Procedure : 2018/2770(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-0321/2018

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Debates :

Votes :

PV 05/07/2018 - 6.13
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Texts adopted :

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to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its borders (2018/2770(RSP))

Javier Couso Permuy, Paloma López Bermejo, Ángela Vallina, Nikolaos Chountis, Maria Lidia Senra Rodríguez, Eleonora Forenza, João Ferreira, João Pimenta Lopes, Miguel Viegas on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

European Parliament resolution on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its borders (2018/2770(RSP))  

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Chapter 1, Article 1(2) of the UN Charter of 1945, with its stated purpose ‘to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’,

–  having regard to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which state that ‘all peoples have the right of self-determination’ and that ‘by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’,

–  having regard to the declaration of 27 January 2013 of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU, in which the signatories reaffirmed their commitment to all the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and their support for all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all states and to respect their territorial integrity and political independence,

–  having regard to the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace, agreed at the previous CELAC Summits,

–  having regard to the principle of non-intervention laid down in the UN Charter,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,

–  having regard to the G7 leaders’ statement on Venezuela of 23 May 2018,

–  having regard to the previous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on Venezuela,

–  having regard to the previous statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy on Venezuela,

–  having regard to the previous resolutions of the European Parliament on Venezuela,

–  having regard to the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 7 June 2018 to send an ad hoc delegation to visit the cities of Cúcuta (Colombia) and Boa Vista (Brazil);

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has denounced on several occasions the external interference, destabilisation, disinformation campaigns, manipulation of public opinion and violence promoted by some sectors of the opposition against the sovereignty, independence, peace and democratic stability of the country and against the Venezuelan people;

B.  whereas the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is facing external and internal threats to its sovereignty and peace, at a time when the country is also facing an extraordinary economic war, which has been aggravated recently by price rises, smuggled goods and stockpiling activities; whereas this extraordinary situation has caused social, economic, political, natural and environmental problems;

C.  whereas in December 2014 former US President Barack Obama announced a bill, passed by the US Senate, imposing unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions on the people and Bolivarian Government of Venezuela until 2019; whereas all 33 Latin American and Caribbean nations have condemned and rejected these unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Venezuela, and whereas in the Brussels Declaration of the II EU-CELAC Summit of 10 and 11 June 2015, the Heads of State and Government of the EU took note of CELAC’s rejection of the US sanctions against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; whereas the Government of Venezuela has reacted by announcing a set of measures in implementation of articles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

D.  whereas on 8 March 2015 former US President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13692, in which it considered the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to be an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States’; whereas this executive order allows the US to use national-emergency resources to fight the threat, such as enforcing sanctions against the country;

E.  whereas US President Donald Trump has maintained the same strategy as his predecessor, which can be clearly seen in the various executive orders issued by him, namely those of 24 August 2017, 19 March 2018 and 21 May 2018;

F.  whereas those executive orders imposed additional sanctions against Venezuela and prohibit certain additional transactions with respect to Venezuela, all in order to respond to the so-called ‘national emergency’ declared in Executive Order 13692 of 8 March 2015;

G.   whereas the statements of 6 April 2017 and 15 February 2018 by Admiral Kurt Tidd, Head of US Southern Command, prefigure aggression against Venezuela under the doctrine of regional collective security; whereas such statements have the purpose of creating uncertainty and instability in the country and are part of the interventionist strategy in the region against progressive governments;

H.  whereas one of the components of the ongoing destabilisation in Venezuela has been, and continues to be, the multi-million dollar funding of anti-government organisations and political parties which has been going on for over 12 years on the part of US agencies such as USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy; whereas former US President Obama authorised a special fund to the sum of USD 5.5 million to finance anti-government groups in Venezuela through the State Department;

J.  whereas the Organisation of American States (OAS) and in particular its Secretary-General continue to focus their political action on intervening in the internal situation in Venezuela and legitimising by any means the activation of the Democratic Charter so as to make external intervention in the country possible;

K.  whereas the XLVIII General Assembly of the OAS was marked by the threat of Venezuela being suspended from the OAS, as demanded by the US Vice-President, Mike Pence, in the run-up to the event; whereas in the end the only thing that the US could achieve was a resolution supported by 19 of the 24 countries needed to suspend Venezuela from the OAS, with 11 abstentions and 4 votes against completing the nominal vote on the resolution;

L.  whereas Venezuela has decided to leave the OAS; whereas there are 11 months left until the formal withdrawal of Venezuela from the OAS; whereas the intention of the US is to have Venezuela suspended, so that it can continue escalating its unilateral measures against Venezuela outside international law, while US allies harden their siege against the country;

M.  whereas Venezuela was unlawfully prevented from assuming the pro-tempore presidency of Mercosur, with the aim of isolating Venezuela and expelling it from that organisation; whereas negotiations are in progress between the EU and Mercosur on the conclusion of a free trade agreement;

N.  whereas this strategy of destabilisation, isolation and pressure against Venezuela is being pursued by some governments in the region – the so-called ‘Lima Group’ – in flagrant violation of international law;

O.  whereas the EU has made several statements and taken various positions in line with the positions defended by minority sectors of the Venezuelan opposition with the clear intention of interfering in and influencing the internal situation in Venezuela;

P.  whereas on 13 November 2017 the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions on Venezuela and agreed on targeted sanctions; whereas on 22 January 2018 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to put seven individuals holding official positions under restrictive measures; whereas on 28 May 2018 the Foreign Affairs Council agreed in its conclusions to act swiftly, with the aim of imposing additional targeted and reversible restrictive measures against Venezuela; whereas on 25 June 2018 the Foreign Affairs Council agreed in its conclusions new additional sanctions against Venezuela, putting a further 11 individuals holding official positions under restrictive measures;

Q.  whereas major international media corporations are presenting the situation in Venezuela one-sidedly; whereas information is being manipulated, with rumours and fake news being spread about Venezuela simply to justify an intervention in the country;

R.  whereas in 20 years 24 elections have taken place in Venezuela;

S.  whereas since the last election to the National Assembly some sectors of the opposition have played a role in destabilising the country, using legislative power to that end;

T.  whereas some sectors of the opposition decided not to participate in the elections to the Venezuelan National Constituent Assembly and in the presidential elections;

U.  whereas presidential elections took place in Venezuela on 20 May 2018, in which more than 8 million Venezuelan citizens voted; whereas more than 200 international observers were present at the elections; whereas different opposition candidates participated in the electoral process; whereas Nicolás Maduro was re-elected President;

V.  whereas the US, the EU and some governments from the region challenged the electoral process ahead of the presidential elections and still refuse to recognise the result;

W.  whereas the Venezuelan Government and its President have called several times on all sectors of the opposition to engage in dialogue, and have continued to do so with a view to building peace in the country;

X.  whereas some sectors of the opposition supported by external powers such as the US, the EU, the OAS, the G7 and the Lima Group are continuing to foster destabilisation in the country;

Z.  whereas the US, the EU, the OAS and the Lima Group are responsible for the economic siege against Venezuela, which is affecting the Venezuelan people dramatically;

AA.  whereas the so-called ‘humanitarian aid’ defended by the US, the EU, the OAS and the Lima Group is only a pretext and an excuse to legitimise an external intervention in the country;

1.  Strongly condemns the constant external interference and the political, economic and social destabilisation targeted against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

2.  Denounces the spurious ‘instrumentalisation’ of human rights for political ends by the EU, in particular in the case of Venezuela;

3.  Insists that a persistent interventionist strategy against the sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is far from creating spaces for dialogue and peace;

4.  Reaffirms the right of the Venezuelan people to decide their future sovereignly and peacefully and free from external interference or pressure;

5.  Reiterates the need for the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states to be respected in accordance with international law;

6.  Denounces the claims of an alleged ‘humanitarian crisis’ in Venezuela, made with the intention of increasing external interference and defending a campaign of intervention in the country;

7.  Deeply deplores the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 7 June 2018 to send an ad hoc delegation to visit the cities of Cúcuta (Colombia) and Boa Vista (Brazil);

8.  Deeply deplores any external interference by the OAS, the EU, the US or any other country in the internal affairs of other countries; recalls that all peoples have the right to self-determination, to freely determine their political status and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and calls for this right to be respected;

9.  Denounces the undemocratic and insurgent aims of the destabilisation campaign; highlights the imperialist interest of the US in ensuring its access to Venezuela’s oil resources and its political aim of undermining the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA);

10.  Condemns the decision of the US and the EU to maintain sanctions against Venezuela; demands the immediate lifting of these sanctions;

11.  Firmly rejects any attempt by the EU to apply additional sanctions and other measures against Venezuela and its people;

12.  Stresses that dialogue with third countries should not under any circumstances result in restrictions being imposed on the right of peoples to self-determination;

13.  Criticises the recent events in the OAS, which show the continuing lack of democracy of this organisation and its interventionist role, which is always against the sovereign will of the peoples in Latin America;

14.  Deplores the role played by a majority of international media in spreading rumours and using fake information with the aim of undermining the legitimacy of the Venezuelan Government and generating an atmosphere of violence; recalls that freedom of information is a fundamental human right, and calls on international media to act responsibly and to cover events in a fair, accurate and balanced manner, which is not currently the case;

15.  Acknowledges the serious economic crisis that Venezuela is facing; recognises, however, that this economic crisis is caused mostly by external interference, both by the sanctions imposed on the country and the decrease in the price of oil, and by an orchestrated internal economic destabilisation strategy led by some sectors of the opposition and major economic actors in the country, which control the production and distribution of goods, notably in the areas of food and medicines; points out that this internal strategy has led to shortages of goods, which have been aggravated by coordinated group actions by bachaqueros with the purpose of depleting stocks in stores the moment they are refilled, so as to increase the prices of goods, then selling them on the black market or sending them to be counterfeited, a situation that has contributed to the high levels of inflation in the country; recalls that these strategies have happened alongside the systemic removal of the 100-bolivar note, the highest denomination in the country, from the market, with literally tons of these notes being found in countries such as Colombia or Paraguay; recalls that, despite this severe hit to the economy, Venezuela has both maintained its international compromises regarding external debt and continued to grant a significant budget allocation to social development, amounting to over 70 % of its annual budget;

16.  Takes note of the respect for the Constitution shown by the Venezuelan institutions, compared with the permanent disrespect and confrontational attitude shown by the National Assembly and some sectors of the opposition;

17.  Endorses the principles contained in the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace, and urges the entire international community to fully respect this proclamation in its relations with CELAC countries, including a commitment not to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of any other state and to observe the principles of national sovereignty, equal rights and the self-determination of peoples;

18.  Welcomes the implementation of social inclusion policies in Venezuela based on social responsibility and justice, equality, solidarity and human rights, which has helped to reduce inequality in the country, in particular in terms of social development measures and the significant progress made in reducing poverty or in the area of education, including the eradication of illiteracy in 2005 and the increase in the number of students in higher education;

19.  Recalls the importance of Venezuela’s role in creating and strengthening a cooperation and integration process for the benefit of the peoples of Latin America; underlines the significant progress made in regional integration and cooperation in favour of the peoples of Latin America; welcomes the significant achievements of ALBA in the fields of health, education, culture and mutually advantageous cooperation;

20.  Acknowledges that the member countries of ALBA are aware of the hard work of the Venezuelan Government in promoting and protecting human rights, justice and peace, with a view to curbing the plan of international intervention against Venezuela, which threatens not only the stability of this sister nation, but also the region’s stability as well;

21.  Welcomes the recent Venezuelan presidential elections and respects their results;

22.  Condemns all actions aimed at calling into question the indisputable legitimacy of the Venezuelan elections, and calls on the EU Member States to take a responsible stand, in accordance with the principles of non-interference, in showing respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and for the will of the people of Venezuela as expressed at the polls;

23.  Supports the initiatives of dialogue promoted by President Nicolás Maduro and his government, supported by different international organisations and actors, and the fact that the priorities of this dialogue are the wellbeing of all citizens and the institutional relationship, peace, justice, truth, the strengthening of the economy, defence of the rule of law, democracy and respect for national sovereignty;

24.  Reaffirms its solidarity with the Venezuelan people and their struggle to defend the Bolivarian process and the social achievements attained in recent years;

25.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Mercosur Parliament, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, and the Latin American regional bodies, including Unasur, ALBA and CELAC.


Last updated: 3 July 2018Legal notice