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*Plenary sitting*

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**A8-0087/2019**

26.2.2019

## **INTERIM REPORT**

on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund  
(COM(2017)0827 – C8-0000/2018 – 2017/0333R(APP))

Committee on Budgets  
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

Rapporteur: Vladimír Maňka, Pedro Silva Pereira

(Joint committee procedure – Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure)

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## MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

### **on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund (COM(2017)0827 – C8-0000/2018 – 2017/0333R(APP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund (COM(2017)0827),
- having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 5 July 2018 on proposals for reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
- having regard to the letter from the President of the Eurogroup to the President of the European Council of 25 June 2018 on further deepening of the EMU, and to the Euro Summit statement of 29 June 2018 on the European Stability Mechanism reform,
- having regard to the Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening of 4 December 2018,
- having regard to the Euro Summit statement of 14 December 2018,
- having regard to the joint position on future cooperation between the Commission and the ESM of 14 November 2018,
- having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 11 April 2018 on a proposal for a regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund<sup>3</sup>,
- having regard to Opinion No 2/2018 of the European Court of Auditors of 18 September 2018 on the audit and accountability considerations concerning the proposal of 6 December 2017 for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund within the Union legal framework,
- having regard to the Five Presidents' Report of 22 June 2015 on completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, to the Commission white paper of 1 March 2017 on the future of Europe, and to the Commission reflection paper of 31 May 2017 on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union,
- having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2013 on strengthening European democracy in

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 215.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 220, 25.6.2018, p. 2.

the future EMU<sup>1</sup>,

- having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries<sup>2</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2017 on budgetary capacity for the euro area<sup>3</sup>,
  - having regard to its resolution of 30 May 2018 on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and own resources<sup>4</sup>,
  - having regard to Rule 99(5) of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the interim report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0087/2019),
- A. whereas the introduction of the euro is one of the European project's most important political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU construction;
- B. whereas the financial and economic crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the urgent need for the swift deepening of the EMU and for the strengthening of its democratic accountability and transparency;
- C. whereas the euro provides EU citizens with protection and opportunities; whereas a strong and stable eurozone is essential for its members and for the EU as a whole;
- D. whereas membership of a common currency area requires adherence to common rules and obligations, such as those set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as common tools to respond to severe economic and financial shocks and for the promotion of responsibility, solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) provides for a clear connection with the European macroeconomic surveillance mechanisms, in particular compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, including its flexibility clauses, and the implementation of sustainable and inclusive structural reforms; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepening the EMU;
- E. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to strengthen the EMU and to provide financial assistance to several European

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 96.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 378, 9.11.2017, p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 252, 18.7.2018, p. 235.

<sup>4</sup> Texts adopted, P8\_TA(2018)0226.

countries affected by the crisis;

- F. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications for its decision-making process and, in particular, for its capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocks;
  - G. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project;
  - H. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, but also provides a good basis for an important first step towards strengthening its role, developing its financial tools and improving its efficiency and democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform; whereas the discussion on the deepening of the EMU should yield a political solution for reforming the ESM;
  - I. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute to the banking union, providing a proper common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF);
1. Welcomes the Commission proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the deepening of the EMU and the ESM reform; welcomes, in particular, the Commission proposal to integrate the ESM into the EU legal order;
  2. Notes that the functions to be exercised by the reformed ESM will belong to the realm of economic policy and that the name ‘European Monetary Fund’ might be misleading; notes that in its opinion of 11 April 2018, the ECB suggested that the successor of the ESM retain the name ‘ESM’; calls, in the light of the above, for the implications of the choice of a name for the reformed ESM to be properly and thoroughly evaluated, in order to ensure the least possible impact on the smooth functioning of the reformed ESM; suggests that the ESM retain its current name, which is recognised on the capital market, making it clear that the eurozone’s monetary policy remains the competence of the ECB;
  3. Highlights that the proper functioning of the EMU is supported by the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; notes, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis;
  4. Recalls its previous positions in favour of the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation should also take into account the role of national parliaments and continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate economic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament;

5. Underlines that if, in the future, EU budget resources are involved, Parliament should have the political power to exercise all applicable budgetary control rights over the ESM within the discharge procedure; notes that in such an event, the European Court of Auditors should be considered the independent external auditor and be given a clear and formal role in the discharge procedure;
6. Recalls the fiscal and democratic oversight prerogatives of national parliaments; considers that scrutiny over the reformed ESM by national parliaments and by the European Parliament should be further improved; believes that national parliaments should have the right to obtain information about the activities of the reformed ESM and to engage in a dialogue with the reformed ESM's Managing Director;
7. Notes that the Commission's proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM's institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthen and enforce democratic accountability of the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and convergence and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;
8. Underlines that the primary mission of the reformed ESM should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of specific conditionality agreed in adjustment programmes and taking into account the lessons learned from previous financial assistance programmes managed by the Commission, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ECB; stresses that the reformed ESM must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States;
9. Recalls that the range of financial instruments available for the ESM should be available and improved for the reformed ESM, including the possibility of providing sufficient precautionary financial assistance, enabling Member States to access assistance before they face major difficulties in raising funds in the capital market; defends that access to the precautionary conditioned credit line (PCCL) should be available on the basis of a letter of intent and subject to the applicable criteria; notes that these financial tools must be used to help Member States in the case of severe economic and financial shocks; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States can be complemented by a future budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness in order to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;
10. Underlines that the EMU comprises all the EU Member States, all of which, except Denmark and the United Kingdom, are required to adopt the euro and join the euro area, and that any ESM should therefore be open for participation to all EU Member States;
11. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the IMF;

12. Underlines that the reformed ESM should have its own expertise to produce and assess the elements required by its statute; stresses, however, that evaluation of the financial assistance requests made by the ESM, as well as its decision-making on the design of the adjustment programmes, in cooperation with other institutions, should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU's fiscal rules and regulations, which must remain the Commission's exclusive competence;
13. Believes that possible future adjustment programmes should take into account the social impact of the proposed measures, also compared with the long-term impact of no policy change, in the light of a previous and meaningful social impact assessment;
14. Highlights the need to ensure an efficient decision-making procedure in the reformed ESM, particularly in the case of urgent situations; calls, in this context, for an assessment of the current governance setting;
15. Calls for a swift ESM reform that also redefines its role, functions and financial tools, so that the reformed ESM can offer liquidity support in the case of resolution and serve as a fiscal backstop for the SRF; calls for the common backstop to be made operational as soon as possible, by 2020, subject to the agreed conditions, and, in any case, before 2024;
16. Underlines the risk arising from the delay in deepening the banking union; welcomes the conclusions of the Eurogroup report to Leaders on EMU deepening of 4 December 2018, which was endorsed, in all its elements, by the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018; welcomes, in particular, the bringing forward of the introduction of the common backstop to the SRF, provided that sufficient progress has been made in the area of risk reduction, to be assessed in 2020, and the endorsement of the term sheet on the ESM reform; recalls its previous position on the need to complete the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), recognising that risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand; notes that no immediate outcome as regards the future eurozone budget and the stabilisation function has been reached, but takes good note of the mandate to work on the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness; underlines that significant progress has been achieved in the area of risk reduction; recalls that Parliament has made substantial contributions to enabling this, in particular on the banking package and the prudential backstop for non-performing loans;
17. Proposes the establishment of a protocol for an interim Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) between the ESM and Parliament, with immediate effect, to improve interinstitutional dialogue and enhance the ESM's transparency and accountability, specifying the rights of Parliament and its Members as regards questions put to the reformed ESM, regular hearings, nomination rights and appropriate budgetary control rights; recalls its request for an interinstitutional arrangement for economic governance; stresses that the Managing Director of the reformed ESM should be elected by and report to the European Parliament, following a proposal by the Council; urges that gender balance be ensured in the composition of the reformed ESM governing bodies;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Council, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank, the Managing Director of the European Stability Mechanism, and the governments and

parliaments of the Member States.

17.1.2019

## **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL**

for the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on the proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund (COM(2017)0827 – 2017/0333R(APP))

Rapporteur for opinion: Cătălin Sorin Ivan

PA\_Consent\_Interim

### **SUGGESTIONS**

The Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committees responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its report:

- A. whereas the conditions and channels of accountability have to be clearly defined when setting up the new European Monetary Fund (EMF);
  - B. whereas transparency is a key component of good governance both at the level of decision-making and in the implementation of institutional decisions;
  - C. whereas the parliamentary dimension of the future EMF should be clearly ensured by mirroring current practices at the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank, with parliamentary networks or dialogues;
  - D. whereas INTOSAI guidance for good governance should be referred to when external audit arrangements are at stake;
  - E. whereas Member States and national authorities cannot address on their own the systemic risks generated by a Member State to the financial stability of the Union;
1. Welcomes the new set of measures proposed by the Commission to complete the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in line with Parliament's longstanding position on the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework; considers that each of the three pillars of the Banking Union should deepen the global financial architecture;
  2. Welcomes the transformation of the eurozone's ESM rescue fund into a European

Monetary Fund (EMF) within the Union legal framework, this institutional anchoring constituting a key step in the evolution of the overall reform and deepening of the EMU;

3. Notes that the use of the Community method in this proposal is a strong driver for reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process and EU integration;
4. Considers that this evolution will present the opportunity to design a robust accountability framework with enhanced parliamentary oversight based on external audit review and opinions;
5. Recalls that any further development within the Union architecture in relation to the creation of a new institution should always take into account the issues of EU democratic accountability and political oversight with enhanced transparency, clear public auditing provisions (including all public audit dimensions i.e. financial, compliance and performance components) and the efficiency of activities; believes that the combination of those elements will contribute to strengthening the parliamentary legitimacy of EU economic governance;
6. Stresses that, as regards the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Court of Auditors does not currently have well-established audit rights and that there is no formal accountability to Parliament;
7. Emphasises that Parliament's views should be listened to as the new EMF will deal with issues impacting EU or global governance and affecting European citizens; considers further that European national parliaments should be part of the chain of accountability when EU Member State policies will be at stake;
8. Considers that, with regard to the public dimension and impact of the future EMF, assurance should be provided by public auditors, with the European Court of Auditors being given a clear role in the discharge procedure of the EMF in accordance with Article 287 of the TFEU;
9. Suggests that the EMF be tasked with evaluating and making recommendations on the implementation of the Union fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the current fiscal stance in the euro area and at national level, so as to ensure independent assessments of the Member States' budgets and economic forecasts;
10. Asks that the Commission proposal include a clear provision that the European Court of Auditors is the external auditor of the EMF, with an explicit definition of its rights;
11. Calls for Parliament to be given an active role in the process of appointing the managing director of the EMF and ensuring his or her accountability, namely through the obligation to report annually to Parliament;
12. Considers that, like all other EU institutions and bodies, the EMF should report regularly to Parliament and be subject to regular oversight and assessment of its activities with regard to sound financial management;
13. Calls for the exchange and flows of information between Parliament and the future

EMF to be clearly defined through a Memorandum of Understanding.

## PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

<b>Title</b>	Establishment of the European Monetary Fund
<b>References</b>	2017/0333R(APP)
<b>Committees responsible</b>	BUDG                      ECON
<b>Opinion by</b> Date announced in plenary	CONT 5.7.2018
<b>Rapporteur</b> Date appointed	Cătălin Sorin Ivan 9.10.2018
<b>Date adopted</b>	13.12.2018
<b>Result of final vote</b>	+:                      18 -:                      4 0:                      0
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Nedzhmi Ali, Inés Ayala Sender, Jonathan Bullock, Dennis de Jong, Tamás Deutsch, Martina Dlabajová, Luke Ming Flanagan, Ingeborg Gräßle, Arndt Kohn, Georgi Pirinski, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Petri Sarvamaa, Claudia Schmidt, Bart Staes, Marco Valli, Derek Vaughan, Joachim Zeller
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Caterina Chinnici, Benedek Jávor, Marian-Jean Marinescu, Péter Niedermüller
<b>Substitutes under Rule 200(2) present for the final vote</b>	Henna Virkkunen

## FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

18	+
ALDE	Nedzhmi Ali, Martina Dlabajová
PPE	Tamás Deutsch, Ingeborg Gräßle, Marian-Jean Marinescu, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Petri Sarvamaa, Claudia Schmidt, Henna Virkkunen, Joachim Zeller
S&D	Inés Ayala Sender, Caterina Chinnici, Arndt Kohn, Péter Niedermüller, Georgi Pirinski, Derek Vaughan
VERTS/ALE	Benedek Jávor, Bart Staes

4	-
EFDD	Jonathan Bullock, Marco Valli
GUE/NGL	Luke Ming Flanagan, Dennis de Jong

0	0

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention

23.1.2019

## **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS**

for the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

on the proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund  
(COM(2017)0827 – C8 – 2017/0333R(APP))

Rapporteur for opinion: Danuta Maria Hübner

PA\_Consent\_Interim

### **SUGGESTIONS**

The Committee on Constitutional Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committees responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into their report:

1. Welcomes the proposal for the integration of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) into the EU legal order; recalls that such integration must be accompanied by appropriate democratic accountability; notes that only such integration will ensure the management thereof in accordance with the Community method, enable consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitate fiscal and economic policy coordination and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliament; recalls that the competences of the successor of the ESM should in no way replace, duplicate or overlap with the normal macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance provided for in the EU's financial rules and regulations, which must remain the exclusive competence of the Commission, while respecting the autonomy of the successor of the ESM;
2. Notes that the functions to be exercised by the successor of the ESM will belong to the realm of economic policy, and that use of the name 'European Monetary Fund' (EMF) might be misleading in that respect; further notes that the successor of the ESM will perform tasks going way beyond those of a mere paybox; notes that, in its opinion, the European Central Bank (ECB) suggested that the successor of the ESM retain the name 'ESM'; notes that the acronym ESF entails a risk of confusion between a future European Stability Fund and the European Social Fund; in light of the above, calls for the implications of the choice of a name for the successor of the European Stability Mechanism to be properly and thoroughly evaluated before such a decision is taken;

3. Recalls that monetary policy in the Union is an exclusive competence of the ECB;
4. Believes that, taking into account the whole institutional set-up of the EU and of the Euro area, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) system should not be transposed wholesale into the EU legal framework;
5. Recalls that the Commission proposal provides for the establishment of the successor of the ESM as an EU body, which makes the ESM accountable to the European Parliament and the Council and subject to judicial control by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU); takes note of the proposed provisions regarding the accountability of the future successor of the ESM;
6. Believes that the relevant accountability framework for the future successor of the ESM should refer to economic governance as a whole; recalls the request made by this Parliament for an interinstitutional arrangement in this field;
7. Believes that any provisional arrangement concluded between the European Parliament and the successor of the ESM would send out a signal that increases the autonomy of the latter when the strong position of Parliament is that it should, as proposed by the Commission, be integrated into the Treaty and the EU legal order;
8. Requests that the European Parliament be informed immediately and in an appropriate manner of the decisions that have been taken by the successor of the ESM and approved by the Council; urges the future Managing Director of the successor of the ESM to hold transparent and regular dialogue with the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament;
9. Stresses that complete, accurate and timely information is a prerequisite for proper accountability; insists therefore, that the highest standard of transparency and accountability be laid down in the future interinstitutional agreement between the successor of the ESM and the European Parliament regarding the decisions of the successor of the ESM, the background of such decisions, access to the documents of the successor of the ESM and the records of its discussions;
10. Emphasises the need for the democratic accountability of the future Board of Directors of the successor of the ESM; regrets the lack of institutional involvement in the proposed selection procedure for its members and calls for the inclusion of the European Parliament and the European Council in the decision on their appointment;
11. Requests that the European Court of Auditors be given a clear and formal role in the discharge procedure of the successor of the ESM, and that the associated reports should be examined by the European Parliament;
12. Calls for efforts to ensure gender balance in the composition of the governing bodies of the successor of the ESM and in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Managing Director;
13. Understands the need for the Member States to be involved in the decision-making procedures that have an impact on fiscal resources; stresses, however, that the successor of the ESM is an instrument for crisis management, and should therefore be able to act

swiftly; calls for the right balance to be struck between, on the one hand, ensuring democratic control of the successor of the ESM and its accountability to the participating Member States and, on the other hand, the need to enable the requisite actions to be taken quickly; recognises the budgetary powers of national parliaments and takes note of the provisions that ensure the transparency of the successor of the ESM and its accountability to the national parliaments of the ESM members and those of the other participating Member States;

14. Calls for a meaningful ESM reform to be initiated in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future; notes that such reform should focus on strengthening the EMU and improving the decision-making procedure, especially in urgent situations;
15. Notes that both the inclusion of the ESM and the introduction of the successor of the ESM change the institutional architecture of the EU; calls therefore for the matter to be incorporated into the wider discussions on the possible future revision of the Treaties.

## PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

<b>Title</b>	Establishment of the European Monetary Fund
<b>References</b>	2017/0333R(APP)
<b>Committees responsible</b>	BUDG                      ECON
<b>Opinion by</b> Date announced in plenary	AFCO 13.9.2018
<b>Rapporteur</b> Date appointed	Danuta Maria Hübner 24.9.2018
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	6.12.2018
<b>Date adopted</b>	22.1.2019
<b>Result of final vote</b>	+:                      15 –:                      4 0:                      3
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Gerolf Annemans, Mercedes Bresso, Pascal Durand, Esteban González Pons, Danuta Maria Hübner, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Alain Lamassoure, Jo Leinen, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Markus Pieper, Paulo Rangel, Helmut Scholz, György Schöpflin, Pedro Silva Pereira, Barbara Spinelli, Josep-Maria Terricabras, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Pervenche Berès, Ashley Fox, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann
<b>Substitutes under Rule 200(2) present for the final vote</b>	Michael Gahler, Jarosław Wałęsa

## FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

15	+
ALDE	Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz
NI	Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski
PPE	Michael Gahler, Esteban González Pons, Danuta Maria Hübner, Alain Lamassoure, Paulo Rangel, György Schöpflin, Jarosław Wałęsa
S&D	Pervenche Berès, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Jo Leinen, Pedro Silva Pereira

4	-
ECR	Ashley Fox
ENF	Gerolf Annemans
VERTS/ALE	Pascal Durand, Josep-Maria Terricabras

3	0
GUE/NGL	Helmut Scholz, Barbara Spinelli
PPE	Markus Pieper

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention

## PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

<b>Title</b>	Establishment of the European Monetary Fund	
<b>References</b>	2017/0333R(APP)	
<b>Date of consultation / request for consent</b>	27.6.2018	
<b>Committees responsible</b> Date announced in plenary	BUDG 5.7.2018	ECON 5.7.2018
<b>Committees asked for opinions</b> Date announced in plenary	CONT 5.7.2018	AFCO 13.9.2018
<b>Rapporteurs</b> Date appointed	Vladimír Maňka 5.7.2018	Pedro Silva Pereira 5.7.2018
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	26.11.2018	29.1.2019
<b>Date adopted</b>	20.2.2019	
<b>Result of final vote</b>	+: –: 0:	59 25 0
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Jonathan Arnott, Hugues Bayet, Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge, Thierry Cornillet, Esther de Lange, Gérard Deprez, André Elissen, Markus Ferber, José Manuel Fernandes, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Stefan Gehrold, Sven Giegold, Neena Gill, Esteban González Pons, Brian Hayes, Iris Hoffmann, Monika Hohlmeier, Gunnar Hökmark, John Howarth, Danuta Maria Hübner, Petr Ježek, Wolf Klinz, Bernd Kölmel, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Georgios Kyrtos, Philippe Lamberts, Olle Ludvigsson, Vladimír Maňka, Marisa Matias, Costas Mavrides, Alex Mayer, Bernard Monot, Siegfried Mureşan, Luděk Niedermayer, Liadh Ní Riada, Jan Olbrycht, Ralph Packet, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Răzvan Popa, Dariusz Rosati, Alfred Sant, Pedro Silva Pereira, Jordi Solé, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Patricija Šulin, Kay Swinburne, Eleftherios Synadinos, Isabelle Thomas, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Inese Vaidere, Marco Valli, Monika Vana, Daniele Viotti, Marco Zanni	
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Xabier Benito Ziluaga, Matt Carthy, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Ashley Fox, Karine Gloanec Maurin, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Danuta Jazłowiecka, Janusz Lewandowski, Aleksejs Loskutovs, Thomas Mann, Jörg Meuthen, Michel Reimon, Andreas Schwab, Joachim Starbatty, Lieve Wierinck, Auke Zijlstra	
<b>Substitutes under Rule 200(2) present for the final vote</b>	Ole Christensen, Santiago Fisas Ayxelà, Sylvie Guillaume, Esther Herranz García, Agnes Jongerius, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Jo Leinen, Marian-Jean Marinescu, Josep-Maria Terricabras, Henna Virkkunen	
<b>Date tabled</b>	26.2.2019	

## FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

59	+
ALDE	Thierry Cornillet, Gérard Deprez, Petr Ježek, Wolf Klinz, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Lieve Wierinck
ECR	Zbigniew Kuźmiuk
PPE	Reimer Böge, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Markus Ferber, José Manuel Fernandes, Santiago Fisas Ayxelà, Stefan Gehrold, Esteban González Pons, Brian Hayes, Esther Herranz García, Monika Hohlmeier, Gunnar Hökmark, Danuta Maria Hübner, Danuta Jazłowiecka, Georgios Kyrtos, Esther de Lange, Janusz Lewandowski, Aleksejs Loskutovs, Thomas Mann, Marian-Jean Marinescu, Siegfried Mureșan, Luděk Niedermayer, Jan Olbrycht, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Dariusz Rosati, Andreas Schwab, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Patricija Šulin, Inese Vaidere, Henna Virkkunen
S&D	Hugues Bayet, Pervenche Berès, Ole Christensen, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Neena Gill, Karine Gloanec Maurin, Sylvie Guillaume, Iris Hoffmann, John Howarth, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Agnes Jongerius, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Jo Leinen, Olle Ludvigsson, Vladimír Maňka, Costas Mavrides, Alex Mayer, Răzvan Popa, Alfred Sant, Pedro Silva Pereira, Isabelle Thomas, Daniele Viotti

25	-
ECR	Ashley Fox, Bernd Kölmel, Ralph Packet, Joachim Starbatty, Kay Swinburne
EFDD	Jonathan Arnott, Jörg Meuthen, Bernard Monot, Marco Valli
ENF	André Elissen, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Marco Zanni, Auke Zijlstra
GUE/NGL	Xabier Benito Ziluaga, Matt Carthy, Marisa Matias, Liadh Ní Riada, Dimitrios Papadimoulis
NI	Eleftherios Synadinos
VERTS/ALE	Sven Giegold, Philippe Lamberts, Michel Reimon, Jordi Solé, Josep-Maria Terricabras, Monika Vana

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Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

- : against

0 : abstention