Procedure : 2019/2575(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-0154/2019

Texts tabled :

B8-0154/2019

Debates :

Votes :

PV 12/03/2019 - 9.22

Texts adopted :

P8_TA(2019)0156

<Date>{06/03/2019}6.3.2019</Date>
<NoDocSe>B8‑0154/2019</NoDocSe>
PDF 135kWORD 54k

<TitreType>MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION</TitreType>

<TitreSuite>to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission</TitreSuite>

<TitreRecueil>pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure</TitreRecueil>


<Titre>on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them</Titre>

<DocRef>(2019/2575(RSP))</DocRef>


<RepeatBlock-By><Depute>Caroline Nagtegaal</Depute>

<Commission>{ALDE}on behalf of the ALDE Group</Commission>

</RepeatBlock-By>

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-0154/2019

B8‑0154/2019

European Parliament resolution on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them

(2019/2575(RSP))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code[1],

 having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union[2],

 having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 September 2017, on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’) (COM(2017)0477),

 having regard to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Digital Europe programme for the period 2021-2027 (COM(2018)0434),

 having regard to the proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (COM(2018)0630),

 having regard to the statements by the Council and the Commission of 13 February 2019 on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action on the EU level to reduce them,

 having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 February 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union[3],

 having regard to its resolutions on EU-China relations, in particular that of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU China relations[4],

 having regard to the Commission communication of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘5G for Europe: an action plan’ (COM(2016)0588),

 having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2017 on internet connectivity for growth, competitiveness and cohesion: European gigabit society and 5G[5],

 having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)[6],

 having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010[7],

 having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas 5G infrastructure will raise connectivity in the digital economy to a whole new level; whereas it is a key building block of the Gigabit Society, in particular in areas such as transport, energy and health, and the defence and security sector, representing the standard for the future of mobile communication technologies;

B. whereas vulnerabilities in 5G networks could be exploited in order to compromise IT systems, potentially causing very serious damage to economies at both European and national levels; whereas a risk analysis-based approach is necessary;

C. whereas the increased role of third-country technology providers in the EU 5G market has led to serious discussion within Member States, especially in the context of the Chinese National Intelligence Law, which has been in place since June 2017;

D. whereas the scope and parameters of what the Chinese authorities call ‘intelligence work’ is not clearly defined in the Chinese National Intelligence Law; whereas this law gives authorities new legal grounds to monitor and investigate foreign and domestic individuals and institutions, including EU citizens and EU institutions, in order to protect Chinese national security;

E. whereas Chinese telecom companies receive State aid subsidies, which could further strengthen their ability to implement the National Intelligence Law, leading to security problems but also giving them an unfair economic advantage;

F. whereas the Regulation on screening of foreign direct investment, which should enter into force by the end of 2020, reinforces Member States’ ability to screen foreign investment based on security and public order criteria, and establishes a cooperation mechanism which allows the Commission and the Member States to cooperate in their assessment of security risks, including cybersecurity risks, posed by foreign investments;

G. whereas the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) was to be transposed before 9 May 2018; whereas this directive aims to strengthen the security of Europe’s essential infrastructure and to ensure that significant cyber incidents are reported; whereas the Directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code requires telecommunication companies to take measures to manage the risks posed to the security of networks and services and to notify the authorities and, in particular cases, users, of significant security incidents;

H. whereas the European Electronic Communications Code provides for the availability of 5G radio spectrum by the end of 2020 in the EU; whereas the Member States hold independent auctions of spectrum frequencies as part of the 5G roll-out, potentially allowing companies from third countries to gain a dominant market position in several Member States, and consequently the EU as a whole; whereas China has an ambitious Artificial Intelligence strategy for which data are a crucial resource;

1. Recalls the urgent need to build capacities and capabilities inside the EU for digital infrastructure, while reinforcing the EU’s strategic autonomy; recalls the importance of 5G networks, and therefore reiterates its commitment to the 5G action plan;

2. Recalls that the deployment of 5G networks will be improved by ensuring the availability of the appropriate radio spectrum in the EU by the end of 2020, as provided for by the European Electronic Communications Code; underlines that the main challenge for operators is a lack of coordination and predictability;

3. Reiterates the need for common European action to tackle current concerns related to telecom equipment providers supported by the Chinese Government, in order to increase digital resilience and future-proof safeguards designed to protect the single market; calls in the meantime for an increase in information sharing between EU Member States;

4. Calls for an investigation into possible security risks associated with the use of foreign-made technology and for 5G to be regarded as critical infrastructure so that all companies have to comply with higher security standards;

5. Welcomes and highlights in this respect the element of exchange of information between Member States under the cooperation mechanism of the FDI Screening Regulation;

6. Underlines that the FDI Screening Regulation protects critical infrastructure; recalls that companies doing business in the EU enjoy the benefits of the single market but must comply with the EU’s standards and legal framework;

7. Notes with interest that the number of Member States with a screening mechanism has increased since the Commission first proposed the FDI Screening Regulation in 2017;

8. Supports the Commission in the various actions already taken to increase the adoption of measures that would tackle cybersecurity threats and to ensure the strict implementation of appropriate risk management measures, including sanctions against providers that do not respect their obligations;

9. Welcomes and supports the agreement reached on the Cybersecurity Act and the reinforcement of the mandate of the EU Cybersecurity Agency, in order to better support Member States in tackling cybersecurity threats and attacks;

10. Welcomes and supports the proposals on cybersecurity competence centres and a network of national coordination centres, which are designed to help the EU retain and develop the technological and industrial capacities in the field of cybersecurity that are needed to secure its digital single market;

11. Welcomes, in this context, the Digital Europe programme, which imposes security requirements and Commission oversight on entities established in the EU but controlled from third countries, in particular for cybersecurity-related actions;

12. Recalls that effective cybersecurity demands high security standards; calls for a network that is secure by default and by design; urges Member States, together with the Commission, to explore all available means to ensure a high level of security, if appropriate by implementing a European cybersecurity certificate;

13. Recalls that competition is essential in such an innovative sector; recalls that competition ensures that companies are serious competitors with resources able to meet market demand;

14. Calls on the Member States to implement fully the NIS Directive and on the Commission to monitor closely this phase so that the provisions of the directive are properly enforced and Europeans are better protected from external security threats;

15. Calls on the Commission to take into account the above requests in the next discussions on an EU-China strategy, in order to ensure that the EU remains competitive and to make its digital infrastructure secure;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

 

[1] OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36.

[2] OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1.

[3] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0121.

[4] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0343.

[5] OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 144.

[6] OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

[7] OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 129.

Last updated: 7 March 2019Legal notice