Procedure : 2016/2936(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-1122/2016

Texts tabled :

B8-1122/2016

Debates :

PV 26/10/2016 - 17
CRE 26/10/2016 - 17

Votes :

Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

P8_TA(2016)0424

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
PDF 261kWORD 63k
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-1122/2016
19.10.2016
PE589.718v01-00
 
B8-1122/2016

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure


on nuclear security and non-proliferation (2016/2936(RSP))


Michael Gahler, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Sandra Kalniete, Cristian Dan Preda, Elmar Brok, Arnaud Danjean, Tunne Kelam, David McAllister, Lorenzo Cesa, Lars Adaktusson, Andrey Kovatchev, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Eduard Kukan, Andrzej Grzyb, Laima Liucija Andrikienė, Fernando Ruas, Dubravka Šuica, Alojz Peterle, Tokia Saïfi, Julia Pitera on behalf of the PPE Group

European Parliament resolution on nuclear security and non-proliferation (2016/2936(RSP))  
B8-1122/2016

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970,

–  having regard to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which came into force on 29 July 1957,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which entered into force on 8 February 1987, and to the subsequent amendment to it,

–  having regard to the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(1),

–  having regard to the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2015,

–  having regard to the conclusions of the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington DC from 31 March to 1 April 2016,

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the security environment around the European Union, particularly in its neighbourhood, has deteriorated significantly in the last few years and has become more volatile, dangerous and unpredictable, leading to Member States having to deal with a wide range of conventional and unconventional threats posed by state and non-state actors;

B.  whereas five nuclear states are recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the USA, the UK, Russia, France and China), three de facto nuclear weapon states have developed a nuclear capability outside of that treaty (India, Pakistan and Israel), and North Korea is considered as nuclear capable;

C.  whereas international security and stability are challenged by the deteriorating relationship between nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, as was lately the case with the suspension by Russia of the 2000 Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement, by permanent tensions between India and Pakistan, and by North Korean nuclear ambitions;

D.  whereas there are currently 191 states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the five recognised nuclear weapon states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China;

E.  whereas the NPT is a landmark legally binding international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advancing the cause of global nuclear disarmament;

F.  whereas the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is a legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material which establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offences related to nuclear material;

G.  whereas disturbing media reports indicate that Russia has deployed nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems to the Kaliningrad oblast which neighbours EU Member States Poland and Lithuania;

H.  whereas Russia has violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum of Understanding providing security guarantees for Ukraine in return for its nuclear disarmament by occupying the Crimean peninsula and launching a hybrid war in east Ukraine;

I.  whereas the EU has played an active role as a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed with Iran in creating a framework leading to the effective abandonment of the latter’s nuclear ambitions;

J.  whereas on 9 September 2016 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched another nuclear test in violation of its international obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and the 1992 intra-Korean denuclearisation declaration;

K.  whereas global cooperation is vital in order to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism;

1.  Expresses deep concern about the deterioration of the security environment around the European Union and beyond its neighbourhood, which could lead to the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as an active deterrent and possible proliferation among state and non-state actors;

2.  Draws attention to the comeback of nuclear weapons in the strategic planning of nuclear-armed states;

3.  Supports the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in providing the basis for global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to promote the safe and secure use of civil nuclear energy and to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons;

4.  Believes that conditions of security and sustainable nuclear disarmament can only be achieved through a multilateral process in which parties participate in good faith; expresses the belief that nuclear disarmament is the most important objective of global arms control policies and the NPT goal of a nuclear-free world should be the ultimate long-term ambition;

5.  Notes the failure of the 2015 NPT review conference to reach agreement on a final document relating to the non-proliferation agenda; recalls that the EU failed to reach a common position in the run-up to the conference; emphasises that nuclear armed states outside the NPT which are not bound by key international non-proliferation and disarmament obligations add to the risk of the credibility of the NPT being undermined;

6.  Expresses deep concern at the increased nuclear threats arising from Russia’s attitude, with implications for security, stability and predictability at global level, and from the deteriorating relationship with NATO, including potential violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as statements indicating an increased readiness to use nuclear weapons and indicating that the potential deployment of nuclear weapons to additional territories in Europe is being considered; draws attention to Russian military exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons against Poland, and expresses deep concern regarding the deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems to the Kaliningrad oblast which neighbours EU Member States Poland and Lithuania;

7.  Expresses concern at recent nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the risks this poses to regional stability; demands that the DPRK refrains from such tests in the future;

8.  Welcomes the agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran on the latter’s nuclear ambitions and encourages continued cooperation between both sides in order to ensure full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA);

9.  Supports the work on the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting cooperation in the nuclear field in order to promote the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies;

10.  Encourages the continued promotion and rigorous implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and urges countries which have not yet ratified this treaty to do so;

11.  Calls for the intensification of cooperative efforts and effective action as regards the security of nuclear materials in order to minimise the risk of such products being obtained by terrorist groups;

12.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(1)

OJ C 349E, 22.12.2010, p. 77.

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