Go back to the Europarl portal

Choisissez la langue de votre document :

  • bg - български
  • es - español
  • cs - čeština
  • da - dansk
  • de - Deutsch
  • et - eesti keel
  • el - ελληνικά
  • en - English (Selected)
  • fr - français
  • ga - Gaeilge
  • hr - hrvatski
  • it - italiano
  • lv - latviešu valoda
  • lt - lietuvių kalba
  • hu - magyar
  • mt - Malti
  • nl - Nederlands
  • pl - polski
  • pt - português
  • ro - română
  • sk - slovenčina
  • sl - slovenščina
  • fi - suomi
  • sv - svenska
Parliamentary questions
PDF 120kWORD 19k
21 November 2017
Question for written answer E-007161-17
to the Commission
Rule 130
Kostadinka Kuneva (GUE/NGL) , Stelios Kouloglou (GUE/NGL)

 Subject:  ECB refusal to supply the European Court of Auditors with information regarding the memorandum provisions for Greece
 Answer in writing 

In a recent Special Report entitled: ‘The Commission's intervention in the Greek financial crisis’(1), the European Court of Auditors (ECA) examined the management of the three economic adjustment programmes for Greece, revealing serious institutional shortcomings and inefficiency and making eleven recommendations to the Commission, which the latter has accepted. In line with its remit under Article 287 TFEU(2), the ECA also requested information from the European Central Bank (ECB), which, as a member of both the Troika and the Quartet, was responsible for evaluating and monitoring compliance with the terms of financial assistance in cooperation with the Commission. However, the ECB refused to provide this information, leaving the ECA unable to identify its role in the Memorandums of Understanding, as pointed out in its special report(3).

In view of this:

How does the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, assess the ECB's attitude towards the institutional audit authority, bearing in mind that the operational effectiveness of the bank which ought to be controlled by the ECA is not independent of the decisions taken by it(4)?
How are the eleven ECA recommendations reflected by its third assessment and the debt negotiations?

Member supporting the question(5)

(2)Article 287(1), (3) and (4) TFEU.
(3)ECA Special Report (No 17/2017) p. 9 ‘In line with the ECA’s mandate to audit the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB, we have attempted to examine the Bank’s involvement in the Greek Economic Adjustment Programmes. However, the ECB questioned the Court’s mandate in this respect; did not provide sufficient amount of evidence and thus we were unable to report on the role of the ECB in the Greek programmes.’
(4)Article 17 TEU.
(5)This question has the support of an MEP other than the authors: Dimitrios Papadimoulis (GUE/NGL).

Original language of question: EL 
Legal notice