### **European Parliament**

2014-2019



### Plenary sitting

B8-0181/2016

1.2.2016

## **MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Libya (2016/2537(RSP))

Fabio Massimo Castaldo, Ignazio Corrao, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD Group

RE\1085444EN.doc PE576.542v01-00

#### B8-0181/2016

# European Parliament resolution on the situation in Libya (2016/2537(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Libya, in particular those of 15 September 2011<sup>1</sup>, 22 November 2012<sup>2</sup>, 18 September 2014<sup>3</sup> and 15 January 2015<sup>4</sup>,
- having regard to the recent statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Federica Mogherini, on Libya, including those of 7 and 19 January 2016,
- having regard to the declaration by the VP/HR on behalf of the EU on the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement,
- having regard to the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 15 December 2014, of
  9 February, 16 March and 12 October 2015, and of 18 January 2016,
- having regard to United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011),
  2174 (2014), 2238 (2015), 2240 (2015) and 2259 (2015),
- having regard to Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 creating the European Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)<sup>5</sup>,
- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED)<sup>6</sup>, and to the launch of the second phase of the operation against human smugglers (Operation Sophia) on 7 October 2015,
- having regard to the joint communique issued on 13 December 2015 following the Ministerial Meeting for Libya in Rome,
- having regard to the appointment of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya on 4 November 2015,
- having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas on 17 December 2015, in the framework of the UN-facilitated political dialogue, Libyan delegates signed the Libyan Political Agreement in Skhirat, Morocco;
- B. whereas on 19 January 2016 the Libyan Presidential Council announced the formation

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> OJ C 51 E, 22.2.2013, p. 114.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> OJ C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 192.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Texts adopted, P8\_TA(2014)0028.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Texts adopted, P8\_TA(2015)0010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> OJ L 138, 24.5.2013, p. 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> OJ L 122, 19.5.2015, p. 31.

- of a new Government of National Accord aimed at uniting the country's warring factions under the Libyan Political Agreement; whereas only seven of the Council's nine members signed the document, which named a total of 32 ministers, including one woman;
- C. whereas two thirds of the legislature were required to approve the new administration within 10 days in order for it to begin carrying out its work, but on 25 January 2016 the House of Representatives expressed reservations about Article 8 of the Accord and rejected the cabinet proposed by the Presidential Council, setting a 10-day deadline for submission of a new proposal;
- D. whereas at the Ministerial Meeting for Libya held in Rome in December 2015, various actors, including the Arab League, the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union, pledged their support for the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya, stating that they would cease official contacts with individuals and institutions not validated by the Libyan Political Agreement and reject any foreign interference in the Libyan process;
- E. whereas a number of recent terrorist attacks by ISIS/Daesh, including an attack on a training centre in Zliten on 7 January 2016 and other attacks on oil infrastructures and storage facilities, show an increase in activity by the terrorist group in the country; whereas up to 3 000 ISIS/Daesh fighters are now reportedly resident in the city of Sirte and the terrorist group is expanding its influence along the Mediterranean coast; whereas there has been a surge of foreign fighters travelling to join terrorist organisations in Libya;
- F. whereas the absence of rule of law and the high levels of violence in Libya, combined with the proliferation of weapons and the vacuum of power, have allowed violent extremist groups such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Shariah in Libya (ASL) to thrive; whereas these terrorist organisations are using Libya as a safe haven from which to launch operations against neighbouring countries, and Libya has become a new destination for foreign jihadist fighters;
- G. whereas the security situation in Libya remains extremely unstable, not only because of the presence of terrorist organisations but also owing to the presence of militia groups battling for control of smuggling routes and key resource hubs; whereas the Libyan borders remain extremely porous and permeable to the trafficking of weapons and humans;
- H. whereas the current situation in Libya is the product of a series of significant mistakes, dating back to the military intervention of 2011; whereas several international actors have clearly shown their intention to promote a new military campaign against ISIS/Daesh in Libya once the new government is in place, and the US, the UK, France and Italy have reportedly begun to lay the groundwork for such an intervention; whereas, at the same time, various Libyan actors have made it clear that they are against foreign intervention and that help would be welcomed in the form of logistical and technical support only;
- I. whereas since July 2014, Libya has witnessed relentless civil unrest owing to fighting between rival militias, which has resulted in the displacement of an estimated 440 000

people; whereas the security conditions remain extremely volatile and there is a constant flux of migrants trying to reach neighbouring countries and the other side of the Mediterranean; whereas 2015 has been the deadliest year thus far for migrants crossing the Mediterranean, with most of those deaths occurring along a dangerous central Mediterranean route used by smugglers operating out of Libya; whereas in 2015 more than 144 000 migrants tried to cross the sea, the vast majority of whom travelled from Libya;

- J. whereas the European Union is ready to provide Libya with an aid package of EUR 100 million once the unity government starts operating in the country; whereas the money will be used for projects to be discussed with the Government of National Accord;
- K. whereas a series of leaked emails seem to show that former UN Special Representative for Libya Bernardino León was working in coordination with the United Arab Emirates, one of the parties involved in Libya, for most of his tenure, while at the same time laying the groundwork for a remunerative position at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy;
- L. whereas existing divides between the east and west of Libya have been exacerbated by the security situation in the country and, in the absence of a successful process leading to a Government of National Accord, Libyan territorial integrity could be at risk;
- M. whereas Libya has lost USD 60 billion in production and exports as a result of disruptions at oil ports and fields over the past three years, and attacks by Islamic State militants have caused tremendous damage to the oil industry; whereas Libya produced about 1.6 million barrels of oil per day (BOPD) before 2011 but is now the smallest producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, with only 362 000 BOPD;
- 1. Welcomes the signing, on 17 December 2015, of the Libyan Political Agreement and endorses it, but is aware that this step represents only the beginning of a lengthy and difficult process; encourages the work of UN Special Representative Martin Kobler and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and supports their continuous efforts to facilitate the dialogue between the different parties;
- 2. Regrets that the first cabinet proposed by the Presidential Council was rejected by the House of Representatives, but at the same time welcomes the endorsement in principle of the political agreement; strongly condemns the abduction of House of Representatives MP Mohamed al-Ra'id and calls on all influential actors to spare no effort to ensure his immediate and unconditional release; opposes any strategy put in place by any actor to undermine or slow down the political process leading to the creation of a new Government of National Accord;
- 3. Calls on all parties to show responsibility and uphold the country's interests, above all by supporting the creation of the new government, whose priority will be to reach an agreement with all non-jihadist forces in the country and to cooperate with all parties, including the different tribes, the different ethnic groups, municipalities and local actors, to ensure national reconciliation and to create consensus in order to address the outstanding challenges in Libya, including the humanitarian situation, the security challenges and the collapsing economy;

- 4. Stresses that the full implementation of the agreement must be an open and inclusive process whose ownership will be in the hands of the Libyans; stresses the importance of continuous participation of civil society, women, local actors, ethnic groups and representatives of the tribes, including the often forgotten tribes of Fezzan Toubou and Tuareg; believes that setting up a permanent Libyan shura for the political dialogue, which should include as many actors as possible, could help to create political consensus and reinforce the legitimacy of the agreement;
- 5. Calls on Libya's neighbouring countries and regional and international actors to avoid any action that could undermine the Libyan process and to fully respect UN Security Council resolution 2259 (2015), thus ceasing support and contact with parties outside the political agreement; believes that actors who fail to comply and who continue to fuel, by directly or indirectly supporting a faction on the ground or a terrorist group, the proxy war in Libya should be identified and held accountable;
- 6. Strongly condemns the latest terrorist attacks by ISIS/Daesh and expresses its deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims; reiterates that ISIS/Daesh and other terrorist organisations thrive on chaos and disorder and is convinced that they will do everything in their power to undermine the formation of a national government; believes that an inclusive government upholding the rule of law and providing for the needs of its citizens is the best way to halt the spread of radical sentiments and ultimately the best way to counter terrorism;
- 7. Welcomes the EUR 100 million EU support package as a first step to help the new government in the implementation of the agreement; calls on Member States not to act individually but to support the VP/HR in the formulation of a comprehensive strategy, in coordination with UNSMIL and the Libyan authorities, to support the transition and the new Libyan Government; believes that a reform of the security sector (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes are a priority for the country, and calls on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to stand ready to provide the necessary assistance in these areas if requested by the new government;
- 8. Believes in the necessity of preserving the neutrality of Libyan institutions, in particular the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation, while ensuring their transparency and accountability in order to make sure that oil revenues benefit the population of Libya and do not continue to fuel the conflict;
- 9. Is seriously worried by the possibility that some Member States may consider a military intervention in Libya without a UNSCR mandate and/or without a clear request from the Libyan Government; rejects such a possibility, which would seriously undermine the authority of the new government and could have disastrous consequences; recalls that the present critical situation is mainly the result of the irresponsible intervention in Libya of 2011 and that the Member States involved bear particular responsibility; asks for Libya's will regarding possible interventions on its territory to be respected; calls on the Member States and the EU to elaborate instead a clear and coordinated strategy to support the political transition, while recalling that it was largely owing to the lack of a united approach that the 2011 process failed;
- 10. Calls upon the Government of National Accord to hold to account those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights,

including those involved in attacks against civilians or sexual violence, and to cooperate fully with, and provide any necessary assistance to, the International Criminal Court and the Prosecutor, as required by UN Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) and recalled in UN Security Council resolution 2238 (2015);

- 11. Is deeply concerned about the spillover effects that instability in Libya could have on neighbouring countries, especially those which are also in a transition phase, such as Tunisia, and on the region as a whole; calls on the Member States and the Commission to pay particular attention to the regional situation and investigate, in coordination with the countries concerned, possible countermeasures;
- 12. Calls for a more incisive role for the EU Border Mission (EUBAM) in Libya; believes in the need to define, in partnership with UNSMIL, the new Government of National Accord and Libya's neighbouring countries, a joint strategy for border control in order to counter the phenomenon of arms and human trafficking and the influx of foreign fighters;
- 13. Denounces the blatant conflict of interest of former UN Special Representative Bernardino León and his lack of integrity in carrying out his job; recalls that, prior to being appointed UN Special Representative, Mr León also served as EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean; believes that his actions have undermined the credibility of the UN, the EU and the international community as a whole; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to identify means to avoid a similar situation occurring in the future, including by introducing stringent cooling-off periods; decides to carry out an investigation into this case;
- 14. Recalls the EU's strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya; believes that the future government should explore the possibility of adopting institutional arrangements that would ensure a degree of autonomy for regional and local identities, such as a federal-type government;
- 15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Libyan Government of National Accord, the UN Secretary-General, the Arab League and the African Union.

