Dobesedni zapisi razprav

Torek, 22. november 2016 - Strasbourg

12. Izvajanje skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (razprava)

  Elnök asszony. – A következő napirendi pont a Ioan Mircea Paşcu által a Külügyi Bizottság nevében készített, a közös biztonság- és védelempolitika végrehajtásáról szóló jelentésről folytatott vita. (2016/2067(INI)) (A8-0317/2016)

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. – Madam President, before I begin I would like to welcome the presence of the High Representative at this debate as usual, which reflects the fulfilment of her obligation of consultation with Parliament according to Article 36 of the Lisbon Treaty, which should have governed our debate in the first place.

If in 2003 the EU leaders were announcing to the world that Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free, now, 13 years later, they are forced to recognise that we live in times of existential crisis within and beyond the European Union. Naturally, we should ask why is that. How did we get there? What have we done wrong? But primarily, we should ask what should we do to respond successfully to these times of existential crisis, and strengthening CSDP is a major component of that answer. That is why the report is of the opinion that a thorough and substantial revision of the CSDP is needed in order to enable the UN, its Member States to contribute in a decisive way to the security of the Union, to the management of international crisis and to asserting the EU strategic autonomy, recalling that no country can face the current security challenges on its own.

In the relative benign security environment prevalent until now, the EU and its Member States could allow themselves to actuate CSDP mainly with crisis management performed in relative distant places. Now the conflicts around us have multiplied and have become intertwined, spilling through terrorism and refugees into the EU area. Security and defence is no longer only a cry for help coming from a proud defence industry confronted with increasing difficulties like it was the EU Council on Defence in December 2013. Now security and defence is a major, if not even the main concern of European citizens which was finally heard by the EU leaders. Consequently things started to move, and only last week the implementation plan on security and defence has been approved by the member countries. And that, let me tell you, that surprised us, and we had to introduce a number of amendments in order to synch the report with the realities in the field.

The Commission in turn has advanced a number of defence-related initiatives, for instance the defence action plan and the defence industrial policy, getting involved in a support of a pilot plan on defence research run by EDA, the only institution we have for that kind of activity whose role would have to be strengthened in consequence, and instilling more flexibility in the instrument for peace and stability. Naturally, this is a big step compared to the current practices. The EU money was not used for defence and is already resisted in this Parliament. However, if we really want to defend our Union we should be prepared to make this step because otherwise we would continue to linger on in this complacency which brought us where we are today.

In the end, I would mention the relationship with NATO, guided now by the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw last summer. The relationship should be one of cooperation and not competition. The EU needs to acquire a degree of strategic autonomy, particularly for situations where it might have to rely mainly on herself. Let us not forget that NATO is a collective defence alliance and not a company whose unprofitable branches could be shut down. Born from the lessons of two world wars, built with sacrifice by all the Member States, and meant to defend and promote the values which brought us together in the EU too.

  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, I would like to thank to Mr Paşcu: I also consider the debate on your report as a so-called ‘Article 36 debate’ since it deals with the implementation of CSDP, and I also just realised for this debate for sure I should be sitting on the other side of the hemicycle; you will forgive me if, for practical reasons, I take the point from this position.

Let me thank you very much, Mr Paşcu, for an excellent report, and all the Parliament for the work you are doing on security and defence. I had no doubt this would have been the case. This is one of five reports that have just been published, or are about to be discussed, on security and defence. I take it as a clear sign that the European Parliament fully understands the importance of this moment for our work on security and defence. We truly stand at a crucial juncture in our work towards a European Union of security and defence. But before I begin on content, let me say that I am particularly glad, and proud even, to discuss our common defence just a few hours after the presentation of our sustainable development package. Now you will ask me what for – exactly, because it is not only our work on security and defence that goes forward on the implementation of the global strategy, but it is all the different strands of action that we foresee in the global strategy in an integrated manner that are moving forward on implementation. Also because security in our region depends clearly on sustainable development and also vice-versa. So I would like to underline the fact that the debate we are having on this particular issue does not happen in a vacuum but, on the contrary, in full conjunction and in full coherence with the work that we do on other strands of work.

On defence in particular, there is today a momentum for deep and decisive changes. As I was preparing for this debate today I was remembering that, in my hearing in Athens in October 2014, before taking office, we discussed this issue at length and, in particular, I asked my team to print out the minutes of that hearing and I remembered, in particular, a question that Arnaud Danjean asked me at that time and I replied:

Je vais jouer mon rôle de chef de l'Agence européenne de défense, je vais visiter les missions, je vais beaucoup travailler avec les ministres de la défense, parce que dans ce cadre, il est important, bien entendu, de travailler avec nos autres partenaires, notamment l'OTAN mais pas seulement. Cependant, il y a un potentiel dans le traité de Lisbonne qui n'est pas forcément exploité, et je vais voir dans les cinq prochaines années si les conditions politiques pour l'utiliser enfin sont réunies.

I think we are actually there. I think that, after two years of my term of office, not necessarily for personal reasons, or in relation to personal skills, but because of political conditions. First of all, because our citizens see security as a top priority, and also because Member States see the need to work seriously on security and defence, I think we are there: at the political juncture where advancing on security and defence is finally possible.

As we all know, defence falls primarily within Member States’ competences, and that is why, for each step we take, we receive input from Member States. All proposals are discussed extensively with all 28 Member States. Let me stress this: we are still 28 Member States, and all decisions we take in this field are unanimous decisions, including the one we took last week, and this process led to the Council conclusions adopted last Monday, based on the implementation plan that I presented to Ministers as a concrete follow-up to the EU global strategy.

These conclusions formulate the consensus among, as I said, 28 Member States about our joint level of ambition, and open a whole new chapter for our security and defence. I am glad to see, too, that our views are almost identical in all fields. Your report addresses all the critical issues we have been working on and its overall approach matches perfectly with our broader package of proposals concerning European security and defence. The report focuses on a more robust CSDP, on our integrated approach to crises, on our cooperation with NATO and other partners, and on the European defence industry.

If you look at the three proposals we are presenting, they are perfectly in line with your recommendations. It is a package, the one we are working on now on security and defence of the European Union – a package including three different sets of proposals, three different pillars. Those are the implementation plan on security and defence, which I presented and which was adopted last week, and also the implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration that we signed in Warsaw, and the Commission Defence Action Plan on our defence industry.

So, just to give you a sense of how fast and concretely things are moving: on Monday last week the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers together adopted the implementation plan on security and defence. The day after that, on Tuesday last week, we met again with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to progress cooperation with NATO. We presented a joint set of 40 proposals to turn into concrete actions – the principles of the Warsaw Declaration we signed jointly in July. These two processes are obviously autonomous and independent but running side by side, because we both share the assessment that a stronger Europe makes NATO stronger.

It is clear that in practice there is no contradiction between Europe’s strategic autonomy, which we assert, and our commitment to our long-term partners. For NATO members, NATO will remain the cornerstone of collective defence. Strategic autonomy means, first and foremost, the ability to be a reliable partner, to care about our own security at home and in the neighbourhood, to take our fair share of responsibility and to be a genuine security provider.

This will also require stronger European defence capabilities, as the report rightly points out, and this need is also addressed by the implementation plan. I will get to that in a minute, but let me first mention the European Defence Action Plan, which will focus on overcoming the current fragmentation of the market and increasing the competitiveness of the European defence industry. Linked to that is the preparatory action for defence research to be launched next year. This can be a real game changer for our industry. The starting point is one of our most successful experiences, the Horizon 2020 research programme, which, to date, covers civilian and dual-use technologies. A continent-wide joint research programme on defence would be a natural extension of Horizon 2020. We have immense potential in terms of joint research programmes on defence, economies of scale and more predictable timeframes for investments.

To develop the technologies of the future, it is very clear to all of us, I believe, that we need to start investing now, but a big part of our work can also deliver concrete results in a shorter timeframe, and, with the implementation plan on security and defence, we are moving fast in this field too.

So, with last week’s decision – and I am sorry you had to change the report – Member States agreed to raise the level of ambition of our security and defence policies. We have agreed that we need to protect our citizens through our external action. And let me clarify here that this is not about having an Article-5-style approach: as I said, collective defence is not for the European Union, we are not a military alliance, but we need to use our external action and instruments to protect our citizens, including at home.

We need to strengthen our neighbours and partners to prevent new conflicts, and we need to respond to crises in an effective manner. So the implementation plan includes 13 concrete proposals to match this new level of ambition that we determined together and agreed upon, as well as a clear timeframe for action. It will now be up to the European Council in December – when I will present this new level of ambition and the various options for putting it concretely on the table – to discuss and agree on the proposals. But let me mention a few of these proposals, as, again, they are perfectly in line with your report.

I will mention a few of them, not all of them, but enough to give you a flavour of what we are working on.

Firstly, more efficient defence spending. Most of the narrative turns around the need to increase our spending. However, when you look at the numbers, you see that Europeans spend 50% of the United States’ budget on defence, yet in terms of output we achieve 15% compared to what we spend. So we have a budget gap, but we also have an output gap that we have to look at, and here I have proposed a coordinated annual review of defence spending to promote joint programmes among Member States and economies of scale.

Secondly, better rapid response. We know well that reacting fast is, at times, the only way to react effectively. Time is not neutral when one is reacting to crises. We already have first-class civilian experts and we need to be able to deploy them quickly, but this is also about our battle groups, which next year will have been in existence for 10 years. The plan proposes the removal of the political, technical and – let me stress – financial obstacles that have so far prevented the battle groups’ deployment, including through modularity.

Thirdly, the joint planning and conduct of non-combat missions. Let me delete the word ‘non-combat’, as we do not have combat missions, we have executive and non-executive missions. Anyway, the joint planning and conduct of our missions and operations. The European Union is currently deploying 17 military and civilian operations, but to make them more effective we need to improve the coordination among them. The plan seeks to fill the gaps and to ensure that missions are planned and carried out in a coherent way. This is not about creating big, new operational, SHAPE-style headquarter. That is not what we need today: what we need today is to streamline our current structures and make them work better. We already have headquarters running our missions and operations, so this is not about creating something new: it is about using our resources better in a more effective and efficient manner and, as I said, streamlining and making more operational the coordination of our various missions and operations.

The last, though certainly not the least, of these few examples is that of new permanent-structure cooperation. Here again we come to the issue of making full use of the Treaties, as I said two years ago. A single system of permanent-structure cooperation is an option that is there in the Treaties. I suggest that we look into it for those Member States that are willing to undertake higher commitments on security and defence. A single PESCO would be one of the options on which I will work with a view to proposing this to Member States.

For all these proposals I am presenting concrete measures, and I would like to stress that this is very concrete and, at the same time, ambitious yet pragmatic work we are doing. It is not strategic thinking – we did that exercise last year. Now it is about turning this vision into action. We are not getting into a revision of the Treaties, which would take years and I am personally not sure it would lead us very far at this moment. We are not working on the creation of an EU army, only to get stuck in a never-ending ideological debate – and, by the way, not even NATO has a NATO army. As all those who deal with defence issues know very well, Member States have one set of forces, which they can use either nationally, in NATO, in the European Union, in the United Nations or in other formations.

We have already set up our vision, as I said, with the global strategy: we are now turning the vision into concrete, effective and immediate action, and I would like to stress that this immediate action is being taken together in unity.

I see the political will from Member States to do this. I see the will finally to move towards a European Union of security and defence. Our fathers and mothers and grandfathers and grandmothers tried this in the 1950s, and we know how the story ended: the Lisbon Treaty gave us instruments we did not use. Probably, the priority of managing the economic and financial crisis has since distracted us from security issues. I believe that now is the time for us to get serious and work effectively in this direction, and I expect the European Parliament to keep supporting and contributing to this process, as it has been doing, in a very useful manner.

PRZEWODNICTWO: RYSZARD CZARNECKI
Wiceprzewodniczący

  Arnaud Danjean, au nom du groupe PPE. – Monsieur le Président, je voudrais d'abord remercier au nom du PPE, dont j'étais le rapporteur fictif, notre collègue Paşcu qui a fait un excellent rapport, un rapport annuel – il faut le rappeler –, mais qui évidemment trouve une actualité particulière aujourd'hui après les décisions que vous avez rappelées, Madame la Haute représentante, et qui sont importantes.

Malheureusement – et je ne parle pas pour vous, Madame la Haute représentante –, il aura fallu le Brexit et l'élection de Trump pour que, dans beaucoup de pays européens, on se rappelle que la défense et la sécurité devaient être une priorité pour les Européens eux—mêmes. Nous aurions pu souhaiter que cette prise de conscience intervienne plus tôt à cause des conflits et des crises qui nous entourent et qui ont un impact si dangereux. Mais enfin, mieux vaut tard que jamais.

La politique européenne de défense doit être ambitieuse, certes, mais elle doit être réaliste, pragmatique, flexible, et je pense que vous avez dessiné un certain nombre de pistes qu'il conviendra de concrétiser. Beaucoup de choses – nous le répétons depuis des années ici – figurent déjà dans le traité et méritent d'être appliquées avant qu'on ne crée – pardonnez-moi l'expression – de "nouvelles usines à gaz".

Permettez-moi de rappeler trois points qui me semblent très importants politiquement. Premièrement, une politique européenne de défense doit se distancier de deux mythes, celui de l'armée européenne commune, qui n'aide pas à avancer concrètement et pragmatiquement, mais aussi celui de la concurrence avec l'OTAN, parce que ce n'est absolument pas de cela qu’il s'agit. On parle de complémentarité et non pas de concurrence.

Deuxièmement, le lien transatlantique: il est fort, mais ce n'est pas un acquis éternel. Ce qui vient de se passer de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique nous rappelle fort pertinemment que, si nous ne prenons pas notre propre sécurité en main, nous risquons un jour d'avoir de très mauvaises surprises. Il nous faut donc investir plus dans notre défense et effectuer plus d'investissements industriels et dans des dispositifs vraiment opérationnels.

Troisièmement, l'OTAN: il reste un acteur majeur de notre sécurité collective, c'est une évidence. Mais enfin, l'OTAN ne peut pas, avec sa table de décision à laquelle siègent M. Erdoğan et bientôt M. Trump, être la caution de sécurité des Européens. Nous devons nous prendre en main, et il est temps de transformer les bonnes intentions et les bonnes paroles en actions concrètes.

  Ana Gomes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, o relatório que hoje aprovámos sobre a União Europeia da Defesa e este de Ioan Paşcu, sobre Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa, complementam-se face a um desafio que determinará se a União Europeia se constrói ou se deixa destruir.

É urgente repensar a defesa e a segurança da Europa face a mudanças estratégicas em curso, num mundo em desordem em que Brexiters, Putin, Trump e outros tenderão a semear paralisia no Conselho de Segurança e a enfraquecer a NATO.

A Europa tem de acordar, tem de se organizar. A estratégia global aprovada e um livro branco podem ser úteis, mas nada substitui vontade política e controlo democrático – hoje manifestamente insuficientes na maior parte dos Estados-Membros –, que têm de se exercer desde já sobre o compromisso para investir em investigação e tecnologia conjuntamente, em interoperabilidade de equipamentos e forças, em financiamento comum e numa visão integrada das dimensões interna e externa e das vertentes civis e militares da defesa e segurança de todos nós.

A União tem de fazer uso das ferramentas que criou, dos agrupamentos táticos em missões PCSD, apoiando os Estados-Membros, tanto no combate a forças terroristas onde seja necessário, como na neutralização de agressões e ameaças híbridas, incluindo na cibersegurança de infraestruturas críticas. Tarda o estabelecimento de um quartel-general permanente, como disse a Senhora Mogherini.

A União tem de ser capaz de intervir e fazer a diferença nas crises e conflitos, muitos à porta, outros já dentro de portas, com impacto na segurança dos nossos cidadãos, nos nossos interesses, na defesa do direito internacional e na segurança global.

  Geoffrey Van Orden, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, I am tempted to spend my time replying to Ioan’s question about what went wrong with the EU. Well, maybe not listening to our citizens, maybe the euro, maybe migration policy...

What about misguided notions about EU defence? The security and credibility of the West rests on the combined strength of the democracies. We always knew that whoever became the next President of the United States, he or she would have demanded that the Europeans carry more of the defence burden. But I would suggest that this is done by the nations spending more on defence and showing more capability and revitalising the NATO alliance, not creating alternative structures. Unlike the EU, NATO is an intergovernmental organisation. It does not undermine national sovereignty, and above all, it has the enormous advantage of binding the United States to the security of Europe.

That is the great combined power that our potential enemies take seriously. Russia would be delighted if Europe was to develop its so-called ‘strategic autonomy’ separated from the United States – I mean, what’s that all about? It is a dangerous fallacy for the European Union to imagine, and I am quoting here from the report, that it can ‘intervene across the whole spectrum of crisis management’ – that includes war fighting, by the way – and that the EU should aim for a ‘common defence’. I thought you said you were not aiming for collective defence – ‘common defence’ is the same thing. Which immediately casts doubt on the continued relevance of NATO. How on earth would the EU protect its non-NATO members? It is just disingenuous for the EU to talk about complementarity with NATO when the aim is to set up a different military structure.

  Jozo Radoš, u ime kluba ALDE. – Gospodine predsjedniče, najprije bih želio zahvaliti u ime ALDE grupe izvjestitelju na dobroj suradnji, i kao plod te suradnje na dobrom izvješću. Izvješće govori o bitno pogoršanim sigurnosnim okolnostima u Europi, govori o tome da su europska sigurnosna i obrambena politika daleko ispod očekivanja javnosti, naglašava važnost temeljite revizije te politike u takvim okolnostima i poziva Vijeće da radi na tome da europska sigurnosna i obrambena politika, kao što piše u ugovorima o osnivanju Europske unije, preraste u zajedničku obranu. Nakon tako jasnih i ozbiljnih formulacija i samo izvješće treba biti jednako tako ozbiljno, konkretno i vrlo precizno, i to na tragu provedbenog plana koji je Visoka predstavnica predstavila Vijeću Europske unije i na razini izvješća o Europskoj uniji koje je danas ovdje usvojio Europski parlament, a koji govore o potrebi uspostave stalnog zapovjedništva, zajedničkog zapovjedništva, reformi koncepta borbenih grupa, reformi atena mehanizma za financiranje vojnih operacija Europske unije i uspostavi početnog fonda, također za financiranje tih operacija.

To su, dakle, vrlo jasni ciljevi koji se spominju u dokumentima, uključujući ovo naše izvješće, i zato ALDE grupa neće podržati one amandmane koji slabe odlučnost Europske unije za jačanje zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike, kao što su oni amandmani kojima se briše odredba o potrebi za stvaranjem zajedničkog zapovjedništva i relativiziranje europskog programa istraživanja u obrambenom sektoru.

  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! In Europa und weltweit nehmen Armut, soziale Spaltung und Ungerechtigkeit zu. Für viele Menschen stehen die Regierenden und ihre Politik durchaus zu Recht nur für die Vertretung der Interessen ökonomischer und politischer Eliten. Konsequenzen sind sozialer Absturz oder die Angst davor – und der Missbrauch dieser Probleme durch rechtsgerichtete Parteien und Bewegungen. Die Trumps – und wie sie hier so heißen – lassen grüßen.

Das kommt weder überraschend noch von ungefähr. Anstatt in Armutsbekämpfung zu investieren, für soziale Gerechtigkeit einzutreten und Menschen, die vor Krieg, Armut und Terror fliehen, wirksam zu schützen, verschleudern Sie hier Steuergeld an Waffenschmieden, an Forschung für Kriegsgerät, rüsten die Grenzen Europas auf und zwingen Menschen in Armut und Verelendung.

Entwicklungshilfe an Bedingungen dieser Politik zu knüpfen und Deals mit Regierungen, für die Menschenrechte keine Bedeutung haben – so etwas ist eine Schande für eine Union, die sich stets auf ihre großartigen Werte beruft.

Dieser Bericht und der Bericht zur Verteidigungsunion enthalten zu 90 % wieder Geschenke und Zugeständnisse an die Eliten, an mörderische Rüstungs- und Waffenfirmen. Diese werden die Profiteure sein. Doch keine dieser Maßnahmen wird Stabilität und mehr wirkliche Sicherheit erzeugen.

There is no alternative. Frau Thatchers viel zitierte Haltung zu Sozialabbau und Armut kennzeichnet auch die Haltung zur EU-Militär-Union. Da erübrigt sich dann jede Debatte. Aber es muss eine Alternative zur Aufrüstung und zu militärischen Interventionen geben.

  Bodil Valero, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Herr talman! Idag har vi ställt oss bakom ett betänkande om försvarsunionen, och nu diskuterar vi ett annat betänkande som har väldigt många likheter med det. Överlag går våra diskussioner på sistone här i parlamentet mer och mer i riktning mot att vi vill skapa en gemensam militär kapacitet eller en gemensam armé, och det är önskelistor om allehanda militära aktiviteter betalda med EU-medel. Inte minst sedan Brexit-omröstningen är det som om vissa här i parlamentet verkligen har fått ett nytt hopp om att man ska kunna fördjupa samarbetet även på försvarsområdet.

Jag har absolut inget problem med samarbete utan tycker att samarbete är väldig bra – samarbete och samordning. Världen ser nämligen också annorlunda ut än vad den gjorde för bara tio år sedan. Vår säkerhetssituation är också en annan. Vi måste självklart anpassa oss till att det är nya tider och en helt ny värld vi lever i.

Det innebär dock inte att jag ser samma lösningar som de som finns i betänkandet, och som jag tycker också går längre än vad fru Mogherini nyss talade om. Jag tror till exempel inte att lösningen är att den framtida säkerhets- och försvarspolitiken ska utgå från ett gemensamt territorialförsvar, inkluderande dessutom kärnvapen. En annan märklig idé är att EU ska kunna gå in i medlemsländer vid eventuella upplopp. Jag tycker inte att detta inryms i Lissabonfördragets artikel 43, där man listar de militära aktiviteter som får lov att göras. Då skulle vi nämligen behöva en fördragsändring, vilket är något som tar väldigt lång tid, och som jag inte tror står för dörren just nu i alla fall.

  Mike Hookem, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, here we have in black and white the dangerous fantasy that Nick Clegg tried to trick voters with in 2014, when he said there were no plans for an EU military.

Whilst the UK Government dithers over invoking Article 50, and pro-EU MPs and lords plot to overturn the will of the people, the EU is busy putting in place plans to spend British taxpayers’ money on an EU military which many here hope will replace NATO. Except that this scheme will not just focus on martial law, but also seeks to encroach on civil liberties – and I would like to bring to MEPs’ attention the fact that this report wants EU troops to combat subversion. Subversion actually covers everything from threats to the state to political opposition, books, films and even comedians. This is an attack on free speech and, because it comes from a place like this, an attack on those who oppose the EU project.

This report has huge implications for the sovereignty of the UK and its ability to control its own military, and those implications must serve as motivation for all Brexiteers and those who believe in democracy to ensure that the will of the people is served. We cannot afford to be trapped in this bloc, which so shamelessly uses crises of its own making, such as the migrant crisis, to further its political aims.

The terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris have been directly linked to the stupidity of the EU’s migration policy, which, had that policy been carried out by an organisation with any level of accountability, would have resulted in senior figures being unceremoniously fired.

To make the most of this opportunity, we need to invoke Article 50 as soon as possible and revitalise the UK armed forces, including by increasing defence spending and investment in our troops and in the industries needed to have a strong engineering and defence sector in the UK.

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, au nom du groupe ENF. – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, Madame Mogherini, vous nous parlez de défense européenne. Une défense européenne demanderait une souveraineté européenne. Cette souveraineté n'existe pas. La seule qui existe est celle de nos États, qui peuvent certes coopérer, mais qui ne peuvent se dissoudre dans l'entité européenne, qui n'existe que par la volonté des nations et par leur coopération libre.

Une défense européenne impliquerait des intérêts communs. Où sont-ils? Quel intérêt la France partage-t-elle avec ceux qui ont choisi d'être soumis à l'OTAN, mais aussi d'être dans un esprit de revanche, tout en voulant que leur vengeance et leur ressentiment soient réalisés par d'autres car ils n'en ont pas les moyens? Une défense européenne impliquerait une politique étrangère commune. Le peu de politique étrangère commune est dicté par les États-Unis, qui changent. On le voit avec la Russie. Nous sommes ridicules. Une défense européenne impliquerait une filière d'armement maîtrisée et de recherche stratégique.

Vous avez choisi la complémentarité avec l'OTAN, c'est-à-dire la soumission technologique et la domination extérieure, là encore. En réalité, la défense européenne est un mythe pour utiliser les nations encore aptes à se défendre et à conserver leurs capacités propres.

  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Panie Przewodniczący! Mówi się tutaj o obronności i bezpieczeństwie, tymczasem Wspólnota Europejska na początku liczyła sześć państw, przyjęła jeszcze dwadzieścia dwa i nikt nie krzyczy o agresji. Tymczasem do Federacji Rosyjskiej pięć państw zgłosiło chęć wstąpienia: Naddniestrze, Południowa Osetia, Republika Ługańska, Republika Doniecka oraz Krym. Rosja przyjęła tylko jedno z tych pięciu państw. Jeżeli mówimy o zagrożeniu, wystarczy popatrzeć, czy Rosja jest otoczona bazami NATO, czy Europa otoczona jest bazami rosyjskimi. Oczywiście Rosja się boi NATO, a nie Unii Europejskiej, bo kto się boi Unii Europejskiej?

Jeżeli mówimy o oderwaniu siłą, to chciałbym przypomnieć, że amerykańskie samoloty bombardowały miasta cywilne w Europie, po raz pierwszy odrywając Kosowo. I to jest to pierwsze oderwanie siłą terytorium innego państwa, a nie Krym. Również oderwanie Czarnogóry – bardzo miłego państwa skądinąd, któremu znacznie większej pomocy udzielono, niż małe zielone ludziki udzielały pomocy na Krymie.

Jeśli mówimy o zagrożeniu, to państwa, które znajdują się znacznie bliżej Rosji niż Bruksela, mianowicie Bułgaria, Mołdawia, Estonia wybrały ostatnio rządy całkiem prorosyjskie. Podejrzewam, że pani Lösing ma rację, że chodzi tutaj o łapówki za zbrojenia i cała ta historia jest tylko po to, żeby móc dawać łapówki za zbrojenia. A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska musi być zniszczona.

  Elmar Brok (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Vizepräsidentin, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich habe mit Faszination den letzten Reden von ganz rechts und ganz links zugehört, die eine große Übereinstimmung miteinander hatten und bei denen alle Redner in großer Übereinstimmung mit Herrn Putin sind, gegen den man sich nicht verteidigen sollte. Wenn ich höre, dass es mit der kollektiven Sicherheit in Europa sowieso blödsinnig sei – und die Briten verteidigen sich ja ohnehin ganz alleine, wenn ich das richtig verstanden habe, und Frau Lösing, die sagt: „Doch bitte nicht die Grenzen schützen“ –, dann muss ich sagen: Welches Konzept liegt hier vor?

Frau Vizepräsidentin, Hohe Vertreterin! Ich möchte Sie beglückwünschen zu dem Schritt, den Sie bei der Außenminister-Konferenz aufgrund Ihrer Vorschläge mit dem Implementierungsplan zuwege gebracht haben. Der geht uns in manchen Punkten noch nicht weit genug – das ist der Job des Parlaments, da weiter zu drücken. Aber ich glaube, wir müssen institutionell, was permanent structured cooperation angeht, headquarters, battle groups und bei vielen anderen Dingen vorankommen, wir müssen die Finanzmittel dafür haben, wir müssen neue Ideen haben, wie was mit der bestehenden Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik gemacht werden kann. Ich bin auch der Auffassung, dass wir noch viel weiter gehen müssen, wenn es um research und procurement geht.

Dies sind alles Ansätze, Geld zu sparen, Frau Lösing. Wir geben 200 Milliarden Euro aus mit einem negativen Effekt! Und ich glaube, hier können wir mit demselben Geld sehr viel mehr erreichen, wenn man in Richtung dieser Vorschläge vorgeht. Und ich glaube, dass es angesichts der Weltlage, die Sie ja positiv beschrieben haben, aber die ja realistisch mit Herrn Putin da ist und mit der Krim da ist und was da uns auch sonst noch vielleicht bezüglich der Unsicherheit in der NATO entgegenkommen könnte, wichtig ist, dass wir unseren Bürgern bei der inneren und der äußeren Sicherheit ein Angebot machen, soweit wir das schaffen können, mit all den Schwächen, die wir haben. Und dies ist – das muss man auch klarstellen, Herr Hookem –, dass der NATO-Generalsekretär bei dem Treffen der Verteidigungsminister in Bratislava die Vorstellung der Europäischen Union gestützt hat, weil er sagt, eine starke Europäische Union in Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik produziert eine starke NATO. Deswegen ist es in unserem Interesse – und wir müssen unsere Fähigkeiten haben, in Afrika und anderen Orten, wo die NATO nicht zur Verfügung steht –, dass wir für unsere Sicherheit und für bessere Lebensbedingungen, für Menschenrechte kämpfen können.

Ich wünsche Ihnen viel Erfolg auf diesem Weg und danke Ihnen für den Bericht.

  Afzal Khan (S&D). – Mr President, the election of Donald Trump has been a wake-up call for us, even though the US has long urged Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security. European defence structures, require attention, as Ms Mogherini has said. Our spending is 50% that of USA, yet our achievement is 15%. There are clearly issues we need to attend to.

The goal of 2% of GDP, to which NATO allies committed themselves in 2014, has so far been reached by only four Member States. Reports also show how duplication and inefficiency eat into the EUR 200 billion annual defence spend of EU Member States. Lack of interoperability also remains a major problem affecting military cooperation.

What we need is a serious effort from Member States to invest more, and more efficiently, in military capabilities. It is time to demonstrate the political will to take action, as opposed to issuing declarations. The implementation plan on security and defence approved last week by all 28 Member States represents an important step forward in European security and defence.

We must rethink the EU’s defence role and enhance its capacity to act in the changing global strategic environment. We have to be a more independent and resilient actor, less reliant on the US and working more closely with and complementing NATO, as agreed during the summit in Warsaw. If Europe is to remain safe and secure, defence cooperation among Member States must become the norm.

  Marek Jurek (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Ja reprezentuję jeden z tych czterech krajów, o których mówił mój przedmówca, które w pełni wywiązują się z obowiązków wobec wspólnego bezpieczeństwa. Bo trzeba jasno odróżnić dwie rzeczy: wspólne bezpieczeństwo i wspólnie prowadzoną politykę, która do tego zmierza. To jest na przykład udział ogromnej większości naszych państw w Przymierzu Atlantyckim, to jest dbanie o aktualność europejskiego wymiaru NATO, to są oczywiście konkretne decyzje polityczne czy inicjatywy dyplomatyczne, które tę wspólną odpowiedzialność realizują.

Ale czym innym jest wszystko to, co zmierza do budowy armii europejskiej. Pani Przewodnicząca Mogherini mówiła oczywiście o tym, że to jest nierealne, że tego nie będzie, ale wszyscy dobrze wiemy, że to jest stare marzenie, o którym mówił na przykład całkiem niedawno Romano Prodi. Artykuły 12 do 14 tego sprawozdania naprawdę nie uspakajają, chociaż jest w nim bardzo wiele trafnych obserwacji. Artykuł 38, to co idzie dalej – również. Pamiętajmy naprawdę o jednym: Europę stanowią państwa narodów Europy. Kiedy te państwa zamienią się widmo, Europa tak naprawdę przestanie istnieć.

  Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Mogherini! Dass die externe Sicherheit der EU von uns mehr Anstrengungen verlangt, wussten wir schon vor Donald Trump.

Aber die komplette Revision der ESVP, wie es der Bericht vorschlägt, ist falsch und gar nicht nötig. Ich warne vor einer Überdehnung der Ambitionen: Wenn die Augen größer sind als der Magen, geht das selten gut. Dass die sogenannte strategische Autonomie nach wie vor eine dumme Idee ist, hat Herr Van Orden schon gesagt. Die Territorialverteidigung, von der der Bericht spricht, ist ein leeres, haltloses Versprechen. Der ESVP eine Rolle im Inneren gegen Subversion zu geben, ist ein Anschlag auf die Freiheit.

Von einem output gap analytisch zu reden und dann zu sagen, wir müssen mehr Geld sinnlos und ineffizient ausgeben, ist unlogisch. Der Gipfel der Unverfrorenheit besteht darin, dass jetzt die militärischen Subventionen auf das Niveau der USA angehoben werden müssen. Wenn man mit Hektik und Hysterie darauf reagiert, dass man zu lange geschlafen hat, dann wird das nichts, und ein Liebesdienst an der Militärlobby macht das auch nicht besser.

Die Notwendigkeit einer stärkeren europäischen Zusammenarbeit, einer Verteidigungsunion, ist unbestreitbar. Aber das ist der falsche Weg.

  Diane Dodds (NI). – Mr President, there is no doubt that we live in dangerous and uncertain times. Perhaps we should start by congratulating French security forces this week on apprehending those who seemed set on terrorist activity, and express our solidarity with the city of Strasbourg, where heightened security measures have once again been deemed necessary in the run-up to the celebration of Christmas.

However, I also want to make it clear this evening that defence policy is not something that can be auctioned off to the highest bidder. It is the age-old right of sovereign nation states to keep their people safe. Many in these institutions are talking nonsense about an EU army and an operational headquarters. The United Kingdom has always shown itself willing to come to the aid of our allies. We will retain the right and the capacity to defend ourselves and also our closest neighbours inside and outside the European Union. The reality is that, while Brussels panders to federalist ambitions, it sacrifices the positive role that it can play. The EU must support NATO, not compete with it; foster national cooperation, not seek to replace it; and respect the indelible rights of governments to protect their citizens.

  Michèle Alliot-Marie (PPE). – Monsieur le Président, après avoir félicité M. Paşcu pour son rapport, je reprendrai vos propos, Madame Mogherini. Vous nous avez dit que la prochaine administration américaine risquait de faire peser plus de responsabilités sur nos épaules. Vous avez tout à fait raison. Vous le disiez à propos des relations entre Israël et la Palestine. Je crois que c'est vrai d'une façon beaucoup plus générale, et en particulier en matière de sécurité et de défense.

C'est dans la logique des engagements de M. Trump, qui prône finalement un certain repli sur soi des États-Unis et un désengagement, en tous les cas, des grandes zones de conflits où les États-Unis ont beaucoup travaillé au cours de ces dernières années. C'est d'ailleurs dans la logique de ce qui était dit aussi par ses prédécesseurs. La seule différence, c'est qu'il risque de le mettre en place. C'est dans la logique aussi de ses engagements fiscaux. Il faudra bien qu'il trouve de l'argent, et je suis persuadée que cela sera pris sur les dépenses de défense américaine qui représentent un budget extrêmement important, vous l'avez rappelé.

Alors, dire comme je l'ai entendu parfois ici qu'au milieu des crises actuelles qui nous menacent tous, un pays européen, quel qu'il soit, est à même de se protéger – je ne parle même pas de protéger les autres –, c'est quelque chose de totalement faux et de totalement irresponsable. Nous avons, nous, aujourd'hui – vous l'avez rappelé – des industries d'une défense européenne, et je ne parle pas du fantasme de l'armée européenne – Arnaud Danjean a très bien dit qu'il n'en était rien. Il est vrai que nous avons ces instruments, mais à une condition, c'est que chacun y participe effectivement. Or, nous voyons aujourd'hui que les pays européens font un effort par habitant pour leur sécurité et leur défense, qui va à peu près de 1 à 10.

Pensez-vous que l’on puisse effectivement faire une défense européenne en restant dans ce système actuel ou allez-vous inciter et pousser les uns et les autres à faire des efforts qui se rapprochent?

  Inés Ayala Sender (S&D). – Señor Presidente Czarnecki, gracias por la invitación en español. Deseo felicitar, en primer lugar, al ponente, señor Paşcu, por el excelente informe, que abre precisamente muchas preguntas pero, al mismo tiempo, plantea temas apasionantes; y, desde luego, a la Alta Representante, que casi va más aprisa que este Parlamento en ámbitos tan complejos y tan llenos de tabúes, pero tan importantes para la defensa europea y para Europa tal cual. Porque ya lo dijo Felipe González: «Europa no será Europa hasta que no tenga una política de defensa europea».

En ese sentido, deseo decirle que, como española y como europea, sé, por desgracia, que, a veces, la democracia hay que defenderla con las armas. De ahí que sea, en este momento, más importante todavía que en Europa nos hagamos responsables.

Sin embargo, tengo tres pequeños —digamos— elementos. Uno es la financiación —se lo han dicho a usted varias veces—. La financiación desearíamos que no saliera de otro lugar: de los refugiados, de los estudiantes o de los agricultores o de la cohesión. Necesitamos, por lo tanto, un presupuesto para la defensa nuevo, fresco. Y ahí me dirijo al Sr. Brok y al Sr. Gahler porque en Alemania, ahora mismo, se está hablando de aumentar a un 15 % el presupuesto para la defensa. Y yo entiendo que, desde allí, también deberían ser generosos con el ámbito europeo y abrir las puertas y la posibilidad a que realmente el presupuesto europeo, si tiene que, además, cubrir las necesidades —y yo así lo creo— de la defensa y la seguridad europea, tiene que ser un presupuesto más importante.

Y también quería decir que es importante que tengamos en cuenta a los militares, aunque no se hable todavía de un ejército como tal, pero está allí el Eurocorps. Y finalmente el control democrático por parte este Parlamento y de los parlamentos nacionales.

  Charles Tannock (ECR). – Mr President, at a time when there are multiple threats facing Europe it is right for the EU to look at improving its level of intergovernmental cooperation in terms of the Common Security and Defence Policy. As ever, the proposals have been met by some in this House with false accusations that they amount to the creation of an EU army and a concerted effort to undermine the role of NATO.

The CSDP has always been rooted in absolute respect for the Member States’ sovereignty in this key area of national policy, and on acknowledging NATO as the mainstay of European defence. The conclusions of the most recent Foreign Affairs Council uphold these key principles. Its support for strengthening Europe’s industrial defence base, eliminating duplication and waste in certain areas of procurement, and exploring the possibility of greater levels of integration militarily for those Member States willing to take such action under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism is to be welcomed, and also respects the principles of sovereignty.

The EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission stands out as a strong example of what cooperation at EU level can achieve. Bringing together Member States’ defence capabilities alongside the EU’s unique soft-power and hard-power capabilities, it was able comprehensively to defeat piracy in the Indian Ocean, and, most importantly, NATO welcomed this cooperation. It was, of course, commanded by the Royal Navy, based in my London constituency, but that is an aside.

Ultimately, and this is the point I want to make to the High Representative today, the United Kingdom after Brexit must stay plugged into the CFSP and the CSDP. That would be my lifelong ambition post-Brexit.

  Tamás Meszerics (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, political developments in the last six months have compounded the challenges to European security and defence significantly. Some would argue that they have compounded these challenges to the degree that, today, the fundaments of the European security structures are called into question. I am not among those who would seek to raise false alarms, but there is much that we need to rethink.

The reports tend in that direction, but with all the failures which have already been mentioned. We need, I believe, a robust military capability; we need substantial power projection capability; we need credible power in order to be able to engage in conflict prevention successfully. But – allow me to use another comparison on relative defence spending – we spend 2.5 times more per year on defence than Russia. Let me be blunt: I believe we need more efficient and coordinated spending, and not more money.

  Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). – Señor Presidente, quisiera comenzar felicitando al señor Paşcu por su informe. Recoge importantes objetivos de este Parlamento en materia de seguridad y defensa. Como ya se ha señalado en este debate, nuestro entorno de seguridad se está deteriorando progresivamente. Estamos ante un nivel de amenazas, incluida la terrorista, sin precedentes.

El complejo escenario en nuestras regiones vecinas, oriental y meridional, el terrorismo, la inestabilidad en Oriente Medio, en el Sahel, posibles cambios, ya evocados, en la política exterior y de defensa de los Estados Unidos, deben tener como respuesta avances en la dimensión europea de seguridad y defensa, que, además, el brexit probablemente hará menos dificultosos. Esos avances requieren ambición y realismo. Ambición, que se traduce en un importante esfuerzo de voluntad política, y realismo, que pasa por ser consciente de los medios de los que se dispone, así como de las dificultades económicas y presupuestarias actuales. Pero hay que poner en marcha las potencialidades que encierran los Tratados en materia de seguridad y defensa. Pienso, en especial, en la cooperación estructurada permanente y también en el resto de medidas y posibilidades detalladas por el Consejo de Ministros de Defensa de la semana pasada: desde la inclusión de un programa de investigación en el próximo marco financiero plurianual, pasando por el refuerzo de la Agencia Europea de Defensa, hasta el paulatino desarrollo de la base industrial y tecnológica de la defensa europea.

Concluyo: yo espero que la OTAN siga siendo un pilar clave de nuestra estructura de seguridad, pero los europeos debemos poner más de nuestra parte. Como vengo repitiendo desde hace tiempo, con el soft power no es suficiente para hacer frente a nuestros retos y amenazas actuales.

  Jens Geier (S&D). – Herr Präsident, Frau Hohe Vertreterin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zunächst einmal mein Dank an den Berichterstatter, lieber Ioan, und danke auch dafür, dass du Änderungen im Artikel 48 übernommen hast.

Der Schlüsselsatz für mich als Haushälter lautet hier: Ruft die Mitgliedstaaten auf, die notwendigen zusätzlichen finanziellen Ressourcen bereitzustellen. Der Haushalt ist nämlich jetzt bereits unterfinanziert, und das sage ich Ihnen als Berichterstatter für den Haushalt der EU für das Jahr 2017.

Das Pilotprojekt für die Kooperation der Rüstungsindustrie haben wir so gerade noch finanzieren können, dahinter ist nicht viel möglich. Seien wir also vorsichtig, zusätzliche Maßnahmen zu fordern, wenn die Finanzierung nicht gesichert ist, oder nur allgemein die Finanzierung aus dem EU-Haushalt zu verlangen.

Unser Ziel muss es sein, für die Finanzierung der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zusätzliche finanzielle Mittel von den Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen des nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens zu erreichen, denn dieser Haushalt gibt nicht viel mehr her.

  Hans-Olaf Henkel (ECR). – Herr Präsident! Das Letzte, was wir brauchen, ist eine europäische Armee. Die NATO hat den Westeuropäern das Schicksal Osteuropas erspart, und es war die NATO, die das Blutvergießen in Ex-Jugoslawien beendete. Wenn Putin demnächst feststellt, dass im Verteidigungsfall dieses Parlament erst vorher um Erlaubnis gefragt werden muss, ob die europäische Armee eingreifen darf, dann würde nicht nur die Sicherheit Osteuropas aufs Spiel gesetzt.

Natürlich kann Trump seinen Wählern nicht weiter zumuten, die finanzielle Hauptlast der NATO zu tragen. Deshalb müssen wir drei Dinge machen. Erstens: Wir müssen klarstellen, wer in Europa der Aggressor ist und wer nicht. Zweitens: Wir müssen unseren finanziellen Verpflichtungen für die Verteidigung nachkommen. Und drittens müssen wir auch Herrn Trump mal klarmachen, dass die NATO auch sein eigenes Land verteidigt.

  Michael Gahler (PPE). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zunächst herzlichen Dank an den Kollegen Paşcu für seinen hervorragenden Bericht.

Ganz kurz an den Kollegen Henkel: In diesem Bericht steht nichts über eine europäische Armee. Wir beschränken uns auf das, was mit diesem Vertrag möglich ist, und sagen das deutlich in diesem Jahresbericht. Das ist unser Beitrag zur Diskussion über die GSVP. Zwar tragen wir grundsätzlich die jüngsten Entscheidungen des Rates vom 14. November mit, der den Verteidigungsgipfel im Dezember vorbereitet. Doch können wir hier nicht stehen bleiben.

Angesichts der zunehmenden Unwägbarkeiten jenseits des Atlantiks, der krisenhaften Entwicklungen im Süden und im Osten Europas geben wir uns nicht mit den ambitionslosen Entscheidungen der Mitgliedstaaten zufrieden. Statt diesen Mangel an Ambitionen der Mitgliedstaaten schönzureden, bitte ich dieses Haus, an unseren parlamentarischen Forderungen festzuhalten.

Ich erinnere Frau Mogherini daran, dass wir eine EU-Bestandsaufnahme bestehender Fähigkeiten und ein Weißbuch für Sicherheit und Verteidigung einfordern, um den Weg zur europäischen Verteidigungsunion zu beschreiten und die strategische Orientierung mit den Fähigkeitsentwicklungen zu verbinden.

Frau Mogherini, bitte übernehmen Sie endlich Führung und überzeugen Sie die Mitgliedstaaten von der Notwendigkeit, die Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit zu aktivieren. Nur ein starkes, geeintes Europa kann auf Dauer die Sicherheit und Verteidigung unserer Bürger gewährleisten. Der Schlüssel zur geplanten und koordinierten Militär- und Rüstungskooperation liegt in dieser Ständigen Strukturierten Zusammenarbeit.

Ich bitte Sie dafür zu sorgen, den Implementierungsplan zu Sicherheit und Verteidigung in einen Weißbuchprozess zu überführen. Bitte setzen Sie sich in Ihrer Funktion als Vizepräsidentin der Kommission und Leiterin der EDA dafür ein, dass bestehende Beschlusslagen von den europäischen Verteidigungsgipfeln 2013 und 2015 von Kommission und EDA auch umgesetzt werden.

Bitte verschonen Sie uns im angekündigten Verteidigungsaktionsplan der Kommission davor, nur alte Beschlüsse in einem neuen Gewand zu verkaufen. Wir brauchen jetzt eine aktive Kommission zur Überwachung des europäischen Binnenmarktes für Verteidigungsgüter. Wir wollen Klarheit über die europäische Gestaltung von Versorgungssicherheit – security of supply – und EU-finanzierter Verteidigungsforschung. Treiben lassen ist keine Option. Wenn Sie führen, folgen Ihnen auch viele Mitgliedstaaten.

  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Gospodine predsjedniče, poštovana Visoka predstavnice, čestitam izvjestitelju kolegi Paşcu na izvrsnom izvješću jer se u mnogome odmaknuo od rutinskog evidentiranja slabosti i nejasnih poruka kada je riječ o zajedničkoj sigurnosnoj i obrambenoj politici. Opća je ocjena da je ta dimenzija djelovanja Europske unije oduvijek bila više preventivna nego obrambena, ostajući vječito u izgradnji i stalno nedovršena, kao i najslabiji element u procesu europskih integracija. Slažem se i s procjenom da veliki broj dugotrajnih regionalnih kriza te nove asimetrične i hibridne prijetnje danas čine sigurnosni kontekst koji nameće vrlo ozbiljne izazove samoj stabilnosti Europske unije. Trebamo uzeti u obzir i najnovija politička događanja poput Brexita ili rezultate američkih predsjedničkih izbora. Ne smijemo dozvoliti da naša sigurnost ovisi o političkim procesima koji ne idu u prilog jačanju europskog zajedništva.

Ukratko, ovo je vrijeme osporavanja Europske unije na velikom dijelu njenih 15 000 kilometara dugih vanjskih granica, ali i razdoblje ozbiljnog preispitivanja unutar Europske unije kako našim građanima pružiti osjećaj sigurnosti. Odgovori 2016. mogu biti samo zajednički – europski.

  Dubravka Šuica (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedniče, gospođo Visoka povjerenice, ima puno zemalja, naših članica, koje se boje da će izgradnjom zajedničke europske obrambene i sigurnosne politike izgubiti suverenitet. Vrijeme je da se ti mitovi maknu, dakle nema europske vojske - to je ono o čemu stalno govorimo i kompatibilni smo s Natom. To je ono što treba napomenuti i što svi trebaju znati. Dakle ne gradimo nikakvu europsku vojsku, nema straha od toga. Ali ima straha od Brexita, Putina, nove situacije u SAD-u.

U tim novim sigurnosnim uvjetima moramo se potruditi sačuvati naše unutarnje i vanjske granice i stoga se zalažem za to da članak 45. našeg Ugovora protumačimo na način da postane ekvivalentan članku 5. NATO-a po principu „Jedan za sve, svi za jednoga”. To je jedini način da se Europa zaista stavi u centar, da počnemo razmišljati o sebi i da svoju sigurnosnu politiku vodimo sami.

  Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, da federalista europeo convinto, non posso che essere felice che finalmente si parli seriamente di passi concreti verso una difesa europea comune, come il Parlamento chiede da molti anni. Certo, ci sono voluti eventi dirompenti come la Brexit, la vittoria di Trump negli Stati Uniti, il deterioramento della sicurezza nei teatri geopolitici a noi vicini, persino la sfida della crisi dei rifugiati, per mostrare ancora più chiaramente che l'Unione non può perseguire completamente i propri interessi esterni e lavorare per la pace, la sicurezza, se non si dota di strumenti precisi. Penso in particolare alle forze multinazionali, realizzabili grazie alla cooperazione strutturata permanente, che possono essere messe a disposizione della politica di sicurezza e difesa comune, come peraltro già previsto dal trattato di Lisbona.

Forse l'attuale quadro di sicurezza globale spinge in questa direzione, e abbiamo raggiunto ora una condivisione maggiore per dare piena attuazione alle disposizioni del trattato, verso una piena revisione della politica di sicurezza e difesa comune in cooperazione e complementarietà con la NATO, per trasformare finalmente l'Unione europea in un soggetto in grado di assumere le proprie responsabilità per garantire la sicurezza dei propri cittadini, del proprio vicinato e del mondo.

  Alojz Peterle (PPE). – Pridružujem se čestitkam kolegu Pascuju in senčnim poročevalcem za jasno poročilo. Očitno je, da mehka moč za uveljavitev miru ni dovolj.

Zato že dolgo podpiram močnejšo obrambno identiteto evropske zveze in v tem ne vidim nevarnosti podvajanja z Natom. Vendar naš problem ni tehnične ali organizacijske narave. Naš ključni izziv je politična podpora obrambni strategiji, za kar je potrebna celovita politična strategija evropske zveze, ki edino lahko pomaga uveljaviti evropsko obrambno strategijo.

  Andrzej Grzyb (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Sprawozdawco! Chciałbym podziękować za sprawozdanie i stwierdzić, że to, co łączy Unię Europejską, to coraz bardziej deficytowy towar. Jednocześnie około 80 % Europejczyków uznaje bezpieczeństwo za ważny problem, i to może nas złączyć, być motorem integracji wchodzącej wychodzącej poza aspekt gospodarczy. Wyzwania w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i obrony trzeba postrzegać szeroko, a kluczowym elementem jest oczywiście harmonizacja i skorygowanie różnych polityk, w tym również polityk gospodarczych, bowiem zdolności obronne są funkcją rozwoju gospodarki: im lepsza gospodarka, tym lepsze zdolności obronne. Chodzi zatem o politykę przemysłową Unii, politykę reindustrializacji, ale również innowacyjność i badania, czyli wszystko to, co pomieściliśmy między innymi w programie „Horyzont 2020ˮ oraz kwestie niezależności energetycznej czy cyberbezpieczeństwo.

Chciałbym zwrócić również uwagę na aspekt militarny, ochronę granic, a zarazem relacje Unia – NATO, które zostały potwierdzone też deklaracją z Warszawy z lata 2016 r. Jest to również ten element, który powinien tutaj być uwypuklony.

Z zadowoleniem należy przyjąć koordynujące propozycje, jak chociażby strategię globalną Unii Europejskiej, czy też Europejską Unię Obrony, która może w przyszłości zastąpić dyskutowaną dzisiaj politykę bezpieczeństwa i obrony.

  Ramona Nicole Mănescu (PPE). – Pentru prima dată observăm cum softpower depășește în influență efectivă hardpower. În fața acestei noi realități, atât Uniunea, cât și statele membre sunt nepregătite și vulnerabile.

Acest raport, împreună cu eforturile Comisiei, vor crește capacitatea de acțiune a Uniunii în acest sens. Statele membre trebuie să se implice în regândirea profundă și cât mai rapidă a politicii de securitate și apărare comună. Aceasta înseamnă inclusiv onorarea angajamentului de alocare a 2 % din PIB pentru apărare. În acest moment, Uniunea nu poate asigura protecția cetățenilor și a instituțiilor împotriva unor manipulări sau împotriva atacurilor cibernetice.

În continuare avem nevoie de colaborarea și complementaritatea cu NATO. În același registru, trebuie valorificat Parteneriatul transatlantic, mai ales în contextul unor resurse limitate. Mai mult ca oricând, Uniunea trebuie să susțină întărirea industriei de apărare și a cercetării, iar acest lucru trebuie să se reflecte în distribuția financiară pentru perioada rămasă din actualul cadru financiar multianual.

Vreau să-l felicit pe domnul Pașcu și susțin un vot pozitiv și sper ca direcțiile indicate să devină practică instituțională cât de curând.

Pytania z sali

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Chciałem zwrócić uwagę, że podczas tej sesji mamy kilka bardzo dobrych dokumentów, ważnych debat, ważnych dyskusji dotyczących bezpieczeństwa. Wczoraj pana Urmasa Paeta, dziś pana Paşcu, za chwilę – również kluczowe z punktu widzenia bezpieczeństwa – sprawozdanie pani Anny Fotygi. Jeden wspólny mianownik obejmuje wszystkie debaty – otóż są one krytyczne, oceniają krytycznie stan rzeczy, ale to jest jedyna dobra wiadomość, dlatego że wszystkie zalecenia na tej sali jednak poróżniły poszczególne grupy polityczne. Diagnoza lewej, prawej i środkowej części sali jest identyczna, zgodna. Natomiast szans na wyjście, po to żeby Europa była bezpieczniejsza, w tych dokumentach jednak za wiele nie ma, bo sala się różni w zakresie prognoz sytuacji, gotowości do określonych wydatków na rzecz obronności. I to mnie niestety martwi, chciałem na to zwrócić uwagę.

  Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, negli ultimi anni il contesto della sicurezza in Europa è significativamente peggiorato, divenendo più instabile e complesso. A fronte di ciò la reazione degli Stati membri risulta essere scoordinata e frammentaria, complicando e spesso ostacolando l'adozione di un approccio uniforme.

Sono favorevole all'introduzione di meccanismi di coordinamento, come la creazione di una sede centrale permanente dell'Unione per le missioni e le operazioni civili e militari, dalla quale poter sovraintendere all'intero ciclo di pianificazione, dal concetto politico iniziale ai piani particolareggiati. Occorre però che tutte le decisioni del Consiglio riguardanti le missioni e le operazioni future privilegino gli interventi nei conflitti che interessano direttamente la sicurezza dell'Unione o la sicurezza di partner e regioni in cui essa svolge il ruolo di garante della sicurezza.

La decisione di intervento deve essere basata su analisi e comprensione comune del contesto strategico, nonché sugli interessi strategici condivisi dagli Stati membri, tenendo presenti le azioni di altri alleati e di organizzazioni quali l'ONU e la NATO.

  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, το ενδιαφέρον για την κοινή πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αναζωπύρωσαν τα ραπίσματα που δέχθηκε το οικοδόμημα του ευρωατλαντισμού με το Brexit και τα αποτελέσματα των αμερικανικών εκλογών. Στόχοι αυτής της πολιτικής είναι η εξυπηρέτηση των επεμβατικών δράσεων κάποιων κρατών μελών της Ένωσης στη Μέση Ανατολή και στην Αφρική.

Απεναντίας όμως δεν βλέπω να υπάρχει καμιά κοινή πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης απέναντι στην Τουρκία που παραβιάζει καθημερινά τα ελληνικά κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα στο Αιγαίο και κατέχει παράνομα το 37% του εδάφους της Κύπρου. Ούτε βλέπουμε καμία αλληλεγγύη προς την Ελλάδα, όταν η Αλβανία θέτει ζήτημα Τσαμουριάς και απειλεί τις περιουσίες της αναγνωρισμένης ελληνικής εθνικής μειονότητας της Βορείου Ηπείρου, όπως σας έχω ενημερώσει με επιστολή που σας έστειλα, κυρία Mogherini.

Η κοινή πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας, λοιπόν, είναι μια φενάκη. Ο ελληνικός λαός δεν θα συναινέσει σε καμιά φενάκη που στόχο έχει να εξυπηρετήσει τα επεμβατικά συμφέροντα των ισχυρών της Ευρώπης.

  Hilde Vautmans (ALDE). – Graag wil ik eerst meneer Paşcu bedanken voor zijn uitstekende verslag. Mevrouw Mogherini, ik ben heel erg blij met uw concrete voorstellen en de stappen voorwaarts die u wilt zetten in deze Europese defensie-unie en met de gedrevenheid waarmee u ze hier vandaag hebt verdedigd. Wat ik echter niet begrijp, is waarom u geen stap verder wilt gaan. Persoonlijk denk ik echt dat er een momentum is om de sprong te wagen, de sprong naar een Europees leger, de sprong naar geïntegreerde strijdkrachten. Waarom? We zitten met de brexit, de verkiezing van Trump, de verklaringen in verband met de NAVO, de budgettaire beperkingen in de nationale legers. Daarom denk ik dat we gehoor moeten geven aan de Eurobarometer. Daarin heeft 75 procent van de Europeanen gezegd: “Wij willen een Europese defensie”. In België hebben we trouwens een studie laten uitvoeren waaruit blijkt dat jaarlijks 26 miljard euro zou worden bespaard als we de stap zetten naar een Europese defensie. Mevrouw Mogherini, mijn steun hebt u. Gebruik dit momentum, spring net die stap verder en zorg voor onze veiligheid met een Europese defensie.

  João Pimenta Lopes (GUE/NGL). – Senhor Presidente, a União Europeia prossegue a sua intenção desmesurada de afirmação enquanto bloco militar, promovendo a sua vertente beligerante, militarista e de ingerência externa.

Submisso à estratégia da NATO, pede-se o reforço dos orçamentos de defesa, o aumento do investimento na investigação e na indústria militar, mas a ambição imperialista motiva a criação de um exército europeu que leve a cabo criminosas ações de guerra, como as que este parlamento aprovou sobre a Líbia e como este parlamento se prepara para aprovar sobre a Síria.

Uma política de sangue e de morte, de guerra e destruição, a que ficam associados todos os que nesta casa a promovem e fazem aprovar. Uma política que alimenta a corrida ao armamento, não esquecendo o nuclear, aumentando as tensões mundiais, contrariando compromissos assumidos com o Tratado de Não Proliferação e Desarmamento – uma política que se opõe à paz e a compromete, e que não se desliga das políticas de exploração e empobrecimento dos trabalhadores e dos povos.

  Ελευθέριος Συναδινός ( NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, επιλεκτικά θυμάται ο κύριος Paşcu. Επισημαίνω στον εισηγητή της έκθεσης ότι σε έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου δεν πρέπει να αναγράφονται ανακρίβειες. Το οφείλει ως ευρωβουλευτής και ως πρώην υπουργός Άμυνας της Ρουμανίας. Συγκεκριμένα, αναφέρει στην έκθεση ότι για πρώτη φορά μετά τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο άλλαξαν ευρωπαϊκά σύνορα με τη βία, δηλαδή, στην Ουκρανία, και υπογραμμίζει τον διεθνή αντίκτυπο της στρατιωτικής κατοχής.

Θα ήθελα λοιπόν να του υπενθυμίσω την παράνομη εισβολή της Τουρκίας και τη στρατιωτική κατοχή και τον εποικισμό του 37% του εδάφους της Κύπρου. Μια στρατιωτική κατοχή που συνεχίζεται παρά τις καταδικαστικές αποφάσεις όλων των διεθνών οργανισμών. Επίσης τη βίαιη διάλυση της Γιουγκοσλαβίας, την απόσχιση του Κοσόβου και άλλα. Ή μήπως τα παραλείπει, επειδή εμπλέκεται η Γερμανία και η Αμερική; Προς αποκατάσταση, λοιπόν, της αλήθειας και του δικαίου, ο εισηγητής της έκθεσης οφείλει να συμπεριλάβει στην έκθεσή του τα παραπάνω, διότι, όπως προκύπτει, η κοινή πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας είναι μια κοροϊδία.

  Ivica Tolić (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedniče, visoka predstavnice, kolege i kolegice, na početku želim naglasiti da će zbog sigurnosnog stanja na granicama EU-a i asimetričnih prijetnji unutar Europe sigurnost i obrana biti sve više u fokusu javnosti. Samim time mora se snažnije djelovati na razini institucija EU-a.

Zbog karaktera suvremenih prijetnji i izazova sigurnost i obrana sve snažnije su u interakciji s gospodarstvima država članica i bitno će utjecati na ekonomiju. Zajedničku sigurnosnu politiku EU-a nužno je zato pregledati, doraditi te uskladiti s realnim stanjem i potrebama. Nakon toga potrebno je osigurati implementaciju zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike u što kraćem roku.

Nužno je u što kraćem roku donijeti i strategiju, uspostaviti zajednička politička i upravna tijela i stalnu strukturalnu suradnju. Vrlo je važno razvijati kapacitete vojne industrije, razvijajući što je moguće više dual use tehnologiju. Pritom je važno imati na umu da je opremljenost sigurnosno-obrambenih snaga članica EU-a vrlo raznolika. Samim time raznolike su i sposobnosti. U nekim slučajevima opremljenosti još uvijek se može utvrditi nekompatibilnost opreme. Zato je potrebno i važno poraditi na pametnijem ulaganju u obrambenu industriju, a posebno, kako sam već istaknuo, dual use tehnologiju gdje se primjerice flote koje štite granice EU-a, uključujući hrvatsku na Jadranskom moru, mogu usmjeriti na opremanje, za operacije traganja i spašavanja, za operacije medicinskog prevoženja, sprečavanje onečišćenja mora, a modularnom nadogradnjom u vrlo kratkom vremenu mogu postati borbene flote.

Nijedna zemlja članica uključujući one najjače ne može danas sama odgovoriti na sigurnosne prijetnje, zato trebamo podržati izvješće, doradu i implementaciju zajedničke obrambene i sigurnosne politike i akcijskog plana. Vrijeme pred nama zahtijeva zajedničko dobro osmišljeno i učinkovito djelovanje, i na kraju i vrlo važno, djelovanje na vrijeme.

  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospodine predsjedniče, sigurnosna situacija u Europi i susjednim regijama sve je alarmantnija pa je svima jasno da moramo učiniti više kako bismo zaštitili svoje građane i interese.

Neki u ovome vide priliku za okretanje leđa našim transatlantskim partnerima koji zajedno s nama, rame uz rame, već desetljećima brane naše zajedničke interese i vrijednosti.

Bilo je tu i velikih propusta zbog kojih su životi naših vojnika i građana bespotrebno ugroženi, a naš ugled u svijetu narušen. Od neuspjeha ne treba bježati, nego se s njime suočiti. Svjesna sam da dio kolega u izboru Donalda Trumpa vidi priliku za toliko željeni odmak od Amerike, ali to nije pravi put.

Sjedinjene su Države vjerovale u demokratsku Europu kad je ona bila u ruševinama. Vjerujmo i mi u svoje prekooceanske partnere i zajedno s njima sagradimo bolji, učinkovitiji i za svjetski mir još važniji NATO.

  Csaba Sógor (PPE). – Elnök Úr, az EU tagállamok biztonságának növeléséhez mindenképpen szükség lesz a jövőben az európai védelmi együttműködés formáinak változatossá tételére. Ez még akkor is igaz, ha a NATO mint katonai szövetség védelmi képessége és erőforrásai nem helyettesíthetők. A védelmi együttműködés ugyanakkor a teljes európai integráció továbblendüléséhez is hozzájárulhatna, hiszen az egyik legérzékenyebb területen várná el a tagállamok közötti együttműködést és nyitottságot. A védelmi ipar fejlesztése, a kibervédelmi együttműködés, a közös védelmi kutatások egy teljesen új területet nyitnak meg az integráció előtt, és lehet, hogy éppen erre van szüksége ma az oly sok törésvonal szabdalta Európának. A tagállamok közötti fokozott bizalom kiépítése ezen a fontos területen az egész EU hasznára válhat. Fontos hangsúlyozni, hogy a hadiipari együttműködés a békét szolgálja, hiszen az a kontinens, amely nem tud reagálni a kor kihívásaira, gyenge és sebezhető lesz, ez pedig belső feszültségekhez vezethet.

  Eduard Kukan (PPE). – Mr President, we are facing new threats and challenges to our security. These are interconnected and no threats are isolated. The current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) needs to reflect this change and to be responsive to the hybrid challenges the EU faces.

Let us be honest: no Member State can deal with the current security challenges alone. Cooperation is extremely important. We need a pragmatic way forward. The Member States need to do more on the European defence front, which means not only that they commit verbally but that they honour their commitments with financial contributions as well. We should recall the need for a strong collective defence principle.

We have a number of CSDP tools and instruments which need to be put to more effective use. We also need a concrete permanent structure like the EU headquarters for civilian and military operations. Following these principles, a synergic effect could be created, contributing to a more genuine CSDP.

I would like to thank Mr Paşcu for a good, responsible report.

  Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος ( NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θα ήθελα να επισημάνω ότι, όπως συμβαίνει με την κοινή εξωτερική πολιτική, έτσι και με την πολιτική άμυνας και ασφάλειας υπάρχει μια αντιφατική φιλοσοφία. Από τη μια πλευρά, μας είπε η κυρία Mogherini ότι δεν είμαστε αμυντικός οργανισμός· από την άλλη όμως πλευρά, επιδιώκουμε να επιτύχουμε αμυντικές δυνατότητες. Θέλουμε να αυξήσουμε τις δυνατότητες της αμυντικής βιομηχανίας με έρευνες και παραγωγή ισχυρών οπλικών συστημάτων. Δεν απαντούμε όμως το ερώτημα εναντίον τίνος ισχυρού εχθρού θα χρησιμοποιηθούν αυτά τα μέσα.

Αντιφατική επίσης και συγκεχυμένη είναι και η θέση την οποία λαμβάνουμε μετά την έξοδο της Βρετανίας από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, το Brexit, αλλά και την εκλογή του Trump στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Ο Trump έχει διακηρύξει ότι θα προσπαθήσει και θα επιτύχει να συνεργαστεί με τη Ρωσία. Αυτό θα μειώσει και τις εντάσεις αλλά, πιθανόν, και τον κίνδυνο κάποιας απειλής. Άρα υπάρχει και εδώ αντίφαση.

Ο μόνος πραγματικός κίνδυνος που αντιμετωπίζει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση είναι αυτός που προέρχεται από τη διεθνή τρομοκρατία και τις δυνατότητες που μπορεί να αναπτύξει, όπως, παραδείγματος χάρη, τις επιθέσεις στον κυβερνοχώρο. Αυτός ο κίνδυνος είναι δυνατόν να αντιμετωπιστεί από τη συνεργασία των αρχών ασφάλειας και άμυνας των χωρών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως.

  Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Г-н Председател, Европейският съюз трябваше много отдавна да направи доста повече за своята сигурност. Това се очакванията на мнозинството от европейските граждани, както и очакванията на нашите партньори в Съединените щати. Ние не трябва да дублираме нашия капацитет с този на НАТО, а да го допълваме. Общо закупуване на техника, общо инвестиране в научна и развойна дейност в отбранителния сектор, общо обучение на нашите военнослужещи, общо командване, както и обща отбрана спрямо хибридни атаки.

Тук става въпрос за конкретни стъпки, които трябва да бъдат направени, и то в обозримо бъдеще, г-жо Върховен представител. Ако искаме наистина да играем някаква роля в света, да не бъдем маргинализирани – ние сме 7% от световното население, имаме над 25% от брутния вътрешен продукт, който държи Европейският съюз, и разпределяме над 50% от всички социални блага, за да можем да защитим това, трябва да инвестираме в нашата сигурност, г-жо Могерини, и аз приветствам това, което сте предложили. То трябва да стане обаче факт, а не само да остане на думи, което чуваме от десетилетия на нашия континент. На нас ни трябва обща отбрана, обща сигурност за европейските граждани.

  Stanislav Polčák (PPE). – Já bych chtěl rovněž vyjádřit podporu paní komisařce Mogheriniové, protože její aktivitu vnímám velmi pozitivně.

Já si myslím, že občané EU od nás očekávají především, že jim zajistíme pocit bezpečí. To bezpečí se týká ochrany vnějších hranic, moře, ochrany před teroristy a spektrem dalších teroristických, případně jiných bezpečnostních hrozeb. Myslím si, že na to musíme reagovat a já chci poděkovat panu zpravodaji Paşcuovi za předloženou zprávu, protože ji považuji za vyváženou.

Měli bychom posílit víceletý finanční rámec právě v rozpočtu obranné a bezpečnostní politiky a samozřejmě i rozpočet na jednotlivé roky. V tomto ohledu mám pocit, že jsme vykročili dobrou nohou včetně dnešní schválené zprávy pana kolegy týkající se tedy bezpečnostní a obranné politiky.

(Koniec pytań z sali)

  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Mr President, I think I can raise a point of order myself. I am entering my seventh hour in this hemicycle today. This is a very important debate so I am glad to hear everyone’s views, but if you take all the catch—the-eyes at the end and all those who come into the room speak, it is not fair – not only for me, because the President changes but I am here for seven hours in a row, but it is also not fair for the following debate, which is a very important one. I apologise, but this might mean that at a certain point in the next debate – which is very important, Mrs Fotyga’s report on EU strategic communication – it will obviously be squeezed a bit. I do not think this is fair to our way of working.

First, I would like to stress the fact that the report is excellent. The work we are doing on the common security and defence policy is not being done, because of the UK referendum. I understand that our friends from the UK might think that everything revolves around this, but the global strategy was prepared and presented during the previous year and presented just the day after the result of the referendum. It has been done and it is work we have to do because it is necessary for the security of our citizens, and, as long as the UK is in the European Union, this work will go on with the 28 all together. It also strikes me a bit that precisely those of our colleagues who have indicated that their country will be leaving the European Union are the ones who feel so strongly about the future of European defence cooperation. I also understand that some would like to stay plugged in – you will sort out amongst yourselves what you want to do in the future, and then we will discuss it together. But the European Union will certainly continue to implement the decisions we have already taken with the 28, as I said – and I am glad about that – on concrete ambitious steps to strengthen the common security and defence policy. It is not about the EU army, and it is not about duplication with NATO. NATO is perfectly happy with what we are doing, because this is also a way of strengthening NATO. We are working—hand—in—hand together. It is not about building new, big headquarters; it is about being effective with the instruments we could have tomorrow if the political will is put in place and the financial resources are dedicated. It is not necessarily about spending more; it is about spending smarter, because in times of budget constraints – and some of you mentioned this – the only way for Europeans to invest smartly in defence is by doing it together.

So, as the European Union helps, supports and accompanies Member States in many fields to the advantage of European citizens, from agriculture to infrastructure (I don’t want to go into other issues here), we can do the same on defence and make it more effective, more constructive and easier for Member States to work effectively in defence. No Member State alone – some of you mentioned this – can face security challenges today if not in cooperation, and our security is interconnected. We have seen it in recent months and in the last year and a half. Whenever we face a serious security threat in one of our Member States, all European citizens can be targeted, so we have a collective responsibility to work on our security together.

The integrated approach – soft power and hard power together, the European way – is what will be done more and more, so it is not about choosing hard power versus soft power. The European Union is the only player in the world that can use both hard power and soft power instruments in an integrated manner. Again, NATO is the first to recognise that we have instruments that NATO, as a military alliance, does not have.

I will continue to work in a very committed way, together with Parliament, to advance this agenda in a very pragmatic, but also very ambitious, manner. For me, this is also a test of the Lisbon Treaty. Some say I have two hats, but I actually have three, and I will use the three of them in this work, with the support, I hope, of the European Parliament, as head of the European Defence Agency, Vice—President of the Commission for Commission competences on the industrial and research part of it, and certainly as High Representative and as Chair of the Council, both in the foreign affairs and defence ministers formations.

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. – Mr President, I would say that whatever the High Representative says about the European army is not feasible; it is not on the radar. Whatever you would say, for instance about the headquarters, does not matter. Some people want to refer to this because this is the only way to attack. So I sometimes wonder whether we are really sending the right message. Well what kind of a message should we transmit, because the right one, the most explicit one, is not taken seriously? Mr Van Orden, who is a convinced pessimist with respect to European defence and will remain like that until the end, is somehow ignoring the fact that we also fought in Mali, for instance. In the future, Africa will probably be an area of responsibility where we will have to fight, so from this point of view I would not be so dismissive of this possibility.

Our friend from UKIP is trying to tell us, or to tell me as the author, what I did not say and is attacking me on that. Well, I am not a British citizen to be told the reasons why we should leave the European Union with lies, for instance that subversion is fought with European soldiers. It is not fought like that. Subversion is fought with the means there, that there are military who counter the propaganda which is used for subversion. That is a different story, but I would say that, from this point of view, many things have to be accepted as inevitable.

I am very glad that Mr Bütikofer, who has been my, shall we say...

(The President cut off the speaker)

IN THE CHAIR: ULRIKE LUNACEK
Vice-President

  President. – You have to come to the end Mr Paşcu.

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. – Please allow me to conclude.

  President. – Sorry, we are running very late and I am asking you to finalise, Mr Paşcu. If you can finish in 20 seconds that is fine.

(Interjection)

No, it is not enough for me. I have a list here of how much time is given to each Group and to each MEP and we are running very late with the time. If my predecessor does not stick to the time that is not my fault. I try to adhere to the time that is given to each speaker. So you no longer wish to have the floor? OK. I will switch to German.

   Die Aussprache ist geschlossen.

Die Abstimmung findet am Mittwoch, 23. November 2016, statt.

Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 162 GO)

  Daniel Buda (PPE), în scris. – Deteriorarea mediului de securitate european, generată de creșterea numărului de amenințări, fie ele convenționale sau hibride, a dus la creșterea sentimentului de insecuritate în rândul cetățenilor europeni.

Conform sondajului Eurobarometru 85.1 din 2016, aproximativ două treimi din aceștia doresc ca UE să se implice mai mult în chestiunile ce țin de politica de securitate și de apărare.

În acest context, consider că trebuie luate măsuri care să permită atât folosirea mai eficientă a instrumentelor PSAC existente, cât și crearea unor instrumente noi, pertinente, care să facă posibilă intervenția Uniunii Europene în orice tip de acțiune de gestionare a crizelor, începând cu prevenirea acestora și până la soluționarea lor. De asemenea, politica externă și de securitate europeană trebuie unificată, iar între statele membre trebuie să existe o mai bună cooperare și coordonare. Doar în acest mod, alături de o finanțare eficientă, se va realiza o creștere a eficacității PSAC, precum și o apărare colectivă puternică.

Nu în ultimul rând, sunt de părere că este incorect să ne bazăm doar pe investițiile venite din partea SUA. Statele Unite ale Americii trebuie privite ca parteneri, și nu doar ca unici furnizori de securitate și stabilitate în diverse zone ale lumii, inclusiv în Europa.

Acestea sunt motivele pentru care salut această inițiativă.

  João Ferreira (GUE/NGL), por escrito. – A União Europeia acentua a sua escalada militarista. Todos os pretextos servem. O objetivo é consolidar a UE como um bloco político-militar imperialista.

Defendendo um caminho de submissão à estratégia da NATO, multiplicam-se as vozes – da direita à social-democracia – pedindo o reforço dos orçamentos de defesa, o aumento do investimento na investigação e na indústria militar. Mais: defende-se a criação de um exército europeu, que leve a cabo criminosas ações de guerra, como aquela a que este Parlamento deu aval sobre a Líbia, e como agora se prepara novamente para fazer em relação à Síria. De forma irresponsável e criminosa.

Uma política de sangue e de morte, de agressão e de ingerência, de guerra e destruição, a que ficam associados todos os que nesta casa a promovem e fazem aprovar. Uma política que alimenta a corrida ao armamento, não esquecendo o nuclear, aumentando as tensões mundiais e contrariando compromissos assumidos com o tratado de não proliferação e de desarmamento.

Uma política que se opõe e compromete a Paz, e que não se desliga das políticas de exploração e empobrecimento dos trabalhadores e dos povos. Uma política que merece a nossa firme oposição e combate!

  Karol Karski (ECR), na piśmie. – Szanowny Panie Przewodniczący! Europa znajduje się w wyjątkowej sytuacji, jeżeli chodzi o liczbę konfliktów oraz potencjalnych zapalnych punktów u naszych granic, dobrze zresztą zidentyfikowanych przez sprawozdawcę. Jest rzeczą oczywistą, że aby móc skutecznie sobie radzić z obecnymi i przyszłymi zagrożeniami – zarówno zewnętrznymi, jak i wewnętrznymi – należy wzmocnić możliwości obronne poszczególnych państw członkowskich. Intensyfikowanie współpracy również na poziomie UE może przynieść korzyści, pod warunkiem jednak że zostanie to zrobione w sposób komplementarny do NATO, które jest i pozostanie podstawowym filarem bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. W tym kontekście dziwi zwłaszcza postulowana w sprawozdaniu konieczność zapewnienia większej autonomii strategicznej UE – trudno sobie wyobrazić, żeby miało się to dokonać bez uszczerbku dla NATO.

Najważniejszym obecnie zadaniem stojącym przed państwami będącymi jednocześnie członkami UE i Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego jest pełne wdrożenie postanowień Szczytu w Warszawie oraz spełnienie postulatu dotyczącego poziomu 2% PKB wydawanych na obronność. Unia musi skupić się przede wszystkim na realizacji Deklaracji Warszawskiej o współpracy UE–NATO. Deklaracja ta powinna stanowić trzon wszystkich działań związanych z implementacją Europejskiej Strategii Globalnej w sferze obronnej.

Nie możemy wreszcie zapominać o tym, co się dzieje na wschodzie, i o materialnym wsparciu dla armii ukraińskiej, która czynnie stawia opór w wojnie hybrydowej prowadzonej przez Rosję.

  Soraya Post (S&D), in writing. – The ongoing and escalating militarisation of our policies and the ‘machoisation’ of our politics is quickly turning the geopolitical situation in Europe into a nightmare as vile as the current public discourse, only much more dangerous. Our already very unstable geopolitical situation will not be improved by sabre-rattling where everyone plays follow-the-leader.

As we in Europe would most probably find ourselves, literally speaking, in the line of fire, should a major conflict break out involving Russia, we ought to tread very lightly now that the fundamentals of our security structure is in shatters. The military escalation between Russia and NATO on the former’s borders is a historically well-known recipe for disaster. Instead of directing our scarce resources towards military defence and cooperation with NATO, Europe should focus on de-escalation, diplomacy and dialogue and empowering democrats in the European neighbourhood with whom we can forge new alliances for peace and true stability.

  Janusz Zemke (S&D), na piśmie. – Zgadzam się z koniecznością prowadzenia skutecznej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Do tej pory UE zajmowała się głównie sprawami gospodarczymi, otwierała wspólny rynek dla towarów i przemieszczania się ludzi. Teraz równie ważne staje się zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa, zwłaszcza walka z terroryzmem i ograniczanie skali nielegalnej imigracji.

Postawienie spraw bezpieczeństwa i obrony na wyższym miejscu wśród unijnych priorytetów wymusza także zwiększenie przez poszczególne państwa członkowskie środków na obronność. Przez ostatnie 30 lat ograniczono w Europie wydatki na wojsko i dzisiaj wynoszą one przeciętnie 1,4 % PKB. To wieloletnie niedoinwestowanie silnie obniżyło zdolności obronne poszczególnych państw i Unii jako całości. Dlatego też nie tylko NATO, ale także UE powinna naciskać na państwa, by zwiększyły wydatki obronne do 2 % PKB. Dopiero te dodatkowe środki stwarzałyby szanse na techniczną modernizację wojska, poprawę współdziałania i uzyskanie nowych zdolności, np. do walki w cyberprzestrzeni.

Ze względu na pogarszający się stan bezpieczeństwa wokół Europy powinniśmy w PE częściej analizować rzeczywistą sytuację w zakresie zdolności obronnych poszczególnych państw całej UE.