Procedure : 2014/2777(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-0251/2014

Texts tabled :


Debates :

PV 26/11/2014 - 7
CRE 26/11/2014 - 7

Votes :

PV 26/11/2014 - 12.3
CRE 26/11/2014 - 12.3
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :


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to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the 2014 UN Climate Change Conference – COP 20 in Lima, Peru (1-12 December 2014) (2014/2777(RSP))

Giovanni La Via Chairman - Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Karl-Heinz Florenz on behalf of the PPE Group
Jo Leinen on behalf of the S&D Group
Ian Duncan on behalf of the ECR Group
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy on behalf of the ALDE Group
Merja Kyllönen on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
Bas Eickhout on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Valentinas Mazuronis on behalf of the EFDD Group

European Parliament resolution on the climate change conference in Lima, Peru (COP 20) (2014/2777(RSP))  

The European Parliament,

–       having regard to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to the Kyoto Protocol thereto,

–       having regard to the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to the UNFCCC and the 3rd session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP3), held in Bali in 2007, and to the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/COP 13),

–       having regard to the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC and the 5th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP5), held in Copenhagen, Denmark, from 7 to 18 December 2009, and to the Copenhagen Accord,

–       having regard to the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the UNFCCC and the 6th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP6), held in Cancún, Mexico, from 29 November to 10 December 2010, and to the Cancún Agreements,

–       having regard to the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC and the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP7), held in Durban, South Africa, from 28 November to 9 December 2011, and in particular to the decisions encompassing the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action,

–       having regard to the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8), held in Doha, Qatar, from 26 November to 8 December 2012, and to the adoption of the Doha Climate Gateway,

–       having regard to the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19) to the UNFCCC and the 9th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP9), held in Warsaw, Poland, from 11 to 23 November 2013, and to the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage,

–       having regard to the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 20) to the UNFCCC and the 10th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP10), to be held in Lima, Peru, from 1 to 12 December 2014,

–       having regard to the EU climate and energy package of December 2008,

–       having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 27 March 2013 on ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’ (COM(2013)0169),

–       having regard to Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community(1),

–       having regard to its resolutions of 25 November 2009 on the EU strategy for the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change (COP 15)(2), of 10 February 2010 on the outcome of the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change (COP 15)(3), of 25 November 2010 on the Climate Change Conference in Cancun (COP 16)(4), of 16 November 2011 on the Climate Change Conference in Durban (COP 17)(5), of 22 November 2012 on the Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar (COP 18)(6), and of 23 October 2013 on the Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland (COP 19)(7),

–       having regard to its resolutions of 4 February 2009 on ‘2050: The future begins today – Recommendations for the EU’s future integrated policy on climate change’(8), of 15 March 2012 on a Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050(9) and of 5 February 2014 on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies(10),

–       having regard to the Consultative Communication from the Commission of 26 March 2013 entitled ‘The 2015 International Climate Change Agreement: Shaping international climate policy beyond 2020’ (SWD(2013)0097),

–       having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 March 2012 on the follow-up to COP 17/ CMP7, the Council conclusions of 15 May 2012 on climate finance – fast-start finance, the Council conclusions of 18 July 2011 and 24 June 2013 on EU climate diplomacy, and the Council conclusion of 15 October 2013 on the commitment of the EU and its Member States to scaling up the mobilisation of climate finance,

–       having regard to the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change of April 2013 and the accompanying Staff Working Paper,

–       having regard to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Synthesis Report of November 2012 entitled ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2012’,

–       having regard to the World Bank reports entitled ‘Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided’, ‘Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience’ and ‘Climate-Smart Development: Adding up the Benefits of Climate Action’,

–       having regard to the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate report entitled ‛Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report’,

–       having regard to the three Working Group reports of the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and its Synthesis Report,

–       having regard to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s invitation to Heads of State to attend the Climate Summit in September 2014, with a view to making clear commitments to further action on climate change,

–       having regard to the World Meteorological Organisation’s Greenhouse Gas Bulletin No 10 of 9 September 2014, and to the outcome of the Social PreCOP meeting on climate change held in Venezuela from 4 to 7 November 2014,

–       having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.     whereas climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies, biodiversity and the planet, and must thus be addressed at international level by all Parties;

B.     whereas climate change poses an unprecedented threat to the biosphere, to the availability and supply of food and water, in particular to poor people on most continents, and to health, livelihoods and economic development around the globe; whereas climate-change-related developments can destabilise communities and societies, be a driver of problematic migratory flows and help provoke or fuel tensions and conflicts;

C.     whereas in recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans; whereas in many regions, changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems and affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality; whereas glaciers continue to shrink almost worldwide owing to climate change affecting runoff and water resources downstream;

D.     whereas climate change effects are also influencing the flora and fauna of the planet; whereas many terrestrial, freshwater and marine species have shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change;

E.     whereas according to the scientific evidence presented in the 2014 Working Group reports of the IPCC AR5, warming of the climate system is unequivocal; climate change is occurring, and human activities have been the dominant cause of observed warming since the middle of the 20th century; the widespread and substantial climate-change impacts are already evident in natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans; continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes to the land, atmosphere and oceans in all regions of the globe; all countries, regardless of wealth, will be affected by the impacts of climate change; global greenhouse gas emissions over the period from 2000 to 2010 were the highest in human history; without significant global mitigation action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, global average temperature is likely to be as much as 5°C higher by the end of the century; whereas the IPCC’s findings state that some risks of climate change are considerable and increase disproportionately as temperature increases by between 1°C and 2°C;

F.     whereas, according to IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) findings, the global carbon budget available after 2011 if there is to be a likely chance of keeping the rise in global average temperature below 2°C is 1 010 Gton of CO2, while the current level of annual global emissions is approximately 36 Gton of CO2, and consequently the global 2°C‑compatible carbon budget will be exhausted in 28 years if emissions remain at their current level;

G.     whereas the internationally adopted objective of limiting global warming to below 2°C remains as important as ever; whereas the 5th report of the IPCC clearly states that we need to pursue ‘aggressive’ mitigation by 2050 to avoid exceeding a 2°C rise in global temperatures; whereas Parliament has called for the 2015 agreement to aim at phasing out global carbon emissions by 2050, and whereas, accordingly, this requires the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) to peak urgently and then decrease at a steady rate; whereas no such peak is on the horizon and the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere increased faster in 2013 than during any other year since 1984;

H.     whereas the EU had decreased its emissions by 19 % by 2012 compared to 1990, within the scope of the Kyoto Protocol, while increasing its GDP by more than 45 %, and as a result, almost halved its average emission intensity between 1990 and 2012 and reduced its per capita emissions by 25 %, down to 9 tCO2e (including all gases and all emission sources, but excluding sinks); whereas this should be taken into account both in the discussions about pre-2020 climate ambition and in the preparation of ambitious targets for 2030;

I.      whereas the comparative cut to emissions in the EU in 2012 as against 1990 exceeds that of other major economic areas, demonstrating that the target of a 20 % cut by 2020 is underambitious;

J.      whereas many countries are taking steps towards greening the economy in the industry and energy sectors, for various reasons including climate protection, resource scarcity and efficiency, energy security, innovation and competitiveness; whereas, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global CO2 emissions nevertheless rose to a record high in 2012 and, according to the IPCC, global mean surface temperatures and sea levels continue to rise;

K.     whereas according to the International Energy Outlook 2014, global energy demand is projected to increase by 56 % between 2010 and 2040(11), and meeting this demand would result in a significant increase of CO2 emissions; whereas the major part of this incremental demand and increase in emissions will occur in emerging economies; whereas there have been fossil fuel subsidies of a value of USD 1.9 trillion worldwide according to IMF figures, with the US, China and Russia as top subsidisers accounting for around half of these subsidies(12);

L.     whereas total anthropogenic GHG emissions continued to increase from 1970 to 2010, with larger absolute decadal increases towards the end of this period; whereas CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78 % of the total GHG emission increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the period 2000-2010;

M.    whereas the world’s two biggest GHG emitters, China and the USA, have recently stepped up their climate policies and initiated discussions related to phasing out of fossil fuels; whereas the EU has committed to a roadmap that would lead to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of at least 80 % by 2050;

N.     whereas the crucial role of fossil fuel subsidy reform (FFSR) is not yet acknowledged in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in spite of the important climate benefits of the removal of these subsidies in terms of lowering the global cost of stabilising GHG concentrations and shifting economies away from carbon-intensive activities; whereas this could also bring substantial environmental and health benefits, such as reductions in local air pollution, traffic congestion, accidents and road damage, and provide further incentives for investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and sustainable resource management;

O.     whereas according to the World Bank(13), fighting climate change would lead to additional GDP growth of up to USD 2.6 trillion (EUR 1.9 trillion) per year until 2030; whereas applying climate-related innovations in the energy and industry sectors, particularly in the field of energy efficiency, would be an advantage for Europe as an early mover in the growing global market for energy-related goods and services, creating jobs, stimulating economic growth, increasing energy independence and ensuring affordable energy prices for all, whilst tackling energy poverty and mitigating climate change, and progressing towards a sustainable economy;

P.     whereas the contribution that the re-use and recycling of materials can make to reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) also contributes to a competitive circular economy;

Q.     whereas the goals of climate change policies can only be reached by turning the general course of development towards ecological sustainability in both the developed and the developing countries;

R.     whereas support to developing countries to enable their adaptation and mitigation efforts must be part of the global effort;

S.     whereas the climate finance challenge is inextricable from the wider challenges of financing sustainable global development;

T.     whereas major results in tackling the climate challenge are essential for the pursuit of a great number of objectives in the EU’s environmental, development, humanitarian aid and disaster risk reduction, economic, foreign, security and human rights policies, and also for the longer-term prospects for manageable migration flows towards the EU;

U.     whereas the post-2015 development agenda focuses on sustainability to help tackle global concerns such as poverty, inequality, health, and food and water security;

V.     whereas climate change over the 21st century is projected to increase displacement of people; whereas displacement risk increases when populations lack land, primary food or housing; whereas the impacts of climate change on the critical infrastructure and territorial integrity of many states are expected to influence the national security policies and territorial integrity of small island states and states with extensive coastlines; whereas displacements due to climate change can indirectly increase the risks of violent conflicts in the form of civil war and inter-group violence;

W.    whereas throughout the 21st century, climate-change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and prolong existing poverty traps and create new ones; whereas climate-change impacts are expected to exacerbate poverty in most developing countries and create new poverty pockets in countries with increasing inequality, in both developed and developing countries;

X.     whereas the world must urgently rise to the huge and complex challenge posed by climate change by effecting a step change in mitigation and adaptation efforts, including:

-       agreement, at the climate conference in Paris in December 2015 (COP 21), on an ambitious, legally binding international agreement for post-2020 climate action which is commensurate with the 2°C objective, while respecting the right to equitable and sustainable development;

-       urgent strengthening and broadening of the measures in place to limit GHG emissions until 2020 and beyond; and

-       scaling up of developed countries’ funding for mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity building in developing countries, in line with the creation of the Green Climate Fund and the commitment to provide new and additional such funding amounting to USD 100 billion per year by 2020, while increasing official development aid in order to reach the long-since-pledged level of 0.7 % of gross national income;

Urgent need to act

1.      Recognises the extraordinary scale and seriousness of the threats induced by climate change and expresses profound concern about the continued weakness of the international response to the challenge it poses; is extremely concerned that the world is severely off track with regard to limiting global warming to an increase of below 2°C and calls on governments to take, without delay, concrete measures against climate change and towards a global agreement in Paris 2015 to deliver this target;

2.      Notes that, in line with the IPCC AR5 findings, the global carbon budget available after 2011, if there is to be a likely chance of keeping the rise in global average temperature below 2°C, is 1 010 Gton of CO2; emphasises that all countries need to contribute and that delaying action will increase costs and reduce options;

3.      Notes with concern the latest scientific findings of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, which show that CO2 emissions are set to reach a new 40 billion tonne (per year) record high in 2014 and that total future CO2 emissions cannot exceed 1 200 billion tonnes if there is to be a likely 66 % chance of keeping average global warming under 2°C;

4.      Stresses that the 2015 agreement needs to meet the goal of reducing global emissions to a level compatible with the 2°C carbon budget, and should aim at phasing out global carbon emissions by 2050;

5.      Recalls that the UNFCCC process will consider strengthening the long-term goal in relation to temperature rises to 1.5°C;

6.      Underlines the findings of the New Climate Economy report ‛Better Growth, Better Climate’ that countries of all income levels have the opportunity to build lasting economic growth at the same time as reducing the immense risks of climate change;

7.      Expects the new Commission to assume a proactive role in addressing the global climate crisis, including in terms of additional climate financing; calls on the Commission to make it clear that the climate challenge is one of its top strategic priorities and to organise itself in a way which reflects this, at all levels and across all sectors in domestic and external policies and actions, inter alia by investing in sustainable agriculture, in line with the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, and in sustainable transport;

8.      Emphasises that global climate change policies are based on the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and that they are an integral part of the global efforts to promote sustainable development all over the world; stresses that the climate change policies must be seen in this wider context and linked with the follow-up on the Rio Conference, the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 agenda;

Advancing the Durban Platform

9.      Recalls the UN Secretary-General’s summary of the UN climate summit highlighting that many leaders, from all regions and all levels of economic development, advocated a peak in greenhouse gas emissions before 2020, dramatically reduced emissions thereafter, and climate neutrality in the second half of the century;

10.    Expects the EU and its Member States to play major constructive roles at the COP 20 in Lima in order to create the necessary conditions for a successful global binding climate agreement in Paris in 2015; underlines that the governments of the world have a collective responsibility, including towards future generations, to take adequate climate action;

11.    Recalls that all Parties agreed in Warsaw to UNFCCC decision 1/CP.19, which invites all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), and to communicate them well in advance of the COP 20 (by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so) in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the INDCs and allows for their quantification; calls on the Parties to ensure that their INDCs are in line with the limited 2°C carbon budget and that a global emission peak will be reached as soon as possible;

12.    Calls on the Lima Conference to agree up-front information requirements so that INDCs are transparent, quantifiable and comparable – and differentiated according to the type of contribution; further calls on the Lima Conference to agree on an assessment phase in advance of the Paris COP to consider whether the INDCs presented are collectively sufficient in light of the ʽbelow 2°Cʼ objective, and individually fair;

13.    Emphasises that the countries that have already committed to an economy-wide emission reduction target should continue to make deeper emission cuts, and that others, in particular major emitters and those with the greatest responsibilities and capabilities, should also take on economy-wide targets that set emissions caps and reduce GHG intensity;

14.    Calls for general reinvigoration of the EU’s climate policy and for rapid agreement on ambitious, binding targets for emission reduction, energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources, except socially and environmentally harmful biofuels, by 2030, which would help build momentum in international climate discussions and are in line with the EU’s commitment to reduce its GHG emissions to 80 %-95 % below 1990 levels by 2050;

15.    Reiterates that an ambitious 2030 climate and energy framework will allow the EU to keep its first-mover position and could encourage international partners to raise their ambitions accordingly;

16.    Highlights that Parliament has called on the Commission and the Member States to set a binding EU 2030 target of reducing domestic greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 % compared with 1990 levels, a binding EU 2030 energy efficiency target of 40 %, in line with research on cost-effective energy saving potential, and a binding EU 2030 target of producing at least 30 % of total final energy consumption from renewable energy sources; urges Member States to take these targets into account in their ongoing discussions;

Elements of the 2015 Agreement

17.    Emphasises that the 2015 Agreement must be ambitious from the outset when adopted in Paris, so as to keep the world on track for the ʽbelow 2°C’ objective, and calls for the EU to work with its international partners to that end;

18.    Is of the view that the Lima Conference should set out the main elements of the 2015 Agreement, building on the progress accomplished throughout 2014 under the Durban Platform, and reiterates that mitigation, adaptation, climate finance and means of implementation will all be essential parts of the 2015 Agreement;

19.    Calls on the EU to include all parties in its work towards an ambitious and fair 2015 Agreement which is both in line with the latest science and responsive to new scientific findings and changing circumstances, so that it remains fit for purpose and sustainable for many years beyond 2020; stresses, therefore, the need for a mechanism that allows for a regular review of the mitigation commitments, which will enable Parties to adjust their pledges upwards in light of the ʽbelow 2°C’ objective, without the need for the Agreement to be reopened;

20.    Underlines the need for an effective compliance regime applicable to all Parties under the 2015 Agreement; emphasises that the 2015 Agreement must promote transparency and accountability through a common rules-based regime including accounting rules and monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements; highlights that rules should be differentiated on the basis of the type of commitment Parties decide to choose, drawing on the lessons learnt from the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol;

21.    Believes that effort-sharing should be based on equity principles, focusing in particular on current and accumulated past GHG emissions and on capabilities, assessed, for example, with the help of GDP per capita figures, human development and poverty indexes and data that give a picture of the level of difficulty with which emissions can be reduced or limited; notes the importance of progress on climate funding for overall progress towards a new climate agreement;

Pre-2020 ambition and the Kyoto Protocol

22.    Places particular emphasis on the urgent need for progress in closing the gigatonne gap which exists between scientific findings and the current Parties’ pledges for the period up to 2020; calls for those Parties who have not yet made a commitment to do so; emphasises the important role of other policy measures, including energy efficiency, substantial energy savings, renewable energy, resource efficiency and the phase-down of HFCs, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and strengthening the role of widespread pricing of carbon, in contributing to closing the gigatonne gap;

23.    Calls on all Parties, international organisations, sub-national actors and non-governmental organisations to urgently develop, scale up and implement domestic policies and international cooperation initiatives to close the gigatonne gap, building in particular on the initiatives profiled at the UNSG Climate Summit (such as the Clean Air and Climate Coalition) and on the policy dialogues identifying high-impact opportunities for climate, development and growth conducted at technical and political levels in the UNFCCC framework;

24.    Taking note of the significant surplus of Kyoto Protocol compliance units (AAUs, CERs and ERUs) to be transferred to EU and Member State accounts for the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period, calls for the EU and the Member States, pursuant to Decision 1/CMP.8 requiring Parties to revisit by 2014 their reduction commitments for the second commitment period, to cancel a number of units to align with projected real emissions and with a cost-effective domestic emission trajectory towards the EU’s 2050 climate target;

25.    Looks forward to the EU and several of its Member States, as well as other Parties, undergoing a multilateral assessment of progress on their reduction targets for 2020 at the Lima Conference, as part of the International Assessment and Review (IAR) process; believes that such transparency is necessary to help understand mutual efforts and build trust among all Parties;

26.    Notes that the EU is on track to achieve emissions reductions well beyond the current 20 % target, and reiterates that the EU has offered to increase its emissions reduction target to 30 % by 2020 if other major emitting countries commit to comparable reduction targets;

27.    Clarifies that, although the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will be limited in its extent, it should be seen as a very important interim step, and therefore calls on Parties, including EU Member States, to ratify the second commitment period rapidly;

28.    Underlines the contribution that re-use and recycling can make to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as the use of raw materials is a significant source of GHG production; reiterates the importance of moving to a circular economy with increased recycling rates;

29.    Notes that the EU must fulfil its vital role in reducing emissions through policies that halt the development of highly greenhouse-gas-intensive unconventional fossil fuels such as tar sands;

30.    Notes that many countries are already leading by example, showing that low-carbon development strategies and economic growth go hand in hand; emphasises that a strong international agreement will encourage further ambitious domestic action;

Climate finance

31.    Recalls the EU’s commitment, and that of its Member States, to scaling up the mobilisation of climate finance, in order to contribute their share to the Copenhagen Accord commitment to capitalise the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance; calls on other donor countries to play their part in order to foster further mobilisation of climate finance;

32.    Requests that the EU agree on a roadmap for scaling up predictable, new and additional finance, in line with existing commitments, towards its fair share of the USD 100 billion a year by 2020, and that it establish a mechanism to facilitate accountability and monitoring; welcomes recent pledges made to contribute finance to the Green Climate Fund, and urges other countries to contribute their fair share, with developed countries providing USD 15 billion of grants for the Green Climate Fund in the next three years;

33.    Calls on Member States to make their financial contributions well ahead of the conferences and to better coordinate their announcements concerning climate finance with the EU, in order to facilitate communication with third parties on the overall EU contribution and to make the most positive impact possible on the negotiations; underlines the fact that financial pledges made at the Ban Ki-moon Summit were a good sign and had a positive impact on the image of the EU ahead of the Lima negotiations;

34.    Recalls that innovative financial sources might be needed in order to ensure that the target of USD 100 billion per year will be reached by 2020 and beyond, and calls on nations to look into options in Lima;

35.    Reiterates the call for dedicating revenues from market-based instruments to reduce global aviation and shipping emissions to post-2020 international climate finance and the Green Climate Fund; considers that the EU should make proposals for adequate and predictable international climate finance for the 2015 agreement by the March 2015 deadline;

36.    Urges Member States to use revenues raised through carbon markets for climate financing and development aid in developing countries; points out, however, that this mechanism faces major problems as the revenues have collapsed alongside the global price for carbon; in this context, considers that measures need to be taken to make the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) a much more efficient instrument, in particular through the cancellation of a number of emission units to align with projected real emissions and with a cost-effective domestic emission trajectory towards the EU’s 2050 climate target, which can then generate substantial resources that should help to finance developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation measures;

37.    Calls on the EU and its Member States to clearly define the role of private finance in the context of additional leverage of funding, while recognising that this cannot replace the need for public finance, in particular for adaptation, to emphasise the need for transparent reporting and accountability of such finance and to ensure the implementation of relevant social and environmental safeguards;

Adaptation; loss and damage

38.    Calls on major developed economies to harness their existing advanced infrastructure to promote, enhance and develop sustainable growth and to commit to supporting developing countries in building up their own capacity to ensure future economic growth in all parts of the world is achieved at no further cost to the environment;

39.    Emphasises that adaptation action is an inevitable necessity and needs to play a central role in the new agreement; underlines that acting now to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be less expensive for global and national economies and would make adaptation actions less costly; urges all countries to take appropriate measures to plan, adapt and respond to the impacts of climate change in order to protect their people, societies, economies and environment, and to achieve sustainable climate-resilient development; notes that responding to climate-related risks involves decision making in a changing world, with continuing uncertainty about the severity and timing of climate-change impacts and with limits to the effectiveness of adaptation;

40.    Recalls that developing countries, in particular Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, have contributed the least to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but are the most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have the least capacity to adapt; calls on all countries in a position to do so to support those countries that are the most vulnerable in their efforts to adapt and respond to the impacts of climate change in order to achieve climate‑resilient sustainable development and to seek agreements on strengthening national adaptation planning processes, climate financing, technology transfer and capacity building;

41.    Acknowledges the focus placed at the last two COPs on the need to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing and least developed countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; notes the need to fully implement the decisions taken in Warsaw and further address this in Lima;

42.    Stresses the need to ensure predictability of climate finance for developing countries to assist them in their efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change; in this context, underlines that countries contributing to the Green Climate Fund will need to clarify what sources of finance will be used and how they will raise this money, as this information would ensure predictability of revenues for developing countries;

43.    Recognises the difficulties of separating climate and development actions and their many synergies at country level, but insists that credible and transparent assessments of how additionality is respected remain possible;

44.    Deplores the fact that although spending on mitigation and adaptation activities is increasing, it is dwarfed by the fact that most governments, including governments of developed countries, still actively subsidise the production and consumption of fossil fuels;

45.    Stresses the need to base climate actions on gender-equitable, participatory and rights-based approaches and to tackle climate impacts with a view in particular to supporting poor and marginalised people and communities;

Land sector

46.    Stresses that in line with the IPCC’s findings, land use (agricultural, forest and other land uses) is amongst the most exposed and vulnerable segments of our economies, while simultaneously having significant cost-effective potential for mitigation and enhancing resilience; notes the importance for all Parties to include a land component in their national contribution, with appropriate common metrics to monitor, report and verify quantifiable progress towards several interrelated objectives (i.e. mitigation, productivity and resilience); highlights the fact that the agreement should set out a comprehensive accounting framework for emissions and removals from land;

47.    Stresses that particular attention must be paid to ensuring food and nutrition security for vulnerable populations in the face of climate change;

International aviation and maritime transport

48.    Reiterates the importance of maritime and air transport in terms of GHG emission reductions, and the need for swift progress and ambition in reaching satisfactory and timely outcomes on the part of both the International Maritime Organisation and the International Civil Aviation Organisation, in line with the scale and urgency of the climate challenge;

Climate diplomacy

49.    Stresses, in this context, the importance of the EU as a major player, speaking with ‘one voice’ at the Conference in seeking progress towards an international agreement and staying united in that regard; calls on the Member States to effectively coordinate their positions with that of the EU; underlines that the EU must put pressure on Parties that are not on a trajectory compliant with the 2ºC objective; calls upon the EU delegation to stress those commitments made by other governments in signing the Kyoto Protocol;

50.    Calls on Member States to engage in intensive diplomatic outreach to our partner countries to further EU negotiating positions, coordinating with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, including through the Green Diplomacy Network;

51.    Welcomes the UN SG Climate Summit held in New York on 23 September 2014 to discuss climate change for the first time since Copenhagen, which brought together over 130 heads of state and government and numerous civil society and business actors; welcomes in particular leaders’ announcements of concrete actions to reduce emissions, invest in clean energy and low carbon growth, support pricing of carbon and contribute to climate finance; underlines that the follow-up on leaders’ commitments made in New York will be critical for maintaining the momentum in the run-up to the Lima and Paris Conferences;

52.    Considers that the EU’s credibility in the context of climate negotiations depends on the ambition of its domestic action;

53.    Stresses that the overarching post-2015 agenda should reinforce the international community’s commitment to sustainable development and should also be supportive of international commitments and targets, including on climate change;

54.    Emphasises that COP 21 is a unique opportunity to tackle climate change and to make the link with UN work on the post-2015 development agenda and with the preparations for the March 2015 conference on the Hyogo Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; calls for more active EU climate diplomacy to link these processes, pursuing the objectives of sustainable development in a coherent and ambitious way;

Industry and competitiveness

55.    Is concerned about the global CO2 emissions increase in 2013, according to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, despite falling emissions in Europe and the United States; suggests, therefore, considering differentiated responsibilities so that each country contributes to the global efforts in the field of industrial and energy policy; calls for a better use of technologies such as space satellites for accurate collection of emissions and temperature data, and for transparent cooperation and information‑sharing between countries;

56.    Underlines that Europe should further increase the market penetration of environmentally friendly technologies, including in the fields of ICT, renewable energies, innovative and efficient low-emission technologies, and in particular energy efficiency technologies; stresses that a stable international legal framework would encourage investments in carbon reduction, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and provide opportunities for leading EU businesses in these sectors; notes that innovative sustainable investments can create growth and jobs;

57.    Believes that an ambitious and legally binding international agreement would help to address the carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns of the relevant sectors, in particular the energy-intensive sector;

Research and innovation

58.    Stresses that the development and deployment of sustainable breakthrough technologies hold the key to fighting climate change and, at the same time, to convincing the EU’s partners worldwide that emissions reductions are feasible while increasing competitiveness and jobs;

59.    Calls for an international commitment to increase research and development (R&D) investment in sustainable breakthrough technologies in the relevant sectors; considers it essential that the EU lead by example by channelling research expenditure into the demonstration of innovative climate-friendly and energy-efficient technologies, and that the EU develop close scientific cooperation in this field with international partners, such as the BRIC countries and the USA;

Energy policy

60.    Welcomes recent signals from the US and Chinese governments regarding climate action and their willingness to play a more significant role in global efforts to address climate change; regrets the fact that some developed countries continue to increase their emissions per capita;

61.    Notes that the prices of different energy sources play a major role in determining the behaviour of market actors, including industry and consumers, and notes that the inability of the current international policy framework to fully internalise external costs perpetuates unsustainable consumption patterns; further reiterates that a global carbon market with a sufficiently high trading price would be a sound basis for achieving both substantial emission abatements and a level playing field for industry; calls on the EU and its partners to find, in the immediate future, the most effective way of promoting links between the EU ETS and other trading schemes aiming for a global carbon market, ensuring greater diversity of abatement options, improved market size and liquidity, transparency and, ultimately, more efficient allocation of resources for the energy sector and industry;

62.    Calls for closer coordination between the Council, the Commission and the EEAS so as to enable the EU to speak with a coordinated voice vis-à-vis international organisations such as the IEA, the International Renewable Energy Agency, the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and thus play a more active and influential role, particularly in pushing for policies fostering sustainable energy, energy efficiency and energy safety;

63.    Calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt without delay concrete measures for progressively phasing out all environmentally harmful subsidies by 2020, including subsidies on fossil fuels, guided by the Commission, using an action-based approach and monitoring via the European Semester; calls, in addition, for the internationally coordinated implementation of the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit objective of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, which, according to the IEA, accounted for USD 544 billion worldwide in 2012, as this would significantly reduce CO2 emissions and would also help to cut public deficit in many countries; welcomes the Saint Petersburg G-20 intention to set up a peer-review system on the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies; deplores the lack of progress regarding concrete measures towards the implementation of this objective; calls for a review of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with particular emphasis on preventing adverse impacts of CDM projects on human rights, food security and the environment;

64.    Considers it regrettable that energy savings potential is not adequately tackled internationally and in the EU; underlines the fact that energy savings allow for job creation, economic savings and energy security, and increase competitiveness and emission cuts, and that they are key in decoupling emissions from economic growth; calls on the EU to push for more attention and action regarding energy savings in international negotiations, be it when discussing technology transfer, development plans for developing countries or financial assistance; highlights that in order to be credible, the EU and its Member States must set and meet ambitious energy efficiency targets; stresses the importance of reducing energy wastage in the construction and transport industries and in domestic electrical systems and appliances, in order to maximise energy savings and energy efficiency;

65.    Stresses the need to introduce low-energy-consumption and hydrogen-fuelled transport systems;

HFCs and the Montreal Protocol

66.    Invites the Parties to look at the voting and decision mechanisms of the successful Montreal Protocol, its different approach to responsibilities, and its enforcement and sanction mechanisms and financing, as an example which might also be used under the UNFCCC; calls for the EU to step up efforts to regulate a global HFC phase-down under the Montreal Protocol;

67.    Recalls that the EU has adopted ambitious legislation to phase down HFCs by 79 % by 2030, as climate-friendly alternatives are widely available and their potential should be fully exploited; notes that phasing down the use of HFCs represents a low-hanging fruit for mitigating actions in and outside the EU, and calls on the EU to be actively engaged in facilitating global action on HFCs;

European Parliament delegation

68.    Believes that the EU delegation plays a vital role in the climate change negotiations, and therefore finds it unacceptable that Members of the European Parliament have been unable to attend the EU coordination meetings at previous Conferences of the Parties; expects at least the Chair of the European Parliament delegation to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings in Lima;

69.    Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Contracting Parties.



OJ L 8, 13.1.2009, p. 3.


OJ C 285 E, 21.10.2010, p. 1.


OJ C 341 E, 16.12.2010, p. 25.


OJ C 99 E, 3.4.2012, p. 77.


OJ C 153 E, 31.5.2013, p. 83.


Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0452.


Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0443.


OJ C 67 E, 18.3.2010, p. 44.


OJ C 251 E, 31.8.2013, p. 75.


Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0094.




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