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**A7-0360/2013**

31.10.2013

# REPORT

on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)  
(14605/1/2012 – C7-0000/2013 – 2013/2105(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Maria Eleni Koppa

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## **MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION**

**on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)**

**(14605/1/2012 – C7-0000/2013 – 2013/2105(INI))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the parts concerning the European Security and Defence Policy (14605/1/2012 - C7-0000/2013),
- having regard to Articles 2, 3, 21, 24 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
- having regard to Title V TEU and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
- having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2012,
- having regard to conclusions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security Defence Policy of 6 September 2013,
- having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy of 1 December 2011 and of 23 July 2012, as well as to the Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities of 23 March 2012,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on maritime security strategy of 26 April 2010.
- having regard to the Council conclusions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection of 27 May 2011 and to the previous Council’s conclusions on cyber security,
- having regard to the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing adopted by the EU defence ministers on 19 November 2012,
- having regard to the Commission Communication of 24 July 2013 entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ (COM(2013)0542),
- having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products

within the Community<sup>1</sup>,

- having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2013 on the maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy<sup>3</sup> and on the EU's military structures: state of play and future prospects<sup>4</sup>, of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy<sup>5</sup>, on the EU's mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions<sup>6</sup>, on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters<sup>7</sup>, and on Cyber Security and Defence<sup>8</sup>, of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States<sup>9</sup>, of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty<sup>10</sup> and of 23 November 2010 on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities<sup>11</sup>,
- having regard to its recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, to the Council and to the Commission of 13 June 2013 on the 2013 review of the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS<sup>12</sup> and to the EEAS Review 2013 presented by the High Representative in July 2013<sup>13</sup>,
- having regard to the report of 15 October 2013 by the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission on the Common Security and Defence Policy,
- having regard to the EEAS report on the revision of CSDP crisis management procedures, adopted by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 18 June 2013,
- having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
- having regard to Rule 119(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0360/2013),

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2013)0380.

<sup>4</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2013)0381.

<sup>5</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0455.

<sup>6</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0456.

<sup>7</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0458.

<sup>8</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0457.

<sup>9</sup> OJ C 168 E, 14.6.2013, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> OJ C 377 E, 7.12.2012, p. 51.

<sup>11</sup> OJ C 99 E, 3.4.2012, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2013)0278.

<sup>13</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013\\_eeas\\_review\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf)

### ***European security and defence in a changing world***

1. Notes the significant and ongoing changes in the geopolitical environment characterised by multidimensional and asymmetric threats, by transnational terrorism, by the rise of emerging powers and a strategic shift in attention by the US towards the Pacific region, by increased poverty, hunger and instability in the EU's southern neighbourhood, by growing maritime security challenges, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and increased illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, by challenges in energy security, and by major systemic financial failure and a severe and long-lasting financial and economic crisis with a major impact on the GDP of many EU Member States and, consequently, on national defence budgets on both sides of the Atlantic;
2. Believes that reassessing and strengthening Europe's role in the world constitutes one of the major challenges of the 21st century and that the time has come for the Member States of the Union to show the political will needed for making the EU a relevant global actor and security provider with real strategic autonomy; considers that a change of mindset on the part of Member States is required in order to anchor a European approach to a committed and effective security and defence policy;
3. Welcomes, therefore, the European Council decision to hold a discussion dedicated to security and defence at the December 2013 Summit; considers that this provides a timely opportunity to underline at the highest political level and to communicate to the public in Europe that security and defence issues still matter and that the European dimension is more relevant than ever; strongly believes that the EU needs to be able to provide security for its citizens, to promote and defend its fundamental values, to assume its share of responsibility for world peace and to play an effective role in preventing and managing regional crises in its wider neighbourhood, contributing to their resolution and protecting itself against the negative effects of these crises;
4. Welcomes also the report by the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission on the CSDP, which pinpoints a number of obstacles which the policy faces; deplores the fact, however, that the report does not propose more in the way of measures aimed specifically at remedying the shortcomings of the CSDP;
5. Looks forward to substantive decisions being taken at the December Summit and puts forward its own recommendations with this report, building upon relevant positions taken by Parliament in the recent past and paying close attention to the ongoing debate on the three main issues (clusters) identified by the December 2012 European Council;

### ***Unleashing the potential of the treaties***

6. Notes that the Lisbon Treaty introduced several new instruments in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which have not yet been put into practice;
7. Emphasises in this regard the possibility of establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) among Member States (Article 46(6) TEU), of entrusting CSDP instruments and military planning and conduct capabilities in particular to that group of Member States (Articles 42(5) and 44(1) TEU), and of establishing a start-up fund for preparatory activities for missions which are not charged to the Union budget (Article 41(3) TEU) and

are not incorporated into the ATHENA mechanism; calls, therefore on the President of the European Council and the Vice-President / High Representative to establish the start-up fund; highlights in this context the importance of mainstreaming CSDP matters into those EU policies which have a multifaceted impact on security and defence or contribute to CSDP, such as development and human rights, industrial research and innovation, internal market, international trade and space policies and others, in order to support those Member States which are engaged in further strengthening the CSDP;

8. Stresses the importance of these commonly agreed provisions for the development of the CSDP and calls on the European Council to conduct a serious discussion about their implementation in a coherent manner; calls on the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Vice-President / High Representative (VP/HR) to play an active role in this process;

***First cluster: increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP***

9. Points out that, according to the Treaties, the EU's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (Article 3 TEU) and that its action on the international scene seeks to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders (Article 21 TEU); is convinced that the CSDP serves these aims and underlines the need to upgrade it;
10. Stresses that the main asset of the European Union is the availability of various policies and instruments, combined through the 'comprehensive approach', and that it is possible to achieve better results at all levels by better integrating the CSDP into this approach; welcomes in this respect the review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS published by the VP/HR in July 2013, which recognises the problems of coordination and those related to the speed and effectiveness of decision-making in the area of the CSDP; looks forward to specific decisions being taken at the December Summit and expects the further integration of the CSDP to be analysed thoroughly in the upcoming joint Communication by the VP/HR and the Commission on the implementation of the comprehensive approach;
11. Reiterates its conviction that although elements of the 2003 European Security Strategy, as supplemented in 2008, remain valid, the EU needs to review and to complement this strategy by taking recent developments and the new array of security challenges and risks into account and redefining its strategic interests, objectives and priorities, with a greater emphasis on the protection of its citizens, the defence of critical infrastructures and its neighbourhood, and by dovetailing the different regional and topical sub-strategies; believes that such an exercise will provide a clearer strategic framework for external action by the EU, enhance consistency and, at the same time, communicate better to the citizens the challenges and risks facing them in the future; requests therefore that the European Council launch a debate on the appropriate strategic framework for the Union, mandate the VP/HR to come forward with proposals in this respect before the end of 2014 and ensure sustainable follow-up, subject to regular updates, as primarily defined in the

context of the European Security Strategy;

12. Calls for the review of the EU strategic framework to form the basis for a White Paper on EU security and defence policy and suggests that the European Council could set the necessary process in motion; urges the EU Member States, furthermore, to give serious consideration to the European dimension in their national security strategies, White Papers and decision-making in the field of defence; calls on the VP/HR to develop a common template for the shaping of concurrent national reviews;
13. Points to the need to ensure that the EU is in a position to contribute, by means of crisis management operations, to conflict prevention, stabilisation and resolution;
14. Believes that the introduction of a mutual defence clause and a solidarity clause by the Treaties (Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU) reinforces the sense of common destiny among European citizens; reminds Member States that only in a spirit of commitment, mutual understanding and genuine solidarity will the Union be able to fulfil its global role, thus enhancing the security of Europe and that of its citizens; commends, therefore, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) for the Joint Proposal on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause and calls on the Heads of State and Government to reaffirm their commitment to mutual solidarity and to provide a clear operative interpretation of the two clauses;
15. Notes with concern that the number and timeliness of CSDP missions and operations, and the development of civilian and especially military means and capabilities for the CSDP, fall short of what is required, given the EU's increasingly insecure and unstable neighbourhood; deplores, in particular, the limited overall scope of the CSDP missions related to the crises in Libya and Mali and regrets the lack of flexibility within the Union's decision-making procedures which account for delayed effective responses in crisis scenarios, as the two examples illustrate; calls for the situation to be monitored and for the operational engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, which has yielded positive results, to be maintained; calls for greater ambition and serious efforts to improve the design of future CSDP missions and operations under a 'lessons learned process' and to develop appropriate exit strategies; invites the VP/HR to steer this process and welcomes in this respect her report published on 15 October 2013 as an important step on how to make the CSDP more effective and proactive;
16. Emphasises the need to enhance the visibility of European crisis management and to place all efforts under the CSDP, making use, where appropriate, of the provision in Article 44 TEU for a Council decision entrusting the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task;
17. Expresses its concern, based on experience in the recent past, that the comprehensive approach to crisis management has not yet reached its full potential; considers that missions and operations are more meaningful when they are embedded into a regional strategy, as the positive example of the Horn of Africa demonstrates; takes note of the 'Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations' endorsed by the Member States on 18 June 2013;
18. Asks that the functional problems of civilian CSDP missions, notably regarding the speed

of deployment and staffing, be tackled by reviewing their legal and financial framework, which often complicates the decision-making process and leads to delays; calls for an increase in the number of qualified and politically independent strategic planners, which is too small in comparison to the number of missions; further asks Member States to create a 'civilian reserve corps' that could be deployed quickly if needed welcomes in this regard the recently established permanent CSDP warehouse;

19. Recalls its 2001 resolution, which called for the creation of a European Civil Peace Corps; welcomes recent efforts to create a Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps within the Commission and a pool of experts in mediation, dialogue and reconciliation within the External Action Service; also welcomes the existence and continuation of the Peacebuilding Partnership between the External Action Service and relevant civil society stakeholders;
20. Stresses the important role of mediation and dialogue in preventing and resolving conflicts peacefully; commends the progress which the EEAS has made in strengthening its mediation capacities and reiterates its support for further enhancing Europe's capacities in this field; believes that Parliament's successful involvement in mediation processes has demonstrated the important role parliamentarians can play in supporting mediation and dialogue processes and intends to further step up its efforts in this field;
21. Proposes the inclusion of human rights and gender advisors in all CSDP missions and encourages the exchange of best practices among CSDP missions to ensure that human rights concerns are fully taken into account and women are fully protected and included in conflict and post-conflict resolution; invites the Council and the EEAS to take further steps to include gender aspects in staff planning for CSDP missions;
22. Highlights the fact that successful military operations require a clear command and control function; reiterates therefore its call for the establishment of a permanent military operational headquarters; notes with regret the lack of progress on this issue and the strong resistance by some Member States; stresses further that an effective CSDP requires adequate early warning and intelligence support; considers, therefore, that these headquarters should include cells for intelligence gathering and for early warning/situational awareness;
23. Reiterates its support for a provisional solution and draws attention to its proposal to improve the status of the currently active Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa and assist military planning and coordination among those operating on the ground; asks the VP/HR to develop such an option, within the constraints of its current size and infrastructure, in order to optimise the use of existing resources, and to examine the feasibility of widening the geographical area of operations to encompass other important regions; considers that this body should have legal capacity and be assigned the role of coordinating procurement between Brussels and individual mission headquarters, using economies of scale to maximise savings;
24. Notes the fact that EU battlegroups have never yet been deployed and considers that their existence will be difficult to justify over time; stresses that they constitute an important tool for timely force generation, training and rapid reaction; welcomes the decision to address this issue during the December Summit; is convinced that the EU should dispose



of high-readiness standing battle forces, with land, air, naval, cyber and special forces components and a high level of ambition; underlines the fact that EU battlegroups should be deployable for all types of crises, including climate-driven humanitarian crisis; favours a more flexible and targeted approach to enhance the response and adaptability to different crisis situations, and to improve modularity in order to close gaps during the initial phases of the launch of CSDP operations without, however, compromising the operational capacity of the battlegroup as a whole;

25. Highlights the fact that greater efforts should be made to integrate at EU level initiatives such as the Eurocorps and the European Air Group;
26. Confirms that the existing financial system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ constitutes a serious problem for the CSDP, leading to delays or complete blockages in decision-making, notably on the quick deployment of battlegroups; recommends that Member States agree on an EU financing mechanism based on burden-sharing for the use of battlegroups under the EU flag, in order to give them a realistic future; also calls – in the interests of consistency and efficiency – for the EEAS to be given control over the financial instruments linked to the crisis management measures that it plans and carries out; expects the VP/HR and interested Member States to put forward concrete proposals in this respect;
27. Expresses its concern, furthermore, that the economic and debt crisis may have an impact on the willingness of EU Member States to contribute to CSDP missions and operations, particularly those with military and defence implications; calls therefore for extension of the scope of the ATHENA mechanism and use of the start-up fund (Article 41(3) TEU) to ensure the rapid financing of urgent tasks; stresses, however, that even if the CSDP needs to be reenergised, this should be done in accordance with budgetary constraints;
28. Invites Member States to exploit the possibilities offered by PESCO and to start implementing this Treaty provision in order to tackle the prevailing ‘CSDP fatigue’ and deepen military cooperation and integration; calls on the European Council to deliver clear guidelines for its implementation and invites Member States that are not interested to act constructively; stresses that the possibility of joining at a later stage should be left open in order to ensure flexibility and to avoid a two-speed Europe;
29. Points out that the EU has a vital interest in a secure and open maritime environment that allows the free passage of commerce and the peaceful, legal and sustainable use of the oceans’ riches; stresses the need to develop an EU maritime foreign policy which aims at protecting and preserving critical infrastructure, open sea routes and natural resources and puts an emphasis on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, within the context of international law and in line with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; looks forward to the adoption of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, in line with the April 2010 Council conclusions, and calls for the development of a specific implementation plan; points out that the integration of maritime surveillance across sectors and borders is already a cross-sectoral tool of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IPM); highlights the importance of swiftly implementing the Common Information Sharing Environment project and building a ‘bridge’ between the IPM and the CSDP to improve information sharing between them;

30. Underlines the need to prevent the militarisation of regions like the Arctic and stresses the need to use peaceful means of conflict resolution, including trade instruments;
31. Requests that the European Council reconfirm the importance of space, which underpins the strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States and the potential to gain autonomous access to space by developing launchers and satellites; reiterates the importance of gathering precise intelligence for both civil and military CSDP missions and operations; emphasises in particular the role of space-based assets in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management before, during and after a crisis; invites the Commission to develop a specific policy to support the development of multiple-use space assets;
32. Reiterates the growing importance of tackling cyber security threats; invites the European Council to develop guidelines for the implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy and to take concrete measures regarding the protection of cyber infrastructure, and investing in enhancing EU-wide cooperation on crisis management procedures, cyber exercises, training and education; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to ensure that cyber-security policy is enacted in a cross-sectoral manner, so as to ensure adequate bridging arrangements between the EU's internal and external security policies, and on all Member States to develop or finalise their respective national Cyber Security Strategies and to aim for a greater degree of synchronisation at Union level;
33. Asks the European Council to reaffirm the significance of Europe's energy supply and a diversified and sustainable access to energy resources; notes that some Member States lack the capacity to diversify their energy supplies and are thus becoming increasingly vulnerable; in this respect, strongly supports the collaborative efforts of Member States in crisis situations; stresses that the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe should activate the mutual defence and/or solidarity clause; notes also that operation ATALANTA is already performing an energy security role by combating pirates who have hijacked a number of oil tankers since 2008; believes, therefore, that these aspects need to be part of the necessary strategic approach; emphasises, in this connection, that energy supply is a crucial factor for successful CSDP missions and operations;
34. Underscores the importance of energy efficiency in the field of defence, in particular, stressing the need to assess the impact of energy consumption on defence budgets and military effectiveness and develop a comprehensive energy efficiency strategy for the armed forces;
35. Underlines the importance for the EU to further develop partnerships and deepen its security dialogue with the UN, regional organisations and relevant players, including Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighbourhood countries;
36. Points out that the EU should further engage with the UN, the African Union, the OSCE and ASEAN in order to share analysis and cooperate in addressing the challenges of environmental policy and climate change, including their security implications; underlines the need for preventive action and urges the EU to develop and improve early warning capabilities;
37. Calls for stronger cooperation between the EU and NATO structures through a

complementary approach and closer coordination in order to help avoid duplication between the two partners and to effectively tackle the new threats; is convinced that strengthening the CSDP does no harm to, and indeed reinforces, collective security and transatlantic links; asserts that the development of defence capabilities within an EU context also benefits NATO; notes the constructive collaboration regarding the EU's pooling and sharing initiative and NATO's smart defence initiative; welcomes the Republic of Cyprus's intention to join NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme, which can be a game changer, and urges Turkey to adopt an equally constructive attitude; urges the development of a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO cooperation and the deepening of political dialogue with full respect for the decision-making of each party;

38. Takes the view that the EU needs to be able to act autonomously, particularly in its own neighbourhood, but always in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and ensuring full respect for international humanitarian law;

***Second cluster: enhance the development of defence capabilities***

39. Echoes concerns that further cuts in national defence budgets will make it impossible to maintain critical military capabilities and will result in the irreversible loss of know-how and technologies; notes that the shortfalls in Member States' capabilities became apparent during the operations in Libya and Mali and that the economic crisis has exacerbated existing structural problems; reiterates its view, however, that the problem is less of a budgetary nature than of a political one;
40. Notes the proposals put forward by the VP/HR in her October 2013 report on the CSDP, in particular those intended to create incentives, including tax incentives, for cooperation in the defence capability field; stresses the opportunity for Member States to enjoy the full benefits of working closer together to generate military efficiency and to decide to optimise and spend scarce resources in a better and smarter way, by creating synergies and by a coordinated reduction of unnecessary duplication, redundant and obsolete capabilities;
41. Welcomes the ongoing revision of the Capability Development Plan as the basis for a long-term joint transformation concept for capability-building; believes that this transformation concept should be discussed regularly and its implementation streamlined and, as appropriate, reviewed;
42. Draws attention to the mission of the European Defence Agency (EDA), as provided for in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU, according to which the Agency is entrusted with important tasks in terms of implementing permanent structured cooperation, formulating a European capabilities and armaments policy, developing the military capabilities of Member States and strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, but without financial implications for the EU budget;
43. Considers that, although not a panacea, the pooling and sharing of military capabilities constitutes an important response to shortfalls in European capabilities; welcomes the facilitating role of the EDA and the progress achieved so far; believes that pooling and sharing should not only be considered in terms of joint sourcing, but also in terms of integration, and should cover the shared maintenance and utilisation of capabilities;

44. Calls for the European Defence Agency (EDA) to be given a stronger role in coordinating capabilities, with a view to ending duplication and the existence of parallel programmes in the Member States, which place an excessive burden on taxpayers;
45. Invites the EU Member States to improve information-sharing on defence planning and, in line with the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing, to include pooling and sharing solutions in national defence planning cycles and decision-making processes;
46. Stresses that mutual trust, transparency and reliability are key factors for the success of any common endeavour in the area of security and defence; is convinced that the development of defence capabilities must be embedded into a strategic approach that determines the appropriate mix of capabilities and the goals for which they should be used;
47. In the light of the above, expects the upcoming Defence Summit:
- (a) to provide political and strategic guidance, reconfirming the Member States' commitment to capability development and the level of ambition outlined in the 2008 Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities;
  - (b) to set the foundations for truly collective planning, ranging from strategic planning to procurement and technological development, whilst paying particular attention to the issues of financial arrangements and incentives;
  - (c) to step up the implementation of existing projects, particularly those regarding strategic enablers, and to provide political support for the EDA's flagship projects, i.e. Air-to-Air Refuelling, Satellite Communication, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Cyber Defence, and the Single European Sky;
  - (d) to task the VP/HR and the EDA, in tandem with the Commission, to come forward with new practical proposals regarding the development of defence capabilities by the end of 2014;
  - (e) to establish a monitoring process which regularly assesses the progress achieved;
  - (f) to reiterate the value of closer collaboration with NATO and strategic partners in the capabilities' development domain;
  - (g) to consider launching development work on a Military Headline Goal 2025, possibly complemented by an Industrial Headline Goal;

***Third cluster: strengthen Europe's defence industry***

48. Welcomes the Commission Communication entitled 'Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector', which brings forward some fresh ideas and proposals; fully supports the Commission's efforts to deepen the internal defence and security market and to develop a defence industrial policy, providing adequate support for SMEs which play a key role in innovation, R&D, job creation and economic growth, in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy;

49. Underlines the fact that strengthening the technological and industrial base of the defence sector is an objective of the Union enshrined in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU; stresses that a solid European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) which is able to sustain CSDP and further enhance Europe's military capabilities, whilst preserving the EU's strategic autonomy, is crucial for an effective European defence; highlights the link between research, industry and capability development, which are all necessary elements for economic growth, job creation and competitiveness, as well as for a stronger CSDP;
50. Reiterates the need for a strong and less fragmented European defence industry that is capable of sustaining the CSDP and enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy; highlights the importance of certification and standardisation for improving the interoperability of the armed forces; calls on the European Council to mandate the EDA to prepare a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards, and on the Member States to streamline European certification procedures with the mutual recognition of certificates and to harmonise their certification procedures;
51. Stresses that the anticipation and management of change and restructuring are an integral part of any industrial policy; considers, therefore, that further market integration in the defence sector must go hand in hand with active social dialogue and the mitigation of its negative impacts on regional and local economies, making full use of EU financial instruments, such as the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Fund;
52. Calls on the European Council to take action in these areas through sound financing of R&D, including at Union level; supports the development of effective and cost-efficient cooperation between civilian security and defence research activities; stresses, however, the continued need for an effective dual-use export regime;
53. Stresses the need to ensure new sources of financing for research and innovation in the defence field, e.g. through Horizon 2020;

### ***Concluding remarks***

54. Fully supports holding a debate on the three clusters at the December Defence Summit; highlights their equal importance and the fact that they are interlinked by an inherent logic serving the same strategic goals;
55. Calls on the European Council, as well as policymakers at all levels in the Member States of the Union, to show greater ambition and courage in launching a public debate, this being even more important in times of economic austerity; stresses the need to invest more and step up cooperation in the area of security and defence, and to explain the causal nexus between security and defence on the one hand, and freedom, democracy, rule of law and prosperity on the other;
56. Stresses the indivisible link between internal and external security and that a peaceful, secure and stable environment is a precondition for preserving the political, economic and social model in Europe;
57. Expresses its high hopes that this European Council will not be an isolated event, but the starting point of a continuous process that revisits security and defence matters at

European Council level on a regular basis; favours, as a follow-up to the European Council, the establishment of a roadmap with specific benchmarks and timelines, and a reporting mechanism; advocates the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers in the medium term in order to give security and defence matters the weight they deserve;

58. Resolves to maintain and strengthen closer links with the Member States' national parliaments through regular meetings in order to promote dialogue and exchanges of views on matters of security and defence;
59. Believes that the CSDP is a basic pillar of the European integration process;
60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chair of the Assembly of the African Union and the Secretary General of ASEAN.

## MINORITY OPINION

on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (00000/2013 – 2013/2105(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Maria Eleni Koppa

Minority Opinion tabled by GUE/NGL MEPs Sabine Lösing, Willy Meyer, Nikolaos Chountis

The report wants to grant the military a central role for the security of energy resources and trade lines and heretofore advocates the further militarization of the EU by demanding more CSDP-missions and military capabilities as well as "flexible, high-readiness standing battle forces" – de facto a European Army.

We object this report as it wants to transform the EU into a global military actor, especially since it:

- advocates an EUHQ with intelligence support as well as a permanent Defence Council;
- supports reviewing the financial framework for CSDP missions by the extension of the ATHENA mechanism beyond parliamentary control and the financing of EDA from the EU budget;
- blurs the line between civilian and military research (and funding) as well as between internal and external security;
- regrets that the battlegroups have never been deployed in EU military operations;
- advocates mutual defence and solidarity clause (Art. 42(7) TEU + Art. 222 TFEU) also to secure trade, energy routes/critical infrastructure
- generally focuses on military "solutions" instead of capacities for civil peaceful conflict solutions.

We demand:

- radical (including CBRN) disarmament on EU and global levels;
- no military funding from EU-budget
- all activities strictly within UN Charter, International Law;
- civilian EU, strict civil peaceful approaches to conflict solutions, separation of civil and military actions;
- strict separation of EU from NATO

## RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

<b>Date adopted</b>	24.10.2013
<b>Result of final vote</b>	+: 40 -: 11 0: 7
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Bastiaan Belder, Elmar Brok, Tarja Cronberg, Arnaud Danjean, Susy De Martini, Mark Demesmaecker, Michael Gahler, Marietta Giannakou, Ana Gomes, Andrzej Grzyb, Richard Howitt, Anna Ibrisagic, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Jelko Kacin, Tunne Kelam, Maria Eleni Koppa, Paweł Robert Kowal, Eduard Kukan, Vytautas Landsbergis, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Krzysztof Lisek, Sabine Lösing, Ulrike Lunacek, Willy Meyer, Francisco José Millán Mon, Alexander Mirsky, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Norica Nicolai, Raimon Obiols, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Alojz Peterle, Mirosław Piotrowski, Bernd Posselt, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Cristian Dan Preda, Tokia Saïfi, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Werner Schulz, Sophocles Sophocleous, Charles Tannock, Geoffrey Van Orden, Nikola Vuljanić, Boris Zala
<b>Substitute(s) present for the final vote</b>	Charalampos Angourakis, Reinhard Bütikofer, Marije Cornelissen, Véronique De Keyser, Kinga Gál, Barbara Lochbihler, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Doris Pack, Marietje Schaake, Ivo Vajgl, Janusz Władysław Zemke
<b>Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote</b>	Dubravka Šuica