Пълен протокол на разискванията

Сряда, 10 юни 2015 г. - Страсбург

13. Стратегическото военно положение в Черноморския басейн след незаконното анексиране на Крим от Русия (разискване)

  Πρόεδρος. – Το πρώτο σημείο στην ημερήσια διάταξη είναι η συζήτηση της έκθεσης του κ. Ioan Mircea Paşcu, εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων, σχετικά με τη στρατηγική στρατιωτική κατάσταση στη λεκάνη της Μαύρης Θάλασσας μετά από την παράνομη προσάρτηση της Κριμαίας από τη Ρωσία (2015/2036(INI)) (Α8-0171/2015).

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. – Mr President, after the Cold War, the Black Sea – which was relatively closed before – became, first, a transport route for Caspian oil and gas towards the West and, second, a source of energy in itself, forcing both its opening up and its consideration in a larger regional perspective, namely the ‘Black Sea Area’. Thus the Black Sea Area has become both economically relevant and politically contested, as witness the geopolitics of the various pipelines crossing it and the efforts by Russia and Turkey to oppose outside penetration.

The breaking up of the former Soviet Union and the admission of Romania and Bulgaria to both NATO and the EU have markedly transformed the political landscape, specifically compelling the EU to come up with an integrative instrument, namely the Black Sea Synergy, back in 2007. Contrary to the bureaucratic view, the initiative has had little impact in terms of fostering a regional common identity among the countries in the area, and consequently on strengthening cooperation between them. In part that was so because almost all the countries involved had more important forms of collaboration with the EU, other than the Synergy.

However, the relatively reduced efficiency of the initiative is geopolitical. The area was in flux in 2007 and it still is today. After the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, the latter’s destabilisation of eastern Ukraine and the practical inclusion of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s military organisation, one could say that the Black Sea Area is moving back to what it looked like two decades ago, with Russia attempting to control its northern shores, as the Soviet Union did 24 years ago.

The occupation of Crimea and the current efforts to cut two territorial corridors – one from Russia towards Crimea and another from Crimea towards Transnistria – are undeniable realities. The siege of Mariupol and the destabilisation of Odessa are testimony to that. The fact is that, since the illegal annexation, Crimea has become a launching pad towards Bosnia – and the area around and beyond – due to the transformation of the initially small, defensive Russian force stationed in Sevastopol into a significant strike force equipped with long-range force-projection systems, quite apart from an aggressive programme of modernisation of the Russian Black Sea fleet. In sum, Russia has thus provided itself with a southern Kaliningrad in support of its potential expansion.

Consequently, in the last year-and-a-half the Black Sea has acquired important military relevance, in addition to its existing economic relevance, which could not leave the EU uninterested, especially when both the EU security and defence strategies are being revised, making all the Union’s other interests – environment for instance – inevitably mediated by the long—term militarisation process initiated in the area. Therefore, the aim of this report is to increase the EU’s awareness of the complex situation created in the Black Sea, which could not – and should not – be either ignored or left entirely to NATO to deal with.

This reality calls for responsible management of the situation in the Black Sea, but a dialogue with Russia – provided it was not misinterpreted by the latter as an encouragement to dare more – should obligatorily be accompanied by the continuation of deterrence as part of a strategic reassurance to the eastern members of both NATO and the EU, who have lost faith in Russia’s real intentions.

  Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, I am pleased to have the opportunity today to discuss the issues related to the Black Sea. I will focus on our regional cooperation efforts and perspectives in this area.

I welcome the attention that the European Parliament is giving to the Black Sea Basin. The EU has interests and responsibilities in the Black Sea region. We take an active approach to the sea basins that surround us, and the Black Sea is one of them. There are several reasons – environmental, transport, maritime affairs, civil society – for the EU to play an active role in the Black Sea region.

We welcome the report by Mr Paşcu, which underlines the significant opportunities and challenges in the Black Sea area that require coordinated action. As we have mentioned on previous occasions, while there are good reasons to call for a comprehensive EU strategy for the Black Sea region, we have to make sure it will be well received both within the EU as a whole and among the non-EU Black Sea states. It must therefore come when the ground has been well prepared.

The report before us focuses on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia. The EU stance on this remains clear. We will not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. We continue to condemn it and to fully implement our non-recognition policy, including a trade and investment ban. The EU is assessing the security risks arising from Moscow’s behaviour, for example in the fields of energy security, cyber security, the security of civil aviation and of our banking systems, the stability of our democracies, and ways of countering the Kremlin’s propaganda.

We remain prepared for the long haul in the crisis with Russia and are very conscious of the need to preserve EU unity also in the long term. We must be ready to face Moscow’s confrontation as well as its cooperative behaviour. The current EU double-track approach as regards the Ukraine conflict should be applied to EU-Russia interaction as a whole: resilience and firmness, together with dialogue and engagement. On the one hand, the EU remains steadfast in its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. It continues to support all diplomatic efforts and in particular those linked to the implementation of the Minsk agreements and those linked to UNSC Resolution 2202. Our current efforts focus on supporting the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

The EU has also continued its efforts in the trilateral processes with Ukraine and Russia on energy and on the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as part of the EU’s support for the broader comprehensive peace process. There is no doubt that Ukraine faces immense challenges in the security, political and economic areas all at the same time.

The EU is committed to bolstering Ukraine’s ability to deal with these challenges and is therefore delivering unprecedented financial support. The implementation of the EUR 11 billion support package is under way and the EU has already committed through loans and grants, including through its banks, the EIB and EBRD, around EUR 6 billion. In parallel, the EU has adopted consecutive packages of restrictive measures, including those aimed at entities in Crimea.

The European Council in March explicitly linked the duration of sanctions against Russia to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. The EU remains deeply concerned at the continuous military build-up and deterioration of the human rights situation in the Crimean peninsula, including the denial of free speech and the persecution of persons belonging to minorities.

The EU continues its cooperation initiatives under the Black Sea Synergy as and where possible. As you already know, the EU’s approach to the region is guided by the Black Sea Synergy. This communication, adopted in 2007, sets out goals and tasks across a range of economic sectors and thematic areas based on the notion of the complementarity of various actors and actions. In January 2015, the EEAS and Commission services reviewed the implementation of the Black Sea Synergy and issued a joint staff working document summarising the lessons learned. This document presents a snapshot of the progress in the main fields of cooperation in the Black Sea region during the last five years. The lessons learned highlighted in the document will inform the future development of the Synergy. Stronger partnerships between the EU institutions and Member States, increasing stakeholders’ participation, and better coordination with other regional and international organisations are among the lessons that we take on board as we move forward.

The results of the Black Sea Synergy to date reveal the practical utility and the potential of this EU regional policy approach. The Black Sea Synergy should remain a bottom-up initiative geared towards strengthening regional cooperation via concrete projects, making the best possible use of the wide range of tools at the EU’s disposal.

An important goal is to bring added value to the citizens of the region, while ensuring environmental sustainability. Also, we have a substantial programme of cross-border cooperation in the Black Sea region. There are projects underway to strengthen monitoring capacities of the Black Sea marine environment as well as in the areas of research, tourism and culture. We do all that while increasingly engaging with the civil society and other regional stakeholders.

Last but not least, the EU’s recently-adopted Maritime Security Strategy and its associated action plan looks at maritime security in all the sea basins around us, including the Black Sea, in a cross-sectoral way. As called for by the report, this will help us to address maritime security challenges in an integrated manner, combining civil and military involvement at national and EU level across the numerous policy sectors concerned.

The EU needs to remain closely attuned to its interests in the region, including strategic, political and economic interests, and to further discuss how best they can be achieved. On military issues as, very rightly, the report insists upon, we are maintaining and possibly even strengthening close contact with NATO at both political and working level.

In its conclusions of 18 May, the Council welcomed ongoing efforts to strengthen strategic and practical cooperation between the EU and NATO, with the overall objective of building a true organisation-to-organisation relationship. In this endeavour, we count on the support of the European Parliament, and we look forward to views and ideas from the Members of this House.

  Gabrielius Landsbergis, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, the situation in the Black Sea basin has fundamentally changed due to Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The military balance has significantly shifted towards entrenchment of Russian military dominance in the Black Sea.

There is a country in the region, a neighbour of the EU, which used to benefit from cooperation with European democracies but which, for many years, has been steadily preparing itself for military endeavours instead. We used to close our eyes to this tendency.

Experts estimate that since 2009, Putin has increased defence spending in roubles more than 20 times over. We all know the economic and social challenges Russia now faces, but this does not stop Putin spending up to 34% of the national budget on defence and security. Too many European NATO member states do not manage even 2%. There are new realities for the countries of the region, and they are not the reflection of a greater peace. Russia is testing the boundaries of our security. It is up to the EU and NATO to make it clear to Russia that in the current world you cannot send tanks or amass military forces whenever you think things are not going your way. You cannot bully your neighbours or tear independent states apart.

The annexation of Crimea will never be recognised, and the Minsk Agreement must be implemented. The EU must stay firm on this principle because, if the trend is not stopped in Ukraine, the limits of our security will be tested further.

The military balance in the Black Sea region may be restored by strengthening our transatlantic link and by a bigger NATO presence and increased cooperation under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) but, in addition, we should help threatened countries to take more responsibility for security in their region. Countries that have the most direct security concerns, due to the changed realities, could combine their efforts by creating a joint military battalion for military exercises, increasing interoperability and furthering modernisation.

The issue of the occupation and annexation of Crimea should not be abandoned. There are legal ways to challenge it, including by requesting a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice. It is important to make clear to those responsible for violations of international law and human rights that a crime does not go unpunished.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  Κώστας Χρυσόγονος ( GUE/NGL), ερώτηση με γαλάζια κάρτα. – Κύριε Landsbergis, καταγγέλλετε τη Ρωσία για βίαιη αλλαγή συνόρων στην Ευρώπη με την προσάρτηση της Κριμαίας. Μήπως όμως, προκειμένου η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και αυτό το Κοινοβούλιο να έχουν το δικαίωμα να κάνουν τέτοιες καταγγελίες, θα έπρεπε να έχουν επιδείξει παρόμοια στάση σε όλες τις αντίστοιχες περιπτώσεις;

Όταν ευρωπαϊκά κράτη βομβάρδισαν τη Σερβία για να επιτύχουν την αλλαγή των συνόρων και την απόσχιση του Κοσσυφοπεδίου, ποιες ήταν οι καταγγελίες που ακούστηκαν στην αίθουσα αυτή; Ή μήπως, αντιθέτως, σήμερα η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση απαιτεί από τη Σερβία να αποδεχθεί την απόσχιση του Κοσσυφοπεδίου, προκειμένου να προχωρήσει η διαδικασία ένταξης; Δεν υπάρχει ασυνέπεια σε αυτό;

  Gabrielius Landsbergis (PPE), blue-card answer. – Well, it is very obvious that the United Nations – even the United Nations – called this an illegal act of war. So I do not think it is too much, in this House, to call a spade a spade.

Whenever I hear arguments like that put forward, the only resemblance I hear is to words that come from the Kremlin, and I am saddened to hear them in this House.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  Tibor Szanyi (S&D), Kékkártyás kérdés. – Landsbergis kolléga nagyon helyesen említette, hogy az orosz fél a műveleteivel, hát bizony teszteli, próbálgatja, feszegeti az Európai Közösség tűréshatárait, és nyilván azzal is egyetértek, hogy erre valamiféle fegyelmezett és közös választ kell adni. De Ön milyen eszközöket lát az európai testületek kezében, hogy a közös fellépést aláásó egyes tagországokkal szemben hatékonyabban fellépjünk? Ilyen például az orbáni Magyarország.

  Gabrielius Landsbergis (PPE), blue-card answer. – First of all, I understand the situation that our friends in Romania and Bulgaria find themselves in, having lived for so many years in an area that was apparently an area of peace and recreation and now is an area where, supposedly, nuclear armaments might be kept. The situation has changed dramatically.

Just a few hours ago this Parliament voted in favour, by a big majority, of the EU—Russia relations report. The report states that there are a lot of things that the EU can do. For one thing, the EU can no longer put new ideas on the table and wait for Russia to change its policies.

  Ana Gomes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, como escreve o colega Ioan Paşcu neste relatório, a União Europeia e os seus Estados-Membros não devem reconhecer a anexação ilegal da Crimeia pela Rússia, reiterando o seu compromisso com a independência e a integridade territorial da Ucrânia, em conformidade com a Carta das Nações Unidas e com o Protocolo de Budapeste de 1994.

Considerando a anexação da Crimeia e a continuada ocupação da Osséssia do Sul e da Abcásia, na Geórgia, é preciso que os Estados-Membros tenham uma resposta de segurança conjunta, preparada para os desafios colocados pela Rússia na bacia do Mar Negro e consequentes mudanças do contexto geoestratégico e da situação militar.

Essa resposta deve refletir-se na revisão da Estratégia de Segurança Europeia e da Estratégia Europeia de Segurança Marítima. Dado o potencial de instabilidade e, em particular, a dependência da Europa em relação ao Mar Negro para o trânsito de fornecimentos de energia, a União Europeia tem um interesse estratégico em dissuadir os atores regionais de adotarem uma atitude política temerária, se necessário mobilizando equipamentos navais e aeroespaciais europeus para o Mar Negro. 

Devemos também agir diplomaticamente para persuadir a Rússia a pôr termo às hostilidades e a respeitar os Acordos de Minsk, mas se Putin continuar a orquestrar as forças separatistas do Donbass e a desestabilizar a Ucrânia em Mariupol, Odessa e noutras zonas, é preciso reforçar as sanções contra o regime, em Moscovo, direcionando-as especificamente contra a oligarquia que sustenta Putin. 

É, por isso, vital que os Estados-Membros da União Europeia se mantenham unidos e se abstenham de equipar militarmente a Rússia, arriscando violar o Direito Internacional e o quadro de sanções.

  Marek Jurek, w imieniu grupy ECR. – W rezolucji rosyjskiej powiedzieliśmy dzisiaj, że musimy być przygotowani do konfrontacji z Rosją w oparciu o naszą „soft power”. Ale tak naprawdę my musimy zdawać sobie sprawę z prawdziwego charakteru wyzwania, które sąsiadom i Zachodowi rzuca Putin. Jego polityka zawiera się w tej prostej doktrynie, którą wyłożył: że dla niego największą geopolityczną tragedią dwudziestego wieku był rozpad Związku Sowieckiego. I polityka Putina po prostu zmierza do odbudowy tego więzienia narodów, chociaż oczywiście chce w tym więzieniu zmienić fasadę i przemalować jego ściany. Tym niemniej cel pozostaje ten sam. Do kogo się zwraca? W Europie Wschodniej przede wszystkim do ludzi, którzy nauczyli się traktować Związek Sowiecki jako rzeczywistość normalną, a jednocześnie kierować się irracjonalnym poczuciem zagrożenia ze strony Zachodu, zagrożenia którego nigdy nie było.

Gdyby Putin był pewien, że odpowiedzią na jego aneksję Krymu będzie przyjęcie Gruzji do przymierza atlantyckiego, do wojny na wschodniej Ukrainie by nie doszło. I nasza polityka musi być przede wszystkim polityką konsekwentnej równowagi regionalnej. I druga rzecz: musimy zawsze pamiętać o geopolitycznej funkcji Morza Czarnego. Morze Czarne było zawsze pomostem i drogą między Europą a Azją Środkową i tę funkcję powinno odzyskać. Dlatego właśnie w tym sprawozdaniu zwracamy się o wznowienie prac nad budową gazociągu Nabucco – takiego właśnie połączenia, które energetycznie Azję Środkową i Europę połączy. Oby tylko za tymi wyzwaniami poszły autentyczne czyny.

  Fernando Maura Barandiarán, en nombre del Grupo ALDE. – Señor Presidente, desde el inicio de la crisis ucraniana he venido observando con profunda preocupación la deriva sectaria y belicista emprendida, en algunas ocasiones, por muchos de los miembros de esta Cámara. Los numerosos informes, resoluciones, interpelaciones, vetos a diplomáticos rusos, entre otras medidas adoptadas en este Parlamento, transmiten una imagen que no nos favorece en absoluto.

No hay ninguna duda de que hemos de mantener una postura firme y contundente respecto del Gobierno ruso, pero también es crucial establecer una clara línea divisoria entre la ciudadanía rusa, que debe siempre ser objeto de respeto, consideración y apoyo, y los dirigentes que están al frente de su Gobierno.

Los debates emocionales, la escalada del conflicto, la guerra de propaganda y contrapropaganda, resoluciones como las que hoy discutimos, que están trufadas de hipótesis y no de hechos, perjudican no solo al objetivo último de la resolución del conflicto en Ucrania y la normalización de las relaciones con Rusia, sino a la diplomacia europea en su conjunto.

Si partimos de la base de que la anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia es ilegal y no puede ser reconocida, el Parlamento Europeo es la institución que debe canalizar los intereses y valores europeos, y utilizarlos a través de la diplomacia —lo que llamamos el «poder blando»— para conseguir una solución pacífica al conflicto. Por desgracia, se diría que estamos buscando resolver la situación de otra manera. Es preciso volver al terreno racional, medir las consecuencias de nuestros actos y decisiones y, sobre todo, basarnos en hechos y realidades a la hora de realizar informes y declaraciones.

  Javier Couso Permuy, en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL. – Señor Presidente, este informe nos ayuda a comprender la visión geopolítica de la gran coalición, que se caracteriza por la construcción del enemigo ruso.

Rusia, en este texto, es culpable de la situación en el este de Ucrania; es culpable también de los cambios geoestratégicos en el Mar Negro; es culpable de la inseguridad energética de la Unión Europea; y es incluso culpable de defenderse.

Lo malo es que, cuando construimos enemigos, al final buscamos que se planteen medidas contra ellos. Y ahí vienen las sanciones o las garantías estratégicas firmes de la OTAN a sus miembros orientales. Hablando en plata: traslado de tropas y de armamento.

Y por si fuera poco, se plantea incluso la aplicación del artículo 5 del Tratado de Washington: la guerra.

Todo sustentado con auténticas manipulaciones de la historia reciente, como cuando se afirma que «la anexión ilegal de Crimea ofrece a Rusia un puesto avanzado situado directamente en las fronteras con la OTAN», como si la ampliación de 1999 no hubiera implicado un puesto avanzado frente a Kaliningrado o la de 2004 una auténtica torre de vigilancia junto al país.

Son demasiadas contradicciones. ¿Realmente puede la Unión Europea plantear su política hacia Rusia en función de la incorporación de Crimea a Rusia?

Este Parlamento aprobó hace muy poco una Resolución en la que se seguía dando por buena la independencia de la autoproclamada República de Kosovo, fruto del apoyo prestado por los bombardeos de la OTAN hasta a organizaciones terroristas. Y no podemos olvidar que los estadounidenses pusieron la base de Camp Bondsteel, una de las instalaciones más importantes que fue centro de detención de la CIA ―algunos saben mucho de ello―.

Por tanto, los grupos que apoyen este texto votarán desde una postura cínica y belicista al servicio de intereses que están fuera de Europa. El Grupo GUE/NGL votará por la paz y la cooperación internacional.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul» (artículo 162, apartado 8, del Reglamento))

  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), blue-card question. – In fact I would like to ask our colleague, Mr Couso Permuy, whether he would speak the same way in this Chamber if a country came and seized a part of his country’s territory. Do you know, Mr Couso Permuy, that nowadays the Russian Black Sea fleet is already greater than the combined fleets of all the other Black Sea coastal states and poses a tremendous threat to European Union security and defence?

  Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Precisamente mi país, independientemente del Gobierno que haya, no reconoce precisamente por eso la anexión ilegal o la autoproclamación de Kosovo; porque nos afecta también profundamente en nuestro país. Por lo tanto, no me venga usted hablando de eso. Yo lo que quiero señalar es quién empezó a romper el tablero de Europa. Y no fue Rusia, señores, fuimos nosotros.

(El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul» (artículo 162, apartado 8, del Reglamento))

  Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), pitanje koje je podizanjem plave kartice postavio. – Poštovani gospodine zastupniče, moram reći da je meni jako žao što je došlo do rata na području bivše Jugoslavije i u mom političkom radu od 25 godina učinio sam sve da bude mir na tom području.

Međutim, ne mogu prihvatiti Vaše stavove i pitam Vas zbog toga, mislite li da je tragedija koju su Miloševićevi razbojnici napravili u Srebrenici nešto što je za svaku osudu i mislite li da bi se sličan scenarij lako moguće bio ponovio i na Kosovu i da bi došlo do masovnih ubojstava i masovnog iseljenja stanovništva s Kosova da je Milošević uspio u svojim namjerama?

  Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – De mis palabras no se desprende, en ningún caso, el apoyo a ninguna masacre. Pero es que ahí usted pone el interés solo en un aspecto: en el que le conviene.

Y vuelvo a repetir: quien rompió los acuerdos que se habían tomado tras la disolución de la Unión Soviética fue la OTAN, y no fue el señor Milošević.

  Indrek Tarand, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, if you allow me I will speak in Estonian, because it seems to be the only language that the master of the Kremlin understands.

Esiteks tahaksin tänada hr Pașcut selle eest, et temaga oli tõesti tore koos töötada. Mees nimetab asju õigete nimedega – Krimm on annekteeritud, mitte kuskil meie ei alustanud Krimmi annekteerimist, nagu siin hiljuti fraktsiooni GUE/NGL kolleeg üritas väita. Roheliste fraktsiooni nimel kõneledes tahaksin siiski osutada paarile probleemile, mis meil selle raportiga on olnud. Esimene probleem on see, et paljud meie liikmed arvavad, et liiga tugev keelekasutus, millele ei järgne jõukasutust, võib olla ebaproduktiivne ja pigem anda Putinile Kremlis jälle lõkkematerjali, et väita, et just NATO ründab teda nüüd Musta mere kaudu.

Teine probleem on see, et meie fraktsioon arvab, et selle parlamendi julgeolekukomisjon ei ole tegelikult NATO parlamentaarne assamblee, ja kui raport liiga tugevalt rõhutab NATO rolli Musta mere strateegilise tasakaalu taastamisel, siis me oleme võib-olla eksiteel. Meie parlamendi ülesanne on võib-olla senisest palju tugevamalt nõuda ja toetada seda, et NATO kolmanda sambana lisaks Türgile ja USAle ning Kanadale tekiksid Euroopa Liidu relvajõud, mis siis ka reaalselt suudaks meie kõva retoorikat tagada julgeolekusituatsioonide lahendamisel. Lõpetuseks lisan veel kord, et kui hr Pașcu kodumaa peaks olema hädas, siis meie mehed tulevad alati appi.

  Mike Hookem, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, much of the pain, destruction, loss and suffering caused by the recent fighting in Ukraine can be directly attributed to the expansionist policies of the European Union. As a result, the EU is now deeply embroiled in a highly complex and dangerous standoff with Russia which it cannot hope to win.

Due to the EU’s previous empire-building ambitions in Ukraine, this organisation now has little moral legitimacy to take any action, either diplomatically or militarily, without the risk of further stoking the fires of conflict in the region. This is why I am today calling for a strategy of intervention and the promotion of peace, to be developed and implemented by a non-state, non-partisan actor such as the UN in order to avoid a potentially catastrophic, multinational, military engagement.

While I condemn the EU for its actions in Ukraine, I must also make it clear that I equally condemn Russia's President Putin for his own expansionist ambitions in the Black Sea region. I can only hope that through skilful negotiation and diplomacy, conducted by a competent independent arbiter, a multinational war can be averted.

Ukraine needs the opportunity to take control of its own internal affairs to achieve its ambition of becoming a sustainable and united democracy. Given the opportunity, I am convinced Ukraine can develop into a strong, independent, politically free, and defendable nation that can freely trade on both sides of the current divide and with the rest of the world. What Ukraine does not need is an EU or Russian puppet master pulling its strings, moving forward.

  Harald Vilimsky (NI). – Herr Präsident! Erlauben Sie mir, dass ich meiner Betroffenheit Ausdruck verleihe. Ich habe den vorhergehenden Rednern zugehört und habe bemerkt, wie eine Vielzahl von Rednern ihre Texte in einer sehr leblosen Art und Weise vom Blatt liest, wo hier über technisches Prozedere, wo über abstrakte Analysen gesprochen wird und wo ich in einem Parlament wie diesem Emotionen völlig vermisse.

Vergessen Sie nicht: Auch in diesen Minuten, in denen wir hier debattieren, sterben Menschen. Und es geht nicht darum, geopolitische Interessenlagen in den Fokus zu rücken, ob es die US-amerikanischen sind, ob es die russischen sind oder die EU-amerikanischen oder die amerikanischen Interessen. Es geht primär darum, die Interessen der Menschen zu berücksichtigen. Und das findet hier nicht in einer Art und Weise statt, wie es die Menschen eigentlich verdienen. Wir müssen versuchen, einen Weg zu finden, um in einer demokratischen Art und Weise eine Befriedung herbeizuführen, und nicht – wie es in dem Bericht steht – noch mehr Nato-Material in die Region hineinzubringen und noch mehr Öl ins Feuer zu gießen.

Nein, versuchen wir, diesen urdemokratischen Weg wieder zu entdecken, wo Menschen über ihre Zukunft selbst entscheiden dürfen, um in eine gedeihliche Zukunft gehen zu können. Wir haben doch die Möglichkeit, dass wir in den östlichen Regionen der Ukraine versuchen, mit internationalem Monitoring noch einmal die Menschen zu hören, wie sie sich selbst ihre Zukunft vorstellen – vielleicht um den Preis, dass wir den westlichen Teil der Ukraine näher heranholen an die Europäische Union. Das wäre doch ein für die Zukunft taugliches Modell. Darüber sollten wird diskutieren und nicht mehr über technisches Prozedere.

  Πρόεδρος. – Διευκρινίζω ότι ο κύριος Vilimsky μίλησε ως μη εγγεγραμμένος, εκπροσωπώντας τον εαυτό του και όχι ως εκπρόσωπος των μη εγγεγραμμένων όπως από ορισμένες καμπίνες μεταφράστηκε αυτό που είπα. Το διευκρινίζω γιατί, με βάση τον κανονισμό, όσοι ανήκουν στους μη εγγεγραμμένους ομιλούν εξ ονόματός τους και όχι εξ ονόματος όλων των μη εγγεγραμμένων.

  Artis Pabriks (PPE). – Mr President, I think that this report is very timely and should also give rise to some action in the relevant institutions in the European Union and, I would say, also in NATO. So this is our goal. I see this report as touching on three vital issues as far as the Black Sea is concerned because, after the annexation and occupation (or vice versa: the occupation and annexation) of Crimea, Russia is threatening to turn the international waters of the Black Sea into its internal sea.

We should see this problem in the context of all those recent aggressive activities of Russia in the Baltic Sea as well as in the Arctic, and I can see the problem from an economic, political and also humanitarian perspective. Politically and militarily we have not experienced such a challenge for a long time, and it is very interesting for me to see some on the right or far right or far left actually living in an illusion or disinformation about NATO expanding. If the free breath of my nation, the free will of my nation to join the European Union and NATO means aggression towards Russia, should these nations simply die or not breathe? I do not accept such arguments, so from that perspective we are in an extremely difficult situation and we should act.

So how can we act? I think that there must be a common approach between the European Union and NATO to safeguard our basic security interests in the Black Sea. Democracy cannot be defended only by speeches if those speeches are just hot air without anything behind them. Secondly, we must also ensure that there is no danger for energy pipelines, as has been seen, for instance, also in the Baltic region. And from a humanitarian perspective, let us remember what we can do for those poor Crimean Tatars in the occupied territories.

  Victor Boştinaru (S&D). – Domnule președinte, permiteți-mi să îl salut pe colegul meu, Ioan Mircea Pașcu, și raportul său excelent care radiografiază realitatea militară și strategică din bazinul Mării Negre. Și să subliniez că, dacă după acest raport Comisia Europeană nu își actualizează Sinergia Mării Negre, vom ajunge să nu avem nici securitate, nici energie ci doar o altă bucată de hârtie.

În acest context, doresc să salut decizia președintelui Poroșenko de a denunța cele cinci acorduri dintre Ucraina și Federația Rusă privind tranzitarea teritoriul ucrainean de către forțe militare ruse aflate în regiunea separatistă Transnistria a Republicii Moldova și să precizez că aceste legi au fost adoptate la 21 mai. Țin să menționez de asemenea că aceste acorduri, deși nu se aplicau în practică, transporturile se efectuau împotriva voinței statului ucrainean.

Ca urmare a acestei realități, 1 500 de forțe speciale (Spetsnaz) rusești se află în Transnistria. Este probabil ca Rusia să intenționeze construirea unui pod aerian.

În același context al excelentului raport Pașcu ridic problema vulnerabilității infrastructurii critice energetice din bazinul Mării Negre, acum și în viitor.

În final, doresc să atrag atenția asupra strategiei graduale a Rusiei de a implementa ocuparea unor teritorii din vecinătate trecând de la conflicte interne interetnice la conflicte înghețate și apoi la ocuparea directă a lor ca în cazul Osetiei de Sud, Abhaziei și a Crimeii.

Nu în ultimul rând, evidențiez prezența masivă a Rusiei în cadrul unui război electronic de anvergură identificat ca atare de NATO și partenerii Uniunii Europene și menționez că Rusia a transformat Crimeea într-un impresionant arsenal militar cu scopul de a-și proiecta capabilități strategice asupra regiunii de est a NATO și a Uniunii Europene.

Acesta e sensul pentru care state NATO și non NATO de la Marea Baltică au decis construirea pactului defensiv. Mulțumesc și felicit încă o dată raportorul.

  Mark Demesmaeker (ECR). – De Russische pogingen om de Europese oostgrenzen te hertekenen nemen zorgwekkende proporties aan. De Krim wordt verder gemilitariseerd met nieuwe oorlogsbodems, gevechtsvliegtuigen en honderden extra soldaten. Zoals Kaliningrad in het noorden wordt de Krim een massief Russisch fort en er is meer.

We zien dat Moskou de druk opvoert door de bevroren conflicten in de regio in de confrontatie op te nemen. Moldavië, dat onlangs koos voor toenadering met Europa, is onderhevig aan een stevig Russisch embargo en wordt intern verscheurd als gevolg van een efficiënte Russische propagandamachine. In de zuidelijke regio Gagauzië ijveren Russisch sprekenden voor een annexatie door Rusland. Er zijn ook Russische troepen in Transnistrië, officieel om de vrede te bewaren, maar vandaag zijn ze een ideale aanloop voor het Kremlin om een landcorridor van de Krim naar Odessa en verder naar Transnistrië door te trekken. De Russische interventie in Abchazië en Zuid-Ossetië in 2008 was zogezegd bedoeld om de Russisch sprekende minderheid te beschermen. Hetzelfde schaamlapje wil Poetin gebruiken in de gebieden rond Odessa en Marioepol en veel medelijden met de minderheden heeft de man niet. Bekijk de lijst met mensenrechtenschendingen op de Krim tegen de overgebleven Krim-Tataren, de Oekraïners, de Joden en de Grieken.

Het wordt tijd om de Russische agressiviteit een halt toe te roepen. Collega Pașcu stelt correct dat dit alleen kan door regionale samenwerking te bevorderen met een belangrijke rol voor de NAVO. In dit kader moet de EU zich buigen over een eensluidend antwoord bij de herziening van de Europese veiligheidsstrategie. En ten slotte steun ik zijn oproep om het Europees beleid voor diversificatie van energietoevoer te herzien met het oog op de heropstart van het Nabucco-project.

  Kaja Kallas (ALDE). – Mr President, according to the most recent forecasts, the Ukrainian economy is set to decline by 9% this year. This negative outlook is the direct result of the continued fighting in the east and the military situation in the Black Sea region. Each day of the conflict costs Ukraine over EUR 5 million, and therefore the achievement of peace in the east is not only vital for security and humanitarian reasons, but also from the economic perspective.

In the light of this, we must reiterate that the EU condemns the annexation of Crimea and we must continue to exert pressure on Russia to respect the Minsk peace agreement. Remaining united in our response is imperative to the immediate achievement of peace in the region.

  Σοφία Σακοράφα ( GUE/NGL). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, είμαι έντεκα μήνες σε αυτό το Κοινοβούλιο και στο διάστημα αυτό έχουμε τοποθετηθεί για την Ουκρανία και τη Ρωσία όσο για κανένα άλλο ζήτημα. Συγχαίρω τον εισηγητή γιατί κατάφερε επάξια να παρουσιάσει το πιο ψυχροπολεμικό κείμενο που έχω δει. Διαβάζοντάς το αναρωτήθηκα αν πρόκειται για έκθεση γραμμένη και διαμορφωμένη από εκλεγμένους βουλευτές ή είναι ψήφισμα του ΝΑΤΟ.

Η διαστρέβλωση της πραγματικότητας με αόριστες γενικόλογες εκτιμήσεις, υποθέσεις και αφορισμούς θυμίζουν ψυχροπολεμική περίοδο. Η τυφλή εξυπηρέτηση των γεωστρατηγικών στρατιωτικών και οικονομικών συμφερόντων του ΝΑΤΟ, των ΗΠΑ αλλά και συγκεκριμένων κύκλων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην περιοχή, για τον έλεγχο και τις διαδρομές των ενεργειακών πόρων, κύριοι συνάδελφοι, με τη δαιμονοποίηση μόνο μιας χώρας, χωρίς ίχνος αυτοκριτικής και κριτικής για τις πολιτικές των συμμάχων σας ερμηνεύεται από την κατάληξη.

Προβάλλετε την ανάγκη στρατιωτικής ισορροπίας στην περιοχή και ζητάτε την ενίσχυση του ρόλου του ΝΑΤΟ και την αύξηση των στρατιωτικών κονδυλίων από τα κράτη μέλη, φυσικά σε βάρος των κοινωνικών δαπανών αλλά και της κοινωνικής συνοχής. Η κάθετη άρνησή μου στο ψήφισμα είναι η ελάχιστη υποχρέωσή μου απέναντι στους ψηφοφόρους.

(Η ομιλήτρια δέχεται να απαντήσει σε ερώτηση με γαλάζια κάρτα (άρθρο 162, παράγραφος 8, του κανονισμού))

  Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR), pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – W latach osiemdziesiątych lewica europejska, a przynajmniej część lewicy europejskiej, okazywała solidarność narodom Europy Wschodniej, które walczyły o wolność przeciwko Związkowi Radzieckiemu, przeciwko dyktaturze komunistycznej. My pamiętamy ten czas dobrze. Co się stało z tradycją lewicową, że dziś przechodzi Pani do porządku dziennego nad pragnieniami Ukraińców do życia w wolnym świecie, do życia wraz z Europą? Co się stało z tradycją lewicową, że pomija Pani dziś to zobowiązanie?

  Σοφία Σακοράφα ( GUE/NGL), απάντηση σε ερώτηση με "γαλάζια κάρτα". – Κύριε συνάδελφε, το ψήφισμα, αναφέρει ότι η στάση, της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στα γεγονότα της Γεωργίας το 2008, μπορεί να ενθάρρυνε τη Ρωσία να ενεργήσει με παρόμοιο τρόπο στην Ουκρανία. Δηλαδή το ψήφισμα, δεν κάνει καμιά κριτική στις ευρωπαϊκές ευθύνες, τις ευθύνες της Αμερικής και του ΝΑΤΟ για την αποσταθεροποίηση της περιοχής και τον πόλεμο στην Ουκρανία· ποιος τελικά ευθύνεται;

Ακούστε, κύριοι συνάδελφοι, σας είπα και προηγουμένως δύο τα εκατό από τον προϋπολογισμό ενός κράτους για να ενισχυθεί ο προϋπολογισμός του ΝΑΤΟ, είναι ένα πολύ υπερβολικό ποσόν.

Δεν ντρεπόμαστε λίγο όταν στη χώρα μου αυτή τη στιγμή τα νοσοκομεία και τα σχολεία κλείνουν, να προσπαθούμε με αυτή τη λογική να αποκλιμακώσουμε την περιοχή ενισχύοντας το ΝΑΤΟ; Υπάρχει αποκλιμάκωση στην περιοχή, εάν συνεχίσουμε τις κυρώσεις σε μια χώρα και δημιουργούμε όλα αυτά τα προβλήματα που δημιουργούμε; Έτσι, νομίζετε ότι θα λύσουμε τα προβλήματα σε μια περιοχή η οποία αυτή τη στιγμή φλέγεται; Αυτό είναι το μέλλον της Ευρώπης; Αυτό είναι το μέλλον της περιοχής; Γι αυτό αγωνιζόμαστε;

  Fabio Massimo Castaldo (EFDD). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, leggendo questa relazione, mi sono reso conto che non è soltanto il mare a essere nero, né tantomeno sono nere solo le liste, ma è l'intera situazione a essere completamente nera, sia nell'Europa orientale, ma tanto più anche in questo Parlamento. Più che parlare di guerra fredda, si potrebbe parlare di scenari di guerra molto calda, o meglio di una febbre da guerra, una guerra di propaganda. Una deriva militarista che viene sottolineata nei confronti della Russia, ma che potrebbe benissimo essere sottolineata anche nei nostri confronti.

Il vero grande problema di questa relazione è che non c'è una forma di autocritica. C'è semplicemente critica, a volte anche fondata, nei confronti della Russia, ma non c'è alcuna che critica da parte nostra: eppure bisognerebbe sapere che sullo scacchiere internazionale, gli attori geopolitici agiscono appunto per interessi geopolitici. La Russia fa i suoi con modalità che sono riprovevoli, forse in alcuni casi, ma tanto si potrebbe dire anche di quelle americane e di quelle europee, che magari operano attraverso multinazionali, piuttosto che operare appunto attraverso altre modalità.

Io ritengo che il vero grande rischio – che non viene mai preso fortemente in considerazione – è che una Russia completamente alla deriva cerchi una partnership sempre più stretta e salda con la Cina, e magari anche con l'Iran, creando un blocco asiatico che creerebbe quindi un problema molto più grande di quello che affrontiamo oggi. Non capisco neppure nemmeno come mai la Turchia sia vista come lato affidabilissimo dell'Occidente, nonostante tutto quello che abbiamo sottolineato più volte all'interno di questo Parlamento.

Ebbene, io direi che piuttosto che dire che non c'è via diplomatica, bisogna rilanciare assolutamente con ogni mezzo, a ogni costo un dialogo diplomatico con Mosca, perché non solo è impensabile intraprendere uno scontro, ma ancora peggio lo sarebbe farlo per procura.

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (NI). – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, le rapport de mon collègue Paşcu est irresponsable. Parlons de droit et parlons de la Crimée.

Vous parlez d'annexion illégale, mais au nom de quoi? Il y a d'abord eu un coup d'État – illégal, en effet – fomenté par les États-Unis, et Mme Nuland ne s'en cache pas. Il n'y a donc plus d'État de droit. Il y a aussi un peuple qui, conformément au droit international, a choisi librement son retour dans la patrie russe. Une patrie qu'il n'aurait d'ailleurs jamais dû quitter. Le rapport Forbes ainsi que les médias américains ont souligné la semaine dernière que plus de quatre cinquièmes de la population de la Crimée est pleinement satisfaite de cette situation. Ce rapport conclut que l'exécutif des États-Unis ment à son peuple et ment à l'Europe.

Un esprit revanchard et guerrier a guidé la rédaction de ce rapport. Plutôt que d'être la voix guerrière des États-Unis, qui veulent casser l'Europe en deux et construire un nouveau mur de Berlin, ce parlement devrait soutenir la paix et demander à Kiev d'arrêter les bombardements des populations civiles. J'étais à Lougansk quand ils ont bombardé cette ville. Ce sont eux qui ont commencé! Arrivé à Bruxelles, j'ai constaté que le contraire était dit.

Si une nouvelle guerre mondiale vient endeuiller ce continent, ne pensez pas, chers collègues, que l'Histoire vous oubliera. Les peuples viendront vous juger sévèrement et vous serez condamnés coresponsables des millions de morts qui en résulteront.

(L'orateur accepte de répondre à une question "carton bleu" (article 162, paragraphe 8, du règlement))

  Victor Negrescu (S&D), question "carton bleu". – Monsieur le Président, cher collègue, je ne suis pas d'accord avec ce que vous avez dit. Je soutiens le point de vue du rapporteur et je fais référence à un chiffre assez clair: 6 000 personnes. Il correspond au nombre de personnes tuées durant le conflit en Ukraine. Vous parlez d'un coupable, mais comment savez-vous qui est coupable?

Selon moi, les incidents qui ont eu lieu et l'action de la Russie ont provoqué la mort de 6 000 personnes. Quel est votre message aux familles des 6 000 personnes qui ont été tuées?

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (NI), réponse "carton bleu". – Cher collègue, tout d'abord, il y a eu plus que 6 000 morts. Je pense, d'après les renseignements disponibles, que nous sommes plus proches de 10 000 morts, lesquels ont surtout été déplorés à l'est. Sachez que c'est la partie dite rebelle qui a le plus souffert et qui déplore le plus de morts.

Sachez également que, comme par hasard, les personnes qui cherchaient refuge se sont réfugiées en Russie. Sur le million de personnes qui a quitté l'Ukraine, 750 000 personnes sont actuellement en Russie. Telle est la réalité. Elles ne voient donc pas la Russie comme l'agresseur puisqu'au contraire, elles cherchent protection auprès de ce pays.

  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Mr President, the new Russian military doctrine, as of the end of last year, officially considers that NATO and the EU constitute Russia’s main security threat.

This is a clear indication that Russia considers us not as partners but as adversaries to be weakened, split and compromised. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia is creating an offensive strike force in the region. In fact, Crimea is becoming a Kaliningrad of the south, with all the consequences of that.

The rapid enhancement of offensive Russian military potential is a real threat and security risk for all the neighbouring countries, not just Ukraine. What is happening, by the way, is not a surprise. After the Russian invasion of Georgia seven years ago, the confrontational military pattern became obvious to all who wanted to see it. In fact, the EU has been lagging behind in its reactions. That is why Mr Paşcu’s report is so important and timely.

The Mistral assault helicopter carriers symbolically connect the Georgian invasion with the Ukrainian one because, just after the war against Georgia, Mr Putin ordered these modern French-built warships, and the commander of the Black Sea fleet commented that if they had had these vessels at their disposal, they could have completed the Georgian operation in half a day instead of three days. That is why the message of this report is also to France to abandon, unequivocally and finally, the sale of the ships in question to Russia. They could well be used for enhancing the security of the EU borders.

It is time that the Black Sea security risks were addressed as a priority, not only by NATO but also by the EU, which is in need of a revised and modernised security strategy.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  Σοφία Σακοράφα ( GUE/NGL), ερώτηση με "γαλάζια κάρτα". – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κύριε συνάδελφε, η έκθεση την οποία εσείς χαρακτηρίσατε εξαιρετική δεν κάνει καμία αναφορά στη συνεργασία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης με τον Οργανισμό Παρευξείνιας Συνεργασίας. Αλήθεια, δεν πιστεύετε ότι θα έπρεπε η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να συνεργάζεται με τον ΟΣΕ, που είναι ένας οργανισμός που επιδιώκει την ειρήνη και τη συνεργασία στην περιοχή, αλλά αντίθετα αναφέρεται πάρα πολλές φορές στο ΝΑΤΟ, που οξύνει την αντιπαράθεση και προκαλεί σοβαρά προβλήματα στον Εύξεινο Πόντο;

  Tunne Kelam (PPE), blue-card answer. – Mr President, I think there is no question, and you must be well informed, that the EU is working fully with the OSCE. But in addition, bearing in mind also other countries of Eastern Europe which suffered under the Soviet Union’s occupation and terrorism for half a century, our experience shows that the OSCE is not enough. We need real security, and that is established in NATO.

  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Gospodine predsjedniče, čestitam kolegi Pascu zbog odličnog posla na ovom izvješću jer njegov sadržaj dobro definira smjernice naše zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike nakon nezakonitog ruskog pripojenja Krima te izmijenjenu stratešku i sigurnosno - vojnu situaciju u crnomorskom bazenu.

Nažalost, sporazum iz Minska ostao je, uglavnom, samo mrtvo slovo na papiru. Zato je krajnje vrijeme da osobito Rusija preuzme odgovornost i pomogne zaustaviti neprijateljstva te tako spriječi nove žrtve i razaranja. Podržavam dosljedan pristup nepriznavanja ruske aneksije Krima, predanost neovisnosti, suverenosti i teritorijalnoj cjelovitosti Ukrajine. Ujedno, zalažem se da o tako potrebnom mirovnom rješenju treba nastaviti aktivno i konstruktivno razgovarati. Europska unija i Rusija će ponovno postati partneri onda i kada preduvjeti za partnerstvo budu ispunjeni – odnos dokazanog povjerenja, poštivanje međunarodnih načela i potpisanih sporazuma.

Izvješće je obuhvatilo i iznimno bitnu energetsku dimenziju i poziva na promicanje energetske sigurnosti kao i smanjenje energetske ovisnosti država članica. Pritom i države članice Europske unije trebaju svojim mjerama zajamčiti potrebnu sigurnost iskorištavanja nafte i plina, odnosno njihov siguran prijevoz u crnomorskom prostoru. Tim prije jer je crnomorski bazen izuzetno ekološki osjetljiv, a sve veća militarizacija regije dodatno ugrožava taj osjetljivi ekosustav.

Ruska politika jačanja ofenzivnih vojnih snaga u Crnom moru i planirano jačanje i modernizacija crnomorske flote najbolji su podsjetnik kako bi crnomorski bazen trebao biti stvarni prioritet u vanjskopolitičkom djelovanju Europske unije. Tome treba dodati mogućnost nove eskalacije sukoba oko Pridnjestrovlja/Transnistrije, a što bi predstavljalo prelijevanje rata iz Ukrajine. Postojeća Crnomorska sinergija je zastarjela zbog čega se pridružujem pozivima Komisiji da što prije izradi novu sveobuhvatnu strategiju Europske unije za crnomorski prostor.

(Govornik se složio da odgovori na pitanje podizanjem plave kartice na osnovi članka 162. stavka 8. Poslovnika.)

  Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος ( NI), ερώτηση με "γαλάζια κάρτα". – Ευχαριστώ κύριε συνάδελφε που δέχεστε την ερώτησή μου. Ήθελα να σας ρωτήσω πολύ σύντομα και σαφώς, γιατί όταν αναφέρεστε στο δημοψήφισμα το οποίο έγινε στην Κριμαία, το χαρακτηρίζετε παράνομο, όταν έγινε σύμφωνα με όλες τις αρχές που προβλέπονται διεθνώς, υπήρξαν παρατηρητές εκεί και, επιπλέον, η διαφορά μεταξύ του ναι και του όχι ήταν μεγάλη;

  Tonino Picula (S&D), odgovor na pitanje postavljeno podizanjem plave kartice. – Iza mene stoji iskustvo potpredsjednika parlamentarne skupštine OESS-a i dugogodišnjeg promatrača izbora diljem euroazijskog prostora i uvijek, a vodio sam pet međunarodnih promatračkih misija u Gruziji, Armeniji, Rusiji, Kazahstanu i Moldovi, iza mene naprosto stoji poštivanje nečeg što se zove Kopenhaški sporazum. Niti jedan bitan element Kopenhaškog sporazuma, odnosno kopenhaških pravila da bi se izbori priznali legitimnima, nije zadovoljen tijekom tzv. referenduma u Krimu i zato ga ne mogu priznati kao legalnog.

  Zdzisław Krasnodębski (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Moim zdaniem w sprawozdaniu słusznie podkreśla się, że więcej niż powściągliwa reakcja Unii na rosyjską agresję i naruszanie przez Rosję integralności terytorialnej Gruzji w 2008 roku mogła zachęcić Rosję do podjęcia podobnych działań na Ukrainie. Niestety wtedy zabrakło europejskiego zdecydowania. Gdyby wszyscy europejscy przywódcy przyjęli wówczas taką postawę, jak prezydent Lech Kaczyński, oskarżany wtedy o antyrosyjskość, być może sytuacja na Ukrainie nie byłaby dziś tak dramatyczna, a Rosja byłaby dużo ostrożniejsza w swych ekspansjonistycznych dążeniach. Dlatego tak ważne jest dzisiaj zdecydowane stanowisko Unii – faktyczne, a nie tylko werbalne nieuznawanie aneksji Krymu i stanowcza reakcja na to, co dzieje się w basenie Morza Czarnego. Niestety naruszanie zawieszenia broni na Ukrainie staje się coraz częstsze, mnożą się też incydenty na Morzu Czarnym. Dlatego tak istotne jest wzmocnienie obecności NATO w tym regionie i coraz bardziej nieodzowna staje się decyzja o dostarczeniu Ukrainie broni defensywnej i udzieleniu jej wsparcia na rzecz poprawy jej zdolności obronnych.

  Илхан Кючюк (ALDE). – Г-н Председател, през април 2007 г. Европейската комисия стартира своята инициатива за сътрудничество в региона на Черно море чрез проекта „Черноморско взаимодействие“. Регионът представлява разрастващ се пазар с голям потенциал за развитие и важен възел за енергийни и транспортни потоци. Черно море е основен евроатлантически компонент от стратегическо значение за Европейския съюз и неговите държави членки, особено когато се отнася за гарантирането на тяхната сигурност. Документът акцентира върху икономическото и търговското сътрудничество, докато сътрудничеството в сферата на сигурността и отбраната не е достатъчно споменато

Днес, настоящият формат изглежда, че е остарял. Геополитическото равновесие на черноморския басейн беше нарушено, а съществуващите конфликти в региона се разрастват след анексирането на Крим. В тази връзка смятам за навременно Европейската служба за външна дейност и г-жа Могерини да ревизират европейската стратегия за морска сигурност и в частност, стратегията на Европейския съюз за Черно море. Новата стратегия на Европейския съюз трябва да бъде разработена в пълна координация с нашите партньори от НАТО.

  Udo Voigt (NI). – Herr Präsident! Als ehemaliger Luftwaffenoffizier war ich vor 30 Jahren bestimmt kein großer Freund Russlands. Aber die Dinge haben sich in der internationalen Politik verändert. Ich bin schon sehr verwundert, dass bei einer Debatte in diesem Hause, in der es um Krieg und Frieden geht, noch nicht mal 5 % aller Abgeordneten anwesend sind.

Wenn immer wieder von der Aggression Russlands gesprochen wird, muss man einfach zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass der ehemalige Präsident Gorbatschow klar erklärt hat, dass er in den Neunzigerjahren belogen wurde, als er die Sowjetunion und den Warschauer Pakt aufgelöst hat. Als er eine Politik des Friedens eingeleitet hat, wurde ihm gesagt: Die NATO wird sich nicht nach Osten ausdehnen. Was ist heute mit Polen? Was ist heute mit Bulgarien, mit Ungarn, mit Rumänien und mit den drei baltischen Staaten? Die NATO ist immer mehr an Russland herangegangen, und jetzt mit der Krim war halt mal Schluss. Da immer von Annexion zu sprechen, wenn vorher in einer Volksabstimmung 95 % der dort lebenden Menschen für den Anschluss an und für den Gang mit Russland gestimmt haben, ist schon recht verwerflich.

Wenn ich hier in diesem Hause die Stimmen des Kalten Krieges wieder höre, die von den Mehrheitsfraktionen kommen, frage ich mich ganz klar, ob hier eventuell die Rüstungsindustrie dahintersteckt, weil in den letzten 20 Jahren die Rüstungshaushalte in Europa extrem gesunken sind.

Wir brauchen keinen Krieg. Wir brauchen keine Kriegspolitik. Wir brauchen Dialoge und Gespräche!

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 zu beantworten.)

  Andrey Kovatchev (PPE), blue-card question. – You mention Bulgaria, the Baltic States and Romania joining the European Union and NATO. Those were legitimate decisions on the part of these countries. So you are against the legitimate decisions of the authorities of these countries to join the Union, which is where they want to be? Or how am I to understand your statement?

  Udo Voigt (NI), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Jedes souveräne Land hat das Recht, etwas zu tun. Selbstverständlich war das deren souveränes Recht. Aber eine Politik der EU, die darauf abzielt, Assoziierungsabkommen zu machen und gleichzeitig eine Politik der Assoziierung mit der NATO zu betreiben – wie das jetzt auch in Georgien, Aserbaidschan und so weiter passiert –, ist natürlich ein aggressives Ausdehnen. Man kann das eine tun, und man muss das andere eben auch mal lassen.

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Mamy nadwyżkę słów i deficyt skutecznych działań. Chcę od tego zacząć, dlatego że według mojej oceny to sprawozdanie jest nie tylko krytyczne wobec sytuacji w obszarze Morza Czarnego, ale też krytyczne wobec nas: wobec instytucji, świata demokratycznego, wobec instytucji Parlamentu Europejskiego, instytucji natowskich. To, co budzi mój niepokój, to fakt, że nikt z poważnych instytucji nie przewidział sytuacji na Krymie, nie przewidział rozwoju sytuacji na Ukrainie. Jesteśmy podzieleni w tym Parlamencie, w tej Izbie, jesteśmy niekonsekwentni i niestety jesteśmy spóźnieni wobec tego wszystkiego, co się dzieje w obszarze walk, w obszarze konfliktów, także zbrojnych. Zwracam także uwagę na niewłaściwą ocenę sytuacji przed paru laty, jeżeli chodzi o ocenę sytuacji w Syrii, ocenę rewolucji w Egipcie, ocenę sytuacji w obszarze Morza Czarnego. Te wszystkie zdarzenia pokazują niestety słabość instytucji europejskich, instytucji świata demokratycznego.

Apeluję o większą konsekwencję, o prowadzenie dialogu z tymi państwami, które mogą być dla nas partnerami, o wspomaganie Ukrainy, o wspomaganie tych państw, które liczą na Europę – Europę nowoczesną, Europę demokratyczną. Bardzo mi też zależy na tym, aby pokazać jeszcze jeden element: jeżeli mamy do czynienia z wojną hybrydową, niezbędna jest także hybrydowa odpowiedź, na którą będą składały się liczne działania, a nie tylko i wyłącznie te, które w chwili obecnej są najbardziej widoczne. Jestem przekonany, że krytyczność tego sprawozdania może być źródłem dobrej odpowiedzi, ale na razie z przykrością twierdzę, że jej po prostu nie widać.

  Clare Moody (S&D). – Mr President, I would like to thank the rapporteur for the work on this report and express my sadness and regret that the relationship between the EU and the Russian leadership has had to come to this. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, its deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine and its continued involvement in conflicts across the region, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, mean we can no longer trust the Russian leadership.

With this in mind, I am glad the report recognises the ongoing work of the EU missions in the Black Sea states and, in particular, the human rights abuses that Crimean citizens have suffered since the annexation. In this context, we must remain unified, continue the sanctions against Russia and continue to cooperate with our eastern partners.

  Ангел Джамбазки (ECR). – Г-н Председател, безспорно суверенитетът на националните граници и териториалната цялост трябва да бъдат уважавани и затова анексирането на Крим би трябвало да бъде осъдено, защото е нарушение на международното право.

Но докладът не е посветен само на отношенията между Европейския съюз и Русия. Той е озаглавен „Военната ситуация в Черно море след анексирането на Крим“. В този доклад е пропуснато нещо много важно – а именно политиката на Република Турция и събитията, които могат да произтекат от нея. Когато така справедливо осъждаме политиката на президента Путин, не трябва да забравяме, че политиката на неговия колега президента Ердоган е абсолютно същата и се явяват двете лица на една и съща монета.

Когато говорим за несигурност в Черноморския басейн би трябвало да засягаме и поведението на държавата Турция, нейната подкрепа за Ислямска държава, евентуалната нова бежанска вълна, която може да бъде насочена и подпомагана от Република Турция. В противен случай, отричайки и осъждайки само едната проява на анексиране и на агресия, бихме проявили двоен стандарт. Затова се обръщам и към колегата докладчик – когато се говори за Черноморския басейн трябва да се обърне внимание и на противоевропейската политика на Република Турция.

  Norica Nicolai (ALDE). – Domnule președinte, vreau să salut și eu raportul domnului Pașcu. Îl consider o evaluare foarte corectă a situației strategice și securitare din zonă. Mi-aș fi dorit ca această evaluare să fi avut parte de o dezbatere în acest Parlament cu mult timp în urmă. Din păcate, suntem foarte întârziați în evaluarea situației, și nu numai, în adjudecarea unei poziții comune.

În opinia mea, acordul de la Minsk este un cvasieșec. Nu s-a vorbit deloc despre Crimeea; ca atare evoluția securitară din zonă, din Transnistria, escaladarea conflictului cu Ucraina mă îndreptățesc să cred că în curând vom avea parte de trupe rusești aproape de gurile Dunării, ceea ce va crea o foarte mare problemă pentru securitatea Uniunii Europene. Va fi o graniță foarte lungă cu Rusia și în primul rând va trebui să încercăm să facem pași semnificativi, în primul rând diplomatici, pentru a preveni o astfel de escaladare a conflictului.

  Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL). – Mr President, this report raises concerns over militarisation and the priorities of Russia and the EU in the region. It welcomes efforts by EU Member States to enhance the military capability of the Black Sea states and says that modernisation in enhancing their military capabilities is key to stability. The report also urges the Commission to support EU Member States in increasing their defence budgets. Of course, this does nothing to de-escalate tension in the region. It does, however, expose the hypocrisy of the EU telling Greece to spend money on defence while cutting pensions and raising VAT and forcing austerity on Ireland plus cuts in positive social public spending.

The report highlights EU strategic interests in guaranteeing Member States’ energy supply, and the security of oil and gas exploitation in the Black Sea. So the lives and the livelihoods of the people in Crimea are without doubt a mere secondary consideration.

  Ελευθέριος Συναδινός ( NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, πολλά κράτη της Ένωσης, συμμετέχουν χωρίς τη θέλησή τους, σε γεωπολιτικά παιχνίδια επιρροής, μεταξύ ΝΑΤΟ, Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και Ευρασιατικής Ένωσης. Η προσπάθεια επέκτασης του ΝΑΤΟ και της Ένωσης προς Καύκασο, Μολδαβία και Ουκρανία, ο ενεργειακός υβριδικός και ηλεκτρονικός πόλεμος στην περιοχή της Βαλτικής και των χωρών της χερσονήσου του Αίμου, οι κυρώσεις κατά της Ρωσίας, η Κριμαία, γίνονται στο πλαίσιο του αδιάκοπου αγώνα για ισχύ και προβάδισμα από τους ισχυρούς παίκτες των παραπάνω οργανισμών.

Ας επισημάνουμε αρχικά το γεγονός ότι η προσάρτηση, ή καλύτερα η επανένωση, της Κριμαίας με τη Ρωσία, δεν είναι παράνομη γιατί αυτό ήθελε ο λαός της Κριμαίας και εξάλλου αποδεικνύεται και ιστορικά. Οι υπόλοιπες χώρες της Βαλτικής, με πρόσχημα την κακή, δήθεν, Ρωσία, έπεσαν στην παγίδα της εξωτερικής και οικονομικής πολιτικής της Γερμανίας, όπως αυτή υπαγορεύεται από τις ΗΠΑ. Έτσι, υποχρεώθηκαν σε μια σκληρή εσωτερική υποτίμηση, εξαιρετικά επώδυνη για τους πολίτες τους, για να μπορέσουν να διατηρήσουν τη σταθερή σύνδεση τους με το ευρώ, χωρίς δε καμία απολύτως στήριξη από την ευρωζώνη.

Όταν δυνατές οικονομικά και κεντρικότερες γεωπολιτικά χώρες της Ευρώπης, όπως η Σουηδία, η Δανία και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο δεν υιοθέτησαν το ευρώ, οι χώρες της Βαλτικής έσπευσαν να υποταχτούν στη γερμανική ηγεμονία, παραχωρώντας την εθνική τους κυριαρχία μέσω του εγκλωβισμού τους στο κοινό νόμισμα.

Όποιος έχει κοινό νου καταλαβαίνει ότι επιπλέον κυρώσεις στη Ρωσία και συζητήσεις για στρατιωτική παρουσία και ευέλικτη ανταπόδοση, οδηγούν σε κλιμάκωση της κρίσης και σε καμία περίπτωση δεν ωφελούν την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

(Ο ομιλητής δέχεται να απαντήσει σε ερώτηση με γαλάζια κάρτα (άρθρο 162, παράγραφος 8, του κανονισμού))

  Kosma Złotowski (ECR), pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – Powiada Pan, że na Krymie odbyło się referendum i że jest ono legalne, i że przecież są powody historyczne, aby Krym powrócił do Rosji, ale są również przecież powody historyczne, żeby Krym wrócił do Turcji. Są również powody historyczne, żeby Konstantynopol powrócił do Grecji. Szanowny Panie, gdyby wojska tureckie wkroczyły do Aten, to jaki byłby wynik referendum w Atenach?

  Ελευθέριος Συναδινός ( NI), απάντηση σε ερώτηση με "γαλάζια κάρτα". – Ποιες είναι οι αποδείξεις που έχετε ότι το δημοψήφισμα δεν ήταν νόμιμο, όσον αφορά το λαό της Κριμαίας και τη θέλησή του;

  Jaromír Štětina (PPE). – Včera jsem při diskuzích o vztahu EU a Ruska několikrát zaslechl výraz soft power. Ctím sílu slova a sílu argumentů. Měkká síla vůči zemi útočící na sousední státy se však jeví jako neefektivní. U třetím rokem, dámy a pánové, tu mluvíme o ruské agresi, třetím rokem.

Zatímco my uplatňujeme měkkou sílu, lidé na Ukrajině umírají. Třetím rokem se nám Vladimír Putin vysmívá. Proto vítám zprávu pana Paşcu, která upozorňuje na změnu bezpečnostní situace v Černém moři a na to, že Rusko vytváří z Krymu nový Kaliningrad. Proto vítám demonstraci vojenské síly NATO, které zahájilo námořní vojenské cvičení v Baltském moři. Proto vítám každý náznak ochoty bránit naši demokracii a euroatlantické hodnoty i v Černém moři. Rusko ctí tvrdé protivníky.

  Georgi Pirinski (S&D). – Mr President, clearly the Black Sea has turned into a focal point of confrontation, involving strategic national security interests of the highest importance for the countries of the region. In order to overcome this situation, we are offered two approaches: armaments and oneupmanship, which the rapporteur seems to be proposing.

This is a road to nowhere. What is needed is to take seriously each side’s security concerns and to examine ways of diplomatically overcoming those concerns. I strongly support urging the Commission to become involved in a new Black Sea strategy building on cooperation.

  Kosma Złotowski (ECR). – Region Morza Czarnego ma dla Unii Europejskiej znaczenie strategiczne. To właśnie w tym obszarze rodzi się najwięcej militarnych zagrożeń dla naszego bezpieczeństwa w ostatnim czasie. Zajęcie Krymu przez Rosję to przykład najbardziej spektakularny, ale wcale niejedyny i nie najnowszy. Okupacja Naddniestrza, wojna rosyjsko–gruzińska z 2008 r., zajęcie Osetii i Abchazji czy agresywna postawa rosyjskiej marynarki na Morzu Czarnym to obraz ostatniej dekady.

Wspólnym mianownikiem wszystkich tych problemów była i jest polityka Federacji Rosyjskiej. Dlatego bez powstrzymania imperialistycznych zapędów Kremla nigdy nie uda nam się na stałe ustabilizować sytuacji w tym regionie – to jasne. Mamy nad Morzem Czarnym wielu przyjaciół i strategicznych partnerów: Turcję, Gruzję, Mołdawię i Ukrainę. Możemy wykorzystywać tu również potencjał wojskowy NATO i polityczny Unii. Łącząc siły i możliwości wszystkich tych podmiotów, dzięki dobrej strategii współdziałania, możemy powstrzymać postępującą rosyjską agresję. Ta redukcja to bardzo dobry początek i chciałbym wierzyć, że będzie też ciąg dalszy.

  Urmas Paet (ALDE). – Vaieldamatult on Musta mere julgeolekuolukord läinud järjest raskemaks, sest kõik viis Venemaa poolt tekitatud külmutatud konfliktiala on Musta mere piirkonnas. Muidugi hetkel suurim pingestaja on jätkuv Vene agressioon Ida-Ukrainas ja ka Krimmi annekteerimine. Rahvusvaheline kogukond peab tegema kõik, et peatada Krimmi militariseerimist Venemaa poolt, sealhulgas pidama silmas ka tuumarelvade paigutamise plaani.

Samas pole Krimmi ja Ida-Ukraina olukord ainukesed Musta mere piirkonna olukorra pingestajad. Transnistria külmutatud konflikt vajab lõpuks positiivset lahendust, lähtudes Moldova territoriaalsest terviklikkusest. Vastasel korral on tegemist uue võimaliku kriisiga, nii et Venemaa peab oma väed Transnistriast välja viima. Lisaks on annekteeritud Abhaasia ja Lõuna-Osseetia Gruusias, mis samuti on suurendanud uue konflikti võimalust ja pingeid sealses piirkonnas. Euroopa Liit ja kogu see osa rahvusvahelisest kogukonnast, kes peab oluliseks rahvusvahelist õigust, peab astuma väga selgeid samme, et pingeid Musta mere piirkonnas vähendada.

  Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Г-н председател, искам първо да поздравя колегата и заместник-председател г-н Пашку за добрата работа по доклада.

Незаконното анексиране на Крим и струпването на военна руска техника там води до промяна на баланса на силите в Черноморския басейн. Това създава нови рискове, особено за страните, които са в източния фланг на НАТО. Разрастването на конфликта от източна Украйна на юг заплашва да обхване региони, населени с компактно и българско малцинство в Запорожка и Одеска област, както и да засегне Молдова, където живее също многобройна българска общност.

Налага се все по-отблизо да следим и за правата на други малцинства в анексираните територии и по-специално на местните кримски татари, които са преследвани заради подкрепата си за териториалната цялост на Украйна. Същото важи и за останалото население в Крим, както и за населението на Луганска и Донецка област, които все повече се сблъскват с нарушение на правата на човека.

Длъжни сме да работим за осигуряване на нови енергийни доставчици и намаляване на зависимостта ни от руските доставки не само на думи, но най-накрая и на дела. Това касае особено Източна Европа като например България. Нужен ни е тръбопровод като Набуко и затова категорично заявявам, че трябва да започнем размразяване на проекта. Набуко или тръбопровод, който минава и през България, е шанс за Европа.

Зависимостите обаче не са само енергийни, а и корупционни, уважаеми колеги. Необходимо е да водим борба с корупцията във и извън Европейския съюз. Руската политика и бизнес използват тази корупция за печелене на влияние и контрол.

Много важно е да отговорим и на агресивната руска пропагандна машина както и на продължаващите репресии срещу политически опоненти на режима. В тази връзка, отново от тази трибуна призовавам за незабавното освобождаване на отвлечената и държана незаконно на руска територия украинка Надя Савченко. Русия следва да спазва международните договори. Недопустимо е в 21-ви век да се работи с практиките от времето на Студената война.

  Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D). – Panie Przewodniczący! Dołączam się do stanowiska pana Kovatcheva w sprawie pana Paşcu i bardzo dziękuję za naprawdę bardzo dobre sprawozdanie. To jest sprawozdanie przygotowane w sposób profesjonalny, bo mamy pełną diagnozę sytuacji militarnej. To jest przygotowane profesjonalnie sprawozdanie, ponieważ mamy ocenę sytuacji politycznej oraz tło historyczne. O czymkolwiek tutaj mówiliśmy, historycznie niczego nie brakuje w tym sprawozdaniu – jest zarówno Gruzja, jak i cały region i wszelkiego rodzaju nieszczęścia, które tam się wydarzyły. Natomiast to, co chciałbym szczególnie podkreślić w tym sprawozdaniu, to wyjście w przyszłość. Musimy wrócić do przeglądu traktatu o nierozprzestrzenianiu broni jądrowej. Jest to podkreślone i Rosja musi być stroną tych rozmów. I także to, co jest w naszym interesie, oraz w interesie państw i mieszkańców basenu Morza Czarnego, czyli energetyka, gospodarka morska, bezpieczeństwo i wreszcie środowisko. I takie wezwanie – potrzebujemy strategii dla Morza Czarnego. Tak, potrzebujemy.

  Charles Tannock (ECR). – Mr President, one of the central themes of the Paşcu report is the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. This act has led to an increased militarisation of the Black Sea, including the increased presence of short- and medium-range nuclear weapons as part of Russia’s ambitious programme to upgrade the Black Sea fleet. It is vital that the Member States of the EU work together, both within our Union and NATO, to meet what is a very real and concerning military threat to our security.

At this juncture, I take the opportunity to highlight the difficulties that those in the Crimea are now facing. There are soaring food prices and water shortages, and these are just part of the daily struggle that people are facing under Russian occupation. As feared, the Crimean tatars are being persecuted by the Russians, and ethnic Ukrainians are being expelled from the territory, with an increasing incidence of arrests, raids and police interrogations of their populations being reported. We have also seen incidents of violence against the Jewish population and their property. Indeed, in just the first week of the annexation, a synagogue was vandalised with swastikas. The West, and the European Union in particular, must stand united in condemning Putin’s revanchist doctrine of annexing territory by force.

  Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, felicit și eu raportorul pentru excelentul raport depus astăzi.

Strategia de securitate a Uniunii Europene pentru Marea Neagră trebuie să fie redefinită și consolidată. Acest lucru se impune ca urmare a schimbării peisajului strategic din zonă, astfel încât să putem vorbi de o amplificare a capacității de reacție la evoluțiile din vecinătate, care afectează în mod grav securitatea europeană.

Anexarea ilegală a Crimeii, numeroasele conflicte înghețate de către Rusia în regiune, dar mai ales înarmarea și consolidarea capacităților militare ale acesteia, atât la nivel strategic, cât și tactic, sunt de natură să determine o reacție fermă din partea Uniunii Europene și a Statelor Unite ale Americii.

Frontierele estice ale Uniunii Europene, inclusiv ale României și Poloniei, dar și ale statelor baltice, sunt supuse unor presiuni din ce în ce mai mari. De aceea, apreciez că regimul sancționator aplicat Federației Ruse trebuie continuat și consolidat.

Statele membre trebuie să rămână mai departe unite, într-o singură voce, în războiul hibrid purtat de Rusia împotriva Ucrainei, și să manifeste solidaritate și angajare în sancționarea acțiunilor care contravin normelor de drept internațional.

Securitatea energetică este folosită astăzi de Federația Rusă ca o adevărată armă, însă atragem atenția acesteia, că, oricât de mult ar depinde statele membre de această dimensiune, niciodată nu vor accepta încălcarea principiilor de bază a securității în Europa.

Consider că ar trebui analizată, cu toată responsabilitatea și seriozitatea, posibilitatea de a furniza Ucrainei mijloace militare defensive, dar nu numai, astfel încât să putem vorbi de o întărire reală a capacității de apărare a acesteia, ca o garanție pentru păstrarea păcii și securității în regiune, până când nu va fi prea târziu.

SUA și-a manifestat disponibilitatea în acest sens, iar statele cu ieșire la mare pot avea o contribuție importantă dacă își unesc eforturile. Astfel, Ucraina, Republica Moldova și Georgia trebuie să analizeze posibilitatea unei cooperări mai susținute, inclusiv în domeniul militar.

De asemenea, NATO și Uniunea Europeană trebuie să își continue eforturile, astfel încât zona Mării Negre să rămână o zonă economică deschisă și sigură.

Elnökváltás: GÁLL-PELCZ ILDIKÓ
alelnök

  Francisco Assis (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, o que se tem vindo a passar na bacia do Mar Negro é ainda o resultado da desintegração da União Soviética e dos efeitos traumáticos que isso provocou na velha nação russa. A desintegração da União Soviética não foi apenas o fim de um modelo ideológico, foi-o certamente, mas também correspondeu, historicamente, a uma perda de poder e de influência da Rússia. Isso, evidentemente, teve consequências traumáticas para os russos e levou-os a adotar uma série de comportamentos que são obviamente inaceitáveis e que têm sido objeto da devida condenação por parte de vastíssimos setores da comunidade internacional, das Nações Unidas, da União Europeia. E a política de sanções que tem sido seguida tem sido a política mais correta.

Isso não impede, contudo, de considerar que qualquer política de segurança para o Mar Negro deve apostar, sobretudo, na componente diplomática e que nunca podemos perder de vista a importância de assegurarmos um relacionamento a prazo com a Rússia. A Rússia é um nosso vizinho e nós nunca poderemos perder de vista que também faz parte da satisfação, do acautelamento dos nossos interesses geopolíticos e geoeconómicos fundamentais acautelar o relacionamento futuro com a Rússia.

  Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (ECR). – Bardzo wysoko oceniam sprawozdanie, które jest dziś przedmiotem naszej dyskusji. To jest rzeczywiście przebudzenie Europy względem rosyjskiego imperializmu, względem imperializmu Putina, bo nie chodzi tutaj o mieszkańców Rosji, tylko o tę konkretną władzę. Do tego przebudzenia dochodzi zbyt późno i nie jest ono na miarę tak wielkiego wyzwania, jakim jest zagrożenie ze strony rosyjskiego imperializmu. Ale dobrze, że do tego przebudzenia doszło. Może ono być podstawą dobrej polityki, konsekwentnej polityki, kontynuowania sankcji ekonomicznych wobec Rosji, obecności NATO w tej części świata, wyraźnej pomocy dla Ukrainy i innych państw Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Musi także oznaczać, że Europa staje na własnych nogach. Państwa Unii Europejskiej powinny być gotowe na wydawanie 2% produktu krajowego na politykę obronną po to, by właśnie stanowić istotną część bezpieczeństwa światowego.

  Siegfried Mureşan (PPE). – Madam President, the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine has of course completely changed the security balance in the Black Sea region.

These two pose new security threats to the European Union and to our eastern neighbours. The European Union is now only some 100 kilometres away from the war in eastern Ukraine and less than 300 kilometres away from Crimea. This of course brings us to the point where we need to build a new comprehensive EU strategy for the Black Sea region which corresponds to the new challenges. The current approach of the European Union in the region is outdated. The fact is that we were able neither to prevent Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the war in Ukraine or the annexation of Crimea, nor to provide suitable responses, and we have also not been able to provide solutions to the frozen conflicts in the region.

I expect the High Representative/Vice-President to come up with a comprehensive strategy addressing the new security challenges in the region in the near future. The fact is that Russia is increasing its military spending and is ready to pursue military actions which we, the European Union, are of course not ready to pursue. We are a project for freedom, and this is one of the fundamental achievements of 70 years of European integration. We should of course never jeopardise this fundamental achievement. Precisely because of this, we should act in a way which prevents escalation in the region and not only addresses it, which would mean an additional level of escalation. We should also take into account the military, reputational and financial risks which the Russian Federation is ready to take to keep the region insecure and, basically, to prevent the Black Sea region from becoming an area governed by the rule of law, a prosperous and a secure region. This is exactly where we step in.

My last point is that these countries in the region should be free to make their own foreign policy decisions, to choose whether to engage with Russia or the European Union and how to do so. That should be their option. We are not pressuring them, and the Russian Federation should not pressure them either.

  Boris Zala (S&D) – Európska únia nedocenila význam Čierneho mora. Vidíme konflikt v Transnistrii, v Južnom Osetsku, Abcházsku, Náhornom Karabachu a naposledy ten najväčší okolo Krymu. Centrum destabilizácie je práve v tomto regióne – niekde v trojuholníku Rusko, Turecko, Balkán. V túto chvíľu nie, našťastie, v baltskom regióne. Vítam správu kolegu Paşcu z toho dôvodu, že prvýkrát upozorňuje na tento región ako celok, ale čo vítam osobitne, je to, že jeho uhol pohľadu je prvýkrát pohľadom zo strany Európskej únie ako celku. Európska únia doteraz neuvažovala v geopolitických rozmeroch. Aj to, čo nám povedal pán komisár, sa vôbec nedotýkalo geopolitickej stratégie Európskej únie ako celku. Myslím si, že takto by mala začať uvažovať aj Komisia, aj vysoká reprezentantka, aj my všetci z hľadiska stratégie Európskej únie ako celku.

  Николай Бареков (ECR). – Г-жо Председател, Република България е най-старата суверенна държава, която има излаз на Черно море. Българите сме свързани с този регион исторически и икономически, от векове. В интерес на България и на Европейския съюз е Черноморският басейн да бъде обявен за свободна зона от военно присъствие и военни действия, в която да не се извършват провокации, да не е обект на спекула от страни във военен конфликт.

Твърдо убеден съм, че Европейският съюз трябва да играе ролята на гарант на мира в Черно море, да стимулира социалното и икономическото развитие в граничните зони и да насърчава сближаването им. Всякакво военно присъствие би се отразило пагубно на туризма, рибарството и корабоплаването.

Призовавам ви да направим възможното за ограничаване на милитаризма за сметка на активната дипломация. Анексирането на Крим наруши грубо международното право, но проектът Набуко би бил един сериозен и добър отговор на руската агресия. Призовавам за активен диалог без военни аргументи.

  Janusz Zemke (S&D). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Sądzę, że na tej sali nie ma nikogo, kto by wątpił w to, że to, co dzieje się w basenie Morza Czarnego, nie ma rosnącego znaczenia dla bezpieczeństwa całej Unii Europejskiej. Do czasu aneksji Krymu przez Rosję w basenie tym istniała równowaga militarna. Dzisiaj niestety ta sytuacja się pogorszyła. Powstaje zatem pytanie – co możemy zrobić? Otóż sądzę, że trzeba podjąć dwa działania. Po pierwsze, Unia Europejska powinna wesprzeć państwa, które leżą w basenie Morza Czarnego, pamiętając zawsze o tym, że ma tam swoich dwóch członków – Bułgarię i Rumunię. Jest też drugi problem – sądzę, że pomimo obecnej polityki Rosji nie można zrywać kontaktów z tym państwem. Celem uniknięcia różnych tragicznych zdarzeń należałoby z Rosją utrzymywać bezpośrednią łączność o wojskowym zasięgu.

  Beata Gosiewska (ECR). – Rosja nie tylko podsyca agresywne działania na terytorium Ukrainy. Ona jest agresorem – agresorem, który dzięki kłamliwej propagandzie wojennej wmówił Europie, że agresja Rosji na Krymie i na wschodzie Ukrainy to działania bliżej nieokreślonych separatystów. Należy mówić jasno: za agresję na Ukrainę odpowiedzialna jest Rosja Putina. O sile rosyjskiej propagandy przekonałam się osobiście, bo to właśnie Putin od pięciu lat, za pomocą dezinformacji i kłamliwej propagandy, wyjaśnia światu przyczyny katastrofy smoleńskiej, w której zginęła polska elita na czele z prezydentem Lechem Kaczyńskim – jednym z niewielu przywódców państw europejskich, który w sierpniu 2008 r. potrafił skutecznie przeciwstawić się działaniom Putina w stosunku do Gruzji. Każdy, kto używa słowa separatyści w kontekście tego, co wydarzyło się na Krymie, wpisuje się w retorykę kłamliwej propagandy Putina na temat wojny na Ukrainie.

  Alessia Maria Mosca (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'Europa ha fatto la sua storia sui mari, partendo dal Mediterraneo, gli europei hanno dato vita a una civiltà che si è forgiata attraverso il confronto con l'altro. Il Mar Nero rappresenta uno di questi scenari in cui abbiamo costruito il nostro rapporto con la Russia e il vicino Oriente. Questi mari, devono continuare a essere luoghi di pace e non teatri di tragedie e di conflitti. L'annessione della Crimea, da parte della Russia viola la Carta delle Nazioni Unite, dando a Mosca una base strategica verso i Balcani e il Mediterraneo orientale e rende sempre più difficile il dialogo. Le iniziative prese dal Consiglio verso il Cremlino sono un buon inizio, ma è necessario fare di più. L'Unione europea deve essere indipendente da un punto di vista energetico e procedere spedita nella creazione di una politica estera e di difesa unitaria, anche perché questo aiuta a ridurre le spese dei singoli Stati membri.

Solo così potremo essere interlocutori credibili, in un momento storico in cui si avverte il bisogno di un'Europa in grado di contribuire a superare l'instabile situazione globale che rischia di deflagrare.

  Andrejs Mamikins (S&D). – Priekšsēdētājas kundze, godātie kolēģi! Varbūt ir vērts parunāt ne tikai par negatīvām lietām, bet par iespējamo un esošo sadarbību starp Melnās jūras valstīm.

Ja valstis tērēs naudu tikai bruņošanai, tad varētu pietrūkt naudas daudzu citu svarīgāku problēmu risināšanai. Naudas tērēšana militāriem mērķiem ir maksa par to, ka valstis un šo valstu sabiedrības neuzticas svešiniekiem.

Izriet loģisks jautājums un secinājums — lai vairotu uzticību un ietaupītu naudu, jāsāk dialogs un jārealizē kopīgi mērķi. Kādi tie varētu būt? Kādi varētu būt šie projekti? Piemēram, cīņa ar nelegālo imigrāciju, ekoloģiski projekti, biznesa un iedzīvotāju sadarbība. Ja mēs ieguldīsim pūles, laiku, naudu šajā virzienā, tad atdeve būs daudz lielāka nekā rīkot sacensības par to, kurš saražos un nopirks vairāk militārās tehnikas vai veidos lielāku armiju. Ieroči un armijas nevairos drošību, nevairos uzticību un labklājību. Gluži otrādi — tas ved pretējā virzienā. Kā teicis krievu rakstnieks Antons Čehovs, ja pie sienas karājas ierocis, tad kādā brīdī tas noteikti izšaus. Paldies!

  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D). – Madam President, first of all I would like warmly to congratulate the rapporteur. The seizure of Crimea by Russia and the start of the war in eastern Ukraine by Russia set up a major geopolitical crisis in the Black Sea area.

Crimea offers Russia a strong forward offensive point. It is a thorn in Ukraine’s side and a thorn for the European Union’s eastern border security and defence. Russia, as I mentioned, has tremendously increased – and is increasing – its offensive capability in the Black Sea area. As I also mentioned earlier, the Russian Black Sea fleet is already greater than the combined fleets of all the other Black Sea coastal states. Among those six riparian states, two are Member States of the European Union.

Commissioner, I would like to tell you that I was disappointed by what you said and, at the same time, surprised that you talked only about the soft power of the European Union. We need real European Union common security and defence – real common security capabilities. Otherwise we are not going to play any role.

  Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D). – Sveikinu kolegą M. Pașcu parengus šį labai svarbų pranešimą. Juodosios Jūros baseinas – vienas iš svarbiausių pasaulio regionų. Tačiau Europos Sąjungai jis yra ir strategiškai svarbus kaip išorės siena dėl saugumo ir gynybos užtikrinimo ir Rytų partnerystės vystymo. Po Krymo aneksijos pakitus jėgų pusiausvyrai ir Rusijai neteisėtai kontroliuojant šimtus kilometrų Krymo pakrantės, Juodosios jūros baseinas tampa didele dalimi faktiškai sukarinta zona. Tokie geostrateginės padėties pokyčiai reikalauja veiksmingo Europos Sąjungos reagavimo. Norint užtikrinti šio regiono saugumą ir stabilumą, būtina imtis įvairiausių priemonių, tame tarpe modernizuoti ir stiprinti Juodosios jūros baseino Europos Sąjungos valstybių narių karinius pajėgumus. Visikai pritariu pranešėjui, kad šie pokyčiai, taip pat ir išaugęs Rusijos spaudimas Europos Sąjungos rytiniame pasienyje, kaip pažymėta pranešime, dezinformacijos kaip ginklo naudojimas turi būti rimtai įvertinti ir tinkamai atspindėti Europos saugumo strategijoje.

„Catch the eye” eljárás

  Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il bacino del Mar Nero è senza dubbio una delle regioni più strategiche per l'Unione europea sia per questioni di sicurezza e difesa, sia per la politica europea di vicinato.

Nel 2007, anche a seguito dell'adesione all'Unione europea da parte della Bulgaria e della Romania, la Commissione europea aveva presentato la sinergia del Mar Nero, un'iniziativa di cooperazione per la regione che aveva l'obiettivo di imprimere nuovo slancio ai processi di cooperazione con la Russia, la Turchia e gli altri partner. Tuttavia il cambiamento del panorama geostrategico nel bacino del Mar Nero e l'annessione forzata della Crimea da parte della Russia dimostrano che la sinergia del Mar Nero è ormai obsoleta.

Ci troviamo di fronte a sfide sistemiche più ampie e complesse, che richiedono l'elaborazione in tempi rapidi di una strategia globale dell'Unione europea. La Commissione deve quindi lavorare a una maggiore cooperazione in materia di politica di sicurezza e difesa con gli Stati partner rivieraschi del Mar Nero e vanno sostenute in vie prioritarie le iniziative per la diversificazione delle risorse energetiche nel Mar Nero, nell'ambito di una strategia per l'indipendenza energetica dalla Russia.

  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, η άμεση γειτνίαση και η τεράστια αλληλεξάρτηση των οικονομιών των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Ρωσίας επιβάλλει την επίλυση των διαφορών με ειρηνικό διάλογο, μακριά από ψυχροπολεμικές λογικές που βαθαίνουν ακόμη περισσότερο τις αντιθέσεις των δύο πλευρών. Η ειρηνική συνύπαρξη, το αμοιβαίο όφελος, η επίλυση των διαφορών με διπλωματικά και όχι στρατιωτικά μέσα, θα πρέπει να αποτελούν τους άξονες δράσης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και στην Κριμαία.

Διαφορετικά, η ψυχροπολεμική κατάσταση μεταξύ Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και Ρωσίας θα έχει μόνο αρνητικά αποτελέσματα, όπως ήδη έχει συμβεί με την τεράστια οικονομική ζημιά που έχουν υποστεί οι Έλληνες αγρότες λόγω των ρωσικών αντίμετρων στις κυρώσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης προς τη Ρωσία.

Ανησυχούμε, κυρία πρόεδρε, για την τύχη της ελληνικής μειονότητας των εκατόν πενήντα χιλιάδων ψυχών στη Μαριούπολη, που ζει ειρηνικά επί αιώνες στην ευρύτερη περιοχή, στην περιφέρεια του Ντονέσκ.

Πρέπει λοιπόν και οι δύο πλευρές να επιδείξουν αυτοσυγκράτηση, να διαμορφώσουν τις σχέσεις τους με απόλυτο σεβασμό στο διεθνές δίκαιο και να προχωρήσουν στη συνεννόηση, γιατί αυτό απαιτούν τα συμφέροντα των λαών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της Ρωσίας.

  Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjedavajuća, poštovani gospodine povjereniče, još samo prije nekoliko godina maštali smo zajedno s našim prijateljima koji žive na Crnom moru da im možemo pomoći i da možemo preslikati jedan dio suradnje koju ostvarujemo na Jadranu i na Jonskom moru, i da to može na neki način biti i model za suradnju na Crnom moru.

To su davno prošla vremena, to je zaista prošlo svršeno vrijeme. Danas imamo na sceni, nakon ekoloških katastrofa na Crnom moru, jednu totalnu militarizaciju Crnoga mora, pogotovo nakon aneksije Krima, što naravno zaslužuje svaku osudu. U tom kontekstu želim pozvati Europsku komisiju da zajedno s partnerima, a naročito s Turskom, dobro razmisli kakvu strategiju zajednički postaviti za Crno more, jer mislim da upravo Turska i, naravno, zemlje članice Europske unije mogu odigrati važnu ulogu u obuzdavanju onoga što su ambicije Rusije na Crnom moru.

  Gianluca Buonanno (NI). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, io rimango sorpreso dal fatto che non ci sia l'Alto commissario Mogherini in un tema così importante. Si parla di questioni militari, si parla della Russia, si parla del Mar Nero e con tutto rispetto per chi c'è al posto della Mogherini, manca il titolare.

E come se io da avvocato devo andare in una causa importante in un processo, e invece di andarci io ci mando magari un mio collega che non è certamente il titolare e quindi il mio cliente potrebbe teoricamente arrabbiarsi. Io non faccio l'avvocato, ho fatto solo un esempio. Questo per dire che ancora una volta l'Europa si dimostra non capace di affrontare i problemi con le armi, tra virgolette, che ha. Questo è il risultato finale. Quindi dobbiamo parlare con la Mogherini, dobbiamo parlare con il Commissario ungherese, dobbiamo parlare con chi?

Chiudo dicendo che ancora una volta l'Europa si scaglia contro la Russia, quando noi dobbiamo andare d'accordo con la Russia. Anzi vi dico di più: fosse per me, sarebbe bello che Putin invadesse l'Europa così staremmo tutti meglio.

(„A catch the eye” eljárás vége.)

  Tibor Navracsics, Member of the Commission, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, High Representative/Vice–President Mogherini at the moment is chairing the EU-Latin America summit. I think the summit has an enormous and strategic importance as well. As you know, the College is a college in which one Commissioner can replace another Commissioner.

I think it has been a really fruitful and very helpful debate and exchange. It was very helpful for the EU in forming its policy towards the Black Sea Basin. Let me just make a general remark and then some detailed remarks on the issues you just raised during the debate.

Generally, we can say that the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol by the Russian Federation created a threat, a very dangerous situation, which is a direct challenge to international security, with grave implications for the international legal order that protects the unity and sovereignty of all states. The EU will remain committed to fully implementing its non-recognition policy, including through restrictive measures.

On the other hand, if and when a sustainable solution to the Ukraine conflict is found, we will obviously need to adjust and recalibrate our relationship with Russia. We should be ready to engage with that country. We cannot let dividing lines and lasting rifts split our continent.

Some honourable Members just raised the issue of energy policy and complained about the lack of action at European level regarding the independence and diversification of resources under energy policy. Let me simply say that the European Commission and the Council have just adopted the communication on the Energy Union. Vice–President Šefčovič is travelling to Central Asia to have negotiations there in order to help diversification for central European and EU countries and the EU Member States generally. We are implementing the Third Energy Package, which aims to bring about independence and diversification in energy policy as well.

Others raise the issue of human rights in Crimea. While obviously it is a difficult situation, and we have difficulties and independent NGOs have difficulties in gaining access to Crimea, we can say that High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini is supporting the Council of Europe’s efforts in making the situation more stable and more developed in human rights there. She is supporting Commissioner Muižnieks’s efforts in that area. We have condemned the violation of rights, notably (but not only) of Tatars in Crimea.

Some of you raised the issue of the European Security Strategy. Yes, we need a review of the European Security Strategy. It is on its way and we are absolutely relying on your cooperation on that procedure. We look forward to working closely with you and the Member States on the review of the European Security Strategy.

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. – Madam President, I would first like to say that the report is based on facts and realities. Some of it comes directly from Russian open sources, so there is no point in denying it.

A second observation I would like to make is that there are no ample references, due to the title and the subject of the report, either to the legal aspects – which have been touched upon by some of my colleagues – or to the human rights situation, as has also been mentioned here. All I would like to say here is that there were no human rights problems before, when Crimea belonged to Ukraine; but now there are, after Crimea was annexed illegally by Russia, with the Tatars. So I think we should bear that in mind.

Some of our colleagues have mentioned that the NATO enlargement, which was disrespecting a pledge made to Mr Gorbachev – it was mentioned that he said so – was the cause of what has happened with respect to Ukraine. I would say that even the vision of Mr Gorbachev that there was a pledge that NATO should not enlarge is ignoring the sovereign will of the countries, because we wanted to get into NATO. Probably he meant to say that NATO should not have accepted our decisions, but that is exactly what the Warsaw Pact used to be like. I participated in one of the last meetings of the Warsaw Pact and I participated in NATO, so I know the difference between them.

Anyone coming into the Chamber – probably visitors up there – and listening to our debate would believe that we have seen two different movies. We saw a movie in which Russia is occupying foreign territory through force and transforming it into a stronghold. Others have seen a poor, defenceless, peace-loving Russia defending itself against conquest by NATO and the EU. That is not acceptable. Russia has only two sticks – not a carrot and a stick – one bigger stick and one smaller stick – and the favour done by Russia means being beaten with the smaller stick.

  Elnök asszony. – A vitát lezárom.

A szavazásra 2015. június 11-én, csütörtökön kerül sor.

Írásbeli nyilatkozatok (162. cikk)

  Andrea Bocskor (PPE), írásban. – Az 1954-ben Hruscsov által az USZSZK-nak adományozott Krím-félsziget egy többnemzetiségű színfolt volt, ahol jól megfértek oroszok, tatárok, ukránok és más nemzetiségűek. Sajnos ez a hely mára a katonai erőfitogtatás helyszínévé, Oroszország egyik fő hadibázisává változott. A Krímből kiűzött tatárok beszámolói szerint az új hatalom korlátozza az etnikai és nemzeti kisebbségeket. Szomorú, hogy e gyönyörű táj, amely perzsa, görög, római és török kultúrák nyomait is őrzi, amely nem is olyan rég Ukrajna egyik leglátogatottabb turisztikai vidéke volt, katonai támaszponttá és nukleáris fegyverek hordozására képes nehézbombázók lerakodóhelyévé változott.

Mivel Oroszország fokozta katonai jelenlétét a Fekete-tenger medencéjében, a Krím- félszigeten, a Grúzia részét képező Abházia, és Dél-Oszétia, a Moldova részét képező Dnyeszter-mellék megszállt régióiban, növelte légi és tengeri védelmi haderejét, új haditengerészeti védelmi rakétákat fejlesztve ki, valamint biztosítva, hogy az orosz vadászgépek ellenőrizzék a Fekete-tenger medencéje légterének háromnegyedét, az Európai Uniónak oda kell figyelnie erre, hiszen külső határai ezáltal fokozottan fenyegetve vannak. Fontos, hogy Oroszország végrehajtsa a minszki tűzszüneti megállapodásokat, de a jelentés 16. pontjával ellentétben úgy gondolom, hogy a konfliktus csak békésen, tárgyalások útján rendezhető. Az EU-nak egységes stratégiát kell kialakítania a Fekete-tenger medencéjében létrejött konfliktusok kezeléséhez, s ezekben messzemenően a civil lakosság érdekeit és biztonságát kell figyelembe venni.

  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR), na piśmie. – 18 marca 2014 r. Federacja Rosyjska cynicznie, poprzez szczegółowo zaplanowaną operację z udziałem wojska i służb specjalnych, dokonała bezprawnej aneksji Krymu. Tym samym stały członek RB ONZ złamał zasady integralności terytorialnej, nieingerencji w sprawy wewnętrzne innego państwa oraz zakaz użycia siły zbrojnej przeciwko innemu państwu. Kreml złamał memorandum budapeszteńskie, będące ważnym filarem polityki nierozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej. Rosja w przewrotny sposób próbuje wykorzystać międzynarodową zasadę prawa narodów do samostanowienia. Żadne z uznanych obiektywnych kryteriów (etniczne, naruszeń praw człowieka, najlepszego rozwiązania konfliktu) nie zostało spełnione. Przed aneksją Krym nie był jednorodny etnicznie, a mniejszość rosyjska nie zgłaszała przypadków łamania praw człowieka przez Ukrainę. Po aneksji poprzez czystkę etniczną, wymierzoną głównie w rdzenny naród Tatarów krymskich i Ukraińców, Rosja dąży do uczynienia z Krymu jednorodnej etnicznie strefy zmilitaryzowanej na wzór „niezatapialnego lotniskowca”, jak często określane są Obwód Królewiecki czy Naddniestrze.

Rosja ma długą tradycję zagarniania terytoriów w ten sposób – jeszcze półtora wieku temu północno- wschodnie wybrzeża Morza Czarnego zamieszkiwały narody kaukaskie. Nie możemy dopuścić do powtórzenia na Krymie czystki etnicznej z 1944 r. Musimy sprzeciwić się także „pełzającej” aneksji Abchazji i Osetii Południowej. Rosja nie może przesuwać granic na mapie według swego upodobania. Krym z punktu widzenia prawa międzynarodowego pozostaje terytorium okupowanym. Musi wrócić do Ukrainy. Zbyt rzadko o tym mówimy.

  Eduard Kukan (PPE), in writing. – I would like to congratulate the rapporteur for addressing this most timely international issue. The Black Sea Basin, and notably the situation there, requires our utmost attention: not only due to its strategic importance, in both political and military terms, but in regard to our joint and united approach to Russia’s behaviour in its neighbourhood and on the international scene. With its military manoeuvres, illegal annexations and violations of territorial integrity, the Black Sea Basin is becoming a region where our democratic values are increasingly contested. Also, it is a region where unsettled conflicts and redrawing of borders have taken place. This is completely unacceptable, and must be strongly condemned. We need to speak with one strong voice against such developments, and together with our NATO allies and Easters Partnership countries demonstrate a clear opposition to such behaviour on our Eastern borders.

  József Nagy (PPE), írásban. – Tisztelt Elnök úr, üdvözlöm Paşcu alelnök úr jelentését, s egyetértek vele, hogy nagyon fontos, hogy az EU továbbra is következetesen kommunikáljon Oroszországgal. A Krím-félsziget erőszakos annektálását az EU nem fogadhatja el. Ugyanúgy, ahogy azt sem, ami orosz segédlettel ma Kelet-Ukrajnában folyik. A szituáció az elmúlt hónapokban nemhogy javult volna, de csak romlott. Sürgetem, hogy az EU egységesen, s határozottabban lépjen fel a helyzet stabilizálása érdekében. Saját jól felfogott érdekünkről van szó, hiszen a Fekete-tenger stratégiailag kulcsfontosságú terület számunkra, s szembe kell néznünk a realitással, hogy az egyensúly megbomlott, Oroszország katonailag rendkívül megerősítette a pozícióját. Ez pedig kihatással van az egész régióra, s még inkább átgondolt uniós keleti politikát igényel. Ukrajnának komoly reformokat kell végrehajtania, hogy uniós tagsága felé haladjon. Ezek tükrében fogják az ukránok az EU-t is megítélni.

Ugyanakkor, ha valóban elkötelezettek vagyunk Ukrajna EU csatlakozási folyamatának támogatása mellett, szükséges, hogy az uniós segítséget és kiállást az ukrán polgárok a saját bőrükön mihamarabb tapasztalják.

  Claudia Tapardel (S&D), în scris. – UE trebuie să fie o sursă de stabilitate în regiunea Mării Negre. Apărarea principiilor democrației, a independenței și suveranității statelor din regiune este primordială pentru orice strategie regională pe termen lung. Solidaritatea europeană în susţinerea obiectivelor de reformă şi democratizare ale Moldovei, Georgiei şi Ucrainei fac parte integrantă din strategia de securitate pe care Uniunea Europeană o promovează în bazinul Mării Negre pentru restabilirea stabilităţii şi prosperităţii în regiune. Anexarea ilegală a Crimeei a produs un climat instabil și violent în Estul Ucrainei. Separatiștii sunt în sfera de influență a Federației Ruse și acest lucru trebuie ferm condamnat de întreaga comunitate internațională. La această provocare, în opinia mea, UE trebuie să răspundă cu fermitate și înțelepciune luând măsurile necesare pentru restabilirea păcii în regiune și pentru deturnarea oricăror alte tentative de destabilizare în zonă. Pentru a readuce regiunea Mării Negre la prosperitate și stabilitate avem nevoie, mai presus de orice, de acțiuni care să garanteze siguranța oamenilor și respectarea drepturilor omului în Estul Ucrainei. Viața rămâne cea mai importantă resursă pe care avem datoria să o protejăm. Uniunea Europeană, împreună cu partenerii săi internaționali, prin unitate în jurul acestui principiu, pot depăși actuala criză și pot restabili securitatea regională.