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Eljárás : 2015/2115(INI)
A dokumentum állapota a plenáris ülésen
Válasszon egy dokumentumot : A8-0012/2016

Előterjesztett szövegek :

A8-0012/2016

Viták :

PV 01/02/2016 - 9
CRE 01/02/2016 - 9

Szavazatok :

PV 25/02/2016 - 7.12
CRE 25/02/2016 - 7.12
A szavazatok indokolása

Elfogadott szövegek :

P8_TA(2016)0063

Viták
2016. február 1., Hétfő - Strasbourg Lektorált változat

9. Az Európai Központi Bank 2014. évi éves jelentése (vita)
A felszólalásokról készült videofelvételek
PV
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  Der Präsident. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Aussprache über den Bericht von Notis Marias im Namen des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Währung über den Jahresbericht der Europäischen Zentralbank 2014 (2015/2115(INI)) (A8-0012/2016).

Zu dieser Debatte begrüße ich herzlich in unserem Haus den Präsidenten der Europäischen Zentralbank, Mario Draghi. Herzlich willkommen, Herr Präsident!

Zunächst hat das Wort der Berichterstatter, Herr Notis Marias.

 
  
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  Νότης Μαριάς, Εισηγητής. Κύριε Πρόεδρε, σήμερα το Κοινοβούλιό μας ασκεί μια κορυφαία λειτουργία που προβλέπεται από τη Συνθήκη λειτουργίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και η οποία συνίσταται στην άσκηση δημοκρατικού ελέγχου της δράσης της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας. Διότι ανεξάρτητη Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα, δεν σημαίνει και ανεξέλεγκτη Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα. Οφείλει, λοιπόν, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα να παρέχει λογοδοσία προς το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, το μοναδικό ενωσιακό Όργανο που εκλέγεται απευθείας από τους λαούς της Ένωσης.

Τις προηγούμενες χρονιές, η διαδικασία συζήτησης της ετήσιας έκθεσης δράσης της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας στην Ολομέλεια του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου περιοριζόταν σε ευχολόγια, με απουσία κριτικής προς την ηγεσία της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας και τα πεπραγμένα της. Στην παρούσα έκθεση θέτουμε το δάκτυλο επί τον τύπον των ήλων. Παρότι έγινε ιδιαίτερη προσπάθεια από συγκεκριμένες πολιτικές ομάδες, στο πλαίσιο της Επιτροπής Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Πολιτικής, με κοινές συμβιβαστικές τροπολογίες, να αφαιρεθούν σημαντικά σημεία αιχμής που περιείχε η έκθεση που συνέταξα, παρότι κάποιοι επιχείρησαν να στρογγυλέψουν τις γωνίες, παρότι οι «Ηρακλείς του Στέμματος» αποδείχθηκαν πιο «ντραγκιστές» από τον κύριο Draghi, εν τούτοις τα καίρια σημεία αιχμής της έκθεσης παραμένουν.

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα οφείλει να κάνει σημαντικά βήματα προκειμένου να διασφαλίσει ότι κατά την άσκηση της αποστολής της δεν θα υπάρχει σύγκρουση συμφερόντων λόγω της τετραπλής δράσης που έχει μετατρέψει την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα σε κράτος εν κράτει. Και αυτό γιατί η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα υποτίθεται ότι είναι ανεξάρτητος θεσμός άσκησης νομισματικής πολιτικής, ενώ ταυτόχρονα εποπτεύει τις 130 μεγαλύτερες συστημικές τράπεζες της Ευρώπης. Παράλληλα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα είναι ο μεγαλοδανειστής των χωρών της Ένωσης, αφού έχει αγοράσει στο πλαίσιο της ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης ομόλογα των κρατών της ευρωζώνης, και τέλος, είναι μέλος της Τρόικας που έχει πτωχεύσει και φτωχοποιήσει τις χώρες του μνημονίου.

Για αυτό το λόγο, η έκθεση υπενθυμίζει τη σημαντική και συνάμα πρωτοποριακή απόφαση του Δικαστηρίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης C-62/14, που προσδιορίζει τους όρους και τις προϋποθέσεις υπό τις οποίες οφείλει η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα να εκτελεί το πρόγραμμα ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης. Μια δικαστική απόφαση που στην ουσία ζητά την έξωση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας από την Τρόικα. Ταυτόχρονα, η έκθεσή μας ζητά να υπάρξει διαφάνεια και έλεγχος της Τρόικας, άρα και της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας, κατά την εφαρμογή των προγραμμάτων δήθεν διάσωσης, δηλαδή των μνημονίων.

Κύριε Draghi, η ανεργία παραμένει σε εξαιρετικά υψηλά επίπεδα ιδίως όσον αφορά τους νέους και τους μακροχρόνια ανέργους με τα ποσοστά να παρουσιάζουν ιδιαίτερα απόκλιση, από 6,4% στη Γερμανία σε 26,6% στην Ελλάδα. Και όλα αυτά, ενώ η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα και τα κράτη μέλη διέθεσαν αρκετά τρισεκατομμύρια ευρώ για την αντιμετώπιση της κρίσης από το 2009 και μετά. Ταυτόχρονα, η ΕΚΤ είναι ιδιαίτερα ευμενής στη συνέχιση της άσκηση σκληρής δημοσιονομικής πολιτικής και πολιτικής λιτότητας, η οποία όμως δεν μπόρεσε να μειώσει την ανεργία, ούτε να μειώσει το δημόσιο χρέος. Η έκθεση μάλιστα καλεί τα κράτη μέλη να διενεργήσουν λογιστικό έλεγχο του χρέους, σύμφωνα με τις διατάξεις του κανονισμού (ΕΕ) αριθ. 472/2013.

Επιπλέον, θεωρούμε ότι χρειάζεται μια πολιτική που θα ενισχύσει στις δημόσιες και ιδιωτικές επενδύσεις και θα τροφοδοτήσει την ανάπτυξη. Αυτό απαιτεί αύξηση ρευστότητας και χρηματοδότηση των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων. Παρότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα ξεκίνησε ένα φιλόδοξο πρόγραμμα ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης που ανήλθε στα τέλη του έτους 2015 σε 582 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ, από τα οποία 17 δισεκατομμύρια δαπανήθηκαν από την Κεντρική Τράπεζα της φτωχοποιημένης Ελλάδας, εντούτοις κύριε Draghi, δεν αντιμετωπίστηκε επαρκώς ούτε ο αποπληθωρισμός, ούτε η ανεργία, ούτε η υπανάπτυξη. Απέναντι στις εμμονές της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας για αποδόμηση του κοινωνικού κράτους, η έκθεση αναγνωρίζει τα όρια της νομισματικής πολιτικής και επισημαίνει ότι τα οικονομικά προβλήματα της Ένωσης μπορούν να αντιμετωπιστούν με δομικές μεταρρυθμίσεις, οι οποίες όμως οφείλουν να είναι κοινωνικά ισόρροπες.

Από εκεί και πέρα η ποσοτική χαλάρωση και τα χαμηλά επιτόκια δεν μπόρεσαν να συμβάλουν ούτε στην αύξηση των ιδιωτικών επενδύσεων, ενώ είδαμε ταυτόχρονα να δημιουργούνται προβλήματα στα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία που είδαν τις αποδόσεις των αποθεματικών τους να είναι ιδιαίτερα χαμηλές. Η έκθεση επικουρεί το προταθέν από την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή πανευρωπαϊκό σχήμα εγγύησης καταθέσεων, αλλά, επίσης, επισημαίνει και τα σημαντικά βήματα που έγιναν για την δημιουργία Ενιαίας Αρχής Εποπτείας των Τραπεζών.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό επίσης πρέπει να εξεταστεί κατά πόσο η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα, και για ποιον λόγο, επέβαλε πιστωτική ασφυξία στην Ελλάδα από τις αρχές του 2015 που τελικά οδηγήθηκε σε έλεγχο κεφαλαίων. Επομένως, χρειάζεται μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια στον τρόπο λειτουργίας του Μηχανισμού Παροχής Έκτακτης Ρευστότητας. Κλείνοντας, κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλω να ευχαριστήσω τους σκιώδεις εισηγητές για τη θετική τους συμβολή σε αυτή την έκθεσή μου.

 
  
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  Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank. Mr President, we are undoubtedly at a point in time when the cohesion of Europe is being tested. Many of the challenges we must confront are European or even global in nature, and these challenges demand a strong European response. I am therefore grateful to be back in this assembly – a symbol of the need for European debates and European solutions.

Today we are discussing the Annual Report of the European Central Bank for 2014. In that year, the Governing Council adopted a series of measures to respond to the impairment of our monetary policy transmission channels and to the low inflation environment. These measures included two reductions in key ECB interest rates, the announcement of targeted long-term refinancing operations, and two purchase programmes for asset-backed securities and covered bonds. 2014 was also marked by the start of the activities of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the completion of the comprehensive assessment. But rather than looking backwards, allow me to focus on the challenges that still lie ahead of us.

First, I will briefly explain our current monetary policy and why we will re-assess our stance at our March meeting. Second, I would like to discuss the economic challenges we face and what it takes to address them. I am acutely aware that the focus of policymakers lies elsewhere for the moment. But let me be quite clear: economic success is also part of the solution in other fields. Therefore, mitigating economic risks deserves to be high on the political agenda.

It was about three years ago that inflation started moving away from the ECB’s medium-term inflation aim of below, but close to, 2%. Since October 2013, inflation has been below 1%. Throughout 2015, headline inflation in the euro area was very low or even negative, remaining under the influence of low commodity prices. Euro area annual HICP inflation was estimated at 0.4% in January this year.

In parallel to this trend, we had to continually revise our outlook for inflation: while at the start of 2015 our staff was forecasting inflation to reach 1.5% in 2016 and 1.8% in 2017, in December they projected a rate of only 1% for this year, and 1.6% for 2017.

Against this backdrop, the ECB decided in December to act again. Our assessment of the monetary policy stance had two parts. First, we noted that the measures put in place since the summer of 2014 had been very effective. The monetary stimulus that they introduced led to a broad-based easing of financing conditions, stimulated credit provision and has since provided substantial support to the euro area recovery. Without these measures, the euro area would have been in outright deflation last year and prices would have fallen at an even quicker pace this year. Growth would have been significantly lower.

Second, while our measures were deemed effective, they were also judged to be insufficient in view of the deteriorating outlook for price stability. There was a concrete risk that without increasing the quantitative stimulus, the date by which inflation would settle around levels below, but close to, 2% would once more be pushed back beyond any relevant definition of medium-term. Therefore, we decided to recalibrate our monetary policy stance. We cut the deposit facility rate further to -0.3%; we extended the envisaged end-date for our monthly purchases to the end of March 2017, while maintaining its conditionality on the inflation outlook; and we announced that we would reinvest the principal payments of our purchased assets once they mature, for as long as necessary. We also decided to continue conducting the main refinancing operations and the three-month longer-term refinancing operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the last reserve maintenance period of 2017.

Since our meeting in early December, conditions have once more changed. A moderate recovery of the euro area economy is under way, driven mainly by domestic demand. But downside risks have increased again and there is heightened uncertainty about emerging market economies’ growth prospects, volatility in financial and commodity markets, and geopolitical risks. Inflation dynamics are also tangibly weaker than we expected in December. While the most recent wave of disinflation is mainly due to the renewed sharp fall in oil prices, weaker than anticipated growth in wages together with declining inflation expectations call for careful analysis of the channels by which surprises to realised inflation may influence future price and wage-setting in our economy.

Therefore, at our last meeting in January we judged that it would be necessary to review and possibly reconsider our monetary policy stance at our next monetary policy meeting in early March, when the new staff macroeconomic projections will be made available.

Our monetary policy is working, and the ECB is willing to contribute its share to ensuring that recovery remains firmly on track. But there are risks that – if they were to materialise – could undermine its course. The policy challenges we face are fourfold. They relate to the global environment, the situation of the financial system, the economic and fiscal policies of Member States and the political uncertainty surrounding the European project.

First, as regards the global environment: growth prospects are slowly improving in advanced economies, but the outlook in emerging markets is more subdued. Overall, growth is low by historical standards. Moreover, emerging markets are facing economic and financial risks: some are suffering from structural impediments and macroeconomic imbalances, while others have to adjust to lower commodity prices. They remain vulnerable to an abrupt shift in risk sentiment that could tighten financing conditions. A key issue is how emerging markets will be impacted by tighter financing conditions and the ensuing capital outflows, and to what extent this will have repercussions for euro area foreign demand. Against this background, ensuring the continued resilience of the euro area economy is paramount.

Second, there are policy challenges related to our financial markets. The euro area financial system weathered several episodes of stress in the second half of last year. This is a sign that a lot has already been achieved with the establishment of banking union – which, however, is not complete yet. To make our financial system truly safe and sound, we need to progress in two main domains, which complement each other. On the one hand, we need to finalise and implement the work we started when establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism as the initial pillars of banking union. This includes further regulatory work to harmonise our rules for supervisory action and to ensure a consistent application of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’s (BRRD) bail-in provisions. On the other hand, we need a common public backstop for the Single Resolution Fund to strengthen its credibility, and we need to ensure that confidence in the safety of deposits is equally high in all euro area Member States by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. ‘Risk-reduction’ and ‘risk-sharing’ measures are two sides of the same coin and should be pursued in parallel: they are all essential to protecting the stability of the European banking sector.

Third, there are challenges related to the fiscal and economic policies of Member States that require decisive policy action. Fiscal policies should contribute to the economic recovery. At the same time, they should be in full compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. This is important to maintain confidence in the European fiscal framework and in the sustainability of public finances. Moreover, countries would benefit from a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. This involves greater efficiency of public sector services and moving to a more growth-friendly tax system.

But the ongoing cyclical recovery in the euro area should also be supported by effective structural policies, particularly actions to improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure. Such actions are vital to increase productive investment, boost job creation and raise productivity. If reforms are credible, carefully chosen and well designed, their positive effects can be felt quickly, particularly in the context of our supportive monetary policy stance.

Fourth and finally, there is still political uncertainty surrounding the European project. This is true in the broader context of our Union. A solution that would anchor the United Kingdom firmly within the EU while allowing the euro area to integrate further would boost confidence. The Economic and Monetary Union architecture also remains an unfinished construction. Citizens and markets are too often unsure about our capacity to act jointly in a spirit of common responsibility. We should prove them wrong.

Let me conclude and come back to the subject of our debate: your resolution on our Annual Report for 2014. Let me assure you that we are reading this document closely. It reminds us of our duty as a public institution to conduct our business in a transparent and accountable manner. The publication of the diaries of Members of the Executive Board that starts this month is only one example of this. I am looking forward to the debate and thank you for your attention.

 
  
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  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. Mr President, first let me thank the rapporteur, Mr Marias, and his colleagues on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), for their work on this report.

This ex-post assessment of the European Central Bank (ECB) activities by the European Parliament is an important part of democratic accountability and a necessary complement to the ECB’s independence. The Commission shares Parliament’s view that the ECB’s independence, in the conduct of its monetary policy as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to safeguard price stability.

The monetary policy in the euro area is the exclusive competence of the ECB. With its monetary policy measures over the past years, including interest rate cuts, a series of targeted long-term refinancing operations and an expanded assets purchase programme, the ECB has acted to address the risks of an excessively long period of very low inflation. These measures include bank lending to the euro area non—financial private sector to help reduce financial fragmentation. They should support the economy and bring inflation closer to the ECB’s target of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.

The EU economy is continuing with a moderate recovery, and it is supported by certain tailwinds, such as low oil prices, the aforementioned accommodatory monetary policy and a correspondingly lower euro exchange rate, which is favourable for European exporters.

At the same time we are also facing headwinds from geopolitical tensions in our neighbourhood – both our southern and eastern neighbourhoods – and from the slowdown in emerging markets. The global GDP growth forecast has also somewhat deteriorated. It is against this backdrop that we will be updating our economic forecast on Thursday with our winter economic forecast.

The Commission fully shares Parliament’s view that Europe cannot only rely on monetary policy and a favourable external environment to lift GDP growth and to raise our economy’s growth potential. Member States’ governments must roll up their sleeves and implement necessary structural reforms. Structural, fiscal and monetary policies each have to play their role for a consistent, growth-friendly approach acting both on the demand and supply sides of our economies. On the fiscal side, adjustments undertaken in recent years have reduced deficits and stabilised debt levels in the euro area. But Member States continue to face different fiscal challenges which call for a differentiated path of fiscal adjustment going forward.

The Commission agrees with the European Parliament that fiscal adjustment, using the flexibility that is built into the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, needs to go hand in hand with the implementation of structural reforms: reforms of product, services and labour markets that increase productivity, help regain competitiveness, improve the business environment and reduce inequality.

Stimulating investment remains one of the Commission’s policy priorities. The investment plan for Europe will help to reverse recent downward trends in investment by supporting strategic projects and SME financing. European Parliament support for a European Fund for Strategic Investments initiative has been instrumental in laying the ground for decisive and swift Union action to address the main investment needs in Europe. With all the governance bodies in place since early January, EFSI is now up and running. The take-up so far by the market and public authorities leaves us assured that we will meet the EUR 315 billion investment target well within the three—year deadline.

The Commission also shares Parliament’s view on the Capital Markets Union. It is our common objective to support diversification of funding sources, promote cross-border investments and improve access to finance SMEs in particular. Implementing the Capital Markets Union action plan is an ambitious objective. The Commission therefore counts on Parliament’s strong support and commitment, in particular – but not only – for the upcoming legislative procedures.

At the same time we agree with Parliament that we must remain vigilant with regard to risks in all areas of the financial system arising in the current market situation.

Let me conclude by underlining that I see much common ground between your views and the Commission’s. It is reassuring to know that we can count on your support in building the foundations for sustainable growth and job creation in Europe. I thank you for your attention and look forward to a good and fruitful debate today.

 
  
  

PRESIDENZA DELL'ON. DAVID-MARIA SASSOLI
Vicepresidente

 
  
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  Tom Vandenkendelaere, namens de PPE-Fractie. De totstandkoming van dit parlementaire verslag is niet eenvoudig gebleken. De verhitte discussies toonden alvast aan dat het monetaire beleid van u een hot topic is. "Super Mario", "Magic Mario", "Helicopter Mario", u lijkt elke week wel een nieuwe bijnaam te krijgen.

Maar ik kan mij voorstellen dat u die aandacht liever niet krijgt, dat u een stabiele Europese economie verkiest, die geen nood heeft aan onconventionele maatregelen. Dat u ook een ECB verkiest die het vertrouwen krijgt om in alle onafhankelijkheid haar mandaat te vervullen. Daarom roept ons verslag de nationale ministers op om zich niet te mengen in dit beleid door aan stemmingmakerij te doen. Want vertrouwen blijft nog steeds het belangrijkste smeermiddel van de economie en de centrale bank verdient dit vertrouwen, samen met de gouverneurs van de nationale banken.

Uiteraard blijft een debat over het gevoerde beleid heel erg belangrijk. Er zijn duidelijke argumenten pro en contra kwantitatieve verruiming, maar de discussie moet intellectueel eerlijk blijven. Roepen dat de arme spaarder bijvoorbeeld de dupe is, terwijl roekeloze beleggers en schuldverzamelaars feestvieren, dat is de waarheid geweld aandoen. Niemand is natuurlijk enkel spaarder. Veel van mijn leeftijdsgenoten bijvoorbeeld genieten op vandaag als hypotheeknemer net van de zeer lage rentevoeten. Werknemer, werkgever, pensioenspaarder, wij hebben er allemaal belang bij dat de economie sneller aantrekt.

Wij moeten waakzaam blijven ten aanzien van de risico's van dit beleid - ik ben de eerste om het te zeggen vandaag - maar we mogen ons er niet door laten verlammen. Want niet-ingrijpen, zoals sommigen hier ook in dit Parlement schijnen te willen, houdt veel ernstige risico's in. Daarom steun ik de evenwichtige visie van dit parlementair verslag.

 
  
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  Κώστας Μαυρίδης, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας S&D. Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κατ’ αρχάς, να συγχαρούμε τον εισηγητή της έκθεσης, παρά τις όποιες διαφορές, τον κύριο Μαριά. Κύριε Draghi, καλωσορίσατε, η παρουσία σας στην Ολομέλεια είναι πάντα ευπρόσδεκτη, γιατί ενισχύει μεταξύ άλλων και τη δημοκρατική νομιμότητα. Κατ’ αρχάς αναγνωρίζουμε τις προσπάθειες που καταβάλλετε και επικροτούμε την πολιτική σας, ειδικά με το πρόγραμμα ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης, σε ένα εξαιρετικά δύσκολο περιβάλλον, για τον πληθωρισμό και την επιστροφή στην ανάπτυξη.

Εν τούτοις, η ευρωζώνη είναι ακόμα μία εύθραυστη και ένα ανομοιογενές πεδίο με πολιτικές και κοινωνικές αποκλίσεις. Για αυτό και καλωσορίζουμε πρόσφατα την δήλωση του κυρίου Cœuré, ο οποίος μίλησε για την ανάγκη να αντιμετωπιστούν οι οικονομικές αποκλίσεις στην ευρωζώνη και μίλησε για τα κράτη εκείνα τα οποία θα έχουν πλεόνασμα και θα πρέπει να προβούν σε περισσότερες δημόσιες επενδύσεις. Για αυτό, λοιπόν, θα ήθελα τη δική σας δήλωση σε αυτό το θέμα.

Δεύτερον, ο χρηματοπιστωτικός κατακερματισμός είναι ένα σημαντικό πρόβλημα στην ευρωζώνη. Το κόστος δανεισμού για τις μικρές και μεσαίες επιχειρήσεις παραμένει υψηλότερο από τις μεγάλες, ιδίως, σε εκείνα τα κράτη μέλη που είναι σε οικονομική κρίση και τα πράγματα γίνονται διπλά δύσκολα. Και εδώ θα ήθελα τη δική σας άποψη για τους τρόπους παροχής δανείων χαμηλού κόστους προς την πραγματική οικονομία.

Ένα άλλο θέμα είναι τα συνεργατικά πιστωτικά ιδρύματα τα οποία παίζουν σημαντικό ρόλο, λόγω και των ιδιαίτερων αρχών λειτουργίας τους και την αποστολή τους. Θα πρέπει οι εποπτικές αρχές να έχουν υπόψη τους ότι υπάρχουν ειδικές αρχές που θα πρέπει να γίνονται σεβαστές, και θα θέλαμε και το δικό σας σχόλιο.

Τέλος, με δύο σύντομα σχολεία: πρώτο, μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια. Ποια είναι η δική σας θέση, θα πρέπει να υπάρξει ένας κατάλληλος μηχανισμός, όπως στην Ισπανία και στην Ιρλανδία ή κάτι άλλο; Και μια τελευταία κουβέντα, για τις καταθέσεις και την προστασία. Τι προτίθεστε να κάνετε για εκείνα τα κράτη μέλη τα οποία δεν θα ακολουθήσουν τις δικές σας υποδείξεις και θα έχουν την Τραπεζική Ένωση «à la carte».

 
  
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  Stanisław Ożóg, w imieniu grupy ECR. Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowny Sprawozdawco! Panie i Panowie! Koleżanki i Koledzy! Sprawozdanie jest wyważoną oceną działań EBC. Po raz pierwszy widać tu jednak, w tym sprawozdaniu, głosy krytyki.

Po pierwsze, należy podkreślić wszelkie średnio- i długofalowe instrumenty, które powinny wpływać na ożywienie gospodarcze w Europie, i które sprostałyby potrzebie trwałego ożywienia gospodarki realnej we wszystkich – nie w części – dwudziestu ośmiu krajów Unii Europejskiej. Należy również podkreślić, że mimo iż EBC realizuje swoje działania w celu utrzymania korzystnych warunków finansowania, inwestycje prywatne i publiczne w strefie euro pozostają znacznie poniżej poziomu sprzed obecnego kryzysu. Więc pożądane jest zwiększenie dostępu do finansowania przede wszystkim dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw.

Rozważając roczne sprawozdanie na temat EBC, chciałbym jeszcze zwrócić uwagę na, moim zdaniem, bardzo ważną rzecz. Jest to po pierwsze poszanowanie dla niezależności decyzji EBC, ale również odpowiednie rozdzielenie roli nadzorczej EBC i jego funkcji decyzyjności w ramach polityki pieniężnej. Połączenie obu tych funkcji nie powinno powodować konfliktu interesów dla EBC.

 
  
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  Cora van Nieuwenhuizen, namens de ALDE-Fractie. Ik wil graag beginnen met de rapporteur, de heer Marias, en mijn collega's schaduwrapporteurs te bedanken voor de prettige samenwerking bij dit verslag. In dit verslag spreekt het Parlement sterke zorgen uit over de effecten van de kwantitatieve verruiming, waarbij elke maand 60 miljard euro aan financiële groeihormonen in de economie wordt gepompt.

Mijnheer Draghi, u hebt het vaak gezegd en vandaag ook weer herhaald: monetair beleid alleen is niet voldoende om de economie aan de praat te krijgen. Er zijn ook economische hervormingen en een gezond begrotingsbeleid voor nodig. U noemde het vandaag in uw speech als derde punt. Bent u het met mij eens dat het op deze terreinen nog bepaald niet de goede kant op gaat? In veel landen zit de arbeidsmarkt nog steeds op slot. Het lijkt wel of er op meerdere plekken de mentale omslag van een baan voor het leven naar een leven vol banen nog steeds gemaakt moet worden. Het aanpassen van de pensioenleeftijd is nog niet overal op orde en er zijn vooral grote landen die de hoogste schulden en de grootste tekorten hebben, gecombineerd met de laagste groei en ook de laagste inflatie. Die landen juist proberen het hardst om onder de begrotingsafspraken uit te komen. Geen goede ontwikkeling!

Dit alles overziend vraag ik mij af of het verstandig is in die omstandigheden de kwantitatieve verruiming verder door te zetten en uit te bouwen. Die zorg wordt versterkt door de sterk negatieve bijeffecten van dit soort monetaire stimuli voor de stabiliteit van de pensioenfondsen en financiële markten in Europa. Als we de extreem lage olieprijzen niet meenemen is de inflatie helemaal niet zo dramatisch laag. Ik vraag me daarom af of het nodig is om er nog een schep kwantitatieve verruimingbovenop te doen. Nogmaals, in het licht van het feit dat de zo broodnodige structurele hervormingen en een degelijk begrotingsbeleid nog steeds achterblijven, vindt u het dan nog steeds verantwoord dat u de kar alleen moet trekken met uw kwantitatieve verruiming, die u dan toch door moet zetten?

 
  
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  Fabio De Masi, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. Herr Präsident! Herr Draghi hat mit „whatever it takes“ die Finanzmärkte eine Weile beruhigt. Die faulen Kredite im italienischen Bankensystem und der Versuch, den Giftmüll mit viel Lametta an die Steuerzahler abzustoßen, zeigt aber: Die Euro-Krise geht weiter! Für die Mehrheit ist jeden Tag Euro-Krise im Portemonnaie, und das hat Gründe.

Herr Draghi hat sie in Jackson Hole selbst benannt: Es fehlt an öffentlichen Investitionen zur Unterstützung der Geldpolitik. Die Banken vergeben durch die Kürzung von Löhnen, Renten und Staatsausgaben kaum Kredite, weil es an Investitionsnachfrage fehlt – trotz Nullzinsen. Quantitative Easing führt so nur zu Finanzblasen, statt dass das Geld in der realen Wirtschaft landet. Daher verfehlt die EZB auch ihr Inflationsziel von etwa 2 % jährlich regelmäßig.

Die „Financial Times“ spottet bereits, die deutschen Zentralbanker hätten ein Inflationsziel von 0 bis 0,2 %. Auch die EZB trägt hierfür Verantwortung. In Irland drohte die EZB, den Euro abzudrehen, wenn nicht etwa die marode Anglo Irish von irischen Steuerzahlern gerettet wird. Das war korrupt und keine Geldpolitik.

In Griechenland erzwang die EZB die weitere Kürzung von Löhnen und Renten. Dabei sieht ein Blinder mit Krückstock: Die Strukturreformen haben alles nur noch schlimmer gemacht. Frei nach Bill Clinton: It´s the austerity, stupid.

Der Investitionsstreik kann nur durch öffentliche Investitionen überwunden werden. Die EZB muss das unterstützen etwa durch den Ankauf von Anleihen der Europäischen Investitionsbank. Sonst droht der Euro zu zerbrechen oder er wird abgewählt.

 
  
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  Ernest Urtasun, en nombre del Grupo Verts/ALE. Señor Presidente, señor Draghi, Comisario. Gracias, hoy, por su presencia.

Señor Draghi, este Parlamento ha acogido favorablemente muchas veces muchas de las medidas que ha tomado en los últimos años, como las medidas de política monetaria no convencionales, o su voluntad de mantener programas de compra de bonos soberanos, que —aunque sea momentáneamente— ha puesto fin a la crisis de la financiación soberana. Sin embargo, señor Draghi, tengo que decir que estos programas —y concretamente el programa de expansión cuantitativa— llegaron tarde en algunos casos y fueron mal diseñados.

Sabemos que el volumen de la expansión cuantitativa es insuficiente. Tanto es así que prácticamente no está teniendo impacto en el nivel de precios, como señalaba anteriormente mi compañero. Y también nos preocupa, señor Draghi, que este programa no sea un programa enfocado a poder llegar directamente a la economía real —algo que hemos pedido en varias ocasiones—, y que en estos momentos estemos más alimentando burbujas especulativas y generando procesos de desigualdad que haciendo un programa que pueda llegar verdaderamente a la economía real.

Y sabemos que todo no lo tiene que hacer la política monetaria; que la falta de políticas de sostenimiento de la demanda agregada es, hoy en día, un problema. Y esa no es su responsabilidad. Pero también nos parece que algunos de estos programas, al igual que las TLTRO —cuyos resultados en estos momentos, también por los datos que tenemos, son muy escasos—, no han funcionado como deberían.

Y ya para terminar, señor Draghi, tengo que decir que, ya que estamos evaluando su labor en los últimos años, tenemos que hablar de Grecia. Nos preocupa muchísimo la falta de un marco legal claro para mecanismos como la provisión de liquidez de emergencia; nos preocupa que ustedes tomaran decisiones de manera totalmente arbitraria, en función de si un Gobierno era de un color o de otro, sobre todo si lo comparamos con lo que sucedió en Chipre; nos preocupa también, y con esto termino, la independencia del Banco Central Europeo, al haber tomado decisiones su Consejo de Gobierno prácticamente en paralelo en el tiempo al Eurogrupo, poniendo en grave peligro la credibilidad de la institución.

 
  
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  Marco Valli, a nome del gruppo EFDD. Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'operato della BCE nel 2015 segue quello che è un disegno politico delineato da tempo. Ad oggi 19 paesi dell'Eurozona, più di 330 milioni di persone, hanno ceduto alla BCE la propria sovranità monetaria. Tutti i popoli europei che non controllano più la propria moneta e il proprio sistema bancario devono rendersi conto del fatto che sono popoli ai quali sono stati sottratti diritti fondamentali per autodeterminarsi democraticamente e che si trovano sotto dittatura di Bruxelles e Francoforte.

La BCE, dall'entrata in funzione del primo pilastro dell'Unione bancaria a fine 2014, sta gestendo in totale conflitto di interessi sia le politiche monetarie fallimentari, gonfiando le banche, sia la vigilanza sulle banche stesse. La BCE continua a professare indicazioni politiche che non le competono, d'austerità e riforme, spianando la strada a grandi portatori di interesse, fondi di investimento, grandi elusori fiscali, coloro i quali tirano i fili di questo progetto politico e che si stanno spartendo strategicamente le risorse pubbliche a prezzi di saldo con le privatizzazioni.

Sono attesi forti shock nel 2016, dovuti al rallentamento economico globale e alla crisi dei migranti. Non possiamo pensare che l'unico piano sul tavolo sia quello di ulteriore cessione di sovranità a nuove figure non elette democraticamente e lontane dalle necessità dei popoli, come sancito nel report dei cinque presidenti. Sarebbe un ulteriore schiaffo ai cittadini da parte dell'eurocrazia. Bisogna per questo sostenere al più presto un piano politico nuovo e democratico per l'Europa partendo da una exit strategy ordinata e concordata dall'euro.

Una cosa deve essere chiara: i nemici della democrazia non sono quelli che sollevano dei dubbi sulla moneta unica e sulla BCE, ma quelli che continuano a difenderla religiosamente non ammettendone il fallimento evidente.

 
  
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  Gerolf Annemans, namens de ENF-Fractie. Alsof zeven jaar eurocrisis nog niet genoeg waren, hebben socialisten, christen-democraten en liberalen hier het verslag van onze goede collega Marias gekaapt om Draghi een genuanceerd goed rapport te kunnen geven, zodat hij verder kan gaan zoals hij altijd bezig is geweest.

Mijnheer Marias is wel degelijk opzij gezet in weerwil van wat hij zelf daarover zegt. Een voorzichtige - volgens mij veel te voorzichtige - paragraaf waarin kritisch stond dat de ECB mogelijk haar mandaat te buiten is gegaan toen zij begonnen is soevereine schuld op te kopen. Dat moest allemaal sneuvelen. Zijn verslag is gekaapt en we zijn hier nu in een jaarverslag terechtgekomen dat de euroreligie nog maar eens bevestigt met het klassieke dogma van meneer Draghi: alles gaat goed, want als ik niet verder kan gaan zou het nog slechter gaan.

Volgens dat dogma is dus de weg geplaveid voor mijnheer Draghi om door te kunnen gaan met zijn schuldeneconomie, zijn werkloosheidseconomie, zijn eenheidseconomie en de transfertunie die daar rond gaat. En dat alles met een geldfontein die maar blijft spuiten, hoewel zij geen groei veroorzaakt en geen soelaas brengt. Wat ook niet mogelijk is, want er is geen vertrouwen in het fundamentele voortbestaan van deze munt. Mijnheer Draghi lijkt een met goud belegde oplichter die ons allemaal naar de afgrond begeleidt, naar een chaotische implosie, terwijl het verstandiger zou zijn om deze muntunie op een geordende manier te deconstrueren. Mijnheer Draghi hier vandaag stoppen zou waarschijnlijk een veel interessanter en verstandiger maatregel zijn!

 
  
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  Presidente. – Mi scusi onorevole Annemans, ma non è consentito offendere, tantomeno offendere i nostri ospiti.

 
  
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  Ελευθέριος Συναδινός (NI). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, μία και μόνο φράση της έκθεσης, απεικονίζει την ουσία της ύπαρξης της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας, αλλά και την οικονομική πολιτική της Γερμανίας και κατ’ επέκταση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης παράγραφος 11: «επικροτεί την κατηγορηματική δέσμευση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας να καταβάλλει κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια για την προστασία του ευρώ την οποίαν ανέλαβε τον Αύγουστο του 2012».

Τα πάντα για το χρήμα, όχι για τους πολίτες, ούτε για τα έθνη, ούτε καν για τις χώρες. Η Ελλάδα πέρυσι διαπραγματεύονταν με τους θεσμούς για την επιβίωσή της. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα πιστή στην πολιτική της ανεξαρτησίας, σταμάτησε την παροχή ρευστότητας προς τη χώρα μου για να επιβάλλει την εκδικητική συμπεριφορά των Ευρωπαίων στον κακό μικρό υποτιθέμενο «αδελφό» τους.

Είναι φανερό ότι η λεγόμενη σταθερότητα του ευρώ είναι απλά ένα μέσο επιβολής των οικονομικών συμφερόντων της Γερμανίας, άρα μέρος του προβλήματος. Για να γίνει μέρος της λύσης πρέπει να αλλάξει κατεύθυνση η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Και αυτό μπορεί να γίνει μόνο με εθνικιστικές κυβερνήσεις που ενεργοποιούν τον πολίτη, την οικογένεια και το έθνος έναντι στο χρήμα.

 
  
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  Dariusz Rosati (PPE). Mr President, in my opinion the monetary policy of the ECB has been properly focused on restoring price stability and on contributing to gradual economic recovery in the euro area. Unconventional measures, such as the asset purchase programme and the negative deposit rates, have been generally successful, if somewhat overdue. Had they been introduced earlier – in my opinion at least – the results would have been probably better. But this is not a critique, Mr Draghi, as I am fully aware of the political constraints within which you have to act and the especially strong opposition to those measures from some members of the Governing Council. But let me tell you that the opposition has been vindicated by the facts. These have demonstrated that you were right and your opponents were wrong.

Mr President, we are discussing the European Parliament report today, and I think this is a balanced and objective document. It is a much-improved document compared to the first draft that has been discussed at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), which in my opinion was one-sided, biased and full of unjustified accusations against the ECB – especially for matters for which the ECB is not responsible.

Mr Draghi, I have one question. At one of our earlier meetings during the monetary dialogue meetings at the ECON Committee, you said that you would consider ‘helicopter money’: that is, the direct emission of cash money to market participants. I would like to ask you: what is your current thinking on this, on the legal grounds, and on the consequences – both bad and good – of this measure in the event that we introduce it?

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

 
  
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  Peter van Dalen (ECR), "blauwe kaart"-vraag. Mijnheer Rosati, u heeft een zeer verbazingwekkende speech gehouden. U houdt mijnheer Draghi de hand boven het hoofd en u zegt: de ECB heeft zijn werk goed gedaan. Dat verbaast mij zeer, want de ECB heeft zijn werk helemaal niet goed gedaan. De ECB moet zorgen voor prijsstabiliteit en een inflatie op het niveau van ongeveer twee procent. Al sinds 2013 is die inflatie niet op dat niveau. Hoe kunt u nu zeggen dat mijnheer Draghi zijn werk goed gedaan heeft? Onbegrijpelijk!

 
  
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  Dariusz Rosati (PPE), blue-card answer. The ECB has done whatever was possible within its competences as described in the Treaty. As I said, perhaps the quantitative easing could have been undertaken a little bit earlier, but I also said that there were political constraints. In the final analysis, Mr Draghi took the decisions that saved the euro area back in 2012 by declaring that he would do whatever it took to save the euro. I think he deserves credit for what he has done.

 
  
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  Roberto Gualtieri (S&D). Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, vorrei ringraziare tutti i gruppi politici per il loro contributo a migliorare questo testo, che ora è un testo equilibrato, in cui si esprime con chiarezza un giudizio positivo sull'azione di politica monetaria della BCE e si riconosce l'importanza delle misure non convenzionali adottate negli ultimi mesi.

Io condivido anche la valutazione espressa dal Presidente Draghi sugli ulteriori sviluppi del quadro macroeconomico. Da un lato, osserviamo il rafforzamento dell'economia interna, trainata soprattutto dai consumi, e, dall'altro lato, assistiamo a un indebolimento dell'economia mondiale, determinato sia dal rallentamento delle economie emergenti che dall'aumentare dell'incertezza sui mercati finanziari.

La nostra capacità di influire sull'economia globale è limitata. Possiamo però incidere su quanto avviene nell'area dell'euro, innanzitutto proseguendo e adattando le misure di politica monetaria in atto. Sotto questo aspetto è molto positivo che il Consiglio direttivo della BCE si sia dichiarato unanimemente pronto a riconsiderare l'orientamento della politica monetaria se esso non dovesse rivelarsi sufficiente al perseguimento degli obiettivi annunciati. Naturalmente la politica monetaria da sola non può garantire il passaggio da una ripresa ciclica ad una strutturale. Affinché questo avvenga, è necessario proseguire il cammino di riforme strutturali socialmente equilibrate e volte ad aumentare il potenziale di crescita della nostra economia e, allo stesso tempo, è necessario che la politica di bilancio, a livello aggregato, si muova di pari passo con la politica monetaria, e non contro di essa.

I paesi che hanno spazio fiscale devono utilizzarlo e l'aggiustamento fiscale di chi ha meno spazio deve proseguire con un ritmo sostenibile, applicando tutte le regole del Patto di stabilità, inclusa la flessibilità che esso contiene. Infine, è necessario lavorare per completare l'Unione economica e monetaria, dando concretezza alla visione di lungo periodo del rapporto dei cinque presidenti: fiscal backstop, avviare i lavori, lavorare sulla proposta legislativa della Commissione europea sulla garanzia dei depositi. Naturalmente è lecito che il lavoro sulla riduzione dei rischi prosegua, ma deve avvenire in un quadro internazionale più ampio e tenendo conto anche delle esigenze di stabilità finanziaria.

 
  
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  Sander Loones (ECR). Mijnheer Draghi, u bent inderdaad onafhankelijk, maar u moet ook rekenschap afleggen over uw beleid. Econoom Geert Noels bijvoorbeeld heeft u eind vorig jaar een zevental vragen gesteld. Het was uw hoofdeconoom Peter Praet, die zo vriendelijk was om die te beantwoorden. Wat waren zijn antwoorden? Anderhalf biljoen euro! Zo veel geld heeft u intussen bijgedrukt. De inflatie is niet navenant gestegen. Ook de economische groei valt tegen. Maar, zegt mijnheer Praet, wij gaan gewoon door. Wij blijven gewoon geld bijdrukken zonder limiet.

Mijnheer Draghi, u blaast zeepbellen in onze economie. Uw beleid is een aanslag op ons spaargeld en op onze pensioenen. Ik wil u graag aanbevelen om wat meer te kijken en te horen wat William White zegt, de econoom die de financieel-economische crisis wél heeft aangekondigd en wél had zien aankomen. Wat zegt hij? Het monetair beleid wordt minder effectief na verloop van tijd en die schadelijke neveneffecten worden juist duidelijker en duidelijker. Ik denk dat het voor ons allen tijd is om ons hierover goed te beraden.

 
  
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  Enrique Calvet Chambon (ALDE). Señor Presidente, señor Draghi, señor Comisario, en un minuto cuatro ideas.

Felicitaciones como banquero técnico, señor Draghi. Sin embargo, una pregunta técnica: ¿no le ha preocupado a usted que la entrada de China en los derechos especiales de giro se hiciera casi completamente a costa del euro?

Segunda idea. Como banquero político, sepa usted que tanto yo como mi Grupo apoyaremos siempre la idea de que la política monetaria no resuelve la productividad ni la competitividad de la economía europea ―ahí le apoyaremos― y, por lo tanto, las reformas estructurales pendientes es lo que usted tiene que reclamar a fondo.

Como tercera y como banquero técnico-político, le agradezco la introducción y los primeros pasos que usted ha impulsado en cuanto a la seguridad europea de los depósitos. Pero es un proceso muy lento y todavía muy tímido.

Finalmente, y felicitándole como banquero europeo, usted en 2014 ha conseguido ―usted y los órganos rectores― que hubiera grandes beneficios para el Banco Central Europeo, y eso es bueno. ¿Por qué no le pone usted imaginación a cómo esos beneficios pueden ayudar a la financiación de un mayor y mejor proyecto europeo?

 
  
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  Δημήτριος Παπαδημούλης (GUE/NGL). Κύριε Draghi και κύριε Dombrovskis, δεν αρκεί η νομισματική πολιτική, χρειάζεται και αλλαγή οικονομικής πολιτικής και για αυτά πρέπει να απαντήσει ο κύριος Dombrovskis που είναι παρών. Γιατί απαιτείται εγκατάλειψη της μονομερούς λιτότητας και στροφή στην ανάπτυξη, τόνωση των επενδύσεων και της ζήτησης, ιδιαίτερα, στις πλεονασματικές χώρες.

Κύριε Dombrovskis, γιατί καθυστερεί η πανευρωπαϊκή εγγύηση καταθέσεων, που είναι ο τρίτος πυλώνας του σχεδίου της τραπεζικής ενοποίησης; Ως πότε θα βάζει βέτο ο κύριος Schäuble; Κύριε Draghi, σκοπεύετε να προχωρήσετε και να ενισχύσετε το πρόγραμμα ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης ή θα το μαζέψετε επειδή έχετε εσωτερική αντιπολίτευση από υπερσυντηρητικούς κύκλους που εκφράζει ο κύριος Weidmann; Και πότε επιτέλους θα μετάσχει και η χώρα μου, η Ελλάδα, στο πρόγραμμα ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης και πότε θα πάψει να δανείζεται με μεγαλύτερα επιτόκια από ό,τι άλλες χώρες; Υπάρχουν ενδείξεις σταθεροποίησης της ελληνικής οικονομίας, πρέπει και εσείς να πάρετε πρωτοβουλίες για να μη στραγγαλίζεται.

(Sõnavõtja nõustus vastama nn sinise kaardi korra kohaselt (kodukorra artikli 162 lõige 8) esitatud küsimusele).

 
  
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  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (ENF), question "carton bleu". Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, pourquoi le gouvernement grec ne demande-t-il pas à la Banque centrale d’émettre de la monnaie pour investir dans les économies d'énergie et les énergies nouvelles dans l'économie grecque, car, dans ce cas-là, on ne créerait pas de la fausse monnaie, on investirait dans l'économie réelle et on aurait un véritable changement de l'économie.

Pourquoi l’assouplissement quantitatif se réduit-il aux banques ?

 
  
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  Δημήτριος Παπαδημούλης (GUE/NGL), απάντηση σε ερώτηση με "γαλάζια κάρτα". Η διάλυση της ζώνης του ευρώ και η επιστροφή στα εθνικά νομίσματα είναι το πρόγραμμα της Marie Le Pen, όχι της κυβέρνησης Τσίπρα, Η έξοδος της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ ήταν το σχέδιο του κυρίου Schäuble, που ευτυχώς ακυρώθηκε το καλοκαίρι. Η ελληνική οικονομία σταθεροποιείται και εκτιμούμε ότι το επόμενο διάστημα, και ήδη από το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του 2016, θα περάσουμε σε θετικούς ρυθμούς ανάπτυξης. Αυτό που χρειάζεται, και για αυτό αγωνιζόμαστε εμείς από την Αριστερά, είναι όχι η διάλυση της Ευρώπης, αλλά η αλλαγή της Ευρώπης, η κοινωνική Ευρώπη.

 
  
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  Patrick O’Flynn (EFDD). Mr President, Mr Draghi says his policy is working, but under-performance in the euro area is only out of the spotlight because of catastrophe in the Schengen area. The truth is that both these pillars of European integration face collapse. The Schengen breakdown currently produces more shocking pictures on the TV news, but the euro malfunction is also having devastating consequences. Youth unemployment rates of 40% or more in the southern periphery and long-term stagnation are destroying human potential. The ECB report speaks of structural reforms and, yes, these are sorely needed to improve southern productivity; but even if successfully implemented, they will only go a small way to correct imbalances created by fundamental differences in economic strength. Each country needs its own currency so that it has levers of control over interest rates and influence on exchange rates too, just as each country needs to control its own borders.

 
  
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  Bernard Monot (ENF). Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Président de la BCE, chers collègues, je voudrais, avant tout, dénoncer la lourde influence des principaux groupes politiques sur le rapporteur, M. Marias, qui a malheureusement dénaturé la qualité de son rapport.

Dans ce rapport que nous examinons aujourd'hui, un mot n'est jamais prononcé: le mot pétrole. Inutile de rappeler pourtant que la chute vertigineuse des cours du pétrole, depuis un an et demi, est au cœur de l'actualité économique. Les conséquences sont une déstabilisation de l'industrie pétrolière et de l'ordre économique et financier européen. L'impact des cours du brut est central sur le niveau des prix et explique en partie le risque élevé de déflation combattu par la Banque centrale européenne. Or la baisse des prix de 50 % en quelques semaines n'est pas l'effet de l'offre et de la demande sur les marchés physiques du pétrole, mais bien le résultat de la spéculation sur les marchés des dérivés.

Chaque baril de pétrole échangé sur les marchés physiques est échangé 200 fois le même jour sur les marchés dérivés. Dans ces conditions, on peut prédire que la baisse brutale de ces derniers mois se reproduira bientôt, mais dans le sens inverse, dès que les spéculateurs parieront sur la hausse. Ces mouvements de grande amplitude compliquent directement la politique monétaire de la BCE et la réalisation de son objectif cible de 2 % d'inflation.

Cette volatilité sur les banques systémiques a des risques inattendus sur leur solvabilité également. L'encadrement de la spéculation sur les marchés dérivés des matières premières était l'une des principales priorités de la présidence française du G20, qui voulait moraliser le capitalisme, mais cinq ans plus tard, nous sommes toujours au point mort.

J'aimerais donc savoir, Monsieur Draghi, ce qu'envisage de faire la BCE contre la spéculation financière sur les prix de l'énergie afin de garantir une stabilité des prix durable dans la zone euro.

 
  
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  Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE). Domnule președinte, am convingerea că fără deciziile hotărâte și profesioniste ale Băncii Centrale Europene economia din zona euro ar fi rămas pentru o lungă perioadă de timp în stagnare și ar fi intrat și în deflație.

Ceea ce consider însă că am discutat mai puțin este impactul politicii banilor ieftini pentru o lungă perioadă de timp asupra procesului de economisire și a celui de investiții pe termen lung.

Nu putem să nu constatăm că fondurile de pensii, instituțiile de asigurări și în special investitorii instituționali pe termen lung, ca și oamenii care economisesc au avut de pierdut.

De aceea cred că este legitimă întrebarea pe care mulți o adresează Băncii Centrale Europene: cât timp credeți că această politică monetară a banilor ieftini va continua?

 
  
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  Elisa Ferreira (S&D). Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário Dombrovskis, Senhor Presidente Mario Draghi, muito obrigada Senhor Presidente Mario Draghi pelas respostas que me enviou às perguntas que lhe dirigi enquanto signatária do relatório dos cinco presidentes. Ainda estou à espera da resposta dos outros signatários, dos outros presidentes.

Na sua resposta confirma interesses, a importância de que o Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade pudesse capitalizar diretamente bancos viáveis e, ainda hoje o lembrou, reforçou a sua convicção de que a linha de crédito comum para o Fundo de Resolução e uma estabilização dos depósitos são elementos fundamentais da agenda. Esperemos que o Conselho e a Comissão conservem também os seus compromissos dessa mesma forma.

Mas a verdade é que hoje nós temos uma supervisão bancária única, desde novembro de 2014. Temos, desde há um mês, uma resolução única e todos estes elementos de estabilização da união bancária não estão operacionais. E embora a resolução única europeia ainda não tenha intervindo de facto, as experiências de aplicação da nova diretiva de resolução europeia ABERD têm-se revelado altamente problemáticas, sobretudo no caso das economias mais frágeis.

Hoje, quando se pede, numa economia dessas, o reforço de capital de origem privada à banca e, ao mesmo tempo, pela primeira vez se faz bail-in, se imputam perdas a credores sénior e a depositantes em outros processos de resolução, geram-se tensões absolutamente contraditórias no mercado.

Ao contrário do que se pretendia neste período de transição, a relação entre bancos e Estados parece-me mais complicada, intensa e perigosa do que nunca e fica apenas nas mãos do Estado, e desses Estados frágeis, a contenção dos brutais riscos sistémicos.

Isto leva-me a colocar um conjunto de questões, mas em particular as seguintes: quem está a acompanhar estes impactos? Está o BCE a acompanhá-lo no board derisco sistémico? Pode a união de mercado de capitais ajudar a tratar o problema dos non-performing loans do crédito mal parado? E quem tem a visão global - eu termino já, Senhor Presidente, muito obrigada - quem tem a visão global do sistema bancário dos países? É a política de concorrência nas mãos da Comissão ou é o SSM apoiado e coordenado pelo Banco Central Europeu? São questões que têm de ser respondidas porque um mau começo da União Bancária pode destruí-la e isso seria fatal para a estabilidade europeia. Muito obrigada pelo seu tempo e pela sua tolerância.

 
  
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  Beatrix von Storch (ECR). Herr Präsident! Heute reden wir über die EZB mit der EZB, guten Tag, Herr Draghi! Sie betreiben seit Jahren eine Politik der nationalen Sonderinteressen, Sie retten Staaten, die insolvent sind, und Banken, die vor dem Kollaps stehen – das ist Fiskalpolitik, das ist keine Geldpolitik! Sie haben dafür kein Mandat.

Am 25. Juli 2012 haben Sie gesagt, Sie tun whatever it takes, um den Euro zusammenzuhalten. Herr Draghi, auch das ist nicht Ihre Aufgabe! Ihre Aufgabe ist es, den Wert des Euro stabil zu halten und nicht die Anzahl der Mitglieder in der Eurozone.

Jetzt sagen Sie, Sie geben nicht auf, und jetzt wollen Sie Inflation. Für Ihre Politik wird jemand bezahlen müssen, und es werden nicht die Krisengewinner sein, nicht die Krisenverursacher. Es werden die Menschen sein, die Lebensversicherungen halten, in der betrieblichen Altersvorsorge sind und Sparer sind. Die kleinen Leute also. Und Sie merken es nicht, das ist das Perfide dabei!

Ihre Politik löst die Probleme nicht und schadet den kleinen Leuten, das ist ungerecht und unsozial. Hören Sie damit auf, das wäre ein Dienst an Europa!

 
  
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  Luke Ming Flanagan (GUE/NGL). Mr Draghi, the recently-published report on the banking inquiry in Ireland points an accusatory finger directly at the ECB and estimates that over EUR 9 billion could have been saved on applying haircuts to the unsecured, unguaranteed bond holders but for the threats and bullying of your predecessor Mr Trichet. That EUR 9 billion is gone, history. But there is an even greater injustice happening to Ireland right now under your watch, Mr Draghi. I am referring to the ongoing destruction of the EUR 31 billion promissory note bonds. Those bonds were created in 2009 and 2010 to bail out the creditors of two insolvent Irish banks, but more significantly to help protect the euro itself. The banks were non-systemic. Those banks were eventually liquidated, but the ECB now insists that the entire 31 billion must be taken out of circulation by our central bank. Already we have borrowed 6 billion, and our central bank is now going to be forced to burn 25 billion more. Please answer this question. I am asking you today directly: will you please work with us to stop this obscenity? Do not let this be your legacy to Ireland or our legacy to our children. Please answer this question. Make it a first for me in this Parliament that any damn question would be answered!

 
  
  

PRESIDE: RAMÓN LUIS VALCÁRCEL SISO
Vicepresidente

 
  
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  Barbara Kappel (ENF). Herr Präsident! Herr Vizepräsident Dombrovskis! Herr Präsident Draghi! Ein abgeschwächtes weltweites Wirtschaftswachstum, Börsenturbulenzen in China und ein rasanter Ölpreisverfall sorgen international für große Unsicherheit. Auch in der Eurozone herrscht Unsicherheit nicht nur aufgrund dieser globalen Volatilität, sondern Unsicherheit in Bezug auf die Auswirkungen der Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank, Unsicherheit in Bezug auf die Auswirkungen des riesigen Anleihekaufprogramms im Rahmen des Quantitative Easing, das weder zu einem relevanten Anstieg der Teuerungsrate noch zu einer Ankurbelung der Wirtschaft geführt hat.

Die Inflationsrate ist nach wie vor niedrig, mit 0,4 % im Jänner dieses Jahres knapp an der Nulllinie – kurzfristig gut für Verbraucher und die Kaufkraft, langfristig jedoch schwierig. Die Kreditvergabe an die Privatwirtschaft springt ebenfalls nicht an. Im Dezember vergaben die Banken nur 0,3 % Prozent mehr Unternehmenskredite und 1,4 % mehr Kredite an Privathaushalte, das ist enttäuschend!

Seit März letzten Jahres pumpt die EZB 60 Milliarden Euro pro Monat in die Wirtschaft – bis zum März 2017, bis zum Ende des Programms, werden es 1,5 Billionen sein. Durch diese massiven Anleihekäufe werden die Nationalbanken, die Notenbanken, die größten Gläubiger der Mitgliedstaaten. Die Verflechtung von Geld- und Fiskalpolitik nimmt zu, und es steigt der Druck auf die EZB, die Zinsen niedrig zu halten und weiter Staatsanleihen zu kaufen. Gleichzeitig sinkt der Druck auf die Mitgliedstaaten, Strukturreformen umzusetzen. Ohne Strukturreformen, Haushaltskonsolidierung und öffentliche Investitionen wird es jedoch kein Wachstum und Beschäftigung in Europa geben!

(Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

 
  
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  Jonathan Arnott (EFDD), blue-card question. Mr President, assessing the success or failure of the euro is simple enough because there is a control group: we can look independently at how eurozone and non-eurozone economies have developed, and the non-eurozone ones have developed faster than the eurozone ones. So do you agree with me that the euro is a failed political project, not a successful economic one? Do you agree with me that we should respect the democratic sovereign right of any country which does not want to join the eurozone, and actually we should look at countries leaving rather than joining?

(Applause)

 
  
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  Barbara Kappel (ENF), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. Ich bin grundsätzlich der Meinung, dass man die demokratischen Rechte eines jeden Mitgliedstaates oder generell eines jeden Staates achten sollte, und bin grundsätzlich auch der Meinung, dass es sinnvoller gewesen wäre, eine europäische Währung, eine europäische Einheitswährung nicht ohne eine weiter gehende Vereinigung einzuführen. Nachdem es die im Moment nicht geben kann und nicht geben wird, ist es wahrscheinlich sehr zweifelhaft, ob diese Währung zu einem Erfolg führen wird. So, wie es derzeit ausschaut, nicht.

 
  
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  Eva Paunova (PPE). Mr President, I would like to get back to an issue I raised when discussing the previous ECB report, and that is the availability of bank lending to businesses. Unfortunately, the situation is still unsatisfactory, despite the measures that have been taken lately. European businesses are largely dependent on bank lending and alternative financial sources are quite insufficient to meet the necessary demand. I do still welcome the measures taken by the ECB to address this problem. These include negative interest rates and targeted long-term refinancing operations.

I am also happy to see from the early evidence in this year’s report that parallel policy initiatives were relatively effective, especially when it comes to reducing financial stability risk and giving banks funding. However, while the targeted long-term refinancing operation helped stem the decrease in bank loans, the programme did not provide a stimulus to generate loan growth as intended. A total of EUR 400 billion has been introduced into the banking system through five refinancing operations, but bank corporate lending has only experienced a very moderate growth. As the ECB Annual Report 2014 points out, credit conditions for firms remain tight, especially in some euro area countries. We can see that ECB monetary policies were transmitted only imperfectly to borrowing costs. Bank lending is still insufficient at times, and therefore I do ask the Commission to take more decisive measures to stimulate bank lending to corporations and, especially, to SMEs.

 
  
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  Pervenche Berès (S&D). Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Président de la Banque centrale européenne, vous savez que ce Parlement a un bilan sur la façon dont vous intervenez, autrefois au titre de la troïka et, aujourd'hui, au titre des institutions de Bruxelles.

Plusieurs questions restent posées sur le rôle de la Banque centrale dans la mise en œuvre des mémorandums, notamment en Grèce. Une clarification est nécessaire à cet égard. Je vous demande de nous l’apporter.

Le rapporteur a indiqué que, quelle que soit la qualité de la politique monétaire que vous menez, celle-ci ne peut pas tout et qu’on observe un besoin de relance de l'investissement ici ou là.

Vous avez vous-même dit que les conditions économiques n'étaient pas si sereines et que l'Union économique et monétaire devait être complétée d’urgence, non seulement par un des piliers de l'Union bancaire, ce projet de l'Union des marchés des capitaux, mais aussi par ce qu'on appelle l'achèvement de l'Union économique et monétaire, notamment la mise en place de la capacité budgétaire.

Vous êtes l'un des auteurs du rapport des cinq présidents dans lequel cette question a été évoquée. Compte tenu de la situation économique de la zone euro, compte tenu des difficultés dans lesquelles un certain nombre de nos États se débattent, ne pensez-vous pas qu'il faut accélérer le calendrier et que la perspective d'attendre 2017 pour que, à côté de la politique monétaire, les outils de la politique économique puissent être pleinement mobilisés soit trop tardive?

Dernière question, Monsieur le Président, qui n'a pas été évoquée dans le rapport annuel de M. Marias et qui fait parfois l'objet de ce rendez-vous annuel: c'est la question de l'utilisation des billets de 500 euros. Or, vous savez que c'est une question récurrente, notamment lorsque l’on s’intéresse aux conditions de financement du terrorisme.

Pouvez-vous nous en dire un peu plus car il nous semble que votre institution devra aussi apporter sa contribution à cette thématique?

 
  
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  Zbigniew Kuźmiuk (ECR). Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałbym również przypomnieć deklaracje pana prezesa Mario Dragiego z 2012 r., który powiedział, że EBC zrobi wszystko, co będzie możliwe, aby utrzymać i obronić Euro. I rzeczywiście od tamtego czasu EBC prowadzi politykę bardzo niskich stóp procentowych – ostatnio nawet ujemnych – a od marca 2015 r., jak usłyszeliśmy, do marca 2017r. także skup obligacji rządowych na wtórnym rynku po 60 mld euro miesięcznie, a więc przynajmniej na kwotę około 1,5 bln euro.

Udało się wprawdzie dzięki temu utrzymać cenę długu dla najbardziej zadłużonych krajów strefy euro na względnie niskim poziomie, ale ciągle niska jest dynamika akcji kredytowej przedsiębiorstw, za to niestety powiększa się ryzyko powstawania kolejnych baniek spekulacyjnych. Ciągle niższy niż przed kryzysem jest poziom inwestycji zarówno prywatnych, jak i publicznych i nawet uruchomienie tak zwanego planu Junckera nie zapewni zapewne przełomu w tym zakresie. W konsekwencji okazuje się, że kraje unijne posługujące się własnymi narodowymi walutami od kilku lat odnotowują zarówno wyższy poziom wzrostu gospodarczego, jak i niższe wskaźniki bezrobocia niż większość krajów posługujących się walutą euro.

 
  
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  Thomas Mann (PPE). Herr Präsident! Trotz eines problematischen globalen Umfelds sind die Prognosen für das EU-Wachstum gut: 1,7 %. Dennoch: Die hohen Schuldenstände in den Mitgliedstaaten und die Arbeitslosenquoten müssen weiter sinken. Hierzu darf eine bessere finanzielle Ausstattung der Realwirtschaft beitragen, beispielsweise der kleinen und mittelständischen Unternehmen. Allerdings dürfen die potenziellen Risiken der Niedrigzinspolitik, Präsident Draghi, nicht ausgeblendet werden. Ich denke an die Pensionen, ich denke an die Versicherungen. Über viele Ihrer politischen Interventionen kann man unterschiedlicher Auffassung sein; die Beleidigungen von rechtsaußen dagegen sind völlig inakzeptabel. In einem normalen ökonomischen Umfeld reicht die Festsetzung des Leitzinses aus. Angesichts der Schuldenkrise aber haben Sie viele unkonventionelle Schritte gemacht, um die Geldpolitik zu stärken. Man kann über Wege streiten, aber das Ziel ist absolut in Ordnung.

Und noch eins: Sie haben so manche der Bedenken gegenüber der EZB ausräumen können. Die Aufgabenfülle wurde kritisiert, jetzt erleben wir eine klare organisatorische und räumliche Trennung der Ressorts Aufsichts- und Geldpolitik. Das hat funktioniert. Und seit November 2014 überwacht die EZB ja 122 Banken in der Eurozone. Um weitere Zweifel aufzulösen, müssen wir mehr Transparenz schaffen. Standpunkte, die wir mit Ihnen im Rahmen des monetären Dialogs und bei uns im ECON-Ausschuss teilen und mit denen wir einverstanden sind. Bedauerlich nur, dass vor allem Politexperten diese Dinge kennen, während viele Wirtschaftsakteure das noch gar nicht kennen, und leider immer noch nicht eine breitere Öffentlichkeit. Daran müssen wir gemeinsam arbeiten.

 
  
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  Peter van Dalen (ECR). Wat mij betreft is dit het laatste jaarverslag van president Mario Draghi. Mario moet moven. Hij heeft de doelstelling van de ECB, namelijk om de inflatie op het niveau van twee procent te brengen, niet gehaald. Sinds 2013 al niet. Sterker nog, we zitten al maanden op een inflatie die vrijwel nul is. Het deflatiespook klopt aan de deur en de olieprijs daalt verder door, én een afnemende vraag én een toenemend aanbod. Dus we komen straks ook in deflatie.

Maar wat zien we? De ECB blijft schuldpapieren opkopen en denkt zo de inflatie op te krikken. Dat gaat niet lukken, zelfs al verdubbelt u uw programma. Want wat gebeurt er? Schulden blijven stijgen, noodzakelijke hervormingen blijven uit. Stoppen dit programma! U heeft uw geloofwaardigheid verloren. Ik verzoek u uw conclusies te trekken en op te stappen. Mario moet moven.

 
  
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  Siegfried Mureşan (PPE). Mr President, I would like to say the following to President Draghi. You have applied the right monetary policy tools towards reaching the ECB’s objective on price stability in extremely challenging economic times over the past years. The euro is a trustworthy currency; the euro area has remained attractive, and new Member States have joined over the course of the past two years.

What is needed to consolidate the recovery in the eurozone and the EU are economic reforms at national level. Devaluing our currency cannot remain the only economic policy tool applied to increase demand for our goods on the global markets. The ECB’s policies buy time, but there is no way around reforms. Member States should not lean backwards, even in good economic times. Those countries that are not competitive, do not reform, do not bring their public finances in order and do not stabilise their banking systems will be heading into the next crisis, and the ECB will not be able to help them.

Speaking of price stability, so far core inflation is not heading upwards. The impact of the slowdown in China and other emerging markets is not to be underestimated on the European markets, as you also rightly stated. Given the extension of quantitative easing, the ECB has to provide more information about how it will exit the programme again without having major consequences on inflation targets, on price stability and – most notably – on financial markets.

Finally, President Draghi, you said that policy-makers now have a bigger challenge to think about than the euro, as the refugee crisis is more urgent. You are right, but I would also like to add that we have to learn to tackle two major challenges at a time. The fact that the refugee crisis is a bigger and more urgent crisis should not, of course, be an excuse for us not to work on further strengthening the euro in the long term.

 
  
 

Intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»)

 
  
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  Ivana Maletić (PPE). Gospodine Draghi, mjere koje poduzimate važne su i vrijedne, i cijenimo sve napore otvaranja izvora financiranja europskim poduzetnicima, inovatorima i istraživačima. Ali, naravno, bez mjera fiskalne politike, provedbe reformi i podizanja konkurentnosti ulaganjem u razvoj, istraživanje i inovacije, gospodarsko čudo se ne može očekivati.

Gospodarski rast od 1 % ili 2 % dugoročno znači naše zaostajanje. Zato moramo učiniti sve da otvorimo izvore financiranja rizičnijim projektima s velikim potencijalom rasta. Europska solidarnost i funkcioniranje jedinstvenog tržišta s istim uvjetima poslovanja potrebni su više nego ikad u dijelu postizanja istih kreditnih uvjeta i dostupnosti izvora financiranja poduzetnicima u svim državama članicama.

Zato, koliko god trebali biti oprezni, trebamo biti i brzi i odlučni u daljnjoj uspostavi bankovne unije i unije tržišta kapitala, a trebamo biti i inovativni u pronalaženju novih instrumenata financiranja gospodarstva.

 
  
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  Romana Tomc (PPE). Evropska centralna banka seveda igra zelo pomembno vlogo pri okrevanju svetovnega in evropskega gospodarstva.

Na voljo ima mehanizme, ki spodbujajo rast. Težko je izbrati pravo kombinacijo instrumentov, vendar je v preteklosti ECB že dokazala, da to zmore in zna: pomagati gospodarstvu. Pa vendar ti vsi ukrepi zaenkrat niso bili dovolj učinkoviti. Denar ni prišel do gospodarstva. Ni tako, kot smo pričakovali.

Vendar ne glede na kritičnost do ECB-ja moramo priznati tudi to, da samo ukrepi ECB-ja ne bodo dovolj, da bi spodbudili gospodarsko rast. Potrebne so reforme, kot so že nekateri moji kolegi opozarjali. In seveda posamezne države članice niso bile enako uspešne pri izvajanju teh reform.

Pred nami je morda še ena gospodarska, finančna in socialna kriza in ECB ima pri tem s svojimi ukrepi, kako bo ravnala, veliko odgovornost, da to prepreči.

 
  
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  Nicola Caputo (S&D). Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il rilancio della crescita richiede una risoluta azione politica in tre ambiti: riforme strutturali, politiche di bilancio e politica monetaria. Con queste parole il Presidente Draghi ha risposto a mie interrogazioni del settembre 2014, esponendo le misure di politica monetaria della BCE e poi adottate negli ultimi anni.

La crisi ha tuttavia dolorosamente evidenziato le difficoltà economiche che i cittadini europei affrontano allorquando le rigidità strutturali non sono corrette dagli Stati membri. Di conseguenza, l'attività della BCE, cui va riconosciuto il merito di aver, con ogni determinazione, difeso euro e stabilità dei prezzi, non può bastare.

Il rafforzamento della governance e il coordinamento delle politiche economiche è un passaggio obbligato per correggere squilibri macroeconomici e sfruttare effettività e flessibilità del Patto di stabilità. Se, quindi, vi è una ripresa dell'economia euro, la grande fragilità dei suoi fondamentali lascia ampio margine di intervento all'impegno politico di Stati e istituzioni per l'attuazione di riforme strutturali sostenibili e socialmente equilibrate.

Mi associo alla relazione e ringrazio il Presidente Draghi per il suo impegno nel preservare la credibilità dell'Unione economica e monetaria attraverso gli interventi attuati.

 
  
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  Bernd Lucke (ECR). Herr Präsident! Meine Damen und Herren! Die Europäische Union ist mit zwei gewaltigen Krisen konfrontiert: mit der Eurokrise und mit der Flüchtlingskrise. Diese beiden Krisen gleichen sich auf gespenstische Weise. Während Frau Merkel in der Flüchtlingskrise in bisher ungeahntem Ausmaß Flüchtlinge aufnimmt, um den Schengen-Raum zusammenzuhalten, druckt die Europäische Zentralbank in ungeahntem Ausmaß Geld, um die Eurozone zusammenzuhalten.

Aber beides kauft allenfalls Zeit. Es rührt nicht an die strukturellen Ursachen dieser Probleme heran. Für die Flüchtlingskrise sind diese strukturellen Ursachen – die Kriege und die Armut jenseits der Grenzen der Europäischen Union – nicht bewältigbar. Aber für die Eurozone ist das bewältigbar! Für die Eurozone ist bewältigbar, was wir an wirtschaftlichen Problemen innerhalb Europas und in der Eurozone haben.

Griechenland ist der kranke Mann, der kranke Mann, der fast am Bosporus liegt. Griechenland muss aus der Eurozone ausscheiden, damit die Eurozone zurückfinden kann zu Wachstum und zu Wohlstand!

 
  
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  Miguel Viegas (GUE/NGL). Senhor Presidente, o Banco Central Europeu representa hoje o maior centro de poder da União Europeia. De forma sinuosa e nas costas das populações, o BCE foi-se apropriando de funções que ultrapassam claramente o que estava consignado nos seus estatutos.

O BCE junta a política monetária à supervisão bancária, duas funções claramente conflituantes. O BCE há muito que vem alargando a sua intervenção nos domínios da governação económica recorrendo à chantagem para ditar aos governos nacionais quais devem ser as suas políticas.

Aos Estados nacionais tudo é exigido para poder ter acesso ao financiamento. Ao contrário, rega-se o sector financeiro com milhares de milhões de euros e eu pergunto: com que contrapartidas? Que garantias tem o BCE de que esses milhões distribuídos aos bancos cheguem de facto a quem precisa?

A pergunta legítima que se impõe hoje é a seguinte: dada esta promiscuidade, qual a atual missão do BCE? Promover um quadro macroeconómico estável ou garantir a sobrevivência do sector financeiro?

 
  
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  Peter Eriksson (Verts/ALE). Herr talman! Jag skulle vilja säga att jag har mycket stor respekt för Mario Draghi och ECB:s uppdrag att försöka få den europeiska ekonomin på fötter. Det är en utomordentligt besvärlig uppgift, men jag tycker också att det är intressant att se frågorna kring inflation och de kvantitativa lättnaderna. Vad kan man göra i framtiden?

Vilka möjligheter finns t.ex. att effektivisera de ansträngningar och de satsningar som ECB gör? Kan man rikta insatserna, pengarna och medlen som går ut i samhället och i ekonomin bättre för att få större effektivitet och mer effekt av investeringarna genom de medel som ECB använder? Det är den typen av frågor jag tycker det vore intressant att få ett svar på.

 
  
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  Jonathan Arnott (EFDD). Mr President, there are two ways that you can do things in life. One way is the independent, impartial way. It is the evidence-based way, taking decisions on the grounds of what is best for citizens. The other is to pre-decide on your conclusions and then do whatever it takes to defend them. Well in this report we are urged to do everything possible to defend the euro, so I think we know which of those two it is going to be, and the evidence really does not support that. Take one example of so, so many. I could point out that the Commission expects a 1.7% growth rate for the eurozone in 2016, whereas the World Bank predicts that the UK economy will grow by 2.6%. The report even goes so far as to suggest that officials should be chosen on the basis of gender, which seems to me to be simple, patronising tokenism.

So what do I do? Do I vote against this report because it stands for everything that is wrong with the EU, or do I abstain because, thankfully, Britain is not in the euro and so it is not for British MEPs to tell other countries what they should and should not do?

 
  
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  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (ENF). Monsieur le Président, en 2012, avec François Drouin, le secrétaire général de l'Élysée, M. Bassanini, avec le soutien de M. Monti, ont lancé un groupe de travail avec les banques de développement pour qu'il y ait un assouplissement quantitatif axé sur l'économie réelle. L'idée était d'investir, dans les pays structurellement déficitaires, dans des projets dont la rentabilité est assurée, comme les économies d'énergie, les énergies nouvelles ou des projets d'infrastructure absolument sûrs.

Ce projet n'a pas vu le jour pour différentes raisons. Pourquoi ne relancez-vous pas un assouplissement quantitatif axé sur l'économie réelle?

 
  
 

(Fin de las intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»))

 
  
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  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. Mr President, first of all thank you for this debate. Parliament has an important role in the debate on European economic policies, and it was positive to see such an engaged and informed debate. The Commission fully supports the active role of the ECON Committee in the dialogue with the ECB, which is an important component of the ECB’s transparency and democratic accountability.

The ECB has acted to address the risk of too prolonged a period of very low inflation, and it will continue to play a key role in the overall policy-setting of the euro area. It is now time for public authorities at all levels to take responsibility within their respective mandates. The impact of the crisis has not only been cyclical, it has also had a significant structural component and it has lowered the potential growth of EU economies.

Structural, fiscal and monetary policies each have a role to play in tackling this challenge. This year the Commission will give a clear priority to initiatives which, if agreed quickly, can have a direct impact on jobs and growth. We will focus on new boosts for jobs, growth and investment. We will work to make the internal market deeper and fairer and strengthen its industrial base.

Finally, we will endeavour to make economic and monetary union deeper and fairer, building on the conclusions of the Five Presidents’ report.

 
  
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  Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank. Mr President, I am very thankful for this debate and I will try to respond to most remarks, though – I have to apologise in advance – not all of them, owing to time limits. By the way, some of the statements or questions were inherently political, and so the best equipped to answer are the national governments and the national parliaments, and perhaps your own Parliament.

Let me just try to focus on the main points. I take from many of the questions that were asked that many of you have doubts about the effects of our monetary policy measures. Let me try to explain why I have said several times that our policy measures are actually working.

All the quantitative indicators show improvements in the provision of credit and financing conditions. To give you an idea, bank lending rates in the euro area have fallen by 80 basis points on average since mid-2014. We should also recall that the report you are addressing is 2014, but many things have happened since then. So let me give you an updated picture with respect to the report.

The lending rates have fallen by 80 basis points since mid-2014 and by up to 140 points in the countries that were hit hardest by the crisis.

Second, these improved conditions have translated into higher credit and investment in the euro area, supporting economic growth and inflation and strengthening the resilience of the euro area in the face of adverse global developments. To give you an account of this, in May 2014, before the announcement of the credit-easing measures, the loans to the non-financial corporations, to firms and companies, contracted at an annual rate of 2.9%, but since July 2015 the contraction stopped and loans have started to grow.

Third, actions to ensure price stability bolster confidence in the euro economy as a whole and also support the ongoing recovery. We reckon that, if we had not taken our measures, the euro area would have been in outright deflation last year and prices would have fallen at an even quicker pace this year. To give an example, our staff has calculated that, in the absence of our credit measures and QE, growth would be one percentage point lower in the years 2015-2017. Inflation would have been thoroughly negative in 2015, and certainly much lower than we are projecting now in 2016.

When some of you – several of you – asked ‘what about the SMEs: how is all of this impacting the SMEs?’, well here I can repeat what I said in a press conference: that the pass-through of our measures into the real economy has been significant, if not spectacular, and the credit-easing package in June 2014 seems to have particularly benefited the SMEs, because the lending rates for small loans declined more than for large loans.

Regarding the recent surveys, there are two types of survey. One is the bank lending survey, where we ask banks what they plan to do and what are the major factors that they consider in deciding whether to give credit or not. The response is that, basically, there is no limiting factor today. Then there is the Commission’s survey – if I can quote it – and that says the last survey on SMEs’ access to finance reported an improvement in the availability of bank loans for SMEs and also in the willingness of banks to lend in the six months from April to September 2015. However, we have to acknowledge that lending rates for very small loans remain higher than for large loans, in particular in the vulnerable euro area countries, and that of course reflects the higher lending risk to SMEs to some extent. But certainly we want to overcome this situation. So there have been improvements. Have the improvements been as much as we would like? Not yet; we have to do more. We have to make sure that the SMEs’ credit conditions improve further.

As far as monetary policy stands, I did say in my introductory statement that, in view of the increased downside risks to price stability, we stand ready – and the Governing Council stands ready – in accordance with our mandate to review, and possibly reconsider, our monetary policy stance in early March if warranted by incoming information.

Several of the questions and statements dealt with potential risks associated with low interest rates and our unconventional measures. These concerns relate, in particular, to a perception that low interest rates negatively impact on savers and that our policy may threaten financial stability, with respect especially to pension funds, insurance companies and savers in general. I have discussed these concerns on several occasions, but let me, however, stress the following.

For savers, it is true that nominal rates on many types of savings in the euro area are currently very low by historical standards. I also explained that the low-interest-rate environment is actually a reflection of the current economic and structural conditions. So when I am asked how long this will last: it will last until the economic environment improves. So the low remuneration of savings is a symptom, rather than a cause, of the sluggish recovery after many years in which the economy has operated below its potential and unutilised resources have accumulated. Imagine that we were to depart from the current accommodative monetary policy stance. What would happen? Well, it is not difficult to imagine. We would further curtail economic dynamism and ultimately contribute to prolonging the period of low interest rates through further recession.

But we should also note that deposits are not the only way in which savers invest their savings. So, if one takes a comprehensive view of the financial returns of a household, we see that other financial assets provide a buffer to counteract the low returns of bank deposits. Let me quote a recent study by the Bundesbank that showed that the real return on a typical German household portfolio since 2008 has been around 1.5%, which is certainly lower than the pre-crisis average – but it is certainly higher than many periods during the 1990s, for example. So I do not think we can talk about the expropriation of savings, as some have done – not today, but on other occasions.

Finally, the possible implications for savers have to be put in a broader context. Savings are made out of incomes that must be earned. By supporting employment and encouraging investment in the context of continued sluggish demand conditions, our accommodative monetary policy therefore supports the capacity to save.

Concerns were also expressed on financial stability and how our monetary policy could have an impact on financial stability. Of course, price stability – our objective – is the prerequisite and the basis for financial stability, and we have to stay focused on delivering price stability. At the same time, we are aware that monetary policy measures may have unintended side effects on the financial system, for instance, if low yields invite excessive risk-taking. But to address this we need macro- and micro-prudential measures as tools, not changes in our monetary policy stance.

Let me now just briefly mention comments made on the ECB’s involvement in the macro-economic adjustment programmes in general, which was another point that has been raised. When the Troika was set up in early 2010, the European Monetary Union was not equipped to deal with Member States losing market access. In the run-up to the first Greek programme, Member States saw an advisory role of the ECB alongside the Commission and the IMF, and it was considered to be a useful complement to assure a strong programme. In short, the Troika was created to draw on the diverse experience of the institutions. There was not only a good reason to ask the ECB to provide its advice in the context of the programme work, but also a good case for the ECB to accept this request. Successful programmes had to repair the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and to safeguard financial stability.

Let me stress that this set-up was codified in the ESM Treaty and by the co-legislators in the Two-Pack, and the Court of Justice confirmed its legality. In line with this, the ECB has since provided its advice in programmes in five Member States. But we should not forget that the final responsibility for decisions on the programme design and financing lies with the Eurogroup and with the Eurogroup ministers in their capacity – and the ESM – and not with the institutions involved in the programme.

As I have said on other occasions, the ECB may not be part of the Troika forever, but I believe the right timing for changing the current set-up needs to be carefully considered, and this is not for me to decide upon.

A few remarks dealt with our transparency, and I can only say that this past year has been a year full of decisions that were meant to improve our transparency. Certainly what we have done has strengthened our commitment. The publication of the account of our Governing Council meetings, and the calendars of my fellow Executive Board members and myself and the Supervisory Board Chair, were two further major steps towards increased transparency.

But our readiness to provide further information on topics of interest also underlines that the ECB is a transparent institution. To give you some examples: since September 2015, national central banks can publicly communicate about the provision of ELA to the banks in their respective countries in cases where they deem such communication necessary. We also provided further information on our plans regarding the collection of granular credit and credit risk data, better known as AnaCredit. So I can assure you that the ECB monitors developments in the area of governance and access to documents with a view to further enhancing its transparency and therefore its accountability.

Let me now comment briefly on completing the European Monetary Union. As some of you have acknowledged, the Five Presidents’ Report outlined a clear roadmap for moving ahead with euro area integration, and I certainly welcomed the Commission’s proposals for short-term measures which should now be fully implemented.

For the ECB, of course, the completion of the banking union is of the utmost importance. On the one hand, this means that commonly-agreed rules need to be implemented. The most prominent example of where further progress should be made is the transposition of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) in all euro area Member States. We are still missing a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund. We also need progress on the necessary, still-missing third pillar of the banking union, namely the common European Deposit Guarantee Scheme. Why is it important? Because only such a system will ensure that depositors’ confidence is equally strong across countries and across the whole banking union, which is vital for the future of our economic and monetary union.

Implementing the short-term proposal of the Five Presidents’ Report is important and may be necessary, but it is not a sufficient condition to completing the union. So I am looking forward to the proposals for developing the long-term issues.

Let me also recall, as I have done on other occasions, that for the euro area to prosper, the recovery cannot continue – and here I certainly agree with some of the statements today – to rely on monetary policy only. Our monetary policy provides the room – as I said, it is an essential condition but is not in itself sufficient – for this recovery to become structural from what it is today, namely cyclical.

There was one question about high-denomination banknotes. Let me say that the Executive Board of the ECB has been considering this issue for some time now, and technical work is under way to look at high-denomination banknotes. We have not made a decision yet. There are questions on how to best implement a decision and how to communicate this. We want to make changes, but we want to make changes in an orderly fashion. But rest assured that we are determined not to make seigniorage a comfort for criminals.

 
  
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  Νότης Μαριάς, Εισηγητής. Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω τους συναδέλφους για τη συμμετοχή τους στη συζήτηση. Κύριε Draghi, συμφωνώ ότι πρέπει να δούμε το μέλλον, αυτό όμως προϋποθέτει ότι η ΕΚΤ πρέπει να δει τα λάθη της που έκανε στο παρελθόν. Η ΕΚΤ υποτίμησε τους κινδύνους αποπληθωρισμού, και μόνο τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2014 ξύπνησε και κατέφυγε σε μη συμβατικά μέσα, σχεδιάζοντας ποσοτική χαλάρωση την οποία τελικά άρχισε να εφαρμόζει από τον Ιανουάριο του 2015. Επίσης, αργήσατε να μειώσετε τα επιτόκια όπως έκανε έγκαιρα η FED και δεν απαντήσατε, κύριε Draghi, γιατί ακόμη η ανεργία βρίσκεται στα ύψη. Ταυτόχρονα, συνεχίσατε να επιμένετε στη σκληρή δημοσιονομική πολιτική και στη λιτότητα. Δεν απαντήσατε, κύριε Draghi, για τα μέτρα που πρέπει να λάβετε για να σταματήσει η σύγκρουση συμφερόντων εντός της ΕΚΤ. Τελικά, πότε θα φύγετε από την Τρόικα, κύριε Draghi, όπως σας υπέδειξε το Δικαστήριο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην απόφαση C- 62/2014, και εμμέσως, πριν λίγο, και εσείς o ίδιος το δεχθήκατε; Τελικά πώς εξηγείται, κύριε Draghi, η δανειζόμενη Ελλάς να δανείζει μέσα από την ποσοτική χαλάρωση - με την Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος - 17 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ στους δανειστές της; Πού βρήκε o κύριος Στουρνάρας 17 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ και συμμετείχε η Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος στην ποσοτική χαλάρωση το 2015;

Δεν απαντήσετε, κύριε Draghi, για τον τρόπο εφαρμογής των μνημονίων. Νίπτετε τας χείρας σας ως Πόντιος Πιλάτος, και ρίχνετε τις ευθύνες στο Εurogroup. Όμως εσείς προσπαθήσατε και επιβάλλατε πιστωτική ασφυξία στην Ελλάδα το 2015 και επεβλήθησαν οι έλεγχοι κεφαλαίων. Η εκβιαστική σας πολιτική και η στήριξη των δανειστών προκειμένου να καμφθεί το «όχι» του ελληνικού λαού στο δημοψήφισμα του Ιουλίου το 2015 καταγράφεται ως μελανό σημείο της ΕΚΤ. Ως απαράδεκτη παραβίαση της λαϊκής κυριαρχίας στην Ελλάδα, ως κατάλυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Δημοκρατίας.

Κύριε Draghi, για να υπάρξει πράγματι η λύση των αντιφάσεων στην Ευρωζώνη πρέπει η Ευρωζώνη να πάψει να είναι Ένωση δανειστών. Πρέπει να επιλυθεί το θέμα του δημοσίου χρέους και αυτό πρέπει να γίνει με διαγραφή του επονείδιστου χρέους και αμοιβαιοποίηση του χρέους. Τα παραπάνω σημεία υπήρχαν στην αρχική εισήγηση, αλλά οι Ομάδες ΡΡΕ, S&D και ALDE φρόντισαν να αφαιρέσουν την κριτική προς την ΕΚΤ. Όπως είπα, ήταν «βασιλικότεροι του βασιλέως», δηλαδή ήταν πιο «ντραγκιστές» και από εσάς κύριε Draghi.

 
  
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  El Presidente. – Se cierra el debate.

La votación tendrá lugar en el próximo período parcial de sesiones.

Declaraciones por escrito (artículo 162 del Reglamento)

 
  
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  Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE), por escrito. La Unión Europea atraviesa un momento de incertidumbre política, fruto del auge de partidos populistas en algunos Estados miembros, y económica, principalmente por factores externos, como la crisis en China. El Banco Central Europeo ha mostrado en todo momento su compromiso por garantizar la estabilidad e integridad de la zona del euro y doy la bienvenida a las medidas que ha adoptado. Los Estados miembros deben utilizar la política monetaria expansiva como una oportunidad para seguir adelante con el proceso reformista y así garantizar que nuestra recuperación económica es estructural y no cíclica.

 
Jogi nyilatkozat