Postupak : 2011/0901B(COD)
Faze dokumenta na plenarnoj sjednici
Odabrani dokument : A8-0296/2015

Podneseni tekstovi :

A8-0296/2015

Rasprave :

PV 27/10/2015 - 17
CRE 27/10/2015 - 17

Glasovanja :

PV 28/10/2015 - 7.3
CRE 28/10/2015 - 7.3
Objašnjenja glasovanja
Objašnjenja glasovanja

Doneseni tekstovi :

P8_TA(2015)0377

PREPORUKA ZA DRUGO ČITANJE     ***II
PDF 681kWORD 305k
14.10.2015
PE 567.628v02-00 A8-0296/2015

o stajalištu Vijeća u prvom čitanju s ciljem donošenja uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o izmjeni Protokola br. 3 o Statutu Suda Europske unije

(09375/1/2015 – C8‑0166/2015 – 2011/0901B(COD))

Odbor za pravna pitanja

Izvjestitelj: António Marinho e Pinto

NACRT ZAKONODAVNE REZOLUCIJE EUROPSKOG PARLAMENTA

NACRT ZAKONODAVNE REZOLUCIJE EUROPSKOG PARLAMENTA

o Stajalištu Vijeća u prvom čitanju s ciljem donošenja uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o izmjeni Protokola br. 3 o Statutu Suda Europske unije

(09375/1/2015 – C8‑0166/2015 – 2011/0901B(COD))

(Redovni zakonodavni postupak: drugo čitanje)

Europski parlament,

–  uzimajući u obzir stajalište Vijeća u prvom čitanju (09375/1/2015 – C8‑0166/2015),

–  uzimajući u obzir svoje stajalište u prvom čitanju(1) o zahtjevu Suda Europske unije podnesenom Europskom parlamentu i Vijeću (02074/2011),

–  uzimajući u obzir članak 294. stavak 7. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije,

–  uzimajući u obzir članak 69. Poslovnika,

–  uzimajući u obzir preporuku za drugo čitanje Odbora za pravna pitanja (A8-0296/2015),

1.  usvaja sljedeće stajalište u drugom čitanju;

2.  nalaže svojem predsjedniku da stajalište Parlamenta proslijedi Vijeću, Komisiji i nacionalnim parlamentima.

Amandman    1

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 1.

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

(1) Zbog postupnog proširenja nadležnosti Općeg suda od njegova osnivanja, broj predmeta pred Općim sudom već godinama kontinuirano raste, što je s vremenom dovelo do povećanja broja predmeta koji su u tijeku pred tim sudom. To utječe na trajanje postupaka.

(1) Zbog postupnog proširenja nadležnosti Općeg suda od njegova osnivanja, broj predmeta pred Općim sudom već godinama raste, što je s vremenom dovelo do povećanja broja predmeta koji su u tijeku pred tim sudom. Ako se ne poduzmu odgovarajuće mjere proceduralne i organizacijske prirode, što podrazumijeva i povećanje broja sudaca tog suda, moguće je da će to utjecati na trajanje postupaka.

Amandman    2

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 3.

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

(3) Situacija u kojoj se nalazi Opći sud ima strukturne uzroke povezane s, između ostalog, povećanjem broja i raznovrsnosti pravnih akata institucija, tijela, ureda i agencija Unije kao i s opsegom i složenošću predmeta pred Općim sudom, posebno u području tržišnog natjecanja i državnih potpora.

(3) Situacija u kojoj se nalazi Opći sud ima uzroke povezane s, između ostalog, povećanjem broja i raznovrsnosti pravnih akata institucija, tijela, ureda i agencija Unije, opsegom i složenošću predmeta pred Općim sudom, posebno u području tržišnog natjecanja, državnih potpora, intelektualnog vlasništva te činjenicom da nisu osnovani odgovarajući specijalizirani sudovi predviđeni člankom 257. UFEU-a.

Amandman    3

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 5.

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

(5) Uzimajući u obzir vjerojatni razvoj radnog opterećenja Općeg suda broj sudaca trebalo bi, na kraju procesa koji se sastoji od tri faze, utvrditi na 56, pri čemu se podrazumijeva da ni u kojem trenutku u Općem sudu ne mogu biti više od dva suca imenovana na prijedlog iste države članice.

(5) Uzimajući u obzir razvoj radnog opterećenja Općeg suda broj sudaca trebalo bi, na kraju procesa koji se sastoji od tri faze, utvrditi na 56, što znači po dva suca imenovana na prijedlog svake države članice, pri čemu se podrazumijeva da ni u kojem trenutku u Općem sudu ne mogu biti više od dva suca imenovana na prijedlog iste države članice.

Amandman    4

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 5.a (nova)

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

(5a) Imenovanje dodatnih sudaca trebalo bi se zasnivati na njihovoj neovisnosti, nepristranosti i stručnosti, imajući pritom u vidu njihovu profesionalnu i osobnu prikladnost i poznavanje pravnih sustava Europske unije i država članica, a uz to bi trebalo i zajamčiti spolnu ravnopravnost u ukupnom sastavu Suda.

Amandman    5

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 7.

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

(7) Nadležnost za odlučivanje u prvom stupnju o službeničkim predmetima Unije i sedam mjesta sudaca Službeničkog suda Europske unije trebalo bi, na temelju budućeg zakonodavnog zahtjeva Suda, prenijeti na Opći sud u rujnu 2016.

(7) Kako je Sud već najavio, bit će podnesen drugi zakonodavni prijedlog kako bi se utvrdile sve podrobnosti za prijenos Službeničkog suda Europske unije, uključujući i njegovih sedam sudačkih mjesta te osoblje i resurse.

Amandman    6

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 8.a (nova)

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

(8.a) Djelomičnu izmjenu Općeg suda trebalo bi organizirati na način da vlade država članica postepeno počnu imenovati dva suca za istu djelomičnu izmjenu. Stoga bi se, kako bi se osigurala ravnomjerna zastupljenost žena i muškaraca u tom Sudu [zajednička izjava od... * ], vlade država članica trebale potruditi da izaberu po jednu ženu i jednog muškarca, uz uvjet da se poštuju uvjeti i postupci utvrđeni Ugovorom. Člankom 19. stavkom 2. Ugovora o Europskoj uniji propisano je da se Sud sastoji od najmanje jednog suca iz svake države članice. Budući da je time ravnomjerna geografska zastupljenost već zajamčena, dodatne suce trebalo bi imenovati prvenstveno na temelju stručnih i osobnih kvaliteta, te s obzirom na njihovo poznavanje pravnih sustava Europske unije i država članica, a tek nakon toga bi u obzir trebalo uzeti i njihovo državljanstvo.

 

__________________

 

* SL: umetnuti datum stupanja na snagu ove Uredbe.

Amandman    7

Stajalište Vijeća

Uvodna izjava 9.a (nova)

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

(9.a) Predlaže se imenovanje 19 sudskih savjetnika kako bi svaki sudac imao na raspolaganju još jednog sudskog savjetnika (uzimajući u obzir njih devet već imenovanih 2014.), što je rješenje koje već postoji na Sudu.

Amandman    8

Stajalište Vijeća

Članak 1. – točka 2.a (nova)

Protokol br. 3

Članak 48.

 

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

(2.a) Članku 48. dodaje se sljedeći stavak:

 

„Godine 2019., prije izmjene Općeg suda kojom se potvrđuje odluka da se u taj Sud imenuje dodatnih devet sudaca, provest će se studija utjecaja da se utvrdi je li, u svjetlu radnog opterećenja, potrebno imenovanje navedenih devet sudaca u taj Sud.”

Amandman    9

Stajalište Vijeća

Članak 1. – točka 2.a (nova)

Protokol br. 3

Članak 48.a (novi)

 

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

(2.b) Umeće se sljedeći članak:

 

„Članak 48.a

 

Imenovanja iz država članica dopuštena su samo ako podrazumijevaju po jednog kandidata oba spola kad je riječ o dva istodobna imenovanja na prijedlog te države članice, ili kandidata suprotnog spola u odnosu na spol suca koji nastavlja biti članom Općeg suda ako se imenovanje na položaj drugog suca na prijedlog države članice ne obavlja u isto vrijeme kad i imenovanje prvog suca.”

Justification

See paragraph 15 of the Report on women in political decision-making (2011/2295(INI)) (PIETIKÄINEN), adopted in plenary 3.2.2012, that ‘[c]alls on the Member States to promote positive actions, including binding legislative measures, with a view to ensuring parity in all governing bodies and public appointments and to develop tools for gender monitoring of nominations and elections;’

Amandman    10

Stajalište Vijeća

Članak 2.

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

Mandat dodatnih sudaca Općeg suda koje treba imenovati na temelju članka 48. Protokola br. 3 o Statutu Suda Europske unije jest sljedeći:

Mandat dodatnih sudaca Općeg suda koje treba imenovati na temelju članka 48. Protokola br. 3 o Statutu Suda Europske unije jest sljedeći:

(a) Mandat šest od dvanaest dodatnih sudaca koje treba imenovati od … 4 završava 31. kolovoza 2016. Tih šest sudaca biraju se ždrijebom. Mandat ostalih šest sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2019.;

(a) Mandat šest od dvanaest dodatnih sudaca koje treba imenovati od … * završava 31. kolovoza 2016. Tih šest sudaca biraju se tako da vlade šest država članica 2016. godine imenuju po dva člana za djelomičnu izmjenu Općeg suda. Mandat ostalih šest sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2019.;

(b) Mandat triju od sedam dodatnih sudaca koje treba imenovati od 1. rujna 2016. završava 31. kolovoza 2019. Ta tri suca biraju se ždrijebom. Mandat ostalih četiriju sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2022.;

(b) Mandat triju od sedam dodatnih sudaca koje treba imenovati od 1. rujna 2016. završava 31. kolovoza 2019. Ta tri suca biraju se tako da vlade triju država članica 2019. godine imenuju po dva suca za djelomičnu izmjenu Općeg suda. Mandat ostalih četiriju sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2022.;

(c) Mandat četiriju od devet dodatnih sudaca odabranih ždrijebom koje treba imenovati od 1. rujna 2019. završava 31. kolovoza 2022. Ta četiri suca biraju se ždrijebom. Mandat ostalih pet sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2025.

(c) Mandat četiriju od devet dodatnih sudaca odabranih ždrijebom koje treba imenovati od 1. rujna 2019. završava 31. kolovoza 2022. Ta četiri suca biraju se tako da vlade četiriju država članica 2022. godine imenuju po dva suca za djelomičnu izmjenu Općeg suda. Mandat ostalih pet sudaca završava 31. kolovoza 2025.

__________________

__________________

4 SL: molimo umetnuti „1. rujna 2015.” ili datum stupanja na snagu ove Uredbe ako je taj datum nakon 1. rujna 2015.

* SL: umetnuti „1. rujna 2015.” ili datum stupanja na snagu ove Uredbe ako je taj datum nakon 1. rujna 2015.

Amandman    11

Stajalište Vijeća

Članak 2.a (novi)

Stajalište Vijeća

Izmjena

 

Članak 2.a

 

1. U roku od [pet godina od stupanja na snagu ove Uredbe] Sud sastavlja izvješće, uz pomoć vanjskog konzultanta, za Europski parlament, Vijeće i Komisiju o funkcioniranju Općeg suda.

 

U izvješću se posebna pažnja daje djelotvornosti Općeg suda, nužnosti i učinkovitosti povećanja broja njegovih sudaca na 56, upotrebi i učinkovitosti resursa i daljnjem osnivanju specijaliziranih vijeća i/ili drugim strukturnim promjenama.

 

U skladu s tim, Sud podnosi zakonodavne prijedloge za izmjenu svog Statuta.

 

2. U roku od [dvije godine od stupanja na snagu ove Uredbe] Sud za Parlament, Vijeće i Komisiju sastavlja izvješće o mogućim izmjenama za podjelu nadležnosti u vezi s odlukama o prethodnim pitanjima iz članka 267. Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije. Izvješće prate, gdje je to primjereno, zakonodavni prijedlozi.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Introductory note and explanatory statement

1 - In 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) launched a legislative initiative to change its status to allow the appointment of 12 more judges to the General Court (GC). It claimed at the time that there was a need to reduce both the number of cases per judge and their duration in the GC. In 2013, the CJEU reduced its request to nine judges, a figure that was agreed by the Council of the European Union (hereinafter the Council), the European Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP). Nevertheless, in the previous session, the EP had approved 12 additional judges at first reading. However, the Council never appointed any of these 12 judges, apparently because the Member States did not reach agreement on the choice of judges, since each wanted to appoint ‘its own’ judge and the number of judges to be appointed (12) did not match the number of nominating states (28). Therefore, in October 2014, the CJEU proposed doubling the number of GC judges (28 more) in three stages, and abolishing the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). The Council immediately agreed to these new proposals. This report deals with this new proposal.

2 - The first question to be addressed with regard to the CJEU proposal is establishing which issue it aims to address. It is necessary to establish whether this is a problem with the GC resulting from a shortage of judges, or whether it is rather an issue arising from the Council itself due to its inability to make a number of appointments that does not match the number of its members. In fact, it is inexplicable that only nine more judges were enough to solve the problems of the GC in 2013, while 28 more judges were suddenly required in 2014, as well as the abolition of another court. In other words, the GC requested another twelve judges, in 2011, it agreed that nine were sufficient in 2013 and it stated that 28 more judges are required after all in 2014, together with the abolition of a court. No one can, in good faith, believe that such a change in the number of judges has to do with the problem of outstanding GC cases. If there were 38 members of the Council, they would then request the same number of judges; if there were 21, they would choose that number. Obviously, the problem lies with the Council, which can only make a solution for the GC viable if that solution involves each Member States being able to appoint ‘its own’ judge, even when the resulting number of judges clearly exceeds the actual needs of the GC (see latest General Court statistics, in annex).

3 - The EP should, therefore, reject the Council’s position for a number of reasons. First, it shows deep contempt for European taxpayers’ money. At a time when the EU is imposing severe austerity measures to balance Member States’ budgets and calling on these states to reduce public spending, it makes no sense for the EU to increase spending so frivolously and would be poorly received by the European public. The proposed doubling of the judges would increase the related legal secretaries and assistants by over 100. Given that each office costs more than EUR 1 million a year to run, the total remuneration would require an increase in EU structural spending of more than EUR 20 million per year.

It is inexplicable that, while all the other institutions have agreed to reduce employee numbers by around 5 % and make cuts of around 0.5 % to their budgets, the CJEU should greatly increase its budget without any justification.

Another reason for the EP to reject the CJEU proposal has to do with the dignity of the judicial arm itself, particularly the prestige and respect due to the courts. In fact, the EU should not appoint judges in the way it appoints political commissioners. Judges are not commissioners from Member States and should not be appointed as such. Judges should be chosen for their technical and legal expertise, which guarantees the quality of decision-making, but they should also be chosen for the quality of their character to ensure probity, honesty, impartiality and resilience to any pressures to which they may be exposed. In short, they should be appointed for their courage and independence. Therefore, no judges should be re-nominated; they should be appointed for a single nine-year term instead. There is a very justifiable fear that a judge who could be re-nominated may be tempted to carry out their duties in such a way as to please those who appointed them and earn re-nomination. Even in this section on appointments, moreover, particular emphasis should be given to gender equality. It is incomprehensible that EU justice should be delivered predominantly by men. The number of male judges in the EU courts should be strictly equal to the number of female judges.

4 – Furthermore, the CJEU request is not a true legislative proposal, first and foremost because it was made via a simple letter in October 2014, addressed to the Italian Presidency of the Council. A letter is not the appropriate procedure for formalising a legislative initiative. Yet even if this procedure is deemed appropriate, the proposal should, because of its content, be considered a new legislative initiative and a completely new procedure should therefore be opened. In fact, what is now being discussed is not the appointment of 12 more judges, but rather the appointment of 28 judges and the abolition of a specialist court. In cases, such as this one, of legislative proposals with new content (since this is totally new and, therefore, has never before been considered), the procedural legality of the whole process is harmed (see the correspondence in annex regarding compliance with procedural obligations). Form is the sworn enemy of arbitrariness.

5 - Moreover, a reform of this nature – of the intended depth and scope – should be preceded by an impact study explaining to the co-legislators (Council and EP) its necessity, scope, costs and other consequences. Yet this study, although promised by the CJEU since 2011, has never been carried out. This legislative initiative therefore clearly lacks transparency, both internally and externally (again, see the correspondence in annex regarding compliance with procedural obligations).

In fact, the whole legislative process reveals that none of the bodies that should be consulted commented on the CJEU proposals (28 more judges and scrapping the CST). The EC itself only commented in 2011 (on the increase of 12 judges) and not even the judges of the two courts (GC and CST) directly affected by the proposal or their employees have been consulted. How, then, can a reform abolishing one court and increasing to over 28 the number of judges in the other be introduced, when a body that should automatically be heard on these proposals was only consulted regarding an increase of 12 judges and never commented on scrapping the Civil Service Tribunal? Can it be that a mere letter from the President of the CJEU was enough for a deferential Council and EP immediately to approve everything proposed – i.e. scrapping an EU court and doubling the number of judges in another court – without any objective analysis of all its implications, particularly the financial ones?

This legislative proposal, if approved, would set a very bad example because it would display a double standard. The EU is reserving the right to increase its spending unnecessarily, while imposing severe spending cuts on some Member States, including redundancies, and reductions in wages and other remuneration.

6 - However, beyond the inherent faults of the CJEU proposal, it would, if realised, have serious long-term consequences for the EU’s judicial system. Indeed, many of the elements in this proposal (court structure, financial impact) require a serious and impartial impact analysis and assessment, which have not taken place. There has not even been a cost/benefit analysis or any impact assessment. Conducting an external and independent study is a prerequisite for the legislator to be able to weigh up all the consequences of its statutes. Without this study, Parliament should not move forward with doubling the number of judges and scrapping the CST. Reforms like this should not be introduced through the back door.

It should be noted that the CST has been in existence for over 10 years and has always been seen as a judicial success story, even by the President of the CJEU himself. In addition, the EU Treaties provide for the creation of specialist courts, so it is inexplicable that the CST should now suddenly be abolished. Instead, the possibility of creating new specialist courts should be studied, in particular for trademarks and patents.

The CFEU itself suggests that the proposed abolition of the CST is due to an impasse in the Council on the appointment and re-nomination of its judges. In addition to the decision to double the GC’s judges, the reason for scrapping the CST is, once again, the Council’s inability to make appointments and not the workings of the court to be abolished. Since it cannot adapt to reality, the Council is trying to force reality to adapt to its ossified ways of working.

Scrapping the CST would, therefore, mean abandoning the system of specialist courts provided for in the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon, when it is widely known that specialist justice is better quality justice, not to mention the lack of a legal basis for the abolition of a court. The Treaty provides for the establishment of specialist courts, not their abolition.

7 - The figures provided by the CJEU on the outstanding GC cases and the average duration of these cases are contradicted by the figures provided by the President and by the GC judges during their hearing before the Legal Affairs Committee in Strasbourg, at the invitation of the rapporteur. Inexplicably, the Council completely ignored a GC document expressing the opposition to the reform proposed by the CJEU and the explanations given in Strasbourg, referring to facts and figures contradicting those presented by the CJEU (see the documentation in annex). The most elementary prudence would suggest that, since the two courts have presented mutually contradictory facts, it should be established which facts are correct and which are wrong before any decision is taken. Unfortunately, the Council did not take the precaution of this investigation and pushed foolhardily ahead with judicial reform. The legal community and the European public itself will hardly accept a decision to double the 28 GC judges when the GC judges themselves are against this increase and assert that only a few more officials would be enough to resolve the impasse. In any event, at present, the number of cases brought before the three courts has decreased because of the number of cases ruled on by those same courts. Therefore, the alleged urgency in doubling the number of judges does not exist.

It is worth reiterating that GC productivity has improved significantly since 2013, especially during 2014, without any new judge being appointed. This may be solely due to the hiring of nine new legal secretaries, who enabled the closure of more than 100 cases in 2014 alone. According to the GC’s own information, the number of cases ruled on in the first half of this year was higher than the number of new cases brought before it. Once again: the alleged urgency so often invoked by the CJEU no longer exists. A preferable solution would therefore be to appoint more staff at the Registry and in the translation services, as well as, above all, appointing 19 more legal secretaries, so that each judge would have one more legal secretary, taking account of the nine already appointed in 2014. This solution would significantly limit the fiscal impact of the proposed measure and would also be easily reversible (see documentation in annex).

8 - The issue of compensation for possible delays with GC decisions is pure smoke and mirrors because, for there to be a duty to compensate, it is necessary for (i) there to be actual harm, for (ii) it to derive from an unlawful act (action or omission) and (iii) be culpably practised, and for, between this fact and the harm, there to be (iv) adequate causality; this should all be alleged and proven by those claiming compensation. Judicial experience shows how difficult it is to make these claims. In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) itself takes the view that the right to compensation for delays in justice arises only when there is a delay of more than five years. As far as we know, on average, pending cases at the GC do not exceed this time: quite the opposite.

9 - It is surprising that a reform of this magnitude should be made without prior preparation and without weighing up the consequences across the board. How can the creation of over 100 highly paid jobs (judges, legal secretaries, assistants) be justified to the public, when it is certain that many of them, including judges, would soon end up becoming technically underemployed, since they would not have enough work? Knowing that each GC judge currently rules on an average of 25 cases a year (which is an average infinitely smaller than that of any high court in the Member States), is this new legislative proposal not an affront to the European taxpayer? Having reversed the growth in cases, how many rulings will each judge hand down annually? How will the public see the EU in terms of responsibility for this possible increase?

In the current situation, the CJEU is asking the co-legislator to reach a decision without any basis in fact or in law, and to adopt a costly solution that is very complex and difficult to reverse.

It is the duty of the co-legislator to adopt balanced measures in proportion to the challenges facing it, with deep respect for European taxpayers’ money. These measures have to be sustainable over the long-term.

The new legislative proposal could, if adopted, harm the architecture of European justice, the EU’s image and the way it spends European taxpayers’ money.

Under which terms the following have been formulated:

Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Rules 66(6) and 69(1) and (2)(a), (c) and (d), the rapporteur makes the following conclusions and recommendations:

1 - Rejection of the proposal to double the number of GC judges and abolish the Civil Service Tribunal and, pursuant to and for the purposes of Rule 69(2)(a) and (d), the position adopted by Parliament in its first reading should be recast. The Court of Justice should justify the exact number of judges actually required, taking into account the subsequent change in circumstances, namely the reversal of the growth in the number of new cases brought and ruled on.

2 - Rejection of the proposal to abolish the CST because of lack of legal basis in the Treaty. Instead, judges already appointed should immediately be sworn in and those missing should be appointed; a committee of experts should also be created to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of creating a new court specialising in trademarks, patents and intellectual property.

3 - Pursuant to and for the purposes of Rules of Procedure, Rule 69(2)(c) the appointment of 19 legal secretaries is recommended, so that each judge has one more legal secretary (taking account of the nine already appointed in 2014); this solution is already before the Court of Justice. Isto tako se preporučuje povećanje broja osoblja u tajništvu i u jezičnim službama.

4 - The establishment by Parliament and the Council of a joint committee of experts is recommended to analyse the overall workings of justice in the EU and make suggestions to improve it, taking into account, inter alia, the following aspects:

a) – The recruitment of judges through open tender from amongst law professors of repute and judges from the high courts of each Member State;

b) – The appointment of each judge for a term of nine years only, which cannot be renewed or extended.

c) – Absolute respect for gender parity in the recruitment of judges.

5 - Recommends that all EU courts now be scrutinised by the European Committee for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) on the same terms as the courts of the Member States of the Council of Europe.

Annexes: For a comprehensive understanding of the process, all documentation and correspondence exchanged regarding this case from the beginning of the parliament to date is in annex.

POSTUPAK U NADLEŽNOM ODBORU

Naslov

Prijedlog Uredbe Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o izmjeni Statuta Suda Europske unije povećanjem broja sudaca Općeg suda

Referentni dokumenti

09375/1/2015 – C8-0166/2015 – 2011/0901B(COD)

Datum 1. čitanja u EP-u – broj P

15.4.2014                     T7-0358/2014

Prijedlog Komisije

02074/2011 - C7-0126/2012

Datum objave primitka stajališta Vijeća u prvom čitanju na plenarnoj sjednici

9.7.2015

Nadležni odbor

       Datum objave na plenarnoj sjednici

JURI

9.7.2015

 

 

 

Izvjestitelji

       Datum imenovanja

António Marinho e Pinto

3.9.2014

 

 

 

Razmatranje u odboru

24.9.2014

11.11.2014

23.3.2015

14.7.2015

 

15.9.2015

 

 

 

Datum usvajanja

8.10.2015

 

 

 

Rezultat konačnog glasovanja

+:

–:

0:

18

5

0

Zastupnici nazočni na konačnom glasovanju

Joëlle Bergeron, Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Jean-Marie Cavada, Therese Comodini Cachia, Mady Delvaux, Laura Ferrara, Enrico Gasbarra, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Mary Honeyball, Dietmar Köster, Gilles Lebreton, António Marinho e Pinto, Jiří Maštálka, Julia Reda, József Szájer, Tadeusz Zwiefka

Zamjenici nazočni na konačnom glasovanju

Daniel Buda, Angel Dzhambazki, Jytte Guteland, Heidi Hautala, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Constance Le Grip, Stefano Maullu

Zamjenici nazočni na konačnom glasovanju prema čl. 200. st. 2.

Jarosław Wałęsa

Datum podnošenja

14.10.2015

(1)

Usvojeni tekstovi od 15.4.2014., P7_TA(2014)0358.

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