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AT A GLANCE Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - November 2023 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Szerzők : ANDRZEJ SANDERSKI, ANNA MANGINI

EU defence after Versailles: An agenda for the future EN

03-10-2023 PE 702.604 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This analysis focuses on developments in European Union (EU) security and defence since the Versailles Summit, held on 10–11 March 2022. It shows how the Union’s response to Russia’s war on Ukraine has unleashed and spurred on a range of operational, industrial and political initiatives that will influence security and defence policy for the years to come. The EU is presently trying to grapple with the growing relevance of deterrence and defence while affirming the importance of projecting stability beyond Europe’s borders. In this study, we argue that the next institutional cycle offers an opportunity to balance those priorities. We advance two sets of recommendations: a) the need to rebalance the focus of EU defence policy instruments such as EDF, PESCO or EPF towards generating the skillsets, technologies and capabilities required for deterrence, and strengthen EU-NATO relations; and b) the need to rethink the EU’s approach to external crisis management and adapt to the requirements of non-permissive political and operational environments.
Szerzők : Daniel FIOTT; Luis SIMÓN

The role of cyber in the Russian war against Ukraine: Its impact and the consequences for the future of armed conflict EN

04-09-2023 PE 702.594 SEDE
Briefing
Összefoglaló : On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation carried out a further military invasion of Ukraine, violating the UN Charter. The ongoing international armed conflict in Ukraine raises concerns about harm and impact caused to the civilian population, and the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure which are affected by both kinetic and cyberattacks. This report analyses the magnitude of the cyber dimension of the war in Ukraine, its impact, and the lessons learned with the aim to increase understanding about the threat environment, and strengthen cyber resilience and defence capabilities across the EU and in neighbouring countries.
Szerzők : Stéphane DUGUIN, Pavlina PAVLOVA

Future Shocks 2023: Anticipating and weathering the next storms EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The European Parliament launched a process of monitoring possible future risks for the EU during the COVID-19 crisis, and has developed this further during Russia's war on Ukraine. The annual 'Future Shocks' series provides up-to-date, objective, and authoritative information on global risks through a 360° survey based on risk literature from a broad range of sources. Future Shocks 2023: Anticipating and weathering the next storms discusses 15 risks related to geopolitics, climate change, health, economics and democracy that could occur in the coming decade, and 10 policy responses to address both existing governance capacity and possible ways to enhance risk-response capabilities within the EU.
Szerzők : Gabor Zsolt PATAKI

First EU space strategy for security and defence: What implications for EU strategic autonomy? EN

28-08-2023 PE 747.448 AFET ITRE IMCO SEDE
Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : In 2022, the EU Strategic Compass included space as a strategic domain, and called for a dedicated European strategy. In the meantime, Russia's invasion of Ukraine confirmed the key role of space for defence and resilience, but also highlighted vulnerabilities related to space systems. Another 'wake-up call' came from a different direction; SpaceX's advances in reusable rocket technology leading to Starship's first orbital flight test turned the spotlight onto launch providers and access to space. Space is a critical infrastructure issue with growing economic significance. It is also an increasingly contested arena between competing geopolitical interests. To address these rising challenges, in March 2023 the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President presented their first joint communication on a European space strategy for security and defence.
Szerzők : Gabor Zsolt PATAKI

Security implications of China-owned critical infrastructure in the European Union EN

23-06-2023 PE 702.592 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : China’s footprint in European critical assets has grown steadily over time, without any centralised mechanism that could give the European Union (EU) and Member State agencies visibility and scrutiny over projects of strategic significance for Europe’s defence and security. China’s footprint poses specific challenges to Europe’s efforts to protect its critical infrastructure. China’s party-led political system does not allow clear distinctions between commercial, political and military interests, often viewing Chinese state and private companies’ international activities as instruments helping the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expand its influence in foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals. The CCP’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy incentivises civilian actors to contribute to the modernisation of the People Liberation Army (PLA) through technology transfer. Chinese companies’ access to EU critical infrastructure thus calls for an analysis of threats to Europe’s defence and security architecture. Using research with original Chinese-language sources, this paper analyses the involvement of China state-linked entities in selected critical sectors — ports, rare metals and undersea cables — to identify short-, medium- and long-term threats to the EU’s strategic sovereignty. These cases expose how entities linked to the Chinese party-state can gain access to and exert influence on assets that are vital to Europe’s security and defence, including transport infrastructure, critical resources and telecommunications networks. This research demonstrates that traditional approaches to infrastructure protection based on direct ownership are insufficient, since China’s party-state can obtain access to critical infrastructure through indirect, equally effective channels. As these cases show, infrastructure protection mechanisms, whose codification and implementation remains incomplete, must be extended to be able to scrutinise the risks that China’s leverage over non-science investors and Chinese state-linked contractors pose to the EU’s critical infrastructure.
Szerzők : Frank JÜRIS

The Strategic Compass: Implementing the partnership dimension in the area of security and defence EN

23-06-2023 PE 702.593 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This in-depth analysis (IDA) focuses on how to implement the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension in the field of security and defence, and how to maximise the potential of the EU’s different strategic partnerships. The report not only provides an up-to-date overview of the most important security and defence partnerships, but also places them in their wider historical context, and in the context of future challenges within a fiercely changing geopolitical landscape. The report maps the EU’s different partnerships and their institutional arrangements, as well as the main policy fields in the realm of security and defence. It offers an in-depth analysis of the core challenges of each major partnership and charts out concrete recommendations for gearing each partnership towards a more impactful realisation of the Strategic Compass’s goals. It also examines how existing cooperation arrangements can be improved, and how new fora can be utilised in a more comprehensive manner. Overall, this IDA seeks to examine and assess in detail how the Strategic Compass’s emphasis on security and defence partnerships can be implemented in practice, and what role the European Parliament can play in this process.
Szerzők : Joachim A. KOOPS;Ramon PACHECO PARDO

A preparedness plan for Europe: Addressing food, energy and technological security EN

Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : The current situation in Ukraine has led to severe supply chain disruptions, contributing to a sharp increase in food and commodity prices globally and the limitation of fossil fuel imports from Russia to the EU. Moreover, to end Europe's dependence on semiconductor suppliers from Asian countries, it is necessary to take immediate action of a structural nature, involving all EU Member States and all participants in regional supply markets. The overall aim of this study was to identify drivers of and barriers to building up open strategic autonomy at EU level, before recommending coordinated solutions and addressing supply chain resilience in four critical areas: food security, energy security, semiconductors and satellite communications. This research seeks to contribute to the European Parliament's future work by providing insights into how to protect the European agricultural sector, ensure energy security and the technological sovereignty of semiconductor production, and improve satellite communications.
Szerzők : This study has been written by Joanna Ejdys, Katarzyna Czerewacz-Filipowicz, Katarzyna Halicka, Anna Kononiuk, Andrzej Magruk, Julia Siderska, Danuta Szpilko of Bialystok University of Technology (Poland) at the request of the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) and managed by the Scientific Foresight Unit, within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament.
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Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - March 2023 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Enhancing the capabilities of CSDP missions and operations to identify and respond to disinformation attacks EN

17-02-2023 PE 702.578 SEDE AFET
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : With more and more disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its institutions in recent years, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations have also been subject to such attacks. While this analysis did not identify systematic disinformation campaigns against the EU CSDP missions and operations, it does not imply that the CSDP missions and operations are not on the radar of the malign actors creating and disseminating disinformation. In fact, their activities are occasionally used by malign actors to feed into their campaigns intended to undermine the EU and its allies, which constitute the main target of these campaigns.
Szerzők : Ofer FRIDMAN, Virginie BAUDAIS, Givi GIGITASHVILI

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - February 2023 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Towards EU leadership in the space sector through open strategic autonomy - Cost of non-Europe EN

Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : This 'cost of non-Europe' report looks at the potential benefits of efficient, ambitious and united EU-level action in the space sector. The report finds that to enable the European space sector to benefit from open strategic autonomy, and to ensure EU access to and use of space, including for its security, the EU must act decisively. Moving away from fragmentation could bring large benefits, amounting to at least €140 billion per year by 2050.
Szerzők : ALEKSANDRA HEFLICH, JEROME LEON SAULNIER, CLEMENT THIERRY EVROUX

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - December 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - November 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

The Strategic Compass and EU space-based defence capabilities EN

17-11-2022 PE 702.569 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The European Union relies on space for its economic sovereignty and security and defence. Without space-based capabilities, the EU could not enjoy any degree of strategic autonomy in security and defence. Since the adoption and endorsement of the Strategic Compass, space has only increased its relevance for the EU in the area of security and defence. Indeed, the Compass calls for a dedicated EU Strategy for Space and Defence. Yet space and defence is not a new avenue of policy for the EU and defence cooperation frameworks such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund already fund and advance space-relevant capability programmes. A major challenge facing the EU as it develops its space policies is how to ensure that the Union can develop a credible space and defence strategy, while also investing in the most appropriate space-defence capabilities.
Szerzők : Daniel FIOTT

The EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: This time, it’s for real? EN

28-10-2022 PE 702.568 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU’s Strategic Compass (SC) calls for the creation of a ‘European Rapid Deployment Capacity’ (EU RDC) that would allow the EU to swiftly deploy up to 5 000 troops into non-permissive environments for different types of crises. The In-Depth Analysis (IDA) examines how this objective might be achieved successfully. It looks at the problems related to decision making and political will that have structurally hampered the deployment of the EU Battlegroups since their creation in 2007. It also looks at the conditions under which Member States might be willing to make first use of Article 44, which provides for small groups of Member States to act within an EU framework. Secondly, the IDA analyses operational questions, such as the Rapid Deployment Capacity’s (RDC) possible tasks, force packages and illustrative scenarios, the concept and size, exercises, costs, and addressing shortfalls. Thirdly, the analysis discusses command and control challenges, especially how to rapidly develop the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the RDC’s headquarters, and the role of Operational Headquarters (OHQ). The paper highlights the considerable potential for the RDC to substantially improve on the Battlegroups, strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy, and positively contribute to the EU’s integrated approach to security and peace. Yet, the timetable is highly ambitious and will require Member States to give its achievement a high priority in their contributions. Furthermore, the RDC is only likely to succeed if the right lessons are learnt, not just in terms of improving operational readiness and capacity, but also crucially in terms of political signalling, commitment, and stronger sense of national ownership. The authors provide a number of recommendations for EU institutions on how this might be achieved in the short and longer term.
Szerzők : Christoph MEYER, Ton VAN OSCH, Yf REYKERS

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - October 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - September 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Multilateralism and Democracy. A European Parliament perspective EN

Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This analysis looks into the complex relationship between two trends in international governance: an increase in multilateral arrangements between countries in order to govern internationally on the one hand, and a lack of democratic control over the decisions taken by multilateral organisations or conferences on the other. Multilateralism in the modern sense refers to an international mode of operation involving peaceful negotiations and diplomacy, also referred to as a ‘rules-based international order’ or ‘rules-based multilateralism’. Several European countries have recently launched initiatives in support of multilateralism, in reaction to the increasingly unilateral behaviour of states undermining the existing rules-based international order. Apart from the European Union, no other multilateral organisation has a parliamentary body with the competence to block or amend its decisions, which indicates that there is a democratic deficit in these multilateral organisations. An initial response to such a democratic deficit is the involvement of national parliaments in international decision-making. This is known as ‘parliamentary diplomacy’. Secondly, the involvement of civil society in international decision-making through protests, petitions, consultations or participation can also enhance democracy. Thirdly, the organisation of national referenda on international decisions can be used by national governments or citizens’ initiatives to increase democratic legitimacy. Fourthly, a lack of democracy at international level can also be countered by creating an ‘alliance of democracies’, aimed at multilateral cooperation between democratic countries rather than the democratisation of multilateral organisations. These are mostly alliances of Western countries, which risks emphasising the differences between West and East or North and South. Three short case studies of parliamentary diplomacy with the strong involvement of the European Parliament (the Parliamentary Conference on the World Trade Organization (WTO), delegations to the Conferences of Parties of climate change agreements and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) show that enhancing multilateral democracy is not the only aim of parliamentary diplomacy and that each case reveals a different mix between the ‘parliamentary’ aspect of democratisation and the ‘diplomacy’ aspects of information exchange or influencing.
Szerzők : Mario DAMEN

Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU EN

01-06-2022 PE 702.557 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU’s subsea data cable network is both vital for global connectivity and vulnerable. This study provides a systematic review of the current security threats, as well as the actors at the origin of these threats. Building on reports and expert input, the paper takes stock of current awareness, preparedness and response mechanisms, both at the EU and Member State level. A number of recommendations suggest how to improve the resilience of the cable network. Proposals build on the need to enhance EU-wide awareness, improve coordination and share information across EU institutions and Member States. In addition, surveillance capabilities must be advanced, response and repair mechanisms strengthened, and the topic mainstreamed across external action.
Szerzők : Christian BUEGER, Tobias LIEBETRAU, Jonas FRANKEN

The extent of the European Parliament’s competence in Common Security and Defence Policy EN

01-06-2022 PE 702.559 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : In recent years, security and defence policy has become one of the most burgeoning fields of European cooperation, and the war in Ukraine is further accelerating this integration dynamic. Yet, the formal role of the European Parliament (EP) has not been recalibrated to fit this new setting. Indeed, as the intergovernmental blueprint of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains unaltered, the EP’s role is limited. In light of the rapidly growing scope of CSDP activities and initiatives, which are likely to further expand given the present geopolitical context, one might wonder whether the way in which parliamentary prerogatives set out in EU law are put into practice is compatible with the Union’s general principles of democracy, sincere cooperation, and institutional balance. This in-depth analysis finds that, by virtue of the fundamental democratic principle underpinning the EU edifice, the EP undeniably has a role to play in the CSDP realm. Despite the EP’s more limited involvement in relation to CSDP than to other policy fields, it cannot plausibly be construed so narrowly as to undermine the democratic principle applying to any decision-making process at the EU level – both ex ante and ex post. Respect for the right to information constitutes the very basis for both the EP’s role in democratic oversight and its ability to hold the Commission, which is increasingly active in the field of defence, to account.
Szerzők : Carolyn MOSER; Steven BLOCKMANS

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - May 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Values on the retreat? The role of values in the EU’s external policies EN

Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : There is a general perception in Western countries that the role of values as a foreign policy driver is currently on the decline. This study in the series ‘global trends in external policies’ seeks to contribute to the debate by investigating what is meant by ‘values’, whether their importance is on the wane and, if so, how this manifests itself, and how the European Union (EU) can respond to these trends. The broad concept of values has therefore been split into five categories. Socio-cultural values are implicit drivers of foreign policy. In the case of the EU, these are characterised by diversity. ‘Political values’ is used as a term to describe the fundamental principles of political and public action, defining the relationship between the state and its citizens. For the EU, these are often referred to as the triad of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Economic values characterise the nature of the prevailing economic system in a country. The EU advocates a social market economy. The term ‘Earth values’ refers to the inclusion of environmental considerations in external policies. The EU has become a leader in promoting sustainability. Resulting from the preceding four are ‘international order values’, which characterise the overall international outlook of actors. The EU’s international order value is ‘principled pragmatism’. This study compares the EU’s values with those of four reference countries: the US, Turkey, Russia and China. The US in the West comes closest to many of the EU’s values, but does not overlap completely. Turkey and Russia are in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and increasingly disagree with the EU on values. Chinese values overlap least with the EU’s values. The study confirms a decline in the influence of the political values preferred by the EU. This decline appears to correspond to a clear West-East spectrum. However, the study also notes an opposite trend of increasing influence of Earth values. For these, a Eurocentric spectrum appears more adequate. For economic values, the definition of trends depends on benchmarks and methodology. The international order notion of ‘principled pragmatism’ has been extended to ‘EU strategic autonomy’. Values are often considered as part of EU strategic autonomy and some policies, such as EU accession or trade policy, incorporate them. A values-based approach to external policies should differentiate according to the partner country and the value category concerned. Whereas cooperation on political values does not appear to be fruitful with certain countries, continued efforts on economic or Earth values may still be possible. The study explores what such a differentiated approach could mean for the four reference countries in the near future. Such an approach should also take into account the differing perceptions of partner countries. Although positive avenues of cooperation on, for example, Earth values are still possible, geopolitical tensions, partly rooted in differing values, are overshadowing this path.
Szerzők : Mario DAMEN

Security challenges at the EU’s eastern border: which role for CSDP? EN

31-01-2022 PE 653.653 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This in-depth analysis examines the nature and scope of enduring and emerging threats to the security of the EU and its Member States, and the challenges to its Eastern Partnership policy, from both the EaP’s protracted conflicts and instability in Belarus. It assesses the EU’s engagement with these conflicts and addresses the potential role of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including (but not solely) missions and operations. Finally, it explores potential avenues for future co¬operation between the EU and its EaP partners on security and defence (including under the PESCO+, EPF, and EDF frameworks).
Szerzők : Tracey GERMAN, Andriy TYUSHKA

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - January 2022 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Security and defence in the Indo-Pacific: What is at stake for the EU and its strategy? EN

08-12-2021 PE 653.660 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU published its ‘Joint Communication on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ on 16 September 2021. This Indo-Pacific Strategy lays out five crucial security issues in the region that directly affect the EU’s own security and prosperity. These are maritime security, nuclear security and non-proliferation, cyber security, trafficking, and terrorism. In order to deal with these security issues, the EU has CSDP missions and the CSDP toolbox at its disposal. In fact, the long-standing Operation Atalanta in the Western Indian Ocean is an example of how CSDP missions can protect EU security interests in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, PESCO, EPF, a more robust cyber policy, or the recently established Coordinated Maritime Presences are CSDP toolbox components that can also promote security interests in the region. In addition, the EU has a set of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region that can enhance its power projection and, consequently, strengthen its security. Through a combination of all these tools, the EU can have a security and defence presence in a region where core interests are at stake.
Szerzők : • Dr Ramon PACHECO PARDO • Dr Nicola LEVERINGHAUS

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - September 2021 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

EU preparedness and responses to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats EN

16-07-2021 PE 653.645 SEDE
Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : This study on ‘EU preparedness and responses to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats’ was requested by the European Parliament’s (EP) Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) in the context of, but not limited to, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Building on reports and expert input, this study first provides an update of the current level of each of the C, B, R and N threat elements, including the type of actor from which such threats might stem. It furthermore takes stock of the existing preparedness and response mechanisms and matches these against the updated threat landscape to determine the current state of play of the EU’s response tools and its remaining gaps where improvement may be needed. The study puts forward a number of recommendations on specific issues. The core of the recommendations builds on using a ‘Team Europe’ approach to create and maintain a strong task force based response capacity, with additional authority and competence given by EU Member States to the EU. This would enable the EU to better support and manage an EU-wide crisis response in the CBRN field in a timely and effective manner.
Szerzők : Alexandra RIMPLER-SCHMID, Ralf TRAPP, Sarah LEONARD, Christian KAUNERT, Yves DUBUCQ, Claude LEFEBVRE, Hanna MOHN

Monthly Highlights Newsletter - July 2021 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Preparing the CSDP for the new security environment created by climate change EN

10-06-2021 PE 653.639 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : While the European Union has developed a number of policy commitments and instruments to deal with the nexus between climate change and security, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has lagged behind. This study discusses the security implications of climate change in the EU Neighbourhood and makes recommendations concerning how the CSDP might integrate climate factors into its mission and deliverables. The CSDP will need to adopt a place-specific approach that foregrounds the distinctive social, political and economic dynamics through which climate factors makes themselves felt in different partner countries. The analysis looks in particular depth at the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as two regions where CSDP missions already operate or are likely to operate in the future. Countries in these regions are highly vulnerable to the interaction between a degraded environment and climate change impacts, raising the prospects of humanitarian crises due to food insecurity and internal instability due to competition for resources. These problems compound the EU’s prominent security concerns of terrorism and migration. The EU can move to climate-proof the CSDP through better conflict intelligence and foresight, carefully adapted and adequately resourced mandates, climate-change proofing investments in equipment and infrastructure, and better links to local social and institutional dynamics. The European Parliament should deploy its considerable political capital to support such initiatives, through resolutions, engagement with the UN and other inter-parliamentary fora, and efforts to garner political commitment from the Member States.
Szerzők : Christoph MEYER, Edouard SIMON, Francesca VANTAGGIATO, Richard YOUNGS

Review of the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP): lessons for the implementation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) EN

27-05-2021 PE 653.638 SEDE
Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : Of all European defence initiatives launched since 2016, the European Defence Fund (EDF) is without doubt one of the most promising, if not the most promising. However, the EDF will not by itself solve all problems related to the fragmentation and therefore inefficiency of European defence procurement. Only the Member States can do so, working in good faith together with the Commission in deciding the EDF work programme and funding allocations. Doing this, it will be essential not to confuse the ends – the creation of a strong and competitive European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) – the ways – inclusiveness through wide cross-border cooperation and the will to pursue strategic autonomy – and the means – the defence research projects funded by the EDF. Keeping the course between at times conflicting paths and ensuring the return on a meaningful but still modest investment (EUR 7.9 billion over seven years) will be the main EDF challenges in the years ahead.
Szerzők : • Frédéric MAURO, Lawyer at the bar of Brussels, associate researcher at ‘Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques’ (IRIS) France • Dr. Edouard SIMON, Senior Fellow at IRIS, France/Belgium • Ana Isabel XAVIER, Professor in International Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon (UAL) Portugal

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - March 2021 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

How the COVID-19 crisis has affected security and defence-related aspects of the EU EN

27-01-2021 PE 653.623 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This paper looks at how the COVID-19 pandemic has directly and indirectly affected European security and defence. It documents how missions and operations of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were directly impacted. It finds that COVID-19 has accentuated already recognised capacity shortfalls of the CSDP, such as strategic airlift, secure communications and command and control. Defence spending through EU instruments, and to a lesser extent at national level, has come under pressure although it may still escape post-2008 style cuts. The pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of Member States’ infrastructure and supply chains, and the limited competences of the EU in supporting Member States’ management of public health emergencies. COVID-19 tends to act as a threat multiplier and source of instability, particularly in low-income countries already affected by socio-economic imbalances and governance problems. The pandemic is likely to accelerate existing trends, including the declining share of the US and the EU in the world economy compared to Asia, intensifying concerns about China’s growing assertiveness, growing attention to IT security and cyber capabilities, and the interconnection between conventional and unconventional security risks. This analysis also looks at which lessons the EU should learn in order to better manage and prepare for such crises. At a strategic level, the EU needs to invest in lesson learning exercises with the European Parliament playing a key role in making the learning publicly accessible. It should also be proactive in shaping international discourses about international governance and the role of the EU post COVID-19. Furthermore, the paper elaborates 19 short and longer-term recommendations, for instance, on how CSDP missions can become more resilient in public health emergencies and which capability shortfalls need addressing most; how defence spending can be made more efficient and better targeted; or how the EU can help to better coordinate military support to civilian authorities. Finally, it advocates investment in health intelligence and better managing the biosecurity risks arising from growing access to dual-use technologies. The EU should forge a preventive approach to future pandemics and associated risks and embrace a comprehensive approach to security and resilience. Yet, one should not lose sight of the distinctive function of the CSDP and what it can currently deliver.
Szerzők : Christoph O. Meyer, Sophia Besch, Prof. Martin Bricknell, Dr Ben Jones Christoph O. MEYER, Martin BRICKNELL, Ramon PACHECO PARDO, Ben JONES.

Policy Departments’ Monthly Highlights - January 2021 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

The European space sector as an enabler of EU strategic autonomy EN

16-12-2020 PE 653.620 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : Today, the European Union can boast a degree of strategic autonomy in space. Projects such as Galileo have not only enhanced the EU’s economy, but they may confer on the Union the ability to amplify its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. While the EU continues to promote the safe, secure and sustainable use of space, it is also true that space is rapidly becoming a political arena that hangs over geopolitical competition on earth. Space is crucial for EU security and defence. Yet the EU is at a cross-roads and it needs to develop ways to ensure that it maintains its strategic autonomy in space. Without strategic autonomy in space, there can be no strategic autonomy on earth. There is a need for the Union to invest in its space presence, push the technological frontier in space, ensure that its ground- and space-based critical infrastructure is protected, ensure that its industrial supply chains are resilient and utilise new initiatives in security and defence to further enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously.
Szerzők : Daniel FIOTT

Nuclear arms control regimes: state of play and perspectives EN

02-12-2020 PE 603.496 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU is facing important challenges in the arms control and disarmament domain: firstly, the gradual abandonment of bilateral agreements between the US and Russia that protected European territory, and secondly, an increasing polarisation among the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), evidenced by the controversy sparked by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Both developments combined weaken the arms control and disarmament regime, increasing the likelihood of a global nuclear arms race. While the EU has progressively enhanced its role in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, it is afflicted by the same cleavage over disarmament that characterises the NPT framework. Based on a review of the drivers of the current crisis and the options for addressing them, the present briefing illuminates the EU’s record, and identifies ways in which the European Parliament can support the nuclear arms control agenda despite its lack of formal competence in the field. These notably include developing a modus vivendi with the TPNW, and encouraging the Council to lay the groundwork for a multilateral arms control treaty system.
Szerzők : Clara PORTELA

How the COVID-19 crisis has affected security and defence-related aspects for the EU EN

27-07-2020 PE 603.510 SEDE
Briefing
Összefoglaló : This briefing examines the impact that the COVID-19 crisis has had on security and defence-related aspects for the European Union (EU) between December 2019 and June 2020. Based on this analysis, it identifies key problems or questions that require more attention from policymakers in the coming months and years. Four areas are singled out for analysis, as follows. Section (i), on the security environment and implications for strategy, discusses how COVID-19 tends to feed violent conflict and empowers non-state actors, but also highlights new opportunities to make cease-fires stick. It makes the case for examining in what areas and through what steps Europe can strengthen its self-reliance, unity and strategic leadership capability amidst the growing risk of great power competition. Section (ii), on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and defence-related mechanisms, capabilities and resources, identifies the growing risk to Europe’s defence budget, capabilities and ambitions and suggests a number of ways in which Member States can manage these risks through fiscal measures, greater prioritisation and collaboration. Section (iii) highlights the multi-faceted positive contributions that the armed forces have made to support civilian authorities at home, but suggests substantial untapped potential to do more in future emergencies. It makes the case for analysing the long-term implications of COVID-19 on readiness and generating forces for overseas operations. Section (iv), on the different ways CSDP operations and missions have been affected by COVID-19 and the ways in which they have adapted to support host countries, makes the case for tackling pre-existing problems with staffing of missions and the resilience of missions to infectious diseases. It also recommends reviewing the rationale and scope for what might be termed ‘health diplomacy’.
Szerzők : Christoph O. Meyer, Sophia Besch, Prof. Martin Bricknell, Dr Ben Jones

Recommendations for a transparent and detailed reporting system on arms exports within the EU and to third countries EN

08-05-2020 PE 603.497 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU’s annual report on arms export control presently lags behind the national reports of many countries. The introduction of a searchable online database will be a substantial step in increasing the user-friendliness of the report. This paper makes recommendations with regard to readability, comprehensiveness and comparability. Perhaps the principal recommendation is that steps be taken to harmonise the data provided under the categories ‘licensed value’ and ‘actual exports’, which are presently not consistently interpreted across the EU. The main argument of this paper is that the EU should move towards using data visualisation to complement the lengthy statistical tables in the annual report and thus make it more readable. The EU and its Member States should also explore opportunities to enhance the data contained in the report to include additional identified data fields, narrative sections to complement the statistical data, and disaggregated data on licence denials. In identifying additional data fields that could be included, the paper also examines the challenges associated with the provision of the data in each case.
Szerzők : Dr Ian J. STEWART, Dr Benedict WILKINSON, Prof. Christoph O. MEYER, King's College, London, UK

Policy Departments' Monthly Highlights - February 2020 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

Policy Departments' Monthly Highlights - January 2020 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

CSDP Missions and Operations EN

10-01-2020 PE 603.481 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This policy brief provides an overview of what the EU has done through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations since 2003, and which achievements and challenges it faces at the end of EU High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini’s mandate. It evaluates how the overall political context and the EU’s approach have evolved over time, and how this has affected the launch and implementation of CSDP actions. It looks at a range of criteria for evaluating the success of missions and operations such as effectiveness, degree of match between mission launch and EU interests at stake, responsiveness, coherence with wider policy strategies, coherence with values and norms, and degree of democratic scrutiny and oversight. It assesses some of the achievements as well as shortcomings of previous and ongoing missions and operations against these objectives. The brief identifies three underlying and cross-cutting problems hampering performance: (i) incompatible attitudes among Member States towards the use of force; (ii) resource disincentives and barriers to timely European solidarity; and (iii) gaps between early warning and early action. It outlines some selected initiatives launched and options discussed to address these shortcomings and improve the EU’s performance in crisis management operations.
Szerzők : Christoph O. Meyer, Professor of European & International Politics, King’s College London, UK

CSDP defence capabilities development EN

10-01-2020 PE 603.482 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : For several decades, European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Member States have worked closely to coordinate and, in some cases, jointly develop their military capabilities. Both NATO and the EU ask Member States to provide military capabilities to meet agreed force requirements. European states also cooperate increasingly closely over ways to increase efficiency and improve interoperability. Yet both EU and NATO force requirements suffer from longstanding capability shortfalls. Neither modest growth in defence spending nor deeper cooperation have yet been sufficient to fill these gaps. Spurred on, however, by the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the recent deterioration in security in the east and to the south of Europe, EU Member States have sought to re-invigorate their approach to collaborating on the development of defence capabilities. They have overhauled existing measures and introduced new initiatives, notably the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). While it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of these initiatives, they do significantly extend the scope for action in this field. Success, however, will only be assured if EU Member States support the new ‘top-down’ initiatives while also delivering on their own ‘bottom-up’ commitments to funding and deeper levels of cooperation.
Szerzők : Dr Ben Jones, Teaching Fellow in European Foreign Policy, King’s College London, UK

The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base EN

10-01-2020 PE 603.483 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been a key focus of EU policy efforts in recent years, not just for security reasons, but also for economic ones. There have been a host of funds to strengthen and reinforce the EDTIB, and to ensure deeper cooperation, avoid duplication and underscore the interoperability of equipment. These funding streams have not been fully evaluated, but they are important symbols of the energy and commitment with which the EU has attempted to create an integrated pan-EU defence industry. There have, however, been challenges. The EU Member States remain predisposed to procuring weapons nationally or internationally, rather than regionally. There is a question as to whether these funds are great enough to be genuinely transformative, or whether in practice they are insufficient in relation to investment in the domestic defence industries. Finally, efforts to integrate the EDTIB also risk the EU being seen as protectionist, which may lead other major weapons suppliers such as the US to respond in kind.
Szerzők : Dr Benedict Wilkinson, Associate Director of the Policy Institute, King’s College London, UK

EU’s Institutional Framework regarding Defence Matters EN

10-01-2020 PE 603.484 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This policy brief provides a short overview of recent initiatives and developments in the EU’s institutional defence architecture, with a particular focus on changes proposed and implemented since 2016. Specifically, it looks at the new Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC), as well as proposals to establish a European Peace Facility (EPF) and to take more Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions through qualified majority voting. It examines the institutional state of play at the end of Federica Mogherini’s mandate as EU High Representative and the implications of EU defence institutional innovation for existing governance structures, internal coherence and effective oversight. Finally, it identifies some of the challenges posed by the recent reforms and initiatives relating to the EU’s existing defence infrastructure, and briefly introduces proposals to address these challenges.
Szerzők : Sophia Besch, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, UK (Berlin Office)

10 YEARS OF CSDP - Four in-depth analyses requested by the Sub-Committee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament (EP) EN

10-01-2020 PE 603.485 SEDE
Részletes elemzés
Összefoglaló : This series of in-depth analyses provides a snapshot of some of the European Union’s recent accomplishments related to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): CSDP missions and operations, CSDP defence capabilities development, the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, and the EU’s institutional framework for defence matters.
Szerzők : Christoph O. Meyer; Benedict Wilkinson; Sophia Besch; Ben Jones

Policy Departments' Monthly Highlights - December 2019 EN

Rövid áttekintés
Összefoglaló : The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.

The Mekong River: geopolitics over development, hydropower and the environment EN

Tanulmány
Összefoglaló : The Mekong River is a vital source of livelihoods and economic activity in continental South-East Asia and extends from the Tibetan Plateau to the South China Sea. Its length is 4 800 km. More than half circulates in China, but its channel runs through Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. The Mekong has the world's largest inland freshwater fishery industry, vital to the region's food security, representing around USD 3 000 million per year. Its unique and rich biological habitat provides diverse livelihoods as well as four fifths of the animal protein for more than 60 million people. At the level of biodiversity, the importance of this river for global nature is vital. The Mekong region is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and to the degradation of ecosystems. The uncontrolled growth of the population both in China and in Southeast Asia is exerting unsustainable pressure on the Mekong in terms of a massive exploitation of all kinds of resources linked to the River: water, food, wood, energy, especially recent infrastructure and hydropower development, together with deforestation, illegal wildlife trade and habitat fragmentation. Water scarcity leads to reduced agricultural productivity, unemployment and poverty Four countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam) formed an intergovernmental agency in 1950, The Mekong River Commission (MRC), to defend the sustainable development of the Mekong River and to plan its future. The absence of China and Myanmar mitigates and erodes the effective dialogue of the MRC on the management of the River. The lack of implementing mechanisms denatures the organization itself..
Szerzők : Jorge SOUTULLO SANCHEZ