REPORT on the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union
23 April 1997
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy
Rapporteur: Mr Leo Tindemans
By letter of 23 March 1995, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy requested authorization to draw up a report on the development of a defence and security policy:
WEU, OSCE, NATO.
At the sitting of 27 June 1995, the President of Parliament announced that the Conference of Presidents had authorized the committee to report on the subject and, at the sitting of 20 September 1996, that the Committee on Institutional Affairs had been asked for its opinion.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy had appointed Mr Tindemans rapporteur at its meeting of 22 June 1996.
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 24 June 1996, 9 September 1996, 18 November 1996, 4 February 1997, 27 February 1997, 10 March 1997, 20 March 1997 and 21 April 1997.
Furthermore, the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament considered the report at its meetings of 28 September 1995, 20 November 1995, 24 April 1996, 2 July 1996, 3 October 1996, 26 November 1996, 26 February 1997 and 19 March 1997.
At its meeting of 21 April 1997, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy adopted the motion for a resolution by 33 votes to 6, with 7 abstentions.
The following were present for the vote: Carrère D'Encausse, second vice-chairman and acting chairman; Cushnahan, third vice-chairman; Tindemans, rapporteur; Aelvoet; Alavanos Barón Crespo; Bertens; Burenstam Linder; Carnero González; Cars; Daskalaki; De Melo; Donner; Dupuis; Ebner (for Bernard-Reymond pursuant to Rule 138(2) of the Rules of Procedure); Fabra Vallés (for Bianco); Ferrer (for Graziani); Frischenschlager (for André-Leonard); Garcia Arias (for Avgerinos); Gahrton; Tomolka; Habsburg; Hänsch; Hoff; Kellett-Bowman (for Galeote Quecedo pursuant to Rule 138(2) of the Rules of Procedure); Kittelman (for Kristoffersen); Konrad (for Poettering); Lambrias, Lenz; Lindqvist (for La Malfa); Linser; Malone (for Balfe); Oostlander; Pack (for Rinsche); Piha; Rosado Fernandes (for Caccavale); Roubatis; Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra; Schröder (for Stenzel); E Schroedter (for Cohn-Bendit); Swoboda (for Candal); Terrón I Cusi (for Coates); Theorin; Titley; Truscott and Wiersma.
The opinion of the Committee on Institutional Affairs is attached.
The report was tabled on 23 April 1997.
The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part session.
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Resolution on the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union
The European Parliament,
- having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to its resolution of 18 May 1995 on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (November 1993 - December 1994)[1],
- having regard to its resolution of 18 July 1996 on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy (January-December 1995)[2],
- having regard to its resolution of 14 June 1995 on the establishment of a European Union Analysis Centre for Active Crisis Prevention[3]
- having regard to its resolution of 13 March 1996 embodying (i) Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference and (ii) an evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and definition of the political priorities of the European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference[4],
- having regard to its resolution of 16 January 1997[5] on the general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Institutional Affairs (A4-0162/97),
A. whereas the European Union must be capable of contributing to the stability of the European continent and neighbouring areas, including the Baltic Sea region and the Mediterranean basin, the Near and Middle East and the Black Sea region, and of contributing to the preservation of peace and international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the objectives of the CFSP,
B. whereas the European Union has not yet exploited the full potential of the Treaty on European Union in order to formulate a genuine common security policy and whereas, at the same time, the scope of such a policy could be better defined at the Intergovernmental Conference,
C. whereas the present CFSP should give rise to proper application of a common foreign policy in which the EU speaks with one voice in international organizations; whereas its political profile and responsibility should be commensurate with its real political and economic weight in the world,
D. whereas the CFSP should concentrate on developing capabilities to enable the EU to prevent conflicts and settle them by peaceful means,
E. whereas, despite the differences of opinion among the Member States regarding the need to integrate the WEU into the EU's structure, a consensus is emerging on the need to give the Union the power and the necessary resources to carry out peace-keeping and peace-restoring missions,
F. whereas the Treaty should indeed contain a definition of the concept of common security based on the Union's capacity to anticipate and confront the threats to the Union's common values, fundamental interests, territorial integrity and independence and to help to preserve peace and strengthen international security by developing political interdependence, including financial solidarity,
G. whereas security also implies that the European Union should be capable, where necessary, of taking part in joint operations decided on in the context of the UN and the OSCE, of acting independently to protect its interests and values and of accepting its international responsibilities, in particular in the context of Petersberg missions assigned to the Western European Union, possibly in cooperation with NATO,
H. whereas the European Union does not at present possess its own analysis and evaluation capacity and whereas this is detrimental to the pursuit of an effective common foreign and security policy, whilst the Member States and the WEU possess information capacities and diplomatic networks which should be placed at the disposal of the CFSP,
I. whereas the formulation of the common security policy constitutes an essential stage in the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence,
A SECURITY POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
1. Points out that the Lisbon European Council identified four areas relating to the 'security' dimension which might be the subject of joint actions, namely:- the CSCE (OSCE since the Budapest Summit) process,- the policy of disarmament and arms control in Europe, including confidence-building
measures,
- nuclear non-proliferation issues,
- the economic aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms exports;
2. Takes the view that the areas thus defined, which constitute essential components of a European Union security policy, should be extended to cover all the matters specified below;
3. Proposes therefore that security should be defined so as to make a distinction between external security, which comes under the European Union's external activities, as indicated in Article C of the Maastricht Treaty, and internal security, which comes under the third pillar;
1. The European Union's external security covers matters relating to:
(a) the territorial integrity of the Union and its Member States and the protection of its citizens,
(b) the control of armaments, whether they be conventional or nuclear, including proliferation issues and matters relating to the quantitative limitation, restricted use or prohibition of armaments,
(c) the existence of frontier problems, unresolved minority problems or inter-ethnic rivalries which are liable to spread and ultimately threaten the Member States of the Union, and the political turmoil and instability in certain countries bordering the Community territory,
(d) the glaring inequalities between the rich and the poor countries, with all the consequences that that implies, particularly for migratory flows,
(e) protection of the environment, in so far as environmental imbalances represent a threat to peace, and the threats posed by antiquated nuclear plants, nuclear waste and the storage of radioactive matter,
2. The European Union's internal security covers matters relating to:
(a) the threats represented by terrorism and the activities of organized criminals such as trafficking in weapons and drugs, money laundering and prostitution,
(b) the economic and social crisis in European societies which is leading to a weakening of the social consensus, and is focusing popular discontent on foreigners, giving rise to acts of racism and xenophobia;
4. Notes therefore that security can be safeguarded:
(a) externally, by means of conventional or preventive diplomacy or confidence-building measures in the military field and by means of economic aid, development aid, peacekeeping or peace-restoring missions and all forms of interstate, bilateral or multilateral cooperation such as the promotion of democracy and media pluralism,
(b) and internally, by means of economic and social measures, measures in the field of culture and education in order to combat all forms of racial or xenophobic prejudice, and by measures to be taken under the third pillar;
5. Strongly urges the Member States to make use of the Intergovernmental Conference to intensify the debate on European security and to reach an agreement so as to provide the European Union with the instruments necessary to implement a credible security policy in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty on European Union;
6. Calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council promptly to carry out a feasibility study into setting up a European corps consisting of civilian and military units responsible for keeping and restoring peace;
7. Believes that affirmation of the natural solidarity between the Member States in itself constitutes an important factor of security in as much as it acts in synergy with the security guarantees provided under the WEU and NATO and from which states of the European Union which are not members of those organizations already indirectly benefit;
8. Considers, further, that the inclusion of an economic security clause in the Treaties would give the European Union the means to act when the security of its communications and its supplies is threatened;
9. Affirms, lastly, that under a common security policy the European Union must be able to contribute to world peace and a stable order in the world, primarily in the areas located on its land and sea borders, and that, in this context, the armed forces of the Member States of the European Union might be deployed under a mandate issued by the UN or the OSCE, initially for Petersberg missions;
10. Calls therefore on the IGC, with a view to the affirmation of a common security policy, to provide for:
(a) the incorporation in the Treaties of a political solidarity clause and the addition of the principle of the integrity of the frontiers of the European Union and of its Member States, as features of the natural solidarity between the states of the Union;
(b) the inclusion in the Treaties of Petersberg missions which should take the form of joint actions pursuant to Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union and in which all the Member States of the Union should take part physically and/or financially as an expression of their natural solidarity; these joint actions would be adopted by a qualified majority, except for the right of constructive abstention by one or more Member States,
(c) the setting up, as previously called for in Parliament's resolution of 14 June 1995 and reiterated in that of 16 January 1997, of an analysis, early-warning and policy-planning centre under the joint responsibility of the Council and the Commission and with support from the WEU, for the purpose of providing, at the appropriate time, the necessary information to enable trouble spots to be detected and security-related EU positions and joint actions to be defined;
11. Requests that, with a view to the formulation of a common security policy and the implementation of Petersberg missions, the present cooperation between the European Union and WEU should gradually be strengthened;
12. Calls for the WEU's operational structures to be strengthened, without this leading to the duplication of NATO structures;
REGIONAL ASPECTS OF COMMON SECURITY
Relations with the states located to the east of the Union's borders
13. Notes that the OSCE is a very important component of pan-European security as a forum for dialogue and an instrument of preventive diplomacy; calls for it to be strengthened, provided that the security structures in which the majority of the Member States of the European Union participate are not thereby weakened;
14. Notes as well that the Council of Europe has an important role to play in promoting democracy and respect for human rights, both of which are essential components of security in Europe;
15. Emphasizes the positive role played by the Stability Pact in Europe as preventive diplomatic action by the European Union in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and hence as a plank of the European Union's security policy;
16. Takes note of the desire of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to be integrated in the Western security structures, beginning with NATO, and affirms that this is a matter to be decided solely by the sovereign states concerned and by the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance;
17. Stresses also that an enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance must not signify a new division within the European continent or result in the creation of categories among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and that its purpose is rather to extend stability eastwards and strengthen democracy there;
18. Is aware, however, of the apprehensions expressed in Russia about the prospect of former Warsaw Pact countries joining NATO and emphasizes that they could be allayed if a strategic security partnership were established, concomitantly with the enlargement of NATO, between the USA, the European Union, Russia and the other interested CIS states;
19. Considers that this strategic security partnership must stipulate the rights and obligations of the partners and that these obligations should include the principle of the territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders of the European states;
Relations with the Balkan Region
20. Notes that the Balkans still constitute the principal zone of instability in Europe and that, for this reason, it is important to facilitate the rapprochement of the countries in that region with European structures;
21. Therefore commits the European Union to supporting the democratic forces in that region, encouraging the countries in question to share its values by offering them prospects for cooperation, assisting them economically and financially with the aim of stabilizing them and, finally, promoting regional cooperation within the area;
Relations with the states of the Baltic Region
22. Draws attention to its resolution of 14 July 1995 on the orientations for a Union approach towards the Baltic Sea Region[6];
23. Points out that following the latest accessions to the European Union and with future accessions the Baltic will increasingly become an 'internal' sea and should develop into an area of cooperation between all the states bordering on it, including Russia and its Kaliningrad exclave;
24. Accordingly requests the Council of the European Union to use all the instruments at its disposal under the CFSP to lessen the ever-present threat of tension in the region and to reactivate the Baltic round-table talks which were set up as part of the negotiations on the Stability Pact in Europe and turn them into a forum for regular dialogue with the Baltic States which are not member countries of the European Union;
Relations with the states bordering on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and those of the Near and Middle East
25. Underlines the importance of the Mediterranean for the security of the European Union as reaffirmed at the Barcelona Conference; points out that, despite the association agreements which they have concluded with the European Union, the southern Mediterranean countries are vulnerable to political instability, terrorism and human rights violations on account of economic imbalances and the obstacles standing in the way of the Middle East peace process;
26. Is of the opinion that cooperative security structures should be set up in the Mediterranean to supplement the policy of Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements pursued by the European Union;
27. Reaffirms that the differences of opinion existing between states bordering the Mediterranean must be settled in keeping with international law and the relevant UN resolutions, referring them where necessary, to the International Court of Justice;
28. Stresses the need to ensure the complementarity and transparency of the EU's dialogue with the countries of the Mediterranean Basin in relation to corresponding dialogue with other interational organizations (the WEU, NATO and the OSCE);
29. Affirms that a Mediterranean security policy must be based above all on the improvement of economic and social conditions in the countries on that sea, particularly those on the southern coastline, and on controlling the flow of migrants and the networks used for arms trafficking;
30. Underlines the importance for European security of the Black Sea which borders, notably, on trans-Caucasia, and calls therefore on the European Union to involve itself more fully in the economic cooperation zone of the Black Sea;
31. Notes also the importance of the Near and Middle East for international security, partly on account of the presence of vast oil resources, and urges the Council to develop the CFSP with the countries in that region;
32. Hopes also that the European Union will play a more active political role in the Middle-East peace process, a process to which it has given a vital political impetus since the Venice Declaration of 1980;
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
33. Believes that it would be helpful, in the interests of the coherence and development of the CFSP, if joint Council meetings were to be convened, where necessary, of the foreign ministers and the ministers of defence of the Member States, in particular when it is necessary to instruct WEU to carry out Petersberg missions;
34. Affirms that a common security policy cannot in itself render the European Union immune to every conceivable threat and that the Union will inevitably have to broach the issue of defence;
35. Considers that a wider definition of a common security policy in Europe includes a stronger emphasis on questions such as disarmament, conflict prevention and confidence building;
36. Recalls that, according to the Treaty on European Union, the CFSP includes the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence;
37. Proposes therefore that the Member States should take advantage of the date of 1998 referred to in Article XII of the WEU Treaty to convene a Messina-type Conference for the special purpose of holding a debate on
(a) the content of a common defence policy,
(b) the implications of WEU integration in the European Union, in particular from the point of view of the mutual assistance which the Member States of the European Union would then have to afford each other in the event of attack or the threat of attack against one of them and the consequences which would ensue for the Atlantic Alliance also,
(c) and the institutional adjustments which would then be necessary in order to attain these objectives;
38. Considers that the European Union should adapt its present structure to bring it more closely into line with developments in security and, at a later stage, in defence, and also establish closer contact with the organizations responsible for implementing policy in these areas;
39. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Intergovernmental Conference, the WEU, NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and the parliaments of the Member States and the applicant countries.
B EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
I.INTRODUCTION
1. Europe is a community with a shared destiny. From the Declaration of 9 May 1950 to the Treaty of Maastricht this statement has never been gainsaid. The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community stressed the concept of 'a destiny henceforward shared', whilst the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community spoke of 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'; the Single European Act heralded early on the transformation of the totality of relations between the Member States into a 'European Union'; lastly, the Maastricht Treaty went a step further by establishing the 'European Union'. One of the objectives assigned to the Union under the Treaty is 'to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'.
It cannot be overemphasized that the search for and consolidation of peace and security have always been of central concern to Europe's founding fathers. A case in point is the ECSC Treaty, the aim of which was to prevent another war not only between its members but on the whole European continent; one might also mention the preamble to the Treaty of Rome which refers to principles such as peace, well-being and employment as essential features of a security policy.
2. The Maastricht Treaty is part of the same tradition and is a political test of the determination of the states to press ahead: the changeover to a single currency in 1999 will be its most visible expression. Concurrently, the date of 1998 laid down in the modified Treaty of Brussels establishing the Western European Union provides an opportunity to reflect on a security (and, subsequently, defence) policy for the European Union which would back up the Union's foreign policy as implemented by the Treaty provisions governing the CFSP.
The Member States are currently engaged in revising the Treaties: the Intergovernmental Conference convened for this purpose is due to wind up its proceedings at the Amsterdam European Council in June. The IGC's work on the second pillar has focused on improving the functioning of the CFSP and the idea of making progress (although what kind of progress is as yet uncertain) on security and defence. The most important contributions to the debate are the Finno-Swedish memorandum of 25 April 1996 on strengthening the European Union's role in crisis management, the Franco-German security and defence 'concept' adopted at Nuremberg on 9 December 1996 and the proposal put forward by six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain) concerning the progressive incorporation of the WEU into the European Union. These two documents also reveal the differences of outlook which emerge as soon as the issue of defence policy is raised, as this is an area in which the positions of the European Union Member States are still far apart.
3. In order to clarify the debate and narrow the gap between differing points of view, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy has opted to split the initially planned report on a common security and defence policy for the European Union, by focusing first on the security aspect of the CFSP and then, in the light of the outcome of the IGC, drawing up a second report on defence policy, as referred to in Article J.4 of the TEU.
II. DEFINING A SECURITY POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
4. Article J.1 of the Treaty on European Union lays down five objectives for the CFSP, which constitute the framework for a common security policy:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
A number of these objectives can be attained by using the instruments of the first pillar (agreements with non-member countries, development aid, etc.) and the second pillar (joint action, as provided for in Article J.3 of the TEU, and diplomacy). Article J.1 provides proof that the European Union can achieve security largely by non-military means.
However, there are cases where the military option cannot be avoided, in particular where diplomacy has reached its limits and where the Member States have no choice but to use armed force to defend their fundamental interests and values, as in the case of former Yugoslavia. In order to be credible, a foreign policy must not exclude any options in advance: thus, as part of its security policy, the European Union must be able to use armed force autonomously or take part in joint operations, such as those decided upon within the UN or the OSCE, e.g. to perform the 'Petersberg missions'. Such missions could be carried out by the WEU, possibly in conjunction with NATO.
5. The European Union already operates a security policy. It is worth recalling that the Lisbon European Council (26-27 June 1992) identified four areas under the heading of 'security' which might be the subject of joint action:
- the CSCE process (now the OSCE process, since the Budapest Summit),- disarmament and arms control policy in Europe, including confidence-building measures,- matters relating to nuclear non-proliferation,
- economic aspects of security, including monitoring of military technology transfers to third countries and monitoring of arms exports.
6. These areas are key components of security policy. However, outside the OSCE process, they affect the military sphere to a greater or lesser extent, overlooking the fact that security is a broad concept which goes beyond purely military issues, while not excluding them.
One can therefore attempt, at this stage, to define the basic features of a common security policy, while distinguishing external from internal security, as follows.
1. External security
a) The principal aim of security policy is to preserve the territorial integrity of the Union and protect its citizens: this presupposes the use of - primarily defensive - military means as well as diplomatic means (agreements, etc.).
b) Security also requires arms control, of both conventional and nuclear weapons, and covers matters relating to proliferation (nuclear and ballistic, together with the spread of certain military technologies) as well as quantitative restrictions on armaments (as in the CFE Treaty), restrictions on use (confidence-building measures) and outright bans (e.g. anti-people mines).
c) Unresolved problems relating to frontiers and minorities as well as inter-ethnic rivalries liable to spill over the frontiers of any one state may represent a threat to the security of Europe as a whole. To defuse such problems, the European Union decided to set in train, in the form of a joint action, the process which culminated in the Pact on Stability in Europe, adopted in Paris on 21 March 1995. The OSCE and the Council of Europe also play a key role in this framework. A similar threat may also come from the disorder and the political instability which are currently afflicting certain countries on the Union's borders, such as Albania.
d) Glaring inequalities between rich and poor countries, together with their impact on migration, also constitute a threat to Europe's security. One generally thinks of the north-south divide or the divide between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.
e) Environmental protection is a further requirement for security: a nuclear disaster in a given state (linked to the obsolescence of, and the lack of safety at, nuclear installations, for example) may have destabilising consequences in a neighbouring state; the same is true by extension of natural disasters, such as drought, floods or the greenhouse effect, which, in the worst scenarios, can lead to mass migration. Let us not forget that, because of democratic pressure, water will be a major issue in the 21st century as oil has been in this century.
2. Internal security
a) European societies may feel threatened by terrorism, organized crime and trafficking of all kinds (arms, drugs, money laundering, prostitution). These problems require a variety of responses. In the case of terrorism, a distinction must be made between internal terrorism (e.g. the Red Army Fraction or the Red Brigades) and external terrorism (such as the PLO in the past) which disappears of its own accord when a political solution emerges to the problem to which it was designed to draw attention. The other threats referred to above call for repressive measures as well as economic and social measures, involving cooperation between the states concerned under the first and third pillars.
b) The economic and social crisis in our societies is weakening social consensus, with the risk that foreigners will be treated as scapegoats, which poses a threat to both individual and collective security. However, no further reference will be made to this matter in the present report.
7. It must be stressed that membership of the European Union in itself contributes to security, which is based on the dialogue and cooperation which have superseded historical confrontations between states. The European Union proceeds in the same way vis-à-vis non-member countries. The Central and East European countries understood perfectly well the security offered by the European Union when they applied for membership, although in fact their first reaction after the fall of the Iron Curtain was to apply to join NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, which had no desire to enter into a fresh confrontation with a Russia which was itself evolving, offered them the Partnership for Peace. The CEEC then turned to the European Union, not only in the hope of achieving economic prosperity but above all in order to find, within a large multi-state structure, the freedom and security to which they aspired.
Security is an ongoing concern of the European Union. This can be seen from the political agreements concluded in recent years between the Union and the CEEC (Europe agreements) the CIS states (partnership and cooperation agreements) and the Mediterranean countries (Euro-Mediterranean agreements). In accordance with the decisions of the Lisbon Summit referred to above, the European Union is attempting to secure its 'near abroad'.
Mention should also be made of the important statement issued by the 15 EU Member States on 15 July 1996 in connection with the Imia crisis of January 1996, in which the Council for the first time spoke of the 'natural solidarity' binding the Member States. This statement shows, if proof were needed, that the European Union is more than an economic union - a point which was worth stating.
8. In addition, the fact that 11 EU Member States are members of NATO and 10 are members of the WEU (with the security guarantees provided by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty) represents an extremely important contribution to the security of the Union as a whole which goes hand in hand with the 'natural solidarity' referred to above. It means that the EU Member States which are not members of these military organizations benefit indirectly from the security guarantees which they provide.
III. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY
9. Security is indivisible. The European Union cannot live in peace if war is raging along its borders, since no one can foresee the consequences if a conflict is not rapidly brought under control. This was demonstrated by the Yugoslav crisis and everyone is aware that the current crisis in Albania may have a direct impact on some EU Member States and ultimately on the European Union as a whole. This is a consequence of interdependence.
10. As regards relations with the countries on the Union's eastern borders, the key role played by the OSCE as a forum for pan-European dialogue and an instrument for preventive diplomacy must be stressed. Its failures - ex-Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh - should not be allowed to overshadow its successes elsewhere, the latest example of which is the way in which the OSCE, via the Gonzales mission, has helped advance the democratic process in Serbia.
The Pact on Stability in Europe, mentioned above, is a successful example of preventive diplomacy, since it resulted in the signing of a treaty between Hungary and Slovakia as a well as a treaty between Hungary and Romania. The Pact on Stability in Europe has been a crucial factor in the Union's accession strategy vis-à-vis the CEEC.
We should also bear in mind the important role played by the Council of Europe in promoting democracy and human rights, which are essential components of security in Europe.
There remains the delicate issue of incorporating the CEEC - or, initially, some of these - into the western security organizations, the WEU and NATO. Obviously, membership of the WEU is reserved for members of the European Union who become members of NATO. Consequently, the primary question is whether the CEEC are to accede to NATO. For the Atlantic Alliance, which will take a decision on the matter in July 1997, this enlargement must not lead to the creation of a new division within the continent of Europe: the aim is to extend stability to the East and strengthen democracy there. However, this enlargement raises questions: how should Russia's concerns be taken into account? What guarantees can be offered to the CEEC which are not in the first wave of accessions? How can the worries of countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, which will find NATO coming ever closer to their frontiers, be calmed?
As far as Russia is concerned, negotiations are under way. A charter may be concluded on 27 May 1997 in Paris between NATO and Russia and a NATO-Russia joint brigade be set up. There is no doubt that the West and Russia have a shared interest in finding common ground: the creation of a strategic and security partnership between Europe, the United States and Russia could defuse the issue of NATO enlargement and other CIS states should be allowed to join in. This partnership should stipulate the rights and obligations of the partners, in particular as regards respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of European states.
This example of NATO enlargement to the East highlights the tenuous nature of the dividing line between security and defence. While NATO, during the cold war, was an instrument of defence which safeguarded the security of its members, today it is an instrument of collective security, partly for former adversaries who will not necessarily be included in the organization.
11. As regards relations with the Balkan region, the European Union must have two main goals: to stabilize the region (after the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, there is now a crisis in Albania) to facilitate its future participation in European organizational arrangements and, subsequently, to promote democratic values in the region by supporting democratic forces in these countries and encouraging regional cooperation within the region as well as with neighbouring states.
12. As regards relations with the Baltic sea region, the European Union should recognize that the Baltic will increasingly acquire the character of an internal sea, a mare nostrum, when Poland and the Baltic states become members of the Union. It is important to turn the Baltic into a region for cooperation by developing the partnership with Russia, including its region of Kaliningrad. During the negotiations for the Pact on Stability in Europe, there was a Baltic Round Table, which might be reactivated under the auspices of the OSCE, since the Pact was deposited with the latter. The EU should endeavour, given the prospect of accession by the Baltic states, to persuade them to grant a status to their Russian minorities which meets Council of Europe standards.
13. Lastly, the Mediterranean basin is a vital region for European security. There is scope in that region for many real or potential crises. Disputes should be resolved by negotiation, in compliance with international law and UN Security Council resolutions. Where necessary, matters should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Certain countries in the region are vulnerable to political instability, terrorism and human rights violations, whilst the fact that the Middle East peace process is currently stalled is a continuing source of concern.
The Mediterranean countries have a young population which needs to believe it has an economic future and a prospect of individual advancement. The strategy of Euro-Mediterranean agreements, in conjunction with the MEDA programme, is crucial if economic and social conditions in the Mediterranean countries are to be improved. Cooperation is also needed with the Mediterranean countries on migration control, so as to prevent serious tensions arising within the host countries. To supplement the Euro-Mediterranean agreements it would be useful to set up cooperative security arrangements. The OSCE, NATO and the WEU already conduct dialogues with the Mediterranean countries.
14. Security in the Mediterranean must also take into account adjacent areas, such as the Black Sea region, where the EU should increase its involvement via the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area (without forgetting the Caucasus region, which borders it) and the Near and Middle East, which plays a crucial role in world peace: one needs only to think of the Middle East peace process, which is passing through a shaky stage, and the region consisting of Iran, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula, with its rich oil resources. Here, too, the European Union must be more active.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE IGC AND FINAL REMARKS
15. A common security policy for the European Union presupposes acceptance by its Member States of rights and obligations: the right for each state to enjoy the solidarity of others requires each state to display solidarity when a crisis looms.
It would therefore be useful if the following points were taken on board by the IGC in its final version of the Treaty:
a) the European Union should proclaim, in the form of a political solidarity clause, that its Member States are bound by natural solidarity; the Treaty should also include, as a statement of the fact that the Member States form a community with a shared destiny, the principle of the inviolability of the frontiers of the European Union and its Member States, although at present this principle would not be equivalent to a mutual assistance clause binding on all members, as is the case for the member states of the WEU and NATO;
b) the Petersberg tasks should be included in Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, so as to give practical shape to the European Union's international responsibilities. It should be laid down that all Member States will participate physically and/or financially in Petersberg missions, which would take the form of joint actions, as an expression of the natural solidarity mentioned above;
c) the Treaty provisions on CFSP should be supplemented by an article creating an analysis and assessment capability for the European Union under the joint authority of the Council and the Commission and with support from the WEU, to enable potential crises to be detected and, if possible, preventive action to be taken;
d) the inclusion of an economic security clause would enable the European Union to take action if the security of its communications routes or its supplies were under threat. Western Europe imports 57% of its oil, 37% of its coal and 30% of its gas, hence the importance of such a clause.
16. In connection with the tasks which need to be performed in the light of the new geo-strategic situation, the Commission and the Council should carry out a feasibility study as soon as possible into the establishment of a European corps of military and civilian units which would have special responsibility for performing peace-restoring and peace-keeping missions. Great Britain and the USA already have such bodies and France is considering the possibility thereof. Such units could play an essential role, particularly during a country's reconstruction stage, as was the case in BosniaHerzegovina where IFOR, with the assistance of NGOs or civilians, helped to re-establish basic infrastructure such as water and electricity supplies and even, in certain cases, bridges and roads.
17. All these new tasks and provisions assume that the existing cooperation between the European Union and the WEU will be gradually increased. This will be true as far as the analysis capability is concerned, since the WEU already has resources which it can make available for the CFSP. These are its Planning Cell, its Situation Centre and its Satellite Centre at Torrejón, which can use images provided by observation satellites of the SPOT or other types.
For the sake of consistency and development of the CFSP, joint councils of foreign affairs and defence ministers of Member States should be convened where necessary, e.g. when the WEU is to be asked to carry out Petersberg tasks, since these ministers sit on both organizations.
Lastly, cooperation will have to be increased between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly while these two organizations are evolving in parallel, as each of them has its own responsibilities for the development of the CFSP, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, as laid down in Article J.4 of the TEU.
18. Clearly, a common security policy alone cannot protect the European Union from all possible threats. The day will come when the Union must address the question of its defence. The Member States could make use of the date of 1998, mentioned in Article XII of the WEU Treaty, to convene a Messina-style conference to discuss the following:
a) the content of a common defence policy,
b) the implications of incorporating the WEU into the European Union, especially from the standpoint of the mutual assistance which the EU Member States would have to give each other in the case of an act of aggression or a threat of aggression against any one of them, and the consequences thereof for the Atlantic Alliance,
c) the institutional changes which would be needed to achieve these objectives.
19. All these issues will be aired in a further report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy. The European Parliament, which represents the peoples of the European Union, must not stand aside from a debate which is crucial to the future of the Union. National parliaments, which will have to ratify the Treaties, and the WEU Assembly, which has its own powers in this area, will also have to contribute to this debate, which is of concern to all citizens of the Union. Meanwhile, the development of a common security policy will enable Member States to weigh up the potential for exercising sovereignty jointly in this sphere and, at the same time, to discover what its limits are. This will pave the way for a more ambitious policy enabling the Union to assert its identity through the CFSP and take responsibility for its own destiny in conjunction with its allies and neighbours.
OPINION
(Rule 147 of the Rules of Procedure)
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy
on the development of a common security policy
Committee on Institutional Affairs
Draftsman: Mr Manzella
PROCEDURE
At its meeting of 25 September 1996 the Committee on Institutional Affairs appointed Mr Manzella draftsman.
It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 20 November 1996, 18 March 1997 and 21 April 1997.
At the last meeting it adopted the conclusions by 13 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.
The following were present for the vote: De Giovanni, chairman; Berthu, vice-chairman; Lucas Pires, vice-chairman; Barros Moura, Caligaris, Corbett, B. Donnelly, Fabre-Aubrespy (for Bonde), Gutiérrez Díaz (for Puerta), Hager (for Vanhecke), Herzog, Izquierdo Rojo, Medina Ortega (for Morán pursuant to Rule 138(2) of the Rules of Procedure), Méndez de Vigo, Neyts, Salafranca, Schäfer, Schwaiger (for Brok), Spaak and Tsatsos.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The Committee on Institutional Affairs has been asked by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy for its views on the institutional aspects of the draft report by Mr Tindemans on the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union.
The preparatory work which preceded the drawing up of the draft report led to the deliberate decision to restrict the report to aspects relating to common security and the report makes no attempt, therefore, to address issues relating to defence policy.
This means that the report relates to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (Provisions on a common foreign and security policy), Article J to Article J.11 inclusive, with the sole exception of Article J.4, this being the provision which is specifically intended to introduce into the Treaty the concept of a common defence policy and the prospect of the development thereof into a common defence.
Restricting the scope of the report in this way may at first sight seem puzzling since, according to the logic and the letter of the Treaty, the establishment of a common defence policy is only one of the instrumental procedures for implementing the Union's common security policy which provides for, in order of increasing effect, 'consultation' (Article J.2, paragraphs 1 and 3), the 'common position' (Article J.2, second paragraph), 'joint action' (Article J.3) and, finally, 'common defence' (Article J.4).
It would not therefore seem conceptually possible to deal with the Union's security policy separately from one of its essential components, i.e. the evolving common defence policy.
As proof of this logical difficulty the report is required to take the defence sector into consideration when addressing the issue of military alliances and when tackling the EU-WEU question.
However, for the practical purposes of considering the matter and the relevant Parliament resolution, a thorough look at security policy alone from the institutional point of view - without reference to defence and military alliances - proves to be an excellent choice of method which enables us to define what we might call the essence of the Union's security. This includes all the basic guarantees which enable the Union to exist as an entity and adopt the form of a legal system which is able to develop and adapt freely and, at the same time, to 'assert its identity on the international scene' (Article B of the Treaty, which is deliberately followed, immediately afterwards, by the words 'in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy').
By following this line of thought it is also possible to arrive at, as Mr Tindemans recommends, a definition of the concept of Union security which should be suggested to the IGC. This concept could be viewed - taking into account the objectives laid down in the second paragraph of Article J.1 - in terms of the Union's capacity to anticipate and confront the threats to the Union's common values, fundamental interests, territorial integrity and independence and to help to preserve peace and strengthen international security.
This concept of security thus includes the need for the EU to acquire adequate analytical capability to enable crises to be prevented, the so-called Petersberg missions and, consequently, the question of the relations between the WEU and the EU.
In other words, giving separate consideration to the concept of common security makes it possible, in turn, to separate from the defence sector (in the strict sense of the term) both the question of the analysis unit and the missions intended to preserve the peace and strengthen international security, known as the Petersberg missions.
This separation produces the highly important result that such matters are not subject to the unanimity principle in accordance with Article J.4 (3) but fall within the scope of Article J.3 (joint actions), with the subsequent possibility of having them adopted by a qualified majority, other than in the case of constructive abstention by one or more Member States.
In relation to these matters, a specific topic of pressing urgency in view of the 1998 deadline is that of the relationship between the EU and the WEU, viewed from the security point of view rather than from the defence point of view.
Accordingly, any question closely related to defence issues, such as the question of military alliances and NATO enlargement, should be excluded from the resolution and should be dealt with thoroughly in a more appropriate place.
On the basis of this approach, which follows the same reasoning as suggested in the Tindemans report, the Committee on Institutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy to incorporate the following amendments into its report:
CONCLUSIONS
AMENDMENT 1
Recital C
C. whereas the Treaty should indeed contain a definition of the concept of common security based on the Union's capacity to anticipate and confront the threats to the Union's common values, fundamental interests, territorial integrity and independence and to help to preserve peace and strengthen international security by developing political interdependence, including financial solidarity,
AMENDMENT 2
Paragraph 9(b)
(b) the inclusion, in those same Treaties, of Petersberg missions which should take the form of joint actions pursuant to Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, undertaken as an expression of the natural solidarity amongst the Member States of the Union and adopted by a qualified majority, except for the right of constructive abstention by one or more Member States;
AMENDMENT 3
Paragraph 9(c)
(c) The setting-up within the Commission of a policy-planning and early-warning structure operating in close cooperation with the Council secretariat for the purpose of providing, at the appropriate time, the necessary information to enable trouble spots to be detected and securityrelated EU positions and joint actions to be defined,
AMENDMENT 4
Paragraph 9 (d)
(d) the addition to the Treaty of an EU-WEU protocol establishing: 1. the timetable for the incorporation of the WEU into the EU; 2. the logical steps towards such incorporation on the basis of the common security objective; 3. the development of relations between the national parliaments, the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament in respect of preventive consultation and follow-up in the sector; 4. the position of the EU Member States who are not yet full Members of the WEU in cases in which the EU has recourse to the WEU for the purpose of conducting Petersberg missions;
AMENDMENT 5
Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15
Delete
AMENDMENT 6
Paragraph 23
23. Maintains that the Council's central institutional role in establishing the principles and the general and strategic guidelines of the security policy should be better defined in the Treaty. In the case of Petersberg missions the Joint Councils of Foreign Affairs Ministers and Defence Ministers will make use of the WEU and the Commission and will undertake specific tasks to guide all common action and the associated monitoring of the unity, consistency and effectiveness of security actions;