Volledig verslag van de vergaderingen

Dinsdag 14 februari 2017 - Straatsburg

19. De bankenunie - jaarverslag 2016 (debat)

  Președinte. – Următorul punct de pe ordinea de zi este dezbaterea privind raportul Danutei Maria Hübner, în numele Comisiei pentru afaceri economice și monetare, referitor la uniunea bancară - raportul anual pe 2016 (2016/2247(INI)) (A8-0019/2017).

  Danuta Maria Hübner, rapporteur. – Mr President, I would like to start by saying that the Banking Union has, in my view, been one of the most significant steps taken to respond to the financial crisis, and it is a precious achievement. Since mid-2012 when it was initiated, we have come a long way towards addressing the negative feedback loop and other damaging procyclical ties between banks and sovereigns. However, like the economic governance which we have been intensely discussing during the session, also the Banking Union is halfway through. We have unfinished business with the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), with the fiscal backstop, with possible changes in the prudential treatment of sovereign debt to further dealing banks and sovereign, and with possible transfer of the full responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance to the central level.

We also have legacy issues to deal with, such as non-performing loans. What I intended to do with this report was to give a critical overview of the challenges we are facing, while not pre-empting the outcome of the legislative discussions on EDIS, as well as on the new banking package that amends CRR/CRD, BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism regulation. The recommendations of the report concern all the pillars of the Banking Union, the supervision resolution and deposit insurance, and it looks into a variety of issues.

Through excellent cooperation with other colleagues, we have built broad consensus on this comprehensive report and we look with much detail into all areas where recommendations can be made. The report has become a helpful stock—taking exercise before handing over to the colleagues leading the legislative discussions. I hope the messages will be taken into account and will feed into legislative debates. However, there are also broader issues in this report which will not be dealt with in the current Commission banking package. I am especially thinking of the fiscal backstop. It needs to be done, and actually there is agreement to establish it. The current solution, credit lines between national governments and the ESM, is not sufficient to overcome the banks’ sovereign vicious circle and do away with the bailouts. Ultimate liability for the financing of the backstop should rest with the banking sector, and not with taxpayers. The backstop should be fiscally neutral over the medium term.

There is another set of issues which will not be part of the current negotiations on the banking package because global guidance is needed there. I am thinking here of internal models to calculate capital requirements and the prudential treatment of sovereign debt. In the case of internal models, work is being done at the level of the Basel Committee and also in the EU, at the level of the EBA and of the ECB, as regards the harmonisation of the financial of testing of models.

We need to balance the creation of a level playing field between small and large banks and the transparency and comparability of capital requirements, with the need for risk sensitivity and the possibility to use specific information from banks that can bring useful refinement to the model. In the case of the prudential treatment of sovereign debt, we would like to better reflect the risks involved, and we also hope, with the differentiated capital treatment, to incentivise diversification of exposures across sovereigns. This has to be balanced with the need to keep some kind of safe asset to retain a benchmark for price formation on our financial markets, and not to procyclically penalise financially fragile governments.

To conclude, let us not forget that with the UK out of the Union, all Member States except Denmark are committed to joining the euro in the future, so we should encourage those countries to see the benefits of joining the Banking Union and of benefiting through Banking Union membership from participation in the decision-sharing mechanism between home and host countries that we have established for the resolution of banks.

  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, first of all I would like to thank Ms Hübner for her annual report on the Banking Union. It provides an excellent overview of how much has been achieved since the financial crisis and clearly identifies much of what remains to be done. The Banking Union is central to the new regulatory and supervisory architecture we have put in place. Its main role is to maintain a strong banking system which can effectively finance the needs of the wider economy and encourage economic growth. Ms Hübner’s report is broad in scope, so let us focus on the main measures essential to strengthening the Banking Union.

First, we need to improve the existing institutional framework. That is why the Commission supports a call to reduce national options and discretions, to promote consistency in bank supervision across participating Member States. We will work to achieve this by amending existing banking regulations. The creation of the Single Supervisory and Resolution Mechanisms has improved the coherence of the approach taken by supervisory authorities across the EU. It should now be possible to support a better use of bank capital and liquidity resources across the Banking Union. We are aware that some Member States will have concerns about hosting banks from other EU countries, so our banking proposals aim to extend the use of liquidity and capital waivers with strong safeguards.

Secondly, to reduce risks in the banking sector, our EU banking reform package aims to strengthen the prudential framework and to increase banks’ ability to absorb losses in times of crisis without the help of taxpayers’ money. As set out in your report, the EU regulatory framework must be proportionate and respect diversity in the European banking sector. This is particularly true for smaller banks, for which we want light reporting and disclosure requirements.

EU banks are significantly stronger than they were before the crisis. This is in large part due to their own efforts to adjust their business models, but also thanks to the regulatory reform we introduced, and better supervision. But non-performing loan ratios remain high in some Member States. The Commission is working with those Member States to encourage the gradual reduction of non-performing loans. Banks’ exposure to sovereigns is another area where the Commission is engaged to find a workable solution. We share Parliament’s views that the problem carries many implications. As was agreed in the June 2016 Council conclusions, it is important to await the outcome of the Basel Committee talks before taking a decision at European level. The Commission welcomes the report’s call to complete the Banking Union with a common deposit insurance scheme. We are committed to working with the Parliament and Council to take this forward. Further progress is also needed to build up a sufficiently large and readily available common backstop as a significant strengthening of the Single Resolution Mechanism’s credibility.

Looking beyond the financial risks facing the banking sector, the Commission agrees with Parliament about the need for our financial institutions to have in place strong and well-functioning IT systems. We are committed to working on measures to boost cyber security in the financial sector, and in particular we support facilitating the exchange of sensitive information between banks to prevent cyber attacks while, of course, protecting the use of personal data.

These are just some of the areas that struck me in your report. We share the view that we have strong foundations on which to build, but progress is still needed in a number of important areas. Overall, we can be optimistic about the opportunity to refine our work so as to continue meeting our financial objectives while supporting growth and investment in Europe.

  Burkhard Balz, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Die Bankenunion hat zu einer umfassenden Verlagerung von nationalen Kompetenzen auf die europäische Ebene geführt.

Es wurden mit der europäischen Bankenaufsicht und dem europäischen Abwicklungsmechanismus neue, bislang nie dagewesene Strukturen geschaffen. Es liegt nun an den EU-Institutionen, diese Strukturen mit Glaubwürdigkeit und Inhalt zu füllen und vor allen Dingen fortlaufend zu überprüfen. Es liegt auch an den EU-Institutionen, die richtige Balance zwischen notwendiger europäischer Aufsicht und notwendiger nationaler Aufsicht sicherzustellen, denn beides hat seine Berechtigung und gehört zusammen.

Mit dem Jahresbericht zur Bankenunion 2016 hat die Berichterstatterin einen sehr guten Bericht vorgelegt. Der Bericht macht deutlich, dass die Risikoreduzierung im Bankensektor weiter voranschreiten muss, und zwar sowohl durch den Gesetzgeber als auch durch die Aufseher. So muss das anhaltend hohe Level von ausfallgefährdeten Krediten in einigen Mitgliedstaaten nach wie vor adressiert werden. Die Bankenunion wird gerne als Weg bezeichnet, um die Verbindung zwischen Banken und Staatsfinanzierung zu kappen. Dafür reichen aber nicht die Strukturen der Bankenunion alleine, sondern es muss ein Umdenken in der Risikobetrachtung insgesamt gegeben sein.

Wir müssen die europäische Abwicklungsbehörde mit Durchgriffskräften ausstatten, die hier rechtzeitig unglaubwürdig ein Eingreifen zum Schutz der Steuerzahler und Sparer erlaubt. Wir müssen sicherstellen, dass die Finanzinstitute umfassende Kapital- und Fremdkapitalpuffer in hoher Qualität für mögliche Abwicklungssituationen bereithalten. Die internationalen Anforderungen sind hierbei ein wichtiger Maßstab für die globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit unseres Bankensektors. Gleichzeitig muss die EU sicherstellen, dass ihr richtigerweise für die Bankenunion gewählter risikoorientierter Ansatz angewandt und umgesetzt wird.

Die Bankenunion wird Schritt für Schritt weiter konkretisiert und verbessert. Die EU-Kommission ist seit Ende letzten Jahres in der Pflicht, eine Prüfung der europäischen Bankenaufsicht vorzunehmen. Wir zählen darauf, dass sie unsere kritischen Anmerkungen und Verbesserungsvorschläge auch mit einfließen lässt.

  Mady Delvaux, au nom du groupe S&D. – Monsieur le Président, je voudrais d’abord féliciter Danuta Maria Hübner qui a œuvré pour le consensus le plus large possible pour que, justement, les messages du Parlement soient entendus, qui rappelle les requêtes formulées dans le rapport sur l’Union bancaire de l’année dernière, mais qui fait aussi le suivi de ce qui marche et de ce qui marche moins bien dans l’Union bancaire.

Il faut souligner qu’il y a des avancées notables: le système créé avec la directive relative au redressement des banques et à la résolution de leurs défaillances (BRRD) et la directive relative aux systèmes de garantie des dépôts (DGSD) prend de plus en plus forme, le mécanisme de supervision unique fonctionne, le travail des équipes de surveillance prudentielle conjointe permet le développement d’une expertise et de connaissances partagées, le mécanisme de résolution est entré en vigueur au 1er janvier 2016, le fonds de résolution unique commence à être doté.

Mais nous n’ignorons pas que des hypothèques pèsent lourdement sur la stabilité et la durabilité de notre système bancaire et, donc, sur l’économie européenne. Je ne vais mentionner que les créances douteuses, le traitement prudentiel de la dette souveraine, la question des aides d’État et, surtout, le fait que l’Union bancaire n’est pas complète. Il manque le troisième pilier, il n’y a pas de dispositif de soutien budgétaire. Le risque des «too big to fail» n’est pas éliminé et, sans préjuger les discussions sur les différents points, il y a urgence à compléter l’Union bancaire dans l’intérêt de l’économie réelle, mais surtout pour rassurer et protéger les dépôts des citoyens.

Il reste donc de grands dossiers à finaliser et, en même temps, il faut veiller au fonctionnement quotidien et assurer que la cohérence entre réglementations qui se chevauchent soit garantie, voire établie, que des ressources adéquates soient disponibles et que la sécurité informatique soit davantage prise en compte. Bref, il faut légiférer, mais en même temps, veiller à une mise en œuvre correcte de la réglementation.

  Sander Loones, namens de ECR-Fractie. – Wanneer een bank in de problemen komt wordt de rekening altijd doorgeschoven naar de belastingbetaler. Hoe we daaraan een eind kunnen maken, is een vraag waarmee wij ons hier in de Europese Unie moeten bezighouden. Hoe kunnen we dit verband breken? We hebben een hele reeks regels ingevoerd die onze banken veiliger moeten maken, maar ons werk is nog lang niet af.

De Europese Centrale Bank voert nu een monetaire politiek die ons financieel systeem opnieuw onveiliger maakt. Gratis geld zorgt ervoor dat mensen op zoek gaan naar hogere rendementen en dus ook meer risico’s opzoeken. Aan de andere kant zien we dat de Italiaanse banken al jarenlang het water aan de lippen hebben staan, dat ze bijna verdrinken en dat we er eigenlijk dag na dag moeten voor zorgen dat ze het hoofd boven water houden.

Dat alles wijst op die oude ziekte van de Europese Unie: als wij al regels hebben, dan worden die veel te veel omzeild, dan worden die niet genoeg gerespecteerd, niet goed genoeg toegepast. En vandaag zien we dat nog maar eens. Die spiraal moeten wij doorbreken. Van die kwalijke gewoontes moeten wij af. Zo moeten wij ook een einde maken aan de staatssteun voor de banken. We zetten hier opnieuw een grote stap vooruit.

  Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, the banking union is an EU project after the creation of the euro and it is fundamental for the future of our currency. The absence of European financial supervision was one of the reasons that brought us to the financial crisis. National financial supervision is less effective as banks globalised their activities. The ECB has been reliable and has won strong credibility. The contrast with some national central banks is huge.

Yesterday, for instance, the former President of Banco de España, Miguel Ángel Fernández Ordóñez, as well as his supervisory team, were indicted by the Spanish justice on charges of allowing irregularities in Bankia’s initial public offering in July 2011. Bankia’s IPO was done, even though Banco de España knew that it was close to bankruptcy. It was just done because of the close relations between the Banco de España and Bankia’s Director, Rodrigo Rato. Thousands of people lost their savings and Bankia was bailed out for EUR 23 billion, paid thanks to a European bail—out. This is why the banking union is so important: to say goodbye for ever to the bad practices of many national supervisors in many national central banks in Europe.

I would like to call attention to the amendment to be tabled with the Greens and ECR: the use of public money to bail out banks has to be only in exceptional cases. If the rules of the banking union are not followed, as may happen now in Italy, our future will be full of more public deficits and a new banking crisis will put the euro at risk. Only if all Member States comply with banking union legislation will it be possible to create a European deposit guarantee to complete our project and give extra assurance to citizens and investors.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 162(8))

  Marco Valli (EFDD), Domanda "cartellino blu". – Grazie Ramon per aver accettato la mia domanda. Sulla questione relativa ai crediti deteriorati volevo sapere, visto che ha citato l'Italia, se i crediti che erano stati inseriti all'interno di quelle valutazioni, che non sono poi state fatte in Germania, per quanto riguarda le banche dei Länder tedeschi, cosa ne pensa lei, visto che attacca l'Italia dicendo che non abbiamo risolto il problema dei crediti deteriorati, mentre in Germania un intero sistema bancario come quello dei Länder è fuori dalla vigilanza unica. Io credo che ci siano anche lì grosse valutazioni da fare sul rischio di queste banche.

  Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE). – Risposta a una domanda "cartellino blu". Caro collega, devo dire che se in Germania le piccole casse di risparmio sono fuori dalla supervisione europea, se ci sono perdite, solamente i German taxpayers, i tedeschi, pagheranno per gli errori che può fare la Bundesbank e non ci sarà un effetto di queste perdite su tutta l’Europa. Devo anche dire, per esempio, che nel caso di Bankia il Primo ministro spagnolo Rajoy diceva sempre “it's too big to fail”, ma questo non è vero perché l’ex Commissario Almunia, che era anche spagnolo, diceva che in Germania ci sono banche più grandi di Bankia che sono state chiuse per non causare perdite per i taxpayer. Devo dire che, in questo senso, se l'Italia deve essere coerente, non può firmare l’Unione bancaria nel 2014, come ha fatto Renzi, e dopo dire che adesso faremo un bailout come abbiamo fatto tutta la vita perché ci sono perdite per gli investitori.

  Matt Carthy, on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group. – Mr President, banking union was founded on the promise of ending the days of taxpayer—funded bail-outs, a laudable aspiration. As a representative from Ireland, where our people were saddled with over EUR 60 billion in private European bank debt, and have subsequently suffered from years of austerity at the hands of the Troika and governments led by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, I can say it is an aspiration we would share. But the truth is that the promise of the banking union was – and is – a false promise.

In recent months, we have seen and heard the first real test of the new rules on bank recovery and resolution in the Italian banking crisis. Commissioner, I wish you and your team would have the courage to admit that the banking union’s stated goal of ending public bail-outs and solving the ‘too big to fail’ problem has failed spectacularly. Italy makes it clear for the world to see that taxpayer-funded bail-outs can, and will, continue under these weak and loophole-ridden rules.

The European Central Bank revised its calculation on how big the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) capital shortfall was and did not even bother to tell us why. Is MPS actually solvent? If not, it does not qualify for public assistance. We need rules that truly prevent taxpayer-funded bail-outs; we need to address the bad loan problem by ending the savage austerity agenda championed by this Commission; and we need finally to step up and address the ‘too big to fail’ problem by introducing bank structural reform that actually separates commercial and investment banking. Otherwise we are set to repeat history, and it will be the ordinary, decent families of Europe who will again pay the price.

  Marco Valli, a nome del gruppo EFDD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'analisi che faccio dell'Unione bancaria è molto critica perché quest'Unione purtroppo ha creato ulteriori stabilità invece che andare a parare realmente sulle cause delle crisi bancarie sistemiche. Avremmo dovuto fare una reale separazione bancaria tra banche di investimento e banche che fanno attività del credito. Questo non è stato fatto e si è trovata una soluzione alternativa che crea però dei conflitti di interesse.

Adesso vediamo il primo pilastro supervisione, dove c'è il rischio credito messo sotto una lente di ingrandimento, mentre gli asset di terzo livello e tutto quello che è rischio finanziario, derivati e quant'altro, dove son piene le banche francesi e le banche tedesche, non vengono presi in considerazione. Guarda caso le banche tedesche e le banche francesi oggi fanno offerte d'acquisto per le banche italiane, che sono messe sotto pressione da quei crediti deteriorati che loro hanno scorporato con grossi contributi pubblici negli scorsi anni. Quindi non accetto morale dai deputati tedeschi e francesi e quant'altri che hanno speso centinaia di miliardi per salvare le loro banche e molto probabilmente coprire favori della loro politica nei confronti di imprenditori e quant'altri.

  Bernard Monot, au nom du groupe ENF. – Monsieur le Vice-président, l’Union bancaire, heureusement pour les Européens, n’a encore jamais été vraiment utilisée. Seul Chypre, en 2013, a servi de laboratoire d’essai à la Troïka pour tester le bail-in, cette technique inique de renflouement des banques par ses propres clients, soi-disant pour protéger les contribuables.

Depuis, l’Union européenne est passée en force et en urgence pour préempter la souveraineté bancaire des États membres de la zone euro et des citoyens, et confier la supervision à la BCE.

L’Union bancaire est en vigueur depuis le 1er janvier 2016 et autorise légalement les institutions européennes à ponctionner les comptes bancaires des clients en cas de crise bancaire. Ce MRU, le mécanisme de résolution unique par l’Union européenne, constitue une répression financière intolérable contre les citoyens. Cette méthode est un scandale démocratique, une remise en cause du droit de propriété et un vol légalisé, dénoncé par les patriotes du Front national, qui confirme notre analyse politique sur les conséquences de la crise de 2008 et de la nocivité de l’euro.

J’accuse l’Union européenne et la BCE d’avoir mis en place en 2016 un régime de totalitarisme financier pour sauver les banques et l’euro à tout prix. Pourquoi? Parce qu’en réalité le système bancaire européen est en état d’urgence. C’est justement le premier constat de ce rapport Hübner. La BCE et le FMI s’inquiètent aussi des 1 000 milliards d’euros de créances douteuses qui rongent les bilans des banques. Et ils ont raison, en témoignent la situation critique de la Deutsche Bank, en Allemagne, et la crise bancaire italienne.

Tout cela prouve bien que les tests de résistance rassurants de 2014 étaient, en réalité, complètement bidonnés.

Tout comme le Front national, l’Autorité bancaire européenne (ABE) de surveillance des banques lance une nouvelle alerte sur la solvabilité des banques européennes. Pour l’ABE, les actifs toxiques des banques en faillite, c’est un peu comme la poussière: on la cache dans les bad banks, qui finiront elles aussi par faire faillite et qui seront, au final, encore renflouées par les contribuables européens.

Cette solution que vous refusez, celle de la séparation et de la scission bancaire, est celle de l’indépendance vis-à-vis des banques privées, et elle demande du courage politique. Or, s’il y a bien une caractéristique propre à l’Union européenne, c’est sa fidélité sans faille aux lobbies privés et son désintérêt à l’égard des peuples.

  Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señor presidente, primero quisiera felicitar a mi colega Danuta Hübner por su informe, y decir que la unión bancaria constituye un componente indispensable de la unión monetaria y un pilar fundamental de una verdadera unión económica y monetaria. Pero la unión bancaria no es solo necesaria para garantizar la estabilidad y restablecer la confianza en los bancos de la zona euro; también es esencial para aumentar la integración financiera, para reducir el riesgo en el sistema bancario europeo y el riesgo moral, para contribuir a que se rompa el vínculo entre los bancos y la deuda soberana, y para fomentar el reparto de riesgos en el seno de la unión monetaria.

La unión bancaria desempeña un papel fundamental en la financiación de la inversión y, por lo tanto, en el fomento del crecimiento y la creación de empleo en la Unión. Apostamos entonces por la unión bancaria en respuesta a la crisis financiera y ya hemos logrado los dos primeros pilares: el Mecanismo Único de Supervisión y el Mecanismo Único de Resolución. Debemos continuar avanzando en esta dirección, asegurando que el reparto y la reducción de riesgos avanzan en paralelo. Por eso debemos avanzar en las negociaciones para crear un Fondo Europeo de Garantía de Depósitos que complete la unión bancaria y que garantice que el dinero de los contribuyentes esté protegido ante posibles futuras crisis.

La unión económica y monetaria se encuentra en muchísimo mejor forma hoy de lo que estaba antes de la crisis financiera, pero completar la unión bancaria es un paso necesario para continuar avanzando hacia una verdadera unión económica y monetaria de los Estados miembros.

  Pervenche Berès (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Vice-président, personne ne vous étonnera en vous disant que le groupe socialiste plaide fortement pour compléter l’Union bancaire afin que le troisième pilier soit enfin en place et que l’Union bancaire soit dotée de ce fiscal backstop (dispositif de soutien budgétaire) qui lui fait toujours défaut.

Nous ne souhaitons pas non plus que votre projet d’une union des marchés des capitaux vienne se substituer à cet achèvement de l’Union bancaire ou même que ce marché des capitaux soit un outil pour abaisser la qualité réglementaire.

Je ne sais pas si l’intransigeance peut être toujours bonne conseillère, mais je note que ceux qui demandent l’application la plus stricte des règles du pacte de stabilité ne sont pas toujours les plus fervents partisans d’un déblocage des négociations sur le paquet EDIS. Or, s’ils veulent restaurer la confiance des investisseurs privés, qui semble être l’alpha et l’omega de leur doctrine économique, il faudra bien qu’ils accélèrent le pas.

Concernant le rapport de Danuta Hübner, je veux mentionner trois choses qui me semblent importantes.

Tout d’abord, sur l’affaire des prêts non productifs, il me semble que la proposition que vient de faire le président de l’ABE de créer une «bad bank» doit être examinée attentivement.

Ensuite, regardons ce qui se passe du côté des États-Unis pour éviter que ne se remette en place un système bancaire parallèle dans lequel nos banques européennes déverseraient leurs risques.

Enfin, dernier point, je crois que nous attendons de votre part un réajustement des compétences entre les différents mécanismes au vu de l’expérience acquise. Nous attendons ces propositions avec intérêt.

  Stanisław Ożóg (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie i Panowie! Chcę podkreślić, że przy tak kontrowersyjnym i w sumie trudnym temacie, jakim jest unia bankowa, sprawozdawczyni udało się wyważyć poprawki i osiągnąć kompromisy łączące uwagi prawie wszystkich opcji politycznych. Do sprawozdania włączyła wiele poprawek mojej frakcji politycznej dotyczących między innymi zagrożonych kredytów restrukturyzacji długu, zaangażowania w dług państwowy, wprowadzenia wskaźnika dźwigni. W sprawozdaniu poruszono problem przestrzegania przepisów w kwestii publicznej dla banków. Zaproponowano usprawnienia działania systemu unii bankowej. Polska, moja delegacja, jest jednak sceptyczna wobec stworzenia kontynuacji unii bankowej. I pomimo że raport jest opracowany bardzo dobrze, jest bardzo wyważony, nie możemy go poprzeć. Wstrzymamy się od głosu.

  Jonás Fernández (S&D). – Señor presidente, discutimos hoy un informe importante que votaremos en los próximos días, que apuesta claramente por cerrar el modelo de unión bancaria. En el primer semestre del año 2012 la zona euro estuvo muy cerca del abismo. Creímos por momentos que el euro podía desaparecer y fue el compromiso en el verano de ese 2012 para la creación de la unión bancaria lo que nos salvó del desastre. Y he de decir que desde entonces la crisis empezó primero a desacelerarse y ahora estamos en una situación un poco más optimista, pero con problemas. Pero esa unión bancaria que se puso en marcha en 2012 necesita ser completada, y necesitamos aprobar ya un fondo europeo de garantía de depósitos.

No podemos estar esperando, seguir con las instrucciones de dilación, de dilatación de la negociación por parte del Consejo. Y en el Parlamento tenemos que avanzar rápidamente, con un fiscal backstop que cierre el modelo de una vez.

Procedura „catch the eye”

  Nicola Caputo (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l’elevato livello di crediti deteriorati desta non poca preoccupazione. L'Unione europea deve spingere per la costituzione di una bad bank che è obiettivamente l'unica via di uscita per gestire gli oltre mille miliardi di euro di crediti deteriorati dell'eurozona, consentendo alle banche di vendere i crediti problematici al loro valore economico reale. Serve una risposta forte alla persistente instabilità del contesto bancario in Europa. È condivisibile l'invito del Fondo monetario internazionale ad introdurre cambiamenti profondi, sia nei modelli economici delle banche sia nella struttura del sistema, per garantire a livello europeo un sistema bancario sano.

La crisi ha evidenziato carenze nell'architettura globale della moneta unica. Penso sia arrivato il momento di finalizzare la creazione di un sistema europeo di assicurazione dei depositi, che potrebbe rappresentare il terzo pilastro dell'Unione bancaria ed affiancarsi ai sistemi di garanzia dei depositi, garantendo così un livello più elevato di tutele patrimoniali a fronte dell'emersione dei rischi di default per gli enti creditizi europei.

  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, μια υγιής Τραπεζική Ένωση προϋποθέτει, πρώτα από όλα, διαχωρισμό επενδυτικών και εμπορικών τραπεζών. Χρειαζόμαστε δηλαδή, κύριε Dombrovskis, ένα είδος ευρωπαϊκού Glass-Steagall Act. Δεύτερον, υπάρχει ανάγκη για ένα ευρωπαϊκό σύστημα εγγύησης καταθέσεων. Τα κράτη μέλη διέθεσαν τρισεκατομμύρια ευρώ για να διασώσουν τις τράπεζες. Είχαμε, δηλαδή, κοινωνικοποίηση των ζημιών των τραπεζών, και αυτά όλα τα πλήρωσαν οι φορολογούμενοι. Έτσι, για να σωθούν οι τράπεζες, αυξήθηκε το δημόσιο χρέος. Με το πρώτο μνημόνιο στην Ελλάδα, διασώθηκαν γερμανικές και γαλλικές τράπεζες που κατείχαν ελληνικά κρατικά ομόλογα, ύψους 150 δισεκατομμυρίων EUR, και αφού σώθηκαν οι τράπεζες, και στην Ελλάδα αλλά και σε όλη την Ευρώπη, επιτίθενται πλέον κατά των δανειοληπτών, οι οποίοι έχουν φτωχοποιηθεί από τη λιτότητα και την ανεργία και δεν μπορούν πλέον να πληρώσουν τα δάνειά τους. Χρειαζόμαστε, λοιπόν, ένα δημόσιο ταμείο για τα κόκκινα δάνεια και στην Ελλάδα και στην Ευρώπη για να μην αρπάξουν τα «κοράκια» τις περιουσίες των δανειοληπτών.

(Încheierea procedurii „catch the eye”)

  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, I am grateful to Ms Hübner for her excellent report and to those who took the floor to make interventions. Everything you said points to the importance of having a robust and stable financial system, while at the same time ensuring that banks are able to play their role in lending to the wider economy to support growth and jobs.

To address some points raised by Ms Berès on the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union, it must be very clearly stated that we see the Capital Markets Union as a complement to the Banking Union and not as a replacement. We obviously do not expect capital markets to replace banks in their role of financing the real economy. Indeed, those are complementary projects and need to be seen as such.

I also touched upon completion of the Banking Union, including through the European Deposit Scheme and a common backstop for a single resolution fund. As always, we emphasise that risk sharing and risk reduction must go hand in hand, so we also need to drive forward our risk reduction agenda through our bank reform package and other initiatives which we presented in November of last year, but not limited to that. We count on your continued support in moving forward this important regulatory agenda.

  Danuta Maria Hübner, rapporteur. – Mr President, I would like once again to use this opportunity to thank colleagues for being open to building a broad consensus around the report. As you are here with us, Vice-President Dombrovskis, I would also like to thank you for your positive reactions and I take them as a commitment on the Commission’s part to take on board our recommendations as elements for your further work. We also hope that issues related to the completion of the banking union will find a place in your White Paper. I would like to say that, of course, we all know that it is unfinished business, that it is a living project and there will be improvements and there will hopefully be completion of the banking union, but we believe that it is not only about legislation and the missing elements of the legislative framework. This is absolutely crucial, but we also believe that it is important to ensure that the existing institutions within the banking union develop the best possible practices in their current work.

  Președinte. – Dezbaterea a fost închisă.

Votul va avea loc miercuri, 15 februarie 2017.