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*Committee on Foreign Affairs*

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## **DRAFT REPORT**

on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)

(00000/2013 – 2013/2105(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Maria Eleni Koppa

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## MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

**on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy)**

**(00000/2013 – C7-0000/2013 – 2013/2105(INI))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (00000/2013 - C7-0000/2013),
- having regard to Articles 2, 3, 21, 24 and 36 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
- having regard to Title V TEU and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
- having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2012,
- having regard to the European Security Strategy entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and to the report on its implementation entitled ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’, endorsed by the European Council on 11-12 December 2008,
- having regard to the Council conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy of 1 December 2011 and of 23 July 2012, as well as to the Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities of 23 March 2012;
- having regard to the Council conclusions on maritime security strategy of 26 April 2010;
- having regard to the Council conclusions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection of 27 May 2011 and to the previous Council’s conclusions on cyber security,
- having regard to the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing adopted by the EU defence ministers on 19 November 2012,
- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ of 24 July 2013 (COM(2013)0542),
- having regard to Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC<sup>1</sup>,

- having regard to its resolutions of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy<sup>2</sup>, on the EU's mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions<sup>3</sup>, on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters<sup>4</sup>, and on Cyber Security and Defence<sup>5</sup>, as well as those of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States<sup>6</sup>, of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty<sup>7</sup> and of 23 November 2010 on civilian-military cooperation and the development of civilian-military capabilities<sup>8</sup>,
- having regard to its recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, to the Council and to the Commission of 13 June 2013 on the 2013 review of the organisation and the functioning of the EEAS<sup>9</sup> and to the EEAS Review 2013 presented by the High Representative in July 2013<sup>10</sup>,
- having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
- having regard to Rule 119(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0000/2013),

### ***European security and defence in a changing world***

1. Notes the significant and ongoing changes in the geopolitical environment characterised by multidimensional and asymmetric threats, by the rise of emerging powers and a strategic shift in attention by the US towards the Pacific region, by increased instability in the EU's southern neighbourhood, by maritime challenges, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and by a severe and long-lasting financial and economic crisis with a major impact on the GDP of many EU Member States and, consequently, on national defence budgets on both sides of the Atlantic; notes that no single member of the EU is able to overcome these multifaceted challenges by itself;
2. Believes that reassessing and strengthening Europe's role in the world constitutes one of the major challenges of the 21st century and that the time has come for the Member States

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76.

<sup>2</sup> Text adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0455.

<sup>3</sup> Text adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0456.

<sup>4</sup> Text adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0458.

<sup>5</sup> Text adopted, P7\_TA(2012)0457.

<sup>6</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2011)0574.

<sup>7</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2011)0228.

<sup>8</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2010)0419.

<sup>9</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2013)0278.

<sup>10</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013\\_eeas\\_review\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf)

of the Union to decide whether the EU should be a relevant global actor and security provider with strategic autonomy; considers that a change of mindset is required in order to anchor a European approach to security and defence;

3. Welcomes, therefore, the European Council decision to hold a discussion dedicated to security and defence at the December 2013 Summit; considers that this provides a timely opportunity to underline at the highest political level and to communicate to the public in Europe that security and defence issues matter; strongly believes that the EU needs to be able to provide security for its citizens, to assume its share of responsibility for world peace and to play an effective role in preventing and managing regional crises in its neighbourhood, contributing to their resolution and protecting itself against the negative effects of these crises;
4. Looks forward to substantive decisions being taken at the Summit and puts forward its own recommendations with this report, building upon relevant positions taken by the European Parliament in the recent past and paying close attention to the ongoing debate on the three main issues (clusters) identified by the December 2012 European Council;

### ***Unleashing the potential of the treaties***

5. Notes that the Lisbon Treaty introduced several new instruments in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which have not yet been put into practice;
6. Emphasises in this regard the possibility of establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) among Member States (Article 46.6 TEU), of entrusting CSDP missions and operations in particular to that group of Member States (Articles 42.5 and 44.1 TEU), and of establishing a start-up fund for preparatory activities for missions which are not charged to the Union budget (Article 41.3 TEU); highlights in this context the importance of leveraging those EU policies which have an impact on security and defence, like industrial research and innovation, market, trade and space policies, in order to support those Member States which are engaged in further strengthening the CSDP;
7. Stresses the importance of these commonly agreed provisions for the strengthening of the CSDP and calls on the European Council to conduct a serious discussion about their implementation in a coherent manner; calls on the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) to play an active role in this process;

### ***First cluster: increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP***

8. Points out that, according to the Treaties, the EU's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples (Article 3 TEU) and that its action on the international scene seeks to consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders (Article 21 TEU); is convinced that the CSDP serves these aims and underlines the need to upgrade it;

9. Stresses that the main asset of the European Union is the availability of various policies and instruments, combined through the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’, and that it is possible to achieve better results at all levels by better integrating the CSDP into this approach; welcomes in this respect the review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS published by the HR/VP in July 2013, which recognises the problems of coordination and those related to the speed and effectiveness of decision-making in the area of the CSDP; looks forward to specific decisions being taken at the December Summit and expects the further integration of the CSDP to be analysed thoroughly in the upcoming joint Communication by the HR/VP and the Commission on the implementation of the comprehensive approach;
10. Reiterates its conviction that although elements of the 2003 European Security Strategy, as supplemented in 2008, remain valid, the EU needs to review and to complement this strategy by taking recent developments into account and redefining its interests and priorities, with a greater emphasis on its neighbourhood, and by dovetailing the different regional and topical sub-strategies; believes that such an exercise will provide a clearer strategic framework for external action by the EU, enhance consistency and, at the same time, communicate better to the citizens the challenges and risks facing them in the future; requests therefore that the European Council launch a debate on the appropriate strategic framework for the Union, mandate the HR/VP to come forward with proposals in this respect before the end of 2014 and ensure sustainable follow-up, subject to regular updates;
11. Repeats its call for a European White Paper on defence and suggests that the European Council consider this option; urges the EU Member States, furthermore, to give serious consideration to the European dimension in their national security strategies and White Papers;
12. Believes that the introduction of a mutual defence clause and a solidarity clause by the Treaties (Article 42.7 TEU and Article 222 TFEU) reinforces the sense of common destiny among European citizens; calls on the Heads of State and Government to reaffirm their commitment to mutual political solidarity;
13. Notes with concern that the number and timeliness of CSDP missions and operations, and the development of civilian and especially military means for the CSDP, fall short of what is required, given the EU’s increasingly insecure neighbourhood; deplores, in particular, the limited overall scope of the CSDP missions related to the crises in Libya and Mali; calls for greater ambition and serious efforts to improve the design of future CSDP missions and operations under a ‘lessons learned process’ and to develop appropriate exit strategies;
14. Emphasises the need to enhance the visibility of European crisis management and to place all efforts under the CSDP, making use, where appropriate, of the provision in Article 44 TEU for a Council decision entrusting the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task;
15. Expresses its concern, based on experience in the recent past, that the comprehensive approach to crisis management has not yet reached its full potential; considers that missions and operations are more meaningful when they are embedded into a regional

strategy, as the positive example of the Horn of Africa demonstrates; takes note of the ‘Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations’ endorsed by the Member States on 18 June 2013;

16. Asks that the functional problems of civilian CSDP missions, notably regarding the speed of deployment, be tackled by reviewing their legal and financial framework, which often complicates the decision-making process and leads to delays; calls for an increase in the number of planners, which is too small in comparison to the number of missions; further asks Member States to create a ‘civilian reserve corps’ that could be deployed quickly if needed; welcomes in this regard the recently established permanent CSDP warehouse;
17. Highlights the fact that successful military operations require a clear command and control function; reiterates therefore its call for the establishment of a permanent military operational headquarters; notes with regret the lack of progress on this issue and the strong resistance by some Member States; stresses further that an effective CSDP requires adequate early warning and intelligence support; considers, therefore, that these headquarters should include cells for intelligence gathering and for early warning/situational awareness;
18. Reiterates its support for a provisional solution and draws attention to its proposal to improve the status of the currently active Operations Centre for the Horn of Africa; asks the HR/VP to develop such an option, within the constraints of its current size and infrastructure, in order to optimise the use of existing resources, and to examine the feasibility of creating an organisational cell to take care of the necessary logistics of an operation from Brussels, thus enabling the military commander to concentrate on his/her tasks in the operational field; considers that this body should have legal capacity and be assigned the role of coordinating procurement between Brussels and individual mission headquarters, using economies of scale to maximise savings;
19. Deplores the fact that EU battlegroups have never yet been deployed in EU military operations; stresses nonetheless that they constitute an important tool for timely force generation and rapid reaction; welcomes the decision to address this issue during the December Summit; is convinced that the EU should dispose of high-readiness standing battle forces, with land, air, naval and special forces components and a high level of ambition; favours a more flexible and targeted approach to enhance the response and adaptability to different crisis situations, and to improve modularity in order to close gaps during the initial phases of the launch of CSDP operations without, however, compromising the operational capacity of the battlegroup as a whole;
20. Confirms that the existing financial system of ‘costs lie where they fall’ constitutes a serious problem for the CSDP, leading to delays or complete blockages in decision-making, notably on the quick deployment of battlegroups; recommends that Member States agree on an EU financing mechanism based on burden-sharing for the use of battlegroups under the EU flag, in order to give them a realistic future; expects the HR/VP and interested Member States to put forward concrete proposals in this respect;
21. Expresses its concern, furthermore, that the economic and debt crisis may have an impact on the willingness of EU Member States to contribute to CSDP missions and operations, particularly those with military and defence implications; calls therefore for extension of

the scope of the ATHENA mechanism and use of the start-up fund (Article 41.3 TEU) to ensure the rapid financing of urgent tasks;

22. Invites Member States to exploit the possibilities offered by PESCO and to start implementing this Treaty provision in order to tackle the prevailing 'CSDP fatigue' and deepen military cooperation and integration; calls on the European Council to deliver clear guidelines for its implementation and invites Member States that are not interested to act constructively; stresses that the possibility of joining at a later stage should be left open;
23. Points out that the European economy depends on the freedom of navigation and on open sea routes; calls therefore on the European Council to consider the strategic maritime interests of the EU and to mandate the HR/VP and the Commission to draw up an EU maritime security strategy, in line with the April 2010 Council conclusions, and to develop a specific implementation plan; points out that the integration of maritime surveillance across sectors and borders is already a cross-sectoral tool of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IPM); highlights the importance of swiftly implementing the Common Information Sharing Environment project and building a 'bridge' between the IPM and the CSDP to improve information sharing between them;
24. Requests that the European Council reconfirm the importance of space, which underpins the strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States and the potential to gain autonomous access to space by developing launchers and satellites; reiterates the importance of gathering precise intelligence for both civil and military CSDP missions and operations; emphasises in particular the role of space-based assets in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management before, during and after a crisis; invites the Commission to develop a specific policy to support the development of multiple-use space assets;
25. Invites the European Council to develop guidelines for the implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy and to take concrete measures regarding the protection of cyber infrastructure and EU-wide cooperation on crisis management procedures, cyber exercises, training and education;
26. Asks the European Council to reaffirm the significance of access to energy resources and the security of Europe's energy supply; notes that operation ATALANTA is already performing an energy security role by combating pirates who have hijacked a number of oil tankers since 2008; believes, therefore, that these aspects need to be part of the necessary strategic approach; emphasises in this context that energy supply is a crucial factor for successful CSDP missions and operations; notes that the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe could activate the mutual defence and/or solidarity clause;
27. Underlines the importance for the EU to further develop partnerships and deepen its security dialogue with the UN, regional organisations and relevant players;
28. Points out that the EU should further engage with the UN, the African Union, the OSCE and ASEAN in order to share analysis and cooperate in addressing the challenges of climate change, including its security implications; underlines the need for preventive action and urges the EU to develop and improve early warning capabilities;

29. Calls for stronger cooperation between the EU and NATO structures through a complementary approach; is convinced that strengthening the CSDP does no harm to, and indeed reinforces, collective security and transatlantic links; asserts that the development of defence capabilities within an EU context also benefits NATO; considers that coordination and cooperation between the EU and NATO structures remains unsatisfactory due to the implications of the unresolved Cyprus issue; hopes that the Republic of Cyprus's intention to join NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme can be a game changer and urges Turkey to adopt an equally constructive attitude; urges the development of a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO cooperation and the deepening of political dialogue with full respect for the decision-making of each party;
30. Takes the view that the EU needs to be able to act autonomously when appropriate and necessary, but always in line with the provisions of the UN Charter and ensuring full respect for international humanitarian law;

***Second cluster: enhance the development of defence capabilities***

31. Echoes concerns that further cuts in national defence budgets will make it impossible to maintain critical military capabilities and will result in the irreversible loss of know-how and technologies; notes that the shortfalls in Member States' capabilities became apparent during the operations in Libya and Mali and that the economic crisis has exacerbated existing structural problems; reiterates its view, however, that the problem is less of a budgetary nature than of a political one;
32. Stresses the opportunity for Member States to enjoy the full benefits of working closer together and to decide to spend scarce resources in a better and smarter way, avoiding redundancy and unnecessary duplication;
33. Welcomes the ongoing revision of the Capability Development Plan as the basis for a long-term joint transformation concept for capability-building; believes that this transformation concept should be discussed regularly and its implementation streamlined and, as appropriate, reviewed;
34. Draws attention to the mission of the European Defence Agency (EDA), as provided for in Articles 42(3) and 45 TEU, according to which the Agency is entrusted with important tasks in terms of implementing permanent structured cooperation, formulating a European capabilities and armaments policy, developing the military capabilities of Member States, and strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector; calls on the Member States to empower the Agency to fulfil this mission and to consider financing the Agency from the EU budget;
35. Considers that, although not a panacea, the pooling and sharing of military capabilities constitutes an important response to shortfalls in European capabilities; welcomes the facilitating role of the EDA and the progress achieved so far; believes that pooling and sharing should not only be considered in terms of joint sourcing, but also in terms of integration, and should cover the shared maintenance and utilisation of capabilities;
36. Invites the EU Member States to improve information-sharing on defence planning and, in line with the Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing, to include pooling and sharing

solutions in national defence planning cycles and decision-making processes;

37. Stresses that mutual trust, transparency and reliability are key factors for the success of any common endeavour in the area of security and defence; is convinced that the development of defence capabilities must be embedded into a strategic approach that determines the appropriate mix of capabilities and the goals for which they should be used;
38. In the light of the above, expects the upcoming Defence Summit:
- (a) to provide political and strategic guidance, reconfirming the Member States' commitment to capability development and the level of ambition outlined in the 2008 Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities;
  - (b) to set the foundations for truly collective planning, ranging from strategic planning to procurement and technological development, whilst paying particular attention to the issues of financial arrangements and incentives;
  - (c) to step up the implementation of existing projects, particularly those regarding strategic enablers, and to provide political support for the EDA's flagship projects, i.e. Air-to-Air Refuelling, Satellite Communication, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Cyber Defence, and the Single European Sky;
  - (d) to task the HR/VP and the EDA, in tandem with the Commission, to come forward with new practical proposals regarding the development of defence capabilities by the end of 2014;
  - (e) to establish a monitoring process which regularly assesses the progress achieved;
  - (f) to reiterate the value of closer collaboration with NATO and strategic partners in the capabilities' development domain;
  - (g) to consider launching development work on a Military Headline Goal 2025, possibly complemented by an Industrial Headline Goal;

***Third cluster: strengthen Europe's defence industry***

39. Welcomes the Commission Communication entitled 'Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector', which brings forward some fresh ideas and proposals; fully supports the Commission's efforts to deepen the internal defence and security market and to develop a defence industrial policy, providing adequate support for SMEs which play a key role in innovation, R&D and job creation, in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy;
40. Reiterates the need for a strong and less fragmented European defence industry that is capable of sustaining the CSDP and enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy; highlights the importance of certification and standardisation for improving the interoperability of the armed forces; calls on the European Council to mandate the EDA to prepare a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards, and on the Member States to

streamline European certification procedures with the mutual recognition of certificates and to harmonise their certification procedures;

41. Stresses that the anticipation and management of change and restructuring are an integral part of any industrial policy; considers, therefore, that further market integration in the defence sector must go hand in hand with active social dialogue and the mitigation of its negative impacts on regional and local economies, making full use of EU financial instruments, such as the European Social Fund and the European Globalisation Fund;
42. Calls on the European Council to take action in these areas and to reverse the tendency to cut R&D expenditure, including at Union level; supports the development of effective and cost-efficient cooperation between civilian security and defence research activities; stresses, however, the continued need for an effective dual-use export regime;

### ***Concluding remarks***

43. Fully supports holding a debate on the three clusters at the December Defence Summit; highlights their equal importance and the fact that they are interlinked by an inherent logic serving the same strategic goals;
44. Calls on the European Council, as well as policymakers at all levels in the Member States of the Union, to show greater ambition and courage in launching a public debate, this being even more important in times of economic austerity; stresses the need to invest more and step up cooperation in the area of security and defence, and to explain the causal nexus between security and defence on the one hand, and freedom, democracy, rule of law and prosperity on the other;
45. Stresses the indivisible link between internal and external security and that a peaceful, secure and stable environment is a precondition for preserving the political, economic and social model in Europe;
46. Expresses its high hopes that this European Council will not be an isolated event, but the starting point of a continuous process that revisits security and defence matters at European Council level on a regular basis; favours, as a follow-up to the European Council, the establishment of a roadmap with benchmarks and a reporting mechanism; advocates the creation of a Council of Defence Ministers in the medium term in order to give security and defence matters the weight they deserve;
47. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States, the Secretary-General of NATO, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chair of the Assembly of the African Union and the Secretary General of ASEAN.