THE INFLUENCE OF TURKISH MILITARY FORCES ON POLITICAL AGENDA-SETTING IN TURKEY, ANALYSED ON THE BASIS OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION
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Annex
SUMMARY

This paper analyses the role played by the Turkish military in terms of "agenda-setting" and policy-shaping in the framework of Turkey's approach to the Cyprus question during the last parliamentary term (2002-2007). The paper:

1. Analyses the democratisation of civil-military relations in Turkey through changes in the constitution and legislation.
2. Examines the military’s involvement in the decision-making process and political debate on the question of Cyprus.
3. Identifies areas where improvements are needed to ensure full civilian oversight of the armed forces in conformity with EU practice and Turkey’s Accession Partnership.

The case of Cyprus is contentious but particularly important, since a solution to the Cyprus question is seen as one of the keys for the realisation of Turkey’s EU membership.

Civil-military relations in Turkey

Political transformation in Turkey in the last decade has been influenced by the EU accession process, which sets conditions to be fulfilled by Turkey if it desires entry into the Union, and by the Turkish military’s desire to preserve its role as the guardian of the principles of the Turkish Republic.

In accordance with the requirements of the EU accession process, constitutional changes have limited the role of the military in civilian institutions. These changes were accepted – but not always welcomed – by the Turkish military, since they perceive EU membership as the final step of the Westernisation process that the army has been supporting. However, although the recent changes limit the institutional role of the military, they do not limit its political influence.

The Turkish armed forces have traditionally played an influential role, sometimes a leading role, in the country’s political affairs. This role has been institutionalized in successive Constitutions, and the perception of the military as “guardian of the Constitution” has given it a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the country’s political forces. Its influence in political affairs is associated with a sense of insecurity in Turkey, generated by both domestic and external sources, and is respected by the Turkish people. “The military institution remains an important pressure group, whose power derives from the support extended to it by society rather than from legal arrangements.”

The electoral success of the Justice and Development Party in 2002, coupled with EU pressure on Turkey to align its civil-military relations with EU norms, led to a series of reforms. The most noteworthy have included civilianisation of the National Security Council (NSC), enhanced transparency of defence expenditure, suspension of military jurisdiction over civilians, and removal of NSC representatives from various cultural bodies.

This has demonstrated that the Turkish government is prepared to take EU sensitivities into account, and that the armed forces are reluctant to assume an openly hostile stance against reforms. On the other hand, the government has exercised caution towards the military
elite, particularly in view of its propensity to suspect the Justice and Development Party of, among other things, an Islamist “secret agenda”. Thus Turkey’s civil-military relations are still far from having aligned themselves to EU standards: “these reforms only address the formal mechanisms of the military’s influence and further ‘second generation’ reforms, which concern the engagement of civil society and the implementation and consolidation of democratic oversight, will be of much greater importance”.

The Cyprus question

The Turkish military have been generally supportive of a solution to the Cyprus question, although with reservations and a not very clear position, but they did not want be seen as responsible for a lack of solution or an obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession process. Following the linkage made by the EU between a solution on Cyprus and the realisation of Turkey’s EU membership, military officials have stated on various occasions that they are not against the EU, and even called on it to give Turkey a date for the start of negotiations.

The National Security Council in 2004 acknowledged that the government had political responsibility on Cyprus, and the government took the risk to accept a referendum to be held on the Annan Plan by the two communities on the island. Following the failure of the Plan, the military have tended to act with caution in criticising the government since they know that an adversarial position can be costly.

Both the civil and the military authorities assert that the Cyprus issue is of utmost importance for Turkey’s security, and that no troop withdrawal can be considered before the settlement of the problem. But this is questioned by critical opinion elsewhere – in Nicosia, in Athens, and in the European Parliament. Some commentators have suggested that the presence of Turkish troops is one reason for the failure to solve the problem. From a critical standpoint, a main feature of Turkey’s civil-military relations vis-à-vis Cyprus is Turkey’s continuing refusal to settle the problem through a normalisation of Turkey-Cyprus relations.

Areas for improvement

Civil-military relations in Turkey have shown a substantial improvement with the constitutional amendments and legislative changes between 2002 and 2007. But:

- Democratisation of civil-military relations in Turkey cannot be achieved only through institutional changes. The engagement of civil society, and the implementation of democratic oversight, should be speeded up.
- Parliamentary control over Turkey’s military budget and expenditures must be improved, with progress on the implementation of legislative changes.
- The civilian authorities and parliament should take more responsibility in the formulation and implementation of foreign and national security strategy.
- The process of cooperation and dialogue between civilian authorities and military should be improved by engaging the military through various projects to improve understanding of the EU accession process and build institutional capacity.
- Turkey’s political elite should further awareness on the need to enhance the democratic control of armed forces.
- Improvement of the dialogue between Turkey and the EU is essential for continuing the process of democratisation in Turkey. The EU should assume its
responsibility in this respect, since the ambiguity of its messages has been a contributing factor to delaying the process of civilianisation in Turkey.
The influence of Turkish military forces on political agenda-setting in Turkey, analysed on the basis of the Cyprus question

1. Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Civil-military relations in Turkey have a long historical background, which is described in an Annex to this paper. We take up the story with the European Union’s decision to offer Turkey candidate status in 1999: this intensified EU-Turkey relations and in turn led to a realignment of relations between the civil and military authorities in Turkey.

Changes began during the government led by Bülent Ecevit, and accelerated under the governments led by Abdullah Gül and then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Justice and Development Party (JDP). This acceleration was related to the start of Turkey’s negotiations for EU membership, and the party’s positive attitude to relations with the EU.

The first constitutional changes, which went into force in October 2001 under the Ecevit government, concentrated on modifying the role of the National Security Council (NSC) which had been the focus of many EU criticisms:

- The amendments with respect to the NSC gave the civilian authorities primacy over the military. The reforms transformed the role of the NSC by amending Article 118 of the Constitution, giving it an advisory role and increasing the number of civilian members by including the deputy prime ministers and the minister of justice.
- The new provision read “The National Security Council shall submit its advisory decisions about the formulation, determination and implementation of the national security policy of the State and its opinions about the maintenance of the necessary coordination, to the Council of Ministers”. The Council of Ministers was to “evaluate” the advisory decisions and views of the NSC instead of considering them “with priority”.

The process was continued and intensified by the JDP governments between 2002 and 2007. The reform package for harmonisation with the EU that came into force in August 2003 introduced fundamental changes in the legislation on the duties, functioning and composition of the NSC and enhanced the superiority of the civilian authorities:

- The executive and supervisory powers of the Secretary General of the NSC were curbed and the provisions giving him the duty to follow NSC recommendations in civilian institutions were removed.
- The frequency of NSC meetings was decreased from once a month to once every two months, and the provision that the Chief of General Staff can propose extra meetings was removed.
- The procedure for the appointment of the Secretary General of the NSC was also changed, so that he is chosen either from among high-level civilian bureaucrats or high-ranking military officers, instead of being exclusively from the military. The appointment is made on the proposal of the Prime Minister and the approval of the President, with the Chief of General Staff consulted
only if the appointment concerns a military officer. The post was filled by civilians for the first time with the appointment of Ambassador Yiğit Alpogan in 2004 and Ambassador Tahsin Burcuoğlu in 2007.

- The abrogation of unlimited access of the NSC to civilian institutions, and the change in the number of personnel and withdrawal of armed guards from NSC premises also contributed to the civilianisation process.

General Hilmi Özkök, Chief of the General Staff at the time, confirmed that the armed forces approved and supported these political reforms carried out on the way to the EU. However, despite these changes, the broad definition of national security under the Law of the NSC still provides the military with a strong opportunity for political influence.

The reform package made further amendments to enhance democratic control:

- It improved the transparency of defence expenditures by extending the duties of the Court of Accounts so that it can exercise supervision of the state properties owned by the armed forces, under a procedure designed nevertheless to maintain defence secrecy. A series of second generation reforms followed in order to enhance transparency and accountability of the defence budgeting and procurement. Law on Public Financial Management and Control brought the extra budgetary funds into the state budget in December 2003 and the last paragraph of Article 160 of the Constitution, which exempted auditing of defence budget by the court of Accounts, was abrogated in May 2004. However, despite the Council of Ministers decision in January 2006 on the necessary changes, a thorough reconsideration of the Law on the Court of Accounts is still pending and thus the Court is unable to carry out supervisory duties. This renders parliamentary oversight of the military expenditure problematic due primarily to the lack of parliamentary progress on the matter. Another problem relates to lack of expertise and information on the part of the parliamentarians and their unwillingness to contribute to controlling the defence budget.

- It limited the competence of military courts by providing that they shall not try non-military persons committing crimes regulated by Article 58 of the Military Criminal Code in times of peace. Another legislative change in June 2006 stipulated that no civilians shall be tried by military courts unless military personnel and civilians commit a crime together. This amendment also introduced the right of retrial in military courts if there is an ECHR decision in favour of the military or civilian persons.

Other reforms to enhance democratic control included the following:

- In 1999, the State Security Court was civilianised with a constitutional amendment eliminating military judges and public prosecutors, and in 2004 they were completely abolished.
- In 2001 the NSC representative was removed from the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music, and in 2004 the representative of the Turkish General Staff was removed from the Council of Higher Education, and the NSC representative from the Supreme Council of Radio and Television.
Evidently, the criticisms and suggestions in the EU’s regular reports on Turkey were influential in pressuring the governments to formulate these constitutional and legislative reforms, which eliminated to a large extent the privileges and prerogatives granted to the military by the 1982 constitution. The Turkish army gave its consent to these changes because it believed EU membership to be the final stage of Turkey’s modernisation process and an important means of achieving stability and confronting domestic challenges such as Islam. However, the military’s influence in Turkey is rooted in historical, ideological and sociological factors, and full civilian control requires more than just institutional changes. As a result, despite the many changes made, the political influence of the army has remained intact. Military officials have continued to exercise influence through statements on domestic and foreign policy in areas such as the Cyprus question, secularism and the Kurdish issue.

2. The Cyprus Question

The rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in November 2002 with an almost two-thirds majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave a new impetus to Turkey’s approach to Cyprus. This was due to the personal perception of its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and to the party’s desire for a start of accession talks with the EU. One of Erdoğan’s reasons for pursuing a policy of European integration is believed to be his aim to distance the military from politics. Erdoğan’s statements after the elections confirmed his party’s commitment to European integration, and started a debate which provided challenges to the role of the military. The Cyprus question, presented as one of the keys to start Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, played an important part in Erdoğan’s appeal to change the “status quo”. A solution to the Cyprus question would enhance the party’s popularity at home and its support abroad, and ease suspicions of the domestic and foreign policy aims of the JDP stemming from its Islamist background.

The parliamentary period 2002-2007 coincided with the Annan Plan for Cyprus, and its intense schedule of negotiations provided the JDP with an opportunity. The Cyprus question, with the contending viewpoints of the JDP and military authorities, became an important battlefield for the reorganisation of civil-military relations during the parliamentary term of 2002-2007. By pledging to change Turkey’s stance on Cyprus, which is defined as a “national cause” and an issue of national security based on geo-political and strategic concerns, the JDP governments indicated a restructuring in foreign policy. The JDP also aimed at restructuring of foreign and security policy making, at times by-passing the bureaucratic mechanisms and institutional structures. They pursued a pragmatic approach that relied on advisers with a business background, such as Cüneyt Zapsu, Şaban Dişli and Ömer Çelik.

Erdoğan made a quick start with a tour of EU member states in November 2002, when he was not yet prime minister or a member of parliament. The tour, a party initiative, aimed to assure the Europeans that the JDP government was willing to solve the Cyprus problem. He also signalled a change in Turkish policy by dealing in a package with matters which previously had been handled separately: the Cyprus question, the issues related to European Security and Defence Policy, and the date for Turkey’s accession talks. Considering Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas to be an obstacle to a solution in Cyprus, Erdoğan offered to put pressure on him in return for a date from the EU. To stress the urgency and warn the military of the possible consequences of a non-solution, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakş st
that the Turkish military might be considered as an occupying power on part of the EU territory.17

One of the main struggles over the issue of Cyprus within the institutional setting of foreign policy making in Turkey took place at the State Summit of 18 December 2002 held after the EU Copenhagen Summit.18 At the summit, support for Denktaş and negotiations for a just solution of the Cyprus problem was reiterated by Turkey. Following the summit there was a clear division of views on Cyprus, between the JDP government on one side and the President, the military and Denktaş on the other. The JDP believed that Denktaş was an obstacle to a solution whereas Denktaş accused the Turkish government of sending mixed messages.19 The visit to Denktaş in January 2003 by General Aytaç Yalman, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, also showed that the military initially opposed the Annan Plan; on his visit he stated - contrary to the government’s view that the Annan Plan could be accepted as it was - that Turkish proposals for revision of the Plan should be taken into consideration, that there should not be a return to the pre-1974 period, and that a solution should not tilt the security balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.20 After the collapse of the negotiation process in March 2003 the government reconsidered its position on the Annan Plan and subsequently stated that it needed revision.21

Meanwhile the armed forces softened their rigid stance on the Cyprus question. This was also a consequence of Annan’s consideration of the Turkish demands for revision of his plan. Turkey’s EU accession process was another aspect; military officials stated on various occasions that they were not against the EU, and General Yaşar Büyükanıt, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, even called on the EU to give Turkey a date for the start of negotiations.22

In its progress report on Turkey in November 2003 the EU linked Turkey’s accession process to a solution to the Cyprus question. This provided the JDP with another opportunity to push for its foreign policy goal of the EU integration process that would increase its legitimacy domestically and strengthen its position with the transformation process. This time, to avoid pressure from the military, Erdoğan was more careful in his rhetoric, stating that the “realities on the island will be taken as the basis for a Cyprus solution”.23 The result of the general elections in north Cyprus, which led to a change of government and thus sidelined Denktaş, and the local elections in Turkey in March 2004, where JDP received 46 per cent of the total votes cast, were interpreted as an approval of the JDP policies including its policies on the settlement of the Cyprus question.24 Erdoğan’s cautious approach was related to the EU’s failure to provide guarantees on embedding the Plan within EU basic law and the perception of JDP that efforts for a solution were expected only from the Turkish side.25

The NSC meeting of 5 April 2004 was the second important institutional setting where the Cyprus question was discussed among the different political actors of foreign policy making in Turkey. After the meeting two important developments emerged.

Firstly, the military was cautious not to disturb the process and emphasised the primacy of civilian authorities and referred to the supremacy of the government’s political decisions in most of the statements made on the Cyprus question. The NSC communiqué publicised after the meeting confirmed the primacy of civilian authorities and acknowledged that the government had the political authority and responsibility on Cyprus, besides recommending that it follow with sensitivity Turkey's concerns about the Annan Plan. The attitude of the military was one of restraint, not trying to influence the negotiation process.26 Although later the Chief of General Staff General Özkök criticised the government for
sidestepping the NSC recommendations, he emphasized that government had the final say and Parliament was the supreme power and so had authority to decide on Cyprus.27 With the completion of the critical negotiations in Buergenstock, the most important issue for the military was the derogations, the clauses in the Annan Plan that protect the Turkish Cypriots.

Secondly, the government pursued its own policies with respect to Cyprus, at times ignoring the reservations of the other political actors. The JDP was insistent on its policy of being “one step ahead” and “not the first one to leave the table” in the process of negotiations. It was emphasised on various occasions that the negotiations should be based on a “win-win policy” rather than a “take-it-or-leave-it policy”, which were important policy changes with respect to Cyprus. There were different viewpoints not only within the military but among the political elite: the government, the President and the opposition had different viewpoints, and there was even a division within the government and within the JDP parliamentary group.28 Although the Plan did not fully meet the requirements of the Turkish side, the government - stating that it had political responsibility and constitutional authority - took the political risk to support a referendum to be held in north Cyprus despite the criticisms.

The Annan Plan was put to referenda on the island on 24 April 2004, but was rejected, with 76 per cent of the Greek Cypriots voting “No” and 65 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots voting “Yes”. The EU accepted Cyprus as a member on 1 May 2004, in accordance with the Treaty of Accession of April 2003.

Following the failure of the Annan Plan, the Turkish government endorsed the agreement reached in December 2004 with the EU, and signed the Additional Protocol in July 2005 to extend the Customs Union to ten new members of the EU, including Cyprus. The government took care to state that “the signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960” and this approach did not produce reactionary responses from other actors in Turkey, including the military.29

Since then, despite frictions between the government and the military over other issues such as secularism and the Kurdish question, they have not clashed seriously on issues with respect to Cyprus, but have remained “friendly adversaries”.30 The only exceptions concerned the government’s position on the opening of a Turkish port and an airport to vessels and planes of the Republic of Cyprus at the end of 2006, and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat’s Lokmacı/Ledra Street initiative in Nicosia in January 2007. General Büyükanıt, Chief of Turkey’s General Staff, criticised the government’s initiative, stating that the opening was “a departure from the state's official position” and a “surprise” and that although it was not for the army to make the final decision, it should have given its opinion. He complained that “a person at the head of the armed forces should not learn about this decision from television. Is it not necessary to inform a group that has 40,000 soldiers over there of such an important decision?”31 Similarly General Büyükanıt was uneasy about the demolition of the footbridge and the attempts to open a crossing at the Lokmacı barricade/Ledra Street.32 He argued that such steps, aiming to benefit both communities as was stipulated by Turkey’s national program presented in response to the Accession Partnership with the EU, needed to be taken in a simultaneous and reciprocal manner.33

Thus to a large extent it was the government that managed Turkey’s policy towards the Annan Plan. This was done mostly through a pragmatic approach rather than a structured
policy making process. The military were generally supportive of a solution to the Cyprus question, though not with a very clear position and with certain reservations. While the military could certainly opt for a “resistant” position, they tended to act with caution since they knew that this could be costly for political stability and foreign policy goals of Turkey. Besides, they did not want to be seen as responsible for a lack of solution on Cyprus and an obstacle in Turkey’s EU accession process.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the changes and improvements there is a more critical point of view - especially in Nicosia and in Athens- of the relations between Turkey’s civilian authorities and the military\textsuperscript{35}. According to this standpoint there has been a large convergence between them in the policies favoured and adopted in the period 2002-2007. This is considered to be the case for a number of security-related issues, which include the Cyprus question, on which – except for the endorsement of the Annan Plan, when the government signalled its readiness to engage negotiations before the military gave its consent – there has been parallelism in the statements, decisions and actions of both the civil and the military. Both publicly assert that the Cyprus issue is of utmost importance for Turkey’s security, and that no troop withdrawal can be considered before the settlement of the Cyprus problem.\textsuperscript{36}

The critical standpoint questions the basis for no troop withdrawal, taking account of the asymmetry of military power between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, and the geographic proximity of Turkey to Cyprus. Contrary to the argument that a settlement of the Cyprus problem must precede troop withdrawal, commentators of the critical point of view have suggested that the presence of Turkish troops is in fact one reason for the failure to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{37}

From a critical standpoint, the subject of Turkey’s civil-military relations vis-à-vis Cyprus may be perceived only secondarily as an issue of domestic legislation and institutional reform. Primarily, it is a matter of Turkey’s refusal to settle the problem through a normalisation of Turkey-Cyprus relations, despite calls to Turkey and all other parties involved to settle the Cyprus problem within the UN framework in a manner that involves “the principles on which the EU is founded”. This approach was reflected in the report on Turkey by the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted by Camiel Eurlings in September 2006. Inter alia, that report “urges Turkey to take concrete steps for the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus, as soon as possible, points out that the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers could facilitate the resumption of substantive negotiations and, pursuant to the relevant UN resolutions, calls on the Turkish government to effect an early withdrawal of Turkish forces in accordance with a specific timetable” (extracts from paragraph 53-56)\textsuperscript{38}. 

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3. Areas for Improvement

This paper argues that civil-military relations in Turkey have shown a substantial improvement with the constitutional amendments and legislative changes between 2002 and 2007. The EU accession prospect has contributed to the democratisation process and thus to the civilianisation of the civil-military relations. The military has largely supported the changes, but has been willing to concede power only when it perceived a viable long term prospect for political stability; in this respect, EU membership is seen by the military as a milestone in Turkey’s modernisation and Westernisation.

But certain important issues need to be addressed in pursuing this process:

- Firstly, the definition of Turkey’s national security should be revised, with civilian actors playing a more active role.
- Secondly, the implementation of parliamentary control over Turkey’s military budget and expenditures must be improved. The Turkish Grand National Assembly needs to make progress on the legislative changes, including the Law on the Court of Accounts.
- Thirdly, the civilian authorities and parliament should take more responsibility in the formulation and implementation of foreign and national security strategy. In the past, they have often preferred not to push reforms on sensitive issues, using the military as an excuse for inaction.

Wider questions also need to be taken into account:

- Democratisation of civil-military relations in Turkey cannot be achieved only through institutional changes. Up to now, reforms have addressed the formal mechanisms of the military’s influence. Therefore further ‘second generation’ reforms, concerning the engagement of civil society and the implementation and consolidation of democratic oversight, should be speeded up.
- The process of cooperation and dialogue between civilian authorities and military should be enhanced. As has been shown by developments such as the election of Abdullah Gül to the Presidency of Turkey, dialogue can be effective in placing relations on a more democratic basis. The civilian authorities should also engage the military in the EU accession process through various projects (the Mehmetçik project is an example) which will improve understanding of the process.
- The EU institutions should encourage Turkey’s political elite to create public awareness on the need to enhance the democratic control of armed forces.
- Finally, improvement of the dialogue between Turkey and the EU is essential for continuing the process of democratisation in Turkey. The EU should assume its responsibility in this respect, since the ambiguity of its messages, including those from its member states, has been a contributing factor to delaying reforms and the process of civilianisation in Turkey.
1 Eric Rouleau, “Turkey’s Dream of Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November-December 2000. But the reference here to “guardian of the Constitution” is not correct as it explicitly assigns a role for the protection of the whole constitution. Besides, in rhetoric, such a phrase has never been used. The Constitution itself has been revised on several occasions and the recent changes modified some 30 per cent of it: the first three articles include “Irrevocable Provisions” outlining the principles of the Republic that “shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed”.


3 European Union Center of North Carolina, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, European Integration & Civil-Military Relations, EU Briefings, May 2007, p.5.


5 Emphasis added.

6 In 2004, the NSC was described as a shadow government by Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time. See Milliyet daily, 29 September 2004.

7 Davut Dursun, “Egemenlik ve Özkök Paşa” (Sovereignty and General Özkök), Yeni Şafak daily, 22 October 2003.

8 Fikret Bila, “Milli Savunma Bakani da rahatsız” (Even the Minister of Defence feels Annoyed), Milliyet daily, 7 October 2006; Yeni Şafak daily, 3 August 2007.

9 The Law is under consideration of Turkish Grand National Assembly commissions since March 2005. One of the reasons for the lack of approval is the fact that the Law brings accounts of municipalities under the jurisdiction of the Court of Accounts. This is an issue which is contentious within the JDP as well.


13 JDP was the first party since the early 1990s with a majority in the parliament that enabled it to form a single party government.

14 Ege Cansen, “Silahlı kuvvetler ve AB” (The Armed Forces and the EU), Hürriyet daily, 29 December 2004.

15 Yeni Şafak daily, 23 November 2002.

16 Milliyet daily, 10 December 2002.

17 Radikal daily, 17 December 2002.

18 The summit took place in the Turkish Presidency and among the participants were President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uğur Ziyal, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas, and his undersecretary Ergün Olgun.


22 “Org. Büyükanıt: TSK, AB’ye karşı değil” (General Büyükanıt: TAF is not against the EU), NTV, 29 May 2003.


26 Radikal daily, 28 February 2004.


Turkish Daily News, 9 December 2006; Radikal daily, 9 December 2006.

This reaction was based on the temporary Article 10 of the Turkish Cypriot Constitution which put Lokmacı under military responsibility as it was located within a “forbidden military zone”.

Turkish Daily News, 8 January 2007; Radikal daily, 9 January 2007.


For a fuller exposition of this point of view see Costas Melakopides, Unfair Play: Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, the UK and the EU, Martello Papers 29 (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University Centre for International Relations, 2006).

