figure 5: Analytical tool for defence and diplomacy**

- Review objectives and aggregate capabilities required (Infrastructure, kit, personnel)
- Assess current aggregate capabilities (= \( \Sigma \) Total EU + Total MS)
- Identify gaps and/or surpluses in aggregate capabilities
- Seek ways to reduce surpluses and fill gaps e.g. joint procurement and training, role specialisation, co-location
Gathering the necessary aggregate information, particularly in the field of development aid, which is complex and comprises myriad small projects in numerous third countries, is inevitably beyond the scope of this Study, as it requires a vast amount of information to be made available by every Member State as well as by the EU. One example highlights the inherent difficulties: there is a Director in the UK Department for International Development responsible for Value for Money. She has a whole team of accountants to assist her in evaluating value for DFID’s money, and that is but one department in one Member State. However, governments and parliaments collectively do have the necessary resources and if they were to act in a joined-up way and share information, it would be possible for them to review commitments and assess whether alternative methods could deliver better value for money and/or European Added Value. It is important to recall, however, all the policy areas considered in this Study – Foreign, Defence, and Development – have an element of fixed cost and aspects that need to be flexible according to international context: requirements for defence spending will be higher at times of military conflict, for foreign and development policy might be higher at times of natural disasters, such as flood or famine, as indeed might military expenditure. Thus, there is a need for flexibility in budgets beyond the core costs of personnel and hardware, which again could be best dealt with by the EU and its Member States co-ordinating their responses.

There is a role for the EDA role to encourage, exhort and undertake studies as suggested above in order to further the ‘pooling and sharing’ which Member States have begun to consider as a way to deliver military capabilities in future. And there is a crucial role for the EP and national parliaments to hold governments accountable for decisions in this field. While the EDA has been “working closely with NATO to seek synergies”, the NATO Assembly tends to debate strategic priorities and NATO activities. As the WEU (and hence its Assembly) no longer exists, national parliaments are currently the only bodies that discuss defence expenditure and they do so only on a national basis, focusing on national commitments. There is thus a critical role for the EP, ideally in conjunction with national parliaments, to review the situation in the Union as a whole, rather than the piecemeal approach that national parliaments acting in isolation inevitably have. Better inter-parliamentary communication (again) including national committees would assist in delivering synergies in foreign policy, with evidence-gathering from national actors as well as from NATO/EU officials and, especially, regular communication with the relevant EP committee(s).

If such a joined-up approach to foreign policy and the money to finance it were taken, there would be a clear need for systematic oversight and scrutiny by national parliaments and/or European Parliament. This would necessitate much clearer lines of communication between parliaments than currently experienced via COSAC or any of its analogues. Prior to this, however, parliaments have a key role in

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persuading their national governments of the importance of looking for synergies as the EP and European Commission have already recognised and, especially, of sharing information on costs, so that there is transparency, paving the way for common or shared approaches to be undertaken on the basis of full information, without which the synergies cannot be adequately exploited.

Conclusions

In sum, the key for creating synergies in foreign policy is to identify areas where either EU-level, or more likely collaborative action either within small groups or the MS working at 27, can deliver policy more effectively and/or at lower cost than if states act alone. However, there are two problems that have to be borne in mind: the issue of comparability of budgets and the resistance of (national) institutions. The former could be tackled by requiring Member States to produce their budgets in similar formats and circulating them to other budgetary committees in good time, thereby at least enabling some informed comparative debate and even some bench-marking. Taking evidence from other committees, including the EP’s Budget Committee might be considered as a matter of course to break down the national stove-piping that currently exists. However, there must be clear benefits for the committees and the Member governments in order for this to be politically acceptable.93

While the concept of European Added Value is useful, it is one that, while necessary, is certainly not sufficient to bring about fundamental reforms to the MFF/budget, particularly in regard to foreign policy-making. If Member States are not convinced, they will not agree to alter the balance of funding towards foreign affairs. Thus, it is imperative to focus on areas where Member States’ interests and preferences converge so that the overall benefits of co-ordinating policies and/or uploading further policies and associated budgets are apparent to policy-makers and their electorates. It is also the case that many of the potential synergies for example ‘pooling and sharing’ will take time to yield financial savings, rendering them less immediately attractive to policy-makers seeking to make early budget cuts and subject to pressing electoral timetables. Joint procurement can be a lengthy business. One national official we interviewed for this study stated that he was not interested in investing now to save later; the savings need to be upfront to be of interest. While others interviewed were not so blunt in their answers, it is clear that synergies need to produce headline savings to be of interest to governments or parliaments.

We strongly recommend that the Union adopt an approach whereby it decides what policies it wishes to pursue and then determines the budget rather than deciding a budget/set of budget lines and then trying to find ways of spending the money; finding

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solutions to problems is profoundly better than seeming to have solutions but casting about for the specific problem. This will both yield more effective foreign policy outcomes and ensure Member States are clear at the outset that the budget is being used for activities to which they have committed themselves. In the context of the forthcoming MFF, which takes place at a time of budget cuts across the Union, a clear understanding of foreign policy preferences will be important if budget lines in this area are to be protected.

In addition, it is vital to understand the aims and objectives of Member States as well as the EU in order to try to identify synergies. Areas where cooperation and uploading of policy might appear to deliver EAV and cut aggregate costs will not be acceptable to Member States if it appears that the ‘added value’ diverges in any significant way from their own policy preferences. This is especially clear in the area of development aid where, for example, the UK can see benefits to uploading policy but is reluctant to cede control. This is compounded by a belief that unilateral action by a Member State can be important for leveraging additional money from other states in a way that a larger global EU pot might not be able to achieve.

In order to ascertain where potential synergies lie and whether other MS are likely to be willing to cooperate in order to bring them about, it is vital that policy-makers have a clear sense of current capabilities in each of the participating states. States acting in isolation are more likely to make decisions which cumulatively lead to over- or under-provision. Thus it is important to ensure that duplication and gaps in provision can be identified and tackled. At present there is a dearth of clear information even within individual states where departments seem not to talk to each other. There is a similar issue with respect to parliamentary committees, which typically follow the same thematic lines as the ministries they follow. The European Union and its parliament are not immune from this tendency either and it is compounded by a lack of coordination vertically between the EP and national parliaments and horizontally between national parliaments. Tackling this lack of information and communication would ensure that potential synergies can be identified and suitable action taken. To this end, more effective inter-parliamentary engagement is required.

Inter-parliamentary cooperation, whether formal or informal, is desirable in order that parliamentarians gain the mutual trust and enhanced knowledge that could actually assist them in identifying genuine synergies in their respective foreign policy-making roles. It is not enough that (some) national parliamentary committees, such as the Danish European Committee, communicate with their national MEPs. Taking evidence from national MEPs on relevant EP committees on a systematic basis could assist national parliaments in understanding at least EU aspirations. The twice yearly debates on CFSP might be

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This approach is not uncontroversial. One official from a Member State interviewed for this project took an apparently diametrically opposed view, arguing that the budget should be set on the basis of what money is available and then require sectoral ministries to make the case for further spending. In practice, the two approaches may differ little: capabilities will only be funded to the extent that the budget is available. And in the EU case there is no scope for the EP to raise taxes. Nor can the budget go into deficit. Thus, deciding first what you want to achieve will still not lead to a blank cheque becoming available to fund foreign policy.
regarded as prompts for debates in national parliaments. Coordinated/simultaneous debates across the EU could provide a useful focus to sharing of information and finding common interests and would not be impossible for parliaments to schedule.

The Lisbon Treaty itself provides opportunities for more consistent and profound inter-parliamentary cooperation. As the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee noted in response to the termination of the WEU-ESDA, the Lisbon Treaty’s Protocol 1 on the role of national parliaments in the EU had been proposed as a legal basis for establishing an inter-parliamentary body to scrutinise CSDP.95 Art. 10 of the Protocol allows a conference of national European Scrutiny committees ‘to organise inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy’ (Protocol 1, Art. 10, ToL). Taking advantage of this mechanism could enable national parliaments to share information and to coordinate with one another in a more systematic way, ideally leading to more focused scrutiny of EU foreign and security policy.

However, as the reaction to the House of Commons’ recommendations on Inter-parliamentary Scrutiny highlights, the creation of an inter-parliamentary body to replace the WEU Assembly will not be easy. Whereas the House of Commons recommended six parliamentarians from each country and from the EP, MEPs felt they should make up a larger percentage of such a body. Even if this issue can be resolved other issues remain. National parliamentarians, particularly from the larger Member States, are reluctant to attend meetings of fellow parliamentarians if they believe they are likely simply to be platforms for the EU institutions to talk at them and then adjourn for lunch.96 To a large extent such concerns are justified. Given the number of bicameral systems in the EU, any meeting that seeks to bring together representatives members of all the chambers will have over 40 people, rendering the prospect of any meaningful discussion quite limited. True, the networking associated with such gatherings might be useful in fostering ties between groups of like-minded parliamentarians, but to generate serious professional relationships MPs would need to meet more frequently than every six months as at present. It is unlikely that many MPs would wish to devote so much time to travelling to meetings that appear to have little benefit (at least in terms of their domestic constituencies on whom they rely for re-election).97

While meetings between parliamentarians can work well in the context of coalitions of the willing where only a few states are represented and thus the number of participants is quite small, they are not an effective way of resolving gaps in information or effective communication when all 27 (soon to be 28) MS and the EC/EP are involved. One alternative to such meetings might be for parliamentarians to create a virtual network in

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96 This concern was expressed by officials and by national and European parliamentarians.
97 It is notable that even a Commission official remarked on the fact that his regular meetings with representatives of the MS are always one-way: he presents Commission proposals and the MS listen. Thus any opportunity for genuine dialogue is missing.
which they would undertake similar activities in the own legislature. In particular, in order
to overcome the lack of current data which render the development of synergies so
difficult, the various parliaments could development some shared working practices. For
example, if MPs in all European parliaments began simultaneously to table parlamentary questions on the same topic there would be a chance that a joined-up picture could be developed, enabling parliaments and executives alike to make more informed budgetary decisions of foreign policy than at present. This could be extended from parliamentary questions in plenary session to common lines of questioning in parliamentary committees. Clearly such an approach should be deployed with care. Any sense that parliaments are being required to act in a certain way is likely to backfire. But if used for the limited areas of policy linked to CSDP it could ensure parliaments were able to identify synergies and potentially deliver them. Moreover, such coordination would overcome the gaps in accountability seen in the current arrangements, which would be a positive side-benefit of such a change.
APPENDIX 1: BOXES OF BUDGETARY PROCEDURES

The Danish Folketing

Formulating and proposing
The budget is drawn up in the Ministry of Finance and proposed to the unicameral legislature, the Folketing, by the Government, four months before the start of the next financial year. This timetable is stipulated by the Danish Constitution.

Scrutinising and debating
After the introduction of the government’s budget, the Finance Committee conducts a technical review of the proposals. There follows a formal plenary debate about the proposals, which generally covers a broad perspective on the Government’s economic policy and outlines opposition positions.

Amending and voting
The Danish legislature has unrestricted powers to amend the government’s proposed budget. This usually occurs through a series of negotiations involving representatives of all political parties and the Government. After changes have been made and approved by the plenary, Parliament then votes on individual sectoral appropriations rather than on the total amount of expenditure.

Appropriations are allocated to departments and agencies as a lump sum for operating expenditures, with a sub-limit on wages.

Changes and additional expenditures
As stipulated in the Danish constitution, any changes in spending – including increases, cuts and virements between line items – must be approved by the Finance Committee (after gaining approval from the Ministry of Finance). All changes are bundled into a single legislative act and voted on by the plenary at the end of the year, but in practice this is a formality.

Audit scrutiny
The Rigsrevisionen (National Audit Office) reports to Parliament’s Finance Committee, which is the only body that can commission its studies.

### The French Parlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulating and proposing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The budget is drawn up by the budget department of the Ministry of Finance and proposed to both houses of the legislature – the Assemblée Nationale (lower house) and the Sénat (upper house) – by the Government <strong>four months</strong> before the start of the next financial year. Both chambers are involved in the process, but the lower chamber has the right to overrule the upper.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scrutinising and debating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a formal debate in the legislature on economic and budgetary priorities before the Government introduces its budget. Once the proposals are delivered, they are first given to the Assemblée Nationale Finance Committee, and then passed to the Sénat’s Finance Committee. In both chambers, members of other sectoral committees attend during discussions of relevant appropriations.</td>
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<th>Amending and voting</th>
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<tr>
<td>The legislature cannot make any amendments that increase line-item expenditures, but they do have the power to decrease expenditure. The legislature votes on the total amount of expenditure as well as the sectoral appropriations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sectoral appropriations are allocated to departments and agencies in a <strong>lump sum</strong>, without restrictions on how the departments spend them.</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes and additional expenditures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After the budget is passed, increases in mandatory spending must be approved by the legislature <strong>ex post</strong>, while increases in discretionary spending require <strong>ex ante</strong> approval. The Executive retains the power to cut spending without the need to consult the legislature, but only on a limited proportion of passed appropriations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplementary budgets must be approved before the Executive can overspend on discretionary spending, but this approval is not required for mandatory spending.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Audit scrutiny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The <strong>Cour des Comptes</strong> reports to the Assemblée Nationale, as well as to the President and the Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sources: OECD, available at: [http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en_2649_34119_2494461_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3746,en_2649_34119_2494461_1_1_1,00.html), and the French parliamentary website.
The Irish Oireachtas

**Formulating and proposing**
The Budget is proposed by the Department of Finance in December each year, one month before the start of the financial year. Only the lower chamber of the Parliament, the Dáil, is involved in financial matters.

**Scrutinising and debating**
After the introduction of the budget, there is a formal debate about the broad outline of the proposals. A few months after the start of the financial year, sectoral committees formally consider appropriations for their respective departments and agencies.

**Amending and voting**
The Dáil does not have the power to amend the budget or to propose changes. After the sectoral committees approve the proposals, each sectoral appropriation must be voted on individually.

The appropriations are delivered in a lump sum to the departments, which are not formally required to spend the money in the precise numbers outlined in the Estimates.

**Changes and additional expenditures**
After the Estimates have been approved by parliament, Departments may decrease spending without consulting the parliament. However, any increase in spending, or movement of funds from one sectoral appropriation to another, requires ex-ante legislative approval in the form of a supplementary estimate.

**Audit scrutiny**
Independent ex-post scrutiny is carried out by the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, which reports to the lower chamber’s Public Accounts Committee. Sectoral Committees may also invite Ministers or outside experts to testify about particular aspects of spending.


Oireachtas website, [http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/](http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/)
The Italian Parlamento

**Formulating and proposing**
The budget is drawn up by the General Inspectorate for Budget Policy in the Ministry of Finance and proposed to both houses of the legislature – the Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and the Senato – by the Government, three months before the start of the next financial year. Both chambers are equally involved in the process.

**Scrutinising and debating**
There is a formal debate in the legislature on budgetary and economic priorities before the Government introduces its budget. The Economic and Financial Document is submitted to the Budget Committee, which produces a report for plenary, following input from other Standing Committees.

**Amending and voting**
The Budget and Finance Committees may make unrestricted amendments to the budget proposals, but the plenary may not.

The legislature votes on the specific appropriations rather than on the total amount of expenditure.

Sectoral appropriations are allocated to departments and agencies in a lump sum, covering both capital and operating expenditures, with a sub-limit on wages.

**Changes and additional expenditures**
After the budget is passed, legislative approval is not required for an increase in mandatory spending. However, increases in discretionary spending are subject to ex-post legislative approval.

**Supplementary budgets** must be approved before the Executive can overspend.

**Audit scrutiny**
The Corte dei Conti (Court of Accounts) reports to the parliament.

Sources: Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate.
## The Polish Zgromadzenie Narodowe

### Formulating and proposing
The budget is drawn up in the Ministry of Finance and proposed to both houses of the legislature – the **Sejm** (lower house) and the **Senat** (upper house) – by the Government, no later than **three months before** the start of the financial year. Both chambers are involved in the process, but the lower chamber has the right to overrule the upper.

### Scrutinising and debating
After the Executive introduces the budget, there is a plenary debate on budget policy. The budget proposals are then given to the **Public Finance Committee** of the **Sejm**, while the sectoral committees in both chambers also scrutinise proposals for their respective sectors.

### Amending and voting
After reviewing the budget proposals, the sectoral committees can propose amendments to the Budget, as long as these do not change the total deficit or surplus proposed by the Government. The Finance Committee’s report is then debated by the **Sejm**, where **groups of 15 or more MPs can also propose amendments**. After voting on the Budget and suggested amendments the bill passes to the **Senat**, which can propose amendments to the **Sejm**’s bill. The **Sejm** can, however, reject the **Senat**’s amendments.

Appropriations are allocated as a **lump sum** to the relevant agencies and departments, linked to targets imposed by the Executive.

### Changes and additional expenditures
In theory, the Government must obtain the **Sejm**’s approval in order to raise the overall amount of spending after the Budget passes. However, the Budget includes a number of **Special Reserve Funds** for unforeseen expenditures, which can be used at the Government’s discretion.

### Audit scrutiny
The **Najwyższa Izba Kontroli** (Supreme Audit Office) reports to the **Sejm Public Finance Committee** and submits an annual report on the previous year’s expenditure to the **Sejm**.

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The UK’s Houses of Parliament

Formulating and proposing
The Budget is drawn up by the Treasury and presented to Parliament’s lower chamber, the House of Commons, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the spring (roughly one month before the start of the financial year). Although both Houses of Parliament must approve the budget, the powers of the upper chamber (the House of Lords) are limited by convention.

Two different procedures for revenue and expenditure
After the Government introduces the budget, there is a general debate on budget policy. However, there are separate procedures for approving the revenue side of the budget (the Finance Bill) and the expenditure side (the Estimates/Appropriation Act).

The House of Commons debates the Finance Bill after its introduction. In its Committee Stage, the budget is examined by a Committee of the Whole House and, in part, by the Public Accounts Committee. At this stage, members of the Commons can propose amendments. The Commons then votes on each item of taxation or duty individually. After the budget passes, the Commons it goes to the House of Lords, which must give assent to the budget but cannot make changes or overrule the Commons.

The process relating to expenditures is more restrictive. One of the Estimates is chosen for debate and the rest of the Estimates are approved as a package without debate or the potential for amendments. As in the revenue side, the Lords must assent to the decisions but cannot overrule the lower chamber. Sectoral appropriations are allocated to departments and agencies in a lump sum, covering both capital and operating expenditures, with a sub-limit on wages.

Changes and additional expenditures
After the budget is passed, the Government can increase discretionary expenditure subject to ex-post legislative approval, and can cut or rescind expenditure without legislative approval. The Executive can also overspend without requiring legislative approval.

Audit scrutiny
The National Audit Office reports to the Public Accounts Committee.

The European Parliament

Formulating and proposing
The Budget is proposed by the European Commission and submitted to the two budgetary arms of the Union, the European Parliament and the Council, which co-decide the Budget.

Scrutinising and debating
The proposals go first to the Council and then to the European Parliament.

Amending and voting
The Council may amend the Commission’s proposals. It then sends its formal position with reasons for any amendments to the European Parliament. The EP then takes a position on the Council’s amended version of the proposals.

If the Council does not accept the EP’s amendments, a Conciliation Committee is set up to secure agreement. If this is not reached before the start of the new financial year, a system of 1/12ths is used until such time as the budget is adopted.

Changes and additional expenditures
The Commission may seek to amend the budget during the year, subject to the same procedures as the original budget.

Audit scrutiny
The Court of Auditors provides an ex-post audit to the Council and European Parliament. In the EP it is the Budgetary Control Committee which scrutinises expenditure ex-post following publication of the Court of Auditors’ report.

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Towards a More Comprehensive, Strategic and Cost-effective EU Foreign Policy:
The Role of National Parliaments and the European Parliament

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Polish Aid website, http://www.polishaid.gov.pl


policy-formulation in national parliaments’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 672-89
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT
BUDGETARY AFFAIRS

Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.

Policy Areas
- Budgets
- Budgetary Control

Documents