

2014 - 2019

Committee on Budgets

2014/2221(INI)

26.1.2015


AMENDMENTS 1 - 49

Draft opinion Jean Arthuis(PE546.556v01-00)

on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: Annual Growth Survey 2015 (2014/2221(INI))

AM\1047587EN.doc PE546.807v01-00

AM_Com_NonLegOpinion



Amendment 1 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 1

Draft opinion

1. Emphasises that the principle of budgetary accuracy in public accounts shall govern the drawing up of national budgets and the EU budget; is convinced that said accuracy is one factor in the response to the crisis of confidence existing between the Member States and between said Member States and the citizens of the European Union;

Amendment

1. Emphasises that the principle of budgetary accuracy in public accounts shall govern the drawing up of national budgets and the EU budget so as to ensure convergence and stability in the EU; is convinced that said accuracy is one factor in the response to the crisis of confidence existing between the Member States and between said Member States and the citizens of the European Union, a loss of confidence which has increased since the recent financial crisis struck;

Or. el

Amendment 2 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Calls for greater uniformity in the presentation of public accounts so as to facilitate comparisons; calls in particular for the way in which Member States enter their contributions to the EU budget in their accounts to be standardised; is of the opinion that any operating expenses financed by borrowing ought to be shown as a separate figure which is added to investment expenditure when calculating the deficit;

Amendment

3. Calls for greater uniformity in the presentation of public accounts so as to facilitate comparisons;

Or. en

Amendment 3 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 3

Draft opinion

3. Calls for greater uniformity in the presentation of public accounts so as to facilitate comparisons; calls in particular for the way in which Member States enter their contributions to the EU budget in their accounts to be standardised; is of the opinion that any operating expenses financed by borrowing ought to be shown as a separate figure which is added to investment expenditure when calculating the deficit;

Amendment

3. Calls for greater uniformity in the presentation of public accounts so as to facilitate comparisons *and prevent excessive macro-economic imbalances*; calls in particular for the way in which Member States enter their contributions to the EU budget in their accounts to be standardised; is of the opinion that any operating expenses financed by borrowing ought to be shown as a separate figure which is added to investment expenditure when calculating the deficit;

Or. el

Amendment 4 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Calls on the Commission to offset any democratic deficit in the semester by means of the package of measures announced for 2015 on deepening economic and monetary union; reiterates its demand that any additional funding or instruments, such as a solidarity mechanism, shall fall within the scope of Parliament's budgetary oversight;

Amendment

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 5 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 4

Draft opinion

4. Calls on the Commission to offset any democratic deficit in the semester by means of the package of measures announced for 2015 on deepening economic and monetary union; reiterates its demand that any additional funding or instruments, such as a solidarity mechanism, shall fall within the scope of Parliament's budgetary oversight;

Amendment

4. Calls on the Commission to offset any democratic deficit in the semester by means of the package of measures announced for 2015 on deepening economic and monetary union; reiterates its demand that any additional funding or instruments, such as a solidarity mechanism, shall fall within the scope of Parliament's budgetary oversight *and shall be financed over and above the MFF ceiling for 2014-2020*;

Or. en

Amendment 6 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 5

Draft opinion

5. Considers it vital that the European Parliament and the national parliaments collaborate more closely in the context of the European Semester on economic and budgetary governance; undertakes to deepen its relations with the national parliaments in a spirit of constructive partnership in order to enhance parliamentary oversight of the Commission and the Council on the one hand and national governments and government bodies on the other; *hopes to see* the 2015 European Parliamentary Week and the conference referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance contribute to this goal;

Amendment

5. Considers it vital that the European Parliament and the national parliaments collaborate more closely; undertakes to deepen its relations with the national parliaments in a spirit of constructive partnership in order to enhance parliamentary oversight of the Commission and the Council on the one hand and national governments and government bodies on the other; *doubts*, *however*, *that* the 2015 European Parliamentary Week and the conference referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance *can in any way* contribute to this goal;

Amendment 7 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Recalls that the principle of budgetary accuracy applies to the EU budget too and insists on there being sufficient financing for approved commitments; *notes* that in spite of Parliament's warnings, this principle is being compromised by the current level of outstanding payments and the growing gap between payments and commitments; *regrets* that this *is proving detrimental* to the goals set at the highest political level for growth and employment – notably youth employment – and fears that this will deepen the gulf between the European Union and its citizens;

Amendment

6. Recalls that the principle of budgetary accuracy applies to the EU budget too and insists on there being sufficient financing for approved commitments; *regrets* that in spite of Parliament's warnings, this principle is being compromised by the current level of outstanding payments and the growing gap between payments and commitments leading to an unprecedented amount of unpaid bills of 24,7 billion euros; recalls that the overall ceiling of payment appropriations as foreseen in the current MFF is historically low; deplores that this insidious debt undermines the credibility of the EU and is in contradiction to the goals set at the highest political level for growth and employment notably youth employment – and fears that this will deepen the gulf between the European Union and its citizens:

Or. en

Amendment 8 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 6

Draft opinion

6. Recalls that the principle of budgetary accuracy applies to the EU budget too and insists on there being sufficient financing

Amendment

6. Recalls that the principle of budgetary accuracy applies to the EU budget too and insists on there being sufficient financing

for approved commitments; notes that in spite of Parliament's warnings, this principle is being compromised by the current level of outstanding payments and the growing gap between payments and commitments; regrets that this is proving detrimental to the goals set at the highest political level for growth and employment – notably youth employment – and fears that this will deepen the gulf between the European Union and its citizens;

for approved commitments; notes that in spite of Parliament's warnings, this principle is being compromised by the current level of outstanding payments and the growing gap between payments and commitments; regrets that this is proving detrimental to the goals set at the highest political level for growth and employment – notably youth employment – and support for small and medium-sized undertakings and fears that this will deepen the gulf between the European Union and its citizens;

Or. el

Amendment 9 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 7

Draft opinion

7. Repeats its call for the MFF mid-term review to prepare for a possible reduction in the period for which the next MFF is agreed, so as to ensure its subsequent renegotiation during the mandate of each Parliament and Commission, thus ensuring democratic legitimacy for decisions on the financial perspectives of the European Union, while taking steps to meet the need for stability in programming cycles and investment predictability;

Amendment

7. Repeats its call for the MFF mid-term post electoral revision to prepare the ground, on the basis of Recital 3 of the MFF 14-20 Regulation and in accordance with the Commission's Declaration annexed to it, for the most suitable duration of the MFF post 2020 with a view of striking the right balance between the duration of the respective terms of each Parliament and Commission, thus ensuring democratic legitimacy for decisions on the financial perspectives of the European Union, while taking steps to meet the need for stability in programming cycles and investment predictability;

Or. en

Amendment 10 Siegfried Mureşan

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Draft opinion Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to identify better the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Amendment

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to identify better the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union; calls on the Commission to adopt a clearer methodology for better tracing the EU funds expenditures related to Europe 2020 goals in order to allow for improved impact assessments; also demands more transparency in the Member States' and Commission's publishing of the use of EU funding data, in order to enhance accountability;

Or. en

Amendment 11 Paul Tang

Draft opinion Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to identify better the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Amendment

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to identify better the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union; calls on the Commission to embed this in a broad view on how public investments, national en European, effectively contribute to these goals;

Or. en

Amendment 12 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Calls for the *mid-term review* of the MFF to *identify better* the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Amendment

8. Calls for the *post electoral revision* of the MFF to *enhance* the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 13 Tomáš Zdechovský

Draft opinion Paragraph 8

Draft opinion

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to *identify better* the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Amendment

8. Calls for the mid-term review of the MFF to *analyse and take due account of* the value added by EU funding to the goals of competitiveness, growth, employment and energy transition set by the European Union;

Or. en

Amendment 14 Siegfried Mureșan

Draft opinion Paragraph 8 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

8a. Welcomes the Commission's commitment to streamline the European

Semester through a comprehensive single economic assessment per Member State and streamlined reporting; calls on the assessment to emphasise the need to use funds from the EU Budget to implement Country Specific Recommendations and stresses the need for enhancing Member States' ownership of the European Semester;

Or. en

Amendment 15 Siegfried Mureşan

Draft opinion Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a common method for assessing real payment needs in accordance with commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

Amendment

9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a common method for assessing real payment needs in accordance with commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority; furthermore calls on the Commission to report on the potential impact that delayed payments issue would have on the commitments taken by Member States in the context of the European Semester;

Or. en

Amendment 16 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

Amendment

- 9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a
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common method for assessing real payment needs in accordance with commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

common method for assessing real payment needs in accordance with commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority; *underlines that decommitment is not a solution to the payment crisis*;

Or. en

Amendment 17 Tomáš Zdechovský

Draft opinion Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a *common* method for *assessing real payment needs in accordance with* commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

Amendment

9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a method for *calculating the level of payments necessary to cover the real needs* commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

Or. en

Amendment 18 Isabelle Thomas

Draft opinion Paragraph 9

Draft opinion

9. Calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a common method for assessing real payment needs in *accordance with* commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

Amendment

9. Notes that the Council systematically underestimates real payment needs, thereby creating the first stage in the payments crisis process; calls once more on the Council to agree with Parliament and the Commission on a common method for assessing real payment needs in order to meet the commitments made by the two arms of the budgetary authority;

Amendment 19 Zigmantas Balčytis

Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9a. Notes that in many Member States public administration has to date not been made more efficient, even though improvements in that area would serve to achieve savings by rationalising organisation and cutting red tape for businesses and citizens;

Or. lt

Amendment 20 Flavio Zanonato, Daniele Viotti, Pina Picierno, Pier Antonio Panzeri

Draft opinion Paragraph 9 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

9a. Calls on the Council and the Commission to undertake, together with Parliament, a draft revision of the current budgetary procedure so as to consolidate the role of the two branches of the budgetary authority and the executive role of the Commission;

Or. it

Amendment 21 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

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10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Amendment

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; recalls that Member States are obliged to meet existing commitments within the European budget, while keeping in mind the rationalisation efforts required by the EU itself, in line with procedures that are excessively rigid and in need of review;

Or it

Amendment 22 Jean-Paul Denanot

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

Draft opinion

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Amendment

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State; proposes, in return, as a way of promoting national investments, to remove from the convergence calculation criteria the amount of public funds invested in infrastructure, research and development,

support for SMEs, tackling terrorism and receiving Mediterranean immigrants;

Or. fr

Amendment 23 Jean Arthuis

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

Draft opinion

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Amendment

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State; stresses that this would be in line with the flexibility advocated in the Commission communication of 13 January, which offers favourable treatment for national contributions to the strategic investment fund; points out that the credibility of this fund is based on the solidity of the EU budget, and consequently on a reduction in the number of unpaid invoices;

Or. fr

Amendment 24 Isabelle Thomas

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

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10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Amendment

10. Notes that the MFF is designed with a system of multiple ceilings to give it stability and predictability over the whole of the programming period; regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as something which can be used as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Or. fr

Amendment 25 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

Draft opinion

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

Amendment

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget and thus the implementation of important projects in favour of growth and jobs in the whole EU; recalls that the EU budget is an investment budget and invites therefore the European Commission to consider that GNI based national contributions to the EU budget are to be covered by the "investment"

clause" as interpreted by the Commission in its recent Communication on "making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the stability and growth pact" (COM 2015-12 final); calls in that respect for the way in which Member States enter their contributions to the EU budget in their national budgets to be standardised;

Or. en

Amendment 26 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

(Linguistic amendment: does not apply to English text)

Or. el

Amendment 27 Tomáš Zdechovský

Draft opinion Paragraph 10

Draft opinion

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets, the Commission shall enter in the calculations of deficits each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each

Amendment

10. Regrets once again that Member States persist in viewing their contribution to the EU budget as an adjustment variable in their consolidation efforts, which in turn leads to an artificial reduction in the volume of payments available in the EU budget; proposes therefore that when examining national budgets *special provisions have to be made to show* each country's share of unpaid invoices in order to draw attention to the true state of affairs concerning liabilities attributable to each Member State;

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Member State;

Or. en

Amendment 28 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 10 – point a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

(a) Very much welcomes the interpretation of the "investment clause" put forward by the Commission in its recent Communication on "making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the stability and growth pact" (COM 2015 -12 final); welcomes in particular the fact that national expenditures on project co-funded by some EU key programmes to foster growth and jobs will fall under "the investment clause", but highlights that this clause will only have real economic effects if and only if the EU budget is sufficiently equipped in payment appropriations to pay the bills linked to the implementation of these projects;

Or. en

Amendment 29 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 10 – point b (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

(b) Welcomes the fact that the Commission has underlined the economic significance of the European Structural and Investments Funds (including the

vouth employment initiative) in its Annual Growth Survey 2015; recalls that these funds represent 10 % of total public investment on average in the EU but that the situation varies across countries and that in some countries, they can represent as much as 80 % of the public investment; emphasises that Structural and Investment funds constitute a good example of the synergy between the European budget and the national budgets on the basis of commonly agreed objectives enshrined in partnership agreements on growth and investment according to EUROPE 2020 Strategy; supports every effort in the direction of an intelligent pooling of European and national budgetary means in order to achieve efficiency gains, economic stimulation and lower national deficits thanks to a positive effect of shared resources:

Or. en

Amendment 30 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 10 – point c (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

(c) Recalls that the existing system of own resources is complex, unfair and incomprehensible to citizens; underlines that the fiscal situation of Member States can be eased through a new system of own resources that will reduce GNI contributions, thus enabling Member States to meet their consolidation efforts without jeopardizing EU funding; stresses, therefore, the importance it attaches to the high level group on own resources and supports the debate on a new own resources system, which should

lead to a true reform of EU financing, without increasing the taxation burden on citizens;

Or. en

Amendment 31 Jean-Paul Denanot

Draft opinion Paragraph 10 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

10a. Highlights the urgent need to tackle effectively the tax fraud which is potentially depriving the EU budget of substantial resources;

Or fr

Amendment 32 Siegfried Mureșan

Draft opinion Paragraph 11

Draft opinion

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other;

Amendment

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other; calls on the Commission to present a report on the impact of redeploying funds from EU programmes such as Connecting Europe Facility and Horizon 2020 on the potential beneficiaries of those funds by assessing the number of beneficiaries affected and economic impact;

Amendment 33 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 11

Draft opinion

11. *Welcomes* the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset *on* the *one hand the* deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and *to* stimulate economic *activity on the other*;

Amendment

11. Notes that the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker falls far short of what is required to offset the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and cannot possibly restore confidence, stimulate economic growth or reinvigorate employment and investment in Europe;

Or. it

Amendment 34 Jean-Paul Denanot

Draft opinion Paragraph 11

Draft opinion

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other;

Amendment

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other; questions, nevertheless, the 1:15 multiplier proposed by the Commission, and calls for the EIB to be asked to do more to make the plan credible;

Or. fr

Amendment 35 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 11

Draft opinion

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other;

Amendment

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by fiscal consolidation efforts, and to stimulate economic activity on the other; expects in particular support for SMEs in those Member States particularly affected by the crisis;

Or el

Amendment 36 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 11

Draft opinion

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by *fiscal consolidation efforts*, and to stimulate *economic activity* on the other;

Amendment

11. Welcomes the EUR 315 billion investment plan presented by Commission President Mr Juncker as the first step to offset on the one hand the deficit in public and private investment brought about by the reduction of public spending in a context of economic crises, and to stimulate growth and job creation on the other; fears, however, that this plan will not be able to target some specific investments needed to foster the EUROPE 2020 Strategy (e.g. energy efficiency, education, public infrastructure)

Or. en

Amendment 37 Flavio Zanonato, Daniele Viotti, Pina Picierno, Pier Antonio Panzeri

Draft opinion Paragraph 11 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

11a. Hopes that, following the presentation of the report by Mr Monti's High Level Group on Own Resources, the Council, Parliament and the Commission will, without delay, take steps to introduce and implement a system of EU own resources designed - in the long term - to replace current national contributions;

Or. it

Amendment 38 Isabelle Thomas

Draft opinion Paragraph 11 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

11a. Considers that shifting the Union to a more sustainable and socially inclusive economic model requires additional EU public investment, which is the only way in which projects having an immediate benefit for its citizens can be financed over the longer term;

Or. fr

Amendment 39 Isabelle Thomas

Draft opinion Paragraph 11 b (new)

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Amendment

11b. Believes that, given the exacerbation of economic differences between Europe's regions since the beginning of the economic crisis, the European Strategic Investment Fund should be able to prioritise regions in crisis for part of its funding;

Or. fr

Amendment 40 Isabelle Thomas

Draft opinion Paragraph 11 c (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

11c. Notes that in December 2014 the eurozone was in deflation for the first time since October 2009; considers that it is now more urgent than ever to give back to the Member States the fiscal leeway needed to stimulate economic activity; proposes extending the flexibilities in the stability pact suggested by the Commission in January 2015 by not including contributions to the structural funds and national contributions to the EU budget in public deficit calculations;

Or. fr

Amendment 41 Siegfried Mureşan

Draft opinion Paragraph 12

12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU and the EIB to the European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the budget and in the 2015 budget in particular;

Amendment

12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU and the EIB to the European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the budget and in the 2015 budget in particular; draws the attention in this respect that the EFSI should finance projects with equal or greater value than the one that would have been financed through the EU programmes from which funds are being drawn in order to set up the EU guarantee for the EFSI;

Or. en

Amendment 42 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 12

Draft opinion

12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU and the EIB to the European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the budget and in the 2015 budget in particular;

Amendment

12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU and the EIB to the European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the budget and in the 2015 budget in particular, so as to avert any a real risk of further losses to a Union budget already under massive strain;

Or it

Amendment 43 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 12

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12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU *and* the EIB *to the* European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the budget and in the 2015 budget in particular;

Amendment

12. Confirms its willingness to examine with the utmost vigilance how financial commitments by the EU to the EIB for the setting up of the European Strategic Investment Fund are entered in the EU budget and in the 2015 budget in particular; confirms its intention to closely monitor the way the EIB will engage its own funds in the ESIF;

Or. en

Amendment 44 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Draft opinion Paragraph 13

Draft opinion

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Amendment

13. Does not believe that the Member States have any interest in topping up this fund, notwithstanding the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; considers that European countries are unlikely to invest in a fund in the absence of any guarantees that it will be used in the country making the investment; considers it therefore more reasonable not to reckon on such investments in evaluating the Stability Pact, which is weighing heavily on the economic recovery of the Member States and the European Union itself;

Or. it

Amendment 45 Jean Arthuis

Draft opinion Paragraph 13

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13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the *Commission's intention to exclude* national contributions *from* stability pact *calculations*; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Amendment

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the *flexibility* announced by the Commission in the treatment of national contributions with regard to the stability pact; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Or fr

Amendment 46 Georgios Kyrtsos

Draft opinion Paragraph 13

Draft opinion

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Amendment

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund, which seeks to maximize the impact of public spending and attract private investment, and welcomes the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Or. el

Amendment 47 Tomáš Zdechovský

Draft opinion Paragraph 13

Draft opinion

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the *Commission's intention to exclude* national contributions *from stability pact calculations*; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Amendment

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the *Commission's proposal to show flexibility with regard to the* national contributions *to the EFSI in case those lead to a small and temporary breach of the 3% deficit threshold for a Member State*; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see trans-European and supranational projects chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union

Or. en

Amendment 48 Vladimír Maňka, Isabelle Thomas, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial

Draft opinion Paragraph 13

Draft opinion

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see *trans-European and supranational projects* chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union.

Amendment

13. Calls on the Member States to top up this fund and welcomes the Commission's intention to exclude national contributions from stability pact calculations; rejects the idea of any attempts to renationalise the fund or argue for a fair return which could ensue from national contributions; wishes to see riskier projects that have not found financing means so far and that serve the political ambitions of the EU and in particular the achievement of the EUROPE 2020 Strategy be it at local,

regional, national, or trans-European level, chosen so that citizens may be able to associate the benefits arising from these projects with action by the European Union; insists that the EFSI must be clearly and unequivocally additional to existing EU programmes;

Or. en

Amendment 49 Jean Arthuis

Draft opinion Paragraph 13 a (new)

Draft opinion

Amendment

13a. Underlines the importance it attaches to the new high-level group on own resources, which should lead to a true reform of EU financing; stresses that the Member States' budgetary situation can be improved through a new system of own resources to finance the Union budget that will reduce GNI contributions, thus enabling Member States to accomplish their consolidation efforts without jeopardising EU funding and its credibility; points out that the adoption of consent to taxation gives parliaments their institutional authority.

Or. fr