



2014/2248(INI)

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AMENDMENTS

339 - 685

Draft report

Guy Verhofstadt

(PE585.741v01-00)

Possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union
(2014/2248(INI))

Document 1: AM 1- 338 (PE 592.234)

Document 2: AM 339 - 685 (PE 592.235)

Document 3: AM 686 - 1039 (PE 592.348)

Amendment 339
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. *Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;*

Amendment

6. *Proposes a fundamental review of the Treaty so that decisions and accountability take place as close to the citizens as possible in harmony with the principle of subsidiarity.*

Or. sv

Amendment 340
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. *Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;*

Amendment

6. *Deplores that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; this not only leads to less cohesive effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control and of well-*

reflected solidarity-based choices in the economic and political spheres;

Or. en

Amendment 341
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; ***this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;***

Amendment

6. Notes that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties;

Or. el

Amendment 342
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Notes that the ***fracturing*** process of ‘variable geometry’ ***has found its way into*** the European decision-making process ***every time*** the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; ***this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability***

Amendment

6. Notes that the process of ‘variable geometry’ ***is sometimes present during*** the European decision-making process, ***often when*** the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties;

and control;

Or. en

Amendment 343
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Notes that the ***fracturing*** process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods ***and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;***

Amendment

6. Notes that the process of ‘variable geometry’, ***which*** has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods, ***complies with the ‘United in Diversity’ principle, because only intergovernmental methods do justice to the diversity of the Member States and make it possible for them to co-exist as good neighbours;***

Or. de

Amendment 344
Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Notes ***that the fracturing process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process*** every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability

Amendment

6. Notes every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ (***‘Community method’***) as defined in the Treaties; this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;

and control;

Or. en

Amendment 345
György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

Motion for a resolution

6. Notes that the ***fracturing*** process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ ***as defined*** in the Treaties; ***this not only leads to less effective policy-making but also contributes to a growing lack of transparency, democratic accountability and control;***

Amendment

6. Notes that the ***flexible*** process of ‘variable geometry’ has found its way into the European decision-making process every time the European Council decides to apply intergovernmental methods and to bypass the ‘Union method’ ***albeit undefined*** in the Treaties ***and accepts this as a viable method of European governance;***

Or. en

Amendment 346
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

6a. Believes that the Treaty amendment shall strengthen the yellow card so that it can function in practice; the limit for how many parliaments need to protest needs to be lowered; believes that the influence of national parliaments in the EU’s legislation process must increase; the national parliaments should receive more influence over how the member countries act in the Council and have the same rights as the European

Amendment

Parliament to add proposals; believes that it should be easier to review bad decisions by extended use of ‘sunset paragraphs’ which entail that EU legislation must be reaffirmed or renegotiated after a number of years;

Or. sv

Amendment 347
Esther De Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6a. States that good cooperation between Member States is of great importance and that it must remain possible for Member States to seek closer cooperation in lesser matters where cooperation with all Member States is not a political possibility;

Or. nl

Amendment 348
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6a. Notes that rule-of-law structures, economic prosperity and a stable, performance-focused social system fall within the national responsibility of the Member States;

Or. de

Amendment 349
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6b. *Notes that policy in the Union is characterised by a creeping loss of democracy and that the Union has become an undemocratic construct, whose policy is shaped by bureaucracies without democratic controls; calls, therefore, for major reforms to the Union, so that the Member States can become the leading lights of freedom and democracy in the world once again;*

Or. de

Amendment 350
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ ***is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account***; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ ***for legislating serves European interests, also notes that the process of ‘variable geometry’ serves the common Member States interests, and that both are important in the decision making process of the EU***; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; ***understands ‘variable geometry’ is the practice where different parts of the European Union integrate at different levels and pace depending on the political situation of each individual country***;

further understands this to be necessary as the Union is not a homogeneous state, but a Union of sovereign nations that share a common European identity, culture, and history, but are also united in their diversity;

Or. en

Amendment 351
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; *would like to see the European Parliament, in its capacity as the only body elected directly by citizens, granted the power of initiative, with a view to reforming this method as part of a wider revision of the Treaties along the lines of national systems for legislative assemblies;*

Or. it

Amendment 352
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. ***Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands*** by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. ***Understands*** by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. de

Amendment 353
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control; ***recognizes that a fast-track procedure should be put in place to ensure that even in cases of urgency the ‘Union method’ is respected;***

Or. en

Amendment 354
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ **that** the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ **the legislative procedure in which** the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, **the** Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, **while unanimity obligations become the absolute exceptions**, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. en

Amendment 355
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is **the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account**; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘**current** Union method’ is **outmoded and deeply undemocratic**; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. el

Amendment 356
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission **as part of its competence** as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. de

Amendment 357
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the **only** method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are **formally** taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the **Member States** decide **in co-decision** by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. en

Amendment 358
György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is **not** the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. en

Amendment 359
Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate **judicial** control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate **procedural** control;

Or. el

Amendment 360

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that **all interests, especially** the common European interest, **are taken into account**; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only **democratic** method for legislating which ensures that the common European interest **prevails**; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by majority voting, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. en

Amendment 361

Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 7

Motion for a resolution

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by **majority voting**, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Amendment

7. Considers that the ‘Union method’ is the only method for legislating which ensures that all interests, especially the common European interest, are taken into account; understands by ‘Union method’ that the Commission as the executive initiates legislation, Parliament and the Council representing respectively the citizens and the states decide by **unanimity**, and the Court of Justice oversees and provides ultimate judicial control;

Or. en

Amendment 362
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7a. Considers for these purposes that the European Commission should apply the provisions which scrap the format of one commissioner per Member State and adopt an organigram which favours effectiveness and efficiency and streamlines the working areas of the community portfolio holders. The provisions laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union may be used as a basis in that regard;

Or. es

Amendment 363
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7a. Underlines the fundamental importance of complying with European law by Member States, and considers that its correct implementation must be more thoroughly enforced and surveilled by the Commission and the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 364
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

7a. *Calls for a flexible network in which every Member State can participate as much as possible;*

Or. de

Amendment 365
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8. *Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 366
György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the

European Union;

European Union; *not least by seeking inputs from all the diverse voices to be found in Europe and taking these fully into account in order to enhance the legitimacy of the European project;*

Or. en

Amendment 367
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. *Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;*

Amendment

8. *Reaffirms the mission of a union among the peoples of Europe that celebrates and respects similarities as well as unique individualities, one that respects Member States and the wishes of their citizens, one that pursues a social and caring Europe, only through this can we work more harmoniously in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;*

Or. en

Amendment 368
Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards

Amendment

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances *not only* to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards

disintegration *and* to clarify *once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature*, of the *European Union*;

disintegration, *but also* to clarify *the substantial meaning of such formula, whose purpose should be that of providing the European Union of a constitution framework underwritten by its peoples and not only by the heads of State and Government* of the *Member States*;

Or. en

Amendment 369
Barbara Spinelli

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration *and* to clarify *once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature*, of the *European Union*;

Amendment

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances *not only* to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration, *but also* to clarify *the substantial meaning of such formula, whose purpose should be that of providing the European Union of a real constitution underwritten by its peoples and not only by the heads of State and Government* of the *Member States*;

Or. en

Amendment 370
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Considers it essential *in these circumstances* to reaffirm *the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to*

Amendment

8. Considers it essential to reaffirm *that the peoples of Europe have a right to steer their own future and that the wording of an ‘ever closer union’ (Article*

mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;

1 TEU) does not intend to limit the freedom of choice and political rights of the citizens;

Or. sv

Amendment 371

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. *Considers it essential in these circumstances to reaffirm the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;*

Amendment

8. In order to mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and *with a view to redefining* the moral, political and historical purpose of the European Union, *as well as its constitutional nature, considers that the method of decision-making within the European Union must change radically;*

Or. el

Amendment 372

Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8

Motion for a resolution

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to *reaffirm* the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to *mitigate any tendency towards disintegration and to clarify once more the moral, political and historical purpose, as well as the constitutional nature, of the European Union;*

Amendment

8. Considers it essential in these circumstances to *consider and reassess* the mission of an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Article 1 TEU) in order to *make it possible for the Member States to guarantee the freedom and safety of their citizens, support their citizens’ well-being and contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Europe;*

Amendment 373
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. Stresses that all the meaning of the founding expression “Peoples of Europe” should be revived and that a discussion should be held on the influence that territorial tensions in the Member States exert with regard to the shift in mood towards disintegration. It is not easy that those who have not managed to integrate their own minorities into society in their own country may bring stability to the European project;

Or. es

Amendment 374
Dennis de Jong

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. Stresses that changes to treaties or proposals for enlargement of the European Union not only require approval from national parliaments, but, depending on national arrangements, sometimes need to be put to citizens via a referendum;

Or. nl

Amendment 375

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8a. Suggests to render the requirements for establishing enhanced and structured cooperation less restrictive, inter alia by lowering the minimum number of participating Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 376

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 8 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

8b. For those purposes, and in line with the contents of the ‘Strasbourg Manifesto’, signed by many MEPs who represent the traditional national minorities to which more than 70 million Europeans, calls on the EU institutions to play a more active role in the resolution of such political tension when the disputes take the Member States to a point of no return. An arbitration system to resolve such political conflicts without taking them to court should be included in the reforms to the Union. The basis for the arbitration should be built on frameworks applied at international level in situations of this type and should encourage the principle that the parties to the dispute may neither hinder the debate or the free expression of that debate nor unilaterally impose a position or solution, in accordance with the principles of Canada’s ‘Clarity Act’;

Amendment 377
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. *Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;* **deleted**

Or. de

Amendment 378
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. *Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 379
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. *Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 380

Diane James

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. *Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 381

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions *or, if this is not possible, that it should at least grant all Member States the same powers and rights with a view to*

making them fully equal to one another;

Or. it

Amendment 382

Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should *rationalise* the current *disorderly* ‘variable geometry’, *i.e.* ‘*l’Europe à la carte*’, *by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;*

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should *strengthen* the current ‘variable geometry’ *with the aim of improving the Union;*

Or. sv

Amendment 383

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current *disorderly* ‘variable geometry’, *i.e.* ‘*l’Europe à la carte*’, *by ending the disruptive practice of* opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise *across the board* the current ‘variable geometry’, *and* opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. el

Amendment 384

Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;**

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **assess if these treaties are still fit for purpose in these testing times and if there are short fallings that dialogue needs to be started on those issues and how we, as a Union of equals, can address them;**

Or. en

Amendment 385

Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Mercedes Bresso, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;**

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **put an end to opt-outs by individual Member States on the level of EU primary law;**

Or. en

Amendment 386

György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, **by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;**

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’;

Amendment 387

David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly '*variable geometry*', *i.e.* '*l'Europe à la carte*', by ending the *disruptive* practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly *distinctions* by ending the practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. de

Amendment 388

Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly 'variable geometry', *i.e.* '*l'Europe à la carte*', by ending the *disruptive* practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly 'variable geometry' by ending the practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. de

Amendment 389

Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by **ending** the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by **reconsidering** the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. el

Amendment 390

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **rationalise** the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should **reorganise** the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. en

Amendment 391

Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 9

Motion for a resolution

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, **i.e. ‘l’Europe à la carte’**, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Amendment

9. Proposes that the next revision of the Treaties should rationalise the current disorderly ‘variable geometry’, by ending the disruptive practice of opt-outs, opt-ins and exceptions;

Or. en

Amendment 392
Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9a. Considers that the scope of the future institutions, policies and instruments of the EMU as defined in the new Treaty should be applicable to all Member States, except where specific derogations or transitional periods for some Member States are deemed necessary or justified, and on an exceptional and temporary basis;

Or. en

Amendment 393
Dennis de Jong

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9a. Stresses that Member States themselves must look at public services such as social housing, care, water, electricity, public transport, Internet and education and all other core functions that citizens consider to be of general interest;

Or. nl

Amendment 394
Dennis de Jong

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9b. *Considers it essential in order to counter social dumping that Member States be able to regulate their own labour market, even if this means a temporary suspension of the free movement of workers in states of emergency; stresses that Member States themselves must see to controls in the work place to combat illegal and exploitative labour practices;*

Or. nl

Amendment 395
Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

9b. *Takes the view that the new treaty should provide for adequate mechanisms, under the responsibility of the Commission, in order to: ensure the consistency of all European policies, preserve the integrity of the single market and prevent discrimination against those Member States which are not yet euro area members;*

Or. en

Amendment 396
Diane James

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. *Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of 'associate* ~~*deleted*~~

status' could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Or. en

Amendment 397
György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of 'associate status' could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 398
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of 'associate status' could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

deleted

Amendment 399

Jo Leinen, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

deleted

Amendment 400

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights ***which should incorporate obligations in areas such as financing the EU institutions, fiscal discipline and coordination commitments, adherence to the rules on the functioning of the single market and competence, along with accelerated mechanisms for the full integration of interested states from the***

Amendment 401

Mercedes Bresso, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of *these multiple derogations*, a type of ‘*associate status*’ could be proposed to *those states in the periphery* that only want to participate *on the sideline*, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this *status* should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of *individual opt-outs*, a new type of *membership* could be proposed to states that only want to participate in some specific Union policies; this *kind of membership with a limited involvement in the decision-making process* should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights, *as for example a contribution to the EU budget and the respect of the Union’s fundamental values and the four freedoms*;

Amendment 402

Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda, Viviane Reding, Constance Le Grip, Alain Lamassoure

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, *a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline*, i.e. in some specific Union policies; *this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights*;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, *an instrument or even a status should be developed in order to set up a ring of partners around the EU for countries who cannot yet or will not join the Union*;

Amendment 403

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states *in the periphery* that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights, *first of all the adherence to the rule of law and free movement of people*;

Or. en

Amendment 404

David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘*associate status*’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; *this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights*;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of status *which needs to be defined in more detail* could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies;

Or. de

Amendment 405
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, *instead of the multiple derogations currently in effect*, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

10. Recommends that a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states in the periphery that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Or. de

Amendment 406
Andrey Kovatchev

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states *in the periphery*, that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Amendment

10. Recommends that, instead of these multiple derogations, a type of ‘associate status’ could be proposed to those states that only want to participate on the sideline, i.e. in some specific Union policies; this status should be accompanied by obligations corresponding to the associated rights;

Or. bg

Amendment 407
Viviane Reding

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10a. *Believes that the best set-up for a future-proof European Union would consist of open concentric circles with an inner circle of Member States sharing all Union policies, a second circle of Member States sharing not all Union policies, surrounded by a ring of friends with whom the Member States may share anything but institutions;*

Or. en

Amendment 408

Paulo Rangel, Constance Le Grip, Alain Lamassoure

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10a. *Considers that the possibility of differentiated integration should be left open for all Member States, if they are able and willing to advance with the Union's common objectives; notes, however, that such differentiated integration should only vary in its timescale, so as to ensure a clear and uniform implementation of the Treaties;*

Or. en

Amendment 409

Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda, Viviane Reding, Constance Le Grip, Alain Lamassoure

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 10 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10b. *The single institutional framework*

should be preserved and any form of flexibility should aim to achieve the Union's common objectives, without undermining the principle of equality of all citizens and Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 410

Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of 'associate status' could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 411

György Schöpflin

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of 'associate status' could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that

deleted

this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 412
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. *Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

Amendment

11. *Believes that the European Parliament should respect the will of the majority of the citizens of Great Britain to leave the EU and that they should be given a fair agreement which benefits both parties;*

Or. sv

Amendment 413
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. *Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United*

Amendment

11. *Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could be a good basis for a mutually beneficial cooperation between the United Kingdom and the EU that*

Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

would promote Europe's security;

Or. pl

Amendment 414

Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda, Viviane Reding, Constance Le Grip, Alain Lamassoure

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that *this new type of 'associate status'* could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; *stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

Amendment

11. Notes that *the new instrument or status* could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 415 **Mercedes Bresso**

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of *'associate status'* could also be one of the

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of *membership* could also be one of the

possible outcomes to respect the will of *the* majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; *stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

possible outcomes to respect the will of *a narrow* majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU;

Or. en

Amendment 416
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that *this wish must be respected, given that* the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – *a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union;

Or. de

Amendment 417
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that *this new type of*

Amendment

11. Notes that *the vote* of the *United*

'associate status' could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Kingdom to leave the EU does not represent all regions who voted; the majority decision to leave the EU must be respected, as must the wishes of the people in certain regions who voted to remain in the EU, stresses that the vote of the people in the north of Ireland and Scotland must be respected under the principle of consent;

Or. en

Amendment 418

David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of *'associate status'* could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – *a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of status could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union;

Or. de

Amendment 419

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties, ***with the interests of citizens and democracy as the watchwords***;

Or. el

Amendment 420
Richard Corbett

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the ***citizens of*** the United Kingdom to leave the EU; ***stresses that this wish must be respected, given*** that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the ***those who voted in the recent referendum in*** the United Kingdom to leave the EU; ***while taking account of the 48.1% who wished to remain in it; notes*** that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 421

Diane James

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. *Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;*

Amendment

11. *Stresses that the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties, and the subsequent dissolution of the Union;*

Or. en

Amendment 422

Barbara Spinelli

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could *also* be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment

11. Notes that this new type of ‘associate status’ could be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 423
Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

Motion for a resolution

11. Notes that this *new type of* ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Amendment

11. Notes that this ‘associate status’ could also be one of the possible outcomes to respect the will of the majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the EU; stresses that this wish must be respected, given that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, as one of the larger Member States, and as the largest non-euro-area member, affects the strength and the institutional balance of the Union – a new situation that adds to the need for revision of the Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 424
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

11a. Stresses the need to follow closely political and institutional developments in countries such as Scotland which have clearly expressed their wish to remain in the Union. Considers that on the basis that it had already expressed that wish in a legal and democratic referendum, an accelerated integration mechanism for that country should be established, and the mechanism should start with the automatic acquisition of Associate State, to which the veto principle normally used for ordinary candidates seeking to join the Union should not apply;

Amendment

Or. es

Amendment 425
Barbara Spinelli

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11a. Notes and respects the fact that the people of the Northern Ireland and Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU; believes that an accommodation should be found whereby Northern Ireland maintains its membership of the European Union; calls on the EU to continue to proactively support the peace process in Ireland and to provide for its continuation in any negotiations on British withdrawal; stresses that an accommodation should also be found as far as Scotland is concerned if its citizens express a desire in this direction;

Or. en

Amendment 426
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11a. Believes that the EU should work towards helping Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar to remain inside (or as attached as possible to) the EU in respect of their democratic will, both in case they maintain their current national status or they democratically choose to change it;

Or. en

Amendment 427
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

11a. Notes that the appointment of Guy Verhofstadt MEP as ‘the European Parliament’s representative for the Brexit negotiations’ is the result of non-transparent backroom diplomacy within Parliament and was not decided in plenary;

Or. de

Amendment 428
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; ***considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK’s participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;***

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal;

Or. de

Amendment 429
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; ***considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;***

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal;

Or. en

Amendment 430
Diane James

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; ***considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting***

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal;

the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. en

Amendment 431

Morten Messerschmidt, Ashley Fox, Ulrike Trebesius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; *considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;*

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal;

Or. en

Amendment 432

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the

agreement concerning its own withdrawal; ***considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;***

agreement concerning its own withdrawal, ***which is fully in line with the Treaties;***

Or. pl

Amendment 433
Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making ***of the Union throughout its*** institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making ***in the EU*** institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that ***for the time of the withdrawal negotiations,*** intermediate arrangements will need to be made, concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member; ***proposes that before a formal decision is made, an informal consultation takes place to give visibility to what would be the decision without the participation of UK;***

Or. en

Amendment 434
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member; ***recalls the principle of sincere cooperation as laid out in the Treaties (article 4(3) TEU);***

Or. en

Amendment 435

Jérôme Lavrilleux, Arnaud Danjean, Marc Joulaud, Franck Proust, Michel Dantin, Brice Hortefeux, Philippe Juvin, Françoise Grossetête, Angélique Delahaye, Maurice Ponga, Michèle Alliot-Marie, Tokia Saïfi, Anne Sander, Renaud Muselier

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to

influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

influence decisions – *particularly European Parliament votes* – affecting *the future of* the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. fr

Amendment 436
Jérôme Lavrilleux

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions – *particularly European Parliament votes* – affecting *the future of* the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. fr

Amendment 437
Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United

Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making *of the Union throughout its* institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements *will need to be made* concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making *in the EU* institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that *for the time of the withdrawal negotiations*, intermediate arrangements *should be considered* concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. en

Amendment 438
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate, *in so far as it wishes to*, in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements will need to be made concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. el

Amendment 439
Richard Corbett

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements **will** need to be made concerning the UK's participation in **European** decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements **may** need to be made concerning the UK's participation in **Council** decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. en

Amendment 440
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

Motion for a resolution

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements **will need to be made** concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Amendment

12. Underlines the fact that, until the Treaties cease to apply to the United Kingdom, it will continue to participate in all decision-making of the Union throughout its institutions, with the exception of the negotiations and the agreement concerning its own withdrawal; considers that intermediate arrangements **could be foreseen** concerning the UK's participation in European decision-making, as it will be politically difficult to allow a Member State in the process of leaving to influence decisions affecting the Union of which it will soon cease to be a member;

Or. en

Amendment 441
Jérôme Lavrilleux

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point 1 (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

(1) Calls for the establishment of an ‘observer’ status applicable to all United Kingdom representatives, whether elected or unelected, at the EU institutions; the status would enable the representatives to participate in debates until the United Kingdom leaves the European Union without taking part in decisions, including votes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union; proposes that the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs is given a mandate to set out the arrangements for this ‘observer’ status on behalf of all the institutions;

Or. fr

Amendment 442
Jérôme Lavrilleux, Françoise Grossetête
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 – point 2 (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

(2) Calls for the headquarters of the European Medicines Agency, currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Or. fr

Amendment 443
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. *Recalls that the construction of the European Union has been rooted on four freedoms namely the free movement of goods, the free movement of services and freedom of establishment, the free movement of persons (and citizenship), including free movement of workers and the free movement of capital; therefore, points out that the both the negotiations and the final agreement concerning the withdrawal of the UK from the Union as well as the future framework for the future relationships should respect their substantial indivisibility;*

Or. en

Amendment 444
Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. *Expects, therefore, that when it triggers Article 50 TEU, the United Kingdom will clarify how it intends to act in the Council during deliberations and decision-making on ongoing legislative procedures, so as not to hinder the progress of the EU 27;*

Or. de

Amendment 445
Constance Le Grip

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

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Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Given the choice made by the citizens of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union; calls for the headquarters of the European Banking Authority and the European Medicines Agency, both currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Or. fr

Amendment 446
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12 a. Recognises the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland in the Brexit process and the potential threats to the Irish Peace Process; the EU must work with the Irish Government and the Northern Executive to avoid these threats by any means possible;

Or. en

Amendment 447
Francesc Gambús

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Rejects in any event a hypothetical negotiation in which the United Kingdom remains in the European Union under conditions different to those in place before Brexit;

Amendment 448

Jérôme Lavrilleux, Marc Joulaud, Brice Hortefeux, Philippe Juvin, Franck Proust, Françoise Grossetête, Michel Dantin, Michèle Alliot-Marie, Tokia Saïfi, Anne Sander, Maurice Ponga, Angélique Delahaye, Elisabeth Morin-Chartier, Renaud Muselier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Calls for the headquarters of the European Medicines Agency, currently in London, to be moved to another Member State;

Or. fr

Amendment 449

Jérôme Lavrilleux, Marc Joulaud, Philippe Juvin, Franck Proust, Michel Dantin, Maurice Ponga, Michèle Alliot-Marie, Tokia Saïfi, Anne Sander, Constance Le Grip, Renaud Muselier

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 12 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12b. Calls for the establishment of an ‘observer’ status applicable to all United Kingdom representatives, whether elected or unelected, at the EU institutions; the status would enable the representatives to participate in debates until the United Kingdom leaves the European Union without taking part in decisions, including votes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union; proposes that the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs is given a mandate to set out the arrangements for this ‘observer’ status on behalf of all the institutions;

Amendment 450
Constance Le Grip

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12b. Calls for ‘observer member’ status to be applied to British Members of the European Parliament once the British Government has invoked Article 50 of the TFEU and the British Parliament has voted in favour of repealing the European Communities Act; the status will enable them to participate in Parliamentary debates without taking part in votes; proposes that the Committee on Constitutional Affairs be tasked with preparing and setting out the arrangements for this ‘observer member’ status;

Amendment 451
Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Mercedes Bresso, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

New Economic Governance

New Economic Governance ***and establishment of a Social Europe***

Amendment 452
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

Motion for a resolution

New Economic Governance

Amendment

New Economic ***Policy and*** Governance

Or. en

Amendment 453

Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

12a. Recalls as stated in its resolution of XXXX on a budgetary capacity for the eurozone that the various crises require the euro area to make, as soon as possible, a qualitative leap of integration to deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs;

Or. en

Amendment 454

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States, ***highlighting that the main cause of these problems is a lack of redistribution between Member States, which is essential for correcting imbalances and***

inequalities, supporting harmonious development and building an economic as opposed to merely monetary Union;

Or. it

Amendment 455
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the *lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness* of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the *loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States; acknowledges that a loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States is a direct result of the austerity agenda that has emanated directly from Brussels; further acknowledges that poorly thought out trade agreements and a policy of deindustrialisation are also responsible for a loss of competitiveness of the economies of some Member States;*

Or. en

Amendment 456
Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States; *is of the opinion that human investment must be given equal priority with investment in infrastructure, innovation*

and all the other areas seen as crucial to Europe's global competitiveness;

Or. en

Amendment 457
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the *lack of economic reform and convergence in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;*

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the *loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States, much of it caused by the strait-jacket that membership of the Eurozone imposed, the absence of any tools to deal with a monetary crisis in individual states, a reflection of the poor design of the euro itself;*

Or. en

Amendment 458
Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by *the lack of economic reform and convergence* in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) *as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;*

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by *growing economic and social divergences* in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), *notably due to the absence of a common fiscal and economic policy, aggravated by the lack of a proper aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area and the absence of an industrial strategy;*

Or. en

Amendment 459
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the ***lack of economic reform and convergence in*** the Economic and ***Monetary Union (EMU)*** as well as the loss of ***competitiveness of the economies of many of its*** Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the ***inadequacy and flaws of*** the economic and ***social policy of the Union*** as well as the loss of ***cohesion and solidarity of the*** Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 460
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform ***and convergence*** in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ***loss of competitiveness*** of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ***rapid collapse*** of the economies of many of its Member States;

Or. el

Amendment 461
Pascal Durand
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of ***economic reform and convergence*** in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ***loss of competitiveness of the***

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of ***common fiscal and economic policies*** in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the ***exacerbation of disparities***

economies of many of its Member States;

between its Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 462
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform ***and convergence*** in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;

Amendment

13. Is greatly concerned by the lack of economic reform in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the loss of competitiveness of the economies of many of its Member States;

Or. de

Amendment 463
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Is convinced that the Union needs a legal shift on its economic policy based on the full application of Article 3 TEU and the principles provided for, in particular, in articles 9 to 12 TFEU; asks therefore for a real New Deal for Europe, consisting in common investments in a new environmentally sustainable growth and employment plan, financed by the European Bank of Investments and by own resources deriving from an EU wide coordinated wealth levy, a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and a carbon tax, directly collected by the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 464

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Reaffirms that constitutional elements of the Union, notably the integrity of the Single Market and the fact that this cannot be separated from the four fundamental freedoms of the Union (free movement of capital, people, goods and services) are essential, indivisible pillars of the Union, as is the existence of a state of law, guaranteed by the European Court of Justice; reaffirms this constitutional unity cannot be undone during the negotiations of the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 465

Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Deplores the fact that the structural weakness of the EU institutions and the state-oriented logic too often applied to its operational programmes renders less effective its policies which support innovation, the production economy and reindustrialisation. Stresses that the cross-border, cooperative, synergistic and flexible logic that drives cohesion policies such as intelligent specialisation should be bolstered and that this format should be replicated in employment policies;

Amendment 466
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Strongly deplores the use of austerity policies, which have led to an increase in levels of unemployment and absolute poverty and an explosion in socio-economic discrepancies, and therefore observes the need to strive to remove the constraints and restrictions on public investments imposed on the Member States to boost employment and social and territorial cohesion, paying close attention to the needs and specificities of the different economic contexts;

Or. it

Amendment 467
Dennis de Jong

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Stresses the necessity for a European Union where human considerations rather than the interests of multinationals and financial institutions are central;

Or. nl

Amendment 468
Roberto Gualtieri

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13a. Considers that common fiscal and economic policy should become a shared competence between the Union and the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 469
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13b. Recalls that social rights are fundamental rights, as recognised by international treaties, the ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Social Charter; in this respect, calls on the Commission to swiftly present a proposal for a concrete European Social Pillar aimed at improving living and working conditions, quality employment, fair wages, equal treatment, social dialogue, quality public services and effective social protection, in line with the relevant ILO Conventions, while respecting the prerogative of the Member States to introduce or retain more favourable provisions in this field; moreover, asks the Commission to take into consideration the idea of introducing, in that proposal, provisions establishing a fair and just minimum wage, minimum pensions and a minimum income, in line with the European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2010 on the role of minimum income in combating poverty

and promoting an inclusive society in Europe and article 34(3) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, while respecting the right to collective bargain, as enshrined in article 28 of the EU Charter;

Or. en

Amendment 470
Roberto Gualtieri

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13b. *Calls for the amendment of Article 136 TFEU in order to open its scope to voluntary participation by non-euro Member States, providing for full voting rights in line with the enhanced cooperation procedure, and calls for the dropping of the restrictions under Article 136 TFEU and for the upgrading of this article into a general clause for the adoption by codecision of legal acts concerning the coordination and setting of legally-binding minimum standards with regard to economic, employment and social policy;*

Or. en

Amendment 471
Dennis de Jong

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13b. *states that national parliaments should determine the size and content of national budgets without being dictated by*

the European Union;

Or. nl

Amendment 472
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13c. *Calls on the Commission to start negotiations with the Council of Europe in order to launch the process for the accession of the EU to the European Social Charter; in the meantime, asks the Commission to use the Charter as guiding standard for the impact assessments carried out on the basis of article 12 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making and for drafting the explanatory memoranda foreseen in article 25 of the same, having regard to the fifth recital of the Preamble to the Treaties;*

Or. en

Amendment 473
Roberto Gualtieri

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 c (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

13c. *Considers that art. 119 TFEU should state that the member States and the Union shall conduct their economic policy in accordance with the principle of a social market economy;*

Or. en

Amendment 474
Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions; ***believes that EU must reject the attempts to come back to protectionist national politics, and should continue to be an open economy in the future; warns that this cannot be obtained as a consequence of the dismantling of the social model;***

Or. en

Amendment 475
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that ***neither*** the Stability and Growth Pact ***nor*** the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ***provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that ***strict adherence to*** the Stability and Growth Pact ***and*** the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ***should be reestablished;***

Or. en

Amendment 476

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, ***and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that ***in their current form*** neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions;

Or. en

Amendment 477

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, ***as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form;

Or. en

Amendment 478
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as ***the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as ***they were administered in a draconian manner which only served the interests of the economies of some of the larger Member States and not the Member States who needed assistance; considers it shameful that some member States conspired to foist 42% of the total cost of the European banking crisis upon Ireland;***

Or. en

Amendment 479
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have ***furthermore*** lost credibility in their current form, as ***the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ***and the "bail-in" rules of the European Central Bank*** provide the intended solutions, and that they have lost credibility in their current form;

Or. en

Amendment 480
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda, Constance Le Grip

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;*

Amendment

14. Considers that *the framework for economic governance provided by* the Stability and Growth Pact *and* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *should be developed in order to ensure a truthful and comprehensive implementation of their provisions;*

Or. en

Amendment 481
Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions, *as a result of the institutional inability of the EU to adopt realistic solutions;*

Or. el

Amendment 482
Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as* the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;*

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact *and* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *have the ability to provide a strong framework for economic governance if implemented; considers that* the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences *and that excessive sovereign debt in particular have made macroeconomic adjustment programmes necessary in several Member States;*

Or. en

Amendment 483
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while *Greece has* been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while *Greece’s creditors, especially its foreign bankers, have* been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Or. en

Amendment 484
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;*

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact *has widely demonstrated itself to be grounded in an economic development model that is inadequately equipped for pursuing the European common interest and that it is therefore not an effective tool for resolving the enduring economic crisis, having increased the problems faced in effectively combating unemployment and intensified the impoverishment of those States most affected by the crisis;*

Or. it

Amendment 485
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States, *including Germany*, without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Or. el

Amendment 486
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form*, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions*;

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact *and* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *form a stable framework for economic control, but is concerned*, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *and considers that, above all because of excessive deficits in several Member States, macroeconomic adjust programmes were necessary*;

Or. de

Amendment 487
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form*, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions*;

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact *and* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) *form a stable framework for economic control, but is concerned*, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *and considers that, above all because of excessive deficits in several Member States, macroeconomic adjust programmes were necessary*;

Or. de

Amendment 488
Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that *neither* the Stability and Growth Pact *nor* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide *the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as* the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;*

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact *and* the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide *a strong framework for economic governance, but is greatly concerned that* the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, *and that excessive sovereign debt in particular have made macroeconomic adjustment programmes necessary in several Member States;*

Or. en

Amendment 489
Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. Considers that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed *at different occurrences* by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Or. en

Amendment 490
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. Considers that ***neither*** the Stability and Growth Pact ***nor*** the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide ***the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as*** the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, ***while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;***

Amendment

14. Considers that the Stability and Growth Pact ***and*** the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide ***a strong framework for economic governance, but is greatly concerned that*** the Pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, ***and that excessive sovereign debt levels have made macroeconomic adjustment programs necessary in several Member States;***

Or. en

Amendment 491
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

Motion for a resolution

14. ***Considers that neither*** the Stability and Growth Pact ***nor*** the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ***provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore*** lost credibility ***in their current form, as*** the pact ***has been*** infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Amendment

14. ***Regrets that*** the Stability and Growth Pact ***and*** ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) ***have been persistently infringed and have thus*** lost credibility; the pact ***has been*** infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has, ***in breach of the ‘no-bail-out clause’***, been bailed out on a large scale on three occasions;

Or. de

Amendment 492
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 493

Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, **are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations** and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole; **regrets that Country Specific Recommendations are not binding and that the current system does not sufficiently ensure their national ownership; is interested in this regard in the potential offered by the Advisory European Fiscal Board and its future mission of advising the Commission on a fiscal stance that would be appropriate for the euro area as a whole;**

Or. en

Amendment 494
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they ***have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they ***must be used and consistently implemented;***

Or. de

Amendment 495
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they ***have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they ***must be used and consistently implemented;***

Or. de

Amendment 496
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, ***but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges that the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues ***have brought no improvements, as they have been replaced by ineffective political control mechanisms through numerous weakened market control interventions;***

Or. de

Amendment 497
Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, ***but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues; believes ***that those laws need to be applied and enforced more consistently;***

Or. en

Amendment 498
Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, ***but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, believes ***that those laws need to be applied and enforced more consistently;***

Or. en

Amendment 499
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, ***are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex;

Or. en

Amendment 500
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, ***but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, ***and believes that the legislation needs to be applied and enforced more consistently and that country-specific recommendations should have a binding effect;***

Or. en

Amendment 501
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the ***improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the European Semester ***has put many Member States in a fiscal ‘straight jacket’, and instead of solving the problems it has in fact damaged the economies of many Member States and hindered their ability to leverage through debt in a manner which is necessary to thereafter achieve growth;***

Or. en

Amendment 502

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems, ***in part due to the fact that the rules have not been fully respected nor the tools available in them activated***; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Or. en

Amendment 503

Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they ***have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the***

Amendment

15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues but concludes that they ***need to be implemented better and enforced to help solve Europe's macroeconomic and competitive challenges; Recognizes, however, the current complexity of the system;***

EU as a whole;

Or. en

Amendment 504

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. ***Acknowledges the improvements*** brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; ***believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;***

Amendment

15. ***Notes the changes*** brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems ***since they include pro-cyclical and inflexible rules on debt and deficit, which can be hardly achieved without aggravating an economic and social recovery;***

Or. en

Amendment 505

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. ***Acknowledges the improvements*** brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack ***aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they*** have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do

Amendment

15. ***Believes that the changes*** brought by the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole ***and are not solving any***

not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

problems;

Or. el

Amendment 506

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. ***Acknowledges the improvements brought by*** the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have ***contributed to making*** the system overly complex, ***are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations*** and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Amendment

15. ***Takes note of*** the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have ***rendered*** the system overly complex and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;

Or. en

Amendment 507

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 15

Motion for a resolution

15. Acknowledges ***the improvements brought by*** the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack ***aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved*** the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly

Amendment

15. Acknowledges ***that*** the European Semester, the six-pack and the two-pack ***have not solved but aggravated*** the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system ***not only*** overly complex, ***but essentially unjust and ineffective, increasing the***

complex, *are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill-over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;*

disgregation of the EU and the widespread mistrust of the EU citizens; believes, furthermore, that the current "convergence instruments" - in particular the European Semester - should be reformed to include binding social targets;

Or. en

Amendment 508
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15a. *Deplores the emphasis put, in the 5 Presidents Report, on "flexible" economies capable to quickly adjust to shocks and on a "new convergence process", facilitated by the creation of national Competitiveness Boards; believes that such measures are based on the assumption that (downward) wage flexibility is the main 'shock absorber' and a key tool for assuring the cost competitiveness of national economies. The Competitiveness Boards may in fact institutionalise the pressure towards wage and cost reductions in the pursuit of greater cost competitiveness, especially in less technologically advanced countries; considers that the proposals contained in the "Five presidents' report" claim to promote greater prosperity and solidarity in Europe while in fact further reinforcing the technocratic character of EU governance;*

Or. en

Amendment 509
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15a. *Believes that regarding the country-specific recommendations, they should be tailor-made taking into account the different institutional set up of Member States; if needed, concrete recommendations should be done for concrete regions in order to avoid generalization;*

Or. en

Amendment 510
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

15b. *Underlines the astounding economic success of fiscal federalism in some regions of Spain at reducing unemployment and having a higher control of its budgetary deficit, and considers them a role model to reproduce in other parts of the Union;*

Or. en

Amendment 511
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. *Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the*

deleted

EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;

Or. sv

Amendment 512
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 513
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. *Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 514
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

16. *Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;*

16. *Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU;*

Or. en

Amendment 515
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review *the efficacy of the* many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, *and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;*

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, *as well as the need to change course to the regulatory framework for the financial sector; at the same time, regrets that the measures imposed by the Troika led to a substantial increase of social and economic inequalities to the detriment of the citizens of the countries in which those have been applied; in this regard, reminds that the Court of justice, in its recent judgment Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v. European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB) (joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P), has stated that whilst the Member States do not implement EU law in the context of the ESM Treaty, on the other hand the Charter is addressed to the EU institutions, including when they act outside the EU legal framework;*

Or. en

Amendment 516
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, *and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal*

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function;

bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents' Report that the 'open method of coordination' as the basis for Europe's economic strategy does not function *and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts*;

Or. de

Amendment 517
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is *acutely* aware of the *need to review the efficacy of the* many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as 'reverse qualified majority voting' – *as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents' Report that the 'open method of coordination' as the basis for Europe's economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts*;

Amendment

16. Is aware of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and *considers* to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as 'reverse qualified majority voting'; *highlights that* Europe's economic strategy needs to be *better coordinated*;

Or. en

Amendment 518
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent

crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; *agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;*

crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector;

Or. el

Amendment 519

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to *review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to* entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;

Or. en

Amendment 520

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts; ***moreover, the current sanctions procedure has been undermined by the unwillingness of Member States to sanction each other;***

Or. en

Amendment 521

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – ***such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’*** – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function ***and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts;***

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function;

Or. en

Amendment 522
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the *‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy does not function and needs to be elevated into binding legal acts*;

Amendment

16. Is acutely aware of the need to review the efficacy of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the Europe’s economic strategy needs to be *better coordinated*;

Or. en

Amendment 523
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is *acutely* aware of the *need to review the efficacy of the* many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy *does not function and*

Amendment

16. Is aware of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, *and is considering whether it is necessary* to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy needs to be *better*

needs to be *elevated into binding legal acts*;

coordinated;

Or. de

Amendment 524

Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 16

Motion for a resolution

16. Is *acutely* aware of the *need to review the efficacy of the* many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, and to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy *does not function and* needs to be *elevated into binding legal acts*;

Amendment

16. Is aware of the many recent crisis-management measures taken by the EU, *and is considering whether it is necessary* to codify in primary law certain decision-making procedures – such as ‘reverse qualified majority voting’ – as well as the need to entrench the legal bases of the new regulatory framework for the financial sector; agrees with the Five Presidents’ Report that the ‘open method of coordination’ as the basis for Europe’s economic strategy needs to be *better coordinated*;

Or. de

Amendment 525

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only*

deleted

Amendment

compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for by Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Or. it

Amendment 526
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

deleted

Or. sv

Amendment 527

Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States; *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 528

Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment *deleted*

projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 529

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 530
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 531
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment*

17. *Proposes therefore introducing an insolvency mechanism for the Member States of the Eurozone;*

projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Or. de

Amendment 532
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;*

Amendment

17. The coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU *should not remove the sovereign rights of EU Member States to independently determine their economic policies;*

Or. el

Amendment 533
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes therefore merging *the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single* ‘convergence code’ *of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards* , where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as *a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;*

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore *a* ‘convergence code’, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as *the programme to support structural reforms;*

Or. de

Amendment 534
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes therefore *merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single* ‘convergence code’ *of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards* , where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives *such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument;*

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore *a* ‘convergence code’, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as *the programme to support structural reforms;*

the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Or. de

Amendment 535
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes therefore *merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single* ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, *setting minimum and maximum standards, where only* compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as *a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;*

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore *a* ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature; *suggests that* compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as *the Structural Reform Support Programme;*

Or. en

Amendment 536
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes *therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards*, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with *fiscal* incentives such as *a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States*;

Amendment

17. Proposes a *‘convergence code’ with the aim to strengthen the competitiveness of the Member States and the EU*, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with incentives such as *the Structural Reform Support Programme*;

Or. en

Amendment 537

Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as*

Amendment

17. *Believes that, as parliamentary input on economic policy guidelines is an important aspect of any democratic system, increased legitimacy at the European level can be ensured by the adoption of Convergence Guidelines which contain targeted priorities for the coming years, subject to a codecision procedure that should be introduced in the next Treaty change*;

provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 538

Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;

Amendment

17. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act by ordinary legislative procedure, to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies; suggests that the code should be focusing for the first period on convergence criteria regarding taxation, labour market, including among others minimum wages, investment, social cohesion and public administrative and good governance capacities;

Or. en

Amendment 539

Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. *Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States;*

Amendment

17. *The coordination of economic policies should never have become a ‘shared competence’ between the Union and the Member States, it should have remained the competence of democratically elected government in Member States; taxation rates, including income and corporate tax rates, should always remain the competence of democratically elected governments in Member States; the Union and Member States should work together to ensure combating against tax avoidance and tax evasion;*

Or. en

Amendment 540

Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17

Motion for a resolution

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as

Amendment

17. Proposes therefore merging the deficit and debt procedures, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the country-specific recommendations into a single ‘convergence code’ of a legally binding nature, setting minimum and maximum standards, where only compliance with this code would allow access to EU funds for investment projects or participation in new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a fiscal capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument; the coordination of economic policies as

provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a 'shared competence' between the Union and the Member States;

provided for in Article 5 TFEU would therefore become a 'shared competence' between the Union and the Member States, *where the EU could have the opportunity to encourage Member States to invest expenditure in certain specific areas, e.g. R+D;*

Or. en

Amendment 541
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. Calls for the deduction of net public investment from public debt in an effort to implement the "golden rule for public investment" in order to allow for an optimal intergenerational allocation of public investment; believes that the definition of what qualifies as investment should be assessed; considers that in order to limit short term public debt a corresponding threshold for net investment could be implemented; considers that implementation of the rule could be done through annexing an "investment protocol" to the Treaties under the simplified revision procedure of Art. 48 TEU;

Or. en

Amendment 542
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. *Considers that among the criteria included in the convergence code should be an assessment on the extent to which the master plans for infrastructures with added European value proposed for the TEN-T will incorporate an effective tool to stimulate and speed up the construction of the trans-European transport networks. To ensure that the above is the case, deviations from investment plans access to Union funds should be restricted;*

Or. es

Amendment 543

Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Jonás Fernández, Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. *Considers that the proposed ‘convergence code’ needs to be compatible with the European Pillar of Social Rights which should include the establishment of a European framework on minimum wages, a guaranteed level of social protection across the Union and a European Unemployment Insurance;*

Or. en

Amendment 544

Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 17 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. *Believes the ‘convergence code’*

should aim, first and foremost, at territorial and social cohesion, with a view to obtaining a level playing field and eliminating the root causes of divergence between Member States and between regions;

Or. en

Amendment 545

Jo Leinen, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pervenche Berès

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17a. Proposes that compliance with this code would allow access new instruments that combine economic reform with fiscal incentives such as a budgetary capacity for the euro area or a common debt instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 546

Jo Leinen, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mercedes Bresso, Enrique Guerrero Salom, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 b (new)**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

17b. Suggests that the coordination of economic policies as provided for in Article 5 TFEU should become a 'shared competence' between the Union and the Member States;

Or. en

Amendment 547
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 548
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60

deleted

%; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Or. de

Amendment 549
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 550
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt

deleted

instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Or. sv

Amendment 551
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. *Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 552
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 553
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, *one* such common debt instrument needs to be established;

they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Or. it

Amendment 554

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, *such* a common debt instrument needs to be established, *inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;*

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, a common debt instrument needs to be established;

Or. en

Amendment 555

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, *in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of*

Amendment

18. Believes that a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired

Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments ***on structural reforms*** to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio ***to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;***

by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio;

Or. en

Amendment 556
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, ***such*** a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, ***with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;***

Amendment

18. Believes that in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund;

Or. en

Amendment 557

Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, *such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;*

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, *structural reforms that increase the competitiveness of Member States and the Eurozone as a whole are necessary. Points to the Commission communication on flexibility in the SGP, allowing Member States to conduct anticyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn;*

Or. en

Amendment 558

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, *in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists*

Amendment

18. Believes that, a common debt instrument needs to be established whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for *an investment fund; insists that euro-area members should participate to the instrument on the basis of the principle of cooperation and within the context of common policies of investments, adopted with the purpose of overcoming the imbalances in the Eurozone;*

that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard;

Or. en

Amendment 559
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby *euro-area* members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that *euro-area* members would *only* be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, *as this will prevent moral hazard;*

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt instrument needs to be established, inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011, whereby **Eurozone** Members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, with strong individual commitments on structural reforms to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; insists that **the Eurozone** Members would be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code;

Or. en

Amendment 560
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

Motion for a resolution

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt

Amendment

18. Believes that, in order to reduce the still excessively high debt burden of Member States, such a common debt

instrument needs to be established, ***inspired by the proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts of 9 November 2011***, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, ***with strong individual commitments on structural reforms*** to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; ***insists that euro-area members would only be able to participate when they are in compliance with the convergence code, as this will prevent moral hazard***;

instrument needs to be established, whereby euro-area members would undertake joint and several liability for a sinking fund, to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to the required maximum of 60 %; ***at the same time, calls on all the relevant national authorities in accordance with Article 7(9) of Regulation No 472/2013 to carry out a debt audit; believes that this audit should define the amounts of odious debt for each Member State, and that these should be immediately cancelled from the obligations of those States***;

Or. el

Amendment 561
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18a. Stresses that in the current economic environment of subdued demand, the monetary policy must be complemented by expansionary fiscal policies as well as by strengthening unions collective bargaining power in order to ensure wage growth in line with countries average productivity growth and the ECBs inflation target; deems it necessary, in this context, to revise the objectives of the ECB;

Or. en

Amendment 562
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18a. *Considers it necessary to open the debate at EU level concerning the subject of German war reparations where these are being demanded by Greece and the other EU Member States and considers that the satisfaction of these is not only an economic obligation incumbent on Germany but also an opportunity to stabilise the European economy and at the same time to restore justice;*

Or. el

Amendment 563

Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18a. *Notes that if Member States are able to obtain budget surpluses in economic upturn, a shock absorbing mechanism of over 3% of GDP would be available to Member States to implement countercyclical fiscal policies in times of economic downturn without breaking the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact;*

Or. en

Amendment 564

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 18 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

18b. *Calls for better use of the existing*

*structural funds in the direction of
fostering cohesion;*

Or. en

Amendment 565
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 566
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. el

Amendment 567

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 568

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 569
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 570
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 571
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

**Amendment 572
Burkhard Balz**

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

deleted

Or. en

**Amendment 573
Fabio Massimo Castaldo**

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument

19. Stresses *the need to establish a regulatory framework of reference for the*

will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

insolvency procedure for sovereigns whose foreign debt is unlawful, unbalanced or unsustainable, based on a mechanism for restructuring the sovereign debt aimed at significantly reducing the foreign debt to bring it back down to sustainable levels; Stresses that this will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Or. it

Amendment 574
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors *while avoiding new bail-outs which have proven politically toxic for the European project;*

Or. en

Amendment 575
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in **this new debt** instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in **any new incentive** instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Or. de

Amendment 576
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Stresses, **however**, that conditionality in **this new debt** instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Amendment

19. Stresses that conditionality in **any new incentive** instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Or. de

Amendment 577
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

Motion for a resolution

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality **in this new debt instrument**

Amendment

19. Stresses, however, that conditionality will only be credible if

will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;

Or. en

Amendment 578
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. *Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

deleted

Or. sv

Amendment 579
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. *Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 580
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament; *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 581
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament; *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 582
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of *deleted*

the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 583

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the *integration* of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *as well as* the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Amendment

20. Calls for the *evaluation and, if necessary, review* of the Fiscal Compact *and its subsequent integration* into the EU legal framework; *calls likewise for* the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament *and further development of the inter-parliamentary conference foreseen in Article 13, to allow a substantial and timely discussions between the EP and the national parliaments where needed;*

Or. en

Amendment 584

Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the *integration of the* Fiscal Compact *into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. Calls for the Fiscal Compact *to be abolished;*

Amendment 585

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament, ***ensuring that control and accountability is the responsibility of those contributing to them;***

Or. en

Amendment 586

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, ***on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of its implementation and*** with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 587
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the *integration* of the Fiscal Compact *into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. Calls for the *replacement* of the Fiscal Compact *and the introduction of a really symmetric mechanism for macroeconomic policy coordination that addresses surpluses as well as deficits and does not place the burden of adjustment on deficit countries alone;*

Or. en

Amendment 588
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *as well as* the incorporation of the ESM *and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *and notes that* the incorporation of the ESM *into EU law would not be possible without a fundamental departure from the currently underlying principles of economic governance;*

Or. en

Amendment 589
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. *Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. *Notes that the incorporation of the ESM and of the Single Resolution Fund would only be possible by turning away from the current principles of economic control;*

Or. de

Amendment 590
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *and notes that the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund would only be possible by turning away from the current principles of economic control;*

Or. de

Amendment 591
Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

Motion for a resolution

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *as well as the incorporation of the ESM and the Single Resolution Fund into EU law, with corresponding democratic oversight by Parliament;*

Amendment

20. Calls for the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework *and notes that the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM cannot be incorporated into the Community framework without a complete treaty change;*

Amendment 592

Sylvie Goulard

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20a. In order to ensure that control and accountability is undertaken by those contributing to these instruments believes that the creation of a Euro Area Parliament within the European Parliament will be needed; within the Euro Area Parliament considers it essential to differentiate between discussion concerning policies for the euro area and related decision making; modalities must be found to allow all Member State who are committed to joining the euro area to participate in discussions concerning the euro area, if they so wish, however only Member States who are members of the euro area and contribute to rescue funds etc. should be able to vote on these decisions;

Or. en

Amendment 593

Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20a. Highlights that the role of the ESM will evolve in the future, from this of a crisis management agency into, most likely, this of a debt management agency and backstop for the Single Resolution Fund; stresses that this warrants a

comprehensive review of its architecture, in particular as regards its institutional arrangements such as voting procedures as well as the design of the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument;

Or. en

Amendment 594

Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens, Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 20 b (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

20b. Believes that any future attempts to reintroduce a double-majority for euro-area/non-euro-area Member States in the field of financial legislation must be refused as it would violate article 3 TEU;

Or. en

Amendment 595

Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 596
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 597
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 598
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. sv

Amendment 599
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 600
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 601
Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. *Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 602

Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 603

Morten Messerschmidt, Ulrike Trebesius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 604
Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 605
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 606
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to **increase financial stability**, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area **needs** a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to **correct macroeconomic and financial imbalances within the EU**, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, **it is necessary to establish a procedure for withdrawing from the monetary union to allow Member States for which belonging to the single currency has become economically and socially unsustainable to withdraw and once again become competitive through normal exchange rate adjustments; also highlights the need for States that decide to remain in the euro area to equip themselves with** a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. it

Amendment 607
Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Jonás Fernández

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine, **directly collected**, own resources, **like the**

equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Financial Transactions Tax, the revenues of the European Central Bank, and the carbon tax, and a proper treasury facility, equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council, ***as well as European Tax Agency to combat tax avoidance***;

Or. en

Amendment 608

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, ***in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession***, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 609

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-

border asymmetric *shocks* and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a *fiscal* capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

border asymmetric and *symmetric shocks*, reduce the effects of recession, **and ensure a proper level of investment**, the euro area needs a *budgetary* capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 610
Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow, **such as the adoption of the eurobond**; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. el

Amendment 611
Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to

increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession **and external crisis**, the euro area **urgently** needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 612

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial **stability**, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to increase financial **and social cohesion and solidarity**, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the euro area needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and a proper treasury facility equipped with a capacity to borrow; this treasury must be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 613

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 21

Motion for a resolution

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to

Amendment

21. Is of the opinion that, in order to

increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the *euro area* needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and *a proper treasury facility* equipped with *a capacity* to borrow; this treasury *must* be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through Parliament and the Council;

increase financial stability, mitigate cross-border asymmetric shocks and reduce the effects of recession, the *Eurozone* needs a fiscal capacity based on genuine own resources and *an European Treasury* equipped with *the ability* to borrow; *notes that* this Treasury *should* be based in the Commission and be subject to democratic scrutiny and accountability through *the* Parliament and the Council;

Or. en

Amendment 614
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

21a. *Considers that taxes such as the tax which should be applied to financial transactions should be used to finance the European Commission itself. Stresses that financing the EU institutions should not increase European citizens' tax burden;*

Or. es

Amendment 615
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. *Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;*

deleted

Amendment 616

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

deleted

Or. el

Amendment 617

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 618

Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. *Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 619

Luke Ming Flanagan

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. *Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 620

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

**Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22**

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

22. Points out that, *because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission*

22. Points out that *the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union requires democratic, transparent and accountable governmental institutions than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup, also*

and/or the Eurogroup;

introducing the co-decision procedure on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union (article 121 TFEU); in this regard, expresses once again its deep concern for the lack of transparency and democratic accountability that characterises the decision-making and procedures of the Eurogroup; therefore, asks the Institutions to clarify the legal nature of this body vis-à-vis the EU Treaties;

Or. en

Amendment 621

Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, *because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;*

Amendment

22. Points out that, *stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup, as well as full democratic checks and balances through the involvement of the European Parliament on all EMU aspects; believes that in parallel, to improve ownership, accountability has to be ensured at the level where decisions are taken or implemented, with national parliaments scrutinising national governments and the European Parliament scrutinising the European executives;*

Or. en

Amendment 622

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, *because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union*, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Amendment

22. Points out that stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Or. en

Amendment 623
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, *because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union*, stronger governmental institutions *are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup*;

Amendment

22. Points out that, *stronger governmental institutions are not currently required or requested by a majority of Member States or their citizens, however, a broader dialogue is needed around the European Union institutions and the type of institutions that European citizens and member States wish to see*;

Or. en

Amendment 624
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, because compliance with the *new* code is crucial to the

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the *economic governance* code is

functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental *institutions* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental *commitment and more independent enforcement* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Or. en

Amendment 625
Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, because compliance with the *new code* is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental *institutions* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the *convergence guidelines* is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental *commitment and enforcement* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Or. en

Amendment 626
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger *governmental institutions* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger *obligations and implementation* are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Or. de

Amendment 627
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger **governmental institutions** are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Amendment

22. Points out that, because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger **obligation and implementation** are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;

Or. de

Amendment 628
Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

Motion for a resolution

22. Points out that, **because compliance with the new code is crucial to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and/or the Eurogroup;**

Amendment

22. Points out that, **stronger governmental institutions are required than those currently provided by the Commission and the Eurogroup, as well as full democratic checks and balances through the involvement of the European Parliament on all EMU aspects;**

Or. en

Amendment 629
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* **deleted**

Or. de

Amendment 630
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* **deleted**

Or. sv

Amendment 631

Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* *deleted*

Or. el

Amendment 632

Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* *deleted*

Amendment 633

Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 634

Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of* *deleted*

the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Or. en

Amendment 635
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 636
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give* **deleted**

effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Or. en

Amendment 637

Dariusz Rosati

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. *Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 638

Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski; Ulrike Trebesius

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

deleted

Or. pl

Amendment 639
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

23. Calls , therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations , especially in the financial sector;

23. Calls for better coordination of the positions of the euro area in international organisations;

Or. de

Amendment 640
Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

23. Calls, therefore, *for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and* give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; *the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;*

Amendment

23. Calls, therefore, *on the Commission to* give effect to a common EU economic policy *aimed at fostering social cohesion*, combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget;

Or. en

Amendment 641
Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance *Minister*, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to *formulate* and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Amendment

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance *Ministry*, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to *plan* and give effect, *following approval by the Eurogroup*, to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible *and accountable before the Council and the Eurogroup* for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external

representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Or. el

Amendment 642

Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pedro Silva Pereira, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, *fiscal and monetary* instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Amendment

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic *and fiscal* instruments, backed up by a euro-area budget; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other mutualised funds, *including the budgetary capacity*, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Or. en

Amendment 643

Paulo Rangel

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 23

Motion for a resolution

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission

Amendment

23. Calls, therefore, for the executive authority to be concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister, by endowing the Commission

with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by *a euro-area budget*; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other *mutualised funds*, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

with the capacity to formulate and give effect to a common EU economic policy combining macro-economic, fiscal and monetary instruments, backed up by *an Eurozone fiscal capacity*; the Finance Minister should be responsible for the operation of the ESM and other *instruments*, and be the single external representative of the euro area in international organisations, especially in the financial sector;

Or. en

Amendment 644
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 645
Notis Marias

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of*

deleted

national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. el

Amendment 646
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 647
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

deleted

Amendment 648

Pascal Durand

on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 649

Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 650
Morten Messerschmidt, Ulrike Trebesius

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 651
Luke Ming Flanagan

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. *Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 652
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 653

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 654

Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate

deleted

powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. en

Amendment 655
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in *the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant* with the convergence code;

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in *order to ensure the compliance* with the convergence code;

Or. en

Amendment 656
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow *the Finance Minister* with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the *convergence code* is not respected, *and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument*

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow *the Commission* with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the *Stability and Growth Pact* is not respected;

for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. de

Amendment 657
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow *the Finance Minister* with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the *convergence code* is not respected, *and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow *the Commission* with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the *Stability and Growth Pact* is not respected,

Or. de

Amendment 658
Jo Leinen, Mercedes Bresso, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to *intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to use the *budgetary* capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. en

Amendment 659
Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to *intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;*

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to *respond to symmetrical and especially asymmetrical shocks, particularly through the use of the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument;*

Or. en

Amendment 660
Maite Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to endow the Finance Minister with proportionate powers to *increase labour market flexibility and labour internal mobility,* intervene in the setting of national economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to use the fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. en

Amendment 661
Eleftherios Synadinos

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

Motion for a resolution

24. Considers it necessary to **endow** the Finance Minister **with proportionate powers** to intervene in the **setting of national** economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to **use the** fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Amendment

24. Considers it necessary to **give** the Finance Minister **the power** to intervene in the **debate within the Eurogroup on** economic and fiscal policies in cases where the convergence code is not respected, and the power to **propose the use of** fiscal capacity or the common bond instrument for those Member States that are compliant with the convergence code;

Or. el

Amendment 662
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

24a. Considers that a mechanism to harmonise tax among Member States and European treasuries must be defined, including treasuries which, in accordance with the principles expressed by the European Court of Justice, are independent. The foundations for that harmonisation should place an identical effective overall tax burden on all Member States, harmonise corporate income tax, guarantee that companies pay tax on profits in the territory in which they earn them and stop all competition among European treasuries, excluding measures designed to drive the production economy and employment;

Amendment

Or. es

Amendment 663
Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24a. Disapproves any expansion of the power of European-level institutions, such as the envisaged EU Finance Minister, if not made conditional on the approval of a clear mandate in terms of employment and/or growth-related targets, namely specific numerical targets to be reached within a specified timeframe and not only "full employment" as a general and declamatory aim. This, in turn, would require the creation of, and commitment to, clear institutional arrangements that would make the attainment of such targets possible and put under democratic and transparent scrutiny by the European Parliament;

Or. en

Amendment 664
Barbara Spinelli

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

24a. Disapproves any expansion of the power of European-level institutions, such as the envisaged EU Finance Minister, if not made conditional on the approval of a clear mandate in terms of employment and/or growth-related targets, namely specific numerical targets to be reached within a specified timeframe and not only "full employment" as a general and declamatory aim. This, in turn, would require the creation of, and commitment to, clear institutional arrangements that

would make the attainment of such targets possible;

Or. en

Amendment 665
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. *Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;* *deleted*

Or. sv

Amendment 666
Burkhard Balz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. *Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 667
Esther de Lange

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. *Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 668

Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. *Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 669

Jo Leinen, Pervenche Berès

Motion for a resolution

Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25. *Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;* *deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 670

Barbara Spinelli, Helmut Scholz

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of ***non-conditional*** lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank; ***at the same time, considers it necessary that the ECB also commits to purchasing eurobonds as part of its standard QE policy, keeping borrowing costs down for the eurozone as a whole; calls for the democratic control of the ECB via the European Parliament;***

Or. en

Amendment 671
Pascal Durand
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank ***and to transform the European Stability mechanism into a European monetary fund;***

Or. en

Amendment 672
Danuta Maria Hübner

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort *enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank*;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort, *in particular through a more direct control on the provision of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by National Central Banks* ;

Or. en

Amendment 673
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary *to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank*;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary *to preserve the independence of the European Central Bank*;

Or. de

Amendment 674
David McAllister, Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary *to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank*;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary *to preserve the independence of the European Central Bank*;

Or. de

Amendment 675
Sylvie Goulard, Charles Goerens

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary to endow the European Central Bank with the status of lender of last resort *for market actors directly under its supervision or oversight*, enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank;

Or. en

Amendment 676
Paulo Rangel, Cristian Dan Preda

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it *necessary* to endow the European Central Bank with the status of *lender of last resort enjoying the full powers of a federal reserve bank*;

Amendment

25. Considers it *recommendable, in the long term*, to endow the European Central Bank with the status *and with the competences of a federal reserve bank, provided that its independence is fully granted*;

Or. en

Amendment 677
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

Motion for a resolution

25. Considers it necessary to *endow* the European Central *Bank with the status of* lender of last resort *enjoying the full*

Amendment

25. Considers it necessary to *reinforce* the European Central *Bank's role in which it should not act as the* lender of last resort

powers of a federal reserve bank;

in accord with its limited purpose and mission;

Or. en

Amendment 678
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25a. Considers it necessary, owing to the poor supervision of the ECB, which has gone beyond its mandate to set monetary policy multiple times, to introduce a mechanism which makes it possible for countries to withdraw from the Eurozone;

Or. de

Amendment 679
Rainer Wieland

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;

deleted

Or. de

Amendment 680
Beatrix von Storch

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;* **deleted**

Or. de

Amendment 681
Markus Pieper

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;* **deleted**

Or. de

Amendment 682
Max Andersson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European* **deleted**

Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;

Or. sv

Amendment 683
Pervenche Berès, Pedro Silva Pereira

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 684
Bernd Lucke

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;* **deleted**

Or. en

Amendment 685
Martina Anderson

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

26. *Calls for the suppression of Article 126(10) TFEU in order that the European Court of Justice gain full jurisdiction over the operation of the EMU, as is appropriate in a democratic system of economic governance based on the rule of law and the principle of equality among Member States;* *deleted*

Or. en