REPORT on Space and security

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (30.5.2008)

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

10.6.2008 - (2008/2030(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs
Rapporteur: Karl von Wogau

Procedure : 2008/2030(INI)

Document stages in plenary

Document selected :

A6-0250/2008

Texts tabled :

A6-0250/2008

Debates :

PV 09/07/2008 - 20
CRE 09/07/2008 - 20

Votes :

PV 10/07/2008 - 5.8
CRE 10/07/2008 - 5.8
Explanations of votes
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

P6_TA(2008)0365

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY
RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

on Space and security

(2008/2030(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

– having regard to the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

– having regard to the Council resolution of 22 May 2007 on the European Space Policy,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, and their relevant provisions on European space policy (Article 189 of the TFEU), permanent structured cooperation on security and defence matters (Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU and a related protocol) and enhanced cooperation in the civilian area (Part Six, Title III of the TFEU), as well as the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the TFEU) and mutual assistance provisions in the event of armed aggression against a Member State or States (Article 42(7) of the TEU),

– having regard to its resolution of 29 January 2004 on the action plan for implementing the European space policy[1],

– having regard to its resolution of 14 April 2005 on the European Security Strategy[2],

– having regard to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Outer Space Treaty"),

– having regard to the EU-Russia cooperation on space policy creating in 2006 the Tripartite Space Dialogue between the European Commission, the European Space Agency and Roscosmos (the Russian Space Agency),

– having regard to the Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A6-0250/2008),

A. whereas freedom from space-based threats and secure sustainable access to, and use of, space must be the guiding principles of the European Space Policy,

B. whereas the various political and security challenges which the European Union is increasingly facing make an autonomous European Space Policy a strategic necessity,

C. whereas the lack of a common approach to space policy between EU Member States results in overly costly programmes,

D. whereas the crisis management operations under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) suffer from a lack of interoperability between space assets operated by EU Member States,

E. whereas the European Union is lacking a comprehensive European space-based architecture for security and defence purposes,

F. whereas the development of a new generation of launchers takes approximately 15 years and the present generation of launchers will need replacing in the next 20 years,

G. whereas development of space assets by the USA, Russia, Japan and other emerging space-faring states, most notably China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Israel, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa and Turkey, is rapidly advancing,

H. whereas the French Presidency of the European Union during the second semester of 2008 will set out an advancement of the European Space policy as one of its priorities,

I. whereas one of the most cost-effective elements of a space architecture and of achieving a sustainable fleet of space assets is on-orbit servicing, using in-situ means,

General considerations

1. Notes the importance of the space dimension to the security of the European Union and the need for a common approach necessary for defending European interests in space;

2. Underlines the need for space assets in order that the political and diplomatic activities of the European Union may be based on independent, reliable and complete information in support of its policies for conflict prevention, crisis management operations and global security, especially the monitoring of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of transportation and verification of international treaties, the transnational smuggling of light weapons and small arms, the protection of critical infrastructure and of the European Union’s borders, and civil protection in the event of natural and man-made disasters and crises;

3. Welcomes the adoption of the European Space Policy by the "Space Council" as proposed by a joint communication presented by the Commission and the European Space Agency, especially the chapter on security and defence, while regretting the absence of any reference to the threat of weaponisation of space within the "key issues to be considered in the development of a strategy for international relations" (as mentioned in Annex 3 to Council Resolution 2007/C 136/01 of 21 May 2007[3]); recommends, therefore, that the revised European Security Strategy should take this policy appropriately into account, and is of the view that space matters should be reflected in the possible White Paper on Security and Defence Policy;

4. Notes the inclusion of a legal basis for the European Space Policy in the Treaty of Lisbon; welcomes the opportunity given to it and to the Council to lay down, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the measures needed to shape a European Space Programme; calls on the Commission to submit to it and to the Council an appropriate proposal for such measures, together with a Communication relating to the establishment of appropriate relations with the European Space Agency; also welcomes the possibilities of permanent structured cooperation in security and defence matters and enhanced cooperation in the civilian area;

5. Encourages the Member States of the European Union, the European Space Agency and the various stakeholders to make greater and better use of the existing national and multinational space systems and to foster their mutual complementarity; notes in this respect that common capabilities are needed for ESDP in at least the following areas: telecommunications, information management, observation and navigation; recommends the sharing and exchange of these data in line with the EU concept for Network Centric Operations Architecture;

6. Applauds the efforts of the International Academy of Astronautics and the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety to promote remediation, understanding and measures in respect of space debris;

Autonomous threat assessment

7. Calls on the Member States to pool and exchange the geospatial intelligence necessary for autonomous EU threat assessment;

Earth observation and reconnaissance

8. Urges that the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) be fully developed to make full use of its potential; moreover, recommends the urgent conclusion of agreements between the EUSC and the EU Member States to provide imagery available to ESDP operation and force commanders while ensuring complementarity with Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) observation capacities and derived security-related information; in this regard, welcomes the Tactical Imagery Exploitation Station project, run jointly by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EUSC;

9. Urges the EU Member States having access to the various types of radar, optical and weather observation satellites and reconnaissance systems (Helios, SAR-Lupe, TerraSAR-X, Rapid Eye, Cosmo-Skymed, Pleiades) to make them compatible; welcomes the bilateral and multilateral agreements between the leading EU countries (e.g. SPOT, ORFEO, the Helios cooperative framework, the Schwerinagreement, and the future MUSIS); recommends that the MUSIS system be brought within a European framework and financed from the EU budget;

10. Emphasises the importance of GMES for foreign as well as security and defence policies of the European Union; urges the creation of an operational budget line to ensure the sustainability of GMES services in response to users’ needs;

Navigation – positioning – timing

11.Underlines the necessity of Galileo for autonomous ESDP operations, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for Europe’s own security and for the Union's strategic autonomy; notes that, in particular, its public-regulated service will be vital in the field of navigation, positioning and timing, not least in order to avoid unnecessary risks; 12. Notes the first reading agreement between Parliament and the Council on the proposal for a regulation on the further implementation of the European satellite radionavigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo), which establishes that the Community is the owner of the system and that its deployment phase is fully financed by the Community budget;

13. Draws attention to its position adopted on 23 April 2008[4], in particular, to the fact that the EGNOS and Galileo programmes should be considered as one of the achievements of the future European Space Programme, and to the governance of the programmes, together with the Galileo Interinstitutional Panel, which may serve as a model in the development of a European Space Policy;

Telecommunications

14. Underlines the necessity of secure satellite-supported communication for ESDP operations (EU Military Staff, EU Headquarters, deployable headquarters) and EU Member States' deployments under UN, NATO and other similar organisations;

15. Requests that the current and future satellite telecommunication systems at the disposal of the countries of the European Union (e.g. Skynet, Syracuse, Sicral, SATCOM Bw, Spainsat) be mutually interoperable in order to provide for cost reduction;

16. Supports the cooperative development of a Software-Defined Radio (SDR) by the Commission and the EDA; notes that SDR will contribute to better interoperability of the ground segment of telecommunications systems;

17. Recommends that savings be achieved by shared use of the ground infrastructure supporting different national telecommunications systems;

Space surveillance

18. Supports the creation of a European space surveillance system leading to space situational awareness (including, for example, GRAVES and TIRA) to monitor the space infrastructure, space debris and, possibly, other threats;

Satellite-based early warning against ballistic missiles

19. Deplores the fact that EU Member States do not have access to instant data on ballistic missile launches around the world; expresses support, therefore, for projects leading towards satellite-based early warning against ballistic missile launches (such as the French "Spirale"); furthermore, calls for information acquired through these future systems to be available to all Member States of the European Union in order to protect their population and to support possible countermeasures, as well as to serve in the verification of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the purposes of ESDP operations and safeguarding Europe's security interests;

Signal intelligence

20. Supports the exchange of signal intelligence (electronic intelligence such as "Essaim" and communications intelligence) at European level;

Autonomous access to space and international environment

21. Supports secure, independent and sustainable access to space for the European Union as one of the preconditions of its autonomous action;

22. Recommends that the European non-commercial satellites be carried into orbit by European launchers, preferably from the territory of the European Union, bearing in mind the aspects of security of supply and protection of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base;

23. Points out that it is necessary to increase the development effort for an enhanced Ariane 5 to be available before 2015;

24. Recommends that strategic long-term investment in new European launchers be initiated as soon as possible, in order to keep up with the rising global competition; demands a greater degree of discipline for this project, in budgetary and time-frame terms;25.. Recommends that on-orbit servicing be established as a means of support to enhance the endurance, persistence, availability and operational efficiency of operational space assets and, at the same time, to reduce asset deployment and maintenance costs;

Governance

26. Encourages strong inter-pillar cooperation for space and security, involving all the relevant actors (i.e. the Commission, the Council, the EDA and the European Union Satellite Centre), in order to safeguard the security policy and data security linked with the ESDP;

27. Strongly recommends the promotion of equal access for all EU Member States to operational data gathered using space assets under a reinforced ESDP framework;

28. Recommends that administrative and financial capacities for the management of space-related activities be developed by the EDA;

Financing

29. Points out that the EU budget commits expenditure amounting to approximately EUR 5.25 billion in the years 2007-2013 on common European space activities, resulting in an average expenditure of EUR 750 million per year over that period;

30. Calls on the European Union to set up an operational budget for space assets that serve to support the ESDP and European security interests;

31. Is alarmed by the fact that the lack of coordination among Member States results in a scarcity of resources due to unnecessary duplication of activities; therefore supports the idea of the launching of joint programmes by the Member States, which will provide costs savings in the longer term;

32. Furthermore, notes that the cost of the absence of a common European approach to the procurement, maintenance and functioning of space assets is estimated to amount to hundreds of millions of euros;

33. Points out that, as experience has shown, large-scale common projects cannot be properly managed when 27 different national budget authorities applying the principle of "fair return" are involved; therefore strongly recommends that these projects and programmes be financed from the EU budget;

34. Notes that the estimates of available expertise suggest that the level of investment needed to address the European security and defence needs in terms of satellite telecommunications, and the appropriate expenditure of the European Union on Earth observation and intelligence gathering, including signal intelligence, should be substantially increased in order to provide for the needs and ambitions of a comprehensive space policy;

35. Takes the view that the European Union, the European Space Agency, the EDA and their Member States should provide for reliable and adequate funding for the space activities envisaged and the research connected therewith; attaches great importance to the financing from the budget of the EU, such as on the Galileo project;

Protection of space infrastructure

36. Underscores the vulnerability of strategic space assets as well as the infrastructure allowing access to space, e.g. launchers and space ports; therefore stresses the need for them to be adequately protected by ground-based theatre missile defence, planes and space surveillance systems; furthermore supports the sharing of data with international partners in the event that satellites are rendered inoperable by enemy action;

37. Calls for the vulnerability of future European satellite systems to be reduced through anti-jamming, shielding, on-orbit servicing, high-orbit and multi-orbital constellation architectures;

38. Emphasises that the protective measures must be fully compliant with international standards regarding peaceful uses of outer space and commonly agreed transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs); asks EU Member States to explore the possibility of developing legally or politically binding "rules of the road" for space operators, together with a space traffic management regime;

39. Stresses that, as a result of this vulnerability, advanced communication should never be made fully dependent on space-based technologies;

International legal regime for uses of space

40. Reiterates the importance of the principle of the use of space for peaceful purposes expressed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; is therefore concerned by the possible future weaponisation of space;

41. Urges that under no circumstances should European space policy contribute to the overall militarisation and weaponisation of space;

42. Calls for the international legal regime to be strengthened so as to regulate and protect non-aggressive space uses and for the strengthening of TCBMs, within the framework of the drafting by the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) of space debris mitigation guidelines consistent with those of the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee as well as the development by the UN Conference on Disarmament of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space; furthermore, asks the EU Presidency to represent the EU proactively in COPUOS; calls on the EU institutions to promote a conference to review the Outer Space Treaty, with the aim of strengthening it and expanding its scope to prohibit all weapons in space;

43. Calls on all international actors to refrain from using offensive equipment in space; expresses its particular concern about the use of destructive force against satellites, such as the Chinese anti-satellite system tested in January 2007 and the consequences of the massive increase in debris for space security; recommends, therefore, the adoption of legally binding international instruments focusing on banning the use of weapons against space assets and the stationing of weapons in space;

44. Calls on all space users to register their satellites, including military satellites, by way of a space security confidence-building measure promoting transparency; supports the Council’s pursuit of a comprehensive EU Code of Conduct on Space Objects; demands that this Code be transformed into a legally binding instrument;

45. Urges the United Nations and the European Union to engage in the active diminution of, and protection from, space debris harmful to satellites;

Transatlantic cooperation on space policy and missile defence

46. Urges the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to launch a strategic dialogue on space policy and missile defence, while bearing in mind the legal imperative of avoiding any action that might be incompatible with the principle of the peaceful use of space, especially on the complementarity and interoperability of systems for satellite communications, space surveillance, and early warning of ballistic missiles, as well as protection of European forces by a theatre missile defence system;

47. Calls on the European Union and the United States of America to engage in a strategic dialogue on the use of space assets and to take the global lead within and outside the UN to make sure that outer space is preserved for peaceful policies only;

Other international cooperation

48. Welcomes the strengthened cooperation between the European Union and the Russian Federation within the framework of the Tripartite Space Dialogue set up in 2006 between the European Commission, the European Space Agency and Roscosmos (the Russian Space Agency), including space applications (satellite navigation, Earth observation and satellite communications) as well as access to space (launchers and future space transportation systems);

° °

49. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Space Agency, the parliaments of the Member States and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

[1] OJ C 96 E, 21.4.2005, p. 136.
[2] OJ C 33 E, 9.2.2006, p. 580.
[3] OJ C 136, 20.6.2007, p. 1.
[4] Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2008)0167.

1. Introduction

The European Security Strategy of 2003 uses a wide notion of security. The tasks deriving from the strategy include peace-keeping operations, protection of critical infrastructure and of our common outside borders, counter-proliferation and treaty verification.

The capability to meet these challenges depends and will increasingly do so on the availability of satellite-based systems. In order to close the existing capability gaps in this field, the rapporteur proposes a closer cooperation in the development of common European systems in the area of space technology.

2. European Space Policy

The report welcomes the adoption by the EU Council of the European Space Policy (ESP) as proposed by a joint communication of the European Commission and ESA, esp. the chapter on security and defence.

The Council is invited to make a reference to the ESP in a White Paper implementing the European Security Strategy.

Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty establishes a legal basis for the European Space Policy as well as the possibilities of permanent structured cooperation on security and defence matters and enhanced cooperation in the civilian area.

3. Satellite-based systems

The satellite-based systems in the field of Earth observation and reconnaissance, telecommunications, navigation, positioning and timing, are the ‘eyes and ears’ of those who possess them. These can have military or civilian character.

Therefore it is crucial for the EU countries to have access to data acquired by such systems, in order to provide the decision-makers in the ESDP and CFSP framework with proper information. As it is widely recognized that space assets are a necessity for the EU crisis management operations and can give the EU a crucial edge on the monitoring of proliferation and verification of international treaties, the EU Member States, ESA and various stakeholders should therefore be encouraged to make the best use of the existing national and multinational space systems and to foster their mutual complementarity.

These capabilities can, however, become the ‘Achilles heel’ if aimed at by hostile state or non-state actors or simply collided with space debris. Therefore, it is recommended to construct a space surveillance system that could provide for a better protection of European satellites.

The Earth observation can provide for a permanent and long-range surveillance for a constantly refreshed situation monitoring and terrain mapping. The telecommunications satellites (Satcom) often constitute the only accessible means to set up a fully functional ‘information chain’. They can be used to transmit remotely collected data to distant headquarters as well as to disseminate information on the field to the different units.

Further normalisation and standardisation at European level in the field of research, technical development and production could be considerable in both Earth observation and Satcom areas. As a result, loss-making duplications would be avoided, and economies of scale and savings could be generated.

Moreover, ESDP operations could benefit from a higher level of interoperability between the space assets operated by EU Member States.

The EU Member States have developed several space systems to fulfil their security needs on a national basis. However, the budgetary constraints and need for interoperability argues for a more integrated European approach. France is a leader in this evolution, developing bilateral or multilateral framework agreements with other EU Member States (Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain).

3.1. Earth Observation and reconnaissance

Several countries have developed or are developing their own Earth observation (EO) systems: France (since 1986 with SPOT 1 until Helios B and Pleiades), Italy (Cosmo-SkyMed), Germany (SAR-Lupe), Spain (SEOSAT, in the framework of the European GMES project), Sweden (SVEA project, still waiting for Armed Forces authorization), Great Britain (Topsat). Some of them were conceived to be dual-use and others to be used by more than one country. The EU Member States managing the various types of radar, optical and weather observation satellites and reconnaissance systems must provide for their compatibility.

The bi–and multi–lateral agreements between the leading EU countries must be therefore strongly supported as a means to save tax-payers money. France and Italy, that have signed the ‘Torino Agreement’, based on the combination of the two respective capabilities (optical and radar observation –ORFEO[1]), to complement their reciprocal programmes. For the same reason, France and Germany also signed a bi-lateral capacities exchange agreement between SAR Lupe and Helios II in 2002 (Schwerin agreement). The European Parliament could give its support to creation of a ‘Europeanised’ reconnaissance system, such as the planned future MUSIS[2].

With regard to European Union capabilities in EO field, the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), based in Torrejon (Spain), provides synthetic imagery analysis for security in support of ESDP operations, using open and Member States´ sources. Pending the conclusion of agreements between the EUSC and the EU Member States to provide available imagery to ESDP operations, EUSC is not making full use of its potential.

Finally, GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is a European initiative run by the European Commission and is intended to provide services for civil security in the environment and humanitarian dimension, but also in the contribution to the verification of some disarmament treaties. GMES will be based on observation data received from Earth Observation satellites and ground based information. Once the first services are ready in 2008 (mapping, support for emergency management and forecasting), it should be available in support of ESDP operations and an operational budget line should be established in the EU budget.

Furthermore, the EU Member States should pool and exchange geospatial intelligence not only for the ESDP operations but also for autonomous EU threat assessment.

3.2. Telecommunications

Military and security communities are increasingly relying on commercial systems to provide larger bandwidth for complex military systems. Secure communication is a necessity for every ESDP operations if it is to be successful. Current military Satcom architectures mainly consist of two levels of services: unprotected communications; and highly protected military transmission. In Europe, only few countries have developed high security level capability (due to technological and budget difficulties), and two of them (France and the United Kingdom) are nuclear countries. The United Kingdom uses its own Skynet system, with the last Skynet V version conceived as dual-use. The French armed forces, after using the civilian satellite platform (Telecom-2), have opted for a military-only programme (Syracuse III). Italy and Spain have developed their own military Satcom (SICRAL and Spainsat, respectively). Moreover, the French, Italian and British capabilities, pooled together, have been chosen by NATO to provide a first so-called ‘Satcom Post-2000’ architecture for communications. Finally, from 2009, two new German military satellites will be launched in 2009 (called SatcomBw).

Your rapporteur requests that the current and future satellite telecommunication systems at the disposal of the EU are mutually interoperable. Ideally, future generations of Satcom should be launched and financed in a much more cooperative way than it is the case in the present.

Furthermore, the support should be given to the ongoing development of a Software-Defined Radio by the European Defence Agency in coordination with the European Commission, providing for a full interoperability of the ground segment of telecommunications systems.

3.3 Navigation-Positioning-Timing

Under the joint EC/ESA initiative, Europe will manage a new Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) called Galileo by 2013: a constellation of 30 satellites providing to users with the proper receiver the possibility to know with extreme accuracy their position. The rapporteur welcomes the compromise reached by the EU in November 2007 and underlines the necessity of Galileo being fully available for autonomous ESDP operations (esp. its public-regulated service).

3.4 Satellite-based early warning against ballistic missiles

Projects leading to early warning systems against ballistic missiles launches (such as the French Spirale) are to be given support. Information acquired by them, once ready, must be exchanged with all EU Member States in the future.

3.5. Signal intelligence

Development and exchange of signal intelligence (electronic intelligence /such as French Essaim/ and communications intelligence) is recommended at European level, providing support to ESDP operations.

4. Space surveillance and protection of space infrastructure

At present, Europe is largely dependent on space surveillance (i.e. systematic tracking of space objects) with radars and optical telescopes carried out by the US and Russia. However, ESA and the European Commission started a dialogue on a definition of a possible creation of a European space surveillance system leading to space situation awareness. German TIRA and French GRAVES radars could take part in the system.

This activity is vital if the EU wishes to provide for a better protection of its satellites. The vulnerable strategic space assets as well as the infrastructure enabling access to space must be adequately protected. Sharing of data with international partners in case of having satellites rendered inoperable by enemy action is being proposed.

5. Autonomous access to space and international environment

In the view of the rapporteur, a secure, independent and sustainable access to space by the EU, is one of the preconditions of an autonomous EU action. Therefore, while bearing in mind the aspects of security of supply and protection of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, it is recommended to carry the European non-commercial satellites onto orbit by European launchers from EU territory. A strategic long-term investment into new European launchers should be initiated as soon as possible. In the short, it is necessary to enhance the Ariane 5 launcher through a restartable engine in order to preserve its competitive advantage.

6. Governance

An integrated European space-based architecture must be created in the future with a strong inter-pillar cooperation framework, involving the European Commission, Council, EDA, EUSC, and ESA. A reinforced ESDP framework must be established in order to provide the smaller EU countries with reduced possibilities to finance their own space assets with access to operational data.

7. Financing

Your rapporteur calls on the EU to provide for a reliable and adequate funding for the envisaged space activities and set up an operational budget for services provided by space assets in support of ESDP and European security interests.

The lack of coordination among the EU countries results in scarcity of resources, therefore common programmes should be launched by the EU Member States, establishing longer-term costs savings. It is striking that the cost of the absence of a common European approach to procurement, maintenance and functioning of space assets is estimated at hundreds of million EUR.

Future satellite-based capabilities for security and defence purposes such as MUSIS should be financed from the EU budget.

8. International legal regime for uses of space

The report raises concern over the prospects possible weaponisation of space and reiterates the importance of the principle of use of space for peaceful purposes expressed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Furthermore, the international legal regime to regulate and protect non-aggressive space uses should be strengthened, esp. in the framework of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) drafting space debris mitigation guidelines. These activities should be consistent with those of the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee as well as the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) currently developing a multilateral agreement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The EU Presidency should represent the EU proactively in the above-mentioned UN bodies.

All international actors have to restrain from using offensive equipment in space, such as the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 producing an alarming amount of space debris. The UN and EU must be engaged in actively diminution of and protection from space debris harmful to satellites.

Despite the current practice and contrary to their obligations, not all space users do register their satellites, military included. The registration should be upheld serving as a space security confidence-building measure. Additionally, Council’s pursuit of a comprehensive EU Code of Conduct on Space Objects can provide for a more secure orbit.

9. Transatlantic and other international cooperation on space policy

While the strengthened cooperation between the EU and Russia in the framework of the Tripartite Space Dialogue set up in 2006 between the European Commission, the European Space Agency and Roscosmos (the Russian Space Agency) is very welcome, the cooperation with US and NATO is lagging behind.

Your rapporteur calls therefore on the EU and US to engage in a strategic dialogue on the use of space assets.

EU and NATO are urged to launch a similar dialogue on space policy and missile defence, especially on complementarity and interoperability of systems for satellite communications, space surveillance, and early warning of ballistic missiles, as well as the protection of European forces by a theatre missile defence system.

[1] ORFEO –Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation, French -Italian agreement involving Cosmo-Skymed and Pleiades.
[2] MUSIS– Multinational Space-Based Imaging System for Surveillance, reconnaissance and observation (based on BOC document–Besoin Opérationnel Commun).

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs

on Space and Security
(2008/2030(INI))

Draftswoman: Romana Jordan Cizelj

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:

– having regard to the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, which inserted a new Article 172a into the section on Research and Technological Development, thus providing a legal basis for the Union to draw up a European Space Policy,

General considerations

1. Expresses its satisfaction at the insertion of a Article 172a on European Space Policy into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and welcomes the opportunity given to it and to the Council to lay down, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the measures needed to shape a European Space Programme;

2. Calls upon the Commission to submit to it and to the Council an appropriate proposal for such measures, together with a Communication relating to the establishment of appropriate relations with the European Space Agency;

Navigation - positioning

3. Notes the first reading agreement between the Parliament and the Council on the proposal for a Regulation on the further implementation of the European satellite radionavigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo) which establishes that the Community is the owner of the system and its deployment phase is fully financed by the Community budget;

4. Draws attention to its position adopted on 23 April 2008[1], in particular, to the fact that the EGNOS and Galileo programmes should be considered as one of the achievements of the future European Space Programme, and to the governance of the programmes, together with the Galileo Interinstitutional Panel, which may serve as a model in the development of a European Space Policy.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

[1] Texts Adopted, P6_TA(2008)0167.

Date adopted

Result of final vote

+:

–:

0:

Members present for the final vote

Šarūnas Birutis, Jan Březina, Philippe Busquin, Jerzy Buzek, Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, Giles Chichester, Dragoş Florin David, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Lena Ek, Adam Gierek, Norbert Glante, Umberto Guidoni, András Gyürk, Fiona Hall, David Hammerstein, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Ján Hudacký, Romana Jordan Cizelj, Anne Laperrouze, Eugenijus Maldeikis, Eluned Morgan, Angelika Niebler, Reino Paasilinna, Atanas Paparizov, Aldo Patriciello, Francisca Pleguezuelos Aguilar, Anni Podimata, Miloslav Ransdorf, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Patrizia Toia, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Alejo Vidal-Quadras

Substitute(s) present for the final vote

Gabriele Albertini, Alexander Alvaro, Ivo Belet, Manuel António dos Santos, Robert Goebbels, Satu Hassi, Edit Herczog, Pierre Pribetich, Bernhard Rapkay, Silvia-Adriana Ţicău, Lambert van Nistelrooij

Substitute(s) under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote

Emmanouil Angelakas, Nicolae Vlad Popa

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