



Democratic accountability and parliamentary control in foreign and security policy – general introduction

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
European Parliament
SEDE Committee
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Legitimacy and Accountability

- **Minimum requirement for democratic legitimacy in EU external relations** (Sjursen 2011, Raube and Wouters 2018):
 - Autonomy (the affected of the action must be authors the action)
 - Accountability (decision-makers must be held accountable)
- **Input, throughput and output legitimacy** (V. Schmidt 2013):
 - governing by the people
 - governing with the people
 - governing for the people

Legitimacy and Accountability


Internal and External Input-, Throughput- and Output- Legitimacy in EU Foreign Policy



Raube, Tonra and Sjursen (forthcoming 2018)

Legitimacy and Accountability

Internal and External Input-, Throughput- and Output- Legitimacy in EU Foreign Policy



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Influence

Decision-making stages	
Pre-decision	Problem-formulation
	Agenda-setting
Decision-making	Participation in decision-making
Post-decision	Implementation
	Evaluation

Influence
of parliaments

Influence, accountability and legitimation?

- **Authority, ability and attitude** (Hänggi and Born 2004, 2005; Huff 2015)
- Contextual sources **elevating or sidelining parliaments** and generating **effects on parliaments** (Mello and Peters 2018)

Parliaments in CSDP

Parliamentary Functions

Controllers and Scrutinizers

Decision Makers and Legislators

Parliamentary Diplomats

Parliaments in CSDP


- **Parliamentary Control:** power to sanction (i.e. budgetary powers, legislative powers, war powers)
- **Parliamentary Scrutiny:** softer means of accountability (Wouters and Raube 2012)
- **Decisions Maker and Legislator** (Raube 2012)
- **Parliamentary Diplomats** (Jancic and Stavridis 2016)

Scrutiny **might not include the ultimate power to sanction**, but in such cases parliaments remain far from non-influential. Parliaments may use **the power of the public to scrutinise executive acts, to legitimize or de-legitimize them in public**. In fact, it may also be the case that governments seek to be scrutinised by parliaments in order to legitimise their actions publicly. (Wouters and Raube 2012)


Parliaments in CSDP

European Parliament

- Roland Bieber claimed that **EP parliamentary involvement** is necessary to preserve the self-sustainability of the EU's foreign policy-making system (1990)
- European Parliament has however **not been able to win many formal control powers** in CFSP/ CSDP
- **Symbolic Parliament without Power?**



Parliaments in CSDP



Parliaments in CSDP

Decision-making stages		Indicators
Pre-decision	Problem-formulation	The EP's identifies a problem that is subsequently enters into the policy-making process or instigates institutional reform. The EP's definition of a problem or issue becomes guiding to the policy-making process or the standard for institutional reform.
	Agenda-setting	The EP's concerns become part of the EU's CFSP agenda. The EP's concerns receive more/earlier attention than other issues on the CFSP agenda.
Decision-making	Participation in decision-making	The EP rejects (parts of) a policy or procedure that it does not agree to. The EP amends (parts of) a policy or procedure that it does not agree to.
Post-decision	Implementation	The EP's suggestions for how to implement a certain policy or procedure are (partly) incorporated by the EU executives.
	Evaluation	The EP's evaluation of a policy or procedure leads to the change of given policy or procedure.

Rosén, G. and Raube, K. (2018): 'Influence beyond parliamentary powers: The parliamentarization of European Union security policy', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 20 (1), 69-83.

Parliaments in CSDP

- Variation of **legislative, budgetary and oversight powers** (Dietrich, Marshall and Hummels 2010)
- More specifically: **Variation of constitutionally granted parliamentary war powers** (Cassese 1980, WEU 2001, Peters and Wagner 2011)
 - **Ex-ante veto powers vs. No ex-ante veto powers**
 - **Newly-won vs. lately-lost powers**
 - A trend towards **de-parliamentarization**
 - Formal vs. **informal powers: parliamentarization**
- **Formal powers do not always render care** (Schade 2018)
- **Democratic Peace Theory stands** (Wagner 2018)
 - But: Role of strong governments (Auerswald 1999)
 - Military alliances become important (external) factors, sometimes trumping institutional constraints (Wagner 2018)

Parliaments in CSDP

- **Towards a Parliamentarization of CSDP?**
 - **The overall impact (influence and legitimation) of parliaments dependent on parliamentarization** (Crum 2006; Raube 2012)
 - National Parliaments: **Extended parliamentary consent despite “de-parliamentarized” systems?** (Peters and Wagner 2011)
 - European Parliament: **Growing parliamentary influence in the shadow of non-formalized powers?** (Crum 2006; Rittberger 2003)

Parliaments in CSDP

- **Inter-parliamentary Cooperation in the EU** as enhancing democratic accountability (Wouters/ Raube 2016; Raube/ Wouters and Mütüler-Bac 2019)?
- Exchange of information and added-value for democratic accountability

- **IPC CFSDP/CSDP:**

“...shall provide a framework for the exchange of information and best practices in the area of CFSP/CSDP to enable national parliaments and the European Parliament to be fully informed when carrying out their respective roles in this policy area.” (Rules of Procedure, 1.1)

- Which Role for **Parliamentary Diplomacy**?

Conclusions

- **Parliamentary roles are shaped and alternated unevenly** (from one policy to another) and **fragmented** (from one level of the EU polity to another) in EU external relations
- This fragmentation of parliamentary roles across policies leads to questions about the kind of **legitimacy which currently 'fuels' EU external relations in general and CFSP/CSDP more specifically**
- **Parliamentarization of CSDP**
 - Impact on influence and legitimation through parliaments
- **Democratic (parliamentary) deficit** possible unless further institutionalization