MIGRATION POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH ITS MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS - NEED FOR GREATER MOBILITY
Summary

The construction of an integrated Euro-Mediterranean region necessarily requires the establishment of strong cooperation in the field of migration. For this reason, migration must be considered a real opportunity, bringing benefits for the countries and populations of the two shores of the Mediterranean.

This report analyses European migration policies towards the Mediterranean Partner Countries before and after the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it highlights their key limitations and proposes specific recommendations in order to respond to the imperative of greater mobility in the region.

In order to achieve this, migration policies, often the source of passionate debate, must be tackled serenely and be the subject of constant dialogue between the parties involved, including civil society. These policies must not only meet objectives with regard to controlling migration flows but surpass them and render them an integral part of a coherent and comprehensive development policy for neighbouring countries. The EU must also develop a more attractive policy vis-à-vis migrant workers, which is able to respond to the labour shortages in certain segments of the European market and increase the likelihood of the country of origin benefiting from the competencies acquired in Europe. In this context, the participation of Euro-Mediterranean professional networks is to be encouraged.
This In-Depth Analysis was requested by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

INTRODUCTION 5

PART I – EU MIGRATION POLICY: STAKEHOLDERS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 7

1 HEAVY INTRA-MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION AND ADDITIONAL LABOUR REQUIREMENTS 8
   1.1 NORTH-SOUTH MIGRATION TRENDS 8
   1.2 A NORTH-SOUTH COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE NEED TO SHARE THE BURDEN OF ASYLUM 9

2 EU MIGRATION POLICIES PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING 10
   2.1 THE COMMUNITARISATION OF LABOUR IN EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY 10
   2.2 THE HORIZONTAL APPROACH VS MANAGED IMMIGRATION 11
   2.3 TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO MIGRATION AND MOBILITY 13
   2.4 THE EUROPEAN PACT ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM: RENEWAL OF THE COMMITMENT TO SECURITY 14

3 THE EU’S RESPONSE CONCERNING MIGRATION, TO CHANGES IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES 15
   3.1 THE GLOBAL APPROACH FOR MIGRATION AND MOBILITY: MORE FOR MORE 15
   3.2 MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS (MPS) 16
   3.3 EUROSUR: INCREASED SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 18

PART II – GREATER MOBILITY BETWEEN THE EU AND MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES 20

4 THE EU AND COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: COULD DO BETTER 20
   4.1 STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMS FACED WITH THE ARAB SPRING 20
   4.2 THE INSTITUTIONALISED EXTERNALISATION OF THE EU’S BORDERS 21
   4.3 THE PREDOMINANCE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 22
   4.4 NOT TAKING THE ACTUAL INTERESTS OF MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES INTO ACCOUNT 22

5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 23
   5.1 THINKING CALMLY ABOUT MIGRATION AND MOBILITY 23
   5.2 MOBILITY: COMPONENT OF A NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES 23
   5.3 MAKE EUROPE MORE ATTRACTIVE 23
   5.4 EXPLOIT THE POTENTIAL FOR MIGRATION TO FILL THE GAPS IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS 24
   5.5 PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE MOBILITY THROUGH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS 24

REFERENCES 25

ANNEX 1 26

ANNEX 2 29
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Parliament assumed the rotating presidency of the Parliamentary Assembly - Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM) in March 2012, for the 2012-2013 term. On this occasion, Martin SCHULZ, President of the Parliament, emphasised the need to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the context of the transition experienced by the Arab countries following the revolutions in the Spring 2011 and the need to adapt the European Neighbourhood Policy to the political evolution under way in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs).

Indeed, at a time when societies in Europe and the SEMCS are experiencing profound changes, the challenge of renewing and enriching relationships between the European Union (EU) and its Mediterranean neighbours is particularly acute.

On this occasion, the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs requested a report providing a detailed analysis of the political, social and economic impacts of EU policies pursued with the SEMCs, particularly in the areas of migration and mobility.

In February 2013, President Schulz, entrusted the Institute for Economic Forecasting of the Mediterranean World (Institute de Prospective Économique du Monde Méditerranéen, IPEMED) with writing a report on the reworking of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

This report entitled "Europe and the Mediterranean: propositions for building a major region with global influence", advocates with regard to the issue of mobility and migration to "rethink serenely the issue of mobility" and to move "from an administrative approach to migration to an economic approach to mobility".

This policy paper follows on from that report. It is composed of two parts. The first part outlines European migration policies with regard to SEMCs before and after the Arab Spring. The second part highlights the key limitations of these policies and proposes specific recommendations to promote greater mobility between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours.
INTRODUCTION

In today’s globalised world, it is easy to observe that people move much less easily than goods or capital. The Euro-Mediterranean zone is no exception, despite the many and varied reasons – professional, family and leisure – for mobility. The movement of persons is a far cry from what is required by the European Union (EU) and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) in order to derive benefit from the advantages offered by their proximity and complementarity, as observed in other regions of the world.

Greater mobility may be a solution for facilitating adjustments to the very fragmented labour markets in Europe and in the MPCs. This would compensate for demographic decline in Europe and the sector-based labour shortages recorded in certain Member States, while alleviating the burden of young entrants onto the labour markets of the MPCs, which fuel a persistently high unemployment rate amongst the youngest age brackets. Another, more political, reason calls for greater mobility: the broader and deeper partnership proposed by the EU to the MPCs cannot be envisaged without increased fluidity with regard to the mobility of people in the region.

In 2012, migrants represented 6.9 % of the European population, of whom nearly two-thirds (61.3 %) were nationals of a non-EU country. A quarter of these migrants were Moroccan, Romanian and Turkish citizens. European countries, despite having contrasting and often restrictive immigration policies, constitute the second largest host region for migrants. Western Europe (Germany, France, Benelux) and the United Kingdom still have the highest immigration rates, reaching 11.8 % and 9 % respectively.

Text box 1. Data on migrants residing in the EU-27 in 2012

The total number of non-nationals (persons who are not citizens of their country of residence) living in EU Member States was, as at 1 January 2012, 34.6 million, or 6.9 % of the population of the EU-27. More than a third (13.4 million people in total) of foreigners who were living in the EU-27 as at 1 January 2012 were citizens of another EU Member State, the majority (61.3 %) being nationals of a non-EU country (third country). The highest numbers of people of foreign nationality living in the EU were found in Germany (7.4 million people, of whom 62 % are third-country nationals), Spain (5.2 million, of whom 60 % are third-country nationals), Italy (4.8 million, of whom 70 % are third-country nationals), the United Kingdom (4.8 million, of whom 49 % are third-country nationals) and France (3.8 million, of whom 65 % are third-country nationals). The non-nationals present in these five Member States cumulatively represented 77.7 % of the total number of non-nationals residing in the EU-27, while these same five Member States accounted for 63 % of the population of the EU.

Source: Eurostat

1 Eurostat figures, population counts by nationality
2 Katya Vasileva 2011
3 El Mouhoub Mouhoud 2012
The EU has had migration and mobility provisions in place throughout the process of the construction of Europe. The EU has striven to propose a "communitarised" migration policy to the Member States, constructed around common provisions for managing borders, receiving refugees, granting the right to asylum and attracting the skills to meet the needs of the European labour market.

As regards economic migration, the EU has established provisions to attract expertise from third countries. However, foreigners are using the national provisions of Member States to reach EU territory. They are not systematically appealing to European provisions. Only the provisions reserved for students and very low-skilled or unskilled workers are successfully attracting a significant number of migrants.

In 2011 the events experienced by the MPCs rocked EU migration policy. The huge influx of Tunisian nationals to the island of Lampedusa in Italy in the wake of the Tunisian and Libyan revolutions provoked a conflict between France and Italy and undermined European migration provisions adopted after years of lengthy negotiations. The migration issue appeared more than ever eminently national and led to the acceptance of internal borders possibly being reestablished in the event of a failure to control the Schengen external borders. The referendum in Switzerland (Schengen area member state), which resulted in the restricted movement of foreigners, including Europeans, within the European Economic Area, clearly illustrates this phenomenon.

This report addresses the imperative of greater mobility between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries. It is composed of two parts. The first part focuses on taking stock of the policies put in place by the EU in the field of migration and mobility before and after the Arab Spring. The second part puts forward recommendations for establishing a Euro-Mediterranean migration and mobility area for the benefit of the EU and the MPCs.

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4 We are calling it the “Arab Spring” because that is the name frequently given to such revolutions.
PART I – EU MIGRATION POLICY: STAKEHOLDERS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

After the abolition of internal borders on account of the progressive establishment of the single market, the reception of migrants and the policies concerning the management and control of migration flows concern solely non-EU nationals and the EU’s external borders. Equality of rights for Europeans in the context of the construction of Europe has created a distinction between third country and EU nationals, which was further accentuated with the establishment of the single market, which removed the necessity for work permits for Europeans residing in another Member State. This free movement of European nationals has gone hand-in-hand with increased control of third-country nationals (Schengen area and border police, Frontex), the management of migration flows with the countries of origin and the conclusion of agreements concerning the readmission of illegal migrants in a bilateral and multilateral context. The association agreements with the MPCs were precursors to the integration of a migration dimension into all the regional agreements concluded by the EU today.

The security-orientated, restrictive and intergovernmental approach initially established by Member States with regard to third-country nationals, and more specifically with regard to those wishing to undertake paid employment in the EU, has been progressively "Europeanised" and supplemented by a more global approach taking into account the issues of integration, development and labour market access. The EU is realising the need to put in place an attractive policy to meet the demographic and economic challenges it faces.

This part takes stock of this process by presenting migration provisions before and after the Arab Spring.

Map 1. European visa policy
1 HEAVY INTRA-MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION AND ADDITIONAL LABOUR REQUIREMENTS

The Euro-Mediterranean area is characterised by the intensity of human relationships and additional requirements, particularly in terms of labour. Nevertheless, European migratory policy has difficulty finding a balanced response between long-term requirements and the short-term management of migration flows control, in the context of a difficult communitarisation of migration policies.

1.1 North-South migration trends

According to CARIM\(^5\), the Mediterranean Arab countries comprise 10 million expatriates, or 8% of their working-age population (15-65 years) which corresponds to an annual migration flow of 200,000 people. This expatriate population represented 8.6% of the working-age population in Egypt and Morocco, 20% in Lebanon and 10% in Jordan prior to the Arab uprisings. Tunisia, and Syria all the more so, have experienced high levels of emigration in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings which abated in the former and worsened due to the conflict in the latter.

If the expatriates from the Middle East and Egypt are primarily heading for the oil countries of the Gulf and Libya, or to their immediate neighbours (Syrians to Lebanon and Turkey; Palestinians to Jordan), the Maghrebi and Turkish expatriates largely favour Europe. More distant destinations (North America, Australia) also feature amongst the countries taking in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean migrants.

Table 1. Stock of migrants from Mediterranean Arab countries by destination country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arab Countries</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Other Countries</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2007 (b)</td>
<td>281,631</td>
<td>2,837,654</td>
<td>173,314</td>
<td>3,292,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>66,398</td>
<td>991,796</td>
<td>14,052</td>
<td>1,072,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2008 (b)</td>
<td>153,256</td>
<td>873,947</td>
<td>30,594</td>
<td>1,057,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,928,160</td>
<td>106,398</td>
<td>381,400</td>
<td>2,415,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2008 (c)</td>
<td>141,202</td>
<td>36,432</td>
<td>177,634</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2000 (d)</td>
<td>130,178</td>
<td>130,178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2005 (c)</td>
<td>187,219</td>
<td>109,104</td>
<td>258,487</td>
<td>554,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>2,757,866</td>
<td>4,918,899</td>
<td>1,024,457</td>
<td>8,701,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fargues (2009) and I. Martin (2010), op. cit.

\(^5\) I. Martin et al. (2010)
Immigration stemming from Mediterranean Partner Countries in Europe therefore predominantly comprises nationals from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The Turkish population is the largest, with a total of 2.4 million people residing in an EU country prior to the 2007 crisis. Germany is host to two-thirds of them, due to a migration tradition originating from the recruitment of a Turkish workforce during the three decades of economic prosperity following the Second World War. For the same reasons in addition to its colonial past, France continues to welcome more than half of the nationals from the central Maghreb residing in the EU-15, the number of which amounted to 3 million before the crisis (2007). If there is a very high concentration of Algerians in France, this does not hold true for Tunisian and in particular Moroccan nationals who have diversified their destinations in Europe.

Spain and Italy asserted themselves prior to the crisis as the second and third European recipient countries of Maghrebi migrants, primarily originating from the Morocco. Yet the Spanish sovereign debt crisis, followed by that of Italy severely affected Moroccan citizens residing in these countries, given their precarious jobs, concentrated moreover in sectors which were extremely vulnerable to the economic downturn (construction, industry). Many of them were forced to return to their country of origin for economic reasons (the number of Moroccans residing in Spain and Italy in fact decreased in 2013, for the first time in ten years).

Migration policies in the Member States also tended to be more restrictive during the crisis, with the exception of Germany which is showing the strongest economic performance in Europe. Consequently, incoming flows from third countries slowed down. Amongst the MPCs, this slow-down particularly affected Maghrebi nationals, and especially the Moroccans and Tunisians who are the most widely geographically spread in Europe. These countries therefore had to face some very large return flows at times just as the economic and political crisis was causing their already very high unemployment rates to climb. These individuals arrived in addition to the young people entering the labour market, at the same time as emigration was increasingly less able to ease the jobseeker burden.

Overall, the Maghrebi population residing in the EU-15 has remained stable since 2008, whereas it had been continually rising in the pre-crisis years. This slow-down is the consequence of the economic flows and counter-flows of migrants such as the flow control policies put in place by the Member States. The MPCs are facing a difficult situation: they are unable to ease the burden of the jobseekers on their labour market, strengthening the impact of the economic crisis and rendering the response to social expectations in terms of employment, stemming from the Arab uprisings, non-existent.

1.2 A North-South complementarity and the need to share the burden of asylum

These short-term divergent interests, accentuated by the European crisis, contrast with the long-term needs on the two shores of the Mediterranean, which converge to a much greater extent. A demographic complementarity exists, between an ageing Europe, where the anticipated decline of the working-age population is affecting potential growth, and a Southern and Eastern Mediterranean shore where there are numerous young people entering the labour market, more qualified than in the past given the investment in education. From this perspective, the potential in terms of the working-age population lies in the South rather than the North of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, this situation will become increasingly highlighted because of the demographic deficit of countries such as Germany, Spain and Italy which are also, alongside France, the primary destinations of migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Conversely, the working-age population will continue to rise in

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6 C. Jolly et al. (2011), *Demain la Méditerranée, Scénarios et projections à 2030: croissance, emploi, migration, énergie, agriculture* [Tomorrow the Mediterranean, Scenarios and projections for 2030: growth, employment, migration, energy, agriculture], Paris: IPEMED, Constructing the Mediterranean Collection
the Arab countries of the Mediterranean requiring a growth in employment that even the economic boom years failed to achieve.

In this sense, the increase in Euro-Mediterranean migration presents several advantages for the European countries and the economies of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. In the North, it may compensate for weak intra-European mobility, and reduce sector-based deficits in the workforce (human services, the hotel business, catering, the public buildings and works sector). Indeed, intra-European mobility remains weak, including during the crisis, and is not enabling the labour markets to adjust from an employment area in crisis to a more buoyant employment area. Germany’s strong economic performance has not instigated an influx of labour from the European countries in recession, even though EU migration has increased since 2010-2011. While freedom of movement and labour exists throughout the EU (as of 2014 for the most recent candidate countries), there are far fewer Europeans residing in Germany than extra-Community migrants, or less than 40% of the resident foreign population. If the situation in Europe improves, extra-Community immigration should continue to grow much more strongly than intra-Community immigration.

For the Arab countries of the Mediterranean, migration is more of a necessity today than it once was to ease the burden of jobseekers on the labour market. The low level of skilled employment in particular cannot be overcome in the short term in order to absorb the graduates of higher education. In general terms, the continued and very high youth unemployment rate is preventing them from entering the labour market in the short term, while their inactivity is a structural ferment of social protest, all the more acute since the Arab uprisings. Mobility is henceforth a condition of economic and political transition. Moreover, it instigates an adaptation in the qualifications of the workers from the South who may then seek to reinvest in their country of origin.

Finally, migration is particularly crucial for the MPCs as they are welcoming onto their soil an increasingly large immigrant population arriving from developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, and neighbouring countries facing political instability and major conflicts. They are thus taking on an enormous share of the global burden as regards geopolitical crises and asylum. They in particular are playing host to the majority of influxes of refugees following the Arab uprisings and past or current wars (Syrian refugees in Turkey and Lebanon; Libyan refugees in Tunisia, Egyptian, Palestinian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan). In 2010, Turkey took in almost 1.5 million international migrants of all nationalities and for a variety of reasons, a number which has since increased because of the Syrian conflict; the countries of the central Maghreb and Egypt took in almost 600,0007.

2 EU MIGRATION POLICIES PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING

EU migration policy has been a long time in the making, marked by some profound disagreements between the Member States and the European Commission (EC): the former clearly wanting to maintain the upper hand and have full control of migration policy at the national level and the latter seeking, on the other hand, to establish a common and global policy which meets the long-term interests of the Member States.

2.1 The communitarisation of labour in European migration policy

As the construction of Europe and the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice has developed, the provisions of the Schengen Agreement have been progressively integrated into Community law. Therefore, two sources of law are valid in the EU as regards the free movement of

7 World Bank, World Development Indicators, International Migrant Stock
Migration policies of the European Union with its Mediterranean partners

persons and immigration: the Schengen acquis and the law deriving from the EU treaties. A series of treaties have enabled the EU to develop a migration policy.

A foundation block for the establishment of a 'Europeised' migration policy was put in place with the Single European Act, which entered into force in 1987 and gave rise to the debate at EU level on the measures required for the achievement of a common migration policy.

Article K.1 of Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered into force in 1993, also includes some advancement, by means of cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It stipulates as matters of common interest for the Member States (i) rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; (ii) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; (iii) the conditions of entry, residence (including family reunion and access to employment) and (iv) movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States.

In 1994, the Council recognised that the Member States were not conducting ‘...’ an active immigration policy’ and that the ‘high levels of unemployment in the Member States increase the need to bring Community employment preference properly into practice’.

In 1995, the Schengen area became a legal reality with the removal of all controls and formalities for the internal borders of those Member States who had agreed to be part of it. The establishment of the Schengen Agreement enabled legally-binding cooperation to be established for the management of the migration flows in the EU.

In a Europe without internal borders, the Member States reflect on the issue of control of their territory and decide to act to promote greater mobility in the EU by establishing deeper cooperation with regard to certain areas such as visas. Certain authors8 highlight the willingness of the Member States to take the lead in order to preserve their national prerogative in the face of the more integrated approach sought by various European institutions with a view to creating the single market.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1 December 1999, managed to integrate into Community law for the first time issues relating to asylum, immigration and visa policy, as well as legal cooperation in civil matters. It also integrated the legal corpus of Schengen. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, established the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice. The establishment of this area, in particular the border, asylum and immigration controls, became a jurisdiction shared between the EU and the Member States.

2.2 The horizontal approach vs managed immigration

At its meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, the European Council declared itself, for the first time, in favour of a European migration strategy. It highlighted the need ‘to develop a common EU policy’ on asylum and immigration, structured around (i) partnership with countries of origin; (ii) a Common European Asylum System; (iii) fair treatment of third country nationals; and (iv) management of migration flows.

At the start of the 2000s, the reality of the demographic challenges (ageing population, reduction in the working-age population) and the economic challenges (shortages of skilled and unskilled workforce in certain sectors) catches hold of the Member States and imposes on the EU political agenda the need to adopt an active economic immigration policy.

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Certain Member States began to legislate in this area in order to attract a specific workforce, even going as far as the regularisation of illegal workers. On 14 July 2000, Germany adopted a selective immigration law seeking to attract engineers specialised in information technology. This law established a 'green card' provision which particularly benefited nationals from the Central and Eastern European countries and from India. In 2002, the United Kingdom put in place a programme aiming to attract highly qualified migrants, the 'Highly Skilled Migrant Programme'. Belgium conducted two waves of regularisation in 1974 and 1999, Spain in 2000, 2001 and 2004 and Italy in 2002, 2006 and 2012.

Strong disagreements were to surface between the EC and the Members States during this period regarding the type of policy to pursue, the former seeking a horizontal approach for all migrant workers and the latter favouring a selective policy as regards certain categories of migrants. The European Council proposed that the EC ensure that third-country nationals could benefit from 'rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens'.

Taking advantage of this opening-up, the EC presented its vision of what an EU migration policy could look like, and advocated, in conjunction with the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, a common legal framework concerning all migrants rather than a selective and 'piecemeal approach' centred around employment. The Commission proposed a 'horizontal approach' based on a single residency document, portability of rights, etc.

Table 2. Overview of economic immigration(a) in the EU, as an annual average, by category (2008-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons associated with studies</th>
<th>Scientific research</th>
<th>Highly skilled workers</th>
<th>Seasonal employment</th>
<th>Other paid activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Countries</td>
<td>of which Maghreb</td>
<td>Total Countries</td>
<td>of which Maghreb</td>
<td>Total Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>16030</td>
<td>5454</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>690</td>
<td></td>
<td>610</td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of third-country total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% category in question/total economic migration</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) number of permits issued for the first time in accordance with the specific directives developed by the EU.  
Source: Eurostat, IPEMED calculations

This proposal would go on to be blocked in the European Council due to the members failing to reach an agreement. The reflection on the conditions of entry for migrant workers encountered a setback at the same time as the European dynamic was beginning. As a result of the disagreements between the European stakeholders and the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, reflections on
immigration policy within the European Council in particular (Laeken-December 2001, Seville-October 2002, Thessaloniki-June 2003) focused on issues of asylum and favoured the security-orientated approach once more.

In 2004, the European Commission launched a study\(^{10}\) to better understand how Member States were managing migration. The study observed an overall tightening of national policies which sought to strengthen controls with regard to entering the territory and to protect the national labour market. Hence the interest, according to the study, [...] 'in a pooling of offers of legal immigration' and in affirming the competency of the EU as regards migration policy.

Furthermore, in 2004 the European Council agreed upon the establishment of the multiannual Hague Programme in order to strengthen the area of freedom, security and justice. In its conclusions, the European Council highlighted that [...] 'legal immigration will play an important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development and thus contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy'. It could also play a role in partnerships with third countries. It requested that the European Commission present an action programme on legal immigration prior to the end of 2005.

On 11 January 2005, the European Commission published the Green Paper 'An EU approach to managing economic migration'\(^{11}\). On this occasion, the EC made a clear statement: in order to tackle the demographic decline, the ageing population, the reduction in the working-age population and to remain competitive and innovative, the EU needed more economic migrants and consequently, a European economic immigration strategy. In this Green Paper, the Commission also put forward the possibility of pursuing a policy focused on sector-orientated legislative proposals, with no overall common framework, to demonstrate to the Member States that it was taking into account the reservations that some of them had expressed.

### 2.3 Towards a comprehensive approach to migration and mobility

The Hague Programme was set out\(^{12}\) in May 2005 around ten priorities, the fourth of which concerns the definition [...] 'a new, balanced approach to managing migration, dealing with legal migration and illegal immigration, in order to draw up a shared immigration policy tackling the legal immigrant situation at EU level, while strengthening the fight against illegal immigration and the trafficking of migrants and human beings'. On 21 December of this same year, the Commission announced the outline of the Action Plan on Legal Immigration\(^{13}\).

In this action plan, the European Commission reaffirmed the competency of Member States in setting the number of migrants admitted to the EC for employment purposes, the Community preference principle as well as the need to supplement the measures concerning the admission of migrants with measures concerning integration, combating illegal immigration and cooperating with the countries of origin in order to develop a coherent migration policy. In parallel with this process, the EC promoted a comprehensive policy combining migration, the integration of third-country nationals and the development of the countries of origin. Several communications were drawn up in this regard including *A common agenda for integration*\(^{14}\) and *Migration and development: some concrete orientations*.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{10}\) COM(2004) 412

\(^{11}\) COM(2004) 811

\(^{12}\) COM(2005) 0184

\(^{13}\) COM(2005) 669

\(^{14}\) COM(2005) 389

\(^{15}\) COM(2005) 390
Initially, this new global approach was primarily concerned with issues relating to combating illegal migration and strengthening political dialogue and cooperation with the third countries and particularly those in Africa and the Mediterranean. One year later, in November 2006, in its communication ‘The global approach to migration one year on: towards a comprehensive European migration policy\textsuperscript{16}, the Commission proposed that it open itself up to other fields and other regions of the world in order that its approach be truly comprehensive. From this point on, it would comprise three dimensions: the control of illegal immigration; the promotion of mobility and legal immigration and the contribution to development.

The Commission also evoked, for the first time, the possibility of creating ‘mobility partnerships’ with the third countries under certain conditions. These mobility partnerships\textsuperscript{17} would form part of the actions envisaged to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy\textsuperscript{18}.

2.4 The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum: renewal of the commitment to security

At the end of 2007, the European Commission requested ‘new commitment’ from the Member States in order to build a […] ‘common European immigration policy’\textsuperscript{19}. The Commission was seeking to establish a stronger and more transparent partnership with the Member States in the area of migration. In 2008, it established\textsuperscript{20} ten politically binding principles around which the common migration policy would be structured. These principles were grouped around three key notions: prosperity, solidarity and security.

The Member States responded by adopting, on 24 September 2008, the ‘European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’ carried by the French Presidency of the EU. Criticised by civil society, it proposed a return to a security-orientated and restrictive vision of immigration based on border and immigration control. It reaffirmed the principle of Community preference and requested that the selective approach be strengthened. The ‘European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’ constituted henceforth the basis for the European Union’s development of its common immigration policy. The Stockholm Programme would propose some specific measures for its implementation.

The ‘Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens’, ‘defines strategic guidelines for legislative and operational programming within the area of freedom, security and justice’ for the Union for the years 2010-2014. It puts forward six policy priorities including: i) facilitating access to Europe for specific categories of people (businessmen, tourists, students, scientists, workers, refugees); ii) establishing a comprehensive migration policy based on solidarity, responsibility and partnership with the third countries; iii) and the global approach that constitutes its outward-facing dimension. The programme reiterated the pursuit of selective immigration, supplemented by mechanisms for readmission and return to combat illegal immigration.

The action plan\textsuperscript{21} proposed in order to implement the Stockholm Programme was not received favourably by the Council. In February 2010, the Council had already emphasised that ‘the action plan should more closely mirror the objectives set out in the Stockholm Programme itself’.

\[\textsuperscript{16} COM(2006) 735\]
\[\textsuperscript{17} COM(2007) 248\]
\[\textsuperscript{18} COM(2006) 726\]
\[\textsuperscript{19} COM(2007) 780\]
\[\textsuperscript{20} COM(2008) 359\]
\[\textsuperscript{21} COM(2010) 171\]
3 THE EU'S RESPONSE CONCERNING MIGRATION, TO CHANGES IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES

2011 marked a turning point in relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partner countries. In several of the neighbouring countries in the South, the people rose up and overthrew the authoritarian regimes which were, for the most part, supported by Europe. The reactions and responses by the EU to these movements remained faithful to the 'total security' approach, while the citizens expected greater support.

3.1 The global approach for migration and mobility: more for more

In 2011, the EU became aware of the need to review and adapt its policy towards its neighbouring countries in the Southern Mediterranean. It requested that the EC made proposals to this end. Jointly with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EC presented a 'new strategy' and a 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity' to support the Southern Mediterranean countries committed to reforms. This new strategy, called 'More for More' is structured around three axes:

- institution-building;
- greater involvement of citizens and civil society;
- higher growth and sustainable and inclusive economic development.

The 'more for more' incentive strategy must adapt to the changing situation and to the progress made by each country, and involve 'deeper economic integration, wider market access and closer political cooperation'. It will be integrated into the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)\(^{22}\), which the EC and the High Representative also wish to put in place.

The new strategy does not propose any significant changes with regard to migration. It reiterates the importance to the EU of the Global Approach to Migration and thus the Mobility Partnerships, as well as its interest in facilitating the movement of students, researchers and business people. However, there is a small change in that the Commission states that it is in favour of easing visa rules with countries with whom readmission agreements have been implemented effectively.

A new communication\(^{23}\) on migration that proposes the establishment of a 'dialogue on migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries', together with ongoing discussions between the European Council and the JHA Council, will define a longer-term global approach to migration, which links to the new Neighbourhood Policy and is able to respond to the challenges arising from the Arab Spring.

As a result of these exchanges, the EC presented the 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility' (GAMM) in November 2011\(^ {24}\), to be adopted by the Council in 2012. The GAMM, which is the general strategic framework for the EU's external migration policy, is structured around four pillars:

- legal immigration and mobility;
- irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings;
- international protection and asylum policy;

\(^{22}\) COM(2011) 303
\(^{23}\) COM(2011) 248
\(^{24}\) COM(2011) 743
maximising the development impact of immigration and mobility (new strand in relation to the previous approach).

With regard to legal immigration and mobility, operational priorities are proposed, including:

- capacity-building of the Union to anticipate labour market needs and skills requirements. As always, this concerns establishing a policy based on the demand for labour, within which Member States decide on the number of migrant workers which can be admitted onto their territory;
- increasing the mobility of specific categories of people. Since the adoption of the 'Europe 2020' Strategy, specific attention has been paid to highly qualified migrants;
- fully applying the Visa Code in order to simplify the procedures for granting visas for visits of less than three months;
- making the legal instruments of migration policy more accessible and educational by setting up a European Immigration Portal and Migration and Mobility Resource Centres.

According to the EC, the GAMM should give priority to countries neighbouring the EU in particular to those in the Southern Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, and should be more migrant-centred. Two different flexible frameworks for action are proposed for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods with four instruments to implement them: migration missions, cooperation platforms, migration profiles and Mobility Partnerships.

**Box 2. The instruments of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)**

- **Migration missions** are particularly aimed at evaluating the opportunity to implement Mobility Partnerships or other global approach tools. They also enable political dialogues to be conducted with third countries on the issue of migration.
- **Cooperation platforms** are believed to enable local dialogue on migration for the implementation of Mobility Partnerships. For the Southern Neighbourhood, the Rabat Process, initiated in 2006 between the EU and Western African countries, constitutes the operational dialogue. The 3rd Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, which took place in Dakar on 23 November 2011, confirmed that the Southern countries are confronted by particularly difficult migration and economic realities.
- **Migration appraisals** are carried out with the partner countries involved in the migration appraisal in order to target the programming of financial instruments better, and to facilitate impact assessments on the initiatives implemented.

**3.2 Mobility Partnerships (MPs)**

For the EC, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) must become the principal framework for cooperation on migration and mobility matters with neighbouring countries. Their content is adapted to each of the countries involved. They are in the form of a policy declaration accompanied by an annex listing the different proposals. They cover all migration issues (legal migration, combating irregular immigration, development and asylum), while respecting the division of Community and national responsibilities. MPs are negotiated in the name of the EU for Member States. However, their application requires the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Member States who want them and the partner country.
Before being offered an MP, the country concerned must make progress as part of the dialogue on migration, mobility and security. Based on the 'more for more' strategy, MPs offer flexibility in the visa-granting procedures for the partner country on the condition that the latter signs readmission agreements and commits to combating irregular immigration. In other words, the partner country must actively participate in controlling Europe’s border if it wants mobility for specific categories of its citizens.

When a partner country does not wish to undertake all of the commitments of the MP, and in particular the establishment of readmission agreements and visa facilitation, Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) may be considered. However, there is no partner country in the South on the list of countries which could be offered a CAMM.

Before being concluded with Morocco and Tunisia in June 2013 and March 2014 respectively, MPs were concluded with the Republic of Moldova and Cape Verde in 2008, Georgia in 2009, Armenia in 2011 and Azerbaijan in 2013.

### Table 3. Mobility Partnerships with neighbouring countries in the South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Finalised</th>
<th>On-going negotiations</th>
<th>To be completed in 2014</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COM(2014) 96

At the same time, in 2012, the EC also wanted to launch a ‘broad consultation on what the role of EU policies should be regarding the opportunities of economic migration’\(^{25}\) and the Council is already working on new measures to be implemented as part of an action plan entitled ‘EU Action on Migratory Pressures – a Strategic Response’\(^{26}\), adopted in April 2012, which is based on the following priorities:

- strengthening cooperation with third countries of transit and origin on migration management;

\(^{25}\) COM(2012) 250 final

\(^{26}\) Doc 8714/1/12 REV 1 of the Council of the EU, of 23 April 2012.
Policy Department DG External policies

- enhanced border management at the external borders;
- preventing illegal immigration via the Greek-Turkish border;
- better tackling of abuse of legal migration channels;
- safeguarding and protecting free movement through prevention of abuse of free movement rights by third country nationals;
- enhancing migration management, including cooperation on return practices.

3.3 **EUROSUR: increased surveillance of the Southern Neighbourhood**

After the boats carrying migrants sank close to the island of Lampedusa and Malta on 3 October 2013, the European Parliament adopted the Eurosur Programme (European Border Surveillance System) on 10 October 2013. This new identification and data transfer system aims to monitor the priority refugee flows in the Mediterranean.

**Map 2. Perilous crossings along the bottom edge of the European Union**

Eurosur should improve both Frontex and Member States’ information on the status of the EU’s external borders, the objective being to (i) reduce the number of irregular immigrants entering the EU undetected; (ii) reduce the number of deaths of irregular immigrants by saving more lives at sea; and (iii) increase the internal security of the EU as a whole, by contributing to the prevention of cross-border crime.

With a budget of EUR 224 million for the 2014-20 period, the implementation of this new system responds to much criticism regarding the lack of solidarity between EU Member States in managing migration flows, particularly those emanating from the Southern Neighbourhood.

With the new system, the EU justifies the monitoring of its borders with third countries as far away as possible. The EU also hopes to better divide the burden of welcoming migrants and refugees between Member States whilst also making the Southern Neighbourhood countries readmit as many as possible. The implementation of the Eurosur system in December 2013, [...] “enabled the extension of the

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27 COM(2008) 68
FRONTEX Sea horse Network cooperation programme to Libya, Morocco and then Egypt. [...] In particular, focus should be on detecting small boats of irregular immigrants in departure ports.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) Corinne Balleix (2013)
PART II – GREATER MOBILITY BETWEEN THE EU AND MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES

The revolutionary events in the Mediterranean Arab countries released a disorder, chaos even, to which the EU is unaccustomed. It was easier to rely on the regimes which gave guarantees of stability to Europe, most of the time repressing their citizens. What is sure is that a return to the previous situation is no longer possible despite the violent antagonisms in Egypt, the worrying power void in Libya and the stagnation in Algeria. The citizens have expressed several demands, in particular that of mobility both within their own countries and to other parts of the world.

As developments in the Mediterranean Arab countries are not following the same plan or moving at the same pace and these countries are engaged in political, economic and social transitions, it is without doubt that they will require time to settle down and to find their way back to stability and growth. They also need time to carry out structural reforms and to find their own development models.

The EU, which is one of their most important partners, must support them for the duration of their transitions and help them in their efforts to institute the rule of Law and to establish the supremacy of law. A global development programme could be at the centre of renewing relations between the EU and the Southern Neighbourhood countries. In this respect, migration and mobility must be addressed as part of a peaceful approach to enable the two parties to benefit from the advantages of proximity and complementarity.

The migration pressure is also being felt, often with more violence, in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia which have become host countries for migrants. This phenomenon, which is relatively new to them, confronts them with emergencies which are added to their own priorities related to economic and political transition. Transferring the monitoring of the EU’s external borders to these countries risks worsening their incapacity to effectively manage the flow of migrants which they receive.

In this regard, changes need to be brought to European migration policy with regard to these countries in order to enable greater mobility between them and the EU.

4 THE EU AND COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: COULD DO BETTER

Before presenting recommendations for greater mobility between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, it is necessary to highlight the main limitations of the immigration systems put in place following the Arab Spring.

4.1 Structural weaknesses in the European systems faced with the Arab Spring

The European immigration systems established after the Arab Spring have several weaknesses, the main ones being:

- The absence of straightforward integral support from the EU for the citizens who had overthrown dictators who had long been supported by Europe: the negative reaction of the EU was very badly received by the citizens of the countries concerned and fuelled anti-European feeling amongst some of them.
- The inadequate reception of the flow of refugees to the immediate neighbouring countries following difficult internal situations: the contrast was striking between the Tunisians who welcomed too many (most often into their own homes) of the people fleeing Libya and the instrumentalisation of the massive arrival of North African refugees in Italy and France for internal political reasons.
The fragility of European migration instruments in times of crisis: a reconsideration of the Schengen acquis communautaire by Member States was possible on the occasion of a sudden influx of migrants, even though this acquis is one of the fundamental bases of European migration policy.

The inadequacy of the EU’s migration offer: the EU has developed a large legal corpus on migration with significant monitoring and surveillance systems, but has failed to present a clear migration ‘offer’ to countries in the Southern Neighbourhood.

4.2 The institutionalised externalisation of the EU’s borders

It is estimated that more than 44 000 migrants arrived in Europe, specifically in Italy and France, between January and June 2011. During the same period, Tunisia suffered the aftershocks of the Libyan conflict and became a host country to migrants from 65 different nationalities fleeing Libya. Although the exact figures are not known, it is estimated that Tunisia welcomed over 600 000 migrants.

Table 4. Migrants from third countries arriving through borders with Libya and repatriated to their country of origin in two months (March-April 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>85850</td>
<td>61,3</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>27780</td>
<td>70,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>13857</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>4520</td>
<td>11,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>11905</td>
<td>8,5</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>3708</td>
<td>9,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>8450</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>7589</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>6940</td>
<td>5,0</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2567</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39222</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chouat, M. & Liteyem, B. 2011; selon IOM

The European migration instruments proposed to Southern Neighbourhood countries, specifically the Mobility Partnerships, are presented as having benefits for all parties:

- Member States better regulate and manage migration based on their needs.
- Partner countries can expect a positive impact on their economy and development due to increased mobility.
- Migrants benefit from finding it easier to obtain visas and increase their economic opportunities.

Lastly, circular migration with migrants returning temporarily or permanently to their country of origin are presented as an EU contribution towards 'reducing the brain drain'.

However, several civil society stakeholders, particularly in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, believe that these partnerships, which have already been signed with Morocco and Tunisia, are not up to meeting the challenges which these two countries face. They also question their suitability within the context of a period of difficult political and economic transition.

In effect, the MPS establish, within a binding institutional framework, the externalisation of migration controls for the EU's benefit. In accordance with these agreements, Morocco and Tunisia agree to readmit irregular migrants who have transited through their territories. However, these countries suffer from a lack of reception centres which respect the rights of migrants. Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network questions the capacity of these countries to 'provide [...] an absolute guarantee that the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers will be respected [...].'

The main criticism made about the Mobility Partnerships is that they involve an immigration policy based on 'a multi-speed system'. They plan to 'subordinate for anti-migration purposes, all the European policies, in particular the neighbourhood, cooperation and development assistance policies' and to transfer the responsibilities of European priorities regarding irregular immigration to third countries.

In a report in May 2006, the Strategic Analysis Centre considers that 'EU cooperation with the countries in the south is more and more conditioned by the repression of migrants (readmission agreements, policing of borders, etc.).'

### 4.3 The predominance of European economic considerations

In order to attract Mediterranean partners to accept MPS and other instruments established by the EU, a connection has been implemented between migration and development. The migrant represents an economic asset for the source countries due, in particular, to the migration allowances.

The global approach of making the systematic return of migrants a source of development for the country of origin has not been demonstrated. All the returns do not result in the creation of a business or an automatic transfer of the skills acquired abroad. Furthermore, this approach to migration is taken to the detriment of the rights of migrants to settle permanently in a host country, and to their desire to be mobile between the host country and the country of origin. The counter-example is illustrated by citizens with dual nationalities who manage to integrate well into the host country and to free their creative energy for the benefit of their country of origin because they have citizenship for the two countries.

### 4.4 Not taking the actual interests of Mediterranean partner countries into account

The migration policy carried out by the EU towards its Mediterranean partners does not take their actual interests into account. It does not tackle the structural causes of low development in these countries which is the main cause of migration. The Neighbourhood Policy and other instruments put in place by the EU are disconnected from the migration policies which conceal internal and external challenges.

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30 AEDH – note on economic migration in the EU, 17 October 2011.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Based on these elements, it seems necessary that questions on migration and mobility between the EU and Mediterranean partners be approached with calm and clarity. Migration should not be perceived as a burden, but as a real opportunity, bringing benefits for both parties. It should be the subject of permanent dialogue taking into account the interests of both sides.

5.1 Thinking calmly about migration and mobility

As difficult as they are, questions on migration and mobility must be raised in a calm manner, with the participation of civil society. Relying on security and tough border management is no guarantee of definitive solutions to migratory movements. The EU and its Mediterranean partners cannot build a relationship based on trust and mutual respect without taking into account the rights of citizens in the Southern Neighbourhood countries to move freely. It is worth recalling that, in the context of continuing economic crisis in Europe, many European citizens emigrated to countries in North Africa in the search for new economic opportunities. It must be possible for people to move in both directions. To this end, it is necessary to move away from a purely administrative and security-focused approach to migration towards an approach based on economic mobility to the benefit of both parties.

This involves increasing bilateral and multilateral dialogues by involving employers’ organisations, trade unions and professional networks in the EU and Southern Neighbourhood countries to address all the issues concerning mobility and migration.

It also involves disassociating, particularly at European policy level, the issue of mobility from that of immigration and border control, in order to envisage a Euro-Mediterranean area of mobility without political instrumentalisation.

5.2 Mobility: component of a new development policy for Mediterranean partner countries

Migration and mobility policy must tackle the root causes of migration flows, such as poverty, human rights violations, conflicts, lack of economic opportunities, unsatisfactory working conditions and underemployment. Mediterranean partners cannot be sought only to satisfy European objectives to control migrant flows; it is important that they are persuaded that their interests are being taking into consideration. To this end, MPS must ‘complement a coherent and comprehensive development policy’ to which European companies present in the Mediterranean countries may also contribute.

5.3 Make Europe more attractive

Europe must be more attractive to citizens in the Mediterranean partner countries. This requires the EU and the countries of origin jointly granting and putting in place procedures aimed at securing routes for certain categories of migrants such as researchers, students, professionals, artists and entrepreneurs.

Several proposals have been put forward for this purpose. The European Policy Centre\(^\text{33}\) suggests [...] ‘strengthening links between the status of student and access to the labour market because, despite the existence of a ‘Students’ directive, access to the labour market still comes under the national policies of Member States, which are often contradictory. Adapting the two directives on students and researchers.

\(^{33}\) European Policy Centre (EPC) (2013)
to the requirements for a highly qualified workforce would effectively supplement the provisions provided for by the European blue card, and contribute towards establishing a more attractive and welcoming European migration policy.

For example, this could also be undertaken by assuring certain rights equal to those of nationals, offering the possibility of portability for certain rights (unemployment, retirement, etc.), facilitating access to citizenship and dual nationality and accessing multi-annual securities, etc.

Another proposal consists of granting complete freedom of movement with long term status to highly qualified workers which would enable the authorities in the South to envisage greater mobility between the country of origin and the host country, and consequently increase the potential of the country of origin to benefit from their skills acquired in Europe.

5.4 Exploit the potential for migration to fill the gaps in European labour markets

Migration could be harnessed to respond to shortages in certain sectors of European labour markets. This could be envisaged by strengthening MPS to enable a group of States, who share the same need for (highly) qualified workers and who offer similar working, salary and living conditions, to cooperate more closely in order to put in place policies which are attractive to persons with corresponding profiles. This also assumes a reception for migrants that guarantees them the same rights as European workers, thus increasing their potential for mobility between their country of origin and their host country.

5.5 Promote and encourage mobility through Euro-Mediterranean professional networks

Another way of approaching the issue of mobility consists of involving Euro-Mediterranean professional networks in efforts to build the capacities of Mediterranean partners in certain areas by authorising professionals from the networks in these countries to be trained and employed in EU countries for a fixed period under the auspices of the professional network in question. Professional associations participate in professional networking in the EU and its Southern Neighbourhood. By building on the common interests and values of their professions, these associations mobilise professionals from the North and the South to ensure a transfer of skills and to aid better standard convergence of Southern Neighbourhood countries with the EU. It would also be appropriate to build on professional networks which offer a framework for cooperation which enables members in the network with a lower level of development to make progress, through exchanging experience and solutions, creating transnational training institutes and encompassing qualified mobility within the network.

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34 European Policy Centre (EPC) (2013)
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### ANNEX 1

**Principal texts on European immigration policy (1985 – 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry into force</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Aims and key elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Schengen Agreement</td>
<td>Establishing an area of free movement by removing the internal borders of the signatory countries and introducing a common external border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>'Schengen Convention'</td>
<td>Definition of the arrangements for implementing the Schengen Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
<td>Establishing a single market. Enabling the development of ideas at European level on the measures required to achieve this, and therefore considering a migration policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Treaty of Maastricht</td>
<td>Declaration of specific areas of common interest to Member States (border crossings, conditions of entry and residence, immigration policy, etc.). Integration of the Schengen compensatory measures into the third pillar ‘Cooperation on justice and internal affairs’. Enabling the Council to establish a list of countries whose citizens require a visa and a visa template.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Tampere Programme</td>
<td>First Council declaration in favour of establishing a common European immigration policy. One of the four axes of the programme concerns managing migration flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td>Establishing an area of freedom, security and justice. COMMunitarisation of part of the third pillar (asylum, immigration, visa, judicial cooperation in civil matters).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>'Community policy on Immigration' - COM(2000) 757 final</td>
<td>Presentation by the Commission of its vision for a common immigration policy based around a common judicial framework for all economic migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulation (EC) No 539/2001</td>
<td>Finalising the list of third countries whose nationals require a visa and those countries whose nationals are exempted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty of Nice</td>
<td>Extending the vote by qualified majority to visa, asylum and immigration policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulation (EC) No 415/2003</td>
<td>Establishing conditions for issuing visas at the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Directive concerning admission for purposes</td>
<td>Establishing the minimum general rules concerning admission procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event/Document</td>
<td>Summary/Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Green Paper on 'A Community approach to managing economic migration'</td>
<td>Launching a consultation with civil society and stakeholders on migration policy and the rules to be established for admitting economic migrants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2005 | The Hague Programme | Commission Proposal aimed at strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice.  
Axis concerning the definition of a new approach balanced on managing migration and establishing a common immigration policy. |
Providing specific procedures and conditions for categories of migrants which the EU wishes to attract.  
The Commission abandons the horizontal approach it wanted – the States impose their vision. |
| 2005 | Directive concerning the admission of researchers | Favouring European admission and mobility of researchers by proposing a harmonisation of admission procedures. |
| 2005 | Communication from the Presidency of the Council | Presentation of the global approach to migration based on combating irregular immigration and strengthening political dialogue. |
| 2006 | 'The global approach to migration one year on: towards a comprehensive European migration policy' - COM(2006) 735 final | Presentation by the Commission on extending the global approach to questions of integration and legal migration.  
Suggestion of the possibility of establishing Mobility Partnerships. |
| 2008 | European Pact on immigration and asylum | Drafting by the Members States of a programme advocating a return to a restrictive and secure vision of immigration.  
This is the new framework for the common immigration policy. |
| 2009 | Directive concerning the entry and residence of nationals for highly qualified employment | Establishing the European Blue Card.  
Establishing a harmonised and simplified admission procedure and granting equal treatment to holders of the EPC. |
| 2009 | Lisbon Treaty | Consecration of the area of freedom, security and justice.  
Border control, asylum and immigration policies become a shared competency between the Union and Member States. |
| 2010 | Stockholm Programme | Council presentation of new policy priorities including facilitating access to the European territory to certain categories of migrants, and the implementation of a comprehensive policy on migration. |
| 2011 | It does not obtain the Council’s agreement which does not consider it to be compliant with the Programme. |
| Proposal for a Directive concerning entry and residency conditions for seasonal employment | Commitment to establish a single, simplified procedure for admission applications and a common framework.  
Awaiting a first reading by the Parliament. |
| Proposal for a Directive concerning entry and residency conditions for intra-corporate transfer | Commitment to harmonise admission conditions and to create more attractive residency conditions.  
Awaiting a first reading by the Parliament. |
| 'A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean', COM(2011) 200 final | Presentation by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of a new strategy to address the changes taking place in the Southern Mediterranean.  
Only involves a change to immigration policy. For the first time the Commission declares that they are in favour of visa liberalisation with conditions. |
Expanding the global approach to questions of mobility, visas and economic migration.  
Presentation of Mobility Partnerships. |
| 'Single permit' Framework directive | Establishing a single application procedure and a single permit (residence permit and work permit).  
Forms part of the 2005 Action Plan on legal immigration. |
ANNEX 2

Euromed Migration Projects I, II, III with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria (cooperation suspended), Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Migration I</td>
<td>EUR 2 million</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>Monitoring, analysis and forecasting of migratory movements, their causes and impact in Europe and in Mediterranean partner countries in accordance with a global approach covering all aspects (demographic, economic, legal, social and political) of migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Migration II</td>
<td>EUR 5 million</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>Cooperation on managing migration in order to enable partners to find more effective, targeted and comprehensive solutions to the different types of migration with the aim of establishing incentive mechanisms for legal migration, supporting measures which promote synergies between migration and development, and increasing activities aimed at stopping people trafficking and irregular immigration, and managing mixed flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euromed Migration III</td>
<td>EUR 5 million</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>Implementation of the EU’s global approach which brings together three aspects: horizontal component, legal migration, migration and development and irregular migration: effective training sessions and expert missions to combat irregular immigration in the Euro-Mediterranean region and to build the capacities of partner countries with regard to border control, promoting legal migration networks and worker mobility, and to strengthen synergies between migration and development by recognising the role of taxes and the banking system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: enpi-info.eu
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