



**2015/2283(INI)**

13.10.2016

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **1 - 110**

**Draft report**  
**Sajjad Karim**  
(PE587.620v01-00)

on the Annual Report 2014 on subsidiarity and proportionality  
(COM(2015)0315 – 2015/2283(INI))



**Amendment 1**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 1 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

– *having regard to Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union,*

Or. fr

**Amendment 2**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 1 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

– *having regard to Protocol No 2 of the TEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,*

Or. fr

**Amendment 3**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Citation 11 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

– *having regard to the Protocol (No 1) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union,*

Or. el

**Amendment 4**

**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Citation 11 b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

- *having regard to Protocol (No 2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,*

Or. el

**Amendment 5**

**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Citation 12 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

- *having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda COM(2015) 215, 19.5.2015,*

Or. en

**Amendment 6**

**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Recital A a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**Aa.** *whereas the number of reasoned opinions received fell by 76% in 2014 compared to the number received in the previous year (88 in 2013), owing in particular to the decrease in the number of proposals drawn up by the Commission towards the end of its term of office;*

Or. ro

## **Amendment 7**

**Daniel Buda**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

**B.** *whereas in 2014 three national chambers (the Danish *Folketing*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the UK House of Lords) issued reports with detailed proposals on how to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process;*

*Amendment*

**B.** *whereas in 2014 three national chambers (the Danish *Folketing*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the UK House of Lords) issued reports with detailed proposals on how to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process, **containing, inter alia, ideas on how to extend the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism;***

Or. ro

## **Amendment 8**

**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Recital B**

*Motion for a resolution*

**B.** *whereas in 2014 **three** national chambers (the Danish *Folketing*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the UK House of Lords) issued reports with detailed*

*Amendment*

**B.** *whereas in 2014, **of the 41** national chambers, **three** (the Danish *Folketing*, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and the UK House of Lords) issued reports with detailed*

proposals on how to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process;

proposals on how to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process;

Or. fr

**Amendment 9**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital C**

*Motion for a resolution*

C. whereas by means of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions signed on 5 February 2014 both institutions commit themselves to *cooperating in order to ensure the respect of the subsidiarity principle*;

*Amendment*

C. whereas by means of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions signed on 5 February 2014 both institutions commit themselves to *enhance the legitimacy of the European Union*;

Or. en

**Amendment 10**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

*F. whereas national parliaments continue to observe that the increasing number of delegated powers in the Union's legislative acts makes it difficult to effectively evaluate whether final rules would comply with the principle of subsidiarity*;

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. fr

**Amendment 11**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas *national parliaments continue to observe that the increasing number of delegated powers in the Union's legislative acts makes it difficult to effectively evaluate whether final rules would comply with the principle of subsidiarity;*

*Amendment*

F. whereas *delegated powers in the Union's legislative acts are conferred where flexibility and efficiency are needed and cannot be delivered by means of the ordinary legislative procedure; whereas the adoption of rules essential to the subject envisaged is reserved to the legislators;*

Or. en

**Amendment 12**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F**

*Motion for a resolution*

F. whereas national parliaments continue to observe that *the* increasing number of delegated powers in the Union's legislative acts makes it difficult to effectively evaluate whether final rules would comply with the principle of subsidiarity;

*Amendment*

F. whereas national parliaments continue to observe *an* increasing number of delegated powers in the Union's legislative acts *that are making* it difficult to effectively evaluate whether final rules would comply with the principle of subsidiarity;

Or. el

**Amendment 13**  
**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Recital F a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Fa.*** *whereas subsidiarity and proportionality are key considerations in the context of retrospective evaluations, which assess whether EU actions are actually delivering the expected results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, relevance and EU added value;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 14**

**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

**Recital F b (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***Fb.*** *whereas assessments of subsidiarity and proportionality are integral and permanent parts of the EU policy-making;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 15**

**Ivan Jakovčić**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered

an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen; ***points out that the exercise of EU competence is based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; points out that the general significance and purpose of the subsidiarity principle lie in the fact that it confers a degree of independence on a lower body in relation to a higher body; points to the importance of applying the subsidiarity principle within national frameworks, that is to say, when assigning responsibilities to tiers of power, which usually implies a shift towards local bodies in relation to central government;***

Or. hr

**Amendment 16**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ***which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act***; stresses that ***subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;***

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; stresses that, ***with regard to any new legislative initiative, the Commission is obliged to examine whether the EU has the right to take action and whether this is also justified;***

Or. de

**Amendment 17**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; ***stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’***; points out that national parliaments have a ***vital*** role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are ***among the*** guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; points out that national parliaments ***can*** have a role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken ***at the level that is most effective and*** as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. fr

**Amendment 18**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. ***Welcomes the continued consideration of*** the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, ***which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act***; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are ***closely*** intertwined concepts; ***highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’***; points out that national parliaments have a ***vital*** role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. ***Notes the importance to consider*** the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are intertwined concepts; points out that national parliaments have ***an important*** role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. en

**Amendment 19**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; **highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool** for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which, **in accordance with the Treaties<sup>1a</sup>**, are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts, **and the exercise of subsidiarity control by the Member States’ national parliaments is among the important tools** for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

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<sup>1a</sup> **The importance of respecting and applying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is highlighted in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) and in Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.**

Or. ro

**Amendment 20**  
**Francesc Gambús**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of

subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national *and subnational* parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. es

**Amendment 21**  
**Max Andersson**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are *among the* guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks can be considered an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. en

**Amendment 22**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. **Welcomes the continued consideration of** the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, **which** are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks **can** be considered an important tool **for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’**; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. **Recalls that** the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act **and that they must be respected**; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks **must** be considered an important tool **in line with Protocol No 2**; points out that national parliaments have a vital **and indispensable** role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. fr

**Amendment 23**

**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks **can be considered** an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

*Amendment*

1. Welcomes the continued consideration of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which are guiding principles for the European Union when it chooses to act; stresses that subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy are closely intertwined concepts; highlights that subsidiarity checks **are** an important tool for reducing the so-called ‘democratic deficit’; points out that national parliaments have a vital role to play in ensuring that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen;

Or. el

**Amendment 24**

**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**1a.** *Points out that the control mechanism introduced through the subsidiarity principle represents an important tool for collaboration between European institutions and national institutions;*

Or. ro

**Amendment 25**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

2. *Notes* the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; ***points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments;*** draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal ***received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger*** the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

2. ***Welcomes*** the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal ***was subject to*** the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. en

**Amendment 26**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

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*Motion for a resolution*

2. *Notes* the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; *points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments*; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

*Amendment*

2. *Stresses* the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. el

**Amendment 27**

**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Dietmar Köster**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission *and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments*; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal *received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the* ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

*Amendment*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal *was subject to* ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; *recalls that the fact that the yellow card procedure was triggered twice in the past (2012 and 2013) is a sign that the system is already functional while national parliaments are worried about the subsidiarity principle.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 28**  
**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

*Amendment*

2. Notes the **significant** decrease of **76%** in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014 **compared to the number of reasoned opinions received in the previous year (88 in 2013)**; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. en

**Amendment 29**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and **not** of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; draws attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received

*Amendment*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission – **which was coming to the end of its term of office** – and **by no means** of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; draws

a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

attention to the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. ro

**Amendment 30**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; ***draws attention to*** the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

*Amendment*

2. Notes the decrease in the number of reasoned opinions received from national parliaments in 2014; points out, however, that such a decrease might be as a result of the declining number of legislative proposals by the Commission and not of a loss of interest on the part of national parliaments; ***regrets*** the fact that in 2014 no Commission proposal received a sufficient number of reasoned opinions to trigger the ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card procedures’ under Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

Or. fr

**Amendment 31**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. ***Is concerned by*** the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that,

*Amendment*

3. ***Notes*** the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a

in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient *or non-existent in substance*; stresses, in this connection, the need for the *European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides* detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient; stresses, in this connection, the need for the *Commission to provide* detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions, *including* on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. en

### **Amendment 32**

**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 3**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

3. *Is concerned by the fact* that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in *a number* of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to *make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring* that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

###### *Amendment*

3. *Notes* that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in *some* of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to *ensure* that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. fr

### **Amendment 33**

**Kostas Chrysogonos**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

*Amendment*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments **and more specifically the Austrian Bundesrat, the Czech Senát and the Croatian Hrvatski Sabor** have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. en

**Amendment 34**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in **a number** of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to **make it possible** for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and

*Amendment*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in **certain** of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or **indeed** non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to **facilitate the possibility** for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals **efficiently** by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and

proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. ro

**Amendment 35**  
**Francesc Gambús**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

*Amendment*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national *and subnational* parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. es

**Amendment 36**  
**Ivan Jakovčić**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance;

*Amendment*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance;

stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides *detailed* and *comprehensive* grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides *well-argued* and *factually substantiated* grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. hr

### **Amendment 37**

**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 3**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

###### *Amendment*

3. Is *seriously* concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. fr

### **Amendment 38**

**Notis Marias**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent *in substance*; stresses, in this connection, the *need for* the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

*Amendment*

3. Is concerned by the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent; stresses, in this connection, the *responsibility of* the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. el

**Amendment 39**  
**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

3. *Is concerned by* the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

*Amendment*

3. *Notes* the fact that some national parliaments have highlighted that, in a number of the Commission's legislative proposals, the justification of subsidiarity and proportionality is insufficient or non-existent in substance; stresses, in this connection, the need for the European institutions to make it possible for national parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals by ensuring that the Commission provides detailed and comprehensive grounds for its legislative decisions on subsidiarity and proportionality, in accordance with Article 5 of Protocol No 2 to the TFEU;

Or. it

## Amendment 40

Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Dietmar Köster

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 4

##### *Motion for a resolution*

4. ***Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;***

##### *Amendment*

4. ***Welcomes the package of measures aimed at improving regulation which was adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015 and which addresses the concerns raised by the Impact Assessment Board concerning subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes the Commission's new line on the subject which gives greater prominence to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, including in its impact analyses.***

Or. fr

## Amendment 41

Jean-Marie Cavada

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 4

##### *Motion for a resolution*

4. ***Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial***

##### *Amendment*

4. ***Notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes, in this connection, the package***

importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for *proper* consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on *subsidiarity and proportionality in the context* of impact assessments;

of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on *the importance* of impact assessments;

Or. en

**Amendment 42**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;

*Amendment*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both, *and that this is similar to the rates recorded in previous years and improvements are necessary*; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; welcomes, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on *updated guidelines relating to the evaluation of* subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;

Or. ro

**Amendment 43**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; **welcomes**, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;

*Amendment*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; **considers this to be unacceptable**; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; **notes**, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments; **calls for these measures to be implemented immediately**;

Or. fr

**Amendment 44**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the

*Amendment*

4. Expresses concern that the Impact Assessment Board ('IAB') considered more than 32 % of impact assessments ('IAs') reviewed by them in 2014 to have included an unsatisfactory analysis of the

principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; *welcomes*, in this connection, the package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;

principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or both; notes the crucial importance of impact assessments as tools for aiding decision-making in the legislative process, and stresses the need, in this context, for proper consideration to be given to issues relating to subsidiarity and proportionality; *awaits*, in this connection, the *implementation of the* package of better regulation measures adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015, which *are intended to* place new emphasis on subsidiarity and proportionality in the context of impact assessments;

Or. el

**Amendment 45**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**5. *Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;***

*deleted*

Or. en

**Amendment 46**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

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*Motion for a resolution*

5. ***Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;***

*Amendment*

5. ***Calls on the Commission to provide more detailed annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality that provide a thorough analysis of the principle of proportionality.***

Or. fr

**Amendment 47**

**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;

*Amendment*

5. Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports, ***based on a complex and appropriate evaluation of the way in which these two principles are observed in the EU's decision-making process;***

Or. ro

**Amendment 48**

**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Recalls *concerns raised in previous reports regarding the somewhat perfunctory character* of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which *often fail to pay detailed consideration to* how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce *more* analytical annual reports;

*Amendment*

5. Recalls the *importance* of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, *the purpose of* which *should be to consider in detail* how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce analytical *and detailed* annual reports;

Or. it

**Amendment 49**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. *Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding* the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;

*Amendment*

5. *Regrets* the somewhat perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;

Or. el

**Amendment 50**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 5**

*Motion for a resolution*

5. Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the **somewhat** perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to produce more analytical annual reports;

*Amendment*

5. Recalls concerns raised in previous reports regarding the perfunctory character of the annual reports on subsidiarity and proportionality prepared by the Commission, which **too** often fail to pay detailed consideration to how the principles of subsidiarity and, in particular, proportionality are observed in EU policy-making; calls on the Commission to **urgently** produce more analytical annual reports;

Or. fr

**Amendment 51**  
**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; **notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto;** encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

*Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

Or. fr

**Amendment 52**  
**Francesc Gambús**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

*Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process; ***considers that it would be also very useful for regional parliaments with exclusive legislative powers to make known their views as well and calls on the Commission accordingly to establish a suitable procedure for this purpose.***

Or. es

**Amendment 53**  
**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 6**

*Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the

*Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments, ***especially the Danish Folketing, the Dutch Tweede***

role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

*Kamer and the UK House of Lords*, as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision **or amendment** of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 54** **Enrico Gasbarra**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Paragraph 6**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; ***believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto***; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

##### *Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

**Amendment 55****Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton****Motion for a resolution****Paragraph 6***Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

*Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable **and indispensable** contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; **strongly** encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

Or. fr

**Amendment 56****Tadeusz Zwiefka****Motion for a resolution****Paragraph 6***Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU

*Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU

decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals *requires careful evaluation and* depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 57**

**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

#### **Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

##### *Amendment*

6. Welcomes the reports made by a number of national parliaments as a valuable contribution to the debate on the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and takes note of the proposals included therein; notes, in this connection, that these reports suggest that reasoned opinions should not only concern compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, but also compliance with the principle of proportionality and the legal basis for the proposal; believes that the practicability of these proposals depends on a revision *or an amendment* of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto; encourages other national parliaments to share their views on the role that national parliaments should play in the EU decision-making process;

Or. en

**Amendment 58**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests ***that in any*** review of the Treaties and the Protocols ***thereto*** consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, ***to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;***

*Amendment*

7. Suggests ***therefore that the next*** review of the Treaties and the Protocols consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds ***or if it should also include the principle of proportionality;***

Or. en

**Amendment 59**  
**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament

*Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament

responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached;  
***believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;***

responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached;

Or. it

**Amendment 60**  
**Tadeusz Zwiefka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration ***should*** be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached;  
***believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;***

*Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any ***possible*** review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration ***could*** be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached;

Or. en

**Amendment 61**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, ***and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;***

*Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to ***maintaining the threshold for*** the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, ***as set by Article (7)2 of Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.***

Or. fr

**Amendment 62**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the

*Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds ***or whether they should also cover references to the proportionality principle or the legal basis,*** to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a

threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

Or. ro

### **Amendment 63** **Notis Marias**

#### **Motion for a resolution** **Paragraph 7**

##### *Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration **should** be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that **consideration should be given to the introduction of** a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

##### *Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that a ‘red card’ mechanism **should be introduced** whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if a significant number of national parliaments expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

Or. el

### **Amendment 64** **Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 7**

*Motion for a resolution*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that ***consideration should be given to the introduction of*** a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if ***a significant number of*** national parliaments ***expresses concern on subsidiarity grounds***, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

*Amendment*

7. Suggests that in any review of the Treaties and the Protocols thereto consideration should be given to whether reasoned opinions should be limited to examining subsidiarity grounds, to the appropriate number of national parliament responses required to trigger a ‘yellow’ or ‘orange card’ procedure, and to what the effect should be in cases where the threshold for these procedures is reached; believes that ***it is vital to introduce*** a ‘red card’ mechanism whereby the consideration of a proposal by the EU co-legislators should be stayed if ***one or several*** national parliaments ***believe that the proposal harms their vital interests***, unless the proposal is amended to accommodate those concerns;

Or. fr

**Amendment 65**  
**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. ***Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;***

*Amendment*

***deleted***

**Amendment 66**

**Mady Delvaux**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose *the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;*

*Amendment*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to *propose a legislative initiative to the Commission.*

**Amendment 67**

**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to *propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;*

*Amendment*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to *present legislative proposals to the Commission for examination;*

**Amendment 68**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. *Is of the opinion that the introduction of a 'green card' mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments **the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;***

*Amendment*

8. *Notes that several national parliaments in COSAC have expressed their interest in proposing the introduction of a 'green card' **as an instrument in the context of improving political dialogue,** which would afford national parliaments, **having first secured the support of the European Parliament, the opportunity to suggest constructive proposals for the Commission's consideration and with due regard for the Commission's right of initiative;***

Or. en

**Amendment 69**  
**Tadeusz Zwiefka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 8**

*Motion for a resolution*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a 'green card' mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to **propose** the introduction, **amendment or repeal** of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;

*Amendment*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a 'green card' mechanism could also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to **suggest** the introduction **or amendment** of Union legislation **for the Commission's consideration;** suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;

Or. en

## Amendment 70

Notis Marias

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 8

##### *Motion for a resolution*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism **could** also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;

##### *Amendment*

8. Is of the opinion that the introduction of a ‘green card’ mechanism **should** also be considered, which would afford national parliaments the opportunity to propose the introduction, amendment or repeal of Union legislation; suggests, in this connection, that consideration should be given to the number of national parliaments needed in order to trigger such a procedure, and to the extent of its impact;

Or. el

## Amendment 71

Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton

### Motion for a resolution

#### Paragraph 9

##### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;

##### *Amendment*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate ***at the beginning of the legislative procedure; notes additionally that it would be necessary to extend the period in which the national parliaments can issue a reasoned opinion to the entire***

*duration of the legislative process, or at the very least to its mid-term and to its end.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 72**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;

*Amendment*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient, *given that the time pressure and pressure on resources facing them when responding to draft legislative acts may contribute significantly to the ‘democratic deficit’ felt in the EU*; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;

Or. ro

**Amendment 73**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Takes note of the request from *a number of* national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of

*Amendment*

9. Takes note of the request from *certain* national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of

Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that ***the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;***

Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that ***national parliaments may intervene and consider the question of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity before the presentation of a legislative initiative by the Commission in the form of Green and White Papers or the annual presentation of the Commission's work programme;***

Or. de

#### **Amendment 74**

**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 9**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

9. ***Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;***

###### *Amendment*

9. ***Recalls that the period in which the national parliaments can issue a reasoned opinion is eight weeks according to Article 6 of Protocol 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Stresses that this period is the result of striking a balance between the desire to consult national parliaments and the need to avoid an excessively slow legislative process.***

Or. fr

#### **Amendment 75**

**Tadeusz Zwiefka**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

##### **Paragraph 9**

###### *Motion for a resolution*

9. Takes note of the request from a

###### *Amendment*

9. Takes note of the request from a

number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; ***considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;***

number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient;

Or. en

**Amendment 76**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. ***Takes note of*** the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; **considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;**

*Amendment*

9. ***Considers reasonable*** the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is often deemed insufficient; **considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;**

Or. el

**Amendment 77**  
**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9**

*Motion for a resolution*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is *often* deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;

*Amendment*

9. Takes note of the request from a number of national parliaments to extend the eight-week period in which they can issue a reasoned opinion under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; notes, in this regard, that the current timeframe for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks is *sometimes* deemed insufficient; considers that a twelve-week period would be more appropriate;

Or. it

**Amendment 78**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 9 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

9a. Stresses that the adoption of legal acts requires the agreement of a large majority within the Council, comprising the national ministers of all the Member States, who are politically accountable to their national parliaments, and that this is another way in which the principle of subsidiarity is fully respected;

*Amendment*

9a. Stresses that the adoption of legal acts requires the agreement of a large majority within the Council, comprising the national ministers of all the Member States, who are politically accountable to their national parliaments, and that this is another way in which the principle of subsidiarity is fully respected;

Or. de

**Amendment 79**  
**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 10**

*Motion for a resolution*

10. Considers that reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments in accordance with Article 7(1) of Protocol No 2 are to be **duly** taken into **account** by all institutions **involved in** the decision-making process of the Union **and, in this connection, calls on the EU institutions to make the appropriate arrangements to ensure this;**

*Amendment*

10. Considers that reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments in accordance with Article 7(1) of Protocol No 2 are to be taken into **consideration** by all institutions **during** the decision-making process of the Union.

Or. fr

**Amendment 80**

**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 11**

*Motion for a resolution*

11. Recalls that the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires ‘that the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’; emphasises that the Court of Justice has stated that the principle of proportionality ‘requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them’ **and that ‘in the fields in which the European Union legislature has a broad legislative power’ the lawfulness of a measure adopted in this context can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate with respect to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue, although the European legislator must nonetheless ‘base its choice on objective criteria’ and, when**

*Amendment*

11. Recalls that the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires ‘that the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’; emphasises that the Court of Justice has stated that the principle of proportionality ‘requires that measures implemented through provisions of European Union law be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them’.

*assessing the burdens associated with various possible measures, ‘examine whether objectives pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators’;*

Or. fr

**Amendment 81**  
**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. *Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced proportionality assessments with detailed evaluations of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, and to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that the enlargement of the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality would be desirable;*

*Amendment*

12. *Recalls the importance of impact studies, particularly as regards respect of the principle of proportionality.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 82**  
**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced proportionality assessments with detailed evaluations of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, and to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that the enlargement of the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality would be desirable;

*Amendment*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced proportionality assessments with detailed evaluations of the different legislative options at its disposal, ***explaining sufficient why each legislative initiative is needed, why it is the best tool for the EU to use, what stakeholders think and what the likely environmental, social and economic impacts are, particularly those on public interests, competitiveness and small and medium-sized enterprises, including a more thorough explanation of how the initiative meets the twin tests of subsidiarity (why the goal cannot be achieved by the Member States alone) and proportionality (why the measure proposed does not go further than what is needed to meet its goal)***, so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, and to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that the enlargement of the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality would be desirable;

Or. en

**Amendment 83**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced

*Amendment*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced

*proportionality* assessments with detailed *evaluations* of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, *and* to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that *the enlargement of* the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality *would be desirable*;

assessments *of the way in which the proportionality principle is being observed and implemented*, with *an appropriate* detailed *analysis* of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings *and other entities* concerned, in particular SMEs; *calls on the Commission, to this end*, to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that *it would be desirable, with a view to ensuring more efficient collaboration between national and European institutions, for* the scope of reasoned opinions *to be enlarged* so as to include *an assessment of* respect of the principle of proportionality *in the process of shaping policies at EU level*;

Or. ro

**Amendment 84**  
**Tadeusz Zwiefka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12**

*Motion for a resolution*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced proportionality assessments with detailed evaluations of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, and to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that the enlargement of

*Amendment*

12. Calls on the Commission to systematically carry out enhanced proportionality assessments with detailed evaluations of the different legislative options at its disposal so as to discard alternatives with a disproportionate impact or which are unnecessarily burdensome on the individuals and undertakings concerned, in particular SMEs, and to provide a sufficiently detailed description of all the different alternatives that had been considered so as to allow better scrutiny of its proposals on proportionality grounds; considers that the enlargement of

the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality *would be desirable*;

the scope of reasoned opinions so as to include respect of the principle of proportionality *could be considered*;

Or. en

**Amendment 85**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 12 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**12a.** *Notes that, with a view to ensuring legislative consistency, the examination of respect for the proportionality principle in the case of a draft legislative act should be carried out after the examination of respect for the subsidiarity principle; reiterates, however, that verification of subsidiarity would not be sufficient without verification of proportionality;*

Or. ro

**Amendment 86**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 13**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**13.** *Suggests assessing whether appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines should be laid down at EU level for the evaluation of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that these criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality*

*deleted*

*principles;*

Or. de

**Amendment 87**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 13**

*Motion for a resolution*

13. *Suggests assessing whether* appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines should be laid down at EU level *for the evaluation of* compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that these criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

*Amendment*

13. *Calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of laying down* appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines at EU level, *which would make it possible to evaluate* the compliance of *draft legislative acts* with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that these criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; *recommends, however, that the national parliaments should be afforded adequate assistance to enable them to carry out their control tasks efficiently;*

Or. ro

**Amendment 88**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 13**

*Motion for a resolution*

13. Suggests assessing whether appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines should be laid down at EU level for the evaluation of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; *considers that these*

*Amendment*

13. Suggests assessing whether appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines should be laid down at EU level for the evaluation of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

*criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;*

Or. en

**Amendment 89**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 13**

*Motion for a resolution*

13. Suggests *assessing whether* appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines *should* be laid down at EU level for the evaluation of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that these criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

*Amendment*

13. Suggests *that* appropriate criteria in the form of non-binding guidelines be laid down at EU level for the evaluation of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; considers that these criteria should not unduly restrict the discretion that national parliaments should enjoy when assessing the compliance of the proposals with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles;

Or. el

**Amendment 90**  
**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 13 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*13a. Welcomes the Declaration from the Presidents of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the French National Assembly, the German Bundestag, and the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, which underlined „that more, not less, Europe is*

*needed to respond to the challenges we face, both internally and externally";*

Or. en

**Amendment 91**

**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Mady Delvaux**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 14**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**14. Reiterates that several initiatives could already be introduced to improve the evaluation of European issues by national parliaments, and in particular:** *deleted*

*suggests that each legislative act published in the Official Journal should contain a note detailing those national parliaments which had responded and those which had raised subsidiarity concerns;*

*proposes forwarding the reasoned opinions of national parliaments sent under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 annexed to the TEU and the TFEU to the co-legislators without delay;*

*suggests that guidelines could be prepared outlining criteria for reasoned opinions on subsidiarity issues;*

*proposes mobilising national parliaments to undertake comparative evaluations of ex ante assessments which they have conducted and ex post assessments drawn up by the Commission;*

Or. de

**Amendment 92**

**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – introductory part**

*Motion for a resolution*

14. Reiterates that several initiatives could already be introduced to improve the *evaluation of* European *issues by* national parliaments, and in particular:

*Amendment*

14. Reiterates that several initiatives could already be introduced to improve *collaboration between* the European *institutions and* national parliaments *and make it more efficient*, and in particular:

Or. ro

**Amendment 93**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *suggests that each legislative act published in the Official Journal should contain a note detailing those national parliaments which had responded and those which had raised subsidiarity concerns;*

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. fr

**Amendment 94**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *suggests that each legislative act published in the Official Journal should contain a note detailing those national parliaments which had responded and those which had raised subsidiarity concerns;*

*Amendment*

*deleted*

**Amendment 95**  
**Tadeusz Zwiefka**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 1**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *suggests that each legislative act published in the Official Journal should contain a note detailing those national parliaments which had responded and those which had raised subsidiarity concerns;*

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. en

**Amendment 96**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 2**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *proposes forwarding the reasoned opinions of national parliaments sent under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 annexed to the TEU and the TFEU to the co-legislators without delay;*

*Amendment*

– *recalls that pursuant to Rule 42(3) of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure 'If a national parliament sends the President a reasoned opinion in accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union and Article 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, that document shall be referred to the committee responsible for the subject-matter and forwarded for information to the committee responsible for respect of the principle of subsidiarity'.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 97**  
**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

– suggests that guidelines *could be prepared outlining criteria for reasoned opinions on subsidiarity issues*;

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. fr

**Amendment 98**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

– suggests that guidelines *could be prepared outlining criteria for reasoned opinions on subsidiarity issues*;

*Amendment*

– suggests that guidelines *need to be prepared outlining criteria relating to the evaluation of respect for the subsidiarity principle, which would apply to reasoned opinions from national parliaments; believes, however, that the criteria concerned should not encroach on the freedom enjoyed by national parliaments when assessing the compliance of draft legislative acts with the subsidiarity principle*;

Or. ro

**Amendment 99**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 14 – indent 3**

*Motion for a resolution*

– suggests that guidelines could be

*Amendment*

– suggests that guidelines could be

prepared outlining criteria for *reasoned opinions on* subsidiarity issues;

prepared outlining criteria for subsidiarity issues;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 100**

**Mady Delvaux, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 14 – indent 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *proposes mobilising national parliaments to undertake comparative evaluations of ex ante assessments which they have conducted and ex post assessments drawn up by the Commission;*

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. fr

#### **Amendment 101**

**Jean-Marie Cavada, Mady Delvaux**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 14 – indent 4**

*Motion for a resolution*

– *proposes mobilising national parliaments to undertake comparative evaluations of ex ante assessments which they have conducted and ex post assessments drawn up by the Commission;*

*Amendment*

– *encourages national parliaments to share their remarks on the assessments drawn up by the Commission;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 102**

**Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann**

#### **Motion for a resolution**

#### **Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**16.** *Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;*

*deleted*

Or. de

**Amendment 103**  
**Jean-Marie Cavada**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**16.** *Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;*

*deleted*

Or. en

**Amendment 104**  
**Max Andersson**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**16.** *Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;*

*deleted*

Or. en

**Amendment 105**

**Mady Delvaux, Jean-Marie Cavada, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Dietmar Köster**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

**16.** *Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;*

**16.** *Notes that impact assessments at the beginning of the legislative procedure are an important and necessary instrument for compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Stresses that these guiding principles, which ensure that the European Union is close to its citizens, must guarantee the effectiveness of the EU institutions while avoiding excessive bureaucracy.*

Or. fr

**Amendment 106**  
**Enrico Gasbarra**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

*Amendment*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments – ***without, however, altering the timetable for the final adoption of the legislation*** – when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

Or. it

**Amendment 107**  
**Daniel Buda**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity ***checks*** and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

*Amendment*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity ***verification mechanisms*** and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

**Amendment 108**  
**Notis Marias**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

*Amendment*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that consideration should be given to the introduction of further subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that *the closest* compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

Or. el

**Amendment 109**  
**Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton**

**Motion for a resolution**  
**Paragraph 16**

*Motion for a resolution*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that *consideration should be given to the introduction of further* subsidiarity checks and impact assessments when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments

*Amendment*

16. Notes that legislative proposals may change substantially in the course of the legislative procedure and, in this connection, reiterates that subsidiarity checks and impact assessments *should be introduced* when a major amendment is likely to be adopted and at the conclusion of the legislative negotiations and in advance of the adoption of the final text, in order that compliance with subsidiarity can be guaranteed and that assessments including proportionality can be made;

including proportionality can be made;

Or. fr

**Amendment 110**

**Kostas Chrysogonos, Jiří Maštálka**

**Motion for a resolution**

**Paragraph 16 a (new)**

*Motion for a resolution*

*Amendment*

***16a. Highlights that legislation should be comprehensible and clear, allow parties to easily understand their rights and obligations, include appropriate reporting, monitoring and evaluation requirements, avoid disproportionate costs, and be practical to implement;***

Or. en