



**2017/2146(DEC)**

13.12.2017

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **1 - 17**

**Draft opinion**

**Doru-Claudian Frunzulică**

2016 discharge: EU general budget - 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th EDFs  
(2017/2146(DEC))

AM\_Com\_NonLegOpinion

**Amendment 1**  
**Lola Sánchez Caldentey**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Draft opinion*

1. Supports the use of budget support *but* urges the Commission to ***better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct*** in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

*Amendment*

1. Supports the use of budget support ***due to its proven record as regards development effectiveness and*** urges the Commission to ***boost its policy dialogue potentialities*** in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. en

**Amendment 2**  
**Paul Rübig**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Draft opinion*

1. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance

*Amendment*

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control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; ***expresses deep concern about the potential use of budget support in countries lacking democratic oversight, either due to the lack of a functioning parliamentary democracy or freedoms for civil society and the media, or due to a lack of capacity of oversight bodies***; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. en

### **Amendment 3** **Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot**

#### **Draft opinion** **Paragraph 1**

##### *Draft opinion*

1. Supports the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget

##### *Amendment*

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support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

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Or. fr

#### **Amendment 4** **Joachim Zeller**

#### **Draft opinion** **Paragraph 1**

##### *Draft opinion*

1. ***Supports*** the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's Special

##### *Amendment*

1. ***Is aware of*** the use of budget support but urges the Commission to better define the development outcomes to be achieved in each case and above all to enhance control mechanisms concerning recipient States' conduct in the fields of corruption, respect of human rights, rule of law and democracy; notes the Court's

Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Special Report 35/2016 on the use of budget support for domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) in sub-Saharan Africa, which finds that the Commission's ex- ante analyses of DRM are not sufficiently detailed and do not follow its own guidelines, that the Commission often fails to assess tax exemptions and illicit capital outflows and does not properly consider extraction dividends and whether royalties for access to natural resources have been paid; is concerned about the Commission's low and sometimes not relevant use of DRM conditions in budget support contracts;

Or. de

**Amendment 5**  
**Heidi Hautala, Judith Sargentini**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***1a. Regrets the repeated occurrence of procurement rules' errors in EDF spending<sup>1a</sup>; underlines that this is an on-going problem which the European Court of Auditors has been highlighting for years; calls on the Commission to address this problem, which risks becoming even more important due to accelerated tenders within the EU-Africa Emergency Trust Fund;***

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***<sup>1a</sup> Annual report on the activities funded by the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th European Development Funds for the financial year 2016, ECA.***

Or. en

**Amendment 6**  
**Jean-Luc Schaffhauser**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Draft opinion*

2. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors' special report 11/2017 on the Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic; recognises that despite some shortcomings the trust fund was a hopeful beginning and observes that setting up a trust fund was a rapid response to the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development; calls on the Commission to follow the Court's recommendations to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle (trust fund or other); this guidance must reflect the considerable risks and disadvantage with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; regrets that the fund has not significantly improved general donor coordination;

*Amendment*

2. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors' special report 11/2017 on the Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic; recognises that despite some shortcomings the trust fund was a hopeful beginning and observes that setting up a trust fund was, ***and is***, a rapid response to the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development; calls on the Commission to follow the Court's recommendations to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle (trust fund or other); this guidance must reflect the considerable risks and disadvantage with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; ***there is a need to combine security and development initiatives to free up private investment rendered inoperative by the current security situation in the country***; regrets that the fund has not significantly improved general donor coordination; ***asks the Commission to study the proposal by the Government of the Central African Republic to create a platform enabling private investors, public donors and the authorities of the country to interact in putting together holistic security-development projects***;

Or. fr

**Amendment 7**  
**Paul Rübig**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Draft opinion*

2. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors' special report 11/2017 on the Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic; recognises that despite some shortcomings the trust fund was a hopeful beginning and observes that setting up a trust fund was a rapid response to the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development; calls on the Commission to follow the Court's recommendations to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle (trust fund or other); this guidance must reflect the **considerable** risks and disadvantage with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; regrets that the fund has not significantly improved general donor coordination;

*Amendment*

2. Welcomes the European Court of Auditors' special report 11/2017 on the Bêkou EU trust fund for the Central African Republic; recognises that despite some shortcomings the trust fund was a hopeful beginning and observes that setting up a trust fund was a rapid response to the need to link relief, rehabilitation and development; calls on the Commission to follow the Court's recommendations to prepare guidance on the choice of aid vehicle (trust fund or other); this guidance must reflect the **possible** risks and disadvantage with trust funds and the mixed experience of their use so far; regrets that the fund has not significantly improved general donor coordination;

Or. en

**Amendment 8**  
**Heidi Hautala, Judith Sargentini**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***2a. Highlights the primary importance for an effective EU development policy of internationally agreed development effectiveness principles subscribed to by the Union, such as ownership, untied aid, mutually agreed conditionality's, alignment to beneficiary countries' priorities; regrets a worrying trend by the Union to ignore those principles and give preference to projects more guided by short term political Union interests, as in the case of the EU-Africa Emergency Trust Fund; considers this to be a threat to fulfilling development objectives;***

Or. en



## Amendment 9

Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot

### Draft opinion

#### Paragraph 3

##### *Draft opinion*

3. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the 11th EDF which is supposed to take into account Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development but which should also fully respect the principles of development effectiveness reconfirmed at the Nairobi High Level Forum of the Global Partnership, in particular ownership of priorities by recipient countries;

##### *Amendment*

3. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the 11th EDF which is supposed to take into account Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development but which should also fully respect the principles of development effectiveness reconfirmed at the Nairobi High Level Forum of the Global Partnership, in particular ownership of priorities by recipient countries; ***urges this mid-term review to analyse the synergies observed between the development aid delivered by the EDF and that delivered by each Member State in their development aid policies, so that it will be properly taken into account.***

Or. fr

## Amendment 10

Jean-Luc Schaffhauser

### Draft opinion

#### Paragraph 3

##### *Draft opinion*

3. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the 11th EDF which is supposed to take into account Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development but which should also fully respect the principles of development effectiveness reconfirmed at the Nairobi High Level

##### *Amendment*

3. Looks forward to being fully informed and consulted on the mid-term review of the 11th EDF which is supposed to take into account Agenda 2030 and a new European Consensus on Development but which should also fully respect the principles of development effectiveness reconfirmed at the Nairobi High Level

Forum of the Global Partnership, in particular ownership of priorities by recipient countries;

Forum of the Global Partnership, in particular ownership of priorities by recipient countries, ***always respecting their sovereignty***;

Or. fr

**Amendment 11**  
**Lola Sánchez Caldentey**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector might play a ***crucial*** role; notes that blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, ***provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.***

*Amendment*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector, ***if properly regulated and duly accountable, might play a role; notes that only when fully aligned with the internationally agreed development effectiveness principles, when it is focused on poverty reduction, when its additionality for development objectives are proven, and when it does not imply an opportunity cost vis-à-vis other development programmes,*** blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources.

Or. en

**Amendment 12**  
**Mireille D'Ornano, Florian Philippot**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector might play a crucial role; notes that

*Amendment*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector might play a crucial role, ***as long as the***

blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.

*funding it provides is strictly limited and monitored, in particular to ensure that it does not correspond to hidden commercial interests or inadmissible attempts to influence Member States' policies*; notes that blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.

Or. fr

**Amendment 13**  
**Jean-Luc Schaffhauser**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector might play a crucial role; notes that blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.

*Amendment*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector might play a crucial role; notes that blending might be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles, *and that it is coordinated with public policy in a holistic approach to development, taking into account the security dimension, which is essential in many African countries*;

Or. fr

**Amendment 14**  
**Joachim Zeller**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Draft opinion*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector ***might*** play a crucial role; notes that blending ***might*** be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.

*Amendment*

4. Stresses that given the funding gap required to reach the ambitious development goals, the private sector ***should*** play a crucial role; notes that blending ***can*** be a useful vehicle for leveraging additional resources, provided that its use is duly justified, its added value is demonstrated and it meets development effectiveness principles.

Or. de

**Amendment 15**  
**Paul Rübig**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

***4a. Calls on the Commission to incorporate an incentive-based approach to development by introducing the more-for-more principle, taking as an example the European Neighbourhood Policy; believes that the more and the faster a Country progresses in its internal reforms to the building and consolidation of democratic institutions, the eradication of corruption, the respect for human rights and the rule of law, the more support it should receive from the Union; stresses that this “positive conditionality” approach, accompanied by a strong focus on financing small-scale projects for rural communities, can bring real change and guarantee that Union tax payers’ money is spent in a more sustainable manner; on the other hand, strongly condemns any attempt to make aid conditional on border control;***

Or. en

**Amendment 16**  
**Heidi Hautala**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 a (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

**4a.** *Is worried by the European Court of Auditors' statement<sup>2a</sup> that there is a serious risk for the Union not to meet its aim of mainstreaming climate change throughout the Union budget and that the goal of spending 20 % of its expenditure for climate-related action will not be met;*

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<sup>2a</sup> *Special Report No 31/2016 Spending at least one euro in every five from the EU budget on climate action: ambitious work underway, but at serious risk of falling short, ECA, 2016.*

Or. en

**Amendment 17**  
**Heidi Hautala**

**Draft opinion**  
**Paragraph 4 b (new)**

*Draft opinion*

*Amendment*

**4b.** *Is worried by the European Court of Auditors' finding that the Union certification system for the sustainability of biofuels is not fully reliable<sup>3a</sup>; underlines the potentially negative consequences for developing countries, since, as stated by the Court: "the Commission did not require voluntary schemes to verify that the biofuel production they certify does not cause significant risks of negative socioeconomic effects, such as land*

*tenure conflicts, forced/child labour, poor working conditions for farmers and dangers to health and safety”, and therefore requests the Commission to address this issue;*

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*<sup>3a</sup> Special report No 18/2016: The EU system for the certification of sustainable biofuels*

Or. en