

**Question for written answer E-006142/2016
to the Commission**
Rule 130
Richard Sulík (ECR)

Subject: Independence of Slovakia's network industry regulator

The Regulatory Office for Network Industries (URSO) is a state administration body responsible for regulating network industries throughout Slovakia. In addition to regulatory policy, it is also responsible for control and supervision of matters concerning network industries, establishing price regulation and handling related disputes. The agency is headed by a president, who is appointed and dismissed by the President of Slovakia on the proposal of the government. The regulatory board provides strategic management and a concept for regulating the network industries. The board consists of the chair of the board and six other members. The government, that is to say Parliament, proposes candidates for membership of the board. The president of URSO is also the chair of the board, and he adjudicates at first instance in certain types of proceedings. Legally, the president is unable to attend deliberations on appeals against decisions which he handed down at first instance. However, board meetings are not public, so it is not clear whether the president is in attendance at these deliberations. Moreover, given the political nature of nominations, there are doubts not only about inadequate transparency, but also about excessive collegiality among the members of the board and their loyalty to its chair.

Is the institutional connection between the price regulation agenda and the agenda relating to creating conditions for entrepreneurship in the energy sector and monitoring compliance with them (including compliance with rules on consumer protection) in line with EU law?

Is the aforementioned personnel system at URSO in line with EU law?

Is the aforementioned system able to guarantee a sufficient level of transparency of URSO deliberations?