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ASSESSING THE EU'S APPROACH TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION

DIRECTORATE B

POLICY DEPARTMENT

STUDY

ASSESSING THE EU'S APPROACH TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

Abstract

SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance. The EU has engaged in aspects of SSR for the past decade through its CFSP/CSDP as well as development and enlargement policies. The recently launched CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa take place in a new institutional context, and address European security concerns in a fragile but geopolitically important region. The EU's engagement with SSR in general and the Horn of Africa in particular shows the difficulties in simultaneously pursuing dual objectives of stability and institution-building and in adopting and coordinating long- and short-term approaches to the problems facing the region. To do justice to the holistic conception of SSR and its emphasis on accountability and democratic oversight, the training of security forces and capacity building needs to be framed in a long-term approach that aims for sustainable structural change. The creation of the EEAS has given the EU the right tools – but a continued emphasis on policy coordination is necessary to address old and new, institutional and operational, challenges so as to attain a comprehensive approach to SSR. The input and continued commitment of member states to CSDP also remains vital.

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ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Manage
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid
DG ENL	Directorate General for Enlargement
DCI	Development Co-operation Instrument
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PMG	Politico-Military Group
UN	United Nations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security Sector Reform (SSR) – that is, strengthening and reforming those institutions that are key to maintaining security and the rule of law under conditions of local ownership and democratic accountability - represents a holistic approach to the reform of state security institutions. Such an approach inherently resonates with the EU's emphasis on a comprehensive approach towards situations of conflict and instability. The fight against piracy and the building up and reforming of security and governance institutions in the Horn of Africa have put the spotlight on the EU's approach towards SSR – as do ongoing processes of transition in the MENA region and the need for support to security and governance structures.

The EU has engaged in SSR both through the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Commission instruments for the past decade. It has collected a significant number of lessons learned when it comes to the planning, conduct and coordination of its various policies. While there is significant expertise in SSR, however, the EU has to date not developed an explicit SSR strategy. The EU's approach towards SSR has developed through practice, in particular through its CSDP missions, but without a concomitant codification of procedures and policies. This applies both to the development and subsequent reform of institutional structures and coordination mechanisms in Brussels as well as operational experience in the field.

The launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the increasing engagement with a comprehensive approach to crisis management represents an opportunity to shape a new operational culture towards increasing coherence in the framework of an ongoing review of individual structures and operational practice. Through the EEAS the EU has the increasing potential, not least through its improved representation in the field, to shape a new approach towards addressing situations of instability, weak governance and institutional capacity, and the absence of the rule of law. The EU CSDP holds an important place in the overall EU SSR toolkit both through direct member state intervention as well as civilian and military expertise for reforming a country's security apparatus.

Current areas of transition and instability, together with 'unfinished business' in more established areas of EU engagement, place a renewed focus on SSR as a core activity beyond the EU's borders. The recent launch of a number of CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa in particular represents not only a new geographical engagement and renewed engagement with CSDP instruments that combine simultaneous pursuits of stability and long-term institution building. They also put to the test tenets of EU engagement, in particular the coherence between instruments. Finally, they also pose old and new questions as to the EU and its member states' ability to put a comprehensive approach in practice.

This study first provides an overview of the EU's SSR tools and analyzes EU engagement in the Horn of Africa. The study then evaluates the EU's approach to SSR through CSDP and other instruments – in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere – and formulates recommendations on how to improve the EU's approach to SSR both at the institutional and field level, drawing on the developments since the launch of the EEAS but also the ongoing review of the EU's crisis management structures.

1. THE EU'S ROLE IN SSR

The EU's role in SSR derives, first, from the institutional actors that shape EU policy. This includes the European External Action Service, Commission as well as Council bodies. Instruments and resources, both financial and operational also shape the EU's approach. Finally, a policy framework consisting of the Treaties, secondary legislation that covers SSR, and the European Security Strategy form the strategic and legal background in which the EU's role in SSR is shaped. Much of this framework pre-dates the Lisbon Treaty, and the creation of the EEAS represents an opportunity for the EU to re-think and re-shape its approach towards SSR.

1.1 EU Actors involved in shaping the EU's approach to SSR

A number of institutional actors shape the EU's approach to SSR. They provide institutional resources to draw from in the planning and implementation of SSR policies. First and foremost, this involves EEAS under the political leadership of HR/VP Ashton. Relevant Commission directorates also provide SSR assistance. Council structures, finally, ensure member states input and oversight of individual policy tools and their implementation. Given its unique composition the new EEAS structures – together with relevant Commission instruments - can embed CSDP missions in a broader political and developmental structure, serve as a point of coordination or at least information among member states, and adjust policies in light of conditions on the ground – including relations with host governments.

1.1.1 The European External Action Service (EEAS)

The EEAS combines a number of relevant institutional structures and policy instruments under its roof that encompass crisis management but also political and diplomatic instruments. The latter relate both to country expertise as well as horizontal matters. Staffed by former Commission and Council officials as well as member state diplomats, the EEAS represents an ongoing attempt to merge previously separate organizational cultures, structures and competences. This merger has not been without growing pains and, at the time of writing, is by no means complete. At the same time, in the long term the emerging EEAS structures stand to improve the coherence between EU instruments as well as the EU's representation in the field[1]. The creation of the post of High Representative, which is double-hatted with that of Vice-President of the Commission, gives the EU visibility but is also to improve coherence between EEAS and Commission foreign policy instruments. Balfour et. al. (2012) suggest that the EEAS can fulfill a number of functions in support of EU foreign policy: a service to all the EU institutions as a source of analysis and strategy; a knowledge bank; a scout on the ground through its enhanced delegations; a center of a spider's web of communication for external policies; coordination; and a policy entrepreneur in the identification and formulation of strategies or policy sectors. These functions could also apply to SSR, both in terms of the coordination of instruments, the linkage between Brussels and the field, and the pursuit of institutional and operational innovation.

1.1.2 Crisis management Structures

The EU crisis management structures enable the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, which to date represent the most visible EU contribution to SSR. The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) provides the roof under which civilian and military missions are planned

[1] For an analysis of the emerging EEAS structures and their impact on EU foreign policy see Balfour et. al. (2012) The European External Action Service at Work: How to improve EU foreign policy. EPC Issue Paper No. 67. Brussels, European Policy Center, January.

and conducted. This arrangement is to ensure aid civil-military coordination but more generally also coordination among CSDP operations at the Brussels level. The CMPD in turn comprises the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). These are responsible for the oversight and planning of individual civilian and military CSDP missions, respectively. The CPCC is responsible for the planning, operational conduct and support of civilian CSDP missions[2]. The CPCC, at the time of writing, is responsible for 10 missions, including EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa. The EUMS contributes early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for EU military operation, and coordinates the EU's military dimension with other EU actors. The EU currently conducts three military operations: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as EU NAVFOR Somalia and EUTM Somalia.

The new and planned CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa and in Mali, together with a possible mission in Libya, are the first CSDP missions since 2008. These missions take place in a new institutional framework but also in a geographical area where the EU is developing a regional strategic approach.

1.1.3 Geographical and thematic desks

Individual geographical desks own regional and country-specific expertise and programming. They, together with the thematic desks, provide the political framework in which CSDP missions operate. Thematic desks provide relevant expertise in security policies and, therefore, supporting measures that can complement the operational focus of CSDP missions. Conflict prevention and peace building have been included, and the EEAS seeks to build expertise and capacity for mediation as well. These competences do not necessarily relate to SSR directly, but can inform governance and institution-building measures in situation of fragility and post-conflict.

1.1.4 The EU Special Representatives (EUSR)

The post of EUSR is to enable the EU to appoint representatives to enhance the EU's political engagement with a particular country, region or issue area. EUSR can operate from within a particular country or operate from Brussels. In country settings where there is a CSDP operation, EUSR provide political guidance and advice to the mission. The added value of the post is additional visibility but also capacity for engagement that enhances and complements the work of the HR/VP and the EEAS in providing political guidance, coordination and information to the member states as well as liaison with host governments and other international actors[3]. In Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the post of EUSR and Head of Delegation is double-hatted, further streamlining the EU's political, operational and financial presence in a given country and setting. The EU currently has 10 EUSRs, including for the Horn of Africa and South Sudan[4].

[2] See European Union (2011). Common Security and Defence Policy: The Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC). Brussels, April.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222515/110412%20factsheet%20-%20cpcc%20-%20version%204_en.pdf

[3] See Dominik Tolksdorf (2012). The role of EU Special Representatives in the post-Lisbon foreign policy system: a renaissance? Policy brief 2012/02. Brussels, Institute for European Studies.

[4] See Council of the European Union (2012). EU Special Representatives. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/eu-special-representatives?lang=en

1.1.5 EU delegations

Delegations have key role to play in strengthening EU presence in a particular country – but also in engaging not just the host government but also civil society. The Head of Delegation assumes a key position given that he/she is in charge of spending and on the division between development and diplomacy. The Delegations assume a key function in SSR to the extent that military/political expertise falls under the authority of the Head of Delegation: Bosnia, where the IPA office that has taken over the police reform efforts from the EU Police Mission (EUPM) that ended in June 2012.

Beyond direct responsibility for aspects of SSR as described in the paragraph EU Delegation also fulfill an important function with respect to their access and outreach to civil society. While Delegation work with civil society not necessarily touches on SSR directly, human rights dialogue or a concern with gender and justice could inform EU personnel on broader conditions inside the country the EU acts in. In addition, an extended effort to reach out and engage with civil society stands to improve the EU's ability to assess but also tailor its programs for greater effectiveness, particularly because it aids information exchange between the field and Brussels.

1.1.6 European Commission

The European Commission holds competence in SSR through two Directorates as well as a number of financial instruments (including Foreign Policy Instruments, which are part of the EEAS but controlled by the Commission). The Commission does not implement policy as such: instead, it functions as a funding mechanism that designs and steers policies in development and external assistance and relies on partnership with implementation partner. That means that at implementing stage needs a mechanism for input to streamline Commission spending with operational requirements of concurrent CSDP mission, but also to respond more rapidly to changing conditions in a particular host country and resulting changing demands on EU programmes. This has implications for SSR policies through different conceptualizations of the weight of respective activities but also the separation of Commission and EEAS competences that are bridged only incompletely by the double-hatting the HR with VP of the Commission.

– Directorate General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid

The Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO) indeed holds some competences in SSR, in particular the development aspects of the policy. Prefers or conceptualizes long-term, generational and developmental approach. Coordinates with EEAS (geo desks and others) through HR/VP role that is to improve coherence. DEVCO has conceptualized a strategic approach to security and development as well as situations of fragility – and has experience in administering and funding SSR activities through Commission funding.

– Directorate General for Enlargement

DG Enlargement (ENL) also has programming experience and competences when it comes to SSR in the framework of the enlargement process and the acquis when it comes to the rule of law. Importantly, DG Enlargement also holds funding instruments that can be used for aspects of SSR such as the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) that, amongst other activities funds police reform, border management and rule of law projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo.

1.1.7 Council bodies

Council bodies hold competences through their oversight function of SSR activities conducted through the EEAS, including the crisis management structures.

– Political and Security Committee (PSC)

The PSC is a permanent structure of the Council of the EU that contributes to the drafting and implementation of the CFSP and CSDP. The PSC provides political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations that the EU undertakes. The PSC is permanently chaired by the EEAS. It comprises one ambassador per Member State, a permanent representative of the European Commission, a representative of the EU Military Committee (EUMC), a representative from the Secretariat of the Council of the EU and a legal service. With regard to crisis response and the planning of a CSDP mission, the PSC examines options for responding, suggests political objectives to be pursued, and draws up recommendations for the Council. When the Council has taken the decision to launch an operation, the PSC is the decision-making body in charge of supervising its implementation. The PSC also supervises the political direction of the EU's capability development with the objective of generating the capabilities necessary for missions and operations. The PSC is an important actor also when it comes to cooperation with the EU's partners in crisis management. It regularly liaises with inter alia: the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, and the UN secretariat.

– Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)

CIVCOM is a working group that deals with the civilian aspects of crisis management. It provides information, plans and monitors civilian crisis management operations, and drafts policy recommendations for the PSC. CIVCOM is composed of representatives from the 27 Member States. It acts as a focal point for discussions on thematic issues in civilian crisis management and is to contribute to civilian capability development.

1.2 Policy Framework: The Treaties and SSR

The policy framework for the EU's SSR policy derives indirectly from the treaties and their provisions for EU foreign policy; but also the EU Security Strategy of 2003 as well as its implementation report from 2008. Secondary legislation that however pre-dates the Lisbon Treaty codifies the EU's SSR policy from two perspectives: the Council and Commission. The EEAS combines some of the instruments highlighted in these two perspectives, and opens up new possibilities for coherence in policy formulation and implementation.

1.2.1 The Treaties

The EU has not formulated an explicit SSR strategic framework; however, both the Commission and the Council have in 2005 and 2006, respectively, engaged with a SSR policy framework that have codified EU practice. The Treaties in themselves do not address the EU's SSR policy explicitly but have codified the development of the EU CFSP and CSDP, providing the institutional framework in which the EU actors relevant to SSR have developed. Further, in laying the institutional framework for EU foreign policy, including its crisis management instruments, the existing Treaty framework circumscribes and enables the EU's SSR activities. The EU's security posture as outlined in the 2003 EU Security Strategy as well as its 2008 implementation report provide the general strategic framework from which the EU's SSR policy evolves.

These innovations and developments precede the Lisbon Treaty. Through the institutional provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the renewed focus on policy coherence in the framework of the comprehensive approach, have consequences as far as institutional competences but also new policy options for the EU's SSR activities are concerned.

– From Maastricht to Nice

Starting with the Treaty of Maastricht that went into force in 1993 the EU created foreign policy and eventually also defense structures that enabled the EU to act beyond its borders. Maastricht created the pillar structure (which was abandoned by the Lisbon Treaty) and CFSP, the Treaty of Amsterdam called for the eventual framing of the CSDP. The inclusion of CSDP under CFSP would enable the Union to adopt a coherent approach to addressing security challenge with the possibility of combining crisis management-tools with other foreign policy-tools. Amsterdam incorporated the Petersberg Tasks from the WEU as the range of military tasks that the EU could undertake. The Treaty of Nice, finally, reformed the institutional structures of the EU in view of enlargement, in particular raising the number of seats in the European Parliament.

– Innovations and opportunities brought by the Lisbon Treaty

Opportunities brought by the Lisbon Treaty refer mostly to the improved coherence promised by the creation of the EEAS and, with regards to security and defense, the introduction of Permanent Structured Cooperation as a mechanism for enhance cooperation to move forward defense cooperation. When it comes to the EEAS, the creation of the post of High Representative, which is double-hatted with that of Vice President of the Commission, is to coordinate and bring closer together the political/security and development policies - two policy areas with overlapping responsibility but previously separate planning and implementation mechanisms. The existing policy framework for SSR that is outlined in section 1.2.3. below pre-dates the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty represent an opportunity for increased coherence.

1.2.2 The European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council of 12-13 December 2003, provides the strategic framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', the ESS for the first time identified global challenges and key threats for the EU. Apart from key threats that include terrorism; proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); regional conflicts; state failure; and organized crime, the ESS also identifies security in the neighborhood and strengthening the international rules-based order through effective multilateralism as key objectives for the EU. Most relevant for SSR, the ESS makes explicit the link between security and development, highlighting the risk emanating from state fragility and state failure. Four years after the adoption of the ESS, at the December 2007 European Council member states tasked the High Representative 'to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it'. 'The 2008 Report of the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World', essentially confirms the enduring validity of the 2003 document. The report underlines the need to be 'still more capable, more coherent and more active' for the EU'S full potential to be achieved.

1.2.3 Secondary legislation

The EU's approach to SSR is codified by secondary legislation – that is, three documents that date back to 2005 and 2006 and that engage with then-Council and Commission competences and approaches to the policy.

The 2005 'EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform'[5], a Council document, and the 2006 'Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform'[6] by the European Commission codify the EU approach at the time. The 2006 Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform through its collusion of both concepts forms a common or single framework for the EU's SSR policy.

Both Council and Commission concepts adopt the OECD-DAC "Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance"[7] as their conceptual heritage. At the same time, the respective concepts focus on their respective institutional competences and strengths: the Council document on the role of CSDP missions; the Commission document on the rule of law and long-term impact of SSR-related activities. In addition to their respective institutional emphasis, both concepts are products of their time, and reflect the period of the growth of CSDP in particular that had seen the launch of the first civilian and military missions in the Western Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa, and that indicated further demand for CSDP missions in the area of SSR.

Following these documents and work came institutional improvements to the EU's crisis management structures as well as conceptual engagement with policy areas peripheral to SSR. Since the launch of the EEAS the EU has reviewed individual policy areas (geographic ones), has emphasized an engagement with the comprehensive approach, however, despite operational contributions to SSR, a policy framework has yet to be formulated.

1.3 Instruments and Resources

The EU has at its disposal a number of financial instruments but also operational resources for its SSR activities. This applies both to Commission as well as EEAS and CSDP instruments. The European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) are housed and administered by DG Development. The Instrument for Stability (IFS), which is grouped under the Foreign Policy Instruments, can support the work of CSDP missions and EEAS activities. The CFSP budget and the Athena mechanism, finally, support civilian and military CSDP operations. In this regard, civilian capabilities under the CSDP, form an important operational resource for the EU and its member states.

1.3.1 Financial instruments

There are a number of financial instruments that can support SSR activities, either in general or in specific geographical areas. These include the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, and the Instrument for Stability. Some can provide important supporting measures to SSR policies conducted under CSDP as they touch on the security sector directly whereas others represent long-term, stand-alone instruments in pursuit of aspects of SSR.

– European Development Fund (EDF)

The EDF represents the main instrument to distribute aid for development cooperation in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and OCT. The period from 2008 to 2013 provides an overall budget

[5] Council of the EU concept: 'EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)', 12566/4/05, 13 October 2005

[6] European Commission's concept: 'A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform', Brussels, 24.5.2006, COM(2006) 253 final

[7] OECD (2005). DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Security System Reform and Governance, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf

of EUR 22 682 million. The EDF can be used for support for SSR-related activities such as support for salaries through the UN; support for police reform in Kenya; and support for the African Peace Facility (APF). The APF itself was established to build up the capacities of African states to engage in peace-building activities. Although military and armament spending is excluded, the APF makes it possible to co-finance the operations of African peacekeeping troops.[8] In Somalia, APF funds have supported an African peace enforcement operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) where the EU has contributed up to EUR 350 million to mainly cover AU salaries.[9]

– Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)

The Development-Cooperation Instrument (DCI) was created within DG DEV in 2007. It bundles a range of geographic and thematic instruments and consists of three components: geographic programmes; thematic programmes; and a programme of accompanying measures for the 18 ACP Sugar Protocol Countries. The total budget allocated in the period from 2007-2013 is EUR 16.9 billion, of which 60% are allocated to geographic; 33% to thematic and 7% for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries. The DCI programmes cover a range of development activities, some of which have relevance for SSR including governance, democracy, human rights and support for institutional reforms[10].

– The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was launched in 2006. Housed within DG DEVCO, it focuses on the support and promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries. It explicitly covers aspects of SSR through its objective of supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy. Importantly, it also covers peripheral or flanking measures to narrowly defined SSR activities through support for election monitoring and strengthening the role of civil society and political participation. Its focus on civil society sets the EIDHR apart from other development assistance, but also its ability to grant aid to civil society groups and intergovernmental organisations without agreement of the governments of third countries. The 2007-2013 budget is EUR 1.104 billion[11].

– Instrument for Stability (IfS)

The Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is grouped under Foreign Policy Instruments, is a fund that can be drawn from to react quickly to crisis situations. Adopted in 2006, it serves as a way to bridge immediate crisis interventions and longer-term programming, and can make financial support available on a short-term basis that can later be mainstreamed into other Commission funding. Its advantage lies in rapid deployability, and its ability to 'flank' other EU measures. 'exceptional assistance measures' up to 18 months, deployed in close cooperation with the Council, the IfS can be used for assistance in response to situations of crisis and emerging crisis (Art. 3) and assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation (Art. 4).

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[8] See Overhaus, Marco (2012). EU Reconstruction Aid in Conflict States. The Foreign Policy Instruments in the Grey Area of Security and Development. Research Paper 5. Berlin, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February.

[9] Damien Helly (2012). EU engagement in the Sahel: lessons from Somalia and AfPak. Policy Brief. Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, December.

[10]European Commission (2012).Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI).
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm

[11]European Commission (2012).European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm

The IfS is flexible on time and substance, and it is a political instrument in the sense that it does not follow development standards and guidelines. It can thus fill a gap where other instruments are not applicable or available. With a project budget of EUR 2 billion for the funding period of 2007-2013, its resources are limited – particularly in light of the fact that its flexibility makes the IfS is an attractive budget line.

This flexibility also makes the IfS a useful fund to support the work of CSDP missions: early support for justice reform in Afghanistan serves as an example where IfS funds were used to provide start-up funding to address the link between the CSDP operation EUPOL Afghanistan and justice reform in the area of SSR that were later absorbed by other budget lines. In the Horn of Africa, IfS funds have supported prosecution, court, police and prison services in Kenya, Seychelles and Mauritius (transfer of suspected pirates captured by ATALANTA)

– CFSP budget

The CFSP budget covers a number of SSR-related activities. These include crisis management operations, conflict prevention, resolution and stabilization, monitoring and implementation of peace and security process; emergency measures as well as preparatory and follow-up measures, and EU Special Representatives. Running costs of civilian and military missions are paid for by participating member states, as are personnel for CSDP missions seconded by participating countries. Over the period from 2007-2013 the CFSP budget amounts to EUR 1.74 billion.

– Athena mechanism

The Athena mechanism administers the financing of common costs of EU operations that have military and defense implication on behalf of EU member states that contribute to the financing of EU military operations. Common costs can include transport, infrastructures and medical services According to the principle of 'costs lie where they fall', participating EU member states carry the costs for their participation.

1.3.2 CSDP missions/operations

CSDP missions and operations constitute the most visible SSR-related activity the EU undertakes. Given the operational nature of these missions as well as member state involvement, CSDP missions are bound to have the highest impact, both politically and operationally. Of the 27+ missions launched between 2003 and today, a number of missions have occupied themselves with aspects of SSR. At the time of writing, the EU operates nine missions that focus on SSR, police reform, rule of law, border management and training and capacity-building in theatres as diverse as Kosovo, the Middle East, the Caucasus, sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa.[12]

– Civilian capabilities

Over the past decade the EU has also fine-tuned the process of capability generation for CSDP missions. At the 2000 Feira Council member states committed themselves to make available 5000 police officers by 2003, of which 1000 should be deployable within 30 days. Member states also identified police reform, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection as priority areas.

The formulation of the so-called Civilian Headline Goals (CHG) formalized capability development. The CHG 2008, adopted in 2004, converted the priority areas identified earlier as well as national

[12] For an overview of past and ongoing CSDP missions see CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership web-portal (www.csdpmap.eu) that is administered by ISIS Europe.

commitments into more specific capabilities and criteria for member states with respect to training and staffing. It focused on the elaboration of planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios, a list of the required capabilities including personnel, equipment, planning, logistics and missions support, the assessment of member states contributions with a view to identifying shortfalls and designing a Capability Improvement Plan, and establishing a system for the regular review of national contributions.

The CHG 2010, adopted in 2007, continued to emphasize personnel requirements but added a civil-military dimension. Based on operational experience, and perceived shortfalls particularly in the planning of individual missions, CHG 2010 also developed scenarios for the creation of a pool of specifically trained experts.

– Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)

The Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) are a pool of up to 100 experts drawn and specifically trained by member states in the fields of justice, administration, logistics, management and policy. CRTs are used for deployment during the preparatory stage of an intervention, and can be tasked with carrying out assessment and fact-finding missions in crisis situations; helping to prepare operation plans; ensuring a rapid operational presence on the ground; and supporting the initial phase of civilian missions.

– Deployable pool of SSR experts

In addition to the CRTs, and in light of the EU's increasing engagement with SSR, the CHG 2010 also developed a SSR scenario. As a follow-on to the CRTs, EU member states in 2008 decided on the creation of a SSR pool. These experts receive regular training as well as task and geography-specific training. The creation of a pool of SSR experts was to contribute to carrying out SSR assessments and audits as well as the planning of SSR missions. SSR experts were to also be temporarily deployed in EU missions; and to contribute to development of the European Union concepts in relation to SSR overall[13]. This pool of experts was first drawn upon in the framework of a fact-finding mission to Libya in 2011.

2. INTRODUCTION TO THE EU'S ACTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The EU's actions in the Horn of Africa, including efforts towards SSR, are framed in a comprehensive strategic approach, the 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. Maritime capacity building but also the training of Somali security forces represent key activities for CSDP that aim for attacking the root causes of piracy and over time make the presence of a EU naval operation redundant – and build state capacity capable of maintaining the rule of law so as to reduce piracy and counter the threat of Islamic radicalization and terrorism. The implementation of the strategic framework has just begun and an evaluation is premature – however, in the design and planning of the CSDP missions the EEAS has emphasized inter-institutional coherence. Much will depend on the way in which long-term, institution-building measures complement the ongoing CSDP missions to build sustainable maritime capacities in the region - and Somali state capacity in the prevention of piracy.

2.1 Overview of EU engagement in the region

The Horn of Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia – is an area that has been marked by conflict and/or chronic instability. This holds true especially for the case of Somalia, one of the poorest countries in the world, but also Sudan and South Sudan – where there are

[13] ZIF Glossary of Peace Operations

added concerns over Islamic radicalization and resulting terrorist threats.[14] Weak or ineffective state institutions; the absence of the rule of law; lack of economic opportunity and resulting criminal activity, including piracy, but also concerns over Islamic radicalization have turned Somalia in particular into not just a humanitarian and developmental but also a security concern for the EU and its member states. Underlying motivations for the increase in EU engagement thus span geo-strategic and internal security interests as well as humanitarian concerns.

Previously, the EU has addressed regional and country-specific challenges mostly through its foreign policy and development cooperation instruments as well as its support for AU peacekeeping activities - with individual member states engaging in capacity-building and training activities. An increasing engagement with counter-piracy and concerns over potential radicalization in the region have turned the Horn of Africa into a geographic priority area for the EU and a key theatre for putting in place a comprehensive approach to regional challenges – and towards tackling the root causes of instability. In its emerging policy framework towards the region, the EU emphasizes the attainment of the comprehensive approach.

The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa adopted on 14 November 2011 underpins EU engagement. It makes explicit the EU's security interests by stating that 'the EU's interests in the Horn of Africa are defined by the region's geo-strategic importance, the EU's historic engagement with the countries of the region, its desire to support the welfare of the people and help lift them from poverty into self-sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region and address common challenges'[15].

Given the high priority of the region for EU foreign policy and the interrelatedness of the challenges facing the region, the EU has deployed the full range of policy instruments. This includes the High Representative and the EEAS, EU Delegations, the appointment of a EUSR for the Horn of Africa who, in close consultation with the EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan, contributes to the interrelated challenges facing the Horn and is to contribute to the enhanced coherence, quality, impact and visibility of the EU's action in the region. The Delegation of the EU to Kenya plays a key role in the EU approach towards the Horn of Africa: it took over responsibility for the management of programming for Somalia in 1997 and hosting the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) Regional Support Office that coordinates humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa as well as the Great Lakes.[16]

The EU has supported regional cooperation through the 2007 Horn of Africa Initiative (HoAI) but notes that 'the region lacks a regional organization effective enough to mediate disputes and foster cooperation. As a building block of the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has been slowly building its capacity, but it must continue to develop the capacities of its Secretariat to resolve political problems and regional conflict'. In this context, the EU faces the challenge to simultaneously engage in bilateral support for capacity- and institution building in individual countries while continuing to support regional integration and security mechanisms.

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[14] Additional conflict clusters include the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, internal conflicts in southern and northern Sudan, intra-Ethiopian conflicts, and low-intensity conflicts due to cattle-raiding along the Kenyan, Ugandan, Ethiopian and Sudanese borders. See Paul D. Williams (2011). Horn of Africa: Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace. Washington, DC: The Wilson Center.

[15] Council of the European Union (2011). Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa adopted on 14 November 2011

[16] See Delegation of the European Union to Kenya Homepage http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kenya/about_us/welcome/index_en.htm . At the time of writing, the EU plans to open a Delegation in Mogadishu, which would build up an strengthen EU presence in the country itself.

The Horn of Africa hosts a number of mutually supportive CSDP missions: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has reinforced the profile of CSDP as the EU expanded its operational capability to fight piracy, whereas EUTM Somalia and more recently EUCAP NESTOR focus on training Somali security forces and seek to build up maritime capacity, respectively, in order to permit country authorities to individually intercept piracy.

The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa also sets out an overall approach towards the region that focuses on more traditional foreign policy and development norms. Accordingly, the document states that 'the EU's engagement with the Horn of Africa will be supportive of a regional and country-level environment conducive to peace, security and justice, of good governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and of socio-economic development based on the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with due consideration to equity, climate change and sustainable livelihoods.'[17]

Breaking down the EU's engagement on aspects of SSR across individual countries shows the disparate elements of EU and member state engagements, as well as their different operational emphases. The EU has also engaged in police reform in Kenya, a country that also serves as a focal point for EU presence in support of SSR in Somalia through the EU Delegation in Nairobi. There are considerable needs in South Sudan that, following the country's independence in 2011 includes de-mobilization, re-professionalizing the army and reforming the justice sector. As of mid-2012 the EU aviation security mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) provides assistance on aviation security and support the coordination of security activities for Juba airport.

The bulk of EU efforts centres on Somalia – even if EU activity on behalf of Somalia takes place largely outside the country. The EU is the biggest donor to Somalia in financial terms. It has committed over EUR 1 billion for the period of 2008-2013 for security support, development assistance and humanitarian aid. EUR 500 million have been invested for development aid through the EDF to support effective governance, rule of law, education and economic development.

2.2 Countering piracy, building Somali capacity: EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor

EU engagement in the Horn of Africa in general and in Somalia in particular is motivated by the security threat emanating from piracy in the Western Indian Ocean. The EU's approach aims at tackling both the symptoms of piracy through a focus on interception as well as prosecution and detention of piracy; and its root causes through contributions to economic development but also to building accountable political structures and contributing to conflict resolution and prevention.

EU engagement on Somalia includes three concurrent and mutually reinforcing CSDP operations: EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the EU's naval anti-piracy operation; EUTM Somalia, a training mission that trains Somali security forces in Uganda; and EUCAP Nestor, that focuses on Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. It aims to build up maritime capacity in a number of countries of the Horn of Africa, including detainment facilities in Seychelles and Mauritius and Coast Guard operations in Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti

EUTM Somalia, a military training mission that was launched in April 2012, is to contribute to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TGF) and the institutions in Somalia. By the end

[17] Op. cit. 14

of its second mandate in December 2012 the mission will have trained about 3,000 troops, mainly in Uganda, where the EUTM mission Headquarter is located.[18]

EUCAP Nestor is a civilian mission augmented with military expertise that, following the adoption of a Crisis Management Concept by the Council in December 2011 deployed a technical assessment mission in February 2012. The preparation of the mission is currently under way, with personnel having been deployed as of the second half of 2012.

With an initial mandate of two years, its planned activities comprise two objectives: strengthening the sea-going maritime capacities of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles; and strengthening the rule of law sector, initially in the Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland through the support of the development of a Coastal Police Force. Training is to take place in the Djibouti Regional Training Center, and in the respective countries concerned.[19]

A further purpose of EUCAP Nestor is to offer an exit strategy for Operation Atalanta, as it is to enable a gradual take-over of the responsibilities for maritime security by regional states themselves.[20]

2.3 A comprehensive approach?

The EU's activities in the Horn of Africa are thus marked by a dense institutional presence, a multi-country regional approach that focuses on a number of root causes but also manifestations of piracy, and a strategic framework that underpins these efforts.

The 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa guides the EU's multi-sectoral engagement in the region and defines priority areas for the EU to pursue. The appointment of Alexander Rondos as EU Special Representative to the Horn of Africa in January 2012 is to further assist in the coordination of efforts with regards to Somalia and its regional dimension.

The presence of mutually enforcing CSDP missions, but also Commission instruments points towards an interconnected approach and one that combines short-term CSDP with long-term political and financial instruments. The planning of EUCAP Nestor has emphasized the coordination with existing programmes and cooperation with the EEAS geographic desks.[21]

The planning and operationalization of EUCAP Nestor has relied on, and coordinated with, two complementary Commission programmes. The Critical Maritime Routes Programme that is funded under the Instrument for Stability focuses on the security and safety of essential maritime routes. Within this Programme, MARSIC, a EUR 6 million project, enhances information sharing and training capacities and focuses on capacity building and training of maritime administration staff. The EU under the European Development Fund is setting up the regional Maritime Security Programme (MASE) that is to support the development of a strategy to tackle piracy on land in Somalia; improve national and regional capacities in maritime security; enhance judicial capacities to arrest, transfer and detain piracy suspects; and address economic impact and financial flows related to piracy.[22]

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[18] European Union (2012). EU military training to contribute to the training of Somali Security Forces (EUTM Somalia). Brussels, 26 March.

[19] European Union(2012). Factsheet on EUCAP NESTOR (Regional maritime capacity building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean). Brussels, July.

[20] European Union (2012). The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa. Brussels, June.

[21] Derived from interview with EEAS official, October 2012

[22] Op.Cit. 20

EU activity in the Horn of Africa has been aided by the innovation of the Lisbon Treaty: this includes political leadership and prioritization of the region on the part of the HR/VP; but also enhanced intra- and inter-institutional cooperation and efforts at coordination. Interlocking instruments and initiatives do form the blueprint for a comprehensive approach. However, given the newness of the EU's approach to the Horn of Africa, an assessment of its implementation and its policy impact is premature.

2.4 Calibrating short-term and long-term efforts

The EU has put in place a number of inter-connected programmes and policies with its 2011 Strategic Framework. The two CSDP missions that focus on building maritime capacity (EUCAP Nestor) and the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) focus on short-term capacity building, which does form an important aspect of SSR.

The impact of the EU's policies in Somalia and elsewhere will depend on the manner in which the EU (and other regional and international actors) conceptualize and implement their long-term approaches towards the Horn of Africa – and the underlying root causes of piracy – alongside and as a follow-up to ongoing and future CSDP missions. EUCAP Nestor in particular focuses on several countries - even if the bulk or aim of its efforts is on Somalia. Given regional security complex might also necessitate broader engagement by the EU or its partners that EUCAP Nestor can complement. CSDP forms an important to the EU's overall approach but focuses on one aspect of SSR and the building of state capacity. This contribution must be complemented by other measures that focus on long-term institution- and capacity-building.

This is also because the political, institutional and developmental starting points in Somalia are complex – including local settings and its clan-based structures. The establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions in 2004, and the transition period that followed, ended in September 2012 with the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud by the new Federal Parliament.

At the time of writing, the EU does not maintain a delegation in Mogadishu but operates its Somalia programme out of the EU Delegation to Kenya. This means that local knowledge, and expertise on local and country settings, is scarce or absent. When it comes to training the national army, there is an effort to encourage answerable contact to lower links that are answerable to regions rather than reinforcing militias.[23] At the same time, EUTM funds support Somali clan structures that the EU can negotiate with – a trade-off that could go at the expense of legitimacy; but a trade-off that is a familiar one in fragile and post-conflict states with little by way of compatible institutional structures on which to base reform efforts.

The EU Delegation to manage the development program on behalf of the Somali government[24]. Against the backdrop of weak government capacity, the insertion of EU efforts onto existing clan-based and tribal structures impacts local power balances, but without the EU being able to steer these effects from within the country where it seeks to enhance capacities.

Ambitions to tackle root causes and build sustainable structures – representing generational tasks - are in their infancy. The EU also operates in a challenging environment where it cannot draw on some of the innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the enhanced role of EU Delegation, can for the time being not be drawn upon. In conceptualizing its long-term role in the Horn of Africa, including but going beyond CSDP missions, country-specific knowledge and the fostering and the engagement of a

[23] Derived from interview with EEAS official, September 2012
[24] Derived from interview with EEAS official, June 2012

civil society should receive heightened attention for the EU. This is both to better tailor its policies to country needs, and to work towards a reduction and perhaps also an exit strategy for political and economic commitments.

3. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU'S APPROACH TO SSR

Assessing the effectiveness of the EU's approach to SSR highlights the role played by different EU instruments that contribute to SSR. At the same time, engaging in SSR support is not an optional activity for the EU given that SSR is central to meeting the EU's security objectives as outlined in the European Security Strategy. The EU's soft power remains an effective instrument but increasingly conflicts with security and stabilization needs in the Western Balkans. The EEAS provides an opportunity to work towards a culture of coordination among instruments and conceptualize and implement policies in a coherent and holistic way. The role of CSDP missions remains important, but lessons learned from SSR-related operations and missions highlight the need for greater engagement with planning and staffing missions. Finally, there are enduring factors that hinder a comprehensive approach to SSR that the post-Lisbon era has yet to address.

3.1 Added-value of EU action: should the EU engage in SSR support?

State failure, regional conflict and the security-development nexus are among the key threats identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy and re-enforced in its 2008 Implementation Report. SSR remains a crucial component in tackling these security challenges. Engaging in SSR is thus not so much a question of choice but one of necessity for the EU.

The EU possesses a comprehensive range of instruments for engaging in SSR activities that shape its specific approach, and that put the EU in an advantageous position when it comes to working towards long-term structural transformations through diplomatic, CSDP and Commission instruments. As the current missions in the Horn of Africa illustrate, the CSDP enables the EU to make contributions to specific training requirements that can be flanked with other diplomatic and developmental instruments.

However, the EU's efforts and impact when it comes to SSR do not merely derive from CSDP but also the EU's accession perspective – and the EU's soft power - in the case of the Western Balkans as well as various operational and political support mechanisms in the EEAS and the European Commission. The effectiveness of the application of these policy instruments however hinges on coordination among Brussels-based EU institutions and effective coordination, a focus on accountability, but also feed-back mechanisms between Brussels and the field.

3.1.1 The EU's soft power, and power of attraction: an enduring model for inducing reform?

The EU's approach to SSR, but also its impact, has derived in part from the nature of the EU's power and attraction towards third countries. The enlargement process and the prospect of eventual EU accession contributed to the reform of security institutions in candidate countries by providing suitable incentives. At the same time, and as a result of the political goal to be reached through reform, the enlargement process also entailed strong political oversight mechanisms. These oversight mechanisms and incentives, although they remain in place in the remaining accession countries in the Western Balkans, have proven insufficiently strong as an incentive in the context of post-conflict settings, ethnic politics and contested borders and sovereignty. The power of attraction alone, therefore, does not provide an enduring model for inducing reform – in the Western Balkans, but also in geographic areas further afield the EU's borders.

In the context of Bosnia and Kosovo, therefore, the enlargement perspective alone may not be enough to induce institutional change. Such institutional change rather requires of the EU and its member states political intervention to resolve questions related to status, constitutional reform and, in the context of SSR, improvements to the rule of law and security institutions more broadly[25]. The recent transfer of responsibilities for police reform from a CSDP mission – EUPM – to the EU Delegation under the political lead of the Head of Delegation/EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina will test the degree to which political engagement through the EEAS, coupled with financial and technical support in the field, can contribute to institutional reform[26].

In Kosovo, unresolved status question and internal EU member state dissension, has hampered a united EU stance and cast EULEX Kosovo, the EU's largest civilian CSDP mission that focuses on the rule of law, in a technical role. The ongoing Belgrade-Pristina dialogue under the leadership of HR/VP Ashton represents a political effort to resolve the major stumbling block for EU accession – however a more unified political stance on the part of the EU and its member states will also be required.

In addition to being negatively affected by member state divisions over Kosovo's status and enduring tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo has also been affected by insufficient coordination among EU instruments. A recent report by the European Court of Auditors has concluded that EU assistance to the rule of law has been less effective than it could have, regardless of Kosovo's special status stating that 'despite significant assistance, progress in the rule of law is limited and levels of organized crime and corruption remain high[27]'. This reinforces the sense that the EU, although it is in possession of relevant policy instruments (both operational and financial), has not succeeded in sufficiently coordinating these instruments in pursuit of a commonly held policy goal.

3.1.2 Towards a culture of coordination. Aligning EU instruments

The EU's experience in SSR - in the Western Balkans but also beyond - has highlighted the need for improved coordination among instruments, and between instruments and political goals. The current emphasis on the comprehensive approach has continued to place emphasis on the coherence between instruments. The post-Lisbon era has also given the EU additional instruments and expanded scope for its approach towards SSR. These include financial instruments; high-level political dialogue; but also representation and political, financial and operational input on the part of the HR/VP, the Commission but also the EU Special Representatives.

While coordination undoubtedly contributes to achieving a comprehensive approach, such coordination should rest on common operational guidance or understanding that underpins the application of instruments. This is particular important since many of these instruments continue to be housed in different institutions with different institutional organizational culture. The launch of the EEAS, the re-organization of thematic and geographical areas, and the emerging focus SSR, have resulted in the set-up (or planned set-up) of various coordination and exchange mechanisms that are to help achieve such common operational guidance and understanding.

Efforts are still in their infancy, but could help foster a culture of coordination. Increasing internal coordination and socialization is important also with a view to increasing awareness of different

[25] On this point see Gross and Rotta (2011), The EEAS and the Western Balkans. IAI Working Paper 15. Rome, Instituto Affari Internazionali.

[26] Discussions in framework of EUPM end of mission conference. Sarajevo, 8/9 June 2012.

[27] European Court of Auditors (2012). European Union Assistance to Kosovo related to the Rule of Law. Special Report No. 18. Luxembourg, European Court of Auditors : p. 15

programming cycles and respective priorities. An informal inter-service group on SSR, which includes representatives from the EEAS, and DGs DEVCO, ELARG and HOME, as well as the Council, is to meet 3 times per year to promote coordination and exchange information. A co-initiative of the EEAS with DEVCO has also set up a working group on operational guidance on SSR that, as a first step, is to define achievable and organizational goals, start a coordination process that involves different actors. SSR in its original conceptualization combines security and development concerns but also focuses on governance and the rule of law. These coordination efforts thus also touch on, or fall into broader concepts of peace-building, conflict prevention and transition – and are thereby able to receive input, or work on cross-cutting synergies with thematic desks in the EEAS.[28]

3.1.3 Focus on accountability

The emphasis on training of security forces and capacities through the recently launched CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa, emphasizes one particular aspect of SSR – that of training and capacity-building. The sustainability of reforms, and the creation of governance and oversight structures, require a longer-term timeframe of support. Such state- and institution-building tasks, in particular accountability mechanism put a spotlight on strengthening of oversight institutions and mechanism also on account of the fact that parliamentary oversight mechanisms are important but often underdeveloped. To do justice to the comprehensive and holistic conception of SSR, this domain should be built up further in the conceptualization of the EU's SSR policies – and suggests a strengthened role for the European Parliament this particular aspect of EU engagement with SSR.

3.1.4 Coordinating Brussels and the field

The experience of conducting CSDP missions, but more generally also the need for adjusting political and economic approaches in response to evolving circumstances on the ground continues to highlight the need for coordinating and bridging political and operational requirements between the level of Brussels and the needs and circumstances in the field.

Such coordination is important for increasing operational and political effectiveness, and for responding adequately to changing conditions on the ground. Both can contribute to informing policy formulation and thus contribute to effective implementation. With respect to civilian CSDP missions, the link between the CPCC and political expediencies in Brussels on the one hand and the Head of Mission and CSDP mission activities on the other, has not always worked satisfactorily[29] - and suggests the need for re-thinking of how information but also mission activities in the field can be absorbed and transmitted to Brussels-based institutions.

Coordination also highlights the role of the Delegations in transmitting information to Brussels. This can increase the accuracy and the immediacy of information between Brussels and the field, and to facilitate planning processes for both financial or political programmes and engagement. A strengthened engagement with civil society through the Delegations could in turn enlarge the scope of information derived from the field and permit a closer fit between policy programming and needs and conditions on the ground. This applies equally to early warning and crisis response mechanisms as it does to the EU's ability to fine-tune its programmatic and operational engagements.

[28] Interview with EEAS officials, June 2012

[29] See House of Lords (2011). The EU's Afghan Police Mission. European Union Committee, 8th Report of Session 2010-2011. London, 16 February.

3.2 Lessons learned from SSR-related operations and missions

The experience of over a decade of SSR-related CSDP activities has yielded important lessons for the EU and its member states. This experience has shown that achieving a comprehensive approach hinges on the alignment of instruments and a seamless transition between CSDP and Commission/EEAS instruments. Looking at the CSDP instrument individually, the EU has drawn a number of lessons of how to improve this particular instrument. Starting with mission planning and identifying appropriate mandates this also includes the need to staff mission with sufficient and appropriately trained personnel, to coordinate civil and military contribution, and expand cooperation with international but also regional partners in pursuit of SSR.

3.2.1 A holistic and comprehensive EU approach?

CSDP has been one of the main, and the most visible, EU contributions to SSR. The input, and preceding consensus of 27 member states also lends the instrument added political weight. A holistic and comprehensive approach to SSR that seeks to engage with institution-building in the long-term leaves SSR a generational challenge that CSDP can help kick-start, but one that other mechanisms and instruments will have to take over from. This means that CSDP missions and their mandates require careful planning both in terms of mission activities, mission staff – and also the coordination of CSDP missions with other EU instruments and programmes. A decade-long experience with planning and conducting CSDP mission bears out the challenge these twin requirements entail.

3.2.2 Mission planning

The mission planning phase is important for the conceptualization of operational activities as well as benchmarking measures. It is also important with a view to connecting a mission's activities with other, often pre-existing EU instruments and programmes so that the missions are embedded in a broader EU strategic process. Planning has improved since the start of the first CSDP missions, but revolves around two challenges: civil-military coordination in theatres where civilian and military missions operate concurrently, and the identification and formulation of appropriate mission mandates.

3.2.3 Staffing missions

Staffing civilian CSDP missions has presented a significant, and two-fold, challenge for the EU. Its first challenge refers to the willingness of member states to make available appropriate, adequately trained staff in sufficient numbers for planned CSDP mission.

Staff selection takes place at the national rather than European level, and often involved internal negotiations/or the need for restructuring of competences between ministries of the interior or justice in order to make staff available for international missions. This system thus places responsibility for generating sufficient staff for individual missions in the hands of the member states – and the level and readiness to employ civilian staff varies considerably among capitals.

The second aspect of the challenge of staffing missions refers to the need for common training standards. To start with, training for civilian missions differs from the type of training required for, and provided to, military forces. Civilian staffs tend not to be on-call, and do not receive training either on a regular basis or in the group constellation in which they will be deployed. Instead, when not on mission civilian staff is working in respective national administrations or in other jobs.

Training efforts also take place on the national levels and the quality and regularity of training varies among member states, particularly when it comes to providing regular and geographically and conflict-appropriate training. The level of pre-deployment training tends to vary, and not all member states

follow the same training schedules and methods. This has implications for the preparedness of staff once they are in the field.

The EU has made some efforts to set up common training standards, also with a view to facilitating the dissemination of a common understanding of SSR activities as part of its mission training. Training takes place through the European Security and Defense College (ESDC), which comprises a number of civilian and military institutions from various EU member states. A more recent initiative for the training for civilian crisis management, ENTRi (Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management) was launched in January 2011 to address the training gap.[30] These initiatives point towards the emergence of a European standard for training – but are not mandatory for all mission staff.

3.2.4 Civil-military coordination

The record of planning and conducting CSDP operations has revealed gaps in the coordination between civil and military instruments and operation, and existing coordination structures have been insufficient and underutilized. The creation of the CMPD has combined the planning, conduct and oversight of civilian and military missions at the Brussels level. This is to improve the EU's ability to put together and deploy all facets of the 'comprehensive approach' toolkit across the civil-military spectrum. Nevertheless, planning and oversight mechanisms continue to function separately: the CPCC oversees civilian missions and the EUMS military operations. The creation of a civ-mil cell that is situated within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) was to aide planning of joint civilian/military operation in practice did not become functional, in part due to its location in the EUMS, which meant that military staff came to dominate with little connection to the civilian staff. [31] Coordination represents a challenge also because civilian missions cover a more diverse spectrum of tasks than military operations, and because the planning and financing of operations proceeds along different lines.

Improving civil-military coordination would allow the EU to put together and deploy all facets of its 'comprehensive approach' toolkit across the civil-military spectrum. Beyond addressing institutional constraints, improving civil-military coordination is also a matter of intensifying contacts between civilian and military planners in Brussels, and with mission personnel on the ground (where such contacts have already taken place). This could include, for instance, the sharing of lessons learned (as foreseen in the CHG 2010) and would enable the EU to harness synergies.

There is also a numerical imbalance that hampers coordination. The majority of the CSDP missions launched by the EU have been civilian, but this is not reflected in the staffing levels within the CMPD, where the CPCC consists of approximately 60 officials, compared to 220 in the EUMS. At the same time, military operations tend to be larger in terms of personnel than civilian missions[32].

3.2.5 Working with partners

Collaboration with international partners is an important component in the EU strategic and institutional approach – albeit one that could be developed further in pursuit of improved cooperation but also a working division of labor between international organizations. At the most general level, the EU has made working with others in pursuit of a rule-based international order – the pursuit of 'effective multilateralism' one of its principle objectives.

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[30] See Bloching, S. (2011). Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs. DCAF Brussels – ISIS Europe EU Crisis Management Paper Series, August.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Interview with EEAS official, October 2012

EU conflict prevention and crisis management policies – including SSR as part of these broad policy fields - reflect this overarching perspective: building effective partnership for prevention represents one of the objectives of the Gothenburg Programme on conflict prevention; and the joint Council/Commission paper on Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) explicitly stated that 'there is also a need to ensure co-operation and establish co-ordination modalities as appropriate with other actors external to the EU involved in theatre[33]'.

This refers in the first instance to other international organizations, such as the UN, NATO as well as the AU, but also individual countries the EU cooperates with. The EU has concluded framework agreements with individual partner countries to formalize their participation in CSDP missions. Ideally, such international cooperation should go beyond mere participation and involve strategic discussion on the entire conflict cycle so as to develop joint guidance, and a structural comprehensive dialogue at the services level.

Beyond cooperation with international institutions, partnerships in SSR and other security-related policies also involve countries of a particular region, regional organizations – and potentially also civil-society actors. EU support for the AU in the Horn of Africa (and elsewhere) represents the implementation of one such objective although partnerships or bi-lateral alignment could also be facilitated through political dialogue as part of the Cotonou Agreement, trade, CSDP missions and mediation. The advantage of such an approach is that it could aid the sense of regional/local ownership and, on the part of the EU, an improved understanding and resulting sustainability of processes and developments in a particular region.

3.3 Factors hindering a comprehensive EU approach to SSR

Three factors in particular have to date hindered a comprehensive approach to SSR – and the launch of the EEAS has helped ameliorate but not disappeared these challenges. While a lack of inter-institutional cooperation, in particular between the then-Council instruments and Commission marked the pre-EEAS the launch of the EEAS has revealed new challenges: that of forging a new operational culture, and of calibrating the activities of the EEAS and EU development instruments under the double-hatted HR/VP. The continued inflexibility of financial instruments, and the mismatch between multi-year planning and programming cycle and short-term instruments such as CSDP further hamper policy effectiveness. Finally, coordinating CSDP with EEAS and Commission instruments remains work in progress.

3.3.1 Inter-institutional coordination

Competition between EU actors with SSR-related competences has negatively affected the implementation of a comprehensive approach. 'Turf battles' between the Commission and the Council, and disagreements over the appropriate institution for foreign and/or development spending, marked the first decade of CSDP. The ECOWAS court case, which addressed the delineation of competencies and the classification of support in stemming the flow of weapons in West Africa, the Commission claimed competences in the field of development, and was unwilling to cede authority to the Council[34]. While such battles over competences can also obscure deeper disagreements, such as that of balancing and prioritizing the application of resources between security and development needs. Some of the debates over balancing developing and security needs in the allocation of funds continue. However,

[33] Council of the European Union (2003). Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO). 14457/03. Brussels, 7 November, p. 5.
[34] See Overhaus, op. cit. 8.

since the launch of the EEAS traditional 'turf' battles between CSDP and Development have abated, even if remnants thereof continue to exist.

The challenge of internal coordination currently concerns that of managing an ongoing internal reorganization that has not yet created a coherent organizational culture - and prevent new fault lines appearing within the EEAS, and between the EEAS and relevant Commission DGs. Working cooperation between the EEAS and DG DEV is necessary for the effectiveness and coherence of EU policies. The EEAS ability to work on development issues requires knowledge of processes and ongoing in DG DEV so as to coordinate programming. In addition to forging a new organization culture, preventing these fault lines from arising is also a question of the HR utilizing her role of VP of the Commission to prevent the perception that the EEAS under the HR is concerned with diplomacy and security, whereas DG Development acts as a funding agency.

3.3.2 The (in) flexibility of financial instruments

A second challenge concerns the coordination of funding and programming cycles between Commission and CSDP instruments. The planning and programming of the EU's financial instruments takes place through multi-year programme planning, annual action programmes, and the implementation of these programmes. Such an approach guarantees continuity and aids long-term assistance, but is less suited for rapidly responding to either changing conditions in a given host country. It is also not conducive for an alignment with CSDP instruments. These tend to be planned on a shorter-term basis and their operational mandates do not correspond to financial programming cycles. The IfS, which has limited capacity to begin with, represents an exception – but its popularity as short-term instruments illustrates the need for more flexible spending. These funding cycles make joint planning but also make difficult the concurrent placement of short-term measures onto long-term structural efforts.[35] This inflexibility also applies to budgetary procedures for the procurement of CSDP-mission related equipment such as cars or computers – which explain frequent delays in the operationalization of CSDP missions.

3.3.3 Coordination of CSDP operations with EEAS and Commission programmes

Finally, achieving a comprehensive approach requires the coordination of a number of EU instruments with diverging planning and funding cycles – and also with different organizational logics and cultures that inform planning and programming.

As a first step, there is a need for coordinating CSDP instruments not merely with development, but also with geographic and thematic instruments. The creation of the EEAS has seen a greater engagement with security-related tasks as part of the EEAS thematic priorities that include mediation, conflict prevention and peace-building – and form important and useful activities to further a SSR policy agenda. While programming cycles, working approaches and cultures remain distinct, the emergence of these thematic areas represents an opportunity for achieving a broader approach to a given policy area – however, this requires looking at broad EU options when identifying policy options rather than particular policy instruments, as was suggested in section 3.1.2.

A further factor at play in the achievement of improved coordination of policy instruments in their planning as well as operational phase is the inclusion of country-specific expertise in the development

[35] See Overhaus op.cit.

of policy – and the need for streamlining the inclusion of such expertise in operational planning of CSDP missions, EEAS and Commission activities.

4. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SSR?

EU SSR activities span a range of institutional and operational activities, and the EU has amassed a significant number of lessons learned and institutional memory in aspects of SSR – before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the EEAS. Currently, the EEAS remains an organizational culture in the making and the joining up of different organizational cultures – Commission, Council and member state – has predictably been marked by teething problems. This also concerns the role of the HR/VP and the calibration of the two functions – High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission - the post inhabits. These 'teething problems' are superimposed on 'old' challenges related to the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and their 'fit' with Commission planning cycles.

It is within these parameters the EU engages in aspects of SSR in the Horn of Africa. EU engagement indeed reveals improved, and joined up planning and conduct of missions that is embedded in a regional strategic framework – and that, at the institutional level in Brussels, is working towards coordination mechanisms and formats that improve information and coordination across the board.

While this bodes well for the attainment of a comprehensive approach, the analysis of SSR from the perspective of CSDP missions also reveals a different set of priorities between the member states and EEAS structures, alongside recurrent challenges when it comes to launching and conducting CSDP missions. This extends both to familiar problems of staffing individual missions, but also to a focus on short-term, technical assistance on the part of member states and the member-state led CSDP instrument on the one hand, and long-term, comprehensive and structural assistance on the part of the EEAS and the Commission on the other. Attaining a comprehensive approach, therefore, depends on the extent to which EU instruments and policies can complement member states and their bilateral and CSDP commitments to SSR.

This yields the following recommendations:

For EU institutions

- Bridge organizational and operational differences by aligning instruments - or accept disconnects and plan around them - particularly in the coordination between CSDP missions and EEAS/Commission instruments
- Minimize the effects of such differences by approaching SSR challenges comprehensively, taking into account local, national and regional circumstances – but also institutional capacities at EU-level
- At the level of Brussels, involve all relevant institutional stakeholder in the conceptualization and, as far as possible, planning of short-term and long-term interventions
- Continue investment in international partnerships to complement EU activities, to legitimize international engagements and to enable regional partner organizations to assume functions.
- Strengthen engagement with local actors and civil society to improve information to Brussels and more immediate response in EU programming but also CSDP mission design.

For the European Parliament

- Continue oversight and promote debate on CFSP and CSDP policies with respect to SSR.

– Engage with parliaments in partner countries to raise issues related to SSR with a view to strengthen civil society engagement, oversight of EU spending (and on effects of EU spending): strengthening national oversight mechanisms as part of SSR definitions.

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6. ANNEX

WORKSHOP Security Sector Reform – Summary Report - 28 November 2012, Brussels

Workshop's report elaborated by Marine Jacob of the Trans European Policy Studies Association.

Introductory remarks

Norica NICOLAI, *Vice-Chair of the SEDE Sub-committee*, chaired the workshop. She introduced the debate by outlying that the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a particularly valuable and topical concept for on-going transformation and reconstruction process in the Arab Spring region, the Sahel or in the Horn of Africa. Despite SSR is becoming the core element of CSDP missions, criticism is raised on the effectiveness and fragmented nature of EU action in this field. Therefore, the workshop aimed to provide an objective view of the current status of the SSR.

I.EFFECTS OF ARAB AWAKENING ON THE EU AND ITS SUPPORT FOR SSR/G

According to Giji GYA, *Head of SIB Programmes DCAF,* the Security Sector Reform/Governance (SSR/G) today encompasses the private sector, civil society and media but does not yet cover all the sectors comprehensively. The comprehensive approach is based on this concept of deep democracy and prosperity. As Catherine Ashton said "A strong and accountable institution and supporting a 'vibrant' civil society was the EU's approach into the region". In order to achieve accountability and transparency, SSR should also include Lady Ashton's M-words: 'Mobility, Money and Market'.

From the start of the Mediterranean partnership in 1995 to the Arab Awakening in 2011, Giji GYA observed that the European Union has preceded a considerable shift passing from a stability promoter to a democracy promoter. In 1995, the EU was considered as a soft power promoting stability through the control of security and populations. Within a pre-Lisbon context, the division of the labour was relatively clear in the field of SSR. In the post-Lisbon context, innovations have been launched such as the EEAS presidency role and the role of EUSR, but it still requires a reintegration of the political leadership.

In Giji GYA's view, internal aspects together with external ones have shown that the EU was not prepared to take the lead in reacting to the Arab Spring. As a consequence, EU's image was tainted because of its former long-standing relationship with autocratic Arab rulers. Moreover, with the revival of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic trends, the "EU model" of democracy is no longer the only one. Considering the shift from stability promoter to democracy promoter, it is far from clear whether the EU will have sufficient relevance and influence in this quickly changing region. Baroness Ashton underlined that EU's approach to the post-dictatorship context is encouraging countries to "develop a system of security that puts the interests of citizens first and is effective, accountable and democratic." For Giji GYA, it is difficult to ascertain how this fits with a good evaluation and assessment of the comprehensive approach. Currently, the discussions on an operational guide for SSR between the EEAS, CMPD and DEVCO might lead to interesting issues of reflection.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM – THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING MORE GENDER ASPECTS AND APPLYING SOLID MONITORING AND EVALUATION

André KAHLMEYER started his presentation by recalling the core actors, the field of action and the different sources of budget according to the OECD Handbook on SSR projects. For him, a stronger integration of the monitoring and evaluation process (M&E) in the SSR is essential, especially with regards to the CSDP missions. According to KAHLMEYER, M&E is important to assess the results and impact and to identify whether a project provides value for money. The main problematical issue lies in establishing a causal link between interventions (e.g.: CSDP mission or capacity building mission) to an

impact, in order to allow internal learning and improvement in the system. While monitoring and evaluation are standard features of the European Commission's external aid system, no external or even internal evaluation has been conducted to date of any CSDP mission due to member states blocking the process. The key challenge can be resumed by the 'attribution gap' concept: how to link your intervention to the improvement in the system?

KAHLMEYER mentioned several key building blocks that ensure solid M&E such as the DAC Evaluation criteria, a deep understanding of the key drivers of the conflict, the theory of changes, etc. In his view, another important question is the capacity development of a SSR project. This question refers to the Kick Patrick model evaluation with four levels, each of them corresponding to a questionnaire intended to the participants of a training session: response, learning, implementation and institutional development.

Finally, KAHLMEYER proposed several recommendations for SSR interventions. Firstly, the M&E process should be planned at the beginning of an intervention. Due to political pressure, the evaluation is often embodied one year after the project has started. Secondly, the intervention has to be based on a participatory research in order to take into account the reality of the country where the intervention will be operated. Thirdly, he stressed the importance of a comprehensive and complex understanding of the peace and conflict factors. Any type of intervention has to imply a solid local involvement. Finally, he underlined the need of flexibility in funding and planning for re-focusing a project.

III. CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THEHORN OF AFRICA (2001-2012)

Alexandra DIAS is of the opinion that the choice of the period to analyse the SSR challenges and constraints is not a coincidence. Three of the Horn Africa leaders are no more among us, namely the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi from Ethiopia, Yoveri Museveni from Uganda and Issayas Afeworki of Eritrea.

In order to understand SSR challenges in the Horn Africa region, which has suffered from inter-states war, Alexandra DIAS provided firstly a brief geopolitical overview. Ethiopia has been involved in two wars, one against Somalia before 1977-78 and another one against Eritrea after 1998-2000. This region also witnessed the creation of two new states: Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011. The three allies Meles Zenawi, Yoveri Museveni and Issayas Afeworki were involved the fight against political Islam coming from Sudan in a post-cold war context. However, after 9/11, Eritrea quietly and unexpectedly turned to support the Islamic Courts Union.

In this situation, several challenges appear for the region in terms of SSR. Firstly, both Somalia's independence as well as the Ethiopian-Eritrean War included element of militant nationalism. Secondly, the creation of new states in the region has implied a border reconfiguration which created two landlocked states: Ethiopia and South Sudan. This implies the need to re-think issues related to citizenship, currency, exchange mechanisms and borders which have been subjected to major disputes between Sudan and South Sudan for instance.

According to Alexandra DIAS, the major concern relies in political Islam in the Horn of Africa and the swift in the foreign policy of the United States in the context of 9/11 towards the region. She mentioned for instance the bomb attacks to US Nairobi embassy and Dar Es Salam during the summer of 1998 which are precedents of operations linked to Al-Qaida. Observers of Somalia dynamics argued that Ethiopia interventions in 2006 during the rise of the Islamic Courts Union contributed to the level of radicalisation that was previously absent in Somalia. She stressed that the threat also pertained to the neighbourhood context. She concluded by saying that in Somalia as well as in the region, the pattern of the alliance formation is extremely volatile and the EU has a major role to play.

IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH?

According to Joachim KOOPS, SSR is a strategic topic when looking at global governance, the cooperation between international organisations and the role of the European Union in security issues, since it became the key area when referring to the comprehensive approach. This approach implies coordinated work between EU institutions as well as with the member states, but also requires intensive and systematic cooperation and exchange with other international organisations.

Several problematic aspects of the internal dimension of SSR and the comprehensive approach were mentioned. Firstly, the EU lacks of human resources since the staff is seconded by national ministries of foreign affairs to the EU missions. Moreover, the shift from the military to the multi-crisis response and conflict prevention approach has led to the marginalisation of military instruments especially because of a disjointed approach. Secondly, there is no clear limitation of EU's impact if it is disjointed from the activities of the members states. Member states, such as France in Sahel and Belgium in Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are clearly driven by their own bilateral policies which can undermine EU actions. Thirdly, KOOPS outlined the clear lack of an overall strategy since there hasn't been any coherent and current SSR idea or paper since 2006. Fourthly, there is also no inter-institutional task force. Thanks to the Lisbon treaty successful innovations have been achieved, such as the creation of the Crisis platform. In KOOPS'opinion, EU has to learn from the UN coordinated approach such as its SSR unit as well as from the existing EU crisis response tools to adapt them to the SSR field.

On the external dimension of SSR, Joachim KOOPS outlined several outstanding issues. KOOPS firstly stressed the EU should learn from the United Nations since it is the organisation that has the most advanced experience of the integrated approach in peace-keeping and SSR operations. In July 2012, the Action Pan on EU-UN cooperation in the field of civilian and military peace-keeping and peace-building missions has been approved. Considering this, Joachim KOOPS highlighted the role of Slovakia's UN group of SSR friends which is an opportunity to bring together EU members states, the UN and the EU. However, he regrets that no reference is made to SSR or disarmament which enhanced the absence of UN-EU SSR Roster Coordination. Much cooperation and coordination between these actors would be valuable for the actions on the ground. Secondly, in order to address the capabilities and resources issue, he remembered the valuable use of existing tools such as the European Gendarmerie Force since they have contributed in civil-military missions. However, the question remains: why are there no internal or institutionalised lessons learnt process of these tools? Finally, there is also the possibility of bilateral partnership such as the EU-Japan relationship since Japan is very much active on the SSR and civilian response.

As for the European Parliament's role, Joachim KOOPS reminded the work that is already done with the civil society dialogue as well as the parliamentary oversight. In his view, the EP is a global player and could build up democratic oversight tasks. Moreover, he recommended that the EP could also push for a more systematic and more transparent internal and inter-organisational lessons learnt but also to promote a truly comprehensive approach combining internal and external integrative task force element. In this sense, he considers the European Parliament has a role to play in the field of capabilities and resource issues, despite not having competencies in CSDP missions. He concluded by saying that a balance has to be found between EU's interest of playing a global role in the field of security as well as EU's need to think holistically about the division of labour in order to foster mutual reinforcing cooperation. In this sense, he strongly encourages a pragmatic involvement of Slovakia's 'UN Group of SSR Friends' Initiative.

The Chair expressed her thanks to all speakers and apologised for the Members of the European Parliament that already left.

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