Procedure : 2019/2956(RSP)
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Document selected : B9-0046/2020

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PV 15/01/2020 - 10.5
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<TitreSuite>to wind up the debate on the statement by the Commission</TitreSuite>

<TitreRecueil>pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure</TitreRecueil>

<Titre>on the European Green Deal</Titre>


<RepeatBlock-By><Depute>Marco Zanni, Tom Vandendriessche</Depute>

<Commission>{ID}on behalf of the ID Group</Commission>



European Parliament resolution on the European Green Deal


The European Parliament,

 having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 9, 107, 153, 173, 174, 191 and 194 thereof,

 having regard to the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘The European Green Deal’ (COM(2019)0640 final),

 having regard to the statement of 11 December 2019 by the Commission on the European Green Deal,

 having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas environmental protection (i.e. waste management, the protection of water from pollution, the management of water resources, soil protection, air protection and the reduction of polluting emissions into the atmosphere, protection of biodiversity) cannot be separated from landscape protection (i.e. the so-called ‘visible environment’), which fully covers all aspects relating to the relationship between man and nature; whereas anthropisation is not necessarily synonymous with a negative impact on the environment;

B. whereas the environment should not be considered as it if were abstract and unchanging in nature; whereas the environment encompasses both architectural and environmental elements and comprises environmental, historical and artistic heritage, thus representing the true ‘cultural essence’ of a nation, which has been settled for centuries and is in constant evolution;

C. whereas an environmental protection policy that wants to be effective should focus primarily on the most polluting aspects of our production and consumption model; whereas globalisation (i.e. the free movement of production factors) is a very powerful factor that contributes to the deterioration of the environment;

D. whereas from the post-war period to the present, there has been an almost continuous growth in global CO2 emissions, which was temporarily halted by the onset of the 2007-2008 economic crisis; whereas since the 1970s, we have been observing a relative decoupling between CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and global GDP, ‘i.e. an emission decrease in intensity instead of in absolute value, due to the action of the other macro-factors, such as population and real per capita income, which the increase in efficiency cannot compensate for’[1]; whereas the total decoupling between economic growth and emissions (i.e. the theoretical assumption of a ‘zero-emissions development model’) does not adequately take into account the limitations imposed by the laws of physics; whereas the pursuit of ‘zero emissions’ is therefore configured as an unsustainable model, since not only does it necessarily involve the deindustrialisation and therefore the impoverishment of advanced countries, but also condemns poor countries to eternal underdevelopment and therefore prevents their industrialisation;

E. whereas, since the world began, the climate has been changing and mankind, like other living beings on Earth today, has always successfully adapted to it; whereas this is confirmed by empirical evidence that establishes that all indicators of resilience, mortality, vulnerability and economic loss due to climatic events have significantly improved, especially for poorer countries[2];

F. whereas current knowledge of the climate system does not yet allow us to precisely separate the anthropic effect from other natural causes of change, nor to does it allow us to quantify it; whereas our knowledge is still far from allowing us to define in a sufficiently accurate way the different contributions that determine increases or decreases in the average temperature of the planet;

G. whereas the IPCC is an intergovernmental body that does not carry out scientific research or monitoring or data collection activities, but rather bases its assessments on an anthological choice of peer-reviewed scientific literature and on reports from major world institutions;

H. whereas it is essential that public institutions and political bodies keep a rational and pragmatic approach to the issue of climate change, without resorting to the instrumental use of scientific methods when it comes to reducing public debate spaces and the democratic control mechanisms guaranteed by sovereign constitutions of the Member States;

I. whereas changing the EU’s target of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 means having to hastily rewrite the whole corpus of EU law in the field of climate and energy for the 2021-2030 period, which was recently approved in the last legislature; whereas this means that the Commission and the Council are in clear contradiction with their own goal of wanting to provide markets with stability and certainty in the medium to long term;

J. whereas affordable access to energy is the conditio sine qua non in order to ensure well-being for everyone;

K. whereas the transition to renewable energies has led to higher energy costs and a less stable supply, given the variable nature of several renewable sources;

L. whereas the fiscal tightening measures on fossil fuels and energy that have recently been adopted by some governments – with the declared intention of stimulating the ‘ecological transition’ – have led to protests from the middle and lower classes, which are already living under persistent austerity policies, and sometimes these protests escalate into serious riots both in developing countries and in the EU;

M. whereas the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) is the clearest example of the failure of the market-based mechanisms as conceived and adopted in application of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement; whereas these mechanisms have been corrected several times while being in force as a consequence of market failures, including the proposal to set ope legis a carbon price, which is the negation of the concept of ‘market’ itself; whereas the EU ETS has failed to meet not only its financial objectives, but also its climate ones, since it has not been able to prevent carbon leakage;

N. whereas the producer cannot, in principle, be held responsible for the use made of his product by the consumer; whereas the problem of abandoning waste into the environment is matter that concerns citizens behaviour and the effectiveness of the collection and disposal systems in place for waste;

O. whereas several Member States, in order to save on public expenditure, have preferred to export their waste to third countries and re-import the secondary raw materials that are produced thereof, rather than build the infrastructure needed to fully treat and recycle the waste on-site;

P. whereas the Commission associates the circular economy with the ‘sharing economy’; whereas the latter is not innovative nor sustainable, since it is a business model based on the maximum reduction of labour costs and the outsourcing of business risk, as well as on the large-scale recourse to typical forms of subsistence economy;

Q. whereas quotas and subsidies for electric vehicles are not in line with the principle of a free-market economy and will potentially put our position as market leader in many industries unnecessarily at risk;

R. whereas stricter emission targets would increase the costs of owning and using a car, meaning that many families would not be able to afford their independent mobility anymore; whereas, any potential ban on combustion engines would lead to an expropriation of consumers;

S. whereas categorising electric vehicles as ‘zero-emission vehicles’ deceives consumers, given that producing batteries and energy itself causes emissions and often lead to more emissions than when using latest-generation combustion engines;

T. whereas product labelling should provide consumers with information; whereas it is unreasonable to expect product labelling to be ethical in nature;

U. whereas eating wild-caught fish is a way of protecting the climate, given that it is by far the animal protein with the lowest carbon footprint;

V. whereas the fishing sector should be prioritised as a key user of marine space, since it is impossible to implement effective marine environmental policies when fishers are not taken into account;

W. whereas the area of the EU that is covered by woods and forests has been growing for some centuries, and is still growing mainly thanks to the progressive abandonment of the use of wood as fuel and construction material, as well as due to, in more recent years, the abandonment of the countryside;

X. whereas local financing plays a key role in restoring the link between capital and territory;

Y. whereas the environment is a shared competence of the Union; whereas EU legislation on the environment provide for abstract one-size-fits-all rules, which were once established for all Member States and are modified only subsequently in more detail, which runs counter to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; whereas the European Green Deal follows the same rationalist and constructivist approach;

1. Emphasises that one of the challenges in the decades to come is to reduce atmosphere, soil and water pollution; is aware that this means that serious action needs to be taken regarding the most polluting aspects of our production and consumption models: the production of waste, the dispersion of raw materials and the inefficient use of energy produced; stresses, therefore, that it is committed to using the European Green Deal as an opportunity to bring environmental subject-matter back into the context of rational discussion and for reconciliation between environmental and social policies;

Increasing the EU’s climate ambition for 2030 and 2050

2. Notes that further raising the threshold for reductions in EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 50 or 55 %, as set out in the European Green Deal, will result in unsustainable administrative and financial pressure for firms in the EU and will accelerate their relocation outside the EU to reduce production costs, thus further undermining EU competitiveness, boosting deindustrialisation and reinforcing unfair competition from third countries; notes with regret that these targets are likely to undermine the sustainability of core EU economic sectors, such as the steel industry; deplores that the adoption of new environmental obligations has not yet been accompanied by the introduction of appropriate tools in order to protect the EU’s industry from unfair external competition;

3. Considers it appropriate that each Member State should be left free to determine the taxation of energy products in the manner it deems most effective and appropriate in order to meet the environmental objectives, depending on their own energy mix, and on their peculiar geographical, climatic, anthropogenic conditions and on their socio-economic situation;

4. Reiterates that taxation is an exclusive Member State competence and therefore rejects the very idea of Union taxation; calls on the Commission, in line with Article 194(2) of the TFEU, to propose repealing Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (Text with EEA relevance)[3];

5. Rejects the Commission’s proposal to extend the cap and trade mechanisms, such as the EU ETS, to other sectors; reiterates that the EU is responsible for only approximately 10 % of global CO2 emissions; emphasises, therefore, that it would be more effective to replace the EU ETS with a World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliant carbon border adjustment mechanism based on the carbon footprint of the imported goods, which takes into account direct emissions, emissions from electricity generation and emissions from the use of raw materials; considers it appropriate that the Commission and the Member States should support such a trade measure with the appropriate incentive policies in order to relocate production from third countries to the Member States;

6. Recalls that steel is an intensively traded product, as global overcapacity was around 500 million tonnes in 2018, equivalent to almost 25 % of global steel production capacity; notes that EU steel imports have increased significantly, up from 18 million tonnes in 2013 to a record 30 million tonnes in 2018;

7. Notes that, in order to avoid unfair competition at the expense of the EU steel sector, the EU must adopt measures to counter dumping, governmental subsidisation and other support schemes in third countries by improving the application of trade defence instruments (TDI); notes, further, that the EU must modernise the WTO rulebook in order to tackle trade distorting more effectively;

8. Stresses that the Union should implement reciprocity where third countries deny access to public procurement and enforce the screening of foreign direct investment and verify new free trade agreements, and, if appropriate, revise existing ones in order to ensure market access and the sustainable development of EU industry;

9. Recalls that the growth of coal production in China alone has the potential to neutralise the EU’s efforts to cut CO2 emissions;

10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to focus its political and legislative action on adapting to climate change, rather than on a utopian fight against it;

Supplying clean, affordable and secure energy

11. Recalls that the cost of energy production is inversely proportional to the possibility of ensuring well-being for everyone;

12. Recalls that the planned objectives of decarbonising the energy system, while ensuring a secure and affordable supply, are not actually achievable by solely focusing on boosting renewable energy;

13. Deplores the fact that the Commission’s assurances regarding respect for technological neutrality, in addition to the Member States having exclusive prerogatives regarding their energy mix, are contradicted by the facts; notes, in this regard, that the Energy Union is configured as an undue centralisation of Member States’ energy policies, which are left in the hands of the Commission;

Mobilising industry for a clean and circular economy

14. Believes, in principle, that the circular economy can bring added value, provided that it is a means of reconciling environmental and social policies – that is if it promotes the on-site production of goods that have a low environmental impact and leads to growth in internal demand; Rejects, therefore, the Commission’s proposal to create an EU model for the separate collection of waste, which, inter alia, goes against the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

15. Recognises that EU law – for example on food hygiene and product safety – has also been contributing to the production of unnecessary packaging and, consequently, waste; calls on the Commission to simplify current legislation, rather than propose even more legally binding requirements;

16. Notes that the timing of the campaign stigmatising plastic that is produced and consumed in the EU has coincided with the crisis for waste to be recycled – in particular plastic – in those Member States with poor domestic systems for waste treatment and recycling; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in order to achieve the objectives of reducing the amount of waste left in the environment in a more effective manner, to place greater emphasis on raising public awareness and on the effectiveness of waste collection and treatment systems;

17. Strongly reaffirms that small widespread private property represents one of the main factors behind emancipating and reducing inequalities and constitutes a pillar of western national democracies; considers that the ‘sharing economy’ could lead, on the contrary, to the concentration of ownership into private oligopolies, which would make goods and services accessible only to the few people that can afford to hire them; calls on the Member States to adopt without delay all legislative and regulatory measures to equate the activities of online platforms and the ‘sharing economy’ with the corresponding traditional economic activities;

Building and renovating in an energy and resource efficient way

18. Deems it crucial to continue efforts to consume energy more in a more efficient way; recalls, nevertheless, the Jevons paradox: ‘efficiency’ does not mean the same thing as ‘saving’, since making the same quantity of energy accessible to a larger number of people, leads to an overall decrease in energy intensity instead of a decrease in energy consumption in absolute value; calls on the Commission to propose the replacement, Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC[4], of the energy consumption targets, set in absolute value, with energy intensity targets;

19. Considers it overambitious to kick off the hoped ‘renovation wave’ of public and private buildings given current budgetary constraints and the counterproductive monetary and fiscal policies that are in place;

20. Urges the Commission to refrain from including building emissions in the EU ETS and from making recipients of funding for renovation projects subject to economies of scale; stresses that, rather than stimulating the transition to low CO2 emissions and energy efficiency, both these provisions would mean that property ownership would largely be in the hands of a private oligopoly that is capable of operating on the CO2 financial markets and of accessing complicated EU financial instruments, which would favour the formation of real estate bubbles and accelerate the phenomenon, which is already underway, of the expulsion of the middle class from the centre of big cities;

Accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility

21. Recalls that the forced-stage electrification does not duly take into account the environmental, socio-economic and geopolitical impact; stresses that as long as the batteries do not have an energy density (in MJ/kg) comparable to that of today’s fossil fuels, electric mobility will only be a ballon d’essai or a greenwashing operation for the wealthy; calls on the Commission for a complete review of the Europe on the Move package in order to guarantee technological neutrality, so that all technologies with the best cost-benefit ratio can be freely used on a level playing field;

22. Reiterates that restrictive objectives of reducing CO2 emissions would have severe detrimental impacts on the competitiveness of EU companies, which are contending with increasing competition from third countries that do not apply the same environmental standards;

23. Notes that the increase in the movement of goods and people resulting from the market-oriented policies promoted by the EU in previous years have contributed considerably to increased pollution, and that it is necessary to adopt a different economic model and to favour more efficient transport modes, especially over long distances;

24. Deplores any increase in taxation for EU citizens that intends to stop and phase out the use of current vehicles in order to switch to newer, less polluting ones, since this would mean turning perfectly usable capital and consumer goods into waste; recalls that both citizens and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are often unable to renovate their car fleets due to poor financial capacity and that they should not have to shoulder additional burdens that would put their economic situation in further jeopardy; reiterates that mechanisms that incentivise rather than penalise should be preferred;

25. Recalls that, concerning the road sector – and within the framework of very restrictive objectives to reduce CO2 emissions by 30 % for new heavy goods vehicles by 2030, with an intermediate objective of 15 % by 2025 – the planned transition to ‘e-mobility’ cannot be accomplished without taking into account the current shortcomings of the European road network in terms of its infrastructure development for recharging vehicles that use alternative forms of energy;

26. Stresses that the Commission should take into account the needs of the Member States in reviewing the Council Directive 92/106/EEC of 7 December 1992 on the establishment of common rules for certain types of combined transport of goods between Member States[5] (Combined Transport Directive), considering that the three previous attempts of setting up new legislation have not produced the expected results due to the excessive financial and legislative obligations implied for the Member States, and due to the need for greater protection of social rights and competitiveness in the field;

27. Deplores the lack of progress made with the Single European Sky and the failure to implement the Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs), which have resulted in reduced efficiency and higher costs for the aviation sector;

28. Stresses the importance of safeguarding security, jobs, data, liability and ethics issues in the field of automated and connected multimodal mobility;

29. Recalls that what is usually passed off as ‘sustainable mobility’ today actually constitutes, in the best of cases, a delocalisation of emissions from the centre to the periphery (i.e. from wealthier to less affluent neighbourhoods); stresses that, in the worst case scenario, it can actually lead to increased polluting emissions;

30. Highlights that public incentives that encourage the use of private means of transport for hire are contrary to the objectives of social and territorial cohesion, as they provide an added benefit to those who live in cities and already enjoy a greater offer of means of transport;

31. Reaffirms the irreplaceable role of carried out by local public transport when it comes to social and territorial cohesion; notes that the liberalisation of the transport market, together with cuts in public subsidies and investment in compliance with budgetary discipline, has inevitably led to the concentration of offer where there is greater demand (i.e. in metropolitan areas); deplores the fact that entire regions have therefore been left disconnected from city centres, forcing people living there to resort to the use of private transport; considers it inane to conceive the ‘sharing economy’ as way to solve the shortcomings of local public transport;

32. Points out that reducing forced mobility towards cities, driven by urbanisation, would be a decisive way to cut polluting and CO2 emissions;

From ‘Farm to Fork’: designing a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system

33. Recalls that counterproductive monetary and fiscal policies and the standardisation of food production globally are inversely proportional to the quality of food regimes;

34. Observes that ‘Farm to Fork’ depicts an unfair conception of the primary sector, where farmers and fishers are reduced to climate guardians; observes, further, a worrying ethical dimension where individuals’ daily actions and lifestyles are meticulously controlled;

35. Calls on the Commission to propose a revision of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004[6], so that food labelling is limited to reporting information that is relevant and supplied in such a way that does not mislead the consumer; stresses that such labelling should include information on ingredients (including their origin and the presence of GMOs), allergens, nutritional values, and where the foodstuff was produced and packaged; calls, therefore, on the Commission to refrain from making ambiguous, misleading and arbitrarily discriminatory labelling – such as the traffic lights, Nutri-Score and CO2 footprint – mandatory across the EU;

36. Stresses that more efforts are needed to better manage the food supply chain in order to achieve a cultural paradigm shift to a more local approach; urges the Commission to actively support and foster an EU food chain that sets out to preserve domestic agriculture and fisheries, instead of using food as a bargaining chip on trade agreements;

Preserving and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity

37. Recalls the need for a common agricultural policy (CAP) that establishes an rewarding system for farmers who implement actions intended to protect biodiversity, and that such a system should be straightforward; recalls that the protection of the rural landscape and the prevention of erosion and hydrogeological instability must be included in the list of environmental actions funded by the CAP;

38. Urges the Commission and the Member States to implement more concrete actions that target marine litter and plastic in the sea;

A zero pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment

39. Stresses that climate policies have not always been consistent with the aim of reducing pollution (e.g. ‘Dieselgate’, electric mobility, certain biofuels and certain biomasses); notes that by mistakenly assuming that GHG emissions must be combated first in order to reduce pollution on the planet, the issue of saving the climate now far outweighs that of saving the environment; stresses that, for that reason, huge financial resources have been spent to cut CO2, no matter how negligible the results, while these resources could have been used to benefit the environment in a better way, since reducing pollution is also beneficial for the climate;

40. Recalls that the environment cannot be protected effectively using a one-size-fits-all legislative approach that ignores the geographical, climatic and anthropic conditions of each territory;

Pursuing green finance and investment and ensuring a just transition

41. Notes with concern that the Commission intends to replicate the same financial instruments that have already been proven to be a failure; stresses that EU funds, due to their intrinsic characteristics, are inadequate in order to meet the financing needs that have been established by the Commission; considers that the Just Transition Mechanism has been outlined as a duplication of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), which has been proven to be just a palliative remedy for the plague of deindustrialisation-driven unemployment; notes further, as regards the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, that financial engineering would be increased on the basis of the model of the ineffective Juncker plan;

42. Considers fully fledged, non-systemic regional banks to be decisive tools for financing a just ecological transition according to regional preferences and peculiarities;

Greening national budgets and sending the right price signals

43. Points out that by retaining the same budgetary constraints (which would, in fact, run counter to the idea of the alleged climate emergency), and by undertaking the targeted relaxation of guidelines on State aid, the European Green Deal will inevitably become yet another subsidy used to transform industrial sectors in certain Member States;

44. Deplores the fact that the Commission unduly directs which fiscal policies, in addition to other types of policies, the Member States implement; points out, in this regard, that the European Green Deal runs the risk of being a ‘New Deal’ in name only and that it could be reminiscent of the US Democrats’ slogan, meaning that the European Green Deal could be conceived as a greenwashing operation of the EU’s image;

45. Points out that sustainability is designed to be the external constraint par excellence of national democracies; recalls, in this regard, that whatever industrial development and job creation program subject to the climate external constraint has been suffocated by the constraint itself; calls for the European Green Deal to revert the nature of such a constraint; stresses, therefore, that in order reduce pollution and create more jobs, the European Green Deal should focus first on industrial development and jobs in order to better the quality of the environment;

Mobilising research and fostering innovation

46. Encourages the Commission and the Member States to further develop and promote research and development (R&D) in crucial sectors, such as energy storage, energy efficiency and raw materials recycling;

47. Recalls that EU instruments for research and innovation, such as Horizon Europe, must ensure a genuine and not merely nominal inclusion of micro and small-size enterprises; expresses its regret that, so far, a number of micro and small-size enterprises have been excluded from having access to EU financial tools due to excessive and often unrealistic application criteria;

Activating education and training

48. Reminds the Commission that education and training are the exclusive competence of the Member States; invites the Member States to identify and implement, in the relevant school and professional training courses in the technical-scientific sector, rewards for undertaking innovative projects intended to better protect the environment;

49. Expresses its regret over the fact that no impact assessment has been carried out to determine the social and occupational impact that the European Green Deal will have on the EU’s manufacturing sectors; expresses, further, its regret over the fact that no concrete strategy has been identified either to transfer and improve the skills of EU workers or to define the legal and economic frameworks of the alleged green jobs market; points out, as regards the requalification of skills, that it is delusional to believe that a simple training course is enough to transform a metalworker into a (green) start up;

A green oath: ‘do no harm’

50. Expresses its interest at the Commission’s commitment to provide each legislative and delegated acts proposals with a report that illustrates how compliance with the ‘do no harm’ principle is ensured; calls on the Commission to carry out thorough ex-ante and ex-post environmental and socio-economic impact assessments and to refrain from conducting them with the aim of demonstrating the validity of a by-default predetermined solution;

The EU as a global leader

51. Points out that a phase moving away from globalisation has begun; stresses, in this regard, that it would be wise for the EU to use the European Green Deal as an opportunity to get prepared in advance of this new economic and geopolitical scenario, instead of ideologically insisting on multilateralism just to do away with the idea of sovereigntism;

52. Points out that the European Green Deal should be taken as an opportunity to tackle the major role of global trade as regards pollution; calls for the EU to develop a strategy that prioritises domestic production rather than import the same goods from very far-away third countries; calls, therefore, for a careful revision of EU trade strategy, especially with regard to trade with third countries that have less strict standards, in order to ensure a level playing field;

53. Highlights that Africa does not have an established industrial base nor internal economic exchanges; stresses that it is for this reason that Africa is afflicted by the scourge of emigration, meanwhile Chinese companies are making vast progress on that continent; deplores, in this context, the EU’s lack of vision;

54. Acknowledges the sometimes disastrous natural consequences caused by climate change, notably natural disasters, rising of sea levels, extreme weather phenomena, desertification and water shortages, which force people to abandon their homes and livelihoods; warns that these natural consequences contribute to political instability and economic hardship, which, in turn, can lead to refugee crises; stresses that these crises destabilise not only the regions affected but also the EU; highlights the lack of a universal definition of ‘climate refugees’ and calls for the EU to reflect on said ambiguity and to promote and assist the local and regional support operations that receive refugees affected by climate change;

Time to act - together: a European Climate Pact

55. Notes the similarity of the European Climate Pact with the grand débat national set up by the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, as a tentative response to the yellow vests riots that came about because of the experimental application of certain ecological transition policies; stresses that the same policies are also set out in the European Green Deal;

56. Observes that the establishment of citizens’ assemblies is a method that has already been widely used when it comes to achieving a bottom-up consensus on ecological transition policies; fears that such assemblies are often manipulated in order to reach a predetermined outcome, where people are led to believe that they contributed to said outcome;

57. Emphasises that it is crucial to counter crimes against the environment; stresses, nevertheless, that each Member State should establish its own rules on access to justice;



° °

58. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the European Council, the Council and the parliaments of the Member States.


[1] Quadrio Curzio, A., Pellizzari, F., Zoboli, R. Innovazione tecnologica, scarsità relativa, investimenti. Enciclopedia degli idrocarburi, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, IV, 14 (2007).

[2] Formetta G., Feyen, L. Empirical evidence of declining global vulnerability to climate-related hazards. Global Environmental Change, 57, 101920 (2019).

[3] OJ L 283, 31.10.2003, p. 51.

[4] OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 1.

[5] OJ L 368, 17.12.1992, p. 38.

[6] OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 18.

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