Níl an doiciméad seo ar fáil i do theanga féin. Roghnaítear teanga eile as na teangacha atá ar fáil.

Nós Imeachta : 2019/2574(RSP)
Céimeanna an doiciméid sa chruinniú iomlánach
An doiciméad roghnaithe : B8-0129/2019

Téacsanna arna gcur síos :


Díospóireachtaí :

PV 13/02/2019 - 20
CRE 13/02/2019 - 20

Vótaí :

PV 14/02/2019 - 10.16

Téacsanna arna nglacadh :


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See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-0128/2019

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union  (2019/2574(RSP))

Clare Moody, Knut Fleckenstein, Elena Valenciano, Victor Boştinaru on behalf of the S&D Group

European Parliament resolution on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union  (2019/2574(RSP))  

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 21 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

–  having regard to the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy – Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,

  having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation(1),

–  having regard to the UN Agenda for Disarmament(2),

–  having regard to UN Sustainable Development Goal 16, which aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development(3),

–  having regard to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (hereinafter the ‘INF Treaty’) of 8 December 1987 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)(4),

–  having regard to the statement of 2 February 2019 by the US Secretary of State on US intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty(5),

–  having regard to the statement on the INF Treaty issued by NATO Foreign Ministers on 4 December 2018(6),

–  having regard to the statement on Russia’s failure to comply with the INF Treaty, issued by the North Atlantic Council on 1 February 2019(7),

–  having regard to related statements by civil society organisations, notably that of 1 February 2019 by 2017 Nobel Peace Prize laureate International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) entitled ‘US withdrawal from INF Treaty puts Europe (and the world) at risk’(8),

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the INF Treaty required both parties to destroy their stockpiles of ground-launched nuclear and conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5 500 km, while prohibiting them from possessing, producing and flight-testing such missiles;

B.  whereas the INF Treaty contributed to building and reinforcing stability in the Cold War era by vastly reducing the number of missiles in Europe, making Europe the principal beneficiary of the INF Treaty’s success; whereas the INF Treaty is still a pillar of international peace and stability today, and is of critical importance for collective security in Europe and worldwide;

C.  whereas the joint efforts of Russia and the US to convert the INF Treaty into a multilateral treaty in 2007 by submitting a proposal to the UN failed to find further support from other nuclear states;

D.  whereas in 2014 the Obama administration stated that Russia was ‘in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5 500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles’; whereas subsequent reports, published by the US Department of State in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, reiterated US claims of Russia’s continued violation of the treaty;

E.  whereas in 2017, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the INF Treaty, the US announced that in response to Russia’s non-compliance with the treaty, it would pursue diplomatic, military and economic remedies through the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission (SVC), developing INF-compliant missile technology capable of being scaled up and sanctioning Russian entities involved in developing prohibited cruise missile systems;

F.  whereas on 20 October 2018 President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the treaty as a result of Russia’s non-compliance and China’s non-participation; whereas on 4 December 2018, after the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the US had found Russia in material breach of the treaty and would suspend its obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returned to full and verifiable compliance;

G.  whereas on 4 December 2018 NATO Foreign Ministers acknowledged Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty and called on Russia to return as a matter of urgency to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty;

H.  whereas a potential end to the treaty could lead to escalation of the tensions among nuclear states, to misunderstandings and to a new arms race;

I.  whereas the non-extension of other major arms control treaties, such as the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (‘New START’), would seriously damage the international arms control regime that has provided decades of stability regarding nuclear weapons, leaving the world with no legally binding, verifiable limits on nuclear arsenals;

J.  whereas nuclear proliferation increases security risks; whereas nuclear proliferation also increases the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors, such as terrorist networks and organisations;

K.  whereas Nobel Peace Prize laureate ICAN has called on all states to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

1.  Recalls the ambition of the EU to be a global actor for peace and calls for the expansion of its role in global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and for its actions and policies to strive for the maintenance of international peace and security and support for the rules-based international order;

2.  Expresses deep concern at the US’s announcement regarding the suspension of its obligations under the INF Treaty and its withdrawal within a period of six months; is alarmed by the risk this poses to the global security environment and that of the EU, and fears it would deteriorate relationships between nuclear-armed states;

3.  Calls on Russia to demonstrate full and verifiable compliance in order to address the concerns raised by the US and NATO and enable the continuation of the INF Treaty;

4.  Calls on the US and Russia to redouble their diplomatic efforts to engage in a constructive dialogue that would take into account both parties’ interests and concerns, and to pursue negotiations in good faith in order to safeguard the INF Treaty before the effective withdrawal of the US in August 2019;

5.  Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Federica Mogherini, to engage in dialogue with the INF States Parties in order to restore cross-border trust; urges the Council and the VP/HR to launch an EU-led initiative with a view to pushing for the conversion of the INF Treaty into a multilateral treaty which would involve all nuclear states, including, as a minimum, the People’s Republic of China;

6.  Invites the VP/HR and the Commission to present their joint impact assessment on European security to Parliament should the protection the INF Treaty provides to the Union and its citizens cease to apply; underlines that it is strongly opposed to a new arms race and remilitarisation on European soil;

7.  Asks the VP/HR to bring forward proposals to strengthen the available expertise in non-proliferation and arms control in the EU and to ensure that the EU takes a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture;

8.  Emphasises that the uncertain future of the INF Treaty should not put other arms control agreements in jeopardy; notably urges the US and Russia to renew the New START agreement before it expires in 2021;

9.  Is of the opinion that a world without weapons of mass destruction would be a safer one for everybody; reiterates its full commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global and European security; emphasises its full support to the UN processes, to the work of the UNODA and to the Agenda for Disarmament launched by UN Secretary-General António Guterres; recalls its commitment to pursuing policies designed to move forward with the reduction and elimination of all nuclear arsenals and achieve a world without nuclear weapons;

10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Member States, NATO and the United Nations.


OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 202.















An nuashonrú is déanaí: 13 Feabhra 2019Fógra dlíthiúil