Meridiana and worker protection
1.6.2016
Question for written answer P-004572-16
to the Commission
Rule 130
Curzio Maltese (GUE/NGL)
In 2011 the company Meridiana fly, which benefited from the Cassa integrazione guadagni wage supplementation fund, acquired 100% of Air Italy. This operation led to Meridiana fly staff being made redundant while new staff were recruited to Air Italy, within the same company. Even though the Italian Ministry of Labour had been informed about the dumping taking place within the group at the expense of parent-company employees and to the advantage of the subsidiary, it permitted an increase in the number of Meridiana fly employees eligible for the wage supplementation scheme and an extraordinary extension of the scheme, which is due to end on 26 June 2016. The company Meridiana fly has therefore opened a mobility procedure for 800 employees of the parent company alone, many of whom, certain of losing their jobs, have agreed to voluntarily leave Meridiana fly SpA to be placed on mobility lists for laid-off workers or be re-recruited by the subsidiary Air Italy, under worse economic and social conditions. This means that Meridiana fly and Qatar Airways have been able to conclude an agreement, under the direction of the Italian Government, which allows Qatar to take over a company that has been purged of its older, more expensive workers whilst encouraging the low-cost subsidiary.
Does the Commission not agree that the acquisition of Air Italy by Meridiana fly should give rise to the application of the safeguards laid down in Directive 2001/23/EC?
Does the Commission not agree that the fact that the company is one alone should render the collective redundancy procedure invalid and does it not agree that the Italian Government, which was aware of the dumping, has granted undue state aid to Meridiana through the wage supplementation scheme?
What measures will the Commission take in this regard, to combat intra-company and social dumping? Does it think that use of the EGF might be feasible?