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Menetlus : 2015/0226(COD)
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A8-0387/2016

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PV 25/10/2017 - 14
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P8_TA(2017)0415

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Kolmapäev, 25. oktoober 2017 - Strasbourg Uuendatud versioon

14. Lihtsa, läbipaistva ja standarditud väärtpaberistamise raamistik - Krediidiasutuste ja investeerimisühingute suhtes kohaldatavad usaldatavusnõuded (arutelu)
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PV
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  Przewodniczący. – Kolejnym punktem porządku dnia jest wspólna debata nad:

– sprawozdaniem sporządzonym przez Paula Tanga w imieniu Komisji Gospodarczej i Monetarnej w sprawie ustanowienia wspólnych zasad dotyczących sekurytyzacji, utworzenia europejskich ram dla prostych, przejrzystych i standardowych sekurytyzacji oraz zmiany dyrektyw 2009/65/WE, 2009/138/WE, 2011/61/UE i rozporządzeń (WE) nr 1060/2009 i (UE) nr 648/2012 (COM(2015)0472 – C8-0288/2015 – 2015/0226(COD)) (A8-0387/2017) oraz

– sprawozdaniem sporządzonym przez Othmara Karasa w imieniu Komisji Gospodarczej i Monetarnej w sprawie wymogów ostrożnościowych dla instytucji kredytowych i firm inwestycyjnych (COM(2015)0473 – C8-0289/2015 – 2015/0225(COD) (A8-0388/2017).

 
  
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  Paul Tang, rapporteur. – Mr President, it is good to have this debate just before the vote tomorrow. And the question is: has a toxic product turned into a medicine for the European economy? That is the question we have to ask ourselves and our voters – our public. I dare to say yes, in the realisation that any medicine can be toxic if it is taken in excess. A medicine can be toxic if it is taken in an uncontrolled manner, meaning that you have to take control. I will come back to that.

I am happy to have had the debate not only now, but also on many occasions in this House. It is an extremely important topic if only because of its history. We know that the financial crisis started with toxic products – mortgages – in the USA and then almost blew up the entire system. This was a major blow to the financial sector, the economy and people’s everyday lives. I am happy that we have had this debate, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the people that worked on this, and of course the shadows, especially Othmar Karas – who you could say is my co-rapporteur – as well as the people from the Commission and the Council. I ask forgiveness for having sometimes been strong-headed and a bit stubborn, but I hope I have never been narrow-minded.

The start of this discussion, which was almost two years ago, was with a proposal from the Commission and also the proposal from the Commission tried to draw lessons from the crisis, for example by defining clear responsibilities for issuers and investors. The issuers have to disclose information and the investors have to do due diligence. No longer can someone say ‘I didn’t know what I was selling’, or ‘I didn’t know what I was buying’.

But another question we had in the debate in Parliament was ‘are these all the lessons that we need to learn from a financial crisis?’ Put differently – more technically – what you want is a deep and liquid market at all times, in good times and in bad times. The European Parliament has added some of these lessons.

Firstly, an issue that is not at the core of our discussion: sustainability. We added sustainability by including characteristics of houses and cars. This also shows that we have to do this more consistently as legislators – both the Commission and the Parliament. I know that the Commissioner is working on that, and I very much support it. More at the core of this file was the prudential framework and strong supervision, giving clear roles to the ESRB and to the ESMA. This is important when you want to control the market.

The second was transparency: data repositories now giving a role to European Data Warehouse. There was also a discussion on the retention rates – the skin in the game. As I learnt, through discussions in this House and outside this House, it was not just about the rate, it was about the method. There is still an important difference between a horizontal and a vertical method, because it is not about the rate, it is about the incentive. The European Parliament has taken a good position by differentiating between the two, but we also know that we will have a review later. This is the part that the European Parliament has to take a very close look at.

Finally, let me say that this is also for the supervisors. They have an important role to monitor and control this market.

 
  
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  Othmar Karas, Berichterstatter. – Herr Präsident, Herr Vizepräsident Dombrovskis, meine Damen und Herren! Die neuen Regeln für Verbriefungen sind ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zur Schaffung einer europäischen Kapitalmarktunion, eine gute Nachricht für den Finanz- und Wirtschaftsstandort Europa und ein Erfolg für das Europäische Parlament. Durch die Umwandlung von Forderungen in handelbare Wertpapiere streut die Verbriefung Risken, damit diese von jenen getragen werden, die dazu am besten in der Lage sind. Sie schafft neue Investitionsmöglichkeiten, und sie verbessert die Kreditvergabe an Haushalte und Unternehmen.

Bei der Regulierung gab es zweierlei in Einklang zu bringen: Zum einen wollen wir eine wichtige Lehre aus der Finanzkrise ziehen und die Finanzstabilität sicherstellen, zum anderen wollen wir den europäischen Markt wiederbeleben und den Emissionsrückgang von 42 % im Vergleich zum Vorkrisenniveau adressieren.

Wir haben jene Ziele erreicht, für die sich das Europäische Parlament von Beginn an intensiv eingesetzt hat, und ich darf mich bei Kollegen Tang und den anderen Kolleginnen und Kollegen im Ausschuss recht herzlich bedanken. Wir schaffen einfache, transparente und einheitliche Regeln – ein sicheres Vehikel, das hilft, die Realwirtschaft zu finanzieren sowie Vertrauen im europäischen Verbriefungsmarkt sowohl zwischen Banken als auch anderen Finanzinstrumenten wieder herzustellen.

Für das Erreichen dieser Ziele greifen die beiden gemeinsam verhandelten Rechtsakte – ich bin ja Berichterstatter und EVP-Rapporteur – Hand in Hand. Wenn wir sie uns als Auto vorstellen, dann wäre wohl das neue Rahmenwerk für alle Verbriefungen die Karosserie und die Überarbeitung der Eigenkapitalverordnung dessen Motor. Damit der Motor läuft, haben wir als Parlament dafür Sorge getragen, dass wir mit einer risikogerechten Kapitalbehandlung für STS-Verbriefungen die Ausgaben hochwertiger Produkte fördern, dass wir eine Abweichung von Basel bei der Hierarchie der Ansätze unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen ermöglichen, um europäische Besonderheiten zu berücksichtigen, dass wir Anreize für KMU-Verbriefungen ausbauen und dass wir Wiederverbriefungen verbieten, damit Kreditrisken nicht mehr von Investoren verschleiert werden können. Für eine robuste Karosserie haben wir den Risikoselbstbehalt in Einklang mit globalen Standards auf 5 % festgeschrieben, ein Verbriefungsregister für mehr Transparenz geschaffen, die Durchführung von Auto-Verbriefungen sichergestellt und eine umfassende Überwachung des Verbriefungsmarkts durchgesetzt.

Mit diesem Gesetzespaket – verbildlicht in Karosserie und Motor – zeigen wir, dass wir es ernst meinen, gemeinsam klarere, transparentere und strengere Regeln einzuziehen und das Vertrauen in den Markt wieder zurückzugewinnen, damit Gift zur Medizin werden kann und wir bis zu 150 Mrd. EUR an zusätzlichen Finanzmitteln für die europäische Wirtschaft mobilisieren, die wir neben den Reformen dringend benötigen, um Wachstum und Beschäftigung in Europa wieder zu einer Dauererrungenschaft zu machen.

 
  
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  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, today’s debate and your vote tomorrow concern one of the first proposals put forward as part of our capital markets union, and it is an important one. By defining criteria for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation (STS), we can revitalise European capital markets’ securitisation in a sustainable way. There is a broad consensus among regulators, supervisors and companies that this would benefit the European economy. It would free up more lending for investment and help manage risk in the banking sector.

Securitisation allows banks to convert pools of individual loans into bonds, which are then sold to other institutions or long—term investors. This helps banks free up capital set aside for existing loans and, in this way, securitisation supports more lending to the wider economy and gives investors access to more investment instruments. Securitisation is believed by many to have been the trigger for the financial crisis in the US. While EU securitisation has performed well overall during the crisis, the crisis still reveals flaws in the way securitisation was regulated and supervised.

At the moment securitisation in the EU is very low. Last year, issuance of securitised products in Europe was not even at half of its 2007 level. Given its important role in financing the real economy, in 2015 the Commission put forward a framework for revitalising the market in a prudent way. By rebuilding issuance back to the pre-crisis levels, we could generate an additional EUR 115 billion of yearly funding for households and companies.

After two years of discussions, I am happy to say that the final result is both balanced and ambitious. It will help restore an important funding channel for the EU economy, while learning from the mistakes of the past. The new regulation sets out specific criteria for securitisations to help investors understand the nature and the risk of what they are investing in. The qualifying securitisations would be simple. For example, only comparable loans can be brought together in one product, and the repackaging of other securitisations would generally not be allowed.

They would also be transparent, meaning that the right information is available for investors to assess risk and for supervisors to properly monitor markets. Building on the Parliament’s proposal, the package now includes an ESMA-supervised data repository to ensure the transparency of STS securitisations. Securitisations would be standardised to make them easy to identify and understand.

Our proposals contain appropriate safeguards. The issuer would need to retain at least 5% of the securitised asset. This is to ensure that their incentives are aligned with those of the investor. Underlying assets would also need to be creditworthy according to existing EU rules.

Finally, we are introducing new capital requirement rules for those banks that invest in securitisation in order to promote a stable and resilient banking sector. These requirements build on global standards and will fully reflect the lower risks associated with the STS securitisation.

So we have done important work to agree on the final text. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the European Parliament and, in particular, the Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Roberto Gualtieri, the rapporteurs, Paul Tang and Othmar Karas, and the shadow rapporteurs. Let us now conclude this important chapter in building the capital markets union so that the benefits to businesses and households can be quickly realised.

 
  
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  Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, în numele grupului PPE. – Domnule președinte, într-adevăr, prin acest pachet legislativ cu privire la securitizare facem un pas important în direcția realizării a ceea ce chemăm Uniunea Europeană a piețelor de capital. De ce spun acest lucru? În primul rând, pentru prima dată, introducem reguli comune cu privire la securitizare, nu numai pentru toate statele membre, dar și pentru toate categoriile de activități financiare, fie că este vorba de bănci, asigurări, managementul activelor și alte activități.

În al doilea rând, aceste reguli asigură transparența, standardizarea, dar și protecția necesară în activitatea de convertire a unor active financiare, prin securitizare, în noi produse financiare care sunt oferite investitorilor. În acest sens, al prudenței, subliniez în mod deosebit trei măsuri cuprinse în acest pachet legislativ: reținerea a cel puțin 5 % din risc de către cei care inițiază securitizarea, condiții stricte prin care noile produse financiare, rezultate prin securitizare, pot fi oferite micilor investitori și, în fine, interzicerea operațiunilor de securitizare succesivă pentru același activ financiar. Să nu uităm, criza financiară a început exact în zona securitizării, a exceselor în cadrul economiei SUA.

Mulțumesc raporturilor și Comisiei pentru acest pachet legislativ.

 
  
  

PRESIDE: RAMÓN LUIS VALCÁRCEL SISO
Vicepresidente

 
  
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  Jonás Fernández, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señor presidente, la verdad es que llegamos ya a este debate después de largo tiempo negociando ambos Reglamentos, el de las titulizaciones STS y el que varía sus requerimientos de capital.

Muchas veces los ciudadanos con los que me reúno en Asturias, en España, me preguntan qué hacemos en esta Cámara. Incluso el público que está hoy aquí con nosotros nos pregunta qué es eso de las titulizaciones, o en qué trabajamos cada día. Y he de decir que a veces resulta muy difícil explicar cuál es nuestro trabajo, en qué afectan a su día a día los reglamentos, las directivas que aprobamos y debatimos en este Parlamento.

Yo creo que aprobamos hoy dos Reglamentos muy importantes, porque muchas familias están pensando, por ejemplo, en comprar un coche que, probablemente, deseen financiar. O muchas pequeñas empresas están teniendo problemas para que sus entidades bancarias les adelanten el cobro de las facturas o les permitan colocar papel comercial. Y estos dos Reglamentos vienen a ayudar a esas personas.

Estos dos Reglamentos van a permitir que las pequeñas empresas que, en los grandes mercados organizados, no tienen acciones, que no pueden emitir bonos en los mercados de capital internacional, puedan colocar con mayor facilidad ese papel comercial a través de sus propias entidades bancarias, porque estas van a poder titulizarlo, van a poder colocarlo después en esos mercados internacionales. Además van a permitir que, a esos hogares que están pensando en comprar coches o en comprar otra serie de bienes que necesiten financiar, se les pueda financiar con mejores tipos de interés, con un mejor tratamiento.

Por lo tanto, hoy damos un paso muy importante, porque creemos que necesitamos activar esa capacidad de financiación a la economía real y lo hacemos. Y lo hacemos con prudencia, porque hemos logrado que la Junta Europea de Riesgo Sistémico analice los mercados de capitales para evitar burbujas como la que vivimos en la crisis pasada. Y lo conseguimos también para que los requerimientos de capital o el coste para los bancos de realizar este tipo de operaciones sean un poco menores, pero siempre sujetos a criterios de calidad muy restrictivos sobre ese tipo de créditos: calidades importantes, calidades elevadas para no volver a cometer los errores de la crisis pasada.

Además, con esos dos Reglamentos ayudamos a crear ese mercado de capitales europeo. Porque defendemos que las agencias de calificación, que siempre discriminan por la calidad del soberano, tengan un papel menor y los inversores internacionales se fijen exclusivamente en el riesgo de los créditos pequeñitos. Miren exactamente cuál es el riesgo para evitar la discriminación entre los países del Norte y los países del Sur. Así que vamos a aprobar esos dos informes, y creo que, a partir de mañana, los ciudadanos europeos lo van a notar en el día a día.

 
  
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  Kay Swinburne, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, I would like to congratulate the rapporteurs Mr Tang and Mr Karas on their reports. Securitised products can be incredibly complicated financial products, yet in the past they had an overly simplified reputation and consequently enjoyed widespread use.

Post-financial crisis, the use of securitisation has severely diminished across Europe, however. I therefore commend the effort shown by this Parliament to encourage understanding and rebuild trust and confidence in these instruments. I am pleased that we have managed to bring this report closer to international standards and ensure that the EU is not placed at a competitive disadvantage globally. However, I personally believe that we could have been even more ambitious in this proposal and, indeed, with the Capital Markets Union project as a whole, as this is an area in which our level of achievement does not so far seem to match up to our rhetoric.

For CMU to work, it needs decisive action, not purely discussion and then compromise. We need an overhaul of national tax laws that favour debt over equity-financing, a reaffirmation of a commitment to global, supervisory cooperation and standards globally. Furthermore, a cultural shift here in Europe from savings to investment is critical.

The aims of CMU need to guide our hand in all ongoing legislation. We need consistency across all legislative files. The EMIR review, for example, needs to be very specifically about finding solutions to the unintended consequences and burdens that we have placed upon non-financial companies. Therefore, the classification of securitisation special purpose entities as financial counterparties, for example, as recently released in the Commission draft report, seems to contradict and threaten what we have achieved in the securitisation legislation. We need to be careful going forwards.

 
  
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  Petr Ježek, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, colleagues, the simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation regulation is a key milestone as we move towards a capital markets union. I believe that carefully monitored, high—quality securitisation can serve to benefit business across Europe. In the EU as a whole, we are too reliant on loans and other forms of funding from banks. Capital markets give businesses a new avenue for funding for their activities. The diversification of funding is important to help deliver more growth for the European economy.

During our negotiations on this regulation, we tried to find the right balance between the lessons learned from the financial crisis and having a framework which ensured that we did not stifle the potential of the securitisation market. We have agreed to have a sensible level of skin in the game, with the risk retention rate for banks of 5%. We have recognised the specificities of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market, particularly as regards pools of car loans and leases. We have enhanced the transparency of securitisation markets, notably through the establishment of data repositories which will enable competent authorities to have a full overview of the products in the market. We have ensured that those who are responsible for originating securitisation products take full responsibility for the products’ place in the marketplace. They will not be able to shift responsibility to empty shelves such as special—purpose vehicles. In the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) file we have adjusted the prudential requirements by adding a new hierarchy approach and a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment of STS securitisation. In my view, the text we will vote on tomorrow is sensible, prudent, and most of us will give European companies more possibilities to grow.

 
  
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  Νικόλαος Χουντής, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL. – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, στο όνομα της κεφαλαιακής επάρκειας των ελληνικών τραπεζών, στο όνομα της απελευθέρωσης της αγοράς τιτλοποιημένων δανείων και στο όνομα της διαχείρισης των μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων, πραγματοποιείται η καταλήστευση της λαϊκής κατοικίας στην Ελλάδα. Οι ελληνικές τράπεζες, μετά από τρεις ανακεφαλαιοποιήσεις που στοίχισαν στον ελληνικό λαό πάνω από 50 δισεκατομμύρια, βρίσκονται και πάλι σε δυσμενή θέση με κόκκινα δάνεια στους ισολογισμούς τους που αγγίζουν τα 102 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ. Η τρόικα και η ελληνική κυβέρνηση έχουν συμφωνήσει να βγάλουν στο σφυρί ακόμα και την πρώτη κατοικία μέσω ηλεκτρονικών πλειστηριασμών και της πώλησης σε ειδικά funds ― τα «κοράκια» δηλαδή ― των κόκκινων δανείων. Αδιαφορούν για τον ελληνικό λαό που υποφέρει, αδιαφορούν για τις επιπτώσεις της επτάχρονης οικονομικής κρίσης και των πολιτικών των μνημονίων που έχουν οδηγήσει στη φτώχια, την εξαθλίωση, την ανεργία και την καταστροφή της παραγωγικής βάσης της χώρας. Ο ελληνικός λαός, κύριε Πρόεδρε, με σύνθημα «κανένα σπίτι στα χέρια τραπεζίτη», λέει όχι στους πλειστηριασμούς της λαϊκής περιουσίας και κατοικίας, και υπερασπίζεται το σπίτι του, τη δουλειά του και την αξιοπρέπειά του.

 
  
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  Molly Scott Cato, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, it is now nearly a decade since the financial crisis devastated European economies. At the heart of that crisis was the process of repackaging debt to turn it into new assets, a highly lucrative business, but one that created risks to our financial system when unscrupulous traders bundled bad debts with good, kept the profits and socialised the risks.

Today we are debating an attempt by the European institutions to restart this process of securitisation and to give it a seal of approval as STS: simple, transparent securitisation. Sadly, most in the Parliament and Council of Ministers who have agreed on this new legislation seem not to have learned the lessons of the crisis. Greens attempted to limit the damage securitisation might do by proposing that banks share much more of the risk of the loans that they sell off to ensure that they keep adequate skin in the game. They should be discouraged from investing in each other securitisations and should ensure that the products are as simple as possible. This would mean that investors can access the highest-quality information about what is actually in the box, including to what extent the securitisation contributes to sustainability goals.

Rather than strengthening standards against a repetition of past problems, the already unsatisfactory proposal from the Commission was watered down in favour of banks and other lenders of specific kinds of loans, specifically car loans, which many have warned may represent a subprime—style bubble. Negotiations with the Council, where Member States demonstrated even less concern for the safety of the financial system, delivered a result that represents a bad deal for ordinary citizens.

This legislation is the latest example of political amnesia and regulatory rollback with the EU’s political leadership favouring the narrow interests of an oversized financial system over the need to promote financial stability, funding to entrepreneurs and small businesses and quality jobs in the real economy. We regret that it will be passed tomorrow and we will certainly vote against it as a group.

 
  
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  Marco Valli, a nome del gruppo EFDD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l'avidità del sistema finanziario e l'incapacità della politica di reagire ci hanno portato alla crisi del 2008-2009, dove c'era stato un utilizzo sconsiderato di questi prodotti di cartolarizzazione dei crediti. Mi sembra un po' assurdo che oggi si tenti di rilanciare l'economia proprio utilizzando cartolarizzazioni che, nonostante un titolo che sembra poco aggressivo (cioè "semplici, trasparenti e standardizzate"), di fatto non lo saranno perché si utilizza uno strumento sbagliato per cercare di rilanciare l'economia. In realtà quello che si rilancerà saranno gli utili dei fondi speculativi, molto interessati ad acquistare queste cartolarizzazioni e a gestirle.

Infatti da una parte la Banca centrale europea continua a dare requisiti di capitale sempre più alti per mandare in crisi le banche che prestano il denaro all'economia reale e dall'altra c'è la Commissione europea che spinge per velocizzare questo processo e incentivare i loro utili.

Ecco, con questo sistema non andremo da nessuna parte. Bisognerebbe partire da una separazione vera bancaria, ma purtroppo ieri ci ha messo una pietra tombale la Commissione europea, eliminandola definitivamente dal suo programma. Bisogna cambiare rotta perché con questi strumenti si rischiano altre crisi sistemiche.

 
  
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  Barbara Kappel, im Namen der ENF-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Herr Vizepräsident der Kommission! Erst kürzlich hat der amerikanische Finanzminister eine Reihe von Vorschlägen zur Reform des US-Kapitalmarkts gemacht – auch solche zur Verbriefung. Es stört ihn dabei, dass die Reformen nach der Krise Verbriefungen im Vergleich zu anderen traditionelleren Finanzierungsformen – wie etwa Bankeinlagen – benachteiligen. Es stört ihn auch, dass Darlehenhöhen abgesichert werden müssen, wenn sie verbrieft und gebündelt werden, als wenn sie einzeln in den Bankbilanzen aufscheinen.

Europa geht hier einen anderen Weg. Im September 2015 veröffentlichte die Kommission erstmals den Vorschlag in Bezug auf STS-Verbriefungen, das heißt Verbriefungen, die simpel, transparent und standardisiert sind. Nun haben sich Parlament, Rat und Kommission auf die Rahmendaten einer neuen Verbriefungsregulierung geeinigt, die aus zwei Regelwerken besteht, die heute diskutiert werden. Es sind dies die Verbriefungsverordnung – die Kriterien für alle Verbriefungen, insbesondere STS-Verbriefungen, Anforderungen zur due diligence und zum Risikoselbstbehalt – und zweitens die Anpassungen bei der Eigenkapitalverordnung (CRR) zur Umsetzung der überarbeiteten Baseler-Verbriefungsregeln für Institute.

Für Banken ergeben sich aus der Überführung der Baseler-Regelungen zwar Erhöhungen der Risikogewichte, diese werden aber zukünftig geringer ausfallen, wenn sie STS-Kriterien erfüllen. Das heißt, die STS-Kriterien schaffen Anreize, um den europäischen Kapitalmarkt sicherer und robuster zu machen.

 
  
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  Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, uno de los principales pilares de la unión de los mercados de capitales es el esfuerzo por revitalizar el mercado de la titulización con el fin de mejorar la financiación de nuestra economía.

El paquete regulatorio que mañana aprobaremos establece normas comunes para todas las titulizaciones y constituye un marco para que los productos de titulización sean, a pesar de las dudas de algunos, seguros, simples y transparentes, y estén normalizados y suficientemente supervisados. Estas nuevas normas ayudarán a los inversores a evaluar mejor los riesgos relacionados con la titulización, tanto en los propios productos como en las distintas categorías de productos.

En 2014 vimos cómo el mercado de las titulizaciones se redujo casi un 50 % con respecto a su pico de 2007, y esto llevó a que muchas pymes no lograran la financiación que solicitaban.

Este acuerdo contribuye a crear nuevas posibilidades de inversión en toda la Unión y ofrece una fuente adicional de financiación para la economía, especialmente a las pequeñas y medianas empresas y a las empresas de nueva creación.

Gracias a la reactivación del mercado de titulizaciones, lograremos unas fuentes de financiación más diversificadas y menos dependientes del sector bancario, contribuyendo así a la estabilidad y resistencia general del sistema financiero.

Las previsiones de la Comisión muestran que, si el volumen de la titulización de la Unión Europea alcanzara el nivel medio anterior a la crisis, podría generar entre 100 000 y 150 000 millones de euros más de financiación. Las principales favorecidas serían las pequeñas y medianas empresas, que son el motor de la economía europea.

En conclusión, un mercado de titulizaciones bien estructurado contribuirá a mejorar la eficiencia y la estabilidad del sistema financiero, proporcionar oportunidades de inversión y crear beneficios para los ciudadanos y las empresas, con préstamos más baratos y más accesibles. Bienvenida esta propuesta y enhorabuena al equipo negociador por su gran trabajo.

 
  
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  Pervenche Berès (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Vice-président, vous le savez, pour le groupe socialiste, l’idée que l’urgence était de relancer le marché de la titrisation, quand on sait la responsabilité de ce marché dans la crise dont l’Europe n’est pas encore totalement sortie et dont elle continue à subir certains des effets, n’allait pas de soi.

Nous avions mis un certain nombre de conditions et accueilli l’idée d’une rétention par les banques, afin d’affiner leur responsabilité dans la production de ces produits financiers. Sur ce point, nous avons été un peu déçus, le rapporteur l’a dit. Pour autant, je salue sa détermination, qui nous permet d’avoir une législation qui avance sur trois points très significatifs pour notre groupe, que je veux rappeler ici.

D’abord, un rôle explicite pour le superviseur européen AEMF afin qu’il puisse être engagé dans une médiation obligatoire en cas de désaccord entre les différentes autorités compétentes. Cela va au-delà de ce que souhaitait le Conseil et je crois que c’est une bonne approche pour ne pas se perdre dans des conflits sans fin.

La deuxième avancée que je veux souligner – elle est aussi le résultat de notre détermination –, c’est de faire en sorte que cette titrisation ne puisse pas être basée dans les paradis fiscaux, notamment ceux figurant dans la liste des pays recensés par le GAFI comme ne contribuant pas à la lutte contre l’évasion fiscale, dans le cadre des conventions de l’OCDE.

Troisième point, qui nous tient tout autant à cœur, c’est l’idée – le rapporteur l’a rappelé – que, s’agissant des hypothèques ou des prêts automobiles, on intègre des critères environnementaux – d’une certaine manière, nous avons anticipé les travaux que vous menez maintenant au sein de la Commission européenne –, que nous avions également introduits dans le cadre des PRIIP, et que nous continuerons à promouvoir, afin que les marchés financiers apportent également leur contribution au développement durable de notre planète.

 
  
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  Stanisław Ożóg (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Pomimo braku entuzjazmu delegacja polska grupy EKR zdecydowała się poprzeć projekt planu ramowego. Z jednej strony doceniamy fakt, że sekurytyzacja może zwiększyć wydajność i stabilność systemu finansowego oraz stworzyć dodatkowe źródła taniego finansowania dla MŚP, ale z drugiej strony system ten ma poważne wady. Ryzyko kredytowe jest tutaj jedynie przenoszone z instytucji bankowej na niebankową, co utrudni instytucjom nadzoru kontrolę operacji finansowych. O jakiej, w takiej sytuacji, przejrzystości – Szanowni Państwo – my mówimy? Drugim istotnym zagrożeniem jest możliwość manipulacji przez banki rankingiem tych sztucznie generowanych instrumentów, ponownie bez kontroli zewnętrznej. W mojej ocenie projekt wymaga stałego nadzoru i oceny wpływu, by jego jedynym beneficjentem nie okazał się znowu potężny sektor bankowy, ale by zabezpieczał przede wszystkim ostateczne interesy odbiorców usług kredytowych, to jest przedsiębiorców i klientów detalicznych.

 
  
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  Dariusz Rosati (PPE). – Mr President, Commissioner, securitisation is a measure that allows for the transformation of illiquid financial assets into fully tradable financial instruments. In this way, asset-backed securities deepen the liquidity or financial markets and increase the capacity of banks to extend more credit. Moreover, they allow the risk and term structure of available marketable financial instruments to better adjust to the different risk preferences of individual investors. In this sense, securitisation is able to contribute to financial stability and the more efficient allocation of resources across the economy. However, securitisation may carry also risks. Investors may not have access to full information about the underlying assets and their quality. Securitisation may also involve deals that are overly complex and even opaque.

This may result in excessive risk taking by investors and may lead to accumulation of systemic risk in the entire financial sector. The idea behind the two legislative measures we are discussing today is to reduce these risks and to promote a safe and liquid market for securitisation in the EU. Firstly, the regulation strengthens requirements for due diligence and imposes minimal risk-retention standards to ensure that banks retain a net material interest in asset-backed securities they issue. Secondly, there is a ban on re-securitisation. Thirdly, all underlying documentation relevant for any transaction is made readily available to investors. Fourthly, the crucial amendment to the CRR ensures that the capital treatment of securitisation for banks better reflects the risks involved.

Mr. President, I would like to express my thanks to both rapporteurs and to the European Commission for their work. When adopted, this package will not only help us establish a clear set of criteria to identify simple, transparent and standardised securitisations, but it will also contribute to building the Capital Markets Union in Europe.

 
  
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  Neena Gill (S&D). – Mr President, we have heard that 10 years ago a major US bank announced losses of USD 8.4 billion in a quarter due to subprime mortgages. The following months were the start of the subprime crisis due to the meltdown of securitisation products affecting European banks. The rest, we all know, is history.

But here we are today debating a new securitisation proposal that should ensure the impact of any future crisis is limited. So my congratulations to the rapporteurs, Paul Tang and Othmar Karas, for getting this complex regulation agreed. I do welcome the fact that it makes financial instruments safer and more transparent, and that there will be greater standardisation. This is a real step forward, and it ensures that an important source of capital can support SMEs in the European economy. It will also bring more substance to the CMU initiative. So there are three points that stand out for me: a new macroprudential framework to ensure efficient oversight of the securitisation market to detect new bubbles; the creation of a data repository to increase transparency for investors and making it mandatory for insurance to make the information public; and a more sustainable financial system.

Nonetheless, Commissioner, I believe there are issues that you still need to be addressing. How do you see the impact of this new regulation in the context of Brexit, given the high level of activity that takes place in the UK and how confident are you that history will not repeat itself, given the trends in the US towards deregulation?

 
  
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  Sander Loones (ECR). – Wanneer banken een heleboel leningen herverpakken om die vervolgens te verpatsen aan andere financiële spelers, dan noemen we dat securitisatie – effectivisering in correct Nederlands. Heel complex allemaal, maar wel zeer belangrijk. Als je bijvoorbeeld kijkt naar de film “The Big Short”, dan wordt daar mooi in uitgelegd hoe die effectivisering mee aan de basis lag van de financiële crisis in de Verenigde Staten. Een goeie film trouwens, een absolute aanrader, Oscar gewonnen ook, een film met Ryan Gosling en met Christian Bale.

Maar we moeten dus oppassen met die financiële trucjes, met die techniekjes, en daarom vind ik het ook echt belangrijk dat het Europees Parlement maatregelen voorstelt om dat eenvoudiger te maken en vooral ook transparanter te maken. Dat is de enige manier om ervoor te zorgen dat ons financieel systeem sterker wordt, stabieler wordt, en we er tegelijk voor kunnen zorgen dat er toch voldoende middelen gepompt worden in onze economie en in het bijzonder ook in onze kmo's.

 
  
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  Jeppe Kofod (S&D). – Hr. Formand! Hr. Kommissær! Handelen med finansielle ydelser, særlige lån, obligationer, værdipapirer og andre opfindsomme måder at rejse kapital på er en risikofyldt affære. Gevinsterne og fordelene kan være enorme, men det kan tabene og konsekvenserne også. Mens man i årene op til finanskrisen havde alt for travlt med at afregulere finanssektoren, har vi i dag travlt med at rydde op efter fortidens laden stå til. Med disse nye reguleringer rydder vi op i nogle af lommerne af finansverdens vilde vesten, der stadigvæk eksisterer. Det er næppe særlig populært på direktionsgangene, men det er sundt for både samfundsøkonomien og i sidste ende for branchen selv. Opskriften er ligetil. Du tager et ordentlig skud gennemsigtighed, nye krav om oplysninger om de reelle ejere, slut med skjulte bagmænd. Vi stiller også krav om dokumentation for, hvor disse selskaber har hjemme. Slut med skjulte skuffeselskaber. Desuden stiller vi krav om oplysninger om præcis, hvor mange penge der er involveret i disse konstruktioner. Dertil en god sjat regulering i form af forbud mod at operere fra skattely og lande med kunstig lav skat, forbud mod at operere fra lande, der ikke samarbejder om udveksling af skatteoplysninger, og sidst, men ikke mindst, strengere straffe for dem, der ikke kan finde ud af at følge de fælles regler, både kontante bøder på op til halvanden million kroner, men også bøder fastsat ud fra en procentdel af virksomhedens omsætning og rige privatpersoners indkomst. Det er rigtig godt og tiltrængt nyt i kampen for bedre regulering af finansmarkederne.

 
  
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  Miguel Viegas (GUE/NGL). – Senhor Presidente, a titularização está na raiz do processo de financeirização da economia e no coração da bolha especulativa que rebentou em 2008 e mergulhou a Europa e o mundo numa crise social e económica, cujo impacto ainda permanece nas nossas economias. A titularização consiste num instrumento criado pelos banqueiros para limpar os seus balanços, reunindo créditos mais ou menos duvidosos e criando produtos financeiros que nunca foram, nem serão, simples e muito menos transparentes.

Este relançamento do mercado de titularização representa um passo na direção errada. A Europa não precisa de mais finança. A Europa precisa de mais economia real, mais emprego e mais desenvolvimento. Falar de falta de liquidez quando o BCE anda, há meses, a encharcar a Europa com a compra de ativos é, no mínimo, estranho. Em suma, aquilo de que precisamos é de um sistema financeiro público e ao serviço da economia das empresas e dos trabalhadores. Mas este objetivo não cabe nesta União Europeia neoliberal ao serviço da finança e das grandes empresas multinacionais.

 
  
 

Intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»)

 
  
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  Νότης Μαριάς (ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κύριε Dombrovskis, το πρόβλημα με τα κόκκινα δάνεια έχει χτυπήσει ταβάνι στην Ελλάδα ξεπερνώντας τα 100 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ. Οι πρόσφατες ανακοινώσεις του κυρίου Draghi για αυξημένες προβλέψεις στους ισολογισμούς των τραπεζών λόγω κόκκινων δανείων δίνει στις εμπορικές τράπεζες το άλλοθι να τιτλοποιήσουν και να πουλήσουν άρον άρον τα κόκκινα δάνεια στα ειδικά funds, δηλαδή στα «κοράκια» και μάλιστα, αντί πινακίου φακής. Από τον Μάρτιο του 2016, είχα προτείνει να ισχύσει στην Ελλάδα το κυπριακό μοντέλο που καθιερώνει δικαίωμα προτίμησης του δανειολήπτη να αγοράσει το δάνειό του στην τιμή πρώτης προσφοράς που κάνουν τα «κοράκια». Ταυτόχρονα, είχα προτείνει τη δημιουργία ενός ταμείου σωτηρίας των δανειοληπτών προκειμένου οι Έλληνες να μπορέσουν να σώσουν τα σπίτια τους από τα «κοράκια», προκειμένου να μπει τελεία και παύλα στους ηλεκτρονικούς πλειστηριασμούς. Έτσι, 4,5 δισ. ευρώ από τα 25 δισ. ευρώ που περισσεύουν από το τρίτο δανειακό πακέτο των 86 δισεκατομμυρίων μπορούν να χρηματοδοτήσουν το ταμείο διάσωσης δανειοληπτών για να μην περάσει κανένα σπίτι στα χέρια τραπεζίτη.

 
  
 

(Fin de las intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»))

 
  
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  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, first of all, I’m grateful for your engagement and support in the whole process that gets us to the positive result, and I hope that tomorrow’s vote will confirm this.

With your support, we now have a clear set of rules to ensure that simple, transparent and standardised securitisation benefits the real economy. The new rules will clearly differentiate between those products which satisfy the criteria and those that do not. This works towards an important funding channel for the EU economy, without endangering financial stability.

 
  
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  Paul Tang, rapporteur. – Mr President, thank you to all the contributors to this debate. It is interesting to hear that we still have a difference of opinion, and I think that these proposals – with good work from Othmar Karas – that we have brought together have been able to unite Parliament, but not entirely. Let that also be a warning that there are still some doubts that have been part of the debate.

There are opportunities that are emphasised: it could be an opportunity for refinancing the European economy, especially when the policy of cheap money will end one day. Securitisation will then be an important way of financing, but there are not only opportunities – there are also threats. I would like to call also on the supervisors that have been given an important role in this piece of legislation to take on the duty of closely monitoring and following the market, especially when the market starts – it is crucial that it starts in the right way, and that the market gets functioning. This is what I would like to see: if you want to develop a strong market, you also need a strong government and strong supervision. This is what I hope for, because we will see these markets start – maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but the day after tomorrow, when opportunities to finance become scarcer and securitisation becomes more attractive.

Finally, I would like to say that this debate will continue. We have a review, issues have been addressed in the debate, and the European Parliament should follow this market closely at the appropriate times – and I am sure that we will.

 
  
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  Othmar Karas, Berichterstatter. – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Es ist nahezu alles gesagt. Aber es hat die Debatte doch eines gezeigt: dass wir in der Lage sind, ernsthaft miteinander zu diskutieren, obwohl es sich um ein so komplexes Thema handelt. Das ist Parlamentarismus. Wir müssen uns mit den Sorgen und Ängsten und mit den Chancen und Hoffnungen ernsthaft auseinandersetzen und gemeinsam nach Lösungen suchen, und das haben wir hier gemeinsam getan.

Ich möchte den zweiten Punkt aufgreifen. Auch wenn wir jetzt die Ergebnisse der beiden Berichte und des Trilogs loben, so ist das eine Einzelmaßnahme, die alleine unsere Probleme nicht lösen kann. Wir benötigen die Kombination der verschiedenen Maßnahmen, und wir benötigen vor allem die Umsetzung dieser Maßnahmen. Ich will nicht die Hoffnung machen, dass wir mit diesen Regeln alleine das Problem, das wir haben, lösen und alle Lehren aus der Krise gezogen haben. Es ist wiederum ein kleiner Mosaikstein gelungen.

Zum Dritten: Die Debatte hat deutlich gezeigt: die Ursachen der Krise, auf der anderen Seite die Risken der Verbriefungen und auf der dritten Seite die Chancen. Wir haben versucht, die Risken zu minimieren, die Chance zu nutzen und Vertrauen durch diese Regelungen zurückzugewinnen. Wir hoffen, dass uns das mit diesem Paket gelungen ist, und wir werden das bei der Evaluierung sehen.

Aber es wurde gute Arbeit gemacht, und ich bitte die Kolleginnen und Kollegen, morgen diesen beiden Berichten ihre Zustimmung zu geben, als einem wichtigen Beitrag zur Schaffung einer Kapitalmarktunion, die weiterentwickelt werden muss.

 
  
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  El Presidente. – Se cierra el debate.

La votación tendrá lugar mañana.

 
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