Procedure : 2019/2575(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-0162/2019

Texts tabled :

B8-0162/2019

Debates :

Votes :

PV 12/03/2019 - 9.22

Texts adopted :


<Date>{06/03/2019}6.3.2019</Date>
<NoDocSe>B8‑0162/2019</NoDocSe>
PDF 136kWORD 54k

<TitreType>MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION</TitreType>

<TitreSuite>to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission</TitreSuite>

<TitreRecueil>pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure</TitreRecueil>


<Titre>on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action at EU level to reduce them</Titre>

<DocRef>(2019/2575(RSP))</DocRef>


<RepeatBlock-By><Depute>Helmut Scholz, Kostadinka Kuneva, Martina Michels, Eleonora Forenza, Stelios Kouloglou, Dimitrios Papadimoulis</Depute>

<Commission>{GUE/NGL}on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group</Commission>

</RepeatBlock-By>


B8‑0162/2019

European Parliament resolution on security threats connected with the rising Chinese technological presence in the EU and possible action at EU level to reduce them

(2019/2575(RSP))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to the Information Economy Report 2017 entitled ‘Digitalisation, Trade and Development’ published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD/IER/2017),

 having regard to the Trade and Development Report 2018 entitled ‘Power, Platforms and the Free Trade Delusion’ published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD/TDR/2018),

 having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code[1],

 having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union[2],

 having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs[3],

 having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 September 2017, on ENISA, the ‘EU Cybersecurity Agency’, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’) (COM(2017)0477),

 having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 12 September 2018, establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (COM(2018)0630),

 having regard to its position adopted at first reading on 14 February 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union[4],

 having regard to the Commission communication of 14 September 2016 entitled ‘5G for Europe: an action plan’ (COM(2016)0588),

 having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2017 on internet connectivity for growth, competitiveness and cohesion: European gigabit society and 5G[5],

 having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)[6],

 having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 680/2007 and (EC) No 67/2010[7],

 having regard to the Digital Europe programme,

 having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the EU and its Member States need a plan of public investments to develop state-of-the-art capacities in the high-tech sectors such as cybersecurity, ICT, AI and the digital economy; whereas several EU strategies have been devised but have not been implemented fully;

B. whereas it is necessary to ensure fair digital development while striving to improve living standards on a global scale;

C. whereas a few private digital and IT companies, mainly from the United States and China, continue to establish monopolies in the digital market, giving them the power to set international standards and opt out of their social responsibilities;

D. whereas the 5G network will be one of the key technologies of future digital infrastructure, extending the possibility to connect various devices to networks (internet of things etc.), and will bring new possibilities for applications in many areas, such as transport, mobility, energy, health, finance, telecoms, the digital economy and artificial intelligence;

E. whereas vulnerabilities in 5G networks could be exploited in order to compromise IT systems, potentially causing very serious damage to citizens and their lives, and to European and national economies; whereas it is technically possible for technology providers to use components of 5G network technology to breach the data privacy of citizens, companies and institutions; whereas a risk analysis-based approach to public procurement and licensing is necessary;

F. whereas only a limited number of companies provide 5G technical equipment;

G. whereas companies from a number of third countries may pose a problem to the security of the Member States, as they may have access to personal data and control the digital infrastructure of many strategic sectors and services, and may also provide access to data to national intelligence services;

H. whereas the Snowden revelations demonstrated that a systematic abuse of European communication networks and a mass violation of the right of citizens to data privacy was committed in the case of the US National Security Agency’s (NSA) PRISM programme and, in the past, by the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ);

I. whereas the US government intelligence agencies have claimed that Huawei’s equipment poses threats to national security, but did not provide any evidence for this; whereas Huawei is an economic competitor of several large US corporations;

J. whereas owing to the global supply chain of ICT technologies, any ban on the use of Chinese technology may be detrimental to European operators and companies, as it will disrupt the supply of equipment, increase costs for EU operators and their customers, delay the roll-out of next-generation 5G services for years to come, and potentially damage existing networks;

K. whereas cybersecurity needs to be addressed at a multilateral level in order to deliver a strong and coordinated response;

L. whereas suppliers should not be treated differently on the basis of their country of origin, but should instead be treated on the basis of the commitment and the guarantees that they offer to safeguard the right of EU citizens to data privacy and to prevent spying and the sabotaging of technology;

1. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy and public investment plans aimed at reducing Europe’s dependency on foreign technology in the field of cybersecurity, ICT, AI and digital economy;

2. Considers that Member States should base their decisions concerning the access of companies from third countries to future telecoms and 5G services on technical expertise and proper risk assessment, and on those companies’ commitments and guarantees to safeguard the right of EU citizens to data privacy and to prevent spying and the sabotaging of technology, rather than political pressure from the US Administration;

3. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards a multilateral system of cybersecurity governance aimed at establishing a UN regulatory and policy framework for cybersecurity; welcomes the launch of the United Nations’ Global Cybersecurity Index by the UN International Telecommunications Union (ITU);

4. Asks the Commission and the Member States to implement in full the cooperation mechanisms introduced by the EU Network and Information Security Directive;

5. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to properly apply the Cybersecurity Act, and to coordinate closely in this regard;

6. Notes that the strengthened mandate of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) would enhance cybersecurity certification, and believes that ENISA could play a crucial role in analysing cybersecurity threats;

7. Recalls that all companies providing technologies and services in the EU must comply with EU and Members States’ laws and are liable for any breaches of legislation on data protection and cybersecurity;

8. Deems it necessary to undertake a rigorous and independent environmental impact assessment on the possible negative effects of 5G technologies on human health;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

 

[1] OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36.

[2] OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1.

[3] OJ C 378, 9.11.2017, p. 104.

[4] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0121.

[5] OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 144.

[6] OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

[7] OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 129.

Last updated: 7 March 2019Legal notice